Spalek, Basia. "Citizenship, Responsibilisation and Trust in Counter-Terrorism." *Terror Crime Prevention with Communities*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. 75–100. *Bloomsbury Collections*. Web. 26 Apr. 2023. <<http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781472545039.ch-004>>.

Downloaded from Bloomsbury Collections, www.bloomsburycollections.com, 26 April 2023, 08:05 UTC.

Copyright © Basia Spalek 2013. You may share this work for non-commercial purposes only, provided you give attribution to the copyright holder and the publisher, and provide a link to the Creative Commons licence.

Citizenship, Responsibilisation and Trust in Counter-Terrorism

Introduction

As demonstrated in the previous chapters, the causes of terrorism are contested, as are understandings of appropriate response and prevention strategies. Between nation states there exist competing claims over truth, which are largely linked to geo-political power plays. Within and between communities there also exist competing narratives about issues such as the legitimacy of terrorist acts, the proportionality or not of responses to terrorism, the dangerousness of 'radicalisation', the importance of social and economic factors in understanding violent extremism, and so forth. Of significance within the context of such a contested terrain, in many western nation-states including Britain, the US, Canada and Australia, counter-terrorism policy includes a large focus on active citizenship. Individuals as citizens are expected to act responsibly in the face of threats from terrorism, spotting signs of vulnerability within their family, work and other cohorts, and informing appropriate authorities. Individuals as members of communities are also expected to engage with the state in order to prevent terrorism – as argued by Briggs et al. in 2006, the notion that 'communities can defeat terrorism' has become a popular counter-terrorism maxim. As in other areas of social policy – crime, health, welfare – individuals are being viewed as an important resource for preventing terrorism, as part of their responsibilities as active citizens and as members of wider communities. This focus on active citizenship within counter-terrorism policy constitutes a radical shift from traditional counter-terrorism policies and practices. States are attempting to engage, and even build partnerships, with individual citizens and with the wider communities

that they belong to, rather than automatically drawing upon 'hard' counter-terrorism tactics that involve the use of informants, surveillance and so forth.

Whilst at an abstract level, citizenship refers to legal, political and social equality (Marshall, 1950), in practice, even within liberal democratic systems, citizenship is differentiated, and there are often significant inequalities between individual citizens and between the wider group collectivities that they belong to (Spalek, 2008). In the context of security, there are many historical and contemporary examples of individual citizens, and the wider communities to which they belong, experiencing differentiated state-led approaches. In the context of Northern Ireland, for example, Irish Catholic citizens in particular experienced differentiated citizenship by being 'suspect communities' and thereby more likely to be experiencing 'hard' counter-terrorism responses (Hillyard, 1993). Post 9/11, Muslim communities have experienced differentiated citizenship as a result of their securitisation and, increasingly, their responsibilisation – being viewed as the moral agents of terrorism prevention initiatives (Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011; Spalek and McDonald, 2011), even though threats from terrorism are multifaceted, involving separatist, left-wing and anarchic, alongside Islamist, groups.

Whilst there is a substantial amount of research literature about the securitisation of particular communities and their experiences of 'hard-edged' counter-terrorism policies and practices (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; Spalek, El-Awa and McDonald, 2009; Kundnani, 2009; McGovern, 2010; Hickman and Silvestri, 2011; Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011), there is much less analysis and understanding of individuals' engagement with 'softer' counter-terrorism policies and practices, at the core of which lies the notion of active citizenship. What is less clear, therefore, is the issue of how states can encourage and actively persuade citizens to work within state-driven counter-terrorism agendas in a context of differentiated citizenship where there may be competing loyalties associated experiences of belonging at a global, as well as national and local level. In the post 9/11 context, for example, what challenges are there for policy makers attempting to involve and engage with members of Muslim communities for counter-terrorism purposes? This is a question that I and my team have been researching for a number of years now in the context of counter-terrorism policy and practice in Britain in relation to Al Qaeda (AQ) linked terrorism. A key theme that keeps recurring in

many of the interviews that we have undertaken is that of the notion of trust. Interviews with police officers, probation officers, youth workers, community members and others indicate the importance of trust for ‘softer’ counter-terrorism policies. It seems that trust enables state and non-state actors to negotiate spaces of engagement and even partnership within the complex counter-terrorism terrain. This suggests that underpinning ‘softer’ counter-terrorism policies and practices are themes that resonate more directly with conflict transformation – the ability of state and non-state actors to work through any incompatibilities and struggles they may have, with trust serving as the social glue for this. This chapter focuses predominantly on the issue of trust, for this is often a neglected area in research relating to preventing terrorism. The chapter draws on interview data in order to shed light upon questions relating to what trust is, how it is built, and what its significance is for counter-terrorism as conflict transformation. First the key themes of community resilience, active citizenship, trust and confidence in policing will be discussed, before interview data about trust and counter-terrorism as conflict transformation is presented and analysed.

Counter-terrorism policies, community resilience and active citizenship

In Britain, the notion of community resilience features significantly in ‘softer’, community-based approaches to counter-terrorism. For example, in 2006, a Commission on Integration and Cohesion was announced, which was to consider how local areas themselves could play a role in forging cohesive and resilient communities by ‘examining the issues that raise tensions between different groups in different areas, and that lead to segregation and conflict; suggesting how local community and political leadership can push further against perceived barriers to cohesion and integration; looking at how local communities themselves can be empowered to tackle extremist ideologies; and developing approaches that build local areas’ own capacity to prevent problems, and ensure they have the structures in place to recover from periods of tension’ (Commission on Integration and Cohesion, 2006). In the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG, 2007)

document *Preventing Violent Extremism – Winning Hearts and Minds*, it is stated that ‘key to this must be the building of strong communities, confident in themselves, open to others, and resilient to violent extremism’ (DCLG, 2007: 4). In the Review of the Prevent Strategy in 2011 the following phrases in relation to highlighting the significance of resilience can be found: ‘vulnerability to violent extremism includes a lack of resilience in some places and communities’ (Home Office, 2011: 18); ‘resilience in the context of this document means the capability of people, groups and communities to rebut and reject proponents of terrorism and the ideology they promote’ (Home Office: 2011: 108); ‘a stronger sense of ‘belonging’ and citizenship makes communities more resilient to terrorist ideology and propagandists. We believe that Prevent depends on integration, democratic participation and a strong interfaith dialogue’ (Home Office, 2011: 27).

