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International Development Studies and SDP

Syntheses and opportunities

Introduction

SDP as a focus of research can benefit from the sociopolitical insights and critical traditions of development studies. From this perspective, overlooking the history of international development and its attendant politics and policies, or attempting to ‘reinvent’ development theory in the study or practice of SDP, is at the best unnecessary and at worst problematic because it neglects the origins of development inequalities and the contestations regarding how development should be conceptualized and implemented. Furthermore, while approaches to research and practice based on critical theory versus those based on best practices are not mutually exclusive, a focus on practice *at the expense of* power and politics may fail to examine how power and dominance structure the goals, desires, practices and outcomes of international development.

In this chapter, I explore critical issues in development history, power, politics, ideology and ethics, issues then attended to more empirically and substantively in subsequent chapters. I take the politics of development as a basis from which to argue for understandings of development inequalities and ‘equality of condition’ (Baker *et al.* 2004) as a, if not the, focus for practices of SDP. As Targett and Wolfe (2010) have argued, despite important contributions, a critical mass of SDP research has yet to be achieved, meaning that the ‘field’ of SDP research remains largely unformulated. This chapter, in response, offers a contribution to staking out a more coherent and politicized field of SDP theory and research by exploring the history and practice of development, and its associated critical analyses, and connecting this scholarship to the current preponderance of SFD.

To do so, the chapter draws on the tradition of critical theory as a way of making sense of social and political operations rather than a strict ‘problem-solving’ approach. The explication of this distinction is generally attributed to the work of Cox and Sinclair (1996) who argued for the need for critical theory in the study of international relations in order to move beyond the limits of a positivist-based, problem-solving orientation. Cox argued that in the study of social politics and political action, positivism presupposes and tacitly supports a natural, rational state of human actors that underplays subjectivities, histories and the agency of various actors. Instead, Cox showed that relations

of social and political power are not inherent, as suggested in a neo-realist approach, but the product of the interplay between individuals and the various institutional forces of the social and political economy. A critical approach is therefore needed to understand how these relations are constituted and their implication for social and political life. Cox's foundational framework is useful in this chapter, and those that follow, for at least five reasons.

First, choosing critical theory over problem solving aligns with the stated goal of this text to construct a better theoretical understanding of the current underpinnings, and the political orientations and limitations, of employing and mobilizing SFD. This book does not set out to solve the development problems of the world through sport and physical activity but to analyse critically how various relations of unequal power and inequality are manifest and how to theorize sport in relation to these inequalities. Second, Cox's approach to theory aligns with the general Gramscian orientation of this text. As Cox illustrated, Gramscian hegemony provides an important basis from which to counter the limits of positivism as discussed in Chapter 1. In turn, and third, Cox's perspective calls for and requires a historicized understanding of social and political phenomena in order to understand the conditions and processes through which relations of power are constructed, a method that I embrace in this analysis. In the previous chapters, I have offered brief historical overviews of sport in the name of the social good and of hegemony in the analysis of sport; in this chapter I offer a brief historical overview of international development so that we may better situate the politics of development in relation to sport-based initiatives. Fourth, then, it is important to recognize the extent to which Cox's framework has been taken up in critical understandings of development and development inequalities. Here, I draw primarily on the work of Payne (2005) who has employed Cox's insights to explore the historical and political underpinnings of development inequalities. Cox's approach offers 'the most appropriate *starting point*' for the critical analysis of the political economy of unequal development (Payne 2005: 19, emphasis in text) because it offers a means through which to understand how and why particular nations, regions, populations and social groups have experienced development so radically differently, particularly since the end of Second World War. This framework moves beyond positivist, neo-realist approaches that might understand such inequalities as nearly ontological and rejects the notion that there 'simply are' people in parts of the world that are 'underdeveloped'. Finally, then, I argue that despite the preferred orientation towards critical theory over a problem-solving approach, we need not abandon the notion of positive change in and through the use and application of critical analyses. To do so, though, requires an understanding of the various ways in which power is exercised in international development, both in the broader political sphere and on the ground or in the field. Given this orientation, the theoretical explication of development in this chapter is purposively both macro and micro in its focus

and application. The macro-analysis of SDP, based on historical, theoretical and political perspectives and critiques, aligns with, and is supported by, the microanalysis that primarily examines bodies, encounters and experiences.

