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‘Fagin in Berlin provokes a riot’: David Lean’s *Oliver Twist* and perceptions of Jews in occupied Germany

Emily Oliver

Introduction

In February 1949, Berlin citizens clashed violently with the police in the city’s British sector, outside a cinema which was screening an adaptation of the film *Oliver Twist*. The point of contention was not Dickens’s eponymous orphan but one of his chief villains: protesters maintained that the film’s portrayal of Fagin was anti-Semitic and that it should therefore be banned from German cinemas. The incident caused heated comment in the press of all occupation zones of Germany and attracted considerable attention abroad.¹ Although the production company quickly withdrew the film, this apparent blunder in British occupation policy served as a touchstone for much larger issues at the time.

The incident raises important questions about the connections between culture and politics in the Allied occupation of Germany, about the visual depiction and perception of minorities, and about relations between the ‘historic triangle’ of occupiers, Germans and Jews during this period.² As Frank Stern notes, this triangle ‘was a tension-ridden part of a more comprehensive triangle that included the United States with its American Jewish community, Germany with the Jewish remnant, and the Jewish settlement in Palestine as the precursor of the State of Israel.’³ It is necessary to situate the Berlin incident within these wider contexts to understand why *Oliver Twist* caused such offence in Germany. Was it really as anti-Semitic as protesters claimed? What visual histories and stereotypes did *Oliver Twist* mobilize? How did the context of Allied occupation determine the British film’s German reception? What actually happened during the riots, who were the protesters, and how were they portrayed in different Allied-licensed newspapers? What role do race and ethnicity play in studying the Allied occupation of Germany? Cinema is a key medium for

studying the socio-political landscape of occupied Berlin, due to its considerable popularity and its purported psychological potency.⁴ When dealing with a population whose viewing habits had been shaped by twelve years of Nazi cinema, 'cinematic representation, reorganization, and control constituted a crucial cultural component of [...] the victors' postwar plans to denazify and democratize Germany', forcing them to strike a balance between censorship and consumer choice.⁵ The *Oliver Twist* controversy highlights the difficulties of the Western Allies' paradoxical mission to impose democracy from above.

This chapter disentangles the convoluted and variously manipulated narratives surrounding the Berlin protests against the *Oliver Twist* screening. It begins by examining the film itself, focusing particularly on Alec Guinness's portrayal of Fagin, in order to evaluate the charges of anti-Semitism levelled against it. David Lean's *Oliver Twist* adaptation has received much critical attention, frequently including comparisons with Dickens's novel and debates on the film's anti-Semitism, but most of this work only mentions the Berlin protests in passing.⁶ To understand how *Oliver Twist* came to be shown in occupied Berlin, it is necessary to outline British film policy for occupied Germany and how this restricted the choice of British films for export. Scholarly work on British cultural policy during the occupation remains sparse, with Gabriele Clemens's 1997 overview still the most comprehensive source.⁷ Moreover, there exists almost no secondary material on the Berlin protests themselves, which is why this chapter uses German, American and British newspaper reports, and a contemporary confidential account by a Berlin-based rabbi, to reconstruct what exactly happened in response to the first German screenings of *Oliver Twist*.⁸ A key question in this context concerns the identity of the protesters, variously described as Berliners, Jews, Poles, foreigners or criminals. This requires a closer examination of Jewish communities and displaced persons (DPs) in occupied Germany, their treatment by different Allied forces, and their perception by the German population. There is a wealth of studies on different facets of DP life in post-war Germany: most focus on the large DP populations in the American zone or the Belsen-Hohne Camp in the British zone, while comparatively little has been written specifically on the situation of DPs in occupied Berlin.⁹ The chapter concludes by examining the ways in which Lean's *Oliver Twist* was subsequently instrumentalized in the trial of Veit Harlan, director of the notoriously anti-Semitic film *Jud Süß* (1940). While Harlan's work and subsequent denazification have generated much critical commentary, the role played by Lean's *Oliver Twist* in the trial has been somewhat neglected.¹⁰ Analysing reactions to a British film in a post-war German context enables us to trace continuities and changes in identity politics and allegiances between different national groups and minorities during the Allied occupation.

The portrayal of Fagin in *Oliver Twist*

David Lean's *Oliver Twist* premiered in the UK in June 1948. Alec Guinness's portrayal of Fagin in the film referenced a number of Jewish stereotypes. Wearing a large prosthetic hook nose and a long, matted wig and beard, with several of his teeth blacked out, Guinness adopted a Yiddish-inflected Cockney accent and was frequently shot

from below (Oliver's perspective), making him appear powerful and threatening.¹¹ In choosing to present Fagin in this obviously stereotypical manner, Lean and Guinness ignored concerns already raised during the production process, particularly from the United States. As early as May 1947, Hollywood's self-regulating censorship body, the Production Code Administration, had stated:

We assume, of course, that you will bear in mind the advisability of omitting from the portrayal of Fagin any elements or inference that would be offensive to any specific racial group or religion. Otherwise, of course, your picture might meet with very definite audience resistance in this country.¹²

In response to this letter, make-up artist Stuart Freeborn asked Lean whether he should tone down the look he had created for Fagin, to which Lean replied: 'To hell with them! We're not going to change a thing.'¹³ Film critic Al McKee has labelled this 'a startling example of artistic tunnel vision', while Juliet John describes Lean's adaptation as 'brilliant but unthinkingly offensive'¹⁴ (Figure 2.1).

Although *Oliver Twist* was largely well-received in Britain, the film predictably met with opposition in the United States. With Israel having declared its independence in May 1948, and the first of many wars in the Middle East underway, a private screening was arranged for Jewish American campaign groups in September, resulting in unfavourable reactions. The New York Board of Rabbis recommended to the President of the Motion Picture Association of America that the film be banned, prompting the British head of the production company, J. Arthur Rank, to postpone its US release indefinitely.¹⁵ Less than a month later, upon hearing that the adaptation was to be released in the US zone of occupied Germany, American Jews petitioned the US Civil Affairs Division (CAD) to revoke this decision. This, too, was successful, with the CAD duly deciding to postpone the film's release in the American zone indefinitely.¹⁶

Despite the repeated criticism, Lean continued to defend his film's portrayal of Fagin, claiming that it was based on the original illustrations by George Cruikshank, as well as Dickens's own description of Fagin as 'a very old shrivelled Jew, whose villainous-looking and repulsive face was obscured by a quantity of matted red hair'.¹⁷ In the novel, we learn that Fagin is dirty, 'dressed in a greasy flannel gown, with his throat bare', and occasionally Dickens even gives his Jew animalistic features:

As he glided stealthily along, creeping beneath the shelter of the walls and doorways, the hideous old man seemed like some loathsome reptile, engendered in the slime and darkness through which he moved: crawling forth, by night, in search of some rich offal for a meal.¹⁸

Given these examples, Lean was justified in claiming that his conception of Fagin was no more of a caricature than Dickens's.

