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Culture and Enterprise: The Arts from 1979

In the Conservative manifesto of 1979, Margaret Thatcher made it clear that under her administration culture, which J. B. Priestley had once described as essential to society as the 'yeast in the dough', could no longer rely on state support, but must go out into the marketplace. Both in her ideological Conservatism and in her economic policies, Thatcher represented a marked shift away from the Keynesian economics that had shaped the post-war consensus for public funding in Britain. The arts were expected to find funding from 'patronage', both private and industrial. The Conservative manifesto on the arts read:

Economic failure and Socialist policies have placed the arts under threat. Lightening the burden of tax should in time enable the private sponsor to flourish again and the reform of capital taxation will lessen the threat to our heritage . . . We will continue to give as generous support to Britain's cultural and artistic life as the country can afford. (Conservative Party Manifesto, 1979, www.politicsresources.net, accessed August 2011)

It would become apparent over the next two decades that 'the country' would not afford much generous support for the arts and that the 'private sponsor' would be the way forward. The Chair of the Arts Council was so concerned at Conservative policy that he wrote to Mrs Thatcher, as leader of the Opposition; her much publicized response was: 'I can assure you that we will continue to support the arts, though the precise level of expenditure and the rate at which it can be increased must inevitably depend on the economic situation we inherit' (quoted in Baldry 1981). The first of Thatcher's Arts Ministers, Norman St John Stevas, was himself an academic and a lover of the visual arts and of opera; he expressed the widely shared affection for the Arts Council and described it as 'one of the happiest constitutional inventions of the century' (quoted in Shaw 1987, p. 40). Nonetheless, after Thatcher's election victory,

the arts were among the first to be included on the list of public spending cuts. The entrepreneurial Conservatism championed by the Thatcher government promoted the market as the defining field for all aspects of life; every part of the welfare state was now required to 'economise', to save money and to find private funding wherever it could. The Sports Council had set up a working party on sponsorship as early as 1970, and the apparent success of sponsorship in the sporting arena seemed to offer a model which the arts could emulate¹. This was a government committed to a considerable reduction in public spending (the 1980 November White Paper on public expenditure envisaged cuts of £3,500 million in 1980–81, with the only exceptions being defence, the police and social services); sport, the arts and culture were largely expected to find their own way and income. The White Paper made it clear that the government was promoting the direct involvement of commercial interests in what had once been understood as public services.

Commercial sponsorship of the arts was thus vigorously encouraged under Thatcherite social policy and, impelled by government cuts to local government and to arts bodies, would flourish throughout the 1980s. Cultural institutions which had once considered private sponsorship of public cultural events as undesirable, if not inappropriate, were now required by government policy and cuts to their funding to seek private sponsorship. Sponsorship extended into areas which had never before felt the need to involve commercial interests in their activities; public libraries, festivals, arts and sporting events faced with budget cuts in local government all had to find sponsorship of some kind. A series of reductions in the budgets of such bastions of British culture as the Tate Gallery, the National Theatre, the Royal Shakespeare Company, the Royal Opera House, which had once been seen as inviolable and as sources of national pride, meant that these national institutions were as vulnerable as locally funded bodies, and in a financial position that required them to seek commercial partners.

A 1976 Conservative discussion paper, 'The Right Approach: A Statement of Conservative Aims', had made it clear that private finance for the arts was to be encouraged and promised 'a sensible framework for finance, training and co-operation between public and private bodies' (www.margaretthatcher.org, accessed August 2011). Among the organizations that would prove central to that 'sensible framework' was the Association of Business Sponsorship of the Arts (ABSA), an agency which set out to make matches between those seeking sponsorship and advertisers and companies willing to provide it. ABSA was

founded in 1976, based on the American model of philanthropy (especially, the example of the Rockefeller Foundation) and influenced by the success of the sponsorship of sport. ABSA had already begun to promote arts sponsorship under Labour Minister of the Arts, Hugh Jenkins.

ABSA's brief was both to promote private sponsorship of the arts and to foster a public acceptance of this shift in approach to cultural funding. ABSA was funded with a start-up grant of £15,000 and registered as a charity. The idea of commercial sponsorship as a method of cultural funding may have preceded Thatcher's premiership, but it was with her first Conservative Government that commercial sponsorship became a significant factor in the economics of British cultural life. In 1976, ABSA had estimated that they raised £600,000 in sponsorship for the arts; by 1996, its then chairman could report: 'ABSA has fifty staff, ten offices and sponsorship has reached £85 million' (Tweedy 1996, p. 8). ABSA's founder director was the chair of Imperial Tobacco and a Conservative, Luke Rittner (who would, in 1983, become the secretary general of the Arts Council). It is not insignificant that the majority of members of the first board of ABSA were all associated with companies in need of burnishing their brand images; oil companies, large supermarkets and cigarette manufacturers. Members of the first advisory group committee included the managing director of Mobil Oil, the chair of Trust House Forte and representatives of WD. & H. O. Wills, the cigarette manufacturer. According to the economist Mary Allen: 'ABSA began fostering the notion of sponsorship as a business deal, in which the sponsoring business could - indeed should - expect promotional gains in return for their money' (Allen 1990, p. 4). Thus, ABSA, from its founding principles, was clear that sponsorship was not the philanthropic 'patronage' that St John Stevas had envisaged, but that it would bring sponsors real commercial benefits. The material provided to potential sponsors makes it quite clear that the publicity and positive branding attached to the sponsorship of arts events are of considerable value.

A 1978 Conservative discussion pamphlet, 'The Arts: The Way Forward', had argued that 'any government, whatever its political hue, should take some active steps to encourage the arts'. In his Preface, however, St John Stevas reiterated Thatcher's manifesto assertion that private patronage should flourish again and the 1976 paper's pledge that a Conservative government would provide a 'framework' to 'balance' public funding with private sponsorship. While St John Stevas claimed that the "Tory Party continues to take a keen, active and committed interest in the future of the arts in Britain and that we make some

claim to be the arts' best friend' (St John Stevas, 1978), some months after the election, St John Stevas had to concede that now the Conservatives were in office, this might no longer be the case: 'There will be no great sums for the arts from the Government in future. . . . State-side expansion has come to an end . . . we must look to the private sector for new sources of money' (St John Stevas, letter to the *Daily Telegraph*, quoted in Baldry, 1981). In the Conservative's first year of office, between 1979 and 1980, government funding for the arts was reduced by almost £5 million.