Community resilience also features significantly in the Australian Counter-Terrorism White Paper (2010: iii) where it is one of the four key elements of the strategy, where resilience is to mean ‘building a strong and resilient Australian community to resist the development of any form of violent extremism and terrorism on the home front’. According to the Australian Counter-Terrorism White Paper (2010: iv):

Australia’s counter-terrorism efforts are supported by our open democratic society. There are inherent strengths in our society that make Australia resilient to the divisive worldview of al-Qa’ida and like-minded groups. However, we know from experience that the terrorist narrative may resonate with a small number of Australians. It is incumbent upon all Australians to work together to reject ideologies that promote violence, no matter from where they arise or to what purpose they aspire. We must all support and protect the values and freedoms from which all Australians benefit. By reducing disadvantage, addressing real or perceived grievances and encouraging full participation in Australia’s social and economic life, government policies can help to mitigate any marginalisation and radicalisation that may otherwise occur within the Australian community.

In the US counter-terrorism strategy, building a culture of resilience is a core guiding principle. It is stated that ‘the United States and its partners are engaged in the full range of cooperative CT activities—from intelligence sharing to joint training and operations and from countering radicalisation

to pursuing community resilience programs' (The White House, 2011: 6). Furthermore, '... we will continue to assist, engage, and connect communities to increase their collective resilience abroad and at home' (The White House, 2011: 10).

The focus on resilience, and in particular community resilience, illustrates how important it is considered for individuals from within communities to be responsible and active citizens, to be moral agents and help prevent terrorism. This focus heralds a radical shift from traditional counter-terrorism policies and practices, which have pursued 'hard-ended' policies and practices involving surveillance and the use of informants amongst other tactics (Hewitt, 2010). The emphasis on communities and resilience perhaps reflects Durodie's (2005) observations that traditionally, whilst counter-terrorism policies have focussed on fostering technical resilience, insufficient emphasis has been placed upon fostering cultural resilience:

Yet a political debate as to cultural values and social direction is noticeable by its absence. Instead, counter-terrorist measures put in place since 2001 can at best be described as technical in character. These include more surveillance, better intelligence, new protective clothing for so-called 'first responders', along with gadgets to detect chemical, biological or radiological agents, concrete blocks and fences around public buildings, endless checks at airports and stockpiles of vaccines. The problem with these is that, in seeking to secure society from the outside, we fail simultaneously to engage society from the inside with a view to winning a debate as to what we actually stand for.

According to Coafee (2008), developing community resilience is seen as potentially reinforcing institutional security strategies and as a way of mobilising citizens to pursue counter-terrorism goals. The focus on communities, citizens and resilience signals the responsabilisation of individual citizens, citizens being held responsible for being resilient against terrorism and violent extremism. With the focus still being very much on AQ-linked terrorism, despite a recent spate of far-right extremist activities across Europe, it is Muslim communities that have attracted most attention from policy makers and counter-terrorism practitioners, in Britain, Australia, the US, Canada and many parts of Western Europe. As argued by Spalek and Lambert (2007: 2), 'in a post 9/11 context, Muslims' responsibilities as active citizens are being increasingly framed by anti-terror measures which encourage internal

community surveillance so that the responsible Muslim citizen is expected to work with the authorities to help reduce the risk of terrorism'. Debates and policies on wide-ranging issues, including multiculturalism, loyalty, faith, secularism, social cohesion, have, when applied to Muslim communities, increasingly involved the responsabilisation of Muslim communities for preventing terrorism. Therefore, questions of identity, and citizenship itself, have been co-opted into a wider security agenda that has potentially stigmatised Muslim communities (Spalek and McDonald, 2010).

At the same time, the focus on resilience, citizenship and communities within counter-terrorism policies and practices is indicative of a 'risk society' (Beck, 1992). Within a risk-based society, governments and state institutions are unable to manage the risks associated with modernity, and so there is increased emphasis upon an active citizenship that is self-regulating and able to mitigate modern-day risks. This reflects the imposition of a consumer culture within the public sector, an approach that the Conservatives brought into Britain under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Prime Minister John Major, which was then continued by the subsequent Labour and Tory/Liberal Democrat governments of the late 1990s through to today. A risk-based approach to counter-terrorism also involves the state communicating risk to its citizens, and the ways in which this is done will have significant repercussions, either adding to or reducing fears (Mythen and Walklate, 2006). As mentioned previously, not all citizens are equal. Counter-terrorism policies and practices have focused predominantly upon Muslim communities, thereby singling them out as being especially responsible for preventing terrorism. The language of community resilience and citizenship presumes that all individuals have equal choice in deciding whether to help counter terrorism or not. However, in a post-9/11 world, Muslim minorities living within western democratic states have much less freedom and choice in relation to counter-terrorism initiatives, because many of these focus explicitly on Muslim communities. The ideal of 'active citizenship' also echoes the rise of the new criminologies (Garland, 1992: 458), which place responsibility for crime squarely onto individuals, as exemplified by the popularity of Professor Martin Innes' situational crime prevention approach to countering terrorism, discussed in chapter three. Through the risk-based situational approach, significant differences in the structural positions that individuals

occupy are left outside any prevailing discourse, and yet as highlighted in chapter three, social and economic factors are not irrelevant when examining why individuals commit acts of terrorism (Schmid, 2007).