Since Dickens never depicts Fagin praying, attending synagogue or speaking of his beliefs, his is clearly not a religious but an ethnic definition of 'Jewishness'. Dickens confirmed this when defending himself against claims of anti-Semitism in a letter in 1863:

Figure 2.1 Alec Guinness (centre) as Fagin in *Oliver Twist* (1948). Diomedea.

Fagin, in *Oliver Twist*, is a Jew, because it unfortunately was true of the time to which that story refers, that that class of criminal almost invariably was a Jew. But surely no sensible man or woman [...] can fail to observe – firstly, that all the rest of the wicked *dramatis personae* are Christians; and secondly, that he is called a ‘Jew’, not because of his religion, but because of his race. [...] I make mention of Fagin as the Jew, because he is one of the Jewish people, and because it conveys that kind of idea of him which I should give my readers of a Chinaman, by calling him a Chinese.¹⁹

Based on these comments, it is difficult to imagine what 'kind of idea' Dickens wished to give his readers of Fagin other than a stereotypical image of an eastern, unassimilated Jew. Fagin looks different from other East End characters due to his long unkempt hair and his facial features (although the novel makes no specific mention of the shape of his nose). This alone might not necessarily trigger negative associations in the reader's mind, but when added to Fagin's bullying and criminal behaviour and Dickens's descriptions of Fagin as 'hideous' and 'loathsome', it paints an extremely unflattering picture of the novel's only Jewish character whilst emphasizing Fagin's otherness.

Whereas the novel's narrator frequently cues the reader to think of Fagin as 'the Jew', Lean was quick to point out that screenwriter Stanley Hayes's script did not once identify Fagin as a Jew.²⁰ However, Lean's faithful visual rendering of Dickens's descriptions and Alec Guinness's spirited portrayal of the role drew on a long history of Jewish stereotypes. Charles Drazin notes that 'Lean distilled Dickens's work into brilliantly cinematic images but it was the fidelity of those images to the original racist conception of Fagin that made them especially shocking in the context of the 1940s'.²¹ Maria Cristina Paganoni agrees:

Close-ups of Fagin's chipped teeth, shaggy eyebrows and matted hair, profile shots emphasizing his 'Semitic' nose, as well as the effect of his droning voice, are all cinematic techniques that visually and verbally translate what the lexical choices of the novel construct as a monstrous otherness.²²

Notably, one thing Lean's film adds to Dickens's version is Fagin's thick Yiddish accent, 'which categorizes him as an alien with an unstable national identity'.²³ Occasional Yiddish inflections can also be heard in the German version, dubbed by the actor Robert Meyn, suggesting that this Fagin might hail from somewhere in eastern Europe.²⁴

Over the course of the nineteenth century, and particularly since the influx of Jewish refugees from eastern Europe after the First World War, Germans had come to regard eastern European Jews as the epitome of cultural backwardness: 'ghetto Jews', or *Ostjuden*, were perceived as dirty, coarse, loud and immoral.²⁵ According to Steven Aschheim, this view was initially 'formulated and propagated by West European and especially German Jews, serving as a symbolic construct by which they could distinguish themselves from their less fortunate, unemancipated East European brethren'.²⁶ As German Jews assimilated into middle-class society during the nineteenth century, eastern European Jews were perceived as retaining all the characteristics they had striven to overcome. Chief among these was the Yiddish language, 'widely regarded as a corrupt and lowly derivation of German', and therefore despised as an uneducated vernacular.²⁷ Other characteristics frequently associated with *Ostjuden* were unproductivity or criminality, begging and an itinerant lifestyle, boorishness and a narrow worldview.²⁸ In the aftermath of the First World War, German anti-Semites seized upon this perception of a very visible minority to construe eastern European Jews as dangerous to German society: 'Against the postwar background of defeat and economic disintegration, it was easy to present the "mass invasion" of *Ostjuden* as a fundamental threat to German morality, economy, sexuality, politics, and culture'.²⁹ Throughout the Nazi era, exaggerated caricatures of *Ostjuden* could regularly be found

in *Der Stürmer* and other right-wing publications, along with stereotypical depictions in propaganda films such as *Der ewige Jude* (The Eternal Jew) (dir. Fritz Hippler, 1940) and *Jud Süß* (Jew Süß) (dir. Veit Harlan, 1940), all of which reinforced a deeply negative image of eastern European Jews in the German mind – a topic which is discussed at length in Miriam Arani's chapter in this volume.

Although an English creation, Fagin fits perfectly into these particular stereotypes. He is enamoured of material wealth, and Lean's film depicts him greedily handling jewels and pocket watches. Paganoni notes:

He appears to combine and condense in his person the features of the utmost villainy and Jewishness, as if they were somehow inextricable. A thief, a miser, a pimp, possibly a pederast and paedophile, he is part of a Jewish peddling network that inhabits the London underworld.³⁰

In one of the film's scenes, Fagin hides away his treasures and threatens Oliver with a knife when he believes the boy will disclose his hiding place. His actions are motivated by selfish greed: training up young boys to be pick-pockets ultimately serves to line Fagin's own pockets. Based on his visual presentation and his character traits, Fagin conforms to the much-peddled stereotype of the dirty, rough, uncultured eastern Jewish criminal. While Dickens's novel was already well-known in Germany since its first translation in 1839, Fagin's vivid appearance on screen in 1949 suddenly enabled a direct comparison with visual depictions of Jews in Nazi cinema. Lean's faithful rendition of Dickens's nineteenth-century anti-Semitic stereotype caused offence in post-war Berlin not because this was an incomprehensible foreign attitude being imported to another country by its occupiers, but precisely because in the German context the stereotype was so familiar and mobilized attitudes which had been encouraged since before the Second World War, and which Germans were now meant to overcome.

British film policy in occupied Germany

Considering the strong reactions *Oliver Twist* had provoked in the United States, it is surprising that the British division of the Control Commission for Germany nevertheless released the film in Berlin's British sector in February 1949. Reporting on the protests, America's *LIFE* magazine remarked:

Between Dickens and Director Lean history had interposed the ghosts of six million murdered Jews and the specter of genocide. It was hard to see why the producers of *Oliver Twist* had insisted on such complete fidelity [to Dickens] and it was harder still to guess why the authorities had not only permitted exhibition of the picture in Germany but refused to withdraw it immediately after the inevitable reaction came.³¹

Why did British Military Government take such a reckless decision? A closer look at British film policy suggests that the *Oliver Twist* blunder may have been the result of financial pressures limiting Britain's film exports to her zone of occupation.

