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Notes

Cloying Sentiments

- 1 C. Davies, 'Jokes on the Death of Diana', in T. Walter (ed.), *The Mourning for Diana* (Berg, 1999), p. 258.
- 2 L. Grant, 'I'll second those emotions', *Guardian*, 30 December 1997, p. 10.
- 3 D. Aitkenhead, *Guardian*, 16 July 1998.
- 4 D. H. Lawrence, *Phoenix: The Posthumous Papers of D. H. Lawrence* (Heinemann, 1936), p. 545.
- 5 J.-P. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (Routledge, 2003 [1943]), Part IV, 2:iii, esp. pp. 625–32.
- 6 *Ibid.*, pp. 632, 629, 632, 630.
- 7 G. Little, *The Public Emotions: From Mourning to Hope* (ABC Books, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 1999), p. 22.
- 8 *Cit. ibid.*, p. 24.
- 9 T. Walter, 'The Questions People Asked', in Walter, *Mourning*, pp. 19–21. See also A. Kear and D. L. Steinberg (eds), *Mourning Diana: Nation, Culture, and the Performance of Grief* (Routledge, 1999), another wide-ranging collection, and M. Merck (ed.), *After Diana* (Verso, 1998).
- 10 J. Wolffe, 'Royalty and Public Grief in Britain: an Historical Perspective 1817–1997', in Walter, *Mourning*.
- 11 The concept of 'structure of feeling' is generally derived from the work of Raymond Williams, where it is, however, relatively undeveloped and unclear. For discussion, see P. Filmer, 'Structures of feeling and socio-cultural formations: the significance of literature and experience to Raymond Williams's sociology of culture', *British Journal of Sociology* (2003), 54:2.
- 12 Davies, p. 259.
- 13 *Cit. Walter*, 'Questions', p. 31.
- 14 B. Babcock (ed.), *The Reversible World* (Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 32.
- 15 Little, p. 5.
- 16 Walter, 'Questions', p. 26.
- 17 I. Jack, 'Those Who Felt Differently', *Granta* (1997), 60, p. 17.
- 18 *Cit. Walter*, 'Questions', 26.
- 19 D. Knight, 'Why We Enjoy Condemning Sentimentality: A Meta-Aesthetic Perspective', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* (1999), 57:4, pp. 418, 419. This

- argument is of course using the critic's own assumptions about the sentimental against him, without necessarily assuming their validity in themselves.
- 20 E. K. Sedgwick, *The Epistemology of the Closet* (Penguin Books, 1994), p. 180 (see also pp. 152–4).
 - 21 Grant, p. 10.
 - 22 K. S. Gruesz, 'Feeling for the Fireside: Longfellow, Lynch and the Topography of Poetic Power', in M. Chapman and G. Hendler (eds), *Sentimental Men: Masculinity and the Politics of Affect in American Culture* (California University Press, 1999) p. 43.
 - 23 K. Sánchez-Eppler, 'Then When We Clutch Hardest: On the Death of a Child and the Replication of an Image', in *ibid.*, p. 70.
 - 24 *The Letters of Charles Dickens* (Clarendon Press, 1965), vol. 1, p. 327; and see I. Newman, 'The Alleged Unwholesomeness of Sentimentality', in A. Neill and A. Ridley (eds), *Arguing About Art: Contemporary Philosophical Debates* (Routledge, 2002), pp. 326–7, where the episode is discussed.
 - 25 Grant, p. 10.
 - 26 For a discussion of the sentimental in relation to sensationalism and popular culture, see my *Sensational Subjects: The Dramatization of Experience in the Modern World* (Bloomsbury, 2014), Ch. 2; and, for the sentimental in relation to melodrama, Ch. 8.
 - 27 See R. Barthes, *A Lover's Discourse* (Vintage, 2002), pp. 13, 175, 177, for provocative comments on these themes.
 - 28 Grant, p. 10.
 - 29 E. S. H. Tan and N. H. Frijda, 'Sentiment in Film Viewing', in C. Plantinga and M. G. Smith (eds), *Passionate Views: Film, Cognition and Emotion* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), pp. 53, 55.
 - 30 Aitkenhead.
 - 31 R. C. Solomon, *In Defence of Sentimentality* (Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 7.
 - 32 E. Wilson, 'The Unbearable Lightness of Diana', *New Left Review* (1997), 226, p. 140.
 - 33 M. Chapman and G. Hendler, 'Introduction', in Chapman and Hendler, pp. 2, 9.
 - 34 G. Hendler, 'Bloated Bodies and Sober Sentiments: Masculinity in 1840s Temperance Narratives', in Chapman and Hendler, p. 125.
 - 35 *Ibid.*, pp. 128, 130.
 - 36 L. Boltanski, *Distant Suffering: Morality, Media and Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 101.
 - 37 Men cry about 'important' things, like politics and football ...
 - 38 A further complication can be added here. In her recent work, Lauren Berlant argues that 'starting in the 1830s an intimate public sphere of femininity

constituted the first subcultural, mass-mediated, market population of relatively disenfranchised people in the United States', a feminine sphere which would open up opportunities for both the exploration *and* the commercial exploitation of feeling; see *The Female Complaint: The Unfinished Business of Sentimentality in American Culture* (Duke University Press, 2008), p. xii and *passim*.

- 39 S. L. Stratton-Pruitt, 'Murillo in America', in S. L. Stratton-Pruitt (ed.), *Bartolomé Esteban Murillo (1617–1682): Paintings from American Collections* (Kimball Art Museum and Henry H. Abrams, 2002), p. 94. For reception in America, see also M. E. Boone, *Vistas de España: American Vistas of Art and Life in Spain, 1860–1914* (Yale University Press, 2007), Ch. 2.
- 40 X. Brooke, 'Seville and Beyond: The Taste for Murillo's Genre Painting across Europe', in X. Brooke and P. Cherry (eds), *Murillo: Scenes of Childhood* (Dulwich Picture Gallery and Merrell Publishers, 2001), p. 63.
- 41 P. Cherry, 'Murillo's Genre Scenes and their Context', in *ibid.*, p. 13.
- 42 A. Bermingham, Introduction, to A. Bermingham (ed.), *Sensation and Sensibility: Viewing Gainsborough's Cottage Door* (Yale University Press, 2005), p. 8.
- 43 Cherry, p. 27.
- 44 A. E. Pérez Sánchez, *Murillo* (Electra, 2000), p. 55.
- 45 For *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, see D. S. Reynolds, *Mightier Than the Sword: 'Uncle Tom's Cabin' and the Battle for America* (Norton, 2011); L. Berlant, 'Poor Eliza', *American Literature* (1998), 70:3, pp. 635–68, and reproduced in her *The Female Complaint: The Unfinished Business of Sentimentality in American Culture* (Duke University Press, 2008), and T. F. Gossett, *Uncle Tom's Cabin and American Culture* (Southern Methodist University Press, 1985); for *A Christmas Carol*, see P. Davis, *The Lives and Times of Ebenezer Scrooge* (Yale University Press, 1990), and F. A. Guida, *A Christmas Carol and Its Adaptations: A Critical Examination of Dickens's Story and its Productions on Screen and Television* (McFarland and Company, 2000).
- 46 H. B. Stowe, *Uncle Tom's Cabin* (Wordsworth Editions, 1995), pp. 20–1, 124–5, 130–1. Since there are numerous editions and imprints, I will also give chapter references: IV, XIII, XIII.
- 47 C. Dickens, *A Christmas Carol* (Wordsworth Editions, 1993), pp. 60–2, 41–2. Again, I will also give chapter references (Dickens calls them 'staves' [st.]): 3, 2.
- 48 *Cabin*, pp. 317, 319–20, 342 (Chs XXXII, XXXII, XXXV).
- 49 *Carol*, p. 20 (st. 1).
- 50 L. Merish, *Sentimental Materialism: Gender, Commodity Culture, and Nineteenth-Century American Literature* (Duke University Press, 2000), p. 153.
- 51 H. B. Stowe, 'House and Home Papers' [1865] in her *Household Papers and Stories* (AMS Publishers, 1967), p. 82.
- 52 *Cabin*, p. 124 (Ch. XIII).

- 53 Merish, p. 143.
- 54 *Cabin*, p. 131 (Ch. XIII).
- 55 *Carol*, p. 54 (st. 3).
- 56 Merish, p. 150.
- 57 L. Wardley, 'Relic, Fetish, Femmage: The Aesthetics of Sentiment in the Work of Stowe', in S. Samuels (ed.), *The Culture of Sentiment: Race, Gender and Sentimentality in Nineteenth-Century America* (Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 213, 214.
- 58 K. Sánchez-Eppler, 'Bodily Bonds: The Intersecting Rhetorics of Feminism and Abolition', in *ibid.*, p. 112.
- 59 *Cabin*, Ch. XVIII; and see the discussion in Wardley.
- 60 Wardley, p. 216.
- 61 Merish, pp. 138, 165.
- 62 Sánchez-Eppler, 'Clutch Hardest', p. 74.
- 63 A. Jaffe, *Scenes of Sympathy: Identity and Representation in Victorian Fiction* (Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 44.
- 64 *Carol*, p. 25 (st. 1).
- 65 *Cabin*, pp. 319, 344, 390, 344, 313, 345 (Chs XXXII, XXXV, XLII, XXXV, XXXI, XXXV).
- 66 There is an apparently endless supply of circulating female hair in *Cabin*: remember also the strand found in a locket on St Clare after his death (p. 296, Ch. XXIX).
- 67 *Cabin*, pp. 362, 130 (Chs XXXVIII, XIII).
- 68 *Carol*, pp. 29, 18 (st. 1).
- 69 Jaffe, pp. 36, 38.
- 70 E. Barker, *Greuze and the Painting of Sentiment* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 11.
- 71 *Carol*, p. 89 (st. 5).
- 72 J. Tompkins, *Sensational Designs: The Cultural Work of American Fiction 1790–1860* (Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 134, 135.
- 73 *Cabin*, Ch. XXVIII.
- 74 R. Barthes, p. 63.
- 75 J. Culler, *Flaubert: the Uses of Uncertainty* (Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 226; and see pp. 226–8 generally.
- 76 A. Vrettos, *Somatic Fictions: Imagining Illness in Victorian Culture* (Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 100.
- 77 M. Noble, *The Masochistic Pleasures of Sentimental Literature* (Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 65.
- 78 S. Clark, *Sentimental Modernism: Women Writers and the Revolution of the Word* (Indiana University Press, 1991), pp. 10–11.

- 79 J. Kristeva, *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection*, (Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 4.
- 80 *Ibid.*, p. 11.
- 81 Clark, pp. 22, 10.
- 82 *Ibid.*, p. 20.
- 83 Kristeva, p. 3.
- 84 Sedgwick, pp. 142–3: the book links this to gay contexts and controversies
- 85 *Cabin*, pp. 362, 264 (Chs XXXVIII, XXVI).
- 86 M. Noble, 'The Ecstasies of Sentimental Wounding in *Uncle Tom's Cabin*', *Yale Journal of Criticism* (1997), 10:2, pp. 296, 299.
- 87 Barthes, pp. 189, 160.
- 88 R. Barthes, *Camera Lucida* (Vintage, 1993), pp. 21, 27, 73; and see pp. 25–30.
- 89 Noble, 'Ecstasies', p. 305.
- 90 See M. Noble, *The Masochistic Pleasures of Sentimental Literature* (Princeton University Press, 2000), Ch. 2; and G. Bataille, *Eroticism* (Marion Boyars, 1987).
- 91 Tompkins, p. 176.
- 92 See, for example, Susan Warner's *The Wide Wide World*, and Martha Finley's *Elsie Dinsmore*, both from roughly the same period as *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. On Warner, see Tompkins, Ch. 6, and Noble, *Masochistic*, Ch. 3; on Dinsmore, see Noble, Ch. 2; and see Noble, Ch. 4, on Stowe.
- 93 L. Bersani, 'Representation and Its Discontents', in S. J. Greenblatt (ed.), *Allegory and Representation* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 150.
- 94 Jaffe, p. 32.
- 95 Solomon, p. 9.
- 96 Sánchez-Eppler, 'Bodily Bonds', pp. 99–100.
- 97 Barker, p. 11.
- 98 Sánchez-Eppler, 'Bodily Bonds', p. 99.
- 99 Sedgwick, pp. 143, 150.
- 100 J. Elison, *Cato's Tears and the Making of Anglo-American Emotion* (Chicago University Press, 1999), p. 196n. 19.
- 101 Tan and Frijda, pp. 48, 52.
- 102 J. Howard, 'What Is Sentimentality?', *American Literary History* (1999), 11:1, p. 71. The point is made in a discussion of Adam Smith.

Sensibility and Sympathy in the Theatre of Tears

- 1 A. Radcliffe, *A Sicilian Romance* (Oxford University Press, 1993 [1790]), pp. 7–8.
- 2 A. Vincent-Buffault, *The History of Tears: Sensibility and Sentimentality in France* (Macmillan, 1991), p. 53.

- 3 For a general account, see G. J. Barker-Benfield, *The Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Chicago University Press, 1992).
- 4 C. Campbell, *The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism* (Blackwell, 1989), p. 41.
- 5 For a brief account, see E. Barker, *Greuze and the Painting of Sentiment* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 207–8.
- 6 D. J. Denby, *Sentimental Narrative and the Social Order in France, 1760–1820* (Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 115.
- 7 J. Elkins, *Pictures & Tears: A History of People Who Have Cried in Front of Paintings* (Routledge, 2001), p. 124.
- 8 Elkins argues (Ch. 7) that we have ‘lost’ the eighteenth century – we can no longer engage with sentimentalism. The problem here, though, is that while there has clearly been a major shift in aesthetic style and fashion since then, and this is significant for our understanding of different modes of expression and representation, it does not necessarily follow that there are no underlying continuities and patterns. He focuses particularly on the manifest interest Greuze shows elsewhere in depicting adolescent girls on the cusp of womanhood, his ‘attraction to underage girls who have recently been deflowered’, and argues that his philosopher defender Diderot shares this fascination (pp. 113–14, 131; and Barker broadly endorses this: see pp. 1–4, and 242n. 11). Again, one might observe that the fact that we cannot handle this, that it disturbs our convictions about childhood innocence and brings into play our moral panic over paedophilia, shouldn’t blind us to continuities: the sentimentalist linkage of purity, innocence and loss can easily be mapped onto the theme of sexuality and the loss of virginity; our contemporary version reinterprets all this in a different register, but the similarities are there.
- 9 Barker, pp. 237, 238.
- 10 Denby, p. 86.
- 11 A. Bermingham, ‘Introduction’, in A. Bermingham (ed.), *Sensation and Sensibility: Viewing Gainsborough’s Cottage Door* (Yale Center for British Art, 2005), p. 1. The rest of the essay explores Gainsborough’s art as an exemplification of sensibility in the British context.
- 12 In Ann Radcliffe herself, for example. A. Milbank refers to the ‘sequence of alternating frantic chases and frozen tableaux’ in *A Sicilian Romance* (Oxford University Press, 1993 [1790]), Introduction, p. xv.
- 13 D. Diderot, *Entretiens sur le Fils naturel* (1757), p. 88, cit. M. Fried, *Absorption and Theatricality: Painter and Beholder in the Age of Diderot* (California University Press, 1980), p. 95.
- 14 Fried, pp. 78, 92.
- 15 C. Williams, ‘Moving Pictures: George Eliot and melodrama’, in L. Berlant (ed.), *Compassion: The Culture and Politics of an Emotion* (Routledge, 2004), p. 105.

