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Introduction: Evental History and the Humanities

Michael J. Kelly

*Lex divina triplici sentienda est modo: primo ut historice, secundo ut tropo-
logice, tertio ut mystice intellegatur. Historice namque iuxta litteram, tropo-
logice iuxta moralem scientiam, mystice iuxta spiritalem intellegentiam.*¹

In the past few decades, scholars have celebrated the end of history and proclaimed its rebirth. Outside the walls of the academy, in the media, it is easy to find claims that readers and viewers are “witnessing” (or consuming) history, that certain events, from pie-eating contests to war catastrophes and natural phenomena, are “historical.” Governments too are part of this trend, with the US Senate, for example, establishing a formal definition of history in 2006.² This increasing interest in the historical has emerged, in large measure, from elementary and outdated notions of history, eliciting the questions that drive this volume: what role does History, the discipline and its professionals, play amidst an expanding public craving for history and revived discourses in historical theory? To what extent is History informing and leading the discussion on history and on the past? What is its impact on historical theory? These are fresh and urgent questions for the field and for the state of history publicly, and they deserve a collective and inclusive response. This volume aims to initiate that response by exploring the current relationship between History and its cognate humanistic disciplines. To develop a reflection on History itself, this volume looks at History from the perspective of the Humanities.³

The contributions to this volume, and their respective authors, represent a spectrum of humanistic inquiry: anthropology and archaeology, architecture, art, design, education and pedagogy, medieval studies, music, theater and performance, law, literature, rhetoric, and philosophy. By exploring the humanistic

fields with which History is in dialogue, as well as the institutions that correlate between them, the discussions presented can serve as a firm basis through which to elicit original discourses between History and the other Humanities. The chapters of this volume introduce complementing and common theses and have been arranged accordingly. Primary themes and topics include: facticity, facts and the event of (historical) “truth”; objectivity and subjectivity; and the disagreements, and at times apparent dissonance, between History and other humanistic fields, and the partial reconciliations between them since the linguistic turn and postmodernity.

The expanding interest in evental history, today, is largely the result of a diverse, interdisciplinary engagement with the work of Alain Badiou—corresponding to the general proposition that Philosophy presently steers historical theory (to the detriment of History). Badiou’s historical theory is more the product of scholars’ careful exposition of his writing than his own advanced historical-theoretical exposition.⁴ The first *Being and Event* (1988) develops a theory of being. The second, titled *Logics of Worlds* (2006), develops a theory of appearing. In *Logics of Worlds*, Badiou tackles the question of how a truth appears in a world, which can be read as “how history can happen”? Badiou refers to this mode of appearing as a subject-body, a new subject is born from fidelity to a trace-event, which one can call “historical becoming.” Thus, truth engenders history. For Badiou, philosophy cannot find or develop new truths. Neither can history be about finding or creating truths. Truths find history; that is to say, historical conditions develop by which a truth can (re-)emerge from the void (through, as I argue elsewhere, the antihistorian).⁵ In short, history is the history of truth; there is no history of the finite, only of the eternal; history is singularly associated with humanity (which is not to say the latter).

In *The Rebirth of History*, Badiou effectively lays out his philosophy of history, alternatively the history of truth, by analyzing recent riots around the world and schematizing the process of revolt. Here, he establishes three types of riots: *immediate*, *latent*, and *historical*. The immediate riot is the unexpected moment in a world, when the possibility to describe the current state of the world springs forth, announcing through its action that there is a truth that does not fit into this world: for example, the communist idea. The latent riot is the period when subjective decisions are being made, when it comes to be decided whether the immediate riot will be an event or not, and this is defined by subjective choice: faithful, reactive, or obscure (occult). The subject that is born from these riots—a subject for Badiou is almost always a group, or collection of people, or a party, or a movement—who is faithful to the event of the emergence of

the new truth inaugurates a third stage of riot: the historical riot. The historical riot occupies a space and has a unified commitment to alterity; a unified Idea, it is the rebirth of a truth.