British film policy in occupied Germany officially pursued two main goals: (i) to promote an appreciation of British cultural achievements and values, as well as a greater understanding of British occupation policy and (ii) to open up the German market to the British film industry, which was in danger of being eclipsed by Hollywood.³² In addition to these official goals, the majority of films imported by the British authorities were chosen simply for their entertainment value. During the early occupation period, the Control Commission's London-based Film Section chose a cross-section of recent British films for release in its zone, including, notably, two other Dickens adaptations: *Great Expectations* (dir. David Lean, 1946) and *Nicholas Nickleby* (dir. Alberto Cavalcanti, 1947).³³ However, from the outset the selection was constrained by financial considerations. In order to enter into a contract with Military Government, production companies were required to cover all costs for raw materials, post-production (including dubbing or subtitling) and provision of sufficient copies, while the Control Commission would merely finance transport and insurance for feature films. J. Arthur Rank's production company was one of very few capable of shouldering such a financial burden, meaning that initially it was the only company to reach an agreement with the British authorities. Until 1947, Rank enjoyed a quasi-monopoly on British film exports to Germany.³⁴ In October 1947, responsibility for selection, export and distribution of films passed to the newly licensed private company Eagle-Lion Distributors.³⁵ While the Control Commission retained censorship powers, it is likely that selections were still biased in favour of the Rank label: Eagle-Lion Distributors was part of Eagle-Lion Films, owned by J. Arthur Rank.

Oliver Twist's German release thus occurred at a point when the British authorities had technically ceded responsibility for film selection to a private distributor, but could nevertheless be held responsible for controversial decisions. This unresolved situation resulted in a 'blame-game' in the wake of the Berlin protests. The day after the protests, the Soviet-zone newspaper *Neues Deutschland* gave the following summary of responses to the calls for a German ban of *Oliver Twist*:

The Berlin representative of 'Eagle-Lion-Films' [...] stated [...] that the decision had been taken to continue screening the controversial film despite demonstrations, pending a decision by the British Military Governor. [...] A representative of the British Military Government stated that the film's cancellation or non-cancellation was a 'purely German matter'. The 'mayor' of West Berlin [...] responded by claiming that the Western city administration could not influence the question of further public screenings, as this decision lay solely with the responsible British authorities.³⁶

This extract illustrates the confusion caused by the transition from military-controlled censorship to free market laws and German self-government in the later phase of the Allied occupation, and the resulting difficulties in determining who was responsible for film policy decisions. It also points to a longstanding quandary plaguing the Western Allies' cultural policy: how to promote democracy and free choice through undemocratic means (i.e. from above). Although a loosening of Allied control and a free market for cultural products were the ultimate goals, this could occasionally

result in the 'wrong' kinds of films being shown – thus triggering renewed calls for censorship and, in this particular case, violent protests.

Protests in Berlin

Oliver Twist opened at the Kurbel Cinema in Berlin-Charlottenburg on 18 February 1949. When it was shown again two days later, around sixty protesters inside and outside the auditorium disrupted the screening.³⁷ Police were called to the scene, and once the protesters had been ejected from the auditorium, the cinema's proprietor decided to cancel all further screenings that day. West Berlin's mayor and representatives of Berlin's Jewish community wrote to British Military Government, calling for the film to be banned from German cinemas. British Military Government chose not to comment on these initial protests, merely informing the Kurbel's proprietor that the licence for *Oliver Twist* had not been revoked. Meanwhile, Eagle-Lion Distributors demanded that the film be screened as scheduled at the Kurbel.

The following day, the screening went ahead under the protection of fifty German police officers positioned outside the cinema. When a crowd of around 200 protesters attempted to force its way from the street into the cinema, the police started beating protesters with their truncheons.³⁸ Protesters threw stones at the police, who attempted to control the crowd through the use of fire hoses, with some officers even drawing their guns and firing warning shots. Twenty-five protesters and fourteen police officers were injured during the incident and a number of protesters were arrested and taken into custody.³⁹ British Military Police were present and observed the incident, but did not intervene. Finally, the cinema's proprietor announced the film's cancellation, after which the protesters retreated, reportedly singing the Israeli national anthem.⁴⁰

From this last piece of information, we might glean some information on the protesters' identity, which was itself a hotly contested issue. Most newspapers attributed the protests to Berlin Jews, but within these parameters there were important differences in tone and characterization, as well as some confusing contradictions. The Soviet-sector press seized upon the incident as an example of the Western powers' failed denazification of Germany, variously characterizing protesters as 'members of the Jewish people [Volk];'⁴¹ 'outraged Jewish demonstrators'⁴² and 'members of [Berlin's] Jewish community [Gemeinde]'.⁴³ *Neues Deutschland* also delightedly claimed the involvement of 'a large number of progressive, non-Jewish people'⁴⁴ and consequently proceeded to write more generally about 'antifascist demonstrators'.⁴⁵ The American-licensed *Tagesspiegel* adopted a more neutral stance, speaking of 'members of the Jewish population', 'members of Berlin's cultural life' or simply 'a few demonstrators'.⁴⁶ The French-licensed *Kurier* described the protesters as consisting 'almost exclusively of Poles'.⁴⁷ Meanwhile, the tone was starkly different in a number of British-licensed publications: the Berlin-based *Telegraf* spoke of 'Jewish circles, which are usually seen on the Kurfürstendamm, where they enjoy little sympathy'.⁴⁸ At this point the Kurfürstendamm, Berlin's main shopping street, was one of the centres for black market activity. London's *Daily Telegraph* gave a curiously detailed description of the protesters as 'clad in tight-waisted coats, carefully creased trousers and snapbrim felt

hats' and 'shouting in broken German'.⁴⁹ Meanwhile, the German Social Democratic Party's newspaper, also licensed by the British, openly claimed that the demonstration had been organized by 'Polish Jews'⁵⁰ and 'paid black-marketeers'.⁵¹

British occupation authorities seem to have relied almost exclusively on these latter sources for the information they chose to pass on to their superiors back in London. According to a confidential telegram to the Foreign Office:

Reliable information suggests that [the demonstrators] were Jews, many of them of non-GERMAN nationality, known to be leaders of black market activity in areas not far removed from the cinema. We have, however, no firm proof of this. The demonstrations seem to have been deliberately organised.⁵²

Considering its admitted lack of evidence, the Political Division seemed remarkably certain of the protesters' identity and of the event's pre-planned nature. Citing the *Telegraf*, the report went on to indict more Berlin Jews:

In addition it is suggested that Jews from UNRRA [United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration] camps were concerned, who had been removed from BERLIN some time ago, only to return illegally. The presence of such elements amongst the demonstrators had doubtless deterred many honest BERLINERS from associating themselves with the demonstrations.⁵³

Quite apart from the implied contrast between 'honest Berliners' and dishonest, criminal Jews, this report once again raises questions regarding the protesters' identity. In order to understand who these demonstrators actually were, and why non-German Jews might illegally return to Berlin in 1949, it is necessary to take a closer look at Allied treatment of Jews in the aftermath of the Second World War.