- 16 Denby, p. 76.
- 17 Williams, p. 112.
- 18 D. Diderot, *Lettre sur les sourds et muets*, p. 64, cit. Fried, p. 91.
- 19 Fried, p. 91.
- 20 Using Brecht, Barthes argues, in his account of tableau, that there is indeed no overall ‘final’ meaning, in that ‘all the burden of meaning and pleasure bears on each scene, not on the whole’: R. Barthes, ‘Diderot, Brecht, Eisenstein’, from *Music Image Text* (Fontana, 1977), p. 72. Hence the maximum of meaning is concentrated in the instant depicted. See also discussions of Diderot and the later history of tableau in M. Meisel, *Realizations: Narrative, Pictorial, and Theatrical Arts in Nineteenth-Century England* (Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 49, 84–6.
- 21 Barthes, pp. 70, 71.
- 22 Cit. *ibid.*, p. 71.
- 23 Williams, p. 112. The best overall account of melodrama remains P. Brooks, *The Melodramatic Imagination* (Yale University Press, 1976). See also the discussion of melodrama in my *Sensational Subjects: The Dramatization of Experience in the Modern World* (Bloomsbury, 2014), Ch. 8.
- 24 S. Manning, ‘Sensibility’, in J. Keymer and J. Mee (eds), *The Cambridge Companion to English Literature 1740–1830* (Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 89.
- 25 Campbell, p. 134.
- 26 We can let Emily St. Aubert’s father, in Ann Radcliffe’s *The Mysteries of Udolpho*, speak for this complaint: he warns that sensibility ‘is a dangerous quality, which is constantly extracting the excess of misery, or delight, from every surrounding circumstance’ (Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 79.
- 27 Diderot, *Entretiens*, p. 102, cit. Fried, p. 94.
- 28 Fried, pp. 68–9, 68, 104, 104–5.
- 29 Barthes, p. 70.
- 30 J. Caplan, *Framed Narratives: Diderot’s Genealogy of the Beholder* (Manchester University Press, 1986), p. 4.
- 31 Caplan, p. 16.
- 32 Diderot, ‘Eulogy of Richardson’, 1761, from *Diderot’s Selected Writings*, ed. L. G. Crocker, (Collier-Macmillan, 1966), p. 110, cit. in Caplan, p. 99.
- 33 Charles Taylor links this to the Enlightenment project whereby ‘the enlightened trail-blazer of the present most often knowingly sacrifices his own well-being to that of future generations’: *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 331.
- 34 Caplan, p. 20.
- 35 Diderot, ‘Eulogy’, cit. *ibid.*, p. 8, amended trans.
- 36 Caplan, pp. 20, 22–3, 23.

- 37 J. Schulte-Sasse, 'Afterword', in Caplan, pp. 107, 104, 108, 108.
- 38 Barker, p. 238.
- 39 Diderot, *Selected Writings*, p. 110, cit. Schulte-Sasse, p. 99.
- 40 M. Hays, *The Memoirs of Emma Courtney* (Oxford University Press, 1996). Since very few will be familiar with it, I include a brief plot synopsis, as follows. Emma is writing to her adopted stepson Augustus, son of the object of her unrequited love, Augustus Harley, in response to his request for an account of her life and her relations with his father. In doing this, she quotes copiously from her old correspondence with Augustus, and with a friend, the philosopher Mr Francis. Emma met Augustus by chance, after seeing a portrait of him at his mother's home, and engages in a vigorous pursuit of him; early promise gave way to silence and coldness on his part; it later transpired that he had married and had a son. Finally accepting the futility of her passion for Augustus, and in desperate financial straits, she marries another, who proves unfaithful and shoots himself. Augustus dies in an accident, after explaining himself and admitting his love for Emma on his deathbed.
- 41 On the 1790s, see Barker-Benfield, Ch. 7, including pp. 365–8, on Hays specifically. It is of course true that Wollstonecraft's *Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792) is the major work here, and there is a tendency to belittle Hays in comparison: for example, Barker-Benfield claims that Hays 'cobbles together' a celebration of feminine sensibility with Wollstonecraft's 'devastating critique' of it (p. 366), a comment that ignores the way the ambitious fusion of themes in the *Memoirs* both develops and extends Wollstonecraft's more theoretical approach. See also, on the broader issues, K. O'Brien, 'The Feminist Critique of Enlightenment', in M. Fitzpatrick et al. (eds), *The Enlightenment World* (Routledge, 2007).
- 42 Since it is of course Emma who articulates all this, in the course of the novel, I will generally refer to views as 'hers'; for reasons implied above, we can generally assume them to be those of Mary Hays, as they evolved in her past and in the writing of the novel. This of course raises tricky issues around authorship and the fictional subject, returned to later.
- 43 *Emma*, pp. 95, 96.
- 44 *Ibid.*, pp. 99, 129, 129.
- 45 *Ibid.*, p. 146.
- 46 W. M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 164.
- 47 Vincent-Buffault, p. 41.
- 48 J. Todd, *Sensibility: An Introduction* (Methuen, 1986), pp. 5–6.
- 49 J. Mullan, *Sentiment and Sociability: The Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 16.
- 50 Denby, pp. 25, 51.

- 51 *Emma*, pp. 150, 156. The first encounter with the portrait is mentioned on p. 59.
- 52 *Ibid.*, pp. 25, 84.
- 53 *Ibid.*, pp. 169, 82. See also references to the ‘distempered imagination’ at pp. 77, 97, 118, 169.
- 54 Letter to *Monthly Magazine*, May 1797, cit. in G. Kelly, *Women, Writing, and Revolution* (Clarendon, 1993), p. 109; and see Ch. 3 for a general account of the politics of Hays’s writing.
- 55 *Emma*, p. 82.
- 56 The epistolary mode of much eighteenth-century fiction has been widely noted. What Lois Bueler claims in relation to Richardson’s fiction – ‘that a letter has both the immediateness of drama and the recursive possibilities of narrative’ – would have obvious application here, too; see *Clarissa’s Plots* (Delaware University Press, 1994), p. 149. See also T. Castle, *Clarissa’s Ciphers: Meaning and Disruption in Richardson’s Clarissa* (Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 16–18, 41–6, 154–6.
- 57 *Emma*, pp. 28, 41.
- 58 Denby, p. 206.
- 59 *Elements of Criticism* (Kincaid, Bell, Edinburgh, 1762), vol. I, p. 114.
- 60 M. Bell, *Sentimentalism, Ethics and the Culture of Feeling* (Palgrave, 2000), p. 48. The book is a most thoughtful and wide-ranging discussion, taking these themes on into modernism.
- 61 Reddy, p. 164.
- 62 M. Sutrop, ‘Sympathy, Imagination, and the Reader’s Emotional Response to Fiction’, in J. Schlaeger and G. Stedman (eds), *Representations of Emotion* (Gunter Natt, 1999), p. 34 and *passim*.
- 63 Bell, p. 159.
- 64 T. Rajan, ‘Autonarration and Genotext in Mary Hays’s *Memoirs of Emma Courtney*’, *Studies in Romanticism* (1993), 32:2, p. 149.
- 65 See *Emma*, pp. 83, 149, 163–4, 179, for examples.
- 66 P. M. Logan, *Nerves and Narratives: A Cultural History of Hysteria in Nineteenth-Century British Prose* (California University Press, 1997), p. 59; and see Ch. 3 for further discussion.
- 67 *Emma*, p. 7.
- 68 Logan, pp. 71, 72. Claudia Johnson’s claim that female suffering cannot be articulated by heroines at this period because ‘under sentimentality the prestige of suffering belongs to men’ is clearly relevant here, and suggests a further level of gender complexity to be returned to shortly; see her *Equivocal Beings: Politics, Gender, and Sentimentality in the 1790s*. Wollstonecraft, Radcliffe, Burney, Austen (Chicago University Press, 1995), p. 17.
- 69 *Emma*, pp. 8, 86.
- 70 Logan, p. 65.

- 71 Ibid., pp. 42, 9.
- 72 Here, it seems appropriate to allude to the episode in *Uncle Tom's Cabin* when Senator and Mrs Bird are discussing the newly passed legislation that would make it a criminal offence to harbour a fugitive slave. The Senator, who always rejects 'sentimental weakness' in his senatorial speeches, argues that 'we must put aside our private feelings' and not let them affect our judgement. His wife refuses to engage at this level at all, saying she 'hates' reasoning, especially on such topics, as it ignores what is the 'plain right thing'; instead, she asks him whether he would actually turn away a 'poor, shivering, hungry creature', suggesting that he wouldn't, that she knows him better than he knows himself. And of course she turns out to be right – the fleeing Eliza is given refuge and helped on her way. (H. B. Stowe, *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, Wordsworth, 1995, Ch. IX, pp. 83, 75, 76, 75.) In his discussion, Bell tries to show that it is feeling, not reason *divorced* from it, that is crucial; one might add that it calls for an account of judgement that is not reducible to either (pp. 121–3).
- 73 *Emma.*, pp. 140, 145.
- 74 Ibid., pp. 3, 138.
- 75 Ibid., p. 143.
- 76 Ibid., pp. 144, 85, 144, 144, 32.
- 77 Ibid., p. 113.
- 78 Here one can mention Johnson's convincing identification of the 1790s as a period which 'unsettles customary definitions of gender and sexuality both *between* and *within* the sexes' (p. 17) while perhaps indicating reservations about her narrower claim that the apparent 'sentimentalization' of culture was really a "masculinization" of formerly feminine gender traits' now only valued when 'recoded as masculine' (p. 14). This seems to imply a rather gender-determinist model of 'sentiment' as a homogeneous terrain which, insofar as it is occupied by one sex, must necessarily be vacated by the other, and in turn downplays both the subtlety of her own analyses and the possibilities for gendered experimentation within and beyond the established framework, as indeed we find not only in Hays but – in different ways – in Jane Austen (of whose work she is well aware: see the Afterword). See also G. E. Haggerty, *Unnatural Affections: Women and Fiction in the Later Eighteenth Century* (Indiana University Press, 1998).
- 79 *Emma.*, pp. 98, 96, 96, 158.
- 80 Mullan, pp. 239, 240.
- 81 Mannng, p. 87.
- 82 A. Vincent-Buffault, pp. 32, 37.
- 83 Denby argues that the sentimentalist virtue/villainy pairing can be readily superimposed on the Enlightenment reason/obscurantism one (pp. 88–91, 95); and see Reddy (Part II), on sentimentalism in the French Revolution.

- 84 See J. A. Van Sant, *Eighteenth-Century Sensibility and the Novel: The Senses in Social Context* (Cambridge University Press, 1993), Ch. 2, and L. Boltanski, *Distant Suffering: Morality, Media and Politics* (Cambridge university Press, 1999), pp. 6–7.
- 85 Denby, p. 96.
- 86 Van Sant, p. 33.
- 87 Ibid., p. 53.
- 88 1778; cit. in *ibid.*, p. 57.
- 89 For a pertinent discussion of Sterne, exposing some of the paradoxes in ‘charity’, see R. Markley, ‘Sentimentality as Performance: Shaftesbury, Sterne, and the Theatrics of Virtue’, in L. Brown and F. Nussbaum (eds), *The New Eighteenth Century: Theory, Politics, English Literature* (Methuen, 1987).
- 90 Sarah Fielding’s letter to Richardson about her reaction to *Clarissa* can be taken to typify this: ‘When I read her, I am all sensation; my heart glows; I am overwhelmed; my only vent is tears ...’ (cit. Van Sant, p. 116.)
- 91 From c. 1790; cit. Van Sant, p. 51.
- 92 Van Sant, pp. 63–4; and see L. Jordanova, *Sexual Visions: Images of Gender in Science and Medicine from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Centuries* (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989), Chs 2, 5.
- 93 Brissenden cheekily compares the two Jane Austen sisters, Elinor and Marianne, in *Sense and Sensibility*, to Sade’s Juliette and Justine: R. F. Brissenden, *Virtue in Distress: Studies in the Novel of Sentiment from Richardson to Sade* (Macmillan, 1974), pp. 273–6. (See also Part One, Ch. 4, and Part Two, Ch. 5, for related examples.) For discussions of Richardson’s *Clarissa*, see also *ibid.*, Part Two, Ch. 1; Van Sant, Ch. 4; Mullan, Ch. 2; and J. Todd, *Sensibility: An Introduction* (Methuen, 1986), Ch. V.
- 94 L. Hinton, *The Perverse Gaze of Sympathy: Sadoomasochistic Sentiments from Clarissa to Rescue* 911 (State University of New York Press, 1999), p. 46; and see Ch. 1 generally.
- 95 Van Sant, p. 74.
- 96 Cit. in *ibid.*, p. 95.
- 97 L. Haakonssen, *Medicine and Morals in the Enlightenment: John Gregory, Thomas Percival and Benjamin Rush* (Editions Rodopi, 1997), p. 217.
- 98 H. Arendt, *On Revolution* (Penguin, 1990 [1963]), pp. 80–90.
- 99 *Ibid.*, pp. 86, 85, 85. Whether the latter comment is fair to Rousseau is debatable – see the next chapter of this book – but his influence certainly tended in this direction.
- 100 *Ibid.*, pp. 85, 89, 89.
- 101 Boltanski, p. 6.
- 102 Arendt, p. 89.
- 103 The revolutionary, Siéyès, cit. *ibid.*, p. 75.