A historical riot represents the emergence of one political truth only; fidelity to the event that brought forth the truth and is now an event-trace in the historical riot: as Badiou states in *Theory of the Subject*, “there is only one political subject for any historicization.”⁶ Accordingly, the *subject is always an exception to the world*, the subject is *always constituted, rare, finite and dependent on an event*. The subject is an exception to the situation, in a relationship to something in its world as also to something outside of it, an alternative truth, and it is in this paradoxical relationship that history becomes interesting, because it is here that the subject can touch the infinite and elicit a riot (a revolt against the norms)—a disruption that has the potential to call forth the philosophical conditions for a new truth.

Political solutions, that is, new political truths, emerge from outside history, and yet, history is fundamental to their creation. History is meant as a form of organization, a methodology. Central to Badiou’s argument is that riots, including the historical riot, are precursors to the political; *history is prepolitical*. With the birth of a subject in its fidelity in the historical riot, people who are present in the world but absent from its power begin to become present, that is, there is a “historical” awakening, or, rebirth. The so-called Arab Spring, for Badiou, ushered in a new historical sequence, a new time, the coming to the end of the current period and the beginning of an event that could lead to a new historical sequence if the riots (bodies and languages) lead to an Idea (i.e., the political truth, the “communist hypothesis”). The goal of riots and the rebirthing of history is, for Badiou, the return to the world of the communist hypothesis, which simply means: “the proposition that the subordination of labour to the dominant class is not inevitable.”⁷ The “rebirth of history” represents this universal communist potential.

Badiou’s philosophy of history maintains history as a temporal descriptor; history is a sequence of time, as historical riots open the chance for new “long-term temporalities.”⁸ History maintains, as a possibility, the reemergence of the communist hypothesis. History is thus, for Badiou, a fragmented collection (or not) of sequences defined by the subordination of labor to the dominant classes. History, in this sense, is a temporal-atemporal, double-sided line of truths, a meta-history that weaves its way alongside human existence; in certain moments the communist hypothesis exposes itself, while, mostly, an absence of history is characterized by this suppression. Sometimes history exists and

sometimes it is inexistent, and this existence/inexistence is directly correlated to the existence/inexistence of history and politics. Historical becoming is the chance for the rebirth of politics; the rebirth of history represents the chance for a rebirth of politics, and so the communist hypothesis.

In “History and Event,” Quentin Meillassoux claims that for Badiou “there is only a history of the eternal, because only the eternal proceeds from the event.”⁹ Meillassoux is correct: what this means is that history can only be the history of the eternal since truths are eternal and history is only about seizing truths. Truths and history derive from the finite but are, in themselves, infinite. From this logic, Meillassoux argues, truths are both eternal and historical, which might be clarified as *truths are eternal because they are historical*. Truths elicit history, they are history, and they are what end an intervallic period (between history and nonhistory). They and so history are eternal and infinite and capable of being reborn perpetually. Because they are infinite, though, they cannot be repeated: we cannot repeat history. “Marxism, the workers’ movement, mass democracy, Leninism, the party of the proletariat, the socialist state—all the inventions of the 20th century—are not really useful to us any more.”¹⁰

Hence Badiou’s philosophy of history is a double-sided, uneven relationship between infinity and finitude, between nonappearance and appearing, that cannot accommodate a vision of perpetual progress (or regression). History is radical potential, the grounding of a radical politics, or rather, I would say, anti-history is the grounding, the historical riot is the antihistorical event (eliciting evental history). Badiou’s philosophy of history (re-)announces universal historical truths, in the sense that there are and must be the possibility for materially derived transcendental truths that do not fit into the logics of a world, but that can enter it through the conditions that bring forth the “riot” (antihistory), and which can start to be reborn through the historical riot. Performance reopens the past, thereby cutting a hole in the logic of the world.

Incorporating performance into historical analysis is central to History and the supplemental disciplines analyzed throughout this volume. Performance provides the basis for the unpredictable truth-event, and, in this way, is foundational to History. New musicology, as J. P. E. Harper-Scott elaborates below, instead of associating performance and text into an evental history establishes them as dichotomous, with a privileging of the latter, the historical object. Harper-Scott’s model for showing this is the history of Beethoven. In the history of rap one can find a similar situation in the historiography of lyrics versus beats, which narrows the possibilities for rap’s historical becoming and proliferates an “end of rap” narrative. The “end of history,” Berlin-wall-fall moment

for rap happened in the mid-1990s with the suspicious deaths of leading antiestablishment—lyrics-based—rappers: Eazy-E, Tupac Shakur, Biggie Smalls, and Big L. This ended a dialectical moment in which lyrics and beats competed to perform truth-eliciting events. The formal history of rap was subsequently transfigured, imagining itself at an end because the lyricists were dead. Only recently have historians of rap, largely rappers themselves, called for the refocusing of our historical attention away from the agency of any particular rapper or style and onto the subsequent subjective situation that has occurred.¹¹ Historical truth emerges not from Tupac or Beethoven, *per se*, but from the performances of the objective works within a subjectivation process.