In sum, the politics of SFD are evident in that the SDP sector rarely, in my analysis, strives to challenge, resist, destroy and/or rebuild the cultural and political economy of development inequalities (and/or the cultural and political economy of sport), in more equitable ways, nor does it regularly support or advocate for interventions that strive to level the playing field of the political economy (an argument that I examine in more detail in Chapter 4). Rather, the dominant ideology of SDP attempts (with some notable exceptions) to improve the welfare of ‘Others’ within the structures of merit-based achievement, or liberal egalitarianism (Baker *et al.* 2004), an orientation that in turn supports the current culture of sport and political economy of development. (These are structures and relations in which, it must be said, the staunchest SDP advocates have often enjoyed success and by which they disproportionately benefit.) To contextualize this argument, I offer, in the next section, a brief historical overview of international development and its precepts and practices.

A short history of development practice and theory

A short history of the dominant political and institutional machinations of international development is called for here for at least three reasons: First, as Wainwright (2008) has argued, the historical politics of development as they were manifest through colonial practices, the state, the internationalization of civil society and the contemporary globalization of economics, can and should be read as a form of power and its operation. Conceptions of international development as ‘apolitical’ are impossible to justify; the broader politics of development are to be embraced and articulated in any reasonable analysis of its practice. Understanding the history of development therefore supports our understanding of its contemporary operations amid relations of power. This, in turn, dovetails with Biccum’s (2010) assertion that theories of a ‘new’ development politics and practice often elide the historical complexities of development. Such claims to novelty overlook, and even obscure, the continuities and outright continuations between historical colonial practices that worked to assert northern dominance and contemporary development initiatives that arguably do little to upset or challenge these relations of dominance and consent.¹ Third, then, given that the SDP sector tends to be led and championed by stakeholders from the domain of sport, at least more so than the development sector, it is important to recognize that, from the perspective of development studies, sport people are arriving somewhat late to the development game (Black 2010; Kidd 2008).

The genesis of the contemporary era and discourse of international development is often traced to 20th January 1949, when Harry Truman delivered his inaugural address as president of the United States and spoke of the need for economic, social and political improvements in the world's 'underdeveloped areas'.² Truman's speech followed shortly after the international agreements at Bretton Woods in 1944 that led to the organization of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and later the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which became the World Trade Organization (WTO) (see Payne 2005; Therien 1999). The 'Bretton Woods approach' has come to represent an orientation to development based on the importance, if not primacy, of economic liberalization and free trade and to stand in general opposition to the UN development paradigm, which tends to view development primarily as an issue of unequal distribution of resources (Therien 1999). Truman's address contributed to emerging discourses of development particularly by urging the United States and other northern, democratic and 'developed' nations to commit to increasing opportunities for production and prosperity among the world's poor. His address marked a turning point in the social and cultural history of development (Escobar 1995; Esteva 1992; Sachs 1992) and a watershed for the first wave of a global development project, an epoch characterized by three themes of late modern capitalism – decolonization, rationality and development – and influenced by free market economics and positivist social science (Sylvester 1999).

Truman symbolically and practically imbued development with specific meanings, centring capital, science and technology as the foci of a global revolution designed to meet the challenges posed by global poverty, high morbidity due to preventable causes, poor health care and lack of access to education, among others (Escobar 1995). Thus, Truman's speech is often considered the genesis of 'developmentalism', a modernist paradigm that, in its various incarnations, espoused three main perspectives: (1) an essentialist view of the 'developing world' and its members as a homogenous group, (2) an unyielding belief in progress and the modernization of society and (3) the centrality of the nation state as a focal point and lead participant in the development process (Schuurman 2001).³ International development post-Second World War can thus be understood as an era dominated by modernization theory, underpinned primarily by notions of linear growth and sociopolitical improvement (Nederveen Pieterse 2001). This deeply political, and in some cases, neocolonial movement linked national imaginations of progress with ideologies of economic-based manifest destiny.