There were strong elements in the Conservative Party (with direct influence over Thatcher) which believed that state subsidy for the arts should be actively minimized or even abolished altogether. A publication from the Conservative Bow Group, *As You Like It: Private Support for the Arts*,² argued that the arts functioned best with the minimum of government support. The Selsdon Group made its position clear in the title of its paper, *A Policy for the Arts: Just Cut Taxes*; the group advocated a general lowering of taxes which, it suggested, would lead to mass patronage of the arts by middle-income society, and so obviate the need for public funding: 'Art has always been the ultimate form of spending for the rich: there is every reason to believe that in a society where there are very many well-off people rather than a few rich, a richer artistic and cultural life would develop' (Alexander 1978). The Selsdon Declaration stated the group's belief that: 'individual enterprise is the source of all progress in economics, the sciences and the arts and that the task of politics is to create a framework within which the individual can flourish' (www.selsdongroup.co.uk, accessed August 2011); there is here a distinct echo of the 1976 Conservative paper, 'The Right Approach'.

Despite Conservative calls to roll back state support for the arts, a 1982 report from the Education, Science and Arts Committee on *Public and Private Funding of the Arts*,³ reported that there was no significant evidence against the principle of public support for the arts, and indeed, argued that they were irresponsibly underfunded. The report nonetheless argued for a continued growth in business sponsorship (Shaw 1993, pp. 108–9); a sign that commercial sponsorship was now understood to be inevitable. Even those who had once vigorously defended state subsidy for the arts were persuaded of the necessity of sponsorship. Lord Goodman, former chair of the Arts Council, wrote a foreword to a lawyers' guidebook on sponsorship contracts in which he (somewhat reluctantly) concedes: 'It has become more and more evident with the years that money has to be winkled out of private or commercial purses if

the Arts are to be sustained at a proper level for a civilised country' (Goodman, p. vii). Townley and Grayson, the lawyers, make the same point and argue that sport and art could not continue without sponsorship. They situate their new expertise in sponsorship in the political context of the 1980s:

Without sponsorship it is now clear that sport, art and leisure could not survive economically at the public level . . . sponsorship has become important in both political and sociological terms. Subsidies and grants of the arts have fallen under the recessionary economic axe, and therefore arts organisations have looked for financial support from commerce in the form of sponsorship. (Townley and Grayson 1984, p. 3)

The Gulbenkian Foundation published a report, *AIM* (Arts Initiative and Money Project) in 1983, which similarly accepted that arts organizations were now required to seek commercial partners in the chill wind of government cuts. The AIM project was intended to find means of support for those arts administrators who were inexperienced (and often reluctant) in the pursuit of sponsorship. While acknowledging that the arts had been reliant on state funding, the report's introduction bleakly referenced St John Stevas' statements and spoke of the government's

. . . determination to limit public expenditure and indeed to reduce it in real terms. The arts . . . are almost totally dependent on local and national government for their maintenance and development . . . the Right Honorable Norman St John Stevas, MP, felt that the way for the arts to make up for its loss of real sustaining income was to encourage sponsorship and patronage from the commercial world . . . it seems likely that private funding of the arts will only account for a small percentage of the total costs. (Last 1984, p. i)

The former director of ABSA, Luke Rittner, was appointed as the secretary-general of the Arts Council in 1983, in a clear signal that business sponsorship was to be the future for arts funding policy. On his appointment as Arts Minister, Lord Gowrie told Roy Shaw, then chair of the Arts Council, that his main concern was to 'foster the growth of business sponsorship' – an interesting shift in terminology from the 'private sponsors' and 'patrons' that Thatcher and St John Stevas had earlier employed. One attempt to foster commercial sponsorship, the Business Sponsorship Incentive Scheme, was launched by Gowrie in 1984, and run by Richard Luce⁴, who would be Minister for the Arts between 1985 and 1995, 'incentive' was necessary, because commercial sponsors were not at the time rushing to become the 'other sources' of funding

that Thatcher and St John Stevas had envisaged. The scheme promised to match the contributions of first-time and existing sponsors; it was administered by ABSA and paid for out of government funds.

In 1981, ABSA produced a 'Guide for Sponsors' (itself sponsored by McKinsey and Company), in which there is a clear shift in tone from the patronage arguments of St John Stevas and the understanding that sponsorship contributed to a public good, to a recognition of the brand value that is associated with the arts. In the introduction, written by Rittner, the pitch to potential sponsors is overt in its championing of the commercial benefits of sponsorship:

In the past, business has supported the arts mainly as a contribution to the life of the community, in return for a modest acknowledgement - the patronage approach. Today companies are increasingly discovering that, properly handled, a sponsorship approach, whereby association with artistic enterprises is used to achieve specific public relations objective (sic), can make a significant contribution to their public image. (Rittner 1981, p. 2)

Not all Conservatives embraced this free-market approach to cultural provision; William Rees-Mogg, chair of the Arts Council from 1982 to 1989, wistfully reaffirmed the ideals of the post-war Arts Council, which, he said: 'adopted the principle that the arts, like education, health and social security, are universal goods, which ought to be available regardless of ability to pay' (quoted in Shaw 1987, p. 41); this was a statement from a Conservative at a time when public subsidy for the Arts Council had been slashed by half.

The 1985 Arts Council prospectus was titled *A Great British Success Story*; it did unequivocally call for an increase in public investment in the arts, but set out the case in terms of an economic rather than a social good:

... a thriving arts and entertainment industry of high quality is essential for deepening the experience and enjoyment of the people of Great Britain, for richly enhancing the nation's prestige overseas, and most significantly for the good of the British economy. A small increase in public funding will bring quick and sizeable returns. (quoted in Marwick 1990, p. 316)

The 'most significantly' here itself is significant, in signalling a shift in the priorities of the Arts Council, in which the value of the arts for their investment potential takes precedence over the benefits of the 'experience and enjoyment of the people of Great Britain', and even over British prestige abroad. This was a value for money argument, that a small government subsidy will pay substantial

dividends. The arts had become a cultural industry, rather than a benefit for the people; if the Arts Council were now expecting the organizations they oversaw to give a return on public investment, then no aspect of the welfare state was invulnerable. As Marwick puts it:

From the setting up of the Arts Council at the end of the war, the place of the arts in British society had scarcely been in doubt; but the case had never been put in quite this way before. . . . If the arts were no longer a case that justified state investment without promising an economic return and value for money, then there was no aspect of British society immune from the profit margin. The report concluded that the Arts Council delivered 'productivity and efficiency . . . Our product offers excellent value.' (Marwick 1990, p. 317)