Jewish DPs in occupied Germany

After the cessation of hostilities in 1945, there were over 7 million foreign civilians in Germany, most of them there against their will.⁵⁴ Hailing from a number of different countries, these displaced persons, or DPs, had been brought to Nazi Germany for forced labour, or in the case of the 30,000–50,000 Jewish DPs, had survived labour camps, extermination camps, and even death marches.⁵⁵ One of the huge tasks facing the Allies when they assumed control of Germany was therefore to repatriate millions of people as quickly as possible. Since constant fuel shortages and the destruction of train lines made transport difficult, DP camps sprang up all over Germany in order to house, feed, clothe, care for and contain DPs until they could be repatriated. Initially, both American and British policies dictated that DPs should be registered and processed by nationality, with different nationalities being treated according to their former status as either victims or allies of the Nazis. In practice this led to a number of paradoxical situations: for instance, Italian and Hungarian Jews found themselves classed as part of the Axis powers along with their non-Jewish compatriots.⁵⁶ Moreover, following years

of horrendous deprivation, Jewish survivors often required completely different levels of healthcare and nourishment compared to non-Jewish DPs.

American policy towards Jewish DPs changed drastically in the autumn of 1945, when *The New York Times* published Earl G. Harrison's devastating report on conditions in European DP camps. President Truman had tasked Harrison, a former US Immigration Commissioner and the dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, with investigating the treatment of Jewish DPs. After a three-week tour of different facilities, Harrison stated that the Allies were not only failing to provide adequate food, housing and clothing for Jewish DPs, but were also keeping them as prisoners in undignified conditions:

As matters now stand, we appear to be treating the Jews as the Nazis treated them except that we do not exterminate them. They are in concentration camps in large numbers under our military guard instead of SS troops. One is led to wonder whether the German people, seeing this, are not supposing that we are following or at least condoning Nazi policy.⁵⁷

Contrary to the previous Allied practice of classing all DPs by nationality, Harrison demanded that Jews be treated differently: 'The first and plainest need for these people is a recognition of their actual status and by this I mean their status as Jews.'⁵⁸ While admitting that it was 'not normally desirable to set aside particular racial or religious groups from their nationality categories', Harrison justified his demand by stating that 'this was done for so long by the Nazis that a group has been created which has special needs'.⁵⁹ According to Harrison, 'Jews as Jews' had been 'more severely victimized than the non-Jewish members of the same or other nationalities', and therefore the first step towards some form of justice was to acknowledge Jewish distinctiveness.⁶⁰ Accordingly, the Americans created separate Jewish DP camps, 'policed by the US army, administered by UNRRA and opened to [...] Jewish relief organizations'.⁶¹ Conditions in these camps were generally better than in other DP camps and the daily ration for Jewish DPs was raised to twice that of German civilians.⁶²

It was here that American and British policy diverged. While General Eisenhower appointed a Special Adviser on Jewish Affairs, the British occupation authorities refused to recognize Jews as a separate category. Their justification was that separate treatment for Jews would represent a reinstatement of Nazi racial policies.⁶³ However, this was merely a smokescreen: Britain was determined to prevent large-scale emigration to Palestine, at this point still under British mandate.⁶⁴ Following the Second World War, Britain was more dependent than ever on Arab goodwill in the Middle East in order to maintain its access to Arabian oil and the Suez Canal.⁶⁵ The British government therefore had a vested interest in preventing any further emigration of European Jews to Palestine. Recognizing 'Jews as Jews', as Harrison demanded, would have meant recognizing not just a religious or ethnic but a separate *national* identity for Jews – and as a nation they might lay claim to a state or homeland.

Instead of gradually being resolved through repatriation, the DP problem in Germany in fact became more acute from late 1945 onwards. Many Jewish survivors returning to eastern Europe encountered renewed anti-Semitism in their former

homelands. Following a number of violent anti-Semitic pogroms in Poland in 1946, Jews began to pour back into Germany, until these “infiltrates” from Poland and eastern European countries came to represent two-thirds of the overall Jewish DP population.⁶⁶ Paradoxically, the western zones of occupied Germany became the safest place for Jews in post-war Europe, as they were controlled by the Allies and provided access to Jewish relief organizations. The Zionist underground network *Bricha* helped large numbers of Polish Jews transfer illegally into Germany, so that between 1945 and 1948, there were approximately 250,000 Jews temporarily living in the American and British zones of occupied Germany.⁶⁷

A key station on the way from Poland to the American zone of Germany was Berlin, where this mass influx was first felt: ‘By November 1945 7,000 Polish Jews had reached the city; by the end of December that same year between 250 and 300 were coming to Berlin every day.’⁶⁸ There were three Jewish DP camps in Berlin (two in the American sector and one in the French sector), where Jews were cared for by various relief agencies. Their ‘privileges’ included better rations and clothing supplies than the German population. In the post-war economy of scarcity, these supplies could be profitably traded on the black market, creating an invidious situation. According to Grossmann, Germans ‘saw the refugee camps as centers of black market activity fed by easy access to the cigarette and food supplies of the occupiers.’⁶⁹ However, Hilton points out that DPs were not trading the cigarettes and chocolate from their aid packages for profit, but ‘because they had no other alternative sources of goods to barter.’⁷⁰ Despite the fact that everyone in post-war Berlin – Germans, occupiers, and DPs – participated in black and grey markets in some form or another, ‘Germans saw DP involvement as immoral, whereas their own was simply a matter of necessity’, and ‘occupation officials reinforced this perception.’⁷¹ Polish Jews came to be viewed as chiefly responsible for the illicit trade, providing a welcome scapegoat for both Germans and occupiers.⁷² Their increased supplies and black market activity reinforced the stereotype of eastern European Jews as misers, traders and profiteers – ‘a population consumed with the acquisition of wealth at the expense of others, which in the postwar period was characterized as the “blackest” of illicit trade.’⁷³ It was in this spirit that a June 1947 article in the *Berliner Illustrierte* could proclaim that the letters DP should stand for *Deutschlands Parasiten* (‘Germany’s parasites’).⁷⁴

Not only were the new eastern Jewish arrivals segregated from the Germans through their geographical concentration in DP camps and their preferential treatment by American aid organizations, but many also looked markedly different from other Berliners. The American Koppel Pinson, educational director for displaced Jews in Germany, remarked in 1947 that among the ‘infiltrates’ one saw ‘bearded Jews of the traditional East-European type with all the tempo of the formerly bustling Jewish communities of Warsaw, Vilna or Lodz.’⁷⁵ According to Pinson, these DPs had no interest in assimilating into German society:

On one point there is universal agreement – that Jews must not in any way contribute to the rehabilitation of the German economy. ‘We have slaved for the Germans enough’, they say, ‘and we will not contribute to the recovery of the nation that is responsible for the mass slaughter of our people’. This attitude is largely

responsible for the failure of Jewish DP's to seek gainful employment in Germany. They will work for UNRRA, they will work for the occupying powers, they will work for their own camp, but they steadfastly refuse to seek any integration into German industry or commerce.⁷⁶

Since most eastern Jewish DPs rejected the notion of a Jewish future in Germany, viewing it instead as a transit station on the way to the United States or Palestine, they also often refused to acknowledge the authority of German civil and political institutions, giving both the German police and the occupiers an excuse to regard them as a somewhat lawless population.⁷⁷ At the same time, Jewish DPs wanted to ensure their demands were heard and therefore tended to stage public protests in streets and squares, favouring a 'direct and confrontational style of politics typical of prewar Jewish nationalists – the "politics of noise," as its opponents had labeled it'.⁷⁸ All of these aspects combined to make a conspicuous minority even more noticeable in post-war Berlin, rendering it unpopular with both Germans and occupiers.