However, development interventions led by northern organizations and supported by a developmentalist framework generally failed more often than not to secure sustainable material development for the world's relatively impoverished (Bartoli and Unesco 2000). In fact, the social marginalization of the poor and destitute increased amidst developmentalism and solidified

a geopolitical divide of prosperity between those classified as ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ (Escobar 1995). Even the staunchest supporters of the Bretton Woods paradigm were forced to recognize the entrenchment of extreme poverty despite increases in the size of the global economy (Payne 2005). In this way, developmentalism, as both a theoretical approach to conceptualizing development and a practical approach to development initiatives, experienced significant crises, emanating from the critical claims that it was ahistorical and apolitical in regard to global relations of power, that it constructed and sustained a rational scientific approach to development politics, that it contributed to the creation of the very notion of the Third World and its developed, Western opposite and that it merely ‘picked up’ the traditional colonial discourse of ‘stewardship’ and re-mobilized it as a neocolonial discourse of ‘development’ (Nederveen Pieterse 2010: 27–8).

One school of critical thought that responded strongly to the limitations of developmentalist initiatives was dependency theory, or *dependencia*, influenced by Marxist and neo-Marxist theory (some borrowed from the Global North) and championed by scholars from Latin American countries that had experienced developmentalism first-hand. *Dependencia* did not abandon a modernist political ethic but did argue that the marginalization of the Third World owed much to the destructive results of hegemonic capitalism supported by, and through, the developed world (Sylvester 1999). *Dependencia* showed how developmentalism tended to construct the Third World as a cultural caricature, with no claim to history prior to northern penetration (Slater 1993). The most important feature of *dependencia*, however, may have been that it provided evidence of the South ‘theorizing back’, such as in Latin America where critics argued that the ‘evolution’ of thought within developmentalist-style modernism included the southern hemisphere and that southern cultures deserved recognition for their role in development processes (cf. Slater 1993; Zea 1970).

The resulting tension between developmentalism as a solution to Third World poverty and *dependencia* as a reply to global economic systems led to an impasse in development practices and the end of the first wave of development (Schuurman 1993). The resulting morass provided an opportunity for new approaches to development, and the second wave of development came to be characterized by Western notions of neoliberalism,⁴ advocating decreased state interventions and increased market freedoms within a global economy intended to alleviate rural poverty in developing countries (Slater 2004). Underpinned by the Washington Consensus and the leadership of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, supporters of neoliberalism established a hegemony in global institutions like the World Bank and IMF and supported a Washington-led approach to global development and an ahistorical analysis of the poverty and marginalization of particular nations (Payne 2005). The neoliberal wave of development claimed to elevate the poor and relatively powerless to the level

of rational actors, free from the constraints of government policy (Sylvester 1999). However, neoliberalism devastated developing economies, due in large part to the failures of economic-based structural adjustment programmes, which became the official policy of the World Bank in the early 1980s and made fiscal and policy requirements, or 'adjustments', a condition of lending (see Rapley 1996; Slater 1993, 2004). Eventually, the fundamental orthodoxy of neoliberalism established through the Washington Consensus was softened under the relatively moderate approaches of the Post-Washington Consensus during the years of Bill Clinton/Tony Blair and amidst internal criticisms of World Bank policy and effectiveness by the likes of economist Joseph Stiglitz (Payne 2005). Still, the Post-Washington Consensus maintained the basic principles of market economics, and as understood in the terms of Gramscian hegemony, incorporated and co-opted the critical challenges posed by neo-Marxism and social movements into neoliberal thinking in order to maintain its position as development orthodoxy.