British culture was thus a commodity that could be sold in the marketplace, its social and individual benefits a by-product of its economic potential. According to Marwick, the Arts Council saw the benefits to the nation from investment in the arts in these terms:

The nation benefits from investing in the arts, it is explained, because: most of the money is quickly recouped in taxes; the arts increase employment at low cost (thus incidentally producing savings in welfare payments); the arts help the regeneration of depressed inner cities; the arts vitalize the wider entertainment industry; the arts raise the nation's prestige; the arts are a substantial tourist attraction and foreign currency earner; and (last, but conceivably not least) the arts give great pleasure to millions of people. (Marwick 1990, p. 317)

These arguments from the Arts Council would be regularly redeployed by British cities asking for government support in their claims to be host cities for major cultural events, most evidently with the London bid for the Olympics.⁵

In 1986, private sponsorship of the arts was between £250,000 and £300,000, small change in terms of the actual cost of running such institutions as the National Gallery and National Theatre, although the sponsors' logos featured large on theatre programmes and exhibition posters, and banks of seats at the Royal Opera House and the National Theatre were reserved for corporate entertainment. The more prominently the sponsor's name was displayed on poster or programmes, the more easily could the sponsorship be accepted against tax, while also garnering more attention for the sponsor.

Writing in 1988, Sue Kirby identified the nebulous nature of commercial sponsorship of the arts, in which the requirements and responsibilities of both sponsor and organization remained unclear:

Sponsorship is a mutually advantageous collaboration between business and the arts. The museum or gallery receives a much needed injection of cash and possible contact with new groups of people while the company enhances its image and receives good publicity. . . . (Kirby 1998, p. 97)

Kirby recognizes here that sponsorship of the arts offered business companies a means of furthering brand awareness, an indirect form of advertising and an environment which could impress corporate clients – just as sponsorship had done with sporting events. Kirby references the Nuclear Physics/Nuclear Power Gallery which had opened at the Science Museum in 1982 and which was sponsored by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, the Central Electricity Generating Board and British Nuclear Fuels Limited. These organizations loaned exhibits, and the Atomic Energy Authority provided three audio-visual programmes. It is clear that the exhibition could not but be positive about nuclear energy, although as Kirby pointed out, it was the museum itself which made the largest financial contribution to the gallery (Kirby 1988). Another case of sponsorship shaping an ostensibly museum-curated exhibition was the Boilerhouse Gallery at the Victoria and Albert Museum, which was independently operated by the Conran Foundation, under the auspices of the Victoria and Albert Museum. A history of industrial design culminated in a display case of Conran products as the pinnacle of design history.

By 1990, sponsorship of the Arts in the United Kingdom was estimated at £30 million (Allen 1990, p. 7) and a number of new organizations were set up to encourage its growth; in 1990, ABSA set up the ABSA Development Forum ‘for the fund-raising profession in the arts’. The pursuit of sponsorship was now an expected administrative role, and the fundraiser intrinsic to any arts organization. The most direct form of encouragement to seek sponsors, was, however, the continuing cuts to public funding of arts events. A 1987 restructuring of the Arts Council cut the number of organizations to receive funding by half. As the Arts Council ruefully put it: ‘during this period, the Arts Council began encouraging greater corporate sponsorship of the arts’ (www.artscouncil.org). By 1991, two-thirds of arts organizations agreed that they were in no position to have moral scruples and to refuse sponsorship from tobacco companies; the Royal Shakespeare Company’s sponsorship officer spoke for

many arts organizations when he said: 'we cannot afford to have ethics like that' (quoted in Shaw 1993, p. 19).

In 1992, soon after the election of another Conservative government, now under the leadership of John Major, the arts were repositioned under the umbrella of the Department of National Heritage, which now incorporated the Arts Council. With the Office of Arts and Libraries as the core body, the Department of National Heritage took over responsibility for arts organizations, historical sites and parks, sport and tourism. The arts were now officially bound up with tourism and commerce; while the Department's title signalled that its remit was to conserve Britain's artistic heritage rather than to foster a live and challenging artistic culture. In 1993, the Major government licensed a state-franchise for a lottery, in which the arts, sports and heritage each received 18 per cent, administered and allocated by government agencies.

As arts companies had been required by Conservative policy to develop a head for business, so business was becoming increasingly aware of the potential in the sponsorship of arts events for marketing purposes. In 1990, the *Economist* Intelligence Unit published a report: *Sponsoring the Arts: New Business Strategies for the 1990s* (the report itself sponsored by IBM) (Allen 1990). The title indicated that business had come to recognize that sponsorship is not just about patronage of the arts or philanthropy, but represented real opportunities for branding strategy. An advertisement for the consultancy firm Crowcroft-Gourley fronted the report and proclaimed that sponsorship offers 'business value': 'As the business value of arts sponsorship grows the variety of opportunity becomes more daunting' (Allen 1990, p. iii). In 1990, ABSA was the only sponsorship association listed, but the number of advertisements from sponsorship consultants testifies to the flourishing of new services in sponsorship brokering in the arts. The effect of cuts to arts organizations was also clear from the number of advertisements from institutions in search of sponsorship (among them, the National Gallery). The *Economist* report was under no illusions that sponsorship is a philanthropic pursuit; instead, it promotes sponsorship to businesses as a significant marketing strategy, suggesting that sponsorship of the arts could target market sectors which might well be immune to conventional advertising:

Sponsorship can be used both to raise awareness of a company and to enhance its image. The main use of arts projects has been to enhance a company's identity among opinion formers, but increasingly arts sponsorship is being used to reinforce marketing strategies as well as to help recruit employees and gain their

loyalty. . . . In choosing a sponsorship project it is important to bear in mind the audiences it is intended to reach, and the promotional opportunities it could generate. (Allen 1990, p. x)

The report confirmed that sponsorship of the arts had become a sophisticated marketing tool: 'Sponsorship planning has become more strategic during the last few years . . . it is beginning to be included in the mix of techniques - advertising, sales promotion and public relations - that make up the marketing portfolio' (Allen 1990, p. 20).