- 104 Arendt, p. 89. This argument, generalized, is of course an important basis of the critique of the ‘project of Enlightenment’ and its legacy. A useful review of these issues is T. Osborne, *Aspects of Enlightenment: Social Theory and the Ethics of Truth* (Routledge, 1998).
- 105 Boltanski, pp. xiii–xiv.
- 106 Denby, p. 96, 243.
- 107 Ibid., p. 13.
- 108 The conventionally philosophical or political focus in Enlightenment studies has not helped clarify this relationship with the culture of sentimentalism. Some effort in this direction can be found in more recent works such as D. Outram, *The Enlightenment* (Cambridge University Press, 1995); R. Porter, *The Enlightenment* (Palgrave, 2001); and M. Fitzpatrick et al. (eds), *The Enlightenment World* (Routledge, 2007). The most thoughtful and balanced source on this remains Taylor, *Sources*, esp. Chs 17, 19.
- 109 One might also observe another outcome, that the theme of endurance and the transcendence of suffering as a crucial source of identity and insight – but in resolutely secular terms – becomes a powerful stream running into Romanticism and beyond. See, for example, S. Bruhm, *Gothic Bodies: The Politics of Pain in Romantic Fiction* (Pennsylvania University Press, 1994).
- 110 Taylor, pp. 297, 301.
- 111 Diderot, ‘Eulogy’, cit. Caplan, p. 8, amended trans.
- 112 *Emma*, p. 155. (For the other episode, the death of her father, see p. 33.)
- 113 No doubt, in the eighteenth-century context, the most appropriate manifestation of this mutuality would be *shared* tears, and there are indeed two such episodes in the novel: with Mrs Harley (p. 92), and with Augustus (p. 57).
- 114 Bell, p. 5.
- 115 *Emma*, p. 89.

Sympathy Theory

- 1 R. C. Solomon, *In Defence of Sentimentality* (Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 69.
- 2 L. Boltanski, *Distant Suffering: Morality, Media and Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 37.
- 3 H. Ferguson, *The Science of Pleasure: Cosmos and Psyche in the Bourgeois World View* (Routledge, 1990), p. 188, in a summary of Adam Smith’s view.
- 4 D. H. Lawrence, *Phoenix: The Posthumous Papers of D. H. Lawrence* (Heinemann, 1936), p. 545.
- 5 D. H. Lawrence, *Phoenix II: Uncollected, Unpublished and Other Prose Works of D. H. Lawrence* (Heinemann, 1968), p. 187.

- 6 E. K. Sedgwick, *The Epistemology of the Closet* (Penguin Books, 1994), p. 143 (in italics).
- 7 M. Midgley, 'Brutality and Sentimentality', *Philosophy* (1979), 54, pp. 385, 386.
- 8 E. S. H. Tan and N. H. Frijda, 'Sentiment in Film Viewing', in C. Plantinga and M. G. Smith (eds), *Passionate Views: Film, Cognition and Emotion* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), p. 49.
- 9 D. Knight, 'Why We Enjoy Condemning Sentimentality: A Meta-Aesthetic Perspective', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* (1999), 57:4, p. 418.
- 10 Boltanski, p. 101.
- 11 In *From Passions to Emotions: The Construction of a Secular Psychological Category* (Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 17, Thomas Dixon argues that this dichotomy is becoming well established during the first half of the nineteenth century, replacing the more fluid approach of the preceding period. He adds that the category of emotion is an invention of the early nineteenth century, with notions like 'passions', 'affections' and 'sentiments' falling out of favour (p. 3). See also Chs 1, 8.
- 12 T. L. Beauchamp, 'Editor's Introduction' to D. Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* (Oxford University Press, 1998 [1751]), p. 26.
- 13 M. Bell, *Sentimentalism, Ethics, and the Culture of Feeling* (Palgrave, 2000), p. 1.
- 14 M. Z. Rosaldo, 'Toward an Anthropology of Self and Feeling', in R. A. Schweder and R. A. LeVine (eds), *Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotion* (Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 143.
- 15 Bell, p. 19.
- 16 *Ibid.*, p. 13.
- 17 C. Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 390.
- 18 D. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Oxford University Press, 1976 [1739–40]), p. 417.
- 19 Bell, pp. 9, 207.
- 20 W. M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 222; and see pp. 94, 111. This book makes a stimulating and ambitious – if only partially successful – attempt to fuse cognitivist psychology with cultural history.
- 21 Rosaldo, p. 143. Martha Nussbaum, too, argues that the embodiment of emotions does not preclude them from being in some sense 'intelligent' and 'cognitive'; see her *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 25 and *passim*.
- 22 S. Williams, *Emotion and Social Theory* (Sage, 2001), p. 59; and Chs 2, 4, give a helpful account of some of these issues.
- 23 R. Solomon, p. 23.

- 24 Reddy, pp. 94, 128–9; 321–2; 111, 128, 330. Again, J. M. Barbalet gives a useful account in *Emotion, Social Theory, and Social Structure* (Cambridge University Press, 2001), Chs 1, 2, but this rationalist bias is at times evident.
- 25 C. Campbell, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism* (Blackwell, 1987), Ch. 4.
- 26 Ibid., pp. 69, 76, 73–5. A corollary, for Campbell, is that emotion may not be ‘truly genuine’, but may be ‘artificially stimulated for the pleasure it yields’ (p. 134), which was of course implied by critics of sentimentalism, and seems to rest on the assumption that emotion has to be purely ‘natural’ if it is to be genuine; the plausible alternative, that it can be – and perhaps always is – culturally shaped and influenced, seems to be left out of the equation, in favour of a model that seems, as I go on to suggest, both implausibly deliberative and too purely self-motivated. Re-cast, the claim would, however, usefully indicate the significance of the birth and development of a ‘culture of the vicarious’.
- 27 As theorized by A. Giddens; see his *Modernity and Self-Identity* (Polity Press, 1991).
- 28 S. Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion* (Edinburgh University Press, 2004), pp. 7, 6.
- 29 N. Crossley, ‘Emotions and Communicative Action’, in G. Bendelow and J. J. Williams (eds), *Emotions in Social Life* (Routledge, 1998), p. 28.
- 30 Solomon, pp. 24, 251.
- 31 G. Bateson, *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* (Paladin, 1973), p. 456.
- 32 J. Austen, *Sense and Sensibility* (New American Library, 1961 [1811]), p. 8.
- 33 Solomon, p. 243.
- 34 Ahmed, pp. 2–3.
- 35 Ibid., pp. 10, 11, 11, 191.
- 36 Hence connecting with the ‘expressivism’ that Taylor sees as so central to the development of the modern self
- 37 N. Denzin, *On Understanding Emotion* (Jossey Bass, 1984).
- 38 Reddy, p. 110.
- 39 So, that sense of impact, of being swamped, that point of excess that is also a point of *difference* can be read in two ‘different’ ways, with contrasting implications: as the point of intensity on the circuit of sensation, and as the looming up of figuration, the picturing of difference across boundaries, central to the spectacle of sympathy. On the concept of a ‘circuit of sensation’, see Ch. 1 of this book.
- 40 D. J. Denby, *Sentimental Narrative and the Social Order in France, 1760–1820* (Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 31.
- 41 Bell, p. 44.
- 42 For accounts that reflect this changing emphasis, see K. Haakonssen (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith* (Cambridge University Press, 2006); C. L.

Griswold, *Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment* (Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Boltanski, Ch. 3.

43 Hume, p. 363.

44 A. Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (Liberty Fund, 1982 [1759, rev. edn 1790]), pp. 10, 43.

45 A. Broadie, 'Sympathy and the Impartial Spectator', in Haakonssen, pp. 164, 165.

46 M. Sutrop, 'Sympathy, Imagination and the Reader's Response to Fiction', in J. Schlaeger and G. Stedman (eds), *Representations of Emotion* (Gunter Natt, 1999), p. 37.

47 Smith, p. 21.

48 Ibid., pp. 12, 11.

49 Ibid., pp. 9, 10, 12.

50 Ibid., p. 317.

51 J. Howard, 'What is Sentimentality?', *American Literary History* (1997), 11:1, p. 71.

52 C. L. Griswold, 'Imagination: Morals, Science and Arts', in Haakonssen.

53 At this point one might observe, as mentioned in the first chapter of this book, that the widely used distinction between sympathy as 'feeling for' and empathy as 'feeling with' is rather unhelpful, sliding a difference of degree into separate concepts, and downplaying the unavoidable element of 'distance' in the latter in order to berate the former for its alleged aura of patronizing superiority. Ahmed is surely right that empathy 'sustains the very difference that it may seek to overcome' in that 'subjects "feel" something other than what another feels in the very moment of imagining they could feel what another feels' (Ahmed, p. 330). I argue below, using Smith, that a more structural approach can sideline this difficulty.

54 J. Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976 [1967]), pp. 190, 185, and see pp. 182–92, 343. Building on this, see also R. Terada, *Feeling in Theory: Emotion after the 'Death of the Subject'* (Harvard University Press, 2001), Ch. 1. This approach to Rousseau also implies that his critique of the theatre is not a critique of *all* theatricality, but rather a call for a kind of theatre that engages the imagination and hence liberates a potential for passionate response.

55 Smith, pp. 9, 27–30.

56 Of course, we need to remember an alternative view, stemming from the Christian tradition, which emphasizes precisely our capacity to share each other's pain, on the analogy with Christ's suffering. This has considerable resonance in the modern period; perhaps the most powerful philosophical formulation is in Schopenhauer, for whom the will is the source both of our individuality and of our suffering, and *Mitleid* (pity, compassion) is the crucial moral response to this. This does not necessarily contradict Smith, of course, who is using 'pain' in the more literal sense, but it does involve a difference of emphasis.

- 57 See D. M. Morris, *The Culture of Pain* (California University Press, 1991), and S. Bruhm, *Gothic Bodies: The Politics of Pain in Romantic Fiction* (Pennsylvania University Press, 1994), Chs 1, 2, for a penetrating discussion of ‘imagining pain’ in eighteenth-century culture. All recent discussions draw heavily on E. Scarry, *The Body in Pain* (Oxford University Press, 1985).
- 58 On the significance of the contrast with ‘sensation’ here, see Ch. 1.
- 59 Smith, p. 29.
- 60 Ibid., p. 33.
- 61 D. Hume, Letter to Smith, 28 July 1759, in *The Letters of David Hume* (Oxford University Press, 1932), vol. I, p. 313. The issue is discussed in Broadie, pp. 170–4, whose approach differs from that taken here.
- 62 Smith, p. 46n. 2.
- 63 And one has to point out that ‘disinterested’ is not the same as ‘uninterested’. (One should not have to point that out, but alas one must.)
- 64 Griswold, *Smith*, p. 121.
- 65 D. Diderot, *Oeuvres esthétiques* (Garnier, 1968), p. 189, cit. and trans. J. Caplan, *Framed Narratives: Diderot’s Genealogy of the Beholder* (Manchester University Press, 1986), p. 10. See also Smith, p. 143.
- 66 Of course, we need to remember in all this that it is always possible for the response to be *unsympathetic*. Arguably Smith, with his emphasis on the moment of reflection, can give a better account of this possibility than can Hume.
- 67 Hence, as Griswold puts it, in his discussion of Smith, ‘The imagination provides for the “appearance” of selves on the stage’ (*Smith*, p. 342).
- 68 Broadie, p. 177.
- 69 Smith, p. 23.
- 70 Ibid., pp. 24, 24, 147, 147.
- 71 Ibid., pp. 190, 191.
- 72 It is not surprising that the distinction between the virtues here is markedly gender-coded, in Smith: see p. 190. This aspect is discussed in H. Clark, ‘Women and Humanity in Scottish Enlightenment Social Thought: The Case of Adam Smith’, *Historical Reflections* (1993), 19.
- 73 Smith, pp. 113, 113, 130–1.
- 74 Ibid., pp. 130, 134.
- 75 Ibid., p. 137.
- 76 Ibid., p. 159.
- 77 J. Mullan, *Sentiment and Sensibility: The Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 48. In his thoughtful attempt to tease out the differences between Hume and Smith (Ch. 1, esp. pp. 53–6), Mullan writes: ‘Hume generalizes the model of particular contact or connection to explain all social relations; Smith insists on all specific interactions or conflicts being

referred to an abstract and universal standard' (p. 55). The former claim seems sound, but not the latter.

78 Griswold, 'Imagination', p. 38.

79 Griswold, *Smith*, p. 135.

80 Smith, p. 320.

81 This is an appropriate point to remark on a degree of convergence with Kant here. In the notoriously tricky §40 of the *Critique of Judgement*, Kant argues that the *sensus communis*, too, faces both ways: it is a 'public sense', reflective and critical, involving the 'communicability of our feeling'; it is also that 'internal feeling' itself, an awareness of feeling, 'sense' as the 'effect that mere reflection has upon the mind; for then by sense we mean the feeling of pleasure'. It involves a public face of feeling as an interplay of imagination and understanding (a 'sensibility') that can properly be characterized as 'aesthetic'. One might – with some trepidation – gloss this as the claim that 'communicability' is due to this capacity of aesthetic judgement to respond to the homology of reflexivity whereby the formal properties of self-awareness are present as essential preconditions for any actual communication between subjects, as subjects of experience, just as this homology itself, within and between subjects, is present *in* experience as *feeling*. (Quotes are from the J. C. Meredith trans., Oxford University Press, 1952, pp. 151–4.) See also R. A. Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant* (Chicago University Press, 1990), Ch. 8.

82 Smith, pp. 326, 131.

83 See Broadie, pp. 179–86, for a useful account.

84 *Ibid.*, p. 175. One might observe here that the idea of the Enlightenment as dogmatically rationalist is valid up to a point, but, as suggested in the previous chapter, there is another strand – one that incorporates a positive relationship with sentimentalism (as brought out in Denby). This is the strand emphasized in the account of Smith given here. See also I. Wilkinson, *Suffering: A Sociological Introduction* (Polity Press, 2005), Ch. 5, for a good review of these issues.

85 Griswold, *Smith*, p. 300.

86 Griswold, 'Imagination', p. 39.

87 Boltanski, p. 41. At the same time, Boltanski's account separates Smith too strongly from sentimentalism (Chs 3 and 5 respectively).

88 Smith, p. 22, as summarized earlier in the first paragraph of this section, above.

89 Boltanski, p. 49.

90 Smith, p. 51.

91 *Ibid.*, pp. 61, 61, 64, 64, 57.

92 *Ibid.*, p. 62.