“Evental History” pervades the volume’s contributions; understanding it is useful for comprehending the displacement of History (from other fields, from “objectivity,” etc.) and what it means—in a postmodern world—to speak of historical “truth,” facts, and the process of subjectivity and objectivity. This is not to say that there cannot be fair criticisms of a Badiouian-inspired historical investigation, for surely there can. For instance, Badiou’s philosophy of history rightly rejects the (Hegelian-Marxian, or historicist) chain of history and the “democratic materialist” (“there are only bodies and languages”¹²) sublimation of truths, and so potential alterities (i.e. alternative historical sequences), into the logic of the present. However, by generalizing about the “truth” of an event and then about another event as a rebirth of this truth (e.g. the Spartacus event and its universality), Badiou, it could be argued, constructs narrative representations to impose a truth onto or into a historical sequence; this historiographical work, places the logic of the present into the event-trace subjective process, subverting radical potential. Even if so, what we should take is that history remains the history of truths elicited within the conditions for a new historical sequence and that these conditions are defined by performance and the unexpected arrival from those events of a new truth. Badiouian evental history not only influences current thinking across the Humanities, but also presents the vital concept of history as an infinite/finite set in which History involves action and thought, truth, and facts.

Another theme common throughout the volume, and one that F. R. Ankersmit particularly addresses, is the issue of facts, in this case, the shared yet oppositional reliance on facts for historians and lawyers: “But whereas facts are for the historian the basis for coming to a picture of the past, lawyers use them for pronouncing a sentence (or for disputing it). And there is a world of difference between the two.” In other words, lawyers analyze facts not according to the narrative they can construct, but rather weighed against established rules

(law). I would argue that legal historians embrace this legalistic methodological approach in the analysis of their historical objects, leading to a relatively closed legalist-historical discourse and a discursively crippling gap between Legal History and History (akin to Art History and History [see the contribution of Javier López-Alós]).

Legal History is perhaps unique among the humanistic fields in its methodological approach to the past: in law, the past provides modes of inquiry, determination, and outcome for the present: there is no veil over the present and future function of the past and the subjectivity of legal research and defense via historical precedent. This subjective approach leaves open the past for seemingly endless interpretation, and continuous—and at times spontaneous and random—existence in the present. This exceptionality tends to isolate legal history, to make it insular, offering itself as a perfect case study for Luhmann-style social systems theory.¹³ This insularity is neither a model for the relationship between the Humanities and History, nor for the Humanities and society.

The idea of law as a bubble is problematic for history as for its cognate disciplines, especially literary history—itself notably aligned today (as Andre Szczawlińska Muceniecks discusses) with History. The history of the law-history-literature relationship is one of a subjective processing, an existent/non-existent open association between them. In the Middle Ages, from the seventh and eighth centuries (from the *Liber Iudiciorum* and Isidore of Seville's *Origin of the Goths*), law and history were intertwined as narrative devices, making the boundary between legal history and literary history hard to discern (if in fact we should try to do so).¹⁴ At the turn of early modernity, the sixteenth century, some writers imagined legal history via a prism of literary history, but by ("by" because the response was directly to the sixteenth-century scholars) the early seventeenth century, a new historicist approach emerged in which legal history was isolated from literature and wider history: an "objective distancing" in its protoform. One of the best examples of this is the 1613 edition of the *Liber Iudiciorum*—an early medieval Iberian law code—produced by Friedrich Lindenbrog, who removed—from the two existing editions of the code—the literary texts from the legal compilations.¹⁵ Ernest Metzger, historian of Roman Law, maintains that this shift began in earnest in the nineteenth century, simultaneous to the rise of professional history and objectivity.¹⁶

Modernism's "spacing"—or splicing—of History from its cognate disciplines is another common theme in this volume. For Rik Peters, historians began distancing themselves from rhetoric in the nineteenth century, returning to it in the mid-twentieth century after the linguistic turn, which is also the moment,

as Muceniecks demonstrates, that archaeology and history begin a reconciliation precisely by their shared embrace of the linguistic turn and, later, postmodernism. A related theme flowing throughout this volume is the centrality of the linguistic turn to History and its relationship to other disciplines. Almost universally, any rapprochement that occurs does so from this moment. One of the greatest effects of the linguistic turn was to reconnect History to its cognate disciplines.