As the 'Executive Summary' of the report made clear, sponsorship was now seen as an essential component of a corporate promotional strategy, significant both to the branding of a company and in the opportunities it provided for advertising. *Sponsoring the Arts* reported that there were direct rewards of publicity and brand recognition to be gained from appropriate forms of sponsorship and identified a range of areas in which sponsorship could be used as a means for promotional opportunities: corporate hospitality, publicity material and coverage in the press and media (for a relatively low outlay):

Arts sponsorship is most commonly used to achieve goals that fall within the following categories:

- Reinforcing marketing strategies by creating brand awareness, enhancing brand identities, reaching niche markets and communicating with distributors.
- Creating a positive identity for a company with local, national and international opinion formers, while creating opportunities for communication beyond the immediate business environment . . . there are a number of products and services that have become so similar that their own attributes no longer serve to differentiate one brand from another, and which are increasingly distinguished by means of corporate brand identities built on the back of promotions undertaken by their parent companies. Both have led to the development of marketing strategies that include arts sponsorship. (Allen 1990, pp. 23-4)

Sponsorship of the arts is recognized here as a key player in developing a corporate brand and as a means of accruing the cultural capital involved in the arts to the promotion of a company or product. It is clear that the sponsors themselves are well aware of their own motivations, which are not about a philanthropic desire to support artistic endeavours but about promoting brand awareness: 'image enhancement is given as the most common reason

for sponsorship of the arts, particularly among national and multi-national companies' (Allen 1990, p. 27). The benefits of sponsorship are here framed as entirely those of the sponsor – the social or cultural value of the sponsored organization is not referenced at all.

Arts sponsorship is also identified in the report as a means of reaching audiences who might otherwise be resistant to conventional advertising campaigns – and of reaching influential groups. Lloyds Bank were among the companies to recognize the power of targeted sponsorship; their sponsorship of the Lloyds Bank Film Challenge aimed to break through the scepticism of young people and to 'project an image of the bank as forward thinking, creating customer loyalty and bonding within the youth market' (MAPS 1995, p. 37). "The German lager company Becks Beer were also keen to associate themselves with British avant-garde art in the hope of attracting a young and hip market; with the sponsorship for exhibitions of Gilbert and George and Otto Dix, and commissioning the first of a series of limited-edition bottle labels by artists such as Rachel Whiteread, whose controversial 'House' they had also sponsored (MAPS 1995). The strategy clearly worked, and Becks went on (and continue) to support the student bar at the Royal College of Art, to provide beer for art exhibitions and to launch a series of art awards in 1999 – with the stated aim of raising 'awareness of Becks Futures as a new cutting edge art award'. The planning strategy document noted that the launch party had successfully attracted celebrities and 'opinion formers' and had received considerable media coverage, in the broadsheet press, colour supplements and television news, for the well spent sum of £75,000. (*PR Week*, 23.06.00).

Not all sponsors were as adventurous as Becks, the majority were very careful over which kind of event to support; music, followed by theatre and the visual arts were the most sponsored artistic events, according to the *Economist* report. The report made it clear that these forms were prioritized not because of their aesthetic value, but because they could provide an entrée to 'opinion formers' and to wealthy groups of potential clients who might be resistant to more conventional forms of promotion. Nonetheless, corporate capital tended to shy away from any association with controversy. No sponsor came forward to support the 'Sensation' exhibition of Young British Artists at the Royal Academy in 1997, despite the fact that it garnered enormous press attention. Sponsors could also be prim; 'Exposed: The Victorian Nude', an exhibition at the Tate in 2001, again failed to attract any sponsors. Colin Tweedy, now chief executive of Arts and Business, commented that 'The Victorian Nude is likely to have suffered by being not respectable enough and yet not modern enough'.

He went on to suggest that such reticence on the part of big name sponsors was an indication of a general prudery and an aversion to risk taking in the business world: 'Sponsors are by their nature conservative . . . Very few of them want to take risks' (*Observer*, 05.08.01, p. 4). Pamela Carswell, then head of corporate fundraising at the Royal Academy of Art, said at the time: 'Some shows are not so immediately appealing . . . But you have to find a way to make them work for a sponsor' (*Observer*, 05.08.01). Both Tweedy and Carswell, despite their recognition that sponsors could be circumspect about whom they would support, were insistent that sponsorship would never dictate the kind of show that could be put on. Tweedy and Carswell pointed to American museums as entirely subservient to their sponsors and asserted that this was not (yet) the case in Britain.

This was disingenuous; by 2001, the developing hold of the sponsor on the programmes of theatres, galleries and museums was becoming clear, and, promoted by fundraisers such as Tweedy and Carswell, increasingly evident. Wu has pointed to the ways in which corporations had shaped the world of art galleries and museums in both Britain and America from the 1980s:

Since the 1980s, corporate art collections have been set up with increasing frequency on both sides of the Atlantic. Using their economic power, modern corporations have vigorously emulated the former prerogatives of public art museums and galleries by organizing and touring their own collections at home and abroad. They have also successfully transformed art museums and galleries into their own public-relations vehicles, by taking over the function, and by exploiting the social status, that cultural institutions enjoy in our society. (Wu 2002, p. 2)

The novelist Hari Kunzru has pointed out that corporate art collections gain not only benefits in public relations through their associations with public art museums, but also that the relationship allows for the collections themselves to enhance their value:

Nothing confers more value on an artwork than its selection for inclusion in a museum show. It is the definitive critical vote of confidence. This, of course, depends on the fiction that such decisions are made on pure, aesthetically disinterested grounds. As sophisticated investors enter the market and work out how the game is played, that particular story is wearing thin. (Kunzru 2012)

Kunzru notes that the Tate Modern Gallery has had a long partnership with the Swiss Bank, UBS, in which the sponsorship depends upon on the Tate showing

works from the UBS collection.⁶ Similar relationships exist between Deutsche Bank and the Whitney and Guggenheim museums in America and between the industrialist Dakis Joannou and the New York New Museum. Another example (of an individual rather than a corporation) using an art gallery as a public-relations vehicle was the loan of Andrew Lloyd Webber's Pre-Raphaelite collection to the Royal Academy in 2003 under the title 'Pre-Raphaelite and Other Masters – The Andrew Lloyd Webber Collection'. The endorsement of Britain's guardian of British painting ensured that his own private collection would considerably increase in market value.

In 1995, the artist Hans Haake also bore witness to the creeping incursion of the American model of corporate sponsorship into European cultural institutions:

What frightens me is that Europe is beginning to follow the American model. Institutions which were liberated from the tutelage of princes and the Church now fall more and more under the control of corporations. Obviously, these corporations are only to serve the interests of their share-holders – this is what they are set up for. The de facto privatization of cultural institutions has a terrible price. Practically speaking, the republic, the *res publica* – that is, the public cause – is being abandoned. Even though the sponsors cover only a small part of the cost, it is they who really determine the program. . . . (Bourdieu and Haake 1995, p. 71)

In 1998, ABSA changed its name to become 'Arts & Business'. Colin Tweedy explained the name change in an article for *Corporate Citizen Briefing* as a measure of the success of ABSA; he proclaims that arts and business had become more and more closely entwined and that his mission is to see this 'partnership' extended even further:

The latest figures show that business investment in arts organisations and museums across the UK has risen again. For the first time such investment has topped £100 million, rising 20% to £115 million. We have not taken sponsorship out of our title to marginalise sponsorship, but to emphasise the widening and deepening of the partnership between arts and business. . . .

