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Conclusion

*For mankind, o'er wearied with a life
Fostered by force, was ailing from its feuds;
And so the sooner of its own free will
Yielded to laws and strictest codes.*

Titus Lucretius Caro, *Of the Nature of Things*, trans. William Ellery Leonard (London: Dent, 1921), bk. V (p. 232)

War pervaded classical antiquity and is a legacy of the ancient world. It was what poets, dramatists and historians wrote about more than any other topic, and tales of heroism and martial glory were what their audience wanted to hear. Contemplation of a world free of conflict, both civil and interstate, required poetic imagination, but poets such as Hesiod, Ovid, or the prophets who wrote the Hebrew Bible, could imagine peace only in the very distant past, perhaps in the distant future or in the next world, but not in the world in which they actually lived. In the Greek world, the obligation to bear arms came to be viewed as one of the duties of citizenship, and since the Greek city-states were highly competitive and jealous of one another and went to war frequently, it was necessary for citizens to exercise arms on a regular basis. This bellicosity also shaped their athletic games, and their gods smiled on such endeavors when they were not fighting among themselves. If the gods fought among themselves and encouraged those mortals whom they favored to do the same, it was difficult to have anything but brief periods of peace among mortals.

The Greeks frequently had to repel invasions by their Asian neighbors, and their earlier philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle, taught them to think of non-Greek peoples as barbarians fit to be conquered and enslaved. The conquests of Alexander the Great enlarged the Greek world and promoted the idea of cosmopolitanism. This brought a degree of peace within the Hellenistic world, but at the same time, encouraged aggression and expansion on the frontiers of empire. Another reason for going to war frequently in the archaic, classical, and Hellenistic periods, and later in Roman times, was that

the honor and glory won on the battlefield conferred prestige and could advance one's political career. The belief that the individual warrior won glory on the battlefield was peculiar to the Greeks, and, apparently, was not found in the martial cultures of other Near-Eastern empires. This was to be an enduring concept and persisted in Western cultures into medieval and early modern times; it predisposed aristocratic warriors to engage in individual combats as well as to seek honor and glory on the field of battle. The belief that their enemies were inferior peoples sometimes led them to demonize such peoples—a tendency that persists into the present, and that tempts soldiers to commit acts of atrocity or causes their commanders to be disinclined to end wars by negotiated treaties.

The Roman state in the days of the Republic was a political society organized for constant war and expansion, and became the model for the fiscal-military state of the early modern period. The Roman army during the republican period had demanded military service of all citizens, but in the transition to the empire became an organization made up of long-service professional soldiers. The activities of this army consumed most of the taxes raised by the Roman state. The link between citizenship and military service anticipated the militant nationalism of the French Revolution, and the scale of the mobilization of manpower for military service was at times greater than that of Western states during the age of total war in the early twentieth century. Although the *Pax Romana* of Augustus brought peace to the interior of the empire for several centuries, the fact remains that Rome was a bellicose state by any comparison. The concept of peace in Roman thought was limited, developed slowly, and in any case, was imported from the Greek world. It does not appear before the time of Augustus. While Roman intellectuals were influenced by Greek Stoicism, and sometimes condemned war in general terms, it is difficult to demonstrate that such sentiments had any influence on how the empire was governed. Seneca concluded that man's corrupt nature made war inevitable. The Romans were fastidious about providing legal justifications for making war, but cared little about eliminating it.

The Romans were slow to develop a concept of peace, and their political imagination did not carry them very far in that direction. For the Romans, peace came only after a crushing victory and a dictated peace. The Gates of War were seldom shut in the Temple of Janus, and peace was never durable.

The Greeks were more imaginative. It was they who first engaged in the negotiation of peace treaties between equals, thus establishing an important precedent for the emergence of international law in the early modern period. The Athenian Sophist philosopher Isocrates, who witnessed the disintegration caused by the Peloponnesian War, came to advocate peace among the Greek city-states; he questioned Athenian expansion and condemned possession of and employment of mercenary soldiers and naval forces as bellicose and provocative. The Sophists also argued for the principle of human equality—not only among the Greek city-states, but between Greeks and their Asian neighbors.