Arguably, neoliberal development has maintained this hegemonic resiliency, evidenced by, for example, the capitulations of African leaders to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which formally abandoned the neo-Marxist sensibilities of *dependencia* in favour of African integration within a global economy, primarily as a means of attracting aid and securing debt relief (see Bond 2002; Owusu 2003). In this way, the Bretton Woods model of development through trade liberalization remains dominant, and development approaches based on distributive justice are generally considered to constitute a critical opposition (Payne 2005).⁵ At the least, it should be noted that within the political economy of international development, critical responses and social movements since the 1980s largely failed to establish a successful counter-hegemony to neoliberal development philosophy (Payne 2005).

The hegemony of neoliberal development policy and practice has not, however, prevented the emergence of further critical perspectives on development. Most notably, post-development theorists have argued that development practices are based on and (re)produce Eurocentric knowledge and reflect the construction and maintenance of hegemonic power relations and First World authority rather than international benevolence or a commitment to global social justice (see Escobar 1995; Sardar 1999; Tucker 1999, among others). In Tucker's (1999) radical critique, 'development is the process whereby other peoples are dominated and their destinies are shaped according to an essentially northern way of conceiving and perceiving the world'. Post-development scholars have argued that the very term 'development' requires, and in turn (re)produces, knowledge of those who are underdeveloped (Escobar 1995). In turn, development interventions charge communities in developing countries with the nearly impossible task of becoming un-underdeveloped (Esteve 1992).

The post-development perspective sparked debate within contemporary development studies around issues of humanism and cultural autonomy. Supporters of cultural autonomy have argued that development based on universal interpretations of culture breeds imperial knowledge and supports the devastating social, economic and ecological effects of ‘global thinking’ (Esteva and Prakash 1997). Claiming to know Others – and their cultures – as part of a global village is a modernist concept, which ‘is at best only an illusion and at worst the ground for the kinds of destructive and dangerous actions perpetrated by global “think-tanks” like the World Bank’ (Esteva and Prakash 1997: 279). From this position, development constitutes a direct threat to cultural autonomy, in particular the rights of local individuals and communities to govern their own social and economic change, and supports, if not imposes, systems of global economics that exacerbate the inequality and marginalization that development interventions claim to redress.

For universal humanists, however, ‘only with a universal morality of justice is there a future for humanity’ (Schuurman 2001: 14). In this sense, universalism should not be conflated with globalization nor dismissed as economically or culturally imperialist. By attempting to protect cultural differences, universalists argue, relativists problematically essentialize difference; instead, basic material needs can and should be understood as universal characteristics of humanity across cultures (Tomlinson 2001). Tomlinson (2001: 57) therefore advocates ‘benign universalism’ as a means of situating development in an era of increased globalization, given that universalism possesses an ‘attractive inclusivist ethics and politics’.

The relativist/universalist debate is important to SDP research because it contextualizes the social and political terrain of development in which SFD programmes take place. Furthermore, it illustrates a recurring contradiction within development initiatives, namely the tendency for development practitioners to claim ‘proprietaryship of a universal humanism’ that is not available to all (Baaz 2005: 116). This tendency to essentialize the human experience (albeit in a limited fashion), even within a ‘progressive’ mandate such as development or through ostensibly non-threatening and popular social forms like sport, problematically ignores unequal power relations, both discursive and material, and (re)positions dominant groups at the centre of the experience of being ‘human’ (see S. Razack 1998). The type of universalist perspective exemplified by Tomlinson (2001) sheds critical light on the ways in which knowledge of culture, and of Self and Other, can be both produced and foreclosed within the practices of development (Baaz 2005).⁶

Where then does such contentious history and theoretical uncertainty leave the study of sport and SDP? On the one hand, it is possible to argue that there is no firm basis for a unified theory of international development that can be lent to sport and positioned as a basis of the SDP sector. To some degree this is true given the intractable politics of development. On the other hand,

there are at least four important critical insights that can be drawn out and that are useful and important to constructing a critically informed theoretical framework of development for the study of SDP.