Within the national counter-terrorism strategies of western liberal states, there is some mention of the importance of taking into consideration real and perceived grievances in relation to preventing terrorism. In the original Prevent Strategy in Britain in 2007, and in the subsequent Prevent Review in 2011, it is acknowledged that real and imagined grievances can help drive AQ-linked radicalisation. Prevent is about addressing such grievances. In the Australian Counter-Terrorism White Paper (2010: 20) it is stated that ‘by reducing disadvantage, addressing real or perceived grievances and encouraging full participation in Australia’s social and economic life, government policies can help to mitigate any marginalisation and radicalisation that may otherwise occur within the Australian community’. In the US counter-terrorism strategy, the role of grievance is also given some attention:

To rally individuals and groups to its cause, al-Qa’ida preys on local grievances and propagates a self-serving historical and political account. It draws on a distorted interpretation of Islam to justify the murder of Muslim and non-Muslim innocents. Countering this ideology—which has been rejected repeatedly and unequivocally by people of all faiths around the world—is an essential element of our strategy (The White House, 2011: 3).

Furthermore, it is stated that:

Governments that are responsive to the needs of their citizens diminish the discontent of their people and the associated drivers and grievances that al-Qa’ida actively attempts to exploit (The White House, 2011: 5).

Grievance, trust and confidence in policing

The above discussion illustrates the importance placed upon the notion of grievance by national governments in their counter-terrorism strategies. Interestingly, counter-terrorism policing is not directly mentioned as a potential source of local grievance that terrorist strategists might exploit, yet it would appear that counter-terrorism policing is a key issue to consider when examining the significance of grievance in relation to counter-terrorism.

In Britain, secondary analysis of national crime survey data – the British Crime Survey – by Professor Innes and his team in a report commissioned by the Association of Chiefs of Police Officers (ACPO) in 2011 (*Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing*) suggests that taken as a whole, Muslims in Wales and England hold higher levels of trust and confidence in police than the general population. It is through a secondary analysis of this data that Innes et al. conclude that counter-terrorism policing is not causing ‘*widespread or wholesale disengagement and disenchantment within Muslim communities*’ (Innes et al., 2011: 54). This is seen as challenging an often-repeated view that Muslims have been alienated by counter-terrorism policing through the Prevent Strategy (Field, 2011b). It is important to note, however, that the use of quantitative data must be understood as a way of discerning broad trends within populations and that the complexities of populations are often not captured. Data pointing to the experiences of specific populations within specific locales is hard to gather quantitatively because large sample sizes are needed for quantitative analyses to be valid. This is time-consuming and resource-intensive work and so such data is often not gathered. Rather, experiences in relation to overarching categories like ‘Asian’, ‘Black’ or ‘White’ is often what is analysed within quantitative research (Spalek, 2008).

Returning to the specific issue of trust and confidence in policing amongst Muslim populations, national data-sets present ‘average’ Muslim community attitudes, and often obscure attitudinal differences amongst Muslims when taking into consideration factors such as age, religious sect, culture, gender and geographical location. There is a dearth of locally specific data in relation to local Muslim populations in Britain regarding issues of trust and confidence. According to Innes et al. (2011), Muslim young people have lower trust and confidence in their local police than do older Muslims. Moreover, less than half of young Muslim men (aged 16–24) gave the police a positive appraisal and this was lower than for men of the same age within the general population (Innes et al., 2011: 75). Innes et al. (2011: 75) use this analysis to argue that ‘whilst there may be concerns about Prevent policing and it may impact moderately negatively on the views of some groups, there is not a strong anti-police position detectable in the mainstream Muslim population’. Innes et al. (2011: 6) conclude that ‘whilst the “strong critique” of Prevent policing has achieved some political traction, the evidence collated suggests

that it is not a mainstream or majority view within Muslim communities.' Importantly, however, if thinking about counter-terrorism policy and practice as responding to local grievances, then surely it is not mainstream or majority Muslim views that should necessarily be prioritised. Instead, there is great merit in focusing on the specific grievances of young Muslim men rather than being dismissive of these as 'minority perceptions', particularly as it is young Muslim, Arab and Asian men who are likely to bear the brunt of counter-terrorism strategies (Poynting and Mason, 2008).

Alongside young Muslim men as a specific population that needs further consideration in relation to trust and confidence in policing, there is also an argument for focusing on specific geographical locations. In Britain, a project by West Midlands Police called Project Champion generated substantial local and national criticism. In late 2007 West Midlands Police began creating a vehicle movement net involving CCTV cameras around two geographical areas within the city of Birmingham – Alum Rock and Sparkhill. The wider context for this was two significant terrorist plots in 2007, which had raised the national threat level to critical (Thornton, 2010). Two hundred surveillance cameras were placed in predominantly Muslim areas, some of which were hidden. The West Midlands Police Chief Constable is reported to have said that he was 'deeply sorry' that his force got the balance between counter-terrorism and excessive intrusion into people's lives 'so wrong'; and that, moreover, his real regret was that Project Champion had undermined the strong relationships that have existed between West Midlands Police and their communities (*The Telegraph*, 2010). The national outcry led to a review of Project Champion in 2010, conducted by Sara Thornton, Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police, which concluded that 'A proposal was made to establish a permanent surveillance capability in the area. While such a security ring exists in the City of London, this proposal was to create something similar in a semi-residential, predominantly Asian area. This thinking should have been challenged from the start and questions should have been asked about its proportionality, legitimacy, authority and necessity; and about the ethical values that underpinned the proposal' (Thornton, 2010: 48).

It would seem logical to suggest that it is important for research and policy in relation to trust and confidence in policing, and in counter-terrorism policing more specifically, to focus on specific locales – and in the Birmingham

area in Britain this would mean a focus on the Alum Rock and Sparkhill areas. It would be important to access young Muslim men aged between 16 and 24 from within these locales in order to properly understand their grievances in relation to policing and counter-terrorism policing, to ensure that there is evidence-based policy and practice within these specific local areas. Currently, it appears that analyses of trust and confidence in policing with respect to Muslim, and indeed other, populations are rather too general, and that they obscure important specificities of experience. Gathering locally specific data about key groups of Muslims in relation to trust and confidence should be seen as a priority for police services that work in geographical areas where there are significant populations of Muslims, especially when it seems that the wider political and social context may be supportive of security approaches that focus on intelligence gathering and terrorism prevention initiatives being directed at Muslim populations. For example, according to Field (2011a), who looked at findings from a special '9/11 – ten years on' survey undertaken by YouGov on 6/7 September 2011, which involved an online sample of 1,947 adult Britons aged 18 and over, 63 per cent of adults wished to see Britain's security services focus their intelligence-gathering and terrorism-prevention efforts on Muslims living in or seeking to enter this country, on the grounds that, although most Muslims were not terrorists most terrorists threatening Britain were Muslim. It may therefore be that the police will be politically driven or influenced towards increasing or continuing their surveillance of Muslim communities, especially given that, since November 2012 there now are elected Police Commissioners in Britain for the first time.