Germany's DP population decreased considerably in mid-1948, following the establishment of Israel in May and a change in US immigration rules in the same year.⁷⁹ Additionally, most Berlin DPs were evacuated from the city's western sectors during the early phase of the Berlin blockade in July 1948 in order to reduce the number of people the Western Allies needed to supply by air: empty planes returning from their food deliveries for 'Operation Vittles' were used to transport DPs to Frankfurt in the American zone. However, around 150 Jewish DPs chose to remain in Berlin, and Jewish organizations estimated that several hundred returned to the city over the following months to resume their trade.⁸⁰

While most black market activity in Germany had ceased after the currency reform of 1948, Berlin's western sectors remained a hotbed of illicit trade due to the scarcity of goods created by the Soviet blockade. Although voluntary Jewish returnees were no longer eligible for assistance from Jewish aid organizations, their illegal trading on Kurfürstendamm continued, leading to increased friction with Berlin's German Jewish community (*Jüdische Gemeinde*).⁸¹ German-born Steven Schwarzschild, who had returned from exile in the United States to serve as Chief Rabbi of Berlin from September 1948 to May 1950, articulated these differences in outlook between Jewish DPs from eastern Europe and Berlin's Jewish community in a report for the World Union for Progressive Judaism (London) in December 1948:

Due to the greatly different attitudes to almost every problem affecting Jewish existence in this country, beginning with the relationship to the German environment and state, to questions of Jewish Law and rite, as well as the difference of language and mentality, it is next to impossible to establish a working relationship with the elements of Eastern European Orthodoxy.⁸²

Eastern Jewish DPs were thus ostracized not just by non-Jewish Germans and some parts of the occupying forces, but also by their German co-religionists, who regarded them as a potential hindrance to their own successful re-integration into post-war German society.

Given this negative climate, it is clear that introducing a vivid screen presence such as Fagin, the greasy, petty criminal who hoards his valuables away, would further inflame the already fraught situation in occupied Berlin. In a highly confidential report on the *Oliver Twist* riots, Schwarzschild identified the crowd of protesters as having been 'constituted almost exclusively of the former DPs who now transact their business of a dubious nature on the Kurfuerstendamm' and claimed that they were using the *Oliver Twist* screenings as an occasion to articulate their frustration with British foreign policy:

The general attitude was one of defiance, not so much of the German public and police as rather of British authority. (The psychological pattern is consciously an imitation of Israeli precedents: 'In Israel we defied England and won; here we are defying England and shall win. In Israel we used these methods; we shall do so here.' On the whole these are people who are rootless and without any social or moral anchorage, but who compensate for this lack by fancying themselves in the role of patriots in exile.⁸³)

Schwarzschild was not the only one to criticize the DP population's use of *Oliver Twist* as an opportunity for its 'politics of noise.' A Berlin woman, writing to British Military Governor Brian Robertson in February 1949, objected to the film's cancellation, demanding that Berliners should be allowed to make up their own minds about it. Having argued that it was not the film itself but contemporary newspapers which incited anti-Semitic feeling among Germans, she asked:

What is the attitude of the mayor and of the world to the fact that we calmly watch the 'gold and silver men' openly conduct their business on the Kurfürstendamm? No-one is afraid that the behaviour of these people, who are all without exception Jews, might give rise to anti-Semitic tendencies! The Jewish community [*Jüdische Gemeinde*] and the mayor should make it their first task to make these people disappear for good from the Kurfürstendamm; by allowing them to remain they are causing far greater harm to themselves and could be encouraging anti-Semitism. Our peaceful attitude, particularly towards these Jews, surely affords the best evidence of our opinion.⁸⁴

According to this Berlin citizen, neither the British film nor the German population was to blame for the anti-Semitic climate, but the foreign Jews themselves, who were solely responsible for Berlin's black market, and making a sizeable profit from it.

This attitude was not confined to Berlin, or even to occupied Germany, but could also be found in some parts of the British press. Disregarding anti-Semitism's long historical roots in Germany, an article in *The Times* stated:

It is generally agreed that most of the demonstrators were Polish Jews who have come to Berlin as displaced persons or refugees. These non-German Jews predominate in the black market on the Kurfürstendamm, the main street of the

British sector. Their presence and apparent prosperity has contributed much to such anti-Semitism as now exists here.⁸⁵

Meanwhile, the *Daily Telegraph* reported that German bystanders had 'openly expressed their indignation at the inability of the police to deal with "foreign spivs and black market operators"', and the newspaper concluded that 'British prestige has suffered severely by allowing the film to be twice forced off the screen by an organized demonstration of a handful of foreigners.'⁸⁶ Joining forces with the German population to defend Berlin against the negative influence of eastern European Jews, *The Times* reached the astonishing verdict that 'the only positive result of an unhappy episode has been to increase German feeling against foreign Jews.'⁸⁷ Less than four years after the liberation of Belsen, and following a protracted struggle over Palestine, allegiances had clearly shifted: in the British press at least, Germans and Jews had effectively switched roles as victims and perpetrators.

Oliver Twist and *Jud Süß*

Only ten days after the violent clashes surrounding the release of *Oliver Twist*, the trial against German film director Veit Harlan opened in Hamburg (in the British zone). Harlan was charged with crimes against humanity, with the trial focusing particularly on his 1940 film *Jud Süß* – the most notoriously anti-Semitic work of Nazi cinema. It was argued that the film had incited racial hatred against the Jewish population and thus encouraged anti-Semitic pogroms. According to the *Telegraf*, Harlan's defence had requested a screening of David Lean's *Oliver Twist* during the trial.⁸⁸ *Oliver Twist* was to be used as an example of works which could unintentionally appear anti-Semitic, thus ostensibly exonerating Harlan by showing that he was not the only director to produce this kind of work, and weakening the claim that *Jud Süß* had had a unique political impact.⁸⁹ Through its use as evidence to defend an alleged former Nazi propagandist, Lean's film became an even greater embarrassment to the British authorities.

Harlan's request to use *Oliver Twist* as part of his defence strategy was already known when the film opened in Berlin, and repeatedly used to condemn it in the press. A few days after the violent protests, the Soviet-licensed *Berliner Zeitung* noted with more than a hint of irony:

Anyone still harbouring doubts as to whether *Oliver Twist* is an anti-Semitic film has now had confirmation of this through the behaviour of a highly competent expert. Veit Harlan has demanded that the film be shown 'in his defence', and the court has granted this request.⁹⁰

It seems that the mere association with the name Harlan was enough to prove the film's anti-Semitic bias. Harlan's trial, however, proved to be a more complicated matter.