First, the history of international development needs to be reconciled against the political specificities of the contemporary development moment, which is best characterized as: (a) absent of a genuine hegemonic state power, (b) influenced but not dominated by globalization, (c) subject to the shifting nature and importance of nation states and (d) characterized by development as an enduring problem and struggle for all (Payne 2005). All of these factors influence the current mobilization of SFD to the extent that SDP is constitutive of, and constituted by, the broader social and political influences that underpin international development.

Second, then, the binary analyses of development suggested in the debates above (First World vs Third World, North vs South, developmentalism vs post-development, universalism vs relativism, globalism vs provincialism, modernization vs dependency) do not provide effective frameworks for nuanced and critical understandings of development practices and politics (Nederveen Pieterse 2010). Neither, in turn, is a 'postmodern' approach to development satisfactory, given that it tends to privilege a 'Western' deconstruction of the 'Western' construct of modernism itself (Nederveen Pieterse 2010). Following Nederveen Pieterse (2010), what is called for is a historical/cultural review of the Western development project, one that combines, in a pluralist fashion, analyses of the state, the market and culture, and the relations of power that are constituted and substantiated therein. This is necessary in order to make sense of, and, where needed, to deconstruct development theory and practice, particularly in the cases where such practice is dominated by the relatively powerful, and despite the ongoing initiatives and resistance of those in relatively powerless positions. This is a stage, I suggest, at which the SDP sector currently finds itself. The securing of a unified development theory for SDP is unlikely; therefore a reasonable analysis of political structure, in this case of SDP, must investigate the social, economic and political at the same time and as they overlap (Cox and Sinclair 1996: 137).⁷

Following from these perspectives, and third, the political economy of development, which has tended to stand in as primarily encompassing the material conditions of development and the historical and political ways in which they have come about, can be understood as connected to the *cultural* economy of development in much more intimate ways than previously employed. Following McMichael (2009), the structural/post-structural standoff in development studies, as seen particularly in the material versus discursive analysis of development inequalities, need not continue because the economic relations that underpin development inequalities are *always* practiced culturally. In addition to material well-being, inequality can also be about which ways of life count (McMichael 2009). What this means for SDP practice and research

is that the invocation of sport within development and the notion of sport as a universal cultural form or universal language need to be interrogated through the *material* politics and contestations of development. It does not suffice to position sport as a cultural means of redressing development inequalities without critically considering the cultural constructions and meanings of sport itself within and amidst the politics of unequal development.

Fourth, therefore, while we can make theoretical sense of the politics of development in many different ways, I argue for an analysis of SDP that focuses primarily on the intersections of the cultural and political economy of development, by which I mean an analysis of the cultural logic of sport as a response to the structures of politics and economics. As discussed previously, this aligns with the Foucauldian tradition of understanding bio-political regulation as a logic borne of political economy. Such intersections of cultural logic and political economy are best, I argue, for understanding the ways in which sport is mobilized within and amidst development inequalities and for understanding the context of development struggles. With that said, it is important to explore both the materiality and the political logic (and contestation) of development inequality to some degree, and this is where I turn next.

The political economy of development inequality

In his recent analysis of the mobilization of sport to support development and anti-poverty, Gruneau (in press) argues that little analysis is made in SDP literature of the systemic underpinnings of global poverty. These questions are generally eschewed, he argues, in favour of advocating the expansion of rights, a focus that feeds back onto the question of poverty and its politics by overlooking inequality and structural change. Similarly, I suggest that there is a political residue within current SDP policies and programmes, particularly those led and supported by organizations in the Global North, regarding the historical tension of development's dual mandate (Biccum 2010). The problem highlighted by the critical insights of both Gruneau and Biccum is that the organization of the globally political connects the material advancement of some (primarily in the North) to the poverty of many (primarily in the South) (see Sutcliffe 2007).