The Stoics, with their imperturbability and their emphasis on ethical behavior, also expressed an abhorrence of war and a longing for peace. They promoted cosmopolitanism, which they believed could best be realized in a universal monarchy or state. Stoicism, while it had considerable influence on such major Roman thinkers as Cicero, remained a personal philosophy. Its most important contribution is that it caused both the Greeks and the Romans to see the wisdom of imposing constraints on how wars were fought, and a thousand years later, it influenced Erasmian and Neo-Stoic thought during the Renaissance.

Stoicism insisted on a moral standard by which wars could be judged just or unjust. Stoicism also endorsed cosmopolitanism, which promoted the concept of the brotherhood of man and a belief in a natural equality among men, and thus, anticipated some of the tenets of Christianity. Its most enduring idea is the belief that war should be subjected to constraints on how it was fought. Individual Stoic philosophers went further in advocating the abolition of war as irrational, but again, these ideas remained a personal philosophy rather than being integrated into a more widely accepted political philosophy. Stoicism underwent a revival during the Renaissance, and as Neo-Stoicism, did much to introduce an ethical dimension to how wars were fought. It also had some influence on the Erasmian pacifism of the Christian humanists. However, the Greeks and the Romans, the intellectual leaders of the world of classical antiquity, devoted more thought to how to win glory and sustain honor than they ever did to attempting to imagine a world in which peace prevailed. The Roman state was organized for making war, and that was the model to which the emerging sovereign states gave priority during the Renaissance and early modern period when they turned their attention to making their armies more effective.

In late antiquity, after the time of Constantine, the emergence of Christianity as the official religion of the Roman Empire seems to have bred public disorder and contempt for non-Christians, whether pagans or Jews. Despite the early Christian aversion to war, the Augustinian doctrine that war is a consequence of man's sinfulness and that peace was to be found only in the next world cast a shadow over the Middle Ages. Pacifism came to be associated with heretical sects. Augustine and his followers devoted their efforts to laying out a sweeping doctrine of just war, which included making war on heterodox Christians. The bitterness that such crusades engendered could last for generations, and made it difficult ever to achieve peace. Although it was universally assumed that the end of war was peace, everyone wanted peace on his own terms, so peace always remained a contested concept. The concept of just war, which derived from classical antiquity, was a meager inheritance for the Christian world, but it did offer more constraints on how wars were fought than the concept of holy war derived from the Old Testament. The classical doctrine of just war taught that only a legitimate temporal ruler could declare a just war, but this made no sense when the political authority of the Western Roman Empire disintegrated during the Germanic and Turco-Mongolic invasions, and the collapse of imperial authority provided the opportunity for the popes of the Latin Church to assume the power to declare war and proclaim the Crusades.

The decentralized system of feudalism, which emerged toward the end of the early Middle Ages, also proved an ineffective means of preserving peace. The knightly code of chivalry, with its need to continually display martial prowess, worked against peace between kingdoms and within lordships. Chivalric values, with their emphasis on the acquisition of individual honor and glory undermined attempts to impose discipline and to focus on political and military aims in war. Such undisciplined displays of histrionics could only diminish opportunities to secure peace. The medieval knight was devoted to war because the quickest way to enrich himself was by winning ransom and booty. Although the code of chivalry imposed constraints upon methods of war between knights, medieval war remained brutal for lesser persons. The Church decided that the best way to suppress conflict between feudal monarchs as well as feuding and private combat was to send these troublesome knights against the Saracens and infidels and to confer upon them the status of crusaders. But as feudal monarchs gradually gained a monopoly on violence within their

realms, they built up armies with which they could fight one another to further their dynastic ambitions. Thus, another solution to restraining knightly violence was for monarchs to take such knights into royal armies for permanent military service. The *Decretals* of Gratian served to rehabilitate the soldier by making him a warrior in the service of God since he punished sin and crime in the administration of justice. All of this was based on the assumption that the object of war was peace, although the individual knight did not necessarily have this in mind. There were times when medieval writers clearly suffered from war weariness, but they often feared peace more since it was generally believed that extended peace would lead to effeminacy and the decay of military prowess.