We need to make the arts relevant to contacts across a business, embedding creativity into the heart of business culture, and this is where our mission is expanding. (www.ccbriefing.co.uk/April 1999)

A former director of Arts & Business, Andrew McIllroy, describes the function of Arts & Business as an organization. He wrote in 2002: ' . . . the business world did

not yet recognize that the arts could offer serious business benefits in terms of marketing, profile and public relations'. A&B's job was to sell them this message (McIlroy 2002, p. 3). One of the means of 'selling' the message was the 1998 brochure *Arts & Business - it worked for them . . .* (A&B, 1998) which in its title and case studies championed the effectiveness for businesses of 'partnerships' brokered by Arts & Business. Ernst & Young, the global 'professional services' company was one of the 'success' stories of Arts & Business in the late 1990s. The A&B brochure made it very clear that Ernst & Young's (whose corporate slogan is 'Quality in everything we do') sponsorship of blockbuster art exhibitions at prestigious national (and state supported galleries) paid dividends in terms of positive media coverage, brand association with a public institution and the ability to impress and entertain potential clients at a glamorous event, for a very low outlay compared to conventional advertising. As A&B put it:

Ernst & Young wants to build and maintain relationships with an élite group: the top corporate executives in Britain. . . . In research, 69% named Ernst & Young sponsored events as the ones they'd most enjoyed over the past three years. . . . By contrast, hardly any recalled sporting events sponsored by Ernst & Young competitors. Ernst & Young has become synonymous with blockbuster art exhibitions – notably Cézanne at the Tate and Monet at the RA . . . Each event has built on the success of the last – in public appeal, sponsor recognition . . . and value of media coverage (some £850, 000 for Monet). (Arts & Business 1998, p. 34)

As Ernst & Young had already worked out – the visual arts were very capable of delivering a targeted 'élite' audience and could prove extremely cost-effective for brand strategy. Ernst & Young continued to sponsor art exhibitions at major British galleries and currently have a 'partnership' with the Victoria and Albert museum.

In the early 1990s, battered by Conservative cuts, attacks on trade unions and working conditions and the drive to enterprise over industry, the arts seemed to be the least of the opposition's problems. Arts policy was not central to the Labour Party as it had once been for J. B. Priestley and Maynard Keynes, the party under the leadership of Tony Blair had no vision for the 'Arts under socialism'. The only comment on the Arts in the 1992 Labour Manifesto was the rather lame statement that the Arts Minister would encourage the arts 'to develop new ideas' (Dale 2000, p. 332).

Once in office, those new ideas were not readily apparent; New Labour's arts policy did not significantly change from that of the Conservatives. They did

change the title of the body responsible for the arts; in 1997, the Department of National Heritage became the Department for Culture, Media and Sport. Funding for the Arts Council was cut even further; in the Arts Council's own melancholy assessment:

In 1997, the Government created a new senior ministry: the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). While this move elevated the importance the new government placed on the arts and the broader cultural industries, the Arts Council's funding was slashed. . . . (www.artscouncil.org.uk, accessed November 2011)

The name change did not change the remit of the Department responsible for the arts in Britain, or improve state funding for the arts, but it did signal New Labour's championing of the new and promoted an idea of culture that was bound into tourism and the leisure industry:

DCMS was established in July 1997. Its aim is to improve the quality of life for all through cultural and sporting activities, to support the pursuit of excellence and to champion the tourism, creative and leisure industries. It is responsible for government policy relating to the arts, sport, the National Lottery, tourism, libraries, museums and galleries, broadcasting, creative industries (including film and music industries), press freedom and regulation, licensing, gambling and the historic environment. (www.nationalarchives.gov.uk, accessed October 2011)

Under Tony Blair's leadership, New Labour's cultural policy turned the 'arts' of Priestley and Maynard Keynes into the 'cultural industries', an area in which Britain was seen to excel, and, with the erosion of an industrial base, was increasingly important to the national economy. The 'arts' were no longer perceived politically as 'the yeast in the dough' of J. B. Priestley's post-war coinage, but the dough itself, and expected to demonstrate their economic and use value. As Miller and Yúdice explained in 2002:

. . . contemporary policy is as much about developing tourism and cultural commerce as new cultural norms. The premise is that cultural creativity is the spawning ground of innovation. In a global economy, innovation rather than material resources or manufactures drives accumulation. On this premise, Blair's 'Cool Britannia', a cultural-economic project . . . sought to transform London into the creative hub for trends in music, fashion, art and design, thus constituting the foundation for the so-called new economy based on 'content provision'. (Miller and Yúdice 2002, p. 91)

The 'cultural industries' were expected to become a motor of the British economy. The Frieze Art Fair (itself sponsored by Deutsche Bank), first seen in Regent's Park, London, in 2003, was a vivid embodiment of this 'Cool Britannia', where art dealers, sponsors and corporate buyers could be seen entwined in a frenzy of buying and selling. 'Culture' was seen by the Blair government as an export, a means of attracting tourism, a potential weapon against social inclusion and a means of regeneration – the arts were now perceived as what Yúdice (2003) has termed 'culture-as-resource', but they were still expected to find corporate sponsorship. The arts were expected to follow the model of private/public partnerships that New Labour were encouraging across all aspects of the welfare state; the playwright David Hare argued that subsidized theatre in Britain was 'working to a public-private model approved by the Arts Council' (*The Guardian* 25.02.12). The Arts Council itself expressed the partnership in these terms: 'We have developed a modern and progressive model for cultural organizations, bringing together public funding and private enterprise – a truly public-private partnership' (arts council.org. 2011). From 1999, business sponsorship of the arts had been referred to as 'the business arts partnership sector'. The Department for Culture, Media and Sport supported the establishment of an Information Unit of Arts & Business in 1999, to audit information and to disseminate information to broker partnerships between the arts and potential business sponsors. It began publishing a literature review of arts and business partnerships, intended for 'arts, business, government and the next generation of arts managers' (*Arts Research Digest* 2002, p. 2).