There indeed is a significant gap between the material assets of the world's rich and poor, a gap that widened notably between the early nineteenth century and the middle of the twentieth (Berry and Serieux 2007). Many are familiar with some version of the statistical evidence of this. For example, in the early 2000s, the richest 10 per cent of the world's population acquired financial income at a rate of 60 times that of the world's poorest 10 per cent, a global relationship that also largely mirrors the income distribution within the world's

most unequal countries (Baker *et al.* 2004). As a result, relatively rich countries are able to spend more on the social needs of citizens and have more secure access to basic necessities like clean drinking water. Such inequality is further constructed along vectors of social and political power. Women continue to earn less money than men in all countries, a fact that tends to be exacerbated in countries with greater inequality levels overall, and inequalities, both inter- and intra-national, continue to come to rest along gender as it interlocks with race, class, ability, sexuality and space (Baker *et al.* 2004).

These forms of inequality are political in the sense that they result from the systems and organizations that people create and implement (and often justify) even in the face of evidence of their ineffectiveness or failure. For example, world poverty is not necessarily a result of a lack of money or resources, but a result of the fact that the distribution of income generated within the world's economy is highly unequal, with the bulk of this unequal distribution occurring internationally, not intra-nationally (Berry and Serieux 2007). When comparing the world's economic growth from 1960–80 to that of 1980–2005, the era of trade liberalization – driven largely by World Bank policies and reforms as part of the Washington and Post-Washington consensuses – did not yield sustained rates of growth for LMICs or significant progress on social indicators like health and education (Weisbrot, Baker and Rosnick 2007). Indeed, the significant economic growth of China and India between 1980 and 2000 largely served to mask the extreme divergence in economic equality within those countries and throughout the world (Berry and Serieux 2007). A result of such inequality in the distribution of income is that it 'seriously undermines the effectiveness of global growth in reducing poverty' (Woodward and Sims 2007: 130).

While recognizing the problematic of reducing development inequality to binaries of North/South or developed/developing, it nevertheless remains useful to consistently remind that people and organizations in relatively rich countries (often situated in the Global North) striving to support the development of people who are relatively poor and living in relatively poor countries (often in the Global South) constitutes a dominant mode of development practice. This should not distract from the fact that relatively rich nations also suffer widening income inequalities intra-nationally, nor should it suggest that the Global North drives all development programmes and policies, including those within the SDP sector. However, I am loath to lose sight in any analysis of SDP of the extent of global inequality and the unequal relations of power and privilege which it constructs and secures, particularly when this international inequality serves as the bedrock for a plethora of SDP programmes supported by the (richer) North and implemented in the (poorer) South.

One result of this is that while development inequalities are inherently political, the ideological construction of SFD initiatives is rarely 'up for grabs'. Conceptualizing, organizing and evaluating the opportunities for development

(at the level of the social, economic, political and for individuals or groups) through sport regularly takes precedent over a broader social and political commitment to challenging and redressing inequality. This is an important point of distinction because these perspectives are, as points of both theory and practice, not the same in their respective political orientations. Baker *et al.* (2004) refer to these connected, yet disparate, camps as 'liberal egalitarianism' versus that of 'equality of condition'. Liberal egalitarianism seeks to establish opportunities for persons and populations to succeed, suggesting that the job of policy is to construct the opportunity to compete and that winners and losers will result, justifiably so, from such relations. This differs from equality of condition, which sets out to challenge and eliminate major inequalities regardless of the results of sociopolitical competition. Here, I am arguing that a liberal egalitarianism ethos maintains a hegemonic position within the conceptualizations, orientations and indeed implementations of contemporary SDP programmes and initiatives and parallels the ways in which the economic liberalization model of development maintains an orthodox status over the more radical contestation of unequal distribution (Payne 2005). I base this assertion on several factors, each of which I attend to here and also revisit in subsequent chapters.