93 There is a remarkable (and generally unremarked) similarity with the themes of Rousseau's critique of modernity here, despite other obvious differences of

perspective. One of the few scholars to emphasize the relative coherence of Rousseau's system is Nicholas Dent; in his *Rousseau: An Introduction to His Psychological, Social and Political Theory* (Blackwell, 1988), he presents the problem concept *amour-propre* as referring to the need to be a 'human presence' for others, the need for esteem, so it is an inherently social and moral dimension of the self; as such, it can become 'inflamed,' obsessive and excessive, when over-stimulated by the pressures of modern competitive society (pp. 20–5). Conversely, 'pity' offers the prospect of 'human relations not perverted by the demands of "inflamed" *amour-propre*' (p. 97). In Rousseau's own writings, see, *inter alia*, the extended footnote to the First Part of the *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality* [1755], and *Emile* [1762], sec. iv. An older work, Ernst Cassirer's *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (Indiana University Press, 1963 [1932]) is also worth consulting.

- 94 Smith, p. 337 (my italics) and p. 50.
- 95 Ibid., pp. 183, 158; and see also pp. 51–3, 181–3, developing the critique.
- 96 Griswold, *Smith*, pp. 262, 128; see also pp. 222–5, and 'Imagination', pp. 42–5.
- 97 Smith, p. 50; and, for the other issues raised in this paragraph, see pp. 83–5, 34–8.
- 98 Smith draws a distinction between resentment and 'envy,' the latter always being unjustified; see pp. 44–5, 244. On resentment, see also pp. 75–6, 83–4. It may be that in our contemporary age, when there is a widespread perception that wealth and celebrity have no connection with merit whatsoever, the distinction between resentment and envy breaks down, with sympathetic engagement replaced by voyeuristic distraction, but this is not the place to pursue this. See my *Sensational Subjects: Modernity and the Dramatization of Experience* (Bloomsbury, 2014), Chs 5, 6.
- 99 This is developed in an interesting way in Boltanski, Ch. 4. One should add here that, despite his insights, Smith's own political position remains relatively conservative, even in the context of his time.
- 100 Smith, p. 143, Hume, p. 604; and Smith, p. 140.
- 101 Hume, p. 481.
- 102 Griswold, *Smith*, p. 128.
- 103 This has frequently been noticed by critics, e.g. see L. Merish, *Sentimental Materialism: Gender, Commodity Culture, and Nineteenth-Century American Literature* (Duke University Press, 2000), Ch. 1. It is a fair point, but the task here is to uncover the deeper pattern, rather than the specific options opened up within it, and this is clearly what Hume and Smith are at least trying to do.
- 104 There is a rough, undeveloped equivalent of this figure in Hume, in the form of 'general rules'; see Hume, pp. 583–4.
- 105 Smith, pp. 136–7, 36, 235.
- 106 Hume, p. 481. He also implies that since abstraction and self-interest are not

sufficient to generate an involvement in ‘the good of society’, sympathy must have a crucial role (p. 577).

- 107 M. J. Ferreira, ‘Hume and Imagination: Sympathy and “the Other”’, *International Philosophical Quarterly* (1994), 39:1, pp. 55, 56, 56.
- 108 D. Panagia, ‘Inconsistencies of Character: David Hume on Sympathy, Intensity and Artifice’, in C. V. Boundas (ed.), *Deleuze and Philosophy* (Edinburgh University Press, 2006), p. 96.
- 109 Again, this has been widely noted by critics. Thus Merish claims that Scottish Enlightenment theorists mention the plight of recipients of sympathy while ‘abjecting them through a symbolics of race, class, and gender difference, encoding differences of social status that both elicit and regulate the flow of sympathy’, so that such sympathy presupposes significant inequalities of wealth and status (Merish, pp. 38, 39). Again, a fair point, but not the whole truth, as the argument here hopefully shows.
- 110 Among recent contributions, one might cite Richard Sennett’s argument in *Together: The Rituals, Pleasures and Politics of Co-operation* (Allen Lane, 2012) that the twentieth-century emphasis on ‘solidarity’, with its tendency to polarize an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality – which can easily slide into an individualistic ‘you are on your own’ version – distorted the potential of ‘co-operation’ as a model for working with others. Coming from a very different theoretical perspective, Giorgio Agamben’s work again shows the power of such mechanisms of exclusion of the other, though he is concerned to show a sense in which the excluded other is simultaneously ‘included’, as a necessary component of the political order and the hierarchy of power. Taking the inmates of ‘camps’, from the Holocaust to Guantánamo, he shows how they are constructed by this logic of power as ‘unpersons’ in a ‘zone of indistinction’, both ‘beneath’ power yet essential to it. See his elaboration of this in *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford University Press, 1998), and *State of Exception* (Chicago University Press, 2005). While there is, of course, more to these arguments, they all show that modernity has long exercised the power to expel and exclude, and that the rhetoric of identity and identification has played a key part in this.
- 111 Hume, p. 619.
- 112 T. J. McCarthy, *Relationships of Sympathy: The Writer and the Reader in British Romanticism* (Scolar Press, 1997), p. 153.
- 113 Ferreira, p. 56.
- 114 Something of this is also present in Rousseau, for whom the individual’s ‘benevolent sentiments’ reveal ‘his creative and restorative care and power, are an expression of ... positive life and expansive force’, and ‘pity’ is ‘a mode of unfolding of sensibility, which allows for the possibility of loving, beneficial passions’, as Dent puts it (pp. 162, 122).

From Sensibility to Affect?

- 1 A. J. Van Sant, *Eighteenth-Century Sensibility and the Novel: The Senses in Social Context* (Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 91, 94, 95.
- 2 M. Hays, *The Memoirs of Emma Courtney* (Oxford University Press, 1996 [1796]), pp. 99, 99, 92, 92.
- 3 C. Lawrence, 'The Nervous System and Society in the Scottish Enlightenment', in B. Barnes and S. Shapin (eds), *Natural Order: Historical Studies of Scientific Culture* (Sage, 1979), pp. 25, 29. For general treatments of these ideas, see also H. Ferguson, *The Science of Pleasure: Cosmos and Psyche in the Bourgeois World View* (Routledge, 1990), Ch. 9, and G. J. Barker-Benfield, *The Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Chicago University Press, 1992), Ch. 1 and *passim*. These ideas spread through Enlightenment Europe: see J. I. Israel, *Political Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650–1750* (Oxford University Press, 2001), Chs 25, 27, on the decline of Cartesianism and the triumph of Newton and Locke; and J. C. O'Neal, 'The Sensationist Aesthetics of the French Enlightenment', *L'Esprit créateur* (1988), 28:4.
- 4 A. Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (Liberty Fund, 1982 [1759, rev. edn 1790]), p. 43.
- 5 D. Hume, 'Of Tragedy', in *Selected Writings* (Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 126, 129, 129.
- 6 D. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Oxford University Press, 1976 [1739–40]), p. 605 (see also pp. 576, 593, for similar formulations).
- 7 Smith, p. 14, *my italics*.
- 8 See, for example, *Treatise*, pp. 576, 317–19, 385–6.
- 9 See *ibid.*, pp. 317, 605.
- 10 Smith, pp. 10, 11.
- 11 Hume, *Treatise*, pp. 317, 319, 385–6, 576.
- 12 L. Hinton, *The Perverse Gaze of Sympathy: Sadomasochistic Sentiments from Clarissa to Rescue 911* (State University of New York, 1999), p. 23.
- 13 Hume, *Treatise*, p. 319; and, on ideas and impressions, pp. 1, 6, 8.
- 14 This produces a significant issue for interpreting Hume on sympathy, in that he argues that we are most immediately sympathetic to those who are most like us, and who are closest to us (*ibid.*, pp. 581, 604) – a view that, as we have seen, provides grist to the mill of critics of the sympathy discourse generally. I argued, in the previous chapter, that it is possible to read Hume differently, since he also emphasizes the 'expansive' capacity of sympathy, able to respond across boundaries and distances; but there is undoubtedly a tension in his work here, one that reflects deep strands in eighteenth-century culture.
- 15 *Ibid.*, p. 365.

- 16 Smith, pp. 110, 110, 111, 112.
- 17 C. L. Griswold, 'Imagination: Morals, Science, and Arts', in K. Haakonssen (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith* (Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 36, 37.
- 18 D. Marshall, *The Figure of Theater* (Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 172.
- 19 J. Mullan, *Sentiment and Sensibility: The Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 43, 45.
- 20 Here, we are getting close to Campbell's thesis about the origins of modern consumerism in *The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism* (Blackwell, 1987).
- 21 L. Merish, *Sentimental Materialism: Gender, Commodity Culture, and Nineteenth-Century American Literature* (Duke University Press, 2000), p. 50.
- 22 C. L. Griswold, *Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 109.
- 23 Conversely, the model of mimetic identification can readily incorporate rejection of otherness, since the notion of 'mirror identity' as fantasy wholeness is inseparable from the rejection or repression of threats to this precarious status.
- 24 For a brief account of theatricality in relation to mimesis, see M. Potolsky, *Mimesis* (Routledge, 2006), Ch. 4.
- 25 We can remember here that Smith and Hume knew one another, and seem to have been on good terms. They had no particular reason to advertise their differences, even when they were aware of them, and Smith seems to have absorbed much of his older colleague's general philosophical framework. Nor was this Smith's main focus, after all. So teasing out differences here is inevitably speculative – the emphasis being, of course, on the underlying cultural assumptions and implications, rather than the philosophy as such (let alone the biographical aspects).
- 26 Hume, *Treatise*, pp. 7–8. On 'impression' in Hume, see J. Matz, *Literary Impressionism and Modernist Aesthetics* (Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 19–25.
- 27 It is this sense of relationship that a Hume-based perspective has trouble grasping, and arguably this undermines any account of judgement – which involves thinking of something *as* something – stemming from it: see B. Stroud, "Gilding" or "staining" the world with "sentiments" and "phantasms", in R. Read and K. A. Richman (eds), *The New Hume Debate* (Blackwell, 2007, rev. edn), p. 28.
- 28 G. Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature* (Columbia University Press, 1991 [1953]), p. 49, italics in original. In this early work, Deleuze misses a few tricks: 'intensity', later a key term in his system, is barely mentioned here, even though Hume gives ample opportunity for us to use it; he does however refer at times to 'vividness' (pp. 128–9, 132–3). However,

- Deleuze offers a powerful reinterpretation of Hume that proves fundamental to his own thinking. See also J. Roffe, 'David Hume', in G. Jones and J. Roffe (eds), *Deleuze's Philosophical Lineage* (Edinburgh University Press, 2009), and J. Bell, *Deleuze's Hume: Philosophy, Culture and the Scottish Enlightenment* (Edinburgh University Press, 2009).
- 29 D. Panagia, 'Inconsistencies of Character: David Hume on Sympathy, Intensity and Artifice', in C. L. Boundas (ed.), *Deleuze and Philosophy* (Edinburgh University Press, 2006), pp. 94, 95, 95.
 - 30 C. L. Boundas, 'Translator's Introduction' to Deleuze, p. 12; see also pp. 16–17, on intensity.
 - 31 See G. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (Continuum, 2004 [1968]), p. 182. In this, perhaps his major philosophical work, Deleuze makes significant use of 'intensity', and is aware of its links to 'sensibility' and Hume's thought, which he continues to cite with approval. He might also have added, in the spirit of Hume, that the pleasure in sympathy is produced in the succession of alternating relaxations and intensive contractions (p. 95). On intensity in Deleuze, see also C. Colebrook, *Gilles Deleuze* (Routledge, 2002), pp. 38–9; and J. Williams, *Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: a Critical Introduction and Guide* (Edinburgh University Press, 2003), Ch. 7.
 - 32 Van Sant, pp. xiv; 1n. 1, my italics.
 - 33 Still being republished in 1810, this book continued its readership and influence through to the Romantics, including Coleridge.
 - 34 Hartley, pp. 281, 373, cit. Ferguson, p. 180.
 - 35 Mullan, p. 231; and see Ch. 5, *passim*.
 - 36 Barker-Benfield, pp. xvii; see also pp. 4–5, 16–18.
 - 37 S. Manning, 'Sensibility', in T. Keymer and J. Mee (eds), *The Cambridge Companion to English Literature 1740–1830* (Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 83.
 - 38 A. Vincent-Buffault, *The History of Tears: Sensibility and Sentimentality in France* (Macmillan, 1991), p. 119.
 - 39 *Shorter Oxford Dictionary*, entry for 'electricity'.
 - 40 G. S. Rousseau, *Nervous Acts: Essays on Literature, Culture and Sensibility* (Palgrave, 2004), p. 54. This collection of his essays is an invaluable resource for research on these topics; see esp. Chs 1, 5, 7, 8.
 - 41 Lawrence, pp. 19, 25.
 - 42 M. Foucault, *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* (Tavistock, 1967), pp. 152, 152–3.
 - 43 S. Bruhm, *Gothic Bodies: The Politics of Pain in Romantic Fiction* (Pennsylvania University Press, 1994), p. 13; and see Ch. 1, *passim*.
 - 44 Foucault, p. 153.

- 45 R. Rey, *The History of Pain* (Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 122–5.
- 46 *The Works of Robert Whytt* (Edinburgh, 1768), p. 493. These excerpts, and others, are cited in Mullan, p. 229, and Bruhm, p. 12.
- 47 Foucault, p. 153.
- 48 R. K. French, *Robert Whytt, the Soul, and Medicine* (Wellcome Institute of the History of Medicine, 1969), p. 36.
- 49 S. Williams, *Emotion and Social Theory* (Sage, 2001), p. 61.
- 50 P. Schilder, *The Image and Appearance of the Human Body* (International University Press, 1950), p. 11.
- 51 J. Gaub, *De regimine mentis* (1747), cit. in L. J. Rather, *Mind and Body in Eighteenth Century Medicine* (Wellcome Institute of the History of Medicine, 1965), p. 64.
- 52 Whytt, p. 583, cit. Bruhm, p. 14.
- 53 Cit. P. M. Logan, *Nerves and Narratives: A Cultural History of Hysteria in Nineteenth-Century British Prose* (California University Press, 1997), p. 117.
- 54 Logan, p. 118.
- 55 Ibid., p. 119.
- 56 Ibid., pp. 119–20; Van Sant, p. 28; and see Rousseau, *passim*.
- 57 Van Sant, p. 121.
- 58 Ibid., p. 16.
- 59 Ibid., p. xiii.
- 60 S. Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion* (Edinburgh University Press, 2004), p. 28.
- 61 Van Sant, p. 92.
- 62 T. Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions: The Construction of a Secular Psychological Category* (Cambridge University Press, 2003), Chs 1, 2, esp. pp. 17–18.
- 63 Most influential here is B. Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Duke University Press, 2002). This book has become a founding text for the ‘affective turn,’ and a prime route for the diffusion of Deleuzian ideas; see esp. Ch. 1, on the autonomy of affect. It is important to add that I consider here only that aspect of affect theory that relates to the sympathy/sensation tension; on the ramifications of affect theory itself, as a continuation of the ‘sensation’ strand, see my *Sensational Subjects: The Dramatization of Experience in the Modern World* (Bloomsbury, 2014), Ch. 7.
- 64 EID5, p. 1; EIIP17S, p. 46. The *Ethics* (1677, cited as E) is arranged as a treatise in logic, with sections (I–V) divided into numerous propositions, axioms, etc. I use what seems to be becoming the standard mode of citation, as indicated by the translator to the Penguin edition (1996), E. Curley (p. xix), along with page numbers to this edition; this translation is also available in *A Spinoza Reader* (Princeton University Press, 1994).