By 1999, sponsorship of the performing arts was estimated as a 'major income source', representing 15 per cent of the total funding. This figure from sponsors was substantially outweighed, however, by support from public bodies – most notably the Arts Council. While business sponsorship had brought in £142 million, public support from local authorities, regional arts boards and arts councils contributed £312 million. Despite the rhetoric from governments from Thatcher to Blair that the arts must find private support, public feeling was strongly in support of state funding for the arts. In 2004, a research report on the Arts in England reported that 'The research shows the continued high level of support for public funding of the arts, with 79 per cent of people agreeing that 'Arts and cultural projects should receive public funding' (Arts Council England 2004)

There was nonetheless an attempt, driven by the United Kingdom, to harness and promote commercial sponsorship for the arts across the European Union. Colin Tweedy, director of ABSA was at the helm; CEREC (Comité Européen

pour la Rapprochement de l'Economie et de la Culture) was a network of national associations across Europe which was designed to promote business sponsorship. Tweedy was appointed as president of CEREC; his argument in the introductory article was couched in much the same terms as he had argued for ABSA, that commercial sponsorship should now be seen as inevitable to the funding of the arts:

Virtually all the governments across Europe are redefining their priorities and the arts are facing ever-increasing competition from other budgets such as education, transport and environment. The need to attract money from corporations and individuals is essential if the arts in Europe are not only to be maintained, but also to flourish. (Tweedy 1999, p. 3)

CEREC published *Cultural Sponsorship in Europe* in 1999, under the auspices of the French association Admical (Association pour le Développement du Mécénat Industriel et Commercial). The report noted that Britain did not share the commitment to the secured state funding for the arts of the wealthier European nations, but had drawn on the American model of private patronage⁷: 'The United Kingdom is something of a half way house between other European countries and the United States' (p. 21). The CEREC report did cover some sporadic instances of sponsorship in the arts in Europe (it could only find American Express as an example of a consistent corporate sponsor) but remained unpersuaded. The report concluded, rather unenthusiastically, that:

... the combination of recession, pessimism and competition between the new sectors, and the loss of confidence in pan-European solutions, seems to be progressively reducing transnational cultural sponsorship. The single market has not led to an increase in transnational sponsorship ... Many had believed that the European Union would establish a legal and fiscal framework for sponsorship. We know that that there is a lack of interest ... (CEREC 1999, p. 22)

If Britain continued to champion commercial sponsorship under the New Labour government, a conception of the arts, and, with it, the kinds of projects that sponsors were encouraged to fund did change direction. The arts, as the abandonment of the Department of National Heritage suggested, were no longer about prestige or 'heritage', but about cohering communities and delivering social and economic benefits. For New Labour, the arts were perceived as a means of regeneration and of extending social inclusion – and sponsorship deals were now expected to factor in those requirements. Sponsorship for the

arts was expected to extend beyond prestigious productions and events and was seen as a requisite for community and charitable groups. In 2004, a report for the South East England Cultural Consortium (SEEC) and the South East England Development Agency (SEEDA) was published 'as part of an initiative to develop evidence based practice in the use of culture to achieve Regional Economic Strategy Objectives' (Oakley 2004, p. 2). The report's author, Kate Oakley, explains how cultural policy had now made 'inclusiveness' central:

... addressing social exclusion has found its way into the heart of cultural policy in the UK, with DCMS and the Arts Council now having impacts on social exclusion as a core priority. Much of this work takes place in specific settings (such as schools, prisons, community centres) and with specific target groups ... (Oakley 2004, p. 19)

It is clear from reports from Arts & Business that the range of sponsored arts activities had broadened considerably from the prominent national institutions of galleries, opera houses and theatres that had once been the focus of commercial sponsors. Community groups, disabled theatre groups, art activities for children were now targeted as appropriate for sponsorship. A report supported by Arts & Business and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport was published in 2002 (itself sponsored by Marks & Spencer), *Creative Connections: Business and the Arts Working Together to Create a More Inclusive Society*. Phyllida Law, the report's author, claimed that both commercial and philanthropic motivations were at work in business sponsors' support for community arts projects: 'The reasons why businesses choose to spend money on the sorts of arts activities described in this report may be commercial, philanthropic, or a combination of the two. . . .' (Law 2002, p. 6). The Director of Communications for Marks & Spencer (sponsors of the report, and one of the companies celebrated in the Arts & Business report), Cheri Lofland, however, makes it clear that the motivation for her company's involvement in community arts projects continues to be as much about branding as it is about philanthropy: 'Our vision is to strengthen our corporate reputation and trust in the brand by leading standards in corporate community involvement' (Shaw 2002, p. 1).

Under New Labour, corporate sponsorship flourished. In 2005, a newspaper headline read '£425m of private money has caused a "sea change" in the arts' and reported that 'The arts in Britain are relying more than ever before on money from the private sector' (Arendt 2005). Arts & Business released figures at the end of that same year and estimated that private support for the arts had leapt from £393 million to £452 million since 2003. The increasing visibility of corporate

sponsorship was not, however, seen as entirely a matter for celebration. The chief executive of Arts & Business, despite his endorsement of the role of business in sponsoring the arts, was among those to sound warnings about the reliance on corporate funding.

ArtWatch UK⁸ is a campaigning group which functions to 'protect the integrity of works of art from increasingly ambitious and injurious restoration treatments and interventions carried out in publicly supported museums, galleries and other institutions' (artwatchuk.wordpress.com). By 2005, it was clear that the threat to the 'integrity of works of art' came not only from new forms of restoration, but also from the financial involvement of sponsors in the hanging and display of art works in publicly funded galleries. The Director of ArtWatch UK, Michael Daley, expressed his concerns about the power and secrecy of commercial sponsors involved with the visual arts. In a letter to *The Guardian* in 2005, he objected to the use of scaffolds at Tate Britain for huge advertising displays by Hewlett and Packard in 2004, and pointed out that: 'There are forms of commercial exploitation of public museums which are less evident'. Daley's letter articulated a growing anxiety about both the lack of transparency in sponsorship deals and the considerable benefits accruing to corporate sponsors through their relationship with publicly funded arts institutions:

The Tate rehang was made possible by a payment from the Swiss investment banking and securities firm UBS. Neither the Tate nor UBS will disclose the size of the payment. In return for it, UBS seems to have gained a valuable payment in kind: a quarter of the new exhibition will consist of works drawn from UBS's own extensive collection of modern art. These works, after such a favourable showcasing can only be expected to enjoy considerable appreciations in value. If the public and private sectors of the contemporary artworld are increasingly to pursue such cosy, mutually profitable relationships, should guidelines not be issued on the levels of accountability and transparency that might be thought appropriate and desirable? (Daley 2005)

Indeed. No such guidelines were forthcoming under a Labour government, and seemed even less likely to come from the coalition government elected in 2010. As sponsorship came to be seen – by governments, by arts organizations and by sponsorship brokers – as integral to arts funding, no politician was prepared to question the lack of transparency regarding sponsorship deals or to acknowledge that sponsorship was not a source of funding that could be relied upon. Artist Hans Haake was among the few dissenting voices: '... the sponsors' enthusiasm

is not guaranteed for ever. . . . It would be naïve to think that the state will resume its responsibilities for culture when the Cartiers of the world have lost interest' (Bourdieu and Haake 1995, p. 71).