For example, as Muceniecks shows, archaeology, in its desire to “progress” into a “science,” left history behind in the mid-twentieth century by clinging to the old objectivist ideas of history. As such, it seems to me, archaeology—although claiming to be “new” and independent—was reproducing precritical historical paradigms that took the written word (history’s “matter” [see Adi Efal-Lautenschläger’s chapter]) for what it was, and, in this way, ironically, by trying to separate itself from history, archaeology actually reified its subordinate place vis-à-vis history: archaeology’s “matter” became proof enough of the past in ways history’s could no longer be. The ironic antihistoricism that emerged in archaeology led it to resent history, which was replaced in some places by anthropology. “Methodologically,” Muceniecks explains, “this schism applied a new rule on the interpretation of the past: the dominion of the “true,” of the “reality,” provided by material culture against the distortion made through the written sources.” Biblical archaeologists took on the role of “historian” in the new constellation, detached from the radical methodological changes happening in history. The former left theologians to deal with the texts and instead focused on the materiality of objects.

Not unlike this processualist drive of twentieth-century archaeology or disconnected from historicism, legal history in modern scholarship saw its historical object (and clearly not law as a subject) scientifically, as something that develops and produces “knowledge.” In contrast to an interpretive or narrative methodology, modern legal scholars imagine/d legal history as epistemological, and as an object outside of history.¹⁷ In this mode of analysis, law is part of the evolutionary present, tying legal history—one could say, following Ankersmit’s chapter—to juridical discourse, with its indefinite prolongation of the present according to the logics of a legal system.¹⁸ Early medieval legal history, for its part, provides a model for the reconciliation between legal history and history, one with a now-familiar story: the mid-twentieth-century transformations in the study of early medieval legal history came via the rethinking of history in History elicited by the linguistic turn and postmodernism.¹⁹ The question today is what will become of the relationships between legal history

and History, History and the Humanities, and within History, as we navigate our ways through postnarrativist, neomodernist and “speculative” turns? Moreover, in what ways can engagement with evental history help break formal logics of continuity, reground dialectical facts, and reconnect History and theory.

In “From the Extended Mind to the Anthropocene: Rethinking Scale in Literary History,” **Arthur Rose** reads Samuel Beckett’s *Endgame* (1957) against the variance of scale introduced to literary history by the Extended Mind Hypothesis and the Anthropocene. The purpose of this case study is to challenge the functionality of the Extended Mind and the Anthropocene for literary history. These theoretical paradigms shift the possible scope for literary history, either limiting it to presence and environment or extending it in epochal fashion. The result is a form of historicism—itself a problem that both F. R. Ankersmit and Samaila Suleiman address in their respective chapters—that eliminates the necessary historical category of present and leads to a preimaginative (historical imagination relying on the mind and human action as historical object), speculative literary history.

In his contribution, “How We Got Out of Music History, and How We Can Get Back into It,” **J. P. E. Harper-Scott** interrogates the relationship between the Badiouian event and music history by turning the question of “what kind of object is music” into “what kind of subject is music?” To make this move, Harper-Scott outlines the four methodologies of new musicology, as identified by James Hepokowski. Each strategy approaches music from different angles, but the core (and nondialectical) dichotomy established between them is the reading of music either as a textual object or a performative one. The primary absence shared by all the strategies is subjective, namely, the existence of a subject faithful to a music event, whether read as textual or performative. This recognition of the need for History to be the history of a truth, a subjective process in a situation, leads Harper-Scott to call for a music history grounded in evental history. Complementing the example of Beethoven, as a way to demonstrate the meaning of evental history for music, Harper-Scott frames his chapter, from the outset, around the defeat of the Soviet Union. He does so because, apropos Badiou’s theory of history, the moment from the fall of the Berlin wall until now is an intervallic one, an ahistorical period between communist situations.