The concept of holy war derives from the Hebrew Bible or Old Testament. Modern Jews generally reject the idea that the ancient Israelites ever engaged in anything other than defensive war in territories that they had always occupied. Nevertheless, St. Augustine and the Prophet Muhammad claimed to have discovered the concept in various passages of the Hebrew Bible. The early Christians before the time of Augustine would not have understood the concept of holy war since they were pacifists and could not comprehend the concept of holy war except as described in the Book of Revelation, which foretold a battle between angels and demons in which they would have no part. Nor would Roman political theory have allowed a war that was not declared by those possessing political authority in the Roman state. The Christian concept of holy war did not emerge fully developed until the ninth century CE, a period of political weakness when the Western Roman Empire was no more than a distant memory, and all parts of that former empire were beset by barbarian invaders or Muslim conquerors. The Muslim tradition of holy war also derived from the Hebrew Bible, and was intended to destroy idolaters or compel them to convert to Islam, but the main driving force of Islam was expansionism. The Islamic tradition never recognized a distinction between religious and secular authority. By contrast, the concept of holy war was never fully accepted in the Byzantine or Eastern Roman Empire, where imperial authority remained much stronger. In the long run, the Western distinction between spiritual and temporal authority, inherited from the Roman political tradition, did not provide fertile ground for the growth of theocracy.

In both theory and practice, holy war was the most vicious kind of armed conflict, because, unlike war in late antiquity and later in early modern Europe,

there were no constraints on how armies treated their enemies and prisoners. However, not all of the wars that the Saracens and the Franks or crusaders fought with one another were full-scale holy wars, and sometimes rulers such as Saladin, Sultan of Egypt, or the Emperor Frederick II were prepared to negotiate truces, but the clergy of the two opposing faiths usually did their best to sabotage such efforts. Generally, both Muslim jihadists and Christian crusaders aimed at destroying one another. Both also pursued wars against heretical elements within the Christian and Islamic worlds. Muslims could imagine peace only within the Islamic world, and Christians thought that permanent peace could be attained only in the next world. Both Christians and Muslims thought that those who died in these holy wars were martyrs to their faith.

When the Ottoman Turks came to dominate the Near-Eastern Islamic world in the thirteenth century, the focus of Muslim holy war shifted from conquest in all directions to a strategy of expanding westward into Europe as far as the Atlantic Ocean. The Ottoman sultans also claimed the caliphate and attempted to subdue their Arab co-religionists. The Ottoman army became professionalized and highly effective, and it continued to expand westward into Europe, conquering the Byzantine Empire and advancing up the Danube Basin until it was stopped at the gates of Vienna in the late seventeenth century. The Turkish threat helped to keep alive the crusading spirit and gave longevity to the idea of holy war in the West. That the later crusades were not pure holy wars can be seen in the alliance of the Genoese with the Ottomans at the Crusade of Varna.

The crusading ideology grew out of the determination to halt the expansion of Islam and to recover the holy places of Jerusalem. Holy war had become an instrument of papal policy while the temporal rulers of Western Europe remained weak. These motives remained at the heart of the movement, but crusading wars were also directed against heretics within Christendom, and against enemies of the papacy and pagans in the Baltic Sea region. In order to secure the cooperation of secular rulers and members of the feudal nobility, the crusades against Christians also had to serve the needs of secular rulers and their dynastic interests. The Teutonic Knights continued their crusades against the Lithuanians even after the latter were converted to Christianity. When it was objected that the holy war of the Teutonic Knights was nothing but a pretense, the Knights launched campaigns against the heretical Hussites in Bohemia and

fought the Turks in Transylvania. The Hussite heresy, which fed on Czech nationalism and was effectively led by John Hus, with military leadership from Jan Žižka, proved to be the most difficult of all medieval heretical movements to deal with. Four separate crusades were sent against the Hussites, but the latter endured and retaliated by raiding several German states. The holy wars against the Hussites and the Waldensians were failures, and these groups survived into the sixteenth century when they merged with Protestantism.