- 65 That these are two sides of a coin is reflected in Deleuze's two accounts; see *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* (Zone Books, 1992 [1968], hereafter cited as EP), p. 147, and *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* (City Lights Books, 1988 [1970], hereafter SPP), pp. 3, 73. The latter is the more widely cited (doubtless its brevity may have something to do with it); the former, which can seem rather off-putting for non-specialists, is actually one of Deleuze's more accessible tomes, and very recommendable as a conscientious exposition of Spinoza, as well as being the foundation for Deleuze's later work.
- 66 EIID3, p. 70; EIII, Definitions of Affect, III, p. 104.
- 67 EIIP11S, p. 77. The third is given as desire (though this seems different in kind from the other two, and will not be further explored here).
- 68 EP, p. 220 (also SPP, p. 49, a very similar formulation).
- 69 SPP, p. 49.
- 70 Referring to Spinoza, Martin Joughin, the translator of EP, suggests that *affectus* comprises both 'affect' and 'effect': 'an affect is "inwardly" directed toward an object as its final cause, an effect "outwardly" caused by an object as its efficient cause – for Spinoza they are only two aspects of the same process', p. 413.
- 71 SPP, p. 49.
- 72 Deleuze seems ready enough, at this stage of his career, to see 'affect' as interchangeable with 'feeling', as shown. Joughin notes that Deleuze uses *sentiment* as the word for *affectus* in French, and 'feeling' is the natural translation into English, to which Deleuze seems not to have objected (see EP, pp. 413–14). In his later work, though, 'feelings' will be denounced as too polluted by everyday notions, so that when writing about Bacon's paintings, for example, he will claim that 'there are no feelings in Bacon: there are nothing but affects', or sensations as a directly visceral engagement with the world: see his *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation* (Continuum, 2003 [1981]), p. 39. I discuss this aspect of Deleuze's work in *Sensational Subjects*, Ch. 4.
- 73 EIIP30D, p. 86.
- 74 Massumi, pp. 32, 31.
- 75 A. Damasio, *Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow and the Feeling Brain* (Vintage, 2004), p. 215.
- 76 EIIP44S, p. 59.
- 77 Spinoza writes: 'An affect ... is an imagination, insofar as it indicates the present constitution of the body' (EVP34D, p. 176). This formulation again reminds us of the 'one world, two perspectives' approach, entailing differing characterizations of what is ultimately the same object or event.
- 78 EVP6, p. 165.
- 79 EP, pp. 295, 286 (in italics); and see pp. 282–5.

- 80 EIII, Definitions of Affects, XVIII, p. 107.
- 81 M. Gatens and G. Lloyd, *Collective Imaginings: Spinoza, Past and Present* (Routledge, 1999), pp. 77, 142.
- 82 EIVP50S, p. 142.
- 83 EIIP27D, p. 84; EIII30S, p. 86.
- 84 See D. Vardoulakis (ed.), *Spinoza Now* (Minnesota University Press, 2011), for articles discussing aspects of the theory of passions in Spinoza.
- 85 C. Williams, 'Affective Processes Without a Subject: Rethinking the relation between subjectivity and affect with Spinoza', *Subjectivity* (2010) 3:3, p. 255, an account influenced by Deleuze and Massumi.
- 86 EIIP40S2, p. 57.
- 87 EP, p. 278. This is where Spinoza's theory of 'common notions', as the building blocks between imagination and reason, comes into play; see EP, Ch. XVII, and the first few pages of the following chapter, for an exemplary exposition, and one that pays tribute to the positive role of the imagination (whatever the author's criticisms of it elsewhere). More briefly, see SPP, p. 58.
- 88 EIVP15, p. 118. (The example is also used at EIIP35S, p. 53.) Spinoza is, of course, using imagination to include what we might more naturally call perception, hence anticipating an important hinge of Kant's system.
- 89 EIVP15, p. 118. It will be recalled that 'imaginings' disappear when supplanted by stronger ones, not when the object itself disappears – hence the potential for memories, fantasies, phantoms ...
- 90 EIIP17S, p. 46.
- 91 R. Terada, *Feeling in Theory: Emotion after the 'Death of the Subject'* (Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 115.
- 92 EP, p. 147. What we find here is an early manifestation of what will become even more evident in his later work: his determination to ensure that a philosophical understanding of reality is unpolluted by the fallacies of everyday thinking and the stereotypes of popular culture. In particular, concepts like recognition and representation necessarily make reference to this conservative pattern of conventional, taken-for-granted thinking, and merely reproduce it in philosophical form. See also my *Sensational Subjects*, Ch. 4.
- 93 It should be added that Spinoza has his limitations, from this angle: there is no real theory of selfhood, nor is there anything of the later sense of the imagination as a distinctive faculty of mind.
- 94 T. Brennan, *The Transmission of Affect* (Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 71. She adds that 'transmission through physical vibration' is also a social process, vital to 'electrical entrainment'.
- 95 J. Riskin, 'The Mesmerism Investigation and the Crisis of Sensationist Science', in D. Howes (ed.), *The Sixth Sense Reader* (Berg, 2009), p. 120. It should be added

that ‘mesmerism’ would nevertheless continue its career well into the nineteenth century, despite the commission’s best efforts.

Unconscious Arts of Memory

- 1 Appropriately, the term ‘sensibility’ itself falls out of fashion, though uses of it can be found. In George Eliot’s *Daniel Deronda*, Daniel advises Gwendolen: ‘Try to take hold of your sensibility, and use it as if it were a faculty, like vision’ (Penguin, 1995 [1876], p. 452, Ch. 36). This advocates a conjunction of feeling and self-understanding that seems very true to the eighteenth-century tradition.
- 2 Jonathan Crary claims that ‘The problem of consciousness becomes inseparable from the question of physiological temporality and process’: see his *Suspensions of Perception: Attention, Spectacle, and Modern Culture* (MIT Press, 2001), p. 56. This book offers illuminating insights on the development of these themes in nineteenth-century culture.
- 3 W. M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 212, and Chs 6, 7, *passim*.
- 4 P. M. Logan, *Nerves and Narratives: A Cultural History of Hysteria in Nineteenth-Century British Prose* (California University Press, 1997), p. 169. See also J. B. Taylor, *In the Secret Theatre of Home: Wilkie Collins, Sensation Narrative, and Nineteenth-Century Psychology* (Routledge, 1988), Ch. 1.
- 5 M. Bell, *Sentimentalism, Ethics and the Culture of Feeling* (Palgrave, 2000), p. 132.
- 6 J. L. Matus, ‘Historicizing Trauma: The Genealogy of Psychic Shock in *Daniel Deronda*’, *Victorian Literature and Culture* (2008), 36:1, p. 64.
- 7 The Gothic and Romanticism do, of course, anticipate later developments, although the focus on the uncertain boundaries of mind, body, and the other – with the resulting interest in the spectral – and on those between passion and social convention, do not congeal into the patterns apparent later. For various aspects, see T. Castle, *The Female Thermometer: Eighteenth-Century Culture and the Invention of the Uncanny* (Oxford University Press, 1995); S. Bruhm, *Gothic Bodies: The Politics of Pain in Romantic Fiction* (Pennsylvania University Press, 1994); and A. Richardson, *British Romanticism and the Science of the Mind* (Cambridge University Press, 2001).
- 8 L. Otis, *Organic Memory: History and Body in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries* (Nebraska University Press, 1994), p. 3, and see Ch. 1.
- 9 M. Davis, *George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Psychology* (Ashgate, 2006), p. 147.
- 10 S. Shuttleworth, *Charlotte Brontë and Victorian Psychology* (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 47. For further background on nineteenth-century science and psychology, in addition to other items listed in this section, see R. Rylance,

- Victorian Psychology and British Culture, 1850–1880* (Oxford University Press, 2000); A. Stiles (ed.) *Neurology and Literature 1860–1920* (Palgrave, 2008); L. Otis (ed.), *Literature and Science in the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford University Press, 2002); and J. B. Taylor, 'Obscure Recesses: Locating the Victorian Unconscious', in J. B. Bullen (ed.), *Writing and Victorianism* (Longman, 1997).
- 11 Logan, p. 168.
 - 12 R. Knoper, 'Trauma and Sexual Inversion, circa 1885: Oliver Wendell Holmes's *A Mortal Antipathy* and *Maladies of Representation*', in Stiles, p. 126.
 - 13 R. B. Gordon, 'From Charcot to Charlot: Unconscious Imitation and Spectatorship in French Cabaret and Early Cinema', in M. S. Micale (ed.), *The Mind of Modernism: Medicine, Psychology, and the Cultural Arts in Europe and America, 1870–1940* (Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 96.
 - 14 Matus, p. 65.
 - 15 G. H. Lewes, *The Physiology of Common Life* (Blackwood, London, 1860), vol. 2, p. 12, cit. Matus, p. 65.
 - 16 G. H. Lewes, *The Physical Basis of Mind* (Trubner, London, 1877; vol. 3 of *Problems of Life and Mind*, 1874–9), p. 169, cit. Davis, p. 153.
 - 17 Davis, p. 154.
 - 18 Davis, p. 112.
 - 19 G. H. Lewes, *Problems*, vol. 2, p. 413, cit. Davis, p. 112.
 - 20 G. Eliot, *Middlemarch* (Oxford World's Classics, 1998 [1871–2], p. 191 (Ch. 20).
 - 21 *Deronda*, pp. 277 and 63–4 (Chs 24, 6).
 - 22 Davis, p. 182.
 - 23 A. Vrettos, *Somatic Fictions: Imagining Illness in Victorian Culture* (Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 63; and see Ch. 2, *passim*.
 - 24 *Deronda*, p. 27 (Ch. 3).
 - 25 M. Meisel uses this concept to refer to the production of 'reality effects' on the stage and in culture generally. See *Realizations: Narrative, Pictorial, and Theatrical Arts in Nineteenth-Century England* (Princeton University Press, 1983).
 - 26 *Deronda*, Ch. 56.
 - 27 *Ibid.*, pp. 434, 57, 420 (Chs 36, 6, 35).
 - 28 In Ch. 6.
 - 29 C. Williams, 'Moving Pictures: George Eliot and Melodrama', in L. Berlant (ed.), *Compassion: The Culture and Politics of an Emotion* (Routledge, 2004), p. 131.
 - 30 *Deronda*, pp. 557, 358–9, 359 (Chs 45, 31).
 - 31 *Ibid.*, pp. 427, 610, 670 (Chs 35, 48, 54).
 - 32 G. Beer, *Darwin's Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Fiction* (Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 174; and see Ch. 6. See also Davis, pp. 109–12.
 - 33 *Deronda*, p. 424 (Ch. 35).

- 34 This episode is, in some respects, a structural opposite of the former: the return of something hers v. the gift of something asserted to be not-hers. But then again, what is 'hers' was actually her father's, just as the 'not-hers' was Grandcourt's ... For an interesting discussion, see C. Gallagher, 'George Eliot and *Daniel Deronda*: The Prostitute and the Jewish Question', in R. Yeazell (ed.), *Sex, Politics, and Science in the Nineteenth-Century Novel* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), esp. pp. 48–53.
- 35 *Deronda*, pp. 19–20, 447 (Chs 2, 36).
- 36 *Ibid.*, pp. 396, 399 and 790, 792 (Chs 34, 68). One can add here that Daniel has previously saved Mirah from drowning, thus initiating the second theme of the novel, since it is through Mirah's Jewish family that he is led to ponder his own obscure origins and open up issues around cultural identity and belonging.
- 37 *Ibid.*, pp. 142, 589 (Chs 13, 48).
- 38 A. Cvetkovich, *Mixed Feelings: Feminism, Mass Culture, and Victorian Sensationalism* (Rutgers University Press, 1992), p. 129; and see Ch. 6.
- 39 Matus mounts an explicit argument to this effect.
- 40 *Deronda*, p. 564 (Ch. 45).
- 41 *Ibid.*, p. 770 (Ch. 65).
- 42 *Ibid.*, p. 702 (Ch. 57). For other such episodes, see pp. 359, 806 (Chs 31, 69).
- 43 *Ibid.*, pp. 806, 61 (Chs 69, 6).
- 44 Vrettos, p. 70.
- 45 J. Rose, *Sexuality in the Field of Vision* (Verso, 1986), pp. 117, 118; and see Ch. 4, *passim*.
- 46 *Deronda*, p. 686 (Ch. 55).
- 47 G. H. Lewes, diary entry for 29–6–1873, cit. D. Marshall, *The Figure of Theater: Shaftesbury, Defoe, Adam Smith, and George Eliot* (Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 471.
- 48 Williams, pp. 106–11. This article provides an insightful account of melodrama in relation both to Eliot and nineteenth-century popular culture more widely. On this, see also Meisel, and J. Litvak, *Caught in the Act: Theatricality in the Nineteenth-Century English Novel* (California University Press, 1992), Ch. 5.
- 49 Marshall, pp. 194, 231; and see Ch. 8 for an elaboration of these points.
- 50 Vrettos, p. 75.
- 51 Williams, pp. 107–8.
- 52 *Ibid.*, pp. 119–23; and see *Deronda*, Ch. 40 (also Ch. 38).
- 53 Williams, p. 120.
- 54 *Deronda*, pp. 471, 684–5 (Chs 38, 55).
- 55 Rose, p. 119.
- 56 Cvetkovich, p. 152.
- 57 *Deronda*, pp. 693, 694 (Ch. 56).