In her contribution, “Humanist Matters,” **Adi Efal-Lautenschläger** explains the historian’s craft as fundamentally material, grounded in the examination of works, objects. To do this, Efal-Lautenschläger presents four “humanist matters” with which history is constructed: instruments, elements, documents, and

monuments. The aim is to look at how the four are collated: this will provide the humanist habitus. For Efal-Lautenschläger: instruments form the objective motor of historiography, driving the researcher to inquire and investigate; elements arise when the historian employs the revealed instruments to see the constituent parts of the historical substance (understanding elements in an Aristotelian, or Euclidean, way); the document is the evidentiary object: that which “proves” (after being conditioned into factualness, via the prescribed process of *factualité* of the other humanist matters); the document also presents the possibilities for a new reading, an alternative interpretation, serving as a site on which alternative historiographies, correlational to the previous, can be constructed. It is additionally a look back to a beginning, which Efal-Lautenschläger claims is the essence of humanist history; finally, monuments “immortalize the deed.” As such, Efal-Lautenschläger presents a Badiouian-style four-part procedure for the humanist habitus and the production of historical truth, from event to nomination. This humanist history Efal-Lautenschläger grafts into a discussion on memory and mnemonic content of the humanist matters. The task of the humanist is, she claims, “to remember well.” Finally, she presents the Bergsonian distinction between (historical) memory and (historical) imagination: effectively passive vs. active historical reconstruction.

How does rhetoric employ the concept of history? This is the central question of **Rik Peters**’s chapter, “The Rhetoric of Time and the Time of Rhetoric.” Peters introduces this question as a self-reflective device for the field of rhetorical analysis, which needs, he claims, to reimagine its relationship to history. Since the linguistic turn, historians have actively investigated the rhetorical components of History and have largely embraced rhetorical analysis as crucial to the field. Rhetorical analysis, in contrast, has not yet done the same sort of interrogation of its historical components, leading, Peters argues, to the paradoxical condition in which “rhetorical analysis does not apply its most basic assumption to itself.” Peters’s task is to refigure rhetorical discourse analysis via contemporary historical theory to reconnect to History and by which rhetoric can understand “its own historicity.”

Peters builds his argument for a rapprochement between history and rhetoric by showing that, like rhetoric, “historical interpretation is a creative reconstruction to solve problems in the present.” The historical model and theory Peters uses are the case of Admiral Horatio Nelson’s last words “in honor I won them, in honor I will die with them” and the encapsulation theory of R. G. Collingwood, which demonstrates that history is a process of rhetorical interpretation that begins with the event under analysis and carries on to the present.

Interpreters (read: historians) understand the meanings of texts as responses to contemporary rhetorical situations. The interpreter can analyze the past with a view on the future, which provides the perspective from which all speeches are reinterpreted. Thus, history and rhetoric are reunited by this, the idea that all historians and rhetoricians construct arguments with an eye to the future, and that their interpretations and their rhetorical meanings will also change because the idea of the future continuously changes, hence rhetoric is always in time, is always historical.

F. R. Ankersmit, in his chapter, "Past, Present, and Future," sets out to preserve the historical demarcation of the past, present, future, that is, the preservation of the category of the present, against historicism's continuity approach to the past. He does this by way of the historical theory of Reinhart Koselleck and the historical example of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs), and their association to juridical (vs. historical) discourse. According to Ankersmit, Koselleck, responding to historicism's elimination of the present as a category (by relativizing all moments), preserved it by postulating a permanent gap between the space of experience (the past [*Erfahrungsraum*]) and the horizon of expectations (the future [*Erwartungshorizont*]). The TRCs are presented as a model case study for defending Koselleck's theory of history (of demarcated spaces), since they "must function in a context exemplifying most clearly the present's relationship to both the past and the future;" they need to clearly distinguish the past, present, and future. Koselleck is revolutionary by providing the present a space of its own via preserved discourse with the past and future. This recognition of the asymmetry of the past and future is crucial to preventing the past and the future from invading the present and ruining it as a space of its own—law, or juridical discourse, allows one to stretch the present indefinitely; law creates a space for the present to live.