Intelligence-gathering and surveillance approaches have a disproportionate impact on particular areas and groups of Muslims, and so as a priority, locally specific data is required, broken down according to ethnicity, age, religious sect, gender and so on. In the US, counter-terrorism policing has attracted criticism for its surveillance-based approach towards Muslim communities. The counter-terrorism tactics used by the New York Police Department (NYPD) in particular have attracted substantial criticism. Media reports highlight that the NYPD has adopted a pattern of surveillance and infiltration against American Muslims without any valid investigative justification. Media reports suggest that the NYPD infiltrated mosques, eavesdropped in cafes and monitored Muslim neighbourhoods with plainclothes officers (Associated

Press, 2012a). According to press reports, the 2006 NYPD intelligence report 'US-Iran Conflict: the threat to New York City' recommended increasing surveillance of Shia Muslims for tackling a perceived threat from Iranian terrorists (Associated Press, 2012b). According to a written statement to the US Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights by the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR):

Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, CAIR has received hundreds of reports from innocent Americans who have been wrongfully targeted by federal, state and local law enforcement officials because of their race, religion or national origin. They have been searched, investigated and detained without reasonable suspicion. Since then, the American Muslim community has become the unfair target of numerous federal and state counterterrorism initiatives and surveillance programs (CAIR, 2012: 2).

Understanding and directing policy attention towards issues of trust and confidence in policing amongst specific groups within Muslim communities should therefore be a key priority, especially given the responsabilisation of Muslims in relation to counter-terrorism policies. These discussions really highlight the challenges for community-based approaches to counter-terrorism, which increasingly hold the ideal of active citizenship at their core. The discussions above would suggest that not all citizens are equal with respect to the impacts of counter-terrorism strategies and, moreover, with respect to the responsabilisation towards preventing terrorism. Muslim communities in particular have borne the brunt of counter-terrorism policies, due, to some extent, to the focus of western states on AQ-linked terrorism.

The discussions above raise the question of whether it is possible to design counter-terrorism policies and practices that involve the notion of active citizenship. Can members of Muslim communities take a proactive civil stance towards national counter-terrorism strategies and work towards preventing terrorism? Or is it the case that the focus for all active citizens, not only for Muslims, should be a critique of state-driven counter-terrorism policies and practices where, despite state rhetoric around communities defeating terrorism and enhancing community resilience, in reality counter-terrorism continues to be largely driven by 'hard-edged' approaches that include surveillance and infiltration? Muslim community groups in particular have been faced with

this dilemma: whether to partner and work with the authorities and/or to resist actively. ‘Hard-edged’ approaches raise civil liberties questions, for the disproportionate surveillance of Muslim communities would suggest racial and religious profiling, suggesting that not all citizens are equal before the law. Is it possible for non-state actors to implement nationally driven counter-terrorism policies in a way that is relevant to local contexts? Is it possible for non-state actors even to subvert those ‘hard-edged’ approaches that would appear to be so prevalent in counter-terrorism approaches? The next sections of this chapter draw upon data that has been gathered since 2007, from a wide range of state and non-state actors engaged in ‘softer’, community-based approaches to counter-terrorism that have active citizenship and community resilience at their core. The importance of trust is highlighted: it is this that enables state and non-state actors to negotiate spaces of engagement and even partnership within the complex counter-terrorism terrain. This suggests that underpinning ‘softer’ counter-terrorism policies and practices are themes that resonate more directly with conflict transformation – the ability of state and non-state actors to work through any incompatibilities and struggles they may have, with trust serving as the social glue for this.

Trust and trust-building

Whilst there is some literature on policing in relation to the notion of trust, there is little substantial analysis of trust-building between police and communities within sensitive, conflict-based, environments (Spalek, 2010). A substantial body of work indicates that trust in the police can be seriously undermined in situations where communities feel that they are being over-policed (Bowling and Phillips, 2007; Bridges and Gilroy, 1982; Hall et al., 1978; Jefferson, Walker, and Seneviratne, 1992; Jones and Newburn, 2001; Macpherson Inquiry, 1999; Sharp and Atherton, 2007; Sivanandan, 1981; Smith and Gray, 1985; Thacher, 2005; Waddington, Stenson, and Don, 2004). This is a significant issue, given that a number of commentators have highlighted the importance of trust for community intelligence. For example, according to Virta (2008, 30), ‘trust and confidence towards the police is a precondition to community intelligence ... It would be very difficult for the police to get community intelligence if

people do not trust the police'. For Hillyard (1993, 2005), a breakdown of police-community relations can have serious consequences for policing, and in the context of counter-terrorism can halt the flow of vital information from communities. Innes et al. (2007) argue that low trust in the police can inhibit the willingness of individuals to pass community intelligence concerning a range of problems and issues, and a report by Demos (2007) highlights the importance of high trust relationships between communities and the police for effective national security in the age of 'home-grown terrorism'. A lack of community intelligence can lead to intrusive, 'hard' based policing strategies because suspicion tends to be of the community as a whole rather than being limited to specific groups or individuals .