- 58 Marshall, pp. 21, and 207–10.
- 59 Cvetkovich, p. 154.
- 60 Marshall, p. 217.
- 61 *Deronda*, p. 629 (Ch. 51).
- 62 Marshall, p. 227.
- 63 *Deronda*, p. 629 (Ch. 51).
- 64 *Ibid.*, p. 178 (Ch. 16).
- 65 T. Pinney (ed.), *Essays of George Eliot* (Routledge, 1963), p. 270.
- 66 *Deronda*, pp. 451, 630, 366, 366 (Chs 36, 51, 32, 32).
- 67 One must, of course, salute George Eliot's bravery in raising these issues at all, in the context of the time: anti-Semitism was staple fare among ruling class and some intellectual circles in Britain (and remained so until at least the 1940s).
- 68 *Deronda*, p. 725 (Ch. 60).
- 69 *Ibid.*, p. 745 (Ch. 63).
- 70 See also Gallagher, pp. 56–8, who links this to Eliot's critical comments elsewhere on 'cosmopolitanism' and the abstract universalism of market forces – criticisms, especially of the latter, that retain their pertinence.
- 71 *Deronda*, pp. 364, 365, 365, 661, 750 (Chs 32, 53, 63). *Deronda* is articulating here the characteristic evolutionist perspective of his time, presumably shared by the author. We even learn that he seems to be touching the 'electric chain' of his ancestry (p. 721, Ch. 60), a sort of hereditary extension of the circuit of sensation, reaching through time, and operating unconsciously, albeit open to conscious reinforcement.
- 72 A. Jaffe, *Scenes of Sympathy: Identity and Representation in Victorian Fiction* (Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 139; and see pp. 138–40, for elaboration.
- 73 Davis, p. 113.
- 74 *Deronda*, Ch. 18.
- 75 See also *Middlemarch*, Ch. 80, where Eliot shows some sensitivity to this.
- 76 M. Proust, *Swann's Way*, vol. I of *In Search of Lost Time*, trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff and T. Kilmartin (Vintage, 1996 [1913]), p. 51.
- 77 *Deronda*, e.g. pp. 653, 316 (Chs 52, 28). For a summary, referencing Eliot's works generally, see Davis, pp. 147–59.
- 78 Proust was aware of Freud, and apparently sympathetic to the idea of 'repression'; see J. Jordan, 'The unconscious', in R. Bales (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Proust* (Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 104. See also W. C. Carter, 'The vast structure of recollection: from life to literature', p. 37, in the same volume, and R. Mackenzie, 'Proust's "*Livre intérieur*"', in P. Collier and J. Davies (eds), *Modernism and the European Unconscious* (Polity, 1990), p. 150.
- 79 M. Proust, *The Captive*, vol. II of *In Remembrance of Things Past*, trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff (Random House, 1932 [1923]), p. 619.

- 80 W. Benjamin, 'The Image of Proust', from *Illuminations* (Fontana, 1992 [1929]), pp. 210, 198, also available in *Selected Writings*, vol. 2: 1927–34 (Belknap/Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 247, 238.
- 81 *Swann*, p. 52.
- 82 *Ibid.*, p. 53.
- 83 This term, of course, recalls Baudelaire; see the reflections in W. Benjamin, 'On Some Motifs in Baudelaire', in *Illuminations*, and in *Selected Writings*, vol. 4: 1938–1940 (Belknap/Harvard University Press, 2003 [1940]).
- 84 *Swann*, pp. 51, 54–5.
- 85 See, for example, the episode of the scent of hawthorn blossoms recalling those in the old church: *Swann*, pp. 164–6, 132–3.
- 86 *Ibid.*, p. 54.
- 87 'Motifs', p. 180 (335). Numbers in brackets refer to the *Selected Writings* edition; and words in square brackets indicate translations from this edition, when the difference may be significant.
- 88 Jack Jordan, in his article (p. 113), claims that it is not a matter of finding the cause of the sensation in either subject or object, but in the fusion of the two; this seems correct up to a point, but rather misses these discontinuities.
- 89 'Image', p. 209 (246).
- 90 As a record, filed in conscious memory, a photo can of course carry a powerful sense of 'here and now', relative to when it was taken – but it is not, for all that, either experienced, or a record of experience.
- 91 M. Proust, *Time Regained*, vol. VI of *In Search of Lost Time*, trans. A. Mayor and T. Kilmartin, revised D. J. Enright (Modern Library, 1993 [1922]), pp. 255, 257–9. (The pagination in the Vintage [1996] edition is different: for these episodes and the subsequent reflections, see pp. 216–225, 232–4.)
- 92 *Ibid.*, p. 263.
- 93 *Ibid.*, p. 264.
- 94 *Ibid.*, p. 267.
- 95 *Ibid.*, p. 264.
- 96 C. Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 479.
- 97 G. Deleuze, *Proust and Signs* (Minnesota University Press, 2000 [1964]), pp. 60 (in italics in the original), 61. Like Proust, Deleuze takes the forcefulness, the intensity, of the recall as a criterion of its 'truth'; for our purposes, it is the emphasis on 'difference' here that is important.
- 98 W. James, 'Are We Automata?', *Mind* (1879), 4, p. 7, cit. Davis, p. 139.
- 99 Davis, p. 139.
- 100 James, p. 18, cit. Davis, p. 140.
- 101 One must be careful here. There has been an assumption that Proust must have

been influenced by Bergson's emphasis on time as duration; actually, Proust seems to have kept a certain distance, unimpressed by Bergson's insensitivity to some of his central concerns, such as the distinction between two kinds of memory. See Benjamin, 'Motifs', sec. II.

102 *Time Regained*, p. 273.

103 *Ibid.*, p. 275.

104 *Ibid.*, p. 274. 'Interior' might be a more exact translation than 'inner', keeping a clearer sense of the *spatial* aspect of the word in this context.

105 *Ibid.*, p. 264.

106 *Swann*, p. 50.

107 *Proust*, p. 11. And alluding to Proust elsewhere, he suggests that 'The other is the existence of the encompassed possible', a formulation that neatly encapsulates the tension of imaginative engagement here; see *The Logic of Sense* (Continuum, 2004 [1969]), p. 347.

108 Deleuze argues that the emphasis on 'encounter' permits us to avoid the traps of 'recognition', mere familiarity (*Proust*, p. 27). This contributes to his project of purifying art and aesthetics of the twin corruptions of public opinion and objectivism; avoiding the latter, in particular, involves a stronger separation between art and memory than the approach adopted here. (Ch. 5 of *Proust* is indeed entitled 'The *Secondary Role of Memory*', my italics.) One can therefore agree that 'reminiscence is the analogue of art' (*ibid.*, p. 60) without necessarily implying that the relation of homology implies any necessary inferiority of one series to the other, or even that they can be clearly distinguished in the first place. (See also *ibid.*, pp. 55, 111.) For a critique of Deleuze on public opinion and the traps of representation, see also my *Sensational Subjects: Modernity and the Dramatization of Experience* (Bloomsbury, 2014), Ch. 4.

109 'Motifs', p. 184 (338).

110 *Ibid.*, p. 182 (337).

111 *Ibid.*, sec. XI. The Baudelaire quotes are from his poem *Correspondences*.

112 *Ibid.*, p. 186 (340).

113 Which is why, following what seems to be common critical practice with this author, I have made no careful effort to distinguish between 'author' (of the novel) and 'narrator' (of the story). For some purposes, of course, it might be very necessary to do so.

114 *Time Regained*, pp. 264, 265, 270.

115 'Motifs', pp. 153–4 (314), 156 (316), 157 (317).

116 Benjamin suggests that in Freud, too, consciousness and leaving behind a memory trace are presented as incompatible within the same system: 'consciousness comes into being at the site of [takes the place of] a memory trace'. See 'Motifs', p. 157 (317). See also *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of*

- Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. J. Strachey (Hogarth Press, 1953–74), vol. 18, p. 25, on ‘excitatory pressures’ expiring in the very act of consciousness.
- 117 I. Hacking, ‘Memory Sciences, Memory Politics’, in P. Antze and M. Lambek (eds), *Tense Past: Cultural Essays in Trauma and Memory* (Routledge, 1996), p. 70.
- 118 M. Proust, *On Art and Literature*, trans. S. T. Warner (Carroll and Graf, 1997), p. 19.
- 119 W. James, *The Principles of Psychology* (Harvard University Press, 1983 [1890]), pp. 1087–8.
- 120 E. Claparède, ‘La question de la mémoire affective’, *Archives de psychologie* (1911), 10, pp. 367, 369, cit. R. Leys, *Trauma: A Genealogy* (Chicago University Press, 2000), pp. 95, 96. (Passages in square brackets were presumably added by Leys.) See also her useful discussion, pp. 94–7.
- 121 Leys, p. 97.
- 122 S. Freud, ‘The Unconscious’ [1915], *Standard Edition*, vol. 14, p. 178.
- 123 P. Brooks, *Body Work: Objects of Desire in Modern Narrative* (Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 255; Ch. 8 develops the argument.
- 124 Freud, ‘Unconscious’, p. 177. See also the other metapsychological works of 1915, in the same volume. For an interesting discussion, see M. Borch-Jacobsen, *The Emotional Tie: Psychoanalysis, Mimesis and Affect* (Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 123–54.
- 125 For Paul Ricoeur, in *Freud and Philosophy* (Yale University Press, 1970), the *Project* can be seen as evidence of a shift from the language of forces to that of meanings (pp. 130–1); there might be better grounds, though, for arguing that the tension between the two runs right through Freud’s work. Indeed, for Misha Kavka, in *Reality Television, Affect and Intimacy: Reality Matters* (Palgrave, 2008), ‘Ultimately, affect is the touchstone of psychoanalytic knowledge, the stuff of the psyche that does not lie’ (p. 32), though since it is fundamental to psychoanalysis that affect *per se* cannot tell us anything it is difficult to know how we could assess the latter claim.
- 126 J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, *The Language of Psychoanalysis* (Hogarth Press, 1973), pp. 13, 14.
- 127 Kavka, p. 31.

Trauma Trouble

- 1 R. Luckhurst, ‘Traumaculture’, *New Formations* (2003), 50. See also R. Luckhurst, *The Trauma Question* (Routledge, 2008); M. Seltzer, ‘Wound Culture: Trauma in the Pathological Public Sphere’, *October* (1997), 80, reproduced (slightly altered) as Ch. 10 of his *Serial Killers: Death and Life in America’s Wound Culture* (Routledge,

1998). Luckhurst's book is the most useful overview of the topic in its cultural ramifications (literature, film, art, theory); Seltzer's work offers an insightful cultural theory perspective.

- 2 M. S. Micale, 'Medical and Literary Discourses of Trauma in the Age of the American Civil War', in A. Stiles (ed.), *Neurology and Literature, 1860–1920* (Palgrave, 2007), p. 184.
- 3 Seltzer, 'Wound', pp. 3 and 22n. 50.
- 4 A. Jaffe, *Scenes of Sympathy: Identity and Representation in Victorian Fiction* (Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 176.
- 5 Luckhurst, *Trauma*, p. 132; and see Ch. 3, esp. pp. 131–3.
- 6 J. Matus, 'Historicizing Trauma: The Genealogy of Psychic Shock in *Daniel Deronda*', *Victorian Literature and Culture* (2008), 36:1, p. 73.
- 7 D. LaCapra, *Writing History, Writing Trauma* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), p. 23.
- 8 *Ibid.*, p. 22.
- 9 K. Ball, 'Introduction: Trauma and Its Institutional Destinies', *Cultural Critique* (2000), 46, p. 39.
- 10 E. A. Kaplan, *Trauma Culture: The Politics of Terror and Loss in Media and Literature* (Rutgers University Press, 2005), p. 39; and see pp. 39–44, 88–9, and Ch. 4, *passim*. Her book focuses on the twin issues of witnessing, and working through, trauma.
- 11 See J. L. Matus, 'Emergent Theories of Victorian Mind Shock: From War and Railway Accident to Nerves, Electricity and Emotion', in Stiles; M. S. Micale and P. Lerner (eds), *Traumatic Pasts: History, Psychiatry and Trauma in the Modern Age, 1870–1930* (Cambridge University Press, 2001), Chs 2, 3; and W. Schivelbusch, *The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19th Century* (Berg, 1986), Chs 7, 9, 10.
- 12 See R. Leys, *Trauma: A Genealogy* (Chicago University Press, 2000), Ch. III; M. Stone, 'Shellshock and the Psychologists', in W. F. Bynum et al. (eds), *The Anatomy of Madness: Essays in the History of Psychiatry* (Routledge, 1985), vol. 2; Luckhurst, *Trauma*, pp. 49–53; and E. Showalter, *The Female Malady: Women, Madness and English Culture, 1830–1980* (Virago, 1987), Ch. 7.
- 13 W. Brown, 'The Treatment of Cases of Shell Shock in an Advanced Neurological Center', *The Lancet* (1918), 2, p. 198, cit. Leys, p. 101.
- 14 C. Myers, 'Contributions to the Study of Shell Shock', *The Lancet*, (1916), 1, pp. 67–8, cit. Leys, p. 101. One might add that the symptoms of war traumas from later periods, e.g. those of Vietnam veterans, seem broadly consistent with this; see Luckhurst, 'Traumaculture', pp. 29–31.
- 15 Leys, p. 100.
- 16 LaCapra, p. 42.

- 17 Luckhurst, *Trauma*, p. 118.
- 18 S. Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion* (Edinburgh University Press, 2004), p. 27.
- 19 C. Caruth, *Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 115n. 6, 59, 59. The latter claim is repeated by her in C. Caruth (ed.), *Trauma: Explorations in Memory* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 5.
- 20 Luckhurst, 'Traumaculture', p. 28.
- 21 Caruth, *Trauma*, p. 5.
- 22 See Luckhurst, *Trauma*, pp. 11–12, 72–4, 122–4, 147, 179–85, for a useful survey. On the controversies, see also Leys, pp. 241–3, and 253n. 35; Kaplan, pp. 25–38, incl. discussion of Freud and neuroscience; and R. J. McNally, *Remembering Trauma* (Harvard University Press, 2003).
- 23 See, for example, the work of Bessel van der Kolk, who has influenced Caruth: B. A. van der Kolk and O. van der Hart, 'The Intrusive Past: The Flexibility of Memory and the Engraving of Trauma', in Caruth, *Trauma*; and B. A. van der Kolk et al., *Traumatic Stress: The Effects of Overwhelming Experience on Mind, Body, and Society* (Guilford Press, 1999). For a thorough (and devastating) critique, see Leys, Chs VII, VIII. Affect theory, too, draws heavily on neuroscientific sources; for a discussion, see my *Sensational Subjects: The Dramatization of Experience in the Modern World* (Bloomsbury, 2014), Ch. 7.
- 24 Luckhurst, *Trauma*, p. 79.
- 25 L. di Prete, 'Foreign Bodies': *Trauma, Corporeality, and Textuality in Contemporary American Culture* (Routledge, 2006), p. 8. On this point, she acknowledges the influence of D. Horvitz, *Literary Trauma: Sadism, Memory, and Sexual Violence in American Women's Fiction* (State University of New York Press, 2000).
- 26 Seltzer, 'Wound', p. 11.
- 27 K. Farrell, *Post-Traumatic Culture: Injury and Interpretation in the Nineties* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), pp. 5, 3.
- 28 Caruth, *Unclaimed*, p. 61.
- 29 Ibid., p. 62.
- 30 Leys, p. 4.
- 31 One might note, in passing, a degree of overlap here with the uncanny. Trauma is the other that cannot be recognized as such, the alien in identity, constituting it as repetitive, neurotic, 'foreign' to itself. The obsessive, repetitive power of the returning 'image', experienced as all-too-real, and the disruption or fragmentation of time that is both cause and consequence, is vividly brought out in Toni Morrison's *Beloved*, which also reminds us that there can be a collective, social dimension to trauma, and a potential for 'working through'. For discussion, see A. Gordon, *Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination* (Minnesota University Press, 1997), Ch. 4, and Luckhurst, *Trauma*, pp. 90–7.