The holy wars and crusades of the medieval period bequeathed an unfortunate legacy to Reformation and early modern Europe since religious motives, in part, provided a pretext for the numerous wars of that period. Although political and dynastic ambitions also contributed to the wars of the Reformation, the popular exhortations of religious leaders in both the Protestant and Catholic camps stirred up violence in the religious and civil wars that followed. Popular religious discontent helped to unleash peasant rebellions and other social and economic protests based on grievances that had accumulated under the seigniorial and manorial regimes in the latter part of the Middle Ages.

Unemployed soldiers always posed a threat to good order—especially in the case of France after that country withdrew from foreign wars for the half century following the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis of 1559. The many French noblemen and their followers who had fought in the Italian wars returned home, and their presence in the provinces brought about a militarization of provincial French society that undermined royal authority, and made the confessional disputes of the French religious and civil wars more deadly. The provincial governors and their armed retinues sometimes attempted to uphold royal jurisdiction and the Catholic faith, but many disaffected noblemen who failed to secure patronage found an outlet and a refuge in the Huguenot party. These swordsmen took it on themselves to organize militias to protect the meetings of Huguenot congregations. Both Ultra-Catholic and Huguenot noblemen found extensive popular support, and the descent into civil war inevitably followed. The Catholics formed the Holy League; various local armed confraternities were revived or newly organized, and their pursuit of war against the Huguenots not only displayed many of the characteristics of the religious strife seen in other wars of religion, but also reminded some observers of the medieval crusades against the Albigenians. For their part, the Huguenots invited popular hostility by their refusal to abide by the earlier

royal grants of limited toleration as contained in the Peace of Amboise of 1563. Thirty-four more years of religious and civil strife ensued, but the Huguenots did not gain any greater degree of religious toleration than had been conceded by the Peace of Amboise.

That the nature of religious war was changing is exemplified by the Wars of the Three Kingdoms. The Irish civil wars bore all the characteristics of religious conflict between Catholic and Protestant, but the civil wars in England and Scotland were both fought between different factions of Protestantism, although the exaggerated fear of popery played a role in fomenting these conflicts. Like the wars of the Reformation of mainland Europe, popular involvement was informed by the many books and pamphlets that poured forth from the printing press, and large segments of the English people displayed a remarkable awareness of the political issues—especially after the breakdown of official censorship. But popular political discourse had not yet become completely secularized, and religious propaganda still played a significant role in stirring up animosity.

The civil wars of Ireland were indeed religious conflicts, but they were also something more. Several distinct ethnic and religious groups had never been fully assimilated by the middle years of the seventeenth century. The Old Irish clung to their Gaelic language and customs—especially in Ulster—and their Norman and English conquerors had never accorded them the status and rights of subjects. The Old English of Munster and the English Pale had remained loyal to Catholicism, but the Old Irish were reluctant to trust them because the former chose the Royalist cause while the Gaelic Irish formed themselves into the Catholic Confederation of Kilkenny. As the more recent conquerors, the New English and the Ulster Scots were distrusted and hated by both the Old Irish and the Old English. The people of Ireland had never forged a common identity. Clearly, there were numerous political considerations that exacerbated the Irish conflict, but the use of religious propaganda—especially concerning the alleged massacre of Protestants—was even more exaggerated in Ireland than was the case in England and Scotland. This contributed to horrific atrocities that were worse than anything in the mainland European conflicts. The constraints on war, found in the mainland European wars, and to some extent in the civil wars of England, were absent in the Irish wars.