Despite the importance of trust for community intelligence, little is known about how police officers and community members involved in 'soft' community-based approaches to counter-terrorism understand and experience trust, nor about the importance of the role of trust for them; whether trust is at all possible; whether there are different kinds of trust that can exist between police officers and communities; and the significance of this for community intelligence (Spalek, 2010). Interestingly, definitions of community policing have often left out trust, and yet an absence of trust can severely limit the development of community-police initiatives (Spalek, 2010). One suggested definition of community policing that I have previously put forward therefore contains the notion of trust:

Community policing comprises community-oriented goals and objectives. It relies upon community consent in relation to policing initiatives and operations within communities. Trust between community members and police officers is an essential component of community policing (Spalek, 2010: 793).

Discussions around trust often focus upon the extent of any trust by community members in police officers. There is often an automatic assumption that trust is largely about communities trusting police rather than the other way around. The interview data I have gathered points to both sides of the equation really mattering – communities trusting police but also police officers trusting communities. Interview data points to the importance of police officers being open and honest with communities, as one police officer argued:

I don't see how I could do the job that I'm doing if I wasn't honest and open and got trust ... Trust, it's just being open and honest so people know exactly where they stand with you.

The interview data highlights the importance of taking time to build trust, given the sensitivities that exist around preventing terrorism, as the following quotation from a counter-terrorism police officer illustrates:

because you're talking about vulnerabilities and risk within their communities. And even though the community may feel, you know, they may know themselves that there is a risk within their communities, it's quite difficult for them to open up and admit that to police officers. But if they ... if you've spent time building up trust with them, you know, you get to that stage where you are able to have that difficult conversation with them because they trust you enough to have that conversation with you. And for me that's the real crux of it is do they trust you enough to discuss those difficult issues with you.

The importance of police officers taking the time to build trust with communities echoes the work by Goldsmith (2005), who has argued that trust is rooted in experience, in individuals' interactions with other people. It is crucial, however, to highlight that for police officers to build trust with community members it is often important for them to go beyond simply spending time and interacting with community members, and it may involve police officers actually demonstrating their trustworthiness, for example, by empowering communities to manage their sense of unease and uncertainty (Loader, 2006 in Spalek, 2010). The following is a quotation from a police officer talking about the steps s/he took to demonstrate her/his trustworthiness with a community member and with the wider community, by providing a number of initiatives as responses to racial incidents that took place which had not been reported officially to the police:

... a couple of community members, Somali community members, from the XXX Estate, came to us with, there was some racial incidents taking place which they hadn't reported, they didn't feel confident reporting, but within the Somali community, that was having quite a wide impact on how, how safe they felt and how they felt they integrated into the local community. Now we built trust with the community by basically dealing with that matter. And that wasn't just one thing, it was a number of things. That was reassurance patrols, it was talking to the families, it was interventions, it was working alongside the CID,

you know, making sure in the first instance that those instances were reported properly and then actioned properly. And then making sure that they knew we were there to do, you know, the whole safe neighbourhood piece ... and then I hope what that did, I'm pretty confident what that did is it showed them that they did have a voice within the local area and that they could speak up and say 'well actually this isn't right, we're not being treated very well here.' And address their grievances.

The following is a quotation from a community member showing how important it is for police and communities to demonstrate to each other that they are trustworthy through showing their 'competences' and 'results':

trust, the police service have had to trust us and have had to see our competences and our, our results, our activities. And we also have had to trust them as well and, and see some of their, you know, what they've done. And so now at least these things can come to, you know, they can come to an eventual end, whether it's been achieved or it hasn't been achieved and then we can go back to the community and say "you know what? There's no point in engaging with them because they never do anything." Because look, this is it. We've got evidence. These are our minutes, these are our activities, and this is what they have said. So I think this is positive and this accountability and this partner ... and this is where the partnership is. (Muslim Community Member in Spalek, 2010: 802)

One senior police officer argued that police have no right to ask for information, but rather, that it is important for them to engage with communities first, to develop a relationship based on trust and confidence and then an exchange of information may develop:

most importantly recognising that we have no rights to go into communities and ask for information, what we were saying to them was you must first engage and develop a relationship based on trust and confidence and then we believe that information will flow naturally.

It may be that police officers need to build contingent trust with community members before being able to hold relationships with community members that involve implicit trust. According to Goldsmith (2005), contingent trust is about building trust through being engaged in trust-building activities and through actors demonstrating their trustworthiness. Contingent trust is likely to be instrumental in that it looks at shorter-term rather than longer-term

objectives and seeks confirmation through exchange relations. Contingent trust can later become implicit trust, which is a more advanced type of trust that can be found in committed, stable relationships (Goldsmith, 2005). Importantly, contingent and implicit trust applies equally to communities and police officers. Thus, it may be just as important for police officers to trust community members as it is for community members to trust police. Whilst some of the empirical data that I have gathered demonstrates that implicit trust can be built between police officers and community members, it is not necessarily the case that all police officers and all community members should seek to build implicit trust with each other. Implicit trust is perhaps most important for counter-terrorism initiatives that are based on partnership, involving community members as active citizens, actively working with specific police officers or policing units, engaged in deeply sensitive and risk-laden work. This may involve responding to gang violence and hate crime, alongside violent extremism. It may be that police involvement at too early a stage within such sensitive contexts could mean the loss of credibility for community members, who prefer first to appropriately challenge and prevent violence themselves before seeking help from the police:

It's high risk, that is very, very high risk. There's been incidents where you know if it doesn't go the right way someone's getting killed. There's people armed in front of you. But if you don't deal with it in that way, these individuals, you'll lose their trust, their confidence, and they will go to extremists. (Muslim Community Member in Spalek, 2010: 804)

The reality on the ground in deprived urban areas where there is gang violence is that it is impossible for police to tackle this and other forms of extreme violence without the involvement of certain key community members. I would suggest that police and communities within these contexts have to have certain levels of implicit trust in each other in order to enable effective initiatives to be built. Informal social control will be undertaken by those community members with credibility, who, in attempting to prevent extreme forms of violence, may be putting themselves at risk. However, it is difficult to see how police officers can have the reach and effectiveness that community members may have in these challenging contexts, suggesting a significant reliance on community members to make risk-laden decisions:

An individual turns up in a big mackintosh because he had a dispute with another Muslim and the size of the weapon he had down the back of his coat and what did we do? Did we panic and run and call the police? We took him round the corner, my colleagues, spoke with him, really calmly. What are you doing? You're coming to a religious place, this is the house of God, it's a mosque. And you're coming to kill a Muslim? Do you know that killing a Muslim means that you go to the hellfire straight away? Eyes wide. Really? So if I killed this individual I will be punished? Yes you will. And even if he was wrong and he do this you'll still do this because you are not an authority to take anybody's life. What did he do? Jumped in the car, went home, put his weapon away, came back, made up with the individual. (Muslim Community Member in Spalek, 2010: 804)

The following quotation is from a police officer who argues that it is important for police not to view community members as suspects and to be able to put their trust in community members:

So from our perspective when you're dealing with say Salafi, you know, individuals and groups, you know, we just made a decision, you know ... I like you ... we seem to be working together really well. I need to put my trust in you first. Now ... you'll have been very well aware of the law enforcement establishments sort of putting the onus onto Muslim communities ... it's Muslim communities will sort this out, down to them, you know, so we'll support Muslim communities etc., but you know it really is down to them etc. And we're kind of saying well first of all we've got to put our trust in them. You know, so you can't just expect them just to get on with it, you know, you've got to work with them and you've got to trust them, so the trust that we're giving is ... you may as a community or as an organisation or an individual felt that you were somewhat marginalised or excluded from discussion or engagement around counter terrorism or Prevent, I want to turn that on its head now and say I really like you, I want to work with you and I want to trust you so I want you to do some of this and I'm going to tell you all about it.

This same police officer also speaks about the importance of telling community members about the work that he does and also giving community members access to information as a way of building trust:

And I'm going to tell you about me and what I do and I'm going to get you vetted so that you all of a sudden get access to a whole new world of information and activity that you haven't been trusted with or nobody has recognised that you can help us in the past. And does that come with some risk? Yes, it does. Yeah, it

does, of course it does, but then there's no aspect of this work that doesn't come with some risk. And it's about, you know, making measured decisions that help to move this along.

Clearly, as demonstrated in the quotation above, in providing community members with access to information the police officer is taking some risk, however, he argues that this is a justified risk in terms of moving the relationship he has with communities along.

It is also important for police officers who are part of overt counter-terrorism units and approaches to be open and transparent about this. The Muslim Contact Unit, for example, which is a police unit in the Metropolitan Police Service that has applied community policing for counter-terrorism work, has involved police officers being open about them being counter-terrorism police officers, approaching community members as partners rather than informants (Spalek, 2010). MCU officers have argued that to be trusted by community members they have had to build up sincere relationships that are based upon being frank concerning the unit's remit. Without such honesty, the climate of fear generated by counter-terror laws and operations in Muslim communities can cause people to be distrustful of any approaches from police, particularly those that are not clearly defined (Spalek 2010). Research about the MCU would suggest that implicit trust is important not only for the effectiveness of sensitive community-based initiatives that tackle extreme forms of violence, but also because it can act as the glue that keeps police officers and community members partnering each other when external factors may impede more general police–community relations. Thus, international relations between nation states may influence British Muslim communities' perceptions of the British state, influencing their engagement with and perceptions of state actors, including the police. In a study by Spalek (2010), for instance, many Muslim participants spoke about how, from its conception, 'new terrorism' has been perceived by many as a war on Islam, causing reluctance within Muslim communities to help the police. So it would seem that within this very difficult political context, implicit trust can enable police and community members to engage in sensitive, community-based, preventative work in relation to extreme forms of violence: hate crime, gang violence and terrorism.

For more general engagement and outreach work, it may be the case that police officers need to be clear about the boundaries of trust when interacting with community members, as the following quotation from a police officer illustrates:

Trust is ... it's them knowing that they can come to you with a problem and that you will deal with it to the best of your ability, but also acknowledging that there are boundaries, and those boundaries are in line with the role that we do and our, you know, our responsibilities as police officers, in that they know that ... they know they can't just tell me something, you know if there's an offence there or I have an obligation to report back on that. They know that I will. So we're not talking about special favours, anything like that. But it's knowing that we will give the best advice and the best guidance and support that we possibly can within our role.

It is also important to consider the role of distrust in police and community interactions. Distrust is not necessarily a bad thing, as it can lead to more effective communication and engagement, as the following quotation from a community member illustrates:

... no doubt there are police officers that are very trustworthy, they are you know, it would be wrong for me to say otherwise ... but I think sometimes one feels that there's more of a motive, an exterior motive, for the police than meets the eye ... to be honest with you on a few occasions they have been, well, I personally have said to a police, to senior officers, that I do not want to have any further interaction with him. Because I feel that he is gathering intelligence. So he's probably gathering intelligence behind me but now he's gathering it in front of me as well. So you know in asking questions, and getting other stuff.

The following community member stresses that young people in particular should not automatically be trusting, but that there should be sufficient trust in order to achieve core objectives:

... I don't think young people should automatically think they have to trust everyone, I think there's a kind of healthy scepticism that young people need and that's part of their way of surviving. They shouldn't automatically trust the police in every aspect of what the police are doing or saying. There needs to be sufficient trust, that's the thing. If you've got sufficient trust you can work with that and achieve certain things, but I think there needs to be a healthy scepticism as well. And certainly a critical awareness of these very difficult complex issues.

Young, marginalised, people who may be engaged in drug taking and/or gang-related violence, although distrusting of police may trust the youth workers with whom they interact. Youth work provides these young people with safe spaces in which to discuss difficult issues, and youth workers can challenge viewpoints so as to avoid the escalation into violence which will involve the authorities. Youth workers can gain the trust of young people through long-term interaction and through experience (see McDonald, 2012 for further details).