Ankersmit contends that the category of the present is essential for historical theory, essential for historians to be able to construct arguments about the past; the present needs to be maintained as the "other," a site from which to gaze at the past outside of it. Contemporary history is, therefore, legitimate only if the present is its own category and is recognized as such also beyond history, for example in law (and politics). Through Koselleck and the TRCs, Ankersmit presents an eventual history, history as a sequence of interruptions and subjective processes instead of a continuity; historical truths remain immanent, whether actualized during a historical situation or nonappearing in an intervallic period. "Second, it cannot be denied that there are parts of the past with which we can impossibly identify ourselves any longer. Examples would be the Egypt of the

Pharaohs or the Persia of Xerxes and Darius. Although it has to be admitted that even these remote pasts can be quite persistent and tend to die off very, very slowly. Moreover, under certain circumstances they can be resuscitated and regain a prominent place in our identities.”

In dialogue with Ankersmit and the topic of the TRCs’ engagement with history and juridical discourse, **Samaila Suleiman**, in “The Nigerian ‘History Machine,’” presents the century celebrations of Nigeria’s existence as a national entity as a case study in the state’s relationship to History. These 2012 celebrations called for the creation of a historical narrative to show that Nigeria’s existence was legitimate and “not a historical accident.” By them, Suleiman challenges the idea that Nigerian history has been insular professionally and internationally. In contrast to previous historiography, Suleiman examines Nigerian history not via its past and artifacts, but rather by the “real” institutions that are responsible for regulating historical knowledge in Nigeria, such as the National Archives, the National Commission for Museums and Monuments, the Historical Society of Nigeria, and the National Universities Commission.” This is tantamount to the History Machine, which polices the parameters of historical discourses subsequently available to professional historians; the making of history in postcolonial Nigeria, Suleiman argues, “is the function of a collaborative regime of knowledge production, which is, at least at the initial stage, essentially state-driven.” Although historians, archaeologists, and museum curators operate along distinct professional and disciplinary tracks and in separate institutional sites in Nigeria, they work, often unwittingly, in a gigantic knowledge industry.

“The chapter is based on the premise that the links between history as an academic field and the actual sites where historical knowledge is produced such as the archive, the museum, and the publishing house are grossly undertheorized.” Suleiman illustrates how history is created outside the academy, and proposes that we need a broader methodology for interpreting the generic procedure of history-making as part of state and international machines of representing, preserving, and presenting the past. It is the dialectics between the institutions that make history—academia, the state, museums, corporations, etc. (i.e. the history machine)—that represent the output and meaning of history. In contrast to the example of the South African TRC, which rejected historical discourse in favor of juridical discourse, the de-colonializing Nigerian state chose history as its primary ally in dealing with the past. This is because the TRC’s aim is “to pronounce a sentence,” while the Nigerian history machine’s aim is to legitimize a state.

In “History as a Scam: Confrontation and Resentment between Archaeology and History,” **Andre Szczawlinska Muceniecks** critically confronts one of the most dynamic and complex interdisciplinary relationships: History versus Archaeology, which together demonstrate par excellence the humanist habitus. In his pivotal chapter, Muceniecks addresses common themes prevalent throughout the volume: the genealogy of the divide between History and other disciplines; the how and why of accord; and the tendency to antagonistic or apathetic sentiments of nonhistorians toward history, a field which Karl Popper considered particularly unintellectual.²⁰ It is this particular issue, of History being considered, in this case by archaeologists, as “outdated” or unimportant, that Muceniecks interrogates. His case study is the “minimalist” (the text is useless) versus “maximalist” (trust the text more) dispute in biblical studies, a debate that revolves around different values assigned to the written text (a dichotomy not dissimilar to that Harper-Scott reveals in new musicology), in this case the Bible. The debate between the two schools, Muceniecks argues, “should be understood as part of the larger discordance between culture-historical and processual archaeology.”