While Machiavelli can hardly be considered an advocate of peace, he, like earlier Italian scholars such as Dante and Marsilius of Padua, helped to secularize

political thought. This removed that intellectual discipline from the realm of clerical control, and by writing in the vernacular, admitted laymen to the world of political discourse. In the course of time, this helped to lessen the papal power of declaring holy war, and restored to the sovereign ruler the exclusive authority to declare war. The secular rulers were also quite capable of exploiting religious prejudices to justify their own wars, as happened during the wars of the Reformation, but they also had strictly secular ends in sight, and they tended to depend on a broader and more popular political base when they decided policy or declared war. Imitating the example of the citizen army of the Roman Republic, Machiavelli and the classical republicans advocated civic militias in preference to standing armies composed of mercenaries or long-service professional soldiers. A civic militia, they argued, was more likely to promote political stability than foreign mercenaries, who had an interest in keeping the wars going.

Despite the secularizing influence that the Italian humanists had on political discourse, they did not break with the view, derived both from the ancients and the Augustinians, that war arose from man's disposition to violence—something that man had no control over. Since war was inevitable, a prince must encourage his subjects to exercise arms in preparation for the next conflict. Peace always brought the danger that aristocrats and citizens would lose the martial spirit that was necessary to hold an army together and defend one's country. On the other hand, Castiglione warned his readers that however necessary it was to maintain a political society and its people in a state of readiness for war, a prince neglected his duty if he did not encourage his subjects to take advantage of the leisure afforded by peace to cultivate the moral virtues necessary to enjoy peace and prolong the same.

Erasmus, the prince of Christian humanists, attacked the political realism of Machiavelli and the classical republicans by questioning the crusading, chivalric, and patriotic values on which the martial ethos rested. In the short run, he hoped to promote arbitration as an alternative to war, but he also understood that diplomacy was just another word for dissimulation. Ultimately, he aimed at providing a humanist curriculum based on the moral principles of the New Testament and the Roman Stoic philosophers. His audience was necessarily limited because he wrote and published in Latin, whereas Machiavelli and his followers wrote in the vernacular and were widely translated into other modern languages. Erasmus, unlike the Neo-Stoic philosophers, did not help his cause

by making clear his detestation of professional soldiers. Ultimately, Erasmus's dislike of war was based, not on Christian principles, but on the argument that war was irrational and contrary to natural law. Thus, at the same time, he rejected the argument that war was a providential means of punishing man's sins. He also threw out all of the classical Greek and Roman, Augustinian and Scholastic arguments supporting the doctrine of just war.

Erasmian humanism did not equip humanists for dealing with the dreadful political realities of early modern Europe. Erasmus took no account of the development of the Renaissance sovereign state, which came into being primarily to make war more effectively, and his ideas were unacceptable to the Portuguese and Spanish who were entering an extended period of colonial expansion. However, there were those who attempted to impose theoretical restraints on the conduct of armies in the just-war tradition, such as the political theorists of the Salamancan school who sought to place limits on how non-Christian noncombatants were treated in the Indies and in the continuing war with the Turks. The Salamancan thinkers also rejected differences of religion as a sufficient justification for declaring war.

The reason that Erasmian pacifism did not engage with the political realities of his age was that Erasmus, although he had fled the cloister, retained a monkish disengagement from the problems of politics and war. His bitter denunciations of war and soldiers could hardly commend him to those who had to deal with such realities, but needed moral guidance in doing so. For that reason, Michel de Montaigne, Justus Lipsius and the other Neo-Stoics were better guides in developing an ethics of war in an age of religious and civil conflict that Montaigne thought was worse than anything the ancient world had ever experienced, yet they were able to draw on the ancient Stoic virtues of constancy, courage, and tolerance in facing the changing accidents of war. Montaigne demonstrated that it was possible to be both a soldier and a scholar, to combine a rational analysis of war with a care for ethical restraint on how war was waged. He and Justus Lipsius helped to restore the moral dimension that was missing from Machiavellian political and military analysis and to combine it with a skeptical approach to history that characterized Tacitus. Consequently, they reached a wider audience than Erasmus was able to do. Lipsius was widely read by military reformers, which led to more disciplined standing armies and constraints on war, but at the same time these military

reformers also strengthened the sovereign state, the chief activity of which was making war.