Conclusion

This chapter focuses on citizenship, responsabilisation and trust, three inter-related dimensions to counter-terrorism as conflict transformation. It is highlighted that at the heart of 'softer', community-based strategies to counter-terrorism, is the notion of active citizenship – that individuals as citizens have a responsibility to help prevent terrorism. This chapter stresses that although citizenship at an abstract level implies equality, in reality individuals experience different levels of citizenship. When looking at citizenship in relation to nation-state security, particular communities have experienced differentiated state-led approaches to counter-terrorism. Post 9/11, Muslim communities have particularly experienced differentiated citizenship because they have borne the brunt of 'hard-edged' counter-terrorism policies and practices that have included detention without charge, surveillance and the use of informants. Indeed, in this chapter it is suggested that policing is a source of grievance, as a result of disproportionate 'hard' policing tactics targeted at Muslim communities. The question raised in this chapter is how, within a context of differentiated citizenship, states can encourage and actively persuade citizens to work within state-driven counter-terrorism policies. In the post-9/11 context, Muslim communities have undergone responsabilisation – they are viewed as the moral agents for terrorism prevention strategies. This then raises the question of what the challenges are for policy makers attempting to involve and engage with members of Muslim communities for counter-terrorism purposes. Can members of Muslim communities take a proactive civil stance towards national counter-terrorism strategies

and work towards preventing terrorism? Or is it the case that the focus for all active citizens, not only for Muslims, should be a critique of state-driven counter-terrorism policies and practices where, despite state rhetoric around communities defeating terrorism and enhancing community resilience, in reality counter-terrorism continues to be largely driven by 'hard-edged' approaches that include surveillance and infiltration? Muslim community groups have in particular been faced with the dilemma of whether to partner and work with the authorities and/or actively to resist.

This chapter demonstrates the complexities in a notion such as trust. There is often an assumption that trust is largely about communities trusting police rather than the other way around. The interview data I have gathered points to both sides of the equation really mattering – communities trusting police but also police officers trusting communities. The data presented in this chapter also highlights the importance of taking time to build trust, given the sensitivities that exist around preventing terrorism. Often, it is crucial for police officers and community members to go beyond simply spending time and interacting with each other, and actually demonstrating their trustworthiness through their competencies. It may also be that police officers need to build contingent trust with community members before being able to hold relationships with community members that involve implicit trust. According to Goldsmith (2005), contingent trust is about building trust through being engaged in trust-building activities and through actors demonstrating their trustworthiness. Contingent trust can later become implicit trust, which is a more advanced type of trust that can be found in committed, stable relationships (Goldsmith, 2005). This chapter also suggests that implicit trust is perhaps most important for counter-terrorism initiatives that are based on partnership, involving community members as active citizens, actively working with specific police officers or policing units, engaged in deeply sensitive and risk-laden work. This may involve responding to gang violence and hate crime, alongside violent extremism. It may be that police involvement at too early a stage within such sensitive contexts could mean the loss of credibility for community members, who prefer first to appropriately challenge and prevent violence themselves before seeking help from the police.

The next chapter focuses on two further dimensions that feature significantly in counter-terrorism policies: engagement and partnership.

Bibliography

- Associated Press (2012) <http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2012/Document-shows-NYPD-eyed-Shiites-based-on-religion> (accessed 11 May 2012).
- Beck, U. (1992) *Risk Society: towards a new modernity* London: Sage.
- Bowling, B. and Phillips, C. (2007) 'Disproportionate and Discriminatory: Reviewing the Evidence on Police Stop and Search' *Modern Law Review* 70 (6): 936–61.
- Bridges, L. and Gilroy, P. (1982) 'Striking Back' (June): 34–5, <http://www.amielandmelburn.org.uk/collections/mt/pdf/82-06-34.pdf> (accessed 25 April 2010).
- Briggs, R., Fieschi, C. and Lownsbrough, H. (2006) 'Bringing it Home. Community-based approaches to counter-terrorism.' Demos, <http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Bringing%20it%20Home%20-%20web.pdf> (accessed 4 December 2011).
- CAIR (2012) *Written Statement of the Council on American-Islamic Relations on Ending Racial Profiling in America* submitted to the US Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights, 17 April 2012, <http://www.cair.com/Portals/0/pdf/ERPAHearingTestimony.pdf> (accessed 11 May 2012).
- Choudhury, T. and Fenwick, H. (2011) *The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Measures on Muslim Communities*. London: Equality and Human Rights Commission.
- Coaffee, J., Murkami-Wood, D. and Rogers, P. (2008) *The Everyday Resilience of the City: How Cities Respond to Terrorism and Disaster* Basingstoke: PalgraveMacMillan.
- Commission on Integration and Cohesion (2006) *Our Shared Future* London: HMSO, <http://resources.cohesioninstitute.org.uk/Publications/Documents/Document/DownloadDocumentsFile.aspx?recordId=18&file=PDFversion> (accessed 3 April 2013).
- Communities and Local Government (2007) *Preventing Violent Extremism – winning hearts and minds* London: Department for Communities and Local Government, <http://resources.cohesioninstitute.org.uk/Publications/Documents/Document/DownloadDocumentsFile.aspx?recordId=133&file=PDFversion> (accessed 3 April 2013).
- Demos (2007) *The Activist Police Force*. London: Demos.
- Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (2010) *Counter-Terrorism White Paper – Securing Australia – Protecting Our Community* Canberra: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, http://www.dpmc.gov.au/publications/counter_terrorism/ (accessed 3 April 2013).