Muceniecks constructs his argument by way of an extended “standard” narrative history on the growth of archaeological research in Palestine, which serves as a brilliant “occupation” of the archaeological by the historical. After the Palestine example, showing the grounding problems of archaeology: namely archaeology as supplemental to the textual evidence, Muceniecks moves into the 1960s-on growth of “new archaeology,” the turn away from history and the assertion of archaeology as both independent from History and as a hard science that understands “culture” accordingly. The result of this processualism was the creation of a schism fueled by the archaeologist, who saw history as a distorter of truth because of its shift in methodology after the linguistic turn and toward critical theory and the recognition of the subjectivity of all things. Ultimately, processualism was deconstructed by younger archaeologists who embraced the increasingly theoretical paradigms of critical theory, especially as employed in History. Whereas the processualists are “objective,” “scientific,” and firmly against history, the postprocessualists are secure enough of the independence of archaeology to open it up to postmodernist critique and have developed their own critical apparatus. In so doing, they have been able to reconcile with History and deliver to it a model for intradisciplinary theoretical development, which History needs to take seriously.

Javier López-Alós, in his chapter, “Alternative Forms of Historical Writing: Concepts and Facts in Goya’s *Disasters of War*,” turns the reader’s

attention to the estranged relationship between Art History and History. López-Alós seeks to transcend this impasse by complicating the relationship and illustrating how the former's methodology is based on a subjective disposition that can inform the latter. His case study by which to develop this claim is the set of eighty-five etchings on the Peninsula War (*la Guerra de la Independencia*) drawn by Francisco de Goya and referred to as *Disasters of War*. These were drawn between c. 1810 and 1820, but were published only in 1863, more than three decades after Goya's death. An analysis of the etchings and a narration of the history behind their production and publication reveal an underlying tension within them between secularization and progress, on the one hand, and religion on the other, but, more to the point, they also demonstrate an image of historical memory incommensurate with "facts," of the (historical) truth-eliciting confrontation between aesthetics and historical writing. "The plates which conclude the war series reflect the limits in narrating the past, and impact upon the conditions of possibility of historical writing." Thus, when considered as a historical set, the *Disasters* force the interpreter to question the "*a priorisms*" by which history operates.

In her chapter, "'Methods of Reasoning and Imagination': History's Failures and Capacities in Anglophone Design Research," Sarah Teasley shifts the reader's focus from the problematics of Art History to an investigation of the role of History within Design Research and the potentialities a new discourse between them can elicit. As Teasley explains, "Design" refers to an array of practices that coalesce around their shared responsibilities within the creation and performance of artifacts, which include the expected tangible objects, but also mentally and socially constructed patterns of policy, action, and innovation. Taking cue from recent changes in the definition of design by the World Design Organization (WDO)[™], she questions both the interdisciplinary commitments and the right to definition. Design pedagogy, she notes, tends to understand History as a source of critical theory and methodology, while design practice and research often engage an elementary conception of history as a receptacle of the past, one whose contents may be plucked out in the hopes of stimulating innovation. This gap between pedagogy and practice is reflected in the academic/funding tendencies of Design Research, with its historic relationship to engineering and more recent turn to social science methodologies, and distance from Arts and Humanities approaches. Teasley bridges this divide by bringing History—with its reliance on scientific analysis and rhetorical creativity—more actively into conversation with Design Research. The effect of this new dialogue is to strengthen the critical methodologies of both history and

design. In overcoming their often mutually reductive readings of one another, then, Teasley ultimately demonstrates, History and Design Research can redefine the limits of the possible for each other, and, in so doing, mutually enhance the impact of both.

In conclusion, a reading of the gaze from our fellow humanistic disciplines reveals how History is a primary field and its theoretical and methodological apparatuses crucial for the study of core existential topics in the Humanities: issues of being, time, meaning, memory, space, knowledge and identity. The chapters of this volume demonstrate that History's discourses have set the research tone at various points across a number of humanistic fields (archaeology, rhetoric, law, etc.), while for others (literary history, musicology, art history, philosophy, etc.) its influence has been less sustaining. In all cases, it is evident that History has struggled to remain at the innovative threshold in the study of the past—in whatever way it is imagined and performed. Even for those fields for which History has had extensive theoretical and methodological impact, breaks have occurred that have forced fields in the Humanities to uncritically reproduce older historical paradigms, thereby reducing History's capacity to influence the broader making of history. If History is to become the theoretical and methodological innovator and leading voice of its own disciplinary aims, it needs—we historians need—to make History more available to its fellow humanistic disciplines. Yet, in complementary fashion, for the imagined output of such an innovation to be delineated across the Humanities (to become “generic”), informed fairly by each of the humanistic disciplines, historical theory—historical theorists—must in turn respond.

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