The court was not debating whether *Jud Süß* was anti-Semitic, nor whether Harlan was responsible for making the film. Instead, the prosecution was attempting to show that the act of creating the film constituted a crime against humanity, because it had

led directly to violent anti-Semitic behaviour, and thus helped to legitimize genocide. In a sense, it was not Harlan who was on trial, but the film *Jud Süß* itself. However, this direct causal link between a film and specific political events was extremely difficult to prove. In charging Harlan with crimes against humanity, the court had set itself a number of impossible tasks. Firstly, it had to decide whether directing *Jud Süß* constituted a crime according to the laws of the occupation. Secondly, it had to determine the extent of the director's input into the finished product. Thirdly, it had to define the original intentions behind the film. And finally, it had to establish the film's reception by analysing its effect on the population in the early 1940s.⁹¹ Due to the difficulty of marshalling evidence for any of these factors, Harlan was eventually acquitted on 23 April 1949.⁹² He had successfully argued that Goebbels had forced him to make the film. The fact that Harlan had never been a member of the Nazi Party and that his first wife had been Jewish also counted in his favour.⁹³ The court could prove neither that Harlan had taken an active part in the genocide, nor that he had known of the intentions of those in power in the Third Reich. It eventually concluded that 'the measures of persecution and extermination [of Jews] would have been carried out even without the film *Jud Süß*'.⁹⁴

Harlan's acquittal caused outrage in the Soviet-licensed press. According to the *Berliner Zeitung*, the Harlan trial was proof that Western Allied policy over the past four years had led to 'the tearing up of the Potsdam Agreement and remilitarization'.⁹⁵ The paper went on to link the verdict with the recent *Oliver Twist* protests:

It is unsurprising that a military government which tried to force through an anti-Semitic film with the aid of weapons would let the director of another anti-Semitic film be acquitted.⁹⁶

Neue Zeit provided a more measured response to the verdict, recognizing the legal difficulties involved:

If we assume that Harlan cannot legally be convicted for his work on the film *Jud Süß*, this does not so much prove that there is a loophole in our legal system, but that Harlan's 'crime' is of a kind not covered by the law.⁹⁷

The paper lamented that the Hamburg court had not added a moral condemnation to its announcement of Harlan's acquittal, claiming that it was now the press's responsibility to prevent Harlan from regaining a foothold as a director in post-war Germany.

Long before the court reached its verdict on Harlan, Rabbi Schwarzschild had realized the impact the *Oliver Twist* incident would have on the trial's outcome:

The Jewish community of Berlin has done almost irreparable damage to the prosecution of this Nazi, because the Defence has announced the position that, basing itself on the identification of the film 'Jew Suss' with 'Oliver Twist' [...], if Veit Harlan is to be punished, so would have to be dealt with J. Arthur Rank and the British producers of the film 'Oliver Twist'.⁹⁸

The outcome of the Harlan trial and the strong criticism it attracted drew attention to the uncomfortable continuities in anti-Semitic stereotyping from Nazi cinema to post-war British films. The Berlin protesters had merely pointed out these continuities, certainly not wishing Harlan to be acquitted, but instead highlighting the underlying anti-Semitism which in their view informed British foreign and occupation policy.

There were of course important differences between Lean's *Oliver Twist* and Harlan's *Jud Süß*. Lean had not made his film in order to incite racial hatred, or indeed in any way to promote a particular government policy. Unlike *Jud Süß*, the film was not systematically screened in all occupied territories in order to legitimize policies of discrimination and persecution. Instead, *Oliver Twist* was released in British-occupied Germany because it was one of very few high-quality British films available at the time, making officials oblivious to, or willing to overlook, the film's inherent anti-Semitism. However, this tacit acceptance of British anti-Semitism was exposed in the Harlan trial. The entire trial rested on the belief that a film could directly influence the viewer's political outlook. Harlan's defence cleverly exploited this premise: once *Oliver Twist* had been admitted as evidence, the court could not convict Harlan without also indicting cultural products beyond Germany's borders and forcing the occupying powers to examine their own racial prejudices.

Conclusion

Analysing reactions to Lean's *Oliver Twist* in post-war Germany throws into sharp focus the connections between politics and culture under occupation, and the problems caused by differences in occupation policy. With regard to the perception of Jewish distinctiveness, politics and culture reinforced each other in perpetuating stereotypes which mobilized antagonism towards eastern Jews; while American support for Jewish DPs set them apart from the German population, British cultural policy enabled a film to be screened which drew on a visual language familiar to German viewers from Nazi cinema, promoting the view that Jews were markedly different from the rest of the population. The incident complicates Stern's notion of a 'historic triangle' composed of occupiers, Germans and Jews by demonstrating that the 'occupier' category was by no means monolithic. Even when limiting the analysis to American and British occupation policy, we need to pay attention to the differences between the two. Once this distinction is made, it becomes clear that there was no such thing as 'Allied occupation policy': an occupying power's policies and attitudes on the ground in Germany were influenced by that country's domestic pressure groups, specific national history and wider foreign policy interests. Thus, both the change in American DP policy and the decision to ban *Oliver Twist* from the US occupation zone occurred as responses to domestic outrage and lobbying by the American Jewish community. An unintended consequence of US policy was that Germans once again found in the highly conspicuous and allegedly 'privileged' Jewish DP community a scapegoat for their own post-war economic misfortune, reviving prejudices fostered before and during the war. Meanwhile, British DP policy was based on denying Jewish distinctiveness in order to protect Britain's foreign interests in Palestine. Screening

Oliver Twist in Berlin brought all of these issues to a head: the film's othering of eastern Jews exposed British denials of Jewish distinctiveness as false and gave protesters and journalists the opportunity of likening the British occupiers to the Nazi regime they had replaced.

It is no coincidence that the protests occurred in Berlin: this was where the world powers most obviously jostled for dominance after the Second World War. Any differences in occupation policy were thrown into sharp relief through the close geographic proximity of four different sectors, allowing for direct comparison between occupying forces. Thus, in Berlin it was possible for Jewish DPs to access aid in a US sector camp and trade their surplus goods in other sectors, arousing discontent among the German population. Equally, in Berlin inhabitants could see films which had not been released in their zone of occupation, simply by crossing into a different sector. It was also possible for foreign journalists to observe and contrast the treatment of Jews in different sectors of Berlin and report this to their readers at home. The *Oliver Twist* protests were one of many examples showing that four-power control over one city engendered more problems than the occupiers could hope to foresee, and might at any point shed a very negative light on one occupying power while the others looked on. A key concern at this time of incipient Cold War was avoiding embarrassment on the international stage, particularly in the eyes of the other occupiers. The persistent attacks between different zonal newspapers following the *Oliver Twist* protests demonstrate that the Soviet-zone media in particular would seize any opportunity to exploit another power's perceived weakness in the ideological struggle over Germany's future. Accordingly, British steps to rectify the policy blunder demonstrated an overriding concern with appearance over substance: while the film was withdrawn from Germany following the Berlin clashes, nothing about British occupation policy actually changed, indicating that ultimately politics trumped culture. Having caused a riot in Berlin, Fagin disappeared from German screens, but controversial attitudes towards unassimilated Jews did not.