Machiavelli's secular and analytical approach to war and politics was much admired in early modern Europe, but many of those admirers were troubled over the Florentine's omission of the moral dimension and endeavored to supplement his political theory with the study of moral philosophy. Whereas Machiavelli and the classical republicans viewed war as the main function of the state and the best means of preserving republican liberty, the Neo-Stoics such as Lipsius as well as Grotius and Hobbes, were concerned to place constraints on how wars were fought and to incorporate the same in a body of international law, which would be based on natural law rather than divine law or theology. As the European world engaged Asia, Africa, and the New World, the laws of war necessarily concerned the whole human community and not just Christendom. It was assumed that the concept of natural law was comprehensible to non-Western peoples, since it was known to the pre-Christian peoples of classical antiquity.

None of these jurists, such as Gentili and Grotius, could imagine a world without war, but they certainly thought that some wars could be avoided by arbitration and that all wars could be rendered less destructive by the observance of international law and the rules of war. The reason that most jurists and philosophers could not imagine the total abolition of war was that war was accepted as a legitimate means by which a sovereign ruler dispensed justice. Gentili was one of the first jurists to insist on the distinction between public and private war. The former could only be declared by one sovereign ruler against another sovereign by formal declaration, and hostilities could not begin until a waiting period allowed an opportunity for arbitration. Public war could only be fought with customary weapons, and every effort should be made to spare the persons and property of noncombatants. Since securing peace was the object of war, the terms of the peace treaty should treat the vanquished in a just manner that would facilitate a lasting peace.

Grotius was but one of a number of jurists who contributed to the body of international law that established constraints on the conduct of war. Most of these derived from practices that had been embodied in articles of war and codes of military justice that emerged as more disciplined standing armies came into being in the early seventeenth century in Sweden, the Dutch Republic

and the Spanish Army of Flanders, and thereafter, these practices spread through the military forces of mainland Europe and the British Isles. These constraints on how wars were fought also owed something to the medieval code of chivalry and the teachings of the medieval Catholic Church. Despite his aversion to war, Grotius reminds his readers that it is a condition that persists through much of history. Rightly used, it can secure periods of peace, but only the sovereign state has the right to declare and prosecute wars. This is public war, and one of the political community's functions is to suppress private war by securing a monopoly on violence. War is a necessary function of a well governed commonwealth because, as ancient authors insisted, the rule of law cannot be maintained without sanctions. This principle not only applies to domestic matters, but also needs to be extended into the international sphere. Such sanctions depend on the continuing use of war justly declared. Grotius used these arguments to justify the Dutch war of independence from Spain and the right of trading companies such as the Dutch East India Company to assume sovereign rights and to pursue a war of trade and commercial expansion against the Portuguese and Spanish. Thus, much as Grotius abhorred war and soldiers, he helped to provide a framework, based on international law, for its continuance—albeit subject to constraints on its conduct.

If Gentili and Grotius had been careful to insist on a distinction between public and private war, the English classical republicans, such as Milton, Harrington, Sidney, and Locke, effectively eliminated that distinction and furnished arguments and justifications for rebellions against monarchs and the pursuit of civil war. Sidney thought that republican governments preserved domestic peace better than monarchical governments. Thomas Hobbes would have been horrified by this line of reasoning, and more than any other thinker of his age, he worked to develop a science of peace. In addition to the study of history and natural law, Hobbes emphasized the need for people to study moral philosophy to discover and acknowledge their responsibilities for avoiding both civil strife and interstate war. Based on his close study of Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Hobbes thought that the causes of interstate wars could be comprehended under the headings of dynastic ambitions and rivalries, differing religious opinions, and the rhetorical excesses of individual politicians. Whereas other thinkers of the Age of Reason were coming to insist that religious toleration could avoid the contention that led to

religious wars, Hobbes could not imagine a stable civil society without an Erastian state church. The main function of an established church was to teach obedience to the sovereign.