- 32 S. Freud, 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle' [1920], secs II, IV, in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. and ed. J. Strachey (Hogarth Press, 1953–74), vol. 18. This is where Freud introduces his most radical attempt to deal with the problem of repetition itself, the concept of the death instinct, a concept that oscillates in an illuminating if arguably incoherent way between referring to an adaptive 'strategy' of the self in an impossible situation (hence a strategy that is therefore ultimately maladaptive); an aspect of the drive to mastery; and a manifestation of a quasi-organic drive (instinct) to re-establish an earlier state of stasis, in death.
- 33 A problem recognized several times by Freud himself; see, for example, his comment in the late 'Outline of Psycho-Analysis' [1938], *Standard Edition*, vol. 23, p. 184.
- 34 This model is implicit in much of Freud's work, but gets perhaps its most explicit formulation in 'The Aetiology of Hysteria' [1896], *Standard Edition*, vol. 3.
- 35 Seltzer, 'Wound', p. 10.
- 36 This stems from the work of Pierre Janet, contemporary with the earlier part of Freud's career. See S. J. Lynn and J. W. Rhue (eds), *Dissociation: Clinical and Theoretical Perspectives* (Guilford Press, 1994), esp. Chs 1, 18, 20; Luckhurst, *Trauma*, pp. 41–4, 48; and Leys, Ch. III.
- 37 On these wider aspects, see I. Hacking, *Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory* (Princeton University Press, 1995), and Leys, Ch. II. See also my *Sensational Subjects*, Ch. 5, relating this to the notion of distraction.
- 38 T. Elsaesser, 'Postmodernism as mourning work', *Screen* (2001), 4:2, p. 199.
- 39 On 'recovered memory syndrome', see C. Lury, *Prosthetic Culture: Photography, Memory and Identity* (Routledge, 1998), Ch. 5, and Luckhurst, *Trauma*, *passim*.
- 40 Of course, one *can* introduce this, using 'castration anxiety', and indeed shell shock was often associated with a range of physical injuries and disfigurements; but, one might suggest, *pace* Freud, that perhaps castration powerfully figures the wound-as-trauma, rather than the other way round; and it is difficult to see that a notion of the unconscious adds anything *essential* here.
- 41 On the latter, see A. Young, *The Harmony of Illusions: Inventing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder* (Princeton University Press, 1995).
- 42 Seltzer, *Serial Killers*, p. 237.
- 43 G. Le Bon, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* (Ernest Benn, 1947 [1895]), p. 126.
- 44 A. Vrettos, *Somatic Fictions: Imagining Illness in Victorian Culture* (Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 83, 97.
- 45 Cit. R. B. Gordon, 'From Charcot to Charlot: Unconscious Imitation and Spectatorship in French Cabaret and Early Cinema', in M. S. Micale (ed.), *The Mind of Modernism: Medicine, Psychology, and the Cultural Arts in Europe and*

- America, 1880–1940* (Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 118. On this engagement of hysteria with popular culture, see also F. McCarren, ‘The “Symptomatic Act” circa 1900: Hysteria, Hypnosis, Electricity, Dance’, *Cultural Inquiry* (1995) 21.
- 46 Gordon, ‘From Charcot’, p. 117. One might add that there is plenty of scope here for gendering these perceived dangers: crowds, like bodies, could be seen as overflowing, leaking pollution ...
- 47 M. S. Micale, ‘Discourses of Hysteria in *Fin-de-Siècle* France’, in *Mind of Modernism*, p. 90.
- 48 See their account, ‘Studies in Hysteria’[1895], in *Standard Edition*, vol. 2. The symptoms of the celebrated Anna O, for example, included paralysis and loss of feeling on one side of her body, disturbed vision, an odd head posture, coughing, bouts of delirium, hydrophobia, loss of speech (what Breuer called her ‘absences’ [p. 30]), and strange distortions of language, including childhood words and sounds, foreign phrases, and neologisms.
- 49 Cit. B. Inglis, *The Diseases of Civilization* (Paladin, 1983), p. 234.
- 50 Micale, ‘Discourses’, p. 90.
- 51 E. Bronfen, *The Knotted Subject: Hysteria and Its Discontents* (Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 105, 114.
- 52 E. Showalter, *Hystories: Hysterical Epidemics and Modern Culture* (Picador, 1997), p. 15.
- 53 Micale notes the emergence of the ‘new hysteria studies’, and of contemporary disorders that are easily spread by suggestion and imitation, the media playing a key role; see pp. 294 and 4–12 of his *Approaching Hysteria: Disease and Its Interpretations* (Princeton University Press, 1995). This is also noted by Showalter (*Hystories*, pp. 4, 6, 28). This is fair enough, though the latter author has a tendency to classify a whole rag-bag of disorders, physical and mental, as ‘manifestations’ of an underlying ‘essence’ of hysteria, claiming that we must ‘recognize hysterical syndromes as a universal psychopathology of everyday life’ before we can dismantle their ‘stigmatizing mythologies’ (p. 12). This runs the risk of becoming a further move in the hysteria game rather than an analysis of it.
- 54 J. Baudrillard, ‘The Precession of Simulacra’, in *Simulacra and Simulation* (Michigan University Press, 1994), p. 3. See also the stimulating account in R. Butler, *Jean Baudrillard: The Defence of the Real* (Sage, 1999), Ch. 1.
- 55 Vrettos, p. 83.
- 56 Bronfen, pp. 115, 113; and see pp. 109–13, tracing the sources of this from the eighteenth century.
- 57 Vrettos, p. 45; and see pp. 46–7.
- 58 Generally, men avoided the label, though not always; it could at times be fashionable. In a private letter, Freud even used it of himself: see the *Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess* (Harvard University Press, 1995),

p. 325. More usually, the less stigmatizing label of ‘neurasthenia’ was used for men: the classic case is Proust (see M. R. Finn, *Proust, The Body, and Literary Form* [Cambridge University Press, 1999], esp. pp. 38–41). See also M. Gijswit-Hofstra and R. Porter (eds), *Cultures of Neurasthenia from Beard to the First World War* (Rodopi, 2001); and, for further wide-ranging discussions of hysteria, including gender aspects, see S. L. Gilman et al., *Hysteria Beyond Freud* (California University Press, 1993). Given these gender aspects, together with increasing medical scepticism, and the concentration on shell-shock trauma, ‘hysteria’ as a medical label was dying out by the 1920s.

59 Bronfen, p. 40.

60 G. Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation* (Continuum, 2003 [1981]), p. 50. Deleuze suggests an internal connection between painting and hysteria; see pp. 50–5.

61 Once again, one notes a certain convergence with sentimentalism here: both involve an apparent excess of feeling. This renders sentimentalism even more vulnerable to ideological attack at times when any ‘cult of feeling’ is under pressure, the alleged sentimentalist thus becoming available for denunciation as ‘hysterical’. The relevant difference here, though, is that sentimentalism is fundamentally an overflowing of feeling for the other *in* a distance it both affirms and mourns, rather than a crisis of boundaries that can potentially cripple the coherence of the self.

62 One might add that hypnosis played a part in cultural life and entertainment generally, as indeed did hysteria; it contributed to a ‘spectacle of sympathy’ in which the spectacle could clearly win out over the sympathy. This could even be true of the medical environment itself: Charcot’s famous demonstrations of the use of hypnosis in the diagnosis of hysteria took place before an audience, and the theatricality of the ‘performances’ was widely commented on. (See Gordon, ‘From Charcot’, and Showalter, *Female Malady*, Ch. 6.)

63 And we can recall that while Freud’s decisive rejection of hypnosis was motivated not only by his awareness of its therapeutic inconclusiveness – its use seemed merely to result in endless symptomatic repetitions and displacements – but also by his unease at this authoritarian mode of interaction, his own development of the ‘talking cure’ and his discovery of transference do not of course necessarily resolve either problem. Even on his own account, transference is necessarily the site of a *battle*, and the twin possibilities of psychoanalysis as authoritarian imposition in another guise, or as a process ultimately interminable, loom into view ...

64 It follows that seeing hypnosis purely in terms of mimetic identification is inadequate. Leys refers to a ‘profound’ identification between hypnotized self and other, and refers to ‘the tendency of hypnotized persons to imitate or repeat

whatever they were told to say or do' (pp. 46, 8). But this seems odd. If you are under hypnosis, you do not 'imitate' what you are told to say or do; you just do it. With hypnosis, there is *control* of self by other; referring merely to 'identification' obscures the asymmetry here. Going on from this, one can add that although Leys is surely the most penetrating analyst of the medical and psychiatric traditions of trauma theory and treatment, her central theoretical innovation – analysing trauma in terms of a mimesis/anti-mimesis dichotomy – seems suspect. Presenting trauma through a mimetic theory of hypnosis, she then argues that this in turn produces an anti-mimetic reaction, through theorizing trauma as external impact, rather like an infection, so that, on this model, the subject's integrity can be safeguarded, and the subject can, in principle, remember it and report on it (pp. 9–10, 37, 298–9). But this won't do. Even if hypnosis provides a convincing model for trauma (very dubious), we've seen that hypnosis cannot be reduced to mimesis anyway; it has to incorporate the element of coercion, of external force. And conversely, if this element *is* present, and is necessary for trauma, then it must be present in the anti-mimetic model too (as indeed it is, even in her account), and the latter cannot serve to rescue the 'coherent subject' from the risk of fracture and dissociation. Since an essential feature of trauma is precisely this *absence of distance*, so that the victim can gain no purchase on it, and remains trapped in it, we can now see why posing all this in terms of mimesis v. anti-mimesis is not helpful: this central feature runs right through *both* the alleged alternatives. And, beyond this, it seems that the term 'mimesis' is stretched, in opportunist fashion, to cover far too much, just as 'anti-mimesis' is, in turn, left far too vague. For example, we are informed that the anti-mimetic theory 'also tends to make imitation basic to the traumatic experience', but in a different sense of 'imitation': it is not the mimetic sense of 'immersion' in trauma, but 'hypnotic imitation', whereby the subject remains a spectator of the trauma scene and can report on it (p. 299). At this point, the incoherence of the mimesis/anti-mimesis pair seems to have spread contagiously to imitation, now bifurcated into two senses, neither of which seem to be central to 'imitation' anyway ... All in all, then, to claim that 'both mimesis and antimimesis are internal to the traumatic experience' (p. 40) risks tautology – in terms of the central issues, the terms have not been coherently or usefully distinguished in the first place.

65 Bronfen, p. 117.

66 Ibid., pp. xiii, 35, 35, 36.

67 Seltzer, *Serial Killers*, p. 65.

68 Seltzer, 'Wound', p. 11, italics in original.

69 Seltzer, *Serial Killers*, p. 184.

70 Seltzer, *Serial Killers*, pp. 45, 145; 'Wound', p. 9. See also Leys, p. 37 and *passim*.

- 71 And if this extreme form of sensation can be characterized as ‘sensational’, this would of course be even more true in the case of serial killing...
- 72 Seltzer, ‘Wound’, pp. 12, 15, 15.
- 73 Seltzer, *Serial Killers*, pp. 43, 61n. 64; and see pp. 45–6. It needs to be reiterated that the repetition of *content* is crucial for trauma, whereas Seltzer’s own argument, emphasizing a ‘statistical’ notion of the person as embodying ‘merely formal’ equality, goes in a somewhat different direction.
- 74 There is an intriguing reminder here of the thesis of Judith Butler (*Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* [Routledge, 1990]) that identity is performative, reiterative, ‘the stylized repetition of acts through time’, hence subverting any notion of a fixed ground of identity (p. 141); one might remark that the *effect* of trauma is to *reintroduce* this fixed ground, as the crippling, disavowed condition of identity itself ...
- 75 See Leys, for a fascinating discussion of this theme as it occurs in Freud (pp. 29–33). She suggests that Freud postulates a state of ‘primary identification’ that can never be remembered because it precedes the self/other distinction: but if this is the case, who or what is identifying with who or what? It is, rather, a state of undifferentiation, before any question of identification (or mimesis) can arise; such identification can only be emergent, constituted retrospectively.
- 76 Lauren Berlant is critical of the way some identity politics activists ‘assume pain as the only sign readable across hierarchies of social life ... know me, know my pain – you caused it’. Hence ‘trauma stands as truth’. See L. Berlant, ‘The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy, and Politics’, in A. Sarat and T. R. Kearns (eds), *Cultural Pluralism, Identity Politics, and the Law* (Michigan University Press, 1999), pp. 73, 72.
- 77 Caruth (*Unclaimed*, pp. 62–5) tends to present this as a universal ontological dilemma, rather than as having its source in ‘trauma culture’ in the sense being developed here.
- 78 Leys, p. 204.
- 79 LaCapra, pp. xiv, 46–7, 76–81; and see the illuminating account in Ch. 2 overall.
- 80 Luckhurst, *Trauma*, p. 3.
- 81 See Luckhurst, *Trauma*, pp. 29–31, on the example of the 1989 Hillsborough disaster (when 95 spectators died in a football stadium accident), for an elaboration.
- 82 Caruth, *Unclaimed*, pp. 4, 5, 8.
- 83 Caruth, *Trauma*, p. 10.
- 84 Leys, pp. 253, 254, 304; and see her overall critique of Caruth, in Ch. VIII.
- 85 LaCapra’s concept of ‘empathic unsettlement’ is apposite at this point: see LaCapra, p. 78. His use of – and sensitivity to – ‘empathy’ is generally compatible with the approach adopted here.