- Durodie, B. (2005) 'Terrorism and Community Resilience – A UK Perspective' Chatham House Briefing Paper ISP/NSC Briefing Paper 05/01, July 2005.
- Field, C. (2011a) *British Religion in Numbers*, <http://www.brin.ac.uk/news/2011/911-ten-years-on/> (accessed 5 April 2013).
- (2011b) *British Muslims and the Police*, <http://www.brin.ac.uk/news/2011/british-muslims-and-the-police/> (accessed 5 April 2013).
- Garland, D. (1992) 'Criminological Knowledge and its Relation to Power: Foucault's Genealogy and Criminology Today', Vol. 32 *British Journal of Criminology*, pp. 456–80.
- Goldsmith, A. (2005) "Police Reform and the Problem of 'Trust.'" *Theoretical Criminology* 9 (4): 443–70.
- Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J. and Roberts, B. (1978) *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order*. London: Macmillan.
- Hewitt, S. (2010) *Snitch! A History of the Modern Intelligence Informer*. London: Continuum.
- Hickman, M., Silvestri, S. and Nickels, N. (2011) 'Suspect Communities'? Counter-Terrorism Policy, the Press and the Impact on Irish and Muslim Communities in Britain London: Metropolitan University, http://www.city.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/96287/suspect-communities-report-july2011.pdf (accessed 2 April 2013).
- Hillyard, P. (1993) *Suspect Community: People's Experience of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain*. London: Pluto Press.
- (2005) 'The "War on Terror:" Lessons from Ireland' *Essays for Civil Liberties and Democracy in Europe*, *European Civil Liberties Network*, http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf/The_War_on_Terror_lessons_from_Ireland.pdf (accessed 25 April 2010).
- Home Office (2011) *Prevent Strategy* London: HMSO, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf (accessed 2 April 2013).
- Innes, M., Abbot, L., Lowe, T. and Roberts, C. (2007) *Hearts and Minds and Eyes and Ears: Reducing Radicalisation Risks through Reassurance-Oriented Policing*. Cardiff: Cardiff University, Universities' Police Science Institute.
- Innes, M., et al. (2011) *Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing*. ACPO: Cardiff University, <http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/TAM/2011/PREVENT%20Innes%200311%20Final%20send%202.pdf> (accessed 5 April 2013).
- Jefferson, T., Walker, M. and Seneviratne, M. (1992) 'Ethnic Minorities, Crime and Criminal Justice: A Study in a Provincial City', in *Unravelling Criminal Justice*, edited by David Downes. London: Macmillan, pp. 138–64.

- Jones, T. and Newburn, T. (2001) 'Widening Access: Improving Police Relations with Hard to Reach Groups' Paper 138, <http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/prgpdfs/prs138.pdf> (accessed 25 April 2010).
- Kundnani, A. (2009) *Spooked! How not to prevent violent extremism*. London: Institute of Race Relations.
- Loader, I. (2006) 'Policing, Recognition and Belonging.' *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 605 (1): 201–21.
- McDonald, L. Z. (2012) 'Engaging Young People within a Counter-Terrorism Context' in: B.Spalek (ed.) *Counter-Terrorism: community-based approaches to terror crime* Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 90–136.
- McGovern, M. (2010) Countering Terror or Counter-Productive? Comparing Irish and British Muslim Experiences of Counter-Insurgency Law and Policy. Report of a Symposium held in Cultúrlann McAdam Ó Fiaich, Falls Road, Belfast, 23–24 June 2009. Lancashire: Edge Hill University.
- Macpherson Inquiry (1999) *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, Report of an Inquiry by Sir William Macpherson of Cluny*, Cm 4262-I. London: Stationery Office, Parliamentary Papers.
- Marshall, T. (1950) *Citizenship and Social Class* Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
- Mythen, G. and Walklate, S. (2006) 'Criminology and Terrorism', *British Journal of Criminology* 46 (3): pp. 379–98.
- Pantazis, C. and Pemberton, S. (2009) 'From the "Old" to the "New Suspect" Community: Examining the Impacts of Recent UK Counter-Terrorist Legislation' *British Journal of Criminology* 49 (5): 646–66.
- Poynting, S. and Mason, V. (2008) 'The New Integrationism, the State and Islamophobia: Retreat from Multiculturalism in Australia', *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice* 36 (4): 230–46.
- Schmid, A. (2007) 'Terrorism and Democracy', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10(3): 14–25.
- Sharp, D. and Atherton, S. (2007) 'To Serve and Protect? The Experiences of Policing in the Community of Young People from Black and Other Ethnic Minority Groups' *British Journal of Criminology* 47 (5): 746–63.
- Sivanandan, A. (1981) 'From Resistance to Rebellion: Asian and Afro-Caribbean Struggles in Britain', *Race and Class* 23 (2–3): 111–52.
- Smith, D. J. and Gray, J. (1985) *Police and People in London. The PSI Report*. Aldershot: Gower.
- Spalek, B. (2008) *Communities, Identities and Crime* Bristol: Policy Press, pp. 1–241.
- (2010) 'Community Policing, Trust and Muslim Communities in relation to 'new terrorism' *Politics and Policy*, Vol. 38 (4), pp. 789–815.

- Spalek, B., El-Awa, S. and McDonald, L. Z. (2009) *Engagement and Partnership Work in a Counter-Terrorism Context*. University of Birmingham.
- Spalek, B. and Lambert, R. (2007) 'Muslim Communities under Surveillance: A stigmatised faith identity post 9/11' *Criminal Justice Matters: Security and Surveillance* No. 68, pp. 12–13.
- Spalek, B. and McDonald, L. Z. (2011) 'Preventing Religio-Political Violent Extremism Amongst Muslim Youth: a study exploring police-community partnership' University of Birmingham.
- Telegraph, The (2010) 'Police have apologized for putting 200 surveillance cameras in two largely Muslim neighbourhoods', 30 September 2010, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/8034999/Police-apologise-for-putting-200-CCTV-cameras-in-Muslim-area.html> (accessed 11 May 2012).
- Thacher, D. (2005) 'The Local Role in Homeland Security' 39 *Law & Society Review* (3): 635–75.
- Thornton, S. (2010) *Project Champion Review*, 30 September 2010, http://www.west-midlands.police.uk/latest-news/docs/Champion_Review_FINAL_30_09_10.pdf (accessed 16 May 2012).
- Virta, S. (2008) 'Community Policing Meets New Challenges', in *Policing Meets New Challenges: Preventing Radicalization and Recruitment*, edited by Sirpa Virta. Finland: University of Tampere, Department of Management Studies, CEPOL. 15–41.
- Waddington, P. A. J., Stenson, K. and Don, D. (2004) 'In Proportion: Race, and Police Stop and Search' 44 (6): 889–914.
- White House, The (2011) *National Strategy for CounterTerrorism*, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf (accessed 10 May 2012).