Notes

- 1 See 'Baton charge on Berlin *Oliver Twist* Objectors', *Daily Telegraph*, 22 February 1949, 1; 'Berlin Cinema Fight: *Oliver Twist* – Jews Stop First Performance', *Manchester Guardian*, 21 February 1949, 5; 'Berlin Jews Object to *Oliver Twist* Film', *The Times*, 21 February 1949, 3; 'Fagin in Berlin Provokes a Riot', *LIFE*, 7 March 1949, 38–9; Drew Middleton, 'Berliners Halt *Oliver Twist* Film: Call Fagin Portrayal Anti-Semitic', *The New York Times*, 21 February 1949, 1.
- 2 Frank Stern, 'The Historic Triangle: Occupiers, Germans and Jews in Postwar Germany', in *West Germany under Construction: Politics, Society, and Culture in the Adenauer Era*, ed. Robert G. Moeller (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 199.
- 3 *Ibid.*, 203
- 4 In the late 1940s, 54 per cent of the West Berlin's population regularly attended the cinema. See Bettina Greffrath, *Gesellschaftsbilder der Nachkriegszeit: Deutsche Spielfilme 1945–1949* (Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus, 1995), 124.

- 5 Heide Fehrenbach, *Cinema in Democratizing Germany: Reconstructing National Identity after Hitler* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 5.
- 6 See Charles Drazin, 'Dickens's Jew – from Evil to Delightful', *The Jewish Chronicle*, 3 May 2013: <https://www.thejc.com/comment/comment/dickens-s-jew-from-evil-to-delightful-1.44612> (accessed 21 October 2018); Juliet John, 'Fagin, the Holocaust and Mass Culture; or, *Oliver Twist* on Screen', *Dickens Quarterly* 22, no. 4 (2005): 204–23; Al McKee, 'Art or Outrage? *Oliver Twist* and the Flap over Fagin', *Film Comment* 36, no. 1 (2000): 40–5; Maria Cristina Paganoni, 'From Book to Film: The Semiotics of Jewishness in *Oliver Twist*', *Dickens Quarterly* 27, no. 4 (2010): 307–20; Gene Phillips, *Beyond the Epic: The Life and Films of David Lean* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2006).
- 7 See Gabriele Clemens, *Britische Kulturpolitik in Deutschland 1945–1949: Literatur, Film, Musik und Theater* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1997).
- 8 See Steven S. Schwarzschild, 'Highly Personal and Confidential Report of the Events Resulting from the Showing of the British Film *Oliver Twist* in Berlin, February 19th–22nd' [25 February 1949], *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook* 61 (2016): 243–8.
- 9 See Gerard Daniel Cohen, *In War's Wake: Europe's Displaced Persons in the Postwar Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Susanne Dietrich and Julia Schulze Wessel, ed., *Zwischen Selbstorganisation und Stigmatisierung: Die Lebenswirklichkeit jüdischer Displaced Persons und die neue Gestalt des Antisemitismus in der deutschen Nachkriegsgesellschaft* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1998); Fritz Bauer Institut, ed., *Überlebt und unterwegs: Jüdische Displaced Persons im Nachkriegsdeutschland* (Frankfurt: Campus, 1997); Atina Grossmann, *Jews, Germans, and Allies: Close Encounters in Occupied Germany* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Anna Holian, *Between National Socialism and Soviet Communism: Displaced Persons in Postwar Germany* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2015); Wolfgang Jacobmeyer, 'Jüdische Überlebende als "Displaced Persons": Untersuchungen zur Besatzungspolitik in den deutschen Westzonen und zur Zuwanderung osteuropäischer Juden', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 9 (1983): 421–52; Königseder and Juliane Wetzl, *Waiting for Hope: Jewish Displaced Persons in Post-World War II Germany*, trans. John A. Broadwin (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001); Avinoam J. Patt and Michael Berkowitz, ed., *'We Are Here': New Approaches to Jewish Displaced Persons in Postwar Germany* (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 2010). One notable exception focusing specifically on Berlin is Angelika Königseder, *Flucht nach Berlin: Jüdische Displaced Persons 1945–1948* (Berlin: Metropol, 1998).
- 10 See Hester Baer, *Dismantling the Dream Factory: Gender, German Cinema, and the Postwar Quest for a New Film Language* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009); Frank Noack, *Veit Harlan: 'Des Teufels Regisseur'* (Munich: Belleville, 2000); Siegfried Zielinski, *Veit Harlan: Analysen und Materialien zur Auseinandersetzung mit einem Film-Regisseur des deutschen Faschismus* (Frankfurt: Rita G. Fischer, 1981).
- 11 For photographic documentation of Guinness's transformation see Phil De Semlyen, 'Stuart Freeborn at Work: Turning Alec Guinness into Fagin [sic]', *Empire*, 7 February 2013: <http://www.empireonline.com/features/stuart-freeborn-oliver-twist-make-up> (accessed 22 October 2018).
- 12 Joseph I. Breen to A. Reginald Allen, 13 May 1947, *Oliver Twist* file, Production Code Administration (PCA) files, Margaret Herrick Library, Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, Beverly Hills, CA, USA. For more on this controversy, see Thomas Doherty, *Hollywood's Censor: Joseph I. Breen & The Production Code Administration*