Hobbes was a careful student of Greek and Roman classics, but in his attempt to construct a science of politics, he came to reject the authority of classical authors such as Aristotle. Influenced by the Scientific Revolution, he preferred the empirical approach to knowledge over the theoretical method of the Aristoteleans, and he believed that the accumulation of and study of historical examples allowed one to acquire the moral and political wisdom that would enable one to construct a science of politics that was compatible with moral philosophy. This reflected the rationalism and scientific method of inquiry of his age, and a rejection of custom and tradition, which Hobbes maintained had led to political instability in the city-states of the ancient world. From his study of Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Hobbes learned to distrust the false eloquence of politicians—devoid as it was of wisdom—which along with ambition and the pursuit of honor as well as greed, was so often the occasion of war. Thucydides also brought out the pessimistic side of Hobbes's nature, while his acquaintance with the classical republicans and the parliamentary demagogues of the war party in precivil war England led him to distrust aristocratic and democratic participation in government, and to put his trust in monarchical absolutism. Although Hobbes posited that in a state of nature there would have existed a continuously threatening climate of war, he also thought that it was a basic law of nature to work for peace, and refused to believe that war was inevitable, as Thucydides had maintained. Unfortunately, Hobbes could not reconcile this with political liberty and the parliamentary system of representation and an aristocratic and democratic voice in law-making. If the sovereign state was to preserve peace, all power must be vested in the king alone and Parliament's role could only be advisory. Any liberties and rights possessed by the subject would derive from or depend on the absolute sovereign.

The jurists and political philosophers who followed Grotius and Hobbes refined some of the ideas of these two very influential thinkers. Kant was able to imagine a world free of war—or at least, the world that he inhabited. He accepted Hobbes's argument that the natural state of man was undeclared war, but he thought that a state of peace could be established if two or more states characterized by civil societies agreed to submit to arbitration by an international

tribunal staffed by competent jurists, but he did not envision them abandoning their sovereign rights and powers. A key idea that Kant put forward was that commerce within political societies and trade among states promoted civil societies characterized by the rule of law, where laws were made by a representative body separate from but working with a sovereign ruler. The best chance to secure international amity would occur when sovereign states with similar civil societies and political constitutions banded together to form a "league of nations." However, Kant could not imagine such an international body extending beyond Europe.

Adam Ferguson thought that the concept of a civil society represented a significant break with classical antiquity because it rejected the methods of war and the martial ethos of the ancient world. The spread of commerce undercut aristocratic attachment to the martial ethos and led to better disciplined armies led by professional officer corps rather than amateur gallants, and also brought constraints on the conduct of war. He attached importance to Kant's belief that civil societies were associated with the rule of law and representative institutions, but he also feared that too much democracy could destroy a nicely balanced regime. Adam Smith thought that religious toleration was also an important characteristic of a civil society and rose from a multiplicity of religious sects in which none could dominate. Yet, both Ferguson and Smith recognized that the spread of commercial culture brought risks. Prosperity invited the envy of powerful neighbors, and commerce often promoted colonial expansion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Citizens in a commercial society were more interested in their private affairs and less concerned with their duties as citizens. Such societies were usually defended by mercenaries or standing armies composed of long-service soldiers, and the commonwealth was vulnerable to political interference by these permanent military forces unless their loyalty to the regime was somehow guaranteed. Kant was also able to see that countries with a well funded public debt were able to carry on wars of aggression and expansion without interruption, and he continued to favor citizen militias over standing armies as a means of defense. Thus, countries with abundant resources, permanent public debts, and standing armies remained a major obstacle to perpetual peace. Political societies with large standing armies and navies were rarely at peace for long.