- 86 W. Benjamin 'On Some Motifs in Baudelaire', in *Illuminations*, p. 159, and in *Selected Writings*, vol. 4: 1938–1940 (Belknap/Harvard University Press, 2003 [1940]), p. 319.

Sympathy, Sentiment and Media Spectacle

- 1 J. Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (Polity, 1992), p. 49.
- 2 For a more extended discussion, see my *Sensational Subjects: The Dramatization of Experience in the Modern World* (Bloomsbury, 2014), Ch. 6. There is also relevant discussion of the public sphere and the media in Ch. 8.
- 3 See L. Boltanski, *Distant Suffering: Morality, Media and Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 154, 173. This book remains the most thoughtful recent exploration of these issues; see esp. Ch. 2, and Part III.
- 4 The one 'deconstructs' the other, so to speak.
- 5 L. Chouliaraki, *The Spectatorship of Suffering* (Sage, 2006), pp. 13, 11, 2. It is worth adding that a new book by her that looks highly pertinent to these issues arrived too late for consideration here: *The Ironic Spectator: Solidarity in the Age of Post-Humanitarianism* (Polity, 2013). (Subsequent references to 'Chouliaraki' are of course to the former.)
- 6 Chouliaraki, pp. 103, 104. Chouliaraki's use of 'tableau' here marks a departure from the eighteenth-century sense, and from its later use, in melodrama. In these areas, the tableau served, through its intensity, to concentrate the meaning of suffering, engaging the spectator emotionally. The properties of the pictorial scene were supposed to *enhance* 'emotional connectivity', not distance us from it.
- 7 *Ibid.*, pp. 26, 37–8.
- 8 It is when it is *apparently* true, as in 'special effects', that the involvement of technology with melodrama is potentially at its strongest; but even here, the melodramatic effect is enhanced if the audience is not aware of the impact of the technology as a separate aspect. Really, it is the excessive, 'over the top' aspect of technology that is crucial here.
- 9 Chouliaraki, p. 189.
- 10 It appeared in the *New York Times*, 26 March 1993.
- 11 J. Rancière, *The Emancipated Spectator* (Verso, 2009), p. 99.
- 12 One should add that there are motivational complexities here, but the photo, and the reaction to it, was clearly a factor.
- 13 A. and J. Kleinman, 'The Appeal of Experience; The Dismay of Images: Cultural Appropriations of Suffering in Our Times', *Daedalus* (1996) 125:1, p. 7. Their solution is to work through the local; but this, too, presents pitfalls, particularly

the risk of corruption – large quantities of foreign aid disappear into the hands of local elites. The initial problem, clearly, is how to respond meaningfully to this image *without* letting it unwittingly reinforce ‘Darkest Africa’ stereotypes.

- 14 S. Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others* (Penguin, 2004), p. 8.
- 15 Ibid., pp. 9, 6.
- 16 Cit. *ibid.*, p. 23.
- 17 Rancière, p. 103.
- 18 For discussion, see J. Taylor, *Body Horror: Photojournalism, Catastrophe, and War* (New York University Press, 1998), pp. 166–7, 180–3.
- 19 Sontag, pp. 23, 72, 72.
- 20 One must enter a caveat here. It was suggested, in the discussion of sympathy theory in a previous chapter, that an excessively visceral, ‘in your face’ effect may bypass the emotional and imaginative involvement needed for the sympathetic response to engage. Context would seem crucial here, and this may well be a factor in the response to the Iraq image. (The situation is clearly different from watching a horror film ...)
- 21 The photo, by Kenneth Jarecke, appeared in the *Observer*, 3 March 1991, with the caption: ‘The real face of war’. It did not carry commentary. Some newspapers carried pictures of wrecked vehicles, taken from some distance. For most of the press, brief references to Iraqi casualties were presented in the logic of melodramatic personalization: it was all Saddam Hussein’s fault anyway ... It should of course be added that the image is readily accessible now, on the internet.
- 22 Taylor, p. 157. His discussion of this (Ch. 9) is entitled ‘The body vanishes in the Gulf War’. This of course provided some basis for Baudrillard’s thesis in *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place* (Power Publications, 1995), exploring the logic of simulation. See also D. Kellner, *The Persian Gulf TV War* (Westview, 1992); E. Scarry, ‘Watching and authorizing the Gulf War’, in M. Garber et al. (eds), *Media Spectacles* (Routledge, 1993), and D. K. Thussu, ‘Live TV and Bloodless Deaths: War, Infotainment and 24/7 News’, in D. K. Thussu and D. Freedman (eds), *War and the Media: Reporting Conflict 24/7* (Sage, 2003).
- 23 J. Seaton, *Carnage and the Media* (Allen Lane, 2005), p. 220.
- 24 Taylor, p. 129; see also Chs 8, 9; and S. D. Moeller, *Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War, and Death* (Routledge, 1999), Chs 3, 5.
- 25 J. Dawes, *That the World May Know: Bearing Witness to Atrocity* (Harvard University Press, 2009), is a sensitive exploration of these themes in the context of the Rwandan genocide of the 1990s – largely ignored or distorted in the Western media – placing an emphasis on the written word, including literature, rather than the visual image.
- 26 Sontag, p. 63. See also Taylor, pp. 193–6.
- 27 See Chouliaraki, pp. 13–14, 209–13, for a critique of narcissism and an

over-emphasis on feeling, in particular the tendency to reduce cosmopolitanism to intimacy via psychological identification, and the easy idea of a 'common humanity' which really just reflects this narcissism (p. 210). Conversely, when television news combines emotion with an element of impersonality, maintaining a creative tension between 'feeling' and 'watching', permitting reflexive engagement, cosmopolitanism can in principle defeat narcissism (p. 212). Jean Seaton makes a similar point: '... feeling empathy is sometimes about making spectators feel good about themselves, with the glow of shared humanity substituted for an arduous comprehension of what is different about other people' (p. 285). There is a slight problem with Chouliaraki here: in the book, her perspective on theatricality shifts it too close to emotion, hence threatening to assimilate it to the narcissism/identification model she rightly criticizes. But with Nicholas Abercrombie and Brian Longhurst, in *Audiences: A Sociological Theory of Performance and Imagination* (Sage, 1998), this gets worse, and narcissism and spectacle become two sides of the same coin: 'people see themselves as performers being watched by others; narcissism is the treatment of the self as spectacle' (p. 96), in that it is narcissism that provides the emotional dynamics of spectacle. This is insightful enough, as a description of a central strand of modern consumer culture, but as an all-pervasive perspective on modernity it leaves us without those resources for critique that *also* run deep within the modern, as argued previously (see esp. the chapter on sympathy theory). One might want to suggest that while narcissism implies spectacle, the converse is not the case. On the motivational issue, it is certainly true that there can be an easy slide from feeling good after doing good to doing good *in order to* feel good; thus James Dawes, in *That the World May Know*, points out that 'it is sometimes impossible to distinguish the desire to help others from the desire to amplify the self, to distinguish altruism from narcissism', and quotes a UN aid worker referring to 'the narcissism of righteousness' (pp. 122, 126).

- 28 Sontag, p. 91. For her earlier position, see *On Photography* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1977), pp. 17–20. This is summarized in *Regarding Pain*, pp. 94–7; for her critique of this earlier position, and a conditional defence of images, see esp. pp. 102–6, although really the whole essay is relevant. Given that her later position could indeed be seen as tending towards a certain social determinism, there is a degree of unresolved tension here. See also Rancière, pp. 103–5.
- 29 Moeller, p. 2. See also Taylor, pp. 18–26, on Sontag's earlier position, and compassion fatigue.
- 30 K. Tester, *Compassion, Morality and the Media* (Open University Press, 2001), pp. 57, 122; and see Ch. 5, *passim*. And it is not, of course, just telethons that raise enormous sums. In *The Culture of Calamity: Disaster and the Making of Modern America* (Chicago University Press, 2007), K. Rosario points out that 9/11

produced the greatest charitable outpouring ever in the US: nearly two-thirds of households contributed time, money or supplies, and \$1bn went to the American Red Cross alone (p. 197).

- 31 Sontag, *Regarding Pain*, p. 16. Tester observes that it is difficult to see why compassion fatigue should in principle be a problem at all, unless the idea of some bond of sympathy with the stranger has come to be accepted in the first place, as happened with modernity; and he distinguishes this from traditional notions of charity (pp. 18–21). For a useful review, see also I. Wilkinson, *Suffering: A Sociological Introduction* (Polity, 2005), Ch. 6; he concludes, optimistically, that ‘the moral significance of the mass media may lie not so much in their power to exhaust our capacity to feel compassion as in their potential to cultivate it ...’ (p. 156).
- 32 See *Sensational Subjects*, Ch. 3, for further discussion.
- 33 M. Kavka, *Reality Television, Affect and Intimacy: Reality Matters* (Palgrave, 2008), pp. 7, 38, 43. See also pp. 37–46 for the extended discussion of the Diana case.
- 34 A. Jaffe, *Scenes of Sympathy: Identity and Representation in Victorian Fiction* (Cornell, 2000), pp. 14, 15.
- 35 R. Terada, *Feeling in Theory: Emotion after the ‘Death of the Subject’* (Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 21, 40. Terada is explicitly invoking Derrida here; and indeed, it is difficult to avoid seeing Derrida and Deleuze as the two heavyweights lying behind these rival perspectives, representation versus presentation, and their ramifications.
- 36 Terada, p. 71.
- 37 Kavka, p. 44.
- 38 As a recent example of this ‘othering,’ we can mention Adam Phillips and Barbara Taylor. In their engaging and timely defence of kindness and associated virtues, *On Kindness* (Penguin, 2010), they nonetheless take time out to make the provocative claim that ‘Sentimentality is cruelty by other means’ (p. 94) – a claim that comes out of the blue, and is not given any substantive justification.
- 39 Terada, pp. 13, 5, 5, 13.
- 40 For the links between the sentimental, the sensational, and melodrama, see also *Sensational Subjects*, Chs 2, 8.
- 41 Phillips and Taylor, pp. 4, 12.
- 42 S. Žižek, *Violence* (Profile Books, 2009), pp. 56, 1, 57.
- 43 In particular, see J. Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action* (two vols, Heinemann, 1981, and Polity, 1987).
- 44 Žižek, p. 51.
- 45 Ibid., pp. 52, 53.
- 46 Ibid., p. 55. See also p. 166, on Kant.
- 47 The ‘liberal guilt’ thesis has of course been widely argued, and not without reason:

there is plenty for liberals to feel guilty about. See, for example, the essays in L. Berlant (ed.), *Compassion: The Culture and Politics of an Emotion* (Routledge, 2004). Whether the whole potential of the sympathetic orientation can be *reduced* to this functional social-psychological dimension is another matter – this whole book attempts to argue that it cannot.

48 Ibid., p. 70.

49 Žižek is insightful on how ‘love thy neighbour’ is implicit testimony to the fact that our neighbours are frequently those we hate: see pp. 47, 50.

50 M. Sandel, *What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets* (Penguin, 2013), pp. 10, 51, 187.

51 Thus when day-care centres for young children introduced fines for late pickups by parents, so as to avoid teachers having to stay late, this actually *increased* the number of late pickups. The fines had, in effect, become fees, a change of norm from the moral obligation not to inconvenience teachers to a market relation, paying teachers to stay longer. And discontinuing fines permitted no return to the old ethos; once gone, it was indeed gone. See Sandel, pp. 64–5, 89–90, 119.

52 The classic study is by R. M. Titmuss, *The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy* (Pantheon, 1971), arguing that the commercialization of blood-giving tends to drive out voluntary giving, and that the latter is generally preferable on a range of grounds, including economic efficiency.

53 This is an extension of the line of argument used by Adam Smith (see Ch. 4), generally ignored by later followers who focus exclusively on the economics of his *Wealth of Nations*.

54 The gift makes little economic sense: giving money is almost always more ‘rational’, more utility-efficient for the recipient (who can get *exactly* what is wanted), and less costly for the giver (in time, money spent on sending it): see Sandel, pp. 98–104. The classic comparative account of the gift is M. Mauss, *The Gift* [1925]; for a more recent review and development, see L. Hyde, *The Gift: How the Creative Spirit Transforms the World* (Canongate, 2007 [1979]).

55 Sandel, pp. 33, 102. Sandel rightly points out that ‘fairness’, the reduction or elimination of socially engendered inequalities, is a second key requirement for an adequate overall critique of capitalism’s implications; see pp. 8–9, 110–13. This cannot be pursued here, except to observe that it would fit in with the Enlightenment critique touched on above (Ch. 3).

56 The classic account of this distinction within the sociological tradition is E. Durkheim, ‘Individualism and the Intellectuals’ [1898], in *Emile Durkheim: On Morality and Society*, ed. R. Bellah (Chicago University Press, 1973), also in *Durkheim On Religion*, ed. W. S. F. Pickering (Routledge, 1975). Durkheim, in turn, draws on Rousseau’s distinction between *amour-de-soi* and *amour-propre*.

- 57 Žižek, pp. 74–5 and *passim*. See also the discussion of Adam Smith, in Ch. 4, above.

Postscript: Empathy, Spectacle and Mirror-Touch Synaesthesia

- 1 Daria Martin was the moving force behind the conference, and I would like to acknowledge the stimulus of her own contributions for influencing the direction of my thoughts here.
- 2 For a useful survey of synaesthesia research, see J. Ward, 'Synesthesia', *Annual Review of Psychology* (2013), 64; on mirror-touch specifically, see J. Banissy and J. Ward, 'Mechanisms of self-other representations and vicarious experiences of truth in mirror-touch synesthesia', *Frontiers of Human Neuroscience* (2013), 7.
- 3 For an ambitious recent contribution to this, see P. Pisters, *The Neuro-Image: A Deleuzian Film-philosophy of Digital Screen Culture* (Stanford University Press, 2012). Deleuzians, of course, as enthusiasts for the neuroscience links, prefer to see the brain itself as the screen here.
- 4 See S. Choudhury and J. Slaby, *Critical Neuroscience: A Handbook of the Social and Cultural Context of Neuroscience* (Blackwell, 2012), along with references to this controversy, and Deleuzian film theory, in my *Sensational Subjects: The Dramatization of Experience in the Modern World* (Bloomsbury, 2014), Chs 6, 7. See also the discussion of Spinoza and affect theory in Ch. 5 of the present book. The underlying neuroscientific claim is that mirror-neurons get activated both when experiencing emotion *and* when observing other people's emotional states.
- 5 This reminds us of Benjamin and aura; see Ch. 6 of this book.