- (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 222–4; Anthony Slide, *Banned in the USA: British Films in the United States and Their Censorship, 1933–1960* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), 112–13.
- 13 Lean quoted in Phillips, *Beyond the Epic*, 129.
 - 14 McKee, 'Art or Outrage?', 44; John, 'Fagin, the Holocaust and Mass Culture', 207.
 - 15 See Slide, *Banned in the USA*, 113. Lean's *Oliver Twist* was eventually released in the United States in 1951 with twelve minutes of film cut.
 - 16 See Hansjörg Gehring, *Amerikanische Literaturpolitik in Deutschland 1945–1953: Ein Aspekt des Re-Education-Programms* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1976), 57–8.
 - 17 Charles Dickens, *Oliver Twist* (1837–1838; Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 1992), 70.
 - 18 *Ibid.*, 70 and 166.
 - 19 Charles Dickens to Mrs Eliza Davis, 1863, quoted in Deborah Heller, 'The Outcast as Villain and Victim: Jews in Dicken's *Oliver Twist* and *Our Mutual Friend*', in *Jewish Presences in English Literature*, ed. Derek Cohen and Deborah Heller (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990), 42.
 - 20 See Phillips, *Beyond the Epic*, 129.
 - 21 Drazin, 'Dickens's Jew'.
 - 22 Paganoni, 'From Book to Film', 311.
 - 23 *Ibid.*, 313.
 - 24 For the German dubbing cast, see Martin Schowanek, *Deutsche Synchronkartei*: <https://www.synchronkartei.de/film/3862> (accessed 22 October 2018).
 - 25 See Steven E. Aschheim, *Brothers and Strangers: The East European Jew in German and German Jewish Consciousness, 1800–1923* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 3; Julia Schulze Wessel, 'Zur Reformulierung des Antisemitismus in der deutschen Nachkriegsgesellschaft: Eine Analyse deutscher Polizeiakten aus der Zeit von 1945 bis 1948', in *Zwischen Selbstorganisation und Stigmatisierung: Die Lebenswirklichkeit jüdischer Displaced Persons und die neue Gestalt des Antisemitismus in der deutschen Nachkriegsgesellschaft*, ed. Susanne Dietrich and Schulze Wessel (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1998), 151.
 - 26 Aschheim, *Brothers and Strangers*, 3.
 - 27 *Ibid.*, 8.
 - 28 *Ibid.*, 11.
 - 29 *Ibid.*, 230.
 - 30 Paganoni, 'From Book to Film', 310.
 - 31 'Fagin in Berlin', *LIFE*, 39.
 - 32 See Clemens, *Britische Kulturpolitik*, 165.
 - 33 *Ibid.*, 174.
 - 34 *Ibid.*, 166–7.
 - 35 *Ibid.*, 170.
 - 36 'Provokation gegen das fortschrittliche Berlin', *Neues Deutschland*, 22 February 1949, 4.
 - 37 See 'Fagin in Berlin', *LIFE*, 38; 'Berlin Cinema Fight', *Manchester Guardian*, 5.
 - 38 Political Division to Foreign Office, 22 February 1949, FO 1056/265, The National Archives (London) (TNA).
 - 39 'Blutige Krawalle um *Oliver Twist*', *Der Sozialdemokrat*, 22 February 1949, 1.
 - 40 'Berlin Cinema Fight', *Manchester Guardian*, 5; 'Oliver Twist abgesetzt', *Der Tagesspiegel*, 22 February 1949, 4.
 - 41 'Gegen neofaschistische Rassehetze', *Berliner Zeitung*, 23 February 1949, 2.
 - 42 *Ibid.*

- 43 'Protest gegen *Oliver Twist*', *Neue Zeit*, 22 February 1949, 3.
- 44 'Oliver Twist', *Neues Deutschland*, 23 February 1949, 1.
- 45 'Eine Schande für das demokratische Berlin', *Neues Deutschland*, 23 February 1949, 8.
- 46 'Oliver Twist abgesetzt', *Der Tagesspiegel*, 4.
- 47 'Der eilige Protest: Zu dem Film *Oliver Twist*', *Der Kurier*, 21 February 1949, 3.
- 48 Arno Scholz, 'Auf deutschem Rücken ausgetragen', *Telegraf*, 22 February 1949, 16.
- 49 'Baton Charge', *Daily Telegraph*, 1.
- 50 'Tumulte gegen den Film *Oliver Twist*', *Der Sozialdemokrat*, 21 February 1949, 3.
- 51 'Blutige Krawalle', *Der Sozialdemokrat*, 1.
- 52 Political Division to Foreign Office, 22 February 1949, FO 1056/265, TNA.
- 53 Ibid.
- 54 Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (London: Vintage, 2004), 14–15.
- 55 See Jacobmeyer, 'Jüdische Überlebende als "Displaced Persons"', 421.
- 56 See Leonard Dinnerstein, 'Britische und amerikanische DP-Politik', in *Überlebt und unterwegs: Jüdische Displaced Persons im Nachkriegsdeutschland*, ed. Fritz Bauer Institut (Frankfurt: Campus, 1997), 109–10.
- 57 Earl G. Harrison, 'Text of Report to the President on Conditions among Refugees in Western Europe', *New York Times*, 30 September 1945, 38.
- 58 Ibid.
- 59 Ibid.
- 60 Ibid.
- 61 Cohen, *In War's Wake*, 135.
- 62 See Königseder and Wetzel, *Waiting for Hope*, 34.
- 63 See Grossmann, *Jews*, 140.
- 64 See Stern, 'The Historic Triangle', 219.
- 65 See Leonard Dinnerstein, 'America, Britain, and Palestine: The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry and the Displaced Persons, 1945–46', *Diplomatic History* 4, no. 3 (1980): 285; Königseder and Wetzel, *Waiting for Hope*, 38.
- 66 Patt and Berkowitz, 'We Are Here', 3.
- 67 See Grossmann, *Jews*, 132.
- 68 Königseder, *Flucht nach Berlin*, 205.
- 69 Grossmann, *Jews*, 165.
- 70 Laura J. Hilton, 'The Black Market in History and Memory: German Perceptions of Victimhood from 1945 to 1948', *German History* 28, no. 4 (2010): 488.
- 71 Ibid., 488 and 496.
- 72 See Königseder, *Flucht*, 182.
- 73 Hilton, 'The Black Market', 495.
- 74 See Königseder, *Flucht*, 188–9.
- 75 Koppel S. Pinson, 'Jewish Life in Liberated Germany: A Study of the Jewish DP's', *Jewish Social Studies* 9 (1947): 104.
- 76 Ibid., 113.
- 77 See Holian, *Between National Socialism*, 187.
- 78 Ibid., 190.
- 79 Hilton, 'The Black Market', 496.
- 80 See Königseder, *Flucht*, 197–8.
- 81 Ibid., 198–200.
- 82 Steven S. Schwarzschild, 'Quarterly Report to the World Union for Progressive Judaism 29th December 1948', *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook* 61 (2016): 236–7.
- 83 Schwarzschild, 'Highly Personal and Confidential Report', 245.

- 84 K. Küppers, 'Eine Berliner Meinung zu Oliver Twist', letter to General Brian Robertson, Berlin, 26 February 1949, FO 1056/265, TNA.
- 85 'Berliners Not to See *Oliver Twist*', *The Times*, 23 February 1949, 3.
- 86 'Baton Charge', *Daily Telegraph*, 1.
- 87 'Berliners Not to See *Oliver Twist*', *Times*, 3.
- 88 See 'Veit Harlan vor Gericht', *Telegraf* (Berlin edition), 4 March 1949, 2.
- 89 See Noack, *Veit Harlan*, 300.
- 90 'Jud Süß und *Oliver Twist*', *Berliner Zeitung*, 26 February 1949, 3.
- 91 See Zielinski, *Veit Harlan*, 47.
- 92 The prosecution immediately appealed this decision, and another trial was held in 1950 – also resulting in an acquittal.
- 93 See Baer, *Dismantling the Dream Factory*, 203.
- 94 'Freispruch für Veit Harlan: Ernste Warnung und Mahnung der Berliner VVN', *Neues Deutschland*, 24 April 1949, 7.
- 95 'Wider den Blut-Regisseur: Protest gegen den Freispruch im Harlan-Prozeß', *Berliner Zeitung*, 29 April 1949, 3.
- 96 *Ibid.*, 3.
- 97 'Was das Hamburger Gericht vergessen hat', *Neue Zeit*, 24 April 1949, 1.
- 98 Schwarzschild, 'Highly Personal and Confidential Report', 247.