In 2006, Gordon Brown, Blair's successor as prime minister, launched a 2-year programme to 'improve the management and leadership of the cultural sector' – and invested £12 million in Arts Council, England, the Museums, Libraries and Archives Council and in 'Creative and Cultural Skills'. Brown recognized, as he said in his speech at the launch of the programme, that the cultural and creative industries were a valuable social and economic resource, but that nonetheless, government investment remained contingent on the promotion of a close relationship between the arts and business sectors. For Brown, 'the cultural industries' arts organizations should learn from business – and business should benefit from culture:

It is not a sideshow, it is right at the centre – not just of a modern culture and a modern society, but of a modern economy. . . . The learning of leadership skills and management skills is critically essential for our future and the encouragement that we are trying to give to an interaction between the arts and the business world will be of benefit I may say; not simply to you, in the cultural world but also to business itself who will learn from you. (Brown, quoted in Hewison 2006, p. 12)

That 'interaction' between the arts and the business world was not, however, entirely comfortable. The potential for an ideological split between a cultural institution, its artists and audience and the sponsor was sharply outlined in the case of British Petroleum's sponsorship of the Tate Galleries. In 2010, BP had been at the centre of an environmental disaster, an oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. A letter signed by over 160 artists, critics and arts administrators (among them Hans Haake) made the point that cultural sponsorship gave corporations with dubious track records in social welfare considerable cultural legitimacy:

Tonight, the Tate Britain is holding a summer party in which it is also celebrating 20 years of BP sponsorship. As crude oil continues to devastate coastlines and communities in the Gulf of Mexico, BP executives will be enjoying a cocktail reception with curators and artists at Tate Britain. These relationships enable big oil companies to mask the environmentally destructive nature of their activities with the social legitimacy that is associated with such high-profile cultural associations.

We represent a cross-section of people from the arts community that believe that the BP logo represents a stain on Tate's international reputation. Many artists

are angry that Tate and other national cultural institutions continue to sidestep the issue of oil sponsorship. . . . The public is rapidly coming to recognise that the sponsorship programmes of BP and Shell are means by which attention can be distracted from their impacts on human rights, the environment and the global climate (letter to *The Guardian*, 28.06.10).

It is interesting to note here that it is the nature of the sponsor, not the necessity of sponsorship itself that is the point of issue. Over three decades after the founding of ABSA, it continued to be those companies with a need to polish their image who were the most visible sponsors of the arts. In 2011, four of the most significant cultural organizations in London, the British Museum, the National Portrait Gallery, the Royal Opera House and the Tate Gallery, announced that they would all renew sponsorship deals with BP, despite vociferous opposition from artists and environmental campaigners, who argued that 'BP's involvement with these institutions represents a serious stain on the UK's cultural patrimony'. A group of artists protested outside a party to celebrate 20 years of BP's sponsorship in 2010 by spilling treacle (to simulate an oil spill) at the entrance to the Tate Gallery. Exhibitions sponsored by BP continue to employ security guards to counter protestors.

None of these institutions were in a financial position to refuse BP's money. The Conservative culture minister at the time, Ed Vaizey, was quoted as saying 'For more than 20 years, BP has led the way in business support for the arts and I am delighted that this will continue over the next five years' (*The Guardian*, 20.12.11). Nonetheless, it was clear that there was considerable unease from artists at the spread of sponsorship and at the kinds of sponsors involved in supporting the arts. This was also evident when two poets, Alice Oswald and John Kinsella, withdrew from the shortlist of the T. S. Eliot prize in 2011 because of its sponsorship by the investment management company Aurum Fund. Oswald said that poetry 'should be questioning, not endorsing, such institutions' (*The Guardian*, 08.12.12). The Poetry Society had negotiated the Aurum sponsorship in the aftermath of the withdrawal of Arts Council funding.

Among the first initiatives of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government of 2010 had been a swingeing assault on funding to the arts; the spending review of October 2010 proposed cuts to the Arts Council of 50 per cent, cuts to local government and cuts of 25–30 per cent to the Department for Culture, Media and Sport. Sir Nicholas Serota, the director of the Tate and one of the most respected arts administrators in Britain,

described the cuts as 'A blitzkrieg on the arts . . . the greatest crisis in the arts and heritage since government funding began in 1940' (Serota 2010). In November 2010, Somerset council announced that it was cutting the entire arts budget for the county. *The Stage* reported in September, 2011 that local authority spending on culture had fallen by over £200 million (*The Stage*, 15.09.11). Arts bodies across the country were required to make serious budget cuts and in a number of cases, this meant the closure of successful theatres, galleries and art projects. In 2011, Andrew Lloyd Webber sold a single Picasso painting, and, with the millions, managed to rescue some of them.⁹ As the Selsdon group had once pointed out: 'Art has always been the ultimate form of spending for the rich'.

With such severe cuts to arts funding, no institution – however prestigious – is now in a position to be selective about the sponsors that it works with. In September 2011, London hosted the trade exhibition for global arms manufacturers; among them was the Italian defence firm, Finmeccanica, who have a sponsorship deal with the National Gallery; it is the National Gallery which hosts Finmeccanica's corporate reception and also holds events for Defence & Security Equipment International and the Farnborough air show, both weapons fairs. A group of artists, musicians and writers launched a campaign in 2012 calling on the National Gallery to end its sponsorship with Finmeccanica and to stop providing 'a gloss of legitimacy for a reprehensible trade - and very practical support' (www.caat.org).

The working culture of arts organizations has also had to change in the face of funding cuts; with 15 per cent cuts to its funding, the Tate Gallery outsourced the management of its staffing to a private company, which has led to a series of complaints of bullying; as one anonymous member of the Tate's staff expressed it: 'They've put new management in from the private sector - we've always had public sector managers - and they have a whole new regime as a ploy to get rid of people . . . everyone feels very intimidated. It's really unbearable' (quoted in the *Evening Standard*, 24.08.11).