First and foremost, connections between liberal egalitarianism, neoliberal development philosophy and the empowerment and activities of individuals have been identified within critical, empirical analyses of SDP. For example, Levermore (2009) has argued that sport appears 'tailor-made' for neoliberal approaches to development, given that it supports a focus on improving physical infrastructure, advancing the social and economic climate for capacity building and investment, and facilitating the involvement of private business and corporations in development practices. Similarly, in her discourse analysis of development policy, Hayhurst (2009: 203) found evidence that 'SDP policy models are wedded to the increasingly neoliberal character of international development'. These findings are consistent with Wilson and Hayhurst's (2009) contention that in the current political and economic climate, sport-based NGOs continue to promulgate market-driven solutions to underserved populations and a capitalist logic in response to development issues. In a similar manner, Gruneau (in press) has argued that the propensity towards SFD aligns with the increased tendency to approach the problems of development inequality by expanding the rights of individuals but not by focusing on structural changes. Such discourses of individual rights as the basis for success, upward mobility and positive development are supportive of a neoliberal approach to development, which views the development challenge primarily as one of facilitating the basis for 'fair' competition. When SDP programmes are implemented in places and states subjected to marginalization and poverty without consideration of the sociopolitical environment, their sustainability is questionable (see Akindes and Kirwin 2009).

Second, there is a post-colonial connection to be made to the hegemony of neoliberal development philosophy, one that suggests that the attractiveness of SDP for responding to development inequalities lies primarily in assuaging guilt for persons in position of privilege. From this perspective, SDP is organized to provide better opportunities to Others in order that they succeed but not to substantively attend to one's own implication in inequality. Following post-colonial analyses of development (explored more below) from the likes of Karagiannis (2004) and Biccum (2010), it is reasonable to argue that neoliberal development philosophy in SDP represents, facilitates and allows 'some' manner of development change, and undoubtedly results in regular instances of individual upward mobility, but does so while eschewing significant and direct challenges to the structures that sustain inequality for vast populations. From this perspective, neoliberalism is best understood as a means of 'inclusion' into the dominant political economy, and/or an invitation to participate and succeed within hierarchical social and political relations, a discourse that is particularly attractive to those in relative positions of privilege, and which they often work to maintain (see Ong 2006).

Third, liberal egalitarianism as a theoretical basis for understanding and redressing inequality is also particularly attuned to sport and dominant sporting narratives of winning and losing and the competitive ethos of neoliberalism. Neoliberal SDP perpetuates and naturalizes the logic that the poor and underprivileged are those who have not 'played the game' of competitive capitalism properly and, in some cases, positions SDP programmes and initiatives as a means by which to literally teach people how to 'play the game' as a metaphor for development within competitive capitalism. Such notions are understandably attractive to successful sports people who come to SDP having, in general terms, 'won' in/through sport and motivated and interpellated to view SDP and sport for good as a way 'to give back' through sport to those less fortunate (see Kidd 2008). What is less discussed in relation to the notion of 'giving back' through sport, though, is that it generally eschews the knowledge – sometimes explicit though more likely implicit or even nagging – that the relatively privileged are implicated in the marginalization of Others and therefore best give back to maintain their ethical subject positions (Heron 2007). As a result, while dependency theory does not fully explain the inequalities of development (Payne 2005), the notion of 'giving back' references an unequal taking at some unidentified political junction. Clearly, the hegemony of such logic is not solely reserved for 'winners'. That is one does not have to be a 'development winner' to understand neoliberalism and/or liberal egalitarianism and to be rewarded for a commitment to aspirational notions of success. Regardless, though, liberal egalitarianism and neoliberal development philosophy constitute but one approach to redressing inequality, one with, in my analysis, three significant deficiencies relative to equality of condition.

First and foremost, liberal egalitarianism does little to attend directly to inequality because it tends to ignore inequality's structural dimensions and,

in turn, problematically suggests that people merely have choices to make in determining their relative success (Baker *et al.* 2004). This is clearly limited by the fact that not all choices are available to all people. For example, if sport is used to help motivate or encourage young people to make better health choices about their sexual activity as a means of combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic, such choices are produced and constrained by the availability of health information, access to medical or health professionals, and basic supplies such as condoms or affordable antiretroviral drugs. While the issue of choice in development is not inherently besides the point (see Sen 2000), liberal egalitarianism privileges, if not mythologizes, choice when what is needed is a sober analysis of ‘real choices among real options’ (Baker *et al.* 2004: 34) for the people and populations living amidst the ‘structural context’ of unequal development (Payne 2005: 19).