The public culture of the arts has been marketized and privatized to such an extent that arts institutions have themselves become 'brands'. The organization 'Coolest Brands' celebrated 10 years of Superbrands in 2011 and published its list of the coolest brands in Britain. Among the top 20 were Tate Britain, the Baltic Centre for Contemporary Art and the Royal Opera House, Covent Garden; it was no longer that these national and cultural institutions, set up with tax payers' money and developed as a once intrinsic part of the welfare state, were seen as

a means of lending cachet to commercial brands – they had themselves become commodified brands (coolbrandsuk.com).

Since the Conservative manifesto of 1979 had promised to begin the process which would ‘enable the private sponsor to flourish again’, arts organizations had done everything that was required of them: they had become entrepreneurial, they had attracted large swathes of sponsorship, they were a thriving economy but they still face further cuts and, again, are urged by a Conservative Arts Minister to make up the shortfall through private patronage. In January 2011, the *Financial Times* reported:

Jeremy Hunt wants more of Britain’s biggest companies to start sponsoring the arts in the UK as the culture secretary looks for private funding to plug cuts in the arts budget. The culture secretary, having launched a programme to try to attract more individual donations for the arts, is poised to kick off his year of “corporate giving” in the coming weeks amid complaints that blue-chip support for the arts is woefully low. (Rigby 2011)

The abdication of the coalition government from public support to the arts and their conviction in the power and beneficence of private ‘patronage’ were made clear when the head of the Arts Council, Dame Liz Forgan, was removed from office in 2012. Forgan had confronted the government over cuts to the arts, and was seen by the arts community as having steered the Arts Council through a difficult period in which it had seen its funding severely cut. The Culture Secretary, Jeremy Hunt, defended the decision on the grounds that he wanted an Arts Council chair to develop Government ideas; in particular, ‘in increasing the amount of private giving to the arts’ (*Evening Standard*, 23.03.12).

The Arts Council in 2011, in the face of still further cuts to its budget, wrote a statement ‘Why the arts matter’, in which it bleakly warned that arts funding ‘is a finely balanced economy: if public funding is significantly reduced, the knock-on effect will be profound and the private sector will not make up the shortfall’ (www.artscouncil.org, 2011). The *Financial Times* also reported in that same month that ‘Business investment in the arts fell by 11 per cent in real terms last year’ (27.01.11). In 2012, Arts & Business reported a drop of 7 per cent in ‘Corporate philanthropy’, the fourth year in a row that sponsorship of the arts had fallen, to a level lower than that of 2005–06. In a global recession, it is clear that the private sector will indeed not ‘make up the shortfall’.

The perils of a reliance on private capital to fund the nation's culture are vividly evident in the current experience of Spain. A number of Spanish savings banks, known as 'cajas', had developed from 'montes de piedad', a form of pawn shop dating back to the nineteenth century. These were not for profit mutual societies, founded to encourage savings from the poor, and any surplus funds were put into foundations, which supported social welfare and cultural establishments. These foundations would become the main sponsors for the arts in Spain. In the European economic crisis, the 'cajas' have become banks, and, as the head of communications at the Museum of Contemporary Art in Barcelona explains: 'Now that they have changed from being savings banks to banks all this funding is going to disappear . . . Now they are not mutual societies and they have no obligation to fund the "obra social"' (*The Guardian*, 30.06.12). The Madrid foundation has now closed 48 of its cultural and social centres across Spain.

Bourdieu pointed in 1995 to the dangers of a situation in which the arts and culture were reliant on sponsorship. He speaks of:

. . . the threats that the new economic order represents to the autonomy of the intellectual 'creators'. Indeed, it may be feared that recourse to private patronage in order to finance art, literature and science will gradually place artists and scholars in a relationship of material and mental dependence on economic powers and market constraints . . . private patronage may justify the abdication of public authorities, who use the pretext of the existence of private patrons to withdraw and suspend their assistance, with the extraordinary result that citizens still finance the arts and sciences through tax exemptions. Furthermore, they finance the symbolic effect brought to bear on them to the extent that the funding appears as an example of the disinterested generosity of the corporations. (Bourdieu and Haake 1995, p. 160)

It is clear from the reports of sponsors and from ABSA that commercial sponsorship of arts events was anything but 'disinterested generosity', and the development of ABSA and later Arts & Business were instrumental in directly placing artists in that relationship of 'material and mental dependence'. As one former director of Arts & Business put it: ' . . . the arts were seeking to supplement their income. Our job was to teach the professional fundraising and management skills they needed to build bridges to the corporate world' (McIlroy 2002, p. 3). Those skills have been learnt by arts organizations and by artists, but in the context of a global recession, the corporate world is now pulling up the drawbridge.

Notes

- 1 By 1983, sponsorship of sporting events was worth £129 million, a figure that was to grow to £275 million by the end of the decade (Whannel 1992, p. 71).
- 2 Brough, C. (1977), 'As you like it: Private Support for the Arts'. London: The Bow Group.
- 3 Education, Science and Arts Committee (1982), *Public and Private Funding of the Arts*. London: HMSO.
- 4 Luce would later become vice chancellor of the University of Buckingham, Britain's first entirely private university, between 1992 and 1996.
- 5 Liverpool's successful bid to be European Capital of Culture in 2008 was demonstrably beneficial in bringing tourists to the city, in regenerating a long depressed inner city and in giving pleasure to the people of Liverpool and the surrounding areas. The bid for the London Olympics of 2012 made similar claims, that the Olympics would bring lasting benefits to the people of London and be central to the regeneration of neglected areas of the city. It was a case harder to make in 2009–10, as the recession began to bite, and expenditure on elaborate and costly stadia and arenas seemed a luxury that Britain could not then afford.
- 6 Kunzru writes that Nick Serota, director of the Tate galleries, 'like other museum directors, is expected to find money to run his institution from a variety of sources, including corporations and private individuals and this makes museums vulnerable to pressure from those who wish to use them to confer value on their holdings' (Kunzru, p. 17).
- 7 The annual budget for Arts Council England was £573 million for 2011–12, while in Germany, the city of Berlin alone had a budget for the same year of £783 million. Meanwhile, the estimated National Endowment for the Arts budget for the whole of the United States was £97 million for 2012 (*The Guardian*, 14.11.11, p. 21).
- 8 Art Watch UK is 'part of the international monitoring and campaigning ArtWatch International which was founded in 1992' (artwatchuk.wordpress.com).
- 9 The Andrew Lloyd Webber Foundation was established in 1992, and it set out to 'promote the arts, culture and heritage for the public benefit' (andrewlloydwebberfoundation.com, November 2011).