Second, a critical mass of recent research (Baker *et al.* 2004; Judt 2010; McQuaig and Brooks 2010; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009) shows that societies that are relatively more equal are also relatively healthier, happier and more peaceful. Many of the social and economic problems to which development (both international and domestic) attends – poverty, hunger, poor health, insecurity, political violence, displacement – proceed not from a lack of total resources but from the unequal distribution thereof. In fact, contrary to popular notions of the benefits or necessity of competitive capitalism (in SDP and elsewhere), there is even a strong case to be made that pursuing equality of condition can lead to improved and sustainable economic growth (Baker *et al.* 2004). This means that the pursuit of equality is not at odds with economic development but a means by which to improve overall prosperity and economic distribution. At the least, equality of condition is worth pursuing for the extent to which it supports a culture of trust and combats the desperation that proceeds from the constant pursuit and/or protection of individual resources (Judt 2010).

Third, then, equality of condition as a basis of development theorizing offers a positive means by which to pursue social change while remaining cognizant and vigilant of the various relations of power that underpin development and SDP. In other words, actively struggling to support international development through a framework of equality of condition is possible without retreating to the notion of sport as a universal language in order to justify its political palatability. While the notion of sport as a universal language is susceptible to centring particular cultures and social strata as representative of humanity – a process of social and political organization regularly and rightly criticized by post-colonial theory and/or anti-racist feminists (see Mohanty 2003; Razack 1998, among others) – seeking equality can be consistent with support for diversity, difference and a politics of cultural liberation (Baker *et al.* 2004). Therefore, I suggest, it is compatible with the recognition of different sporting cultures and does not require or privilege a notion of universal development or universal sport.⁸

A commitment to equality of condition in SDP would require a shift, primarily in coming to terms with the extent to which inequality in various forms can be sustained in and through sport and physical culture itself. The universalist discourse of sport often used to support its applicability and implementation with regard to development can exacerbate the processes by which citizens, states and organizations ‘forget’ the politics and the political economy of unequal development. The popularity of sport, the ways in which sport culture can romanticize meritocracy and achievement, and the close ties between sport and spectacle can also result in the politics of development being marginalized or forgotten altogether in SFD. In this way, sport becomes an end in and of itself, not a means of political negotiation (see Redeker 2008). This can be seen when sport and opportunities to play and participate are ‘traded’ by those in relative positions of power and privilege within development encounters in exchange for gratitude (Lefebvre 2010) and the construction of dominant benevolence (Darnell 2007).

Instead, then, of asking how sport makes the world better or what sport does for people marginalized in and through the structures of unequal development, a critical analysis of the political economy of development asks why people are relatively poor and what sport can do in solidarity with their struggles. Sport cannot be ‘applied’ effectively to development without first understanding why development inequalities exist. In turn, the larger question for critical scholars and activists interested in sport becomes whether, within this political economy, sport can do more to be an agent of change (see Jarvie 2006). I would argue in the affirmative, but through a renewed focus on development inequality *and* examination of the ways in which sport continues to be organized and mobilized within relations of dominance. In other words, following Greig, Hulme and Turner (2007), a development engagement with inequality needs to be policy based *and* employ a sociological approach conceptualized as more than economic growth. Given the extent to which sport is heavily commodified and susceptible to market logic and the dominant development ethos of competition and growth, this is a significant challenge. Still, sport may offer a cultural alternative to market-based development.

Culture, development and SDP in the post-colonial

On 8 January 2011, journalist Doug Saunders (2011) wrote in *The Globe and Mail* that recent geopolitical and economic activities between nations conventionally understood to be part of the Global South or the ‘post-colonial’ world, particularly trade that now by-passes the traditional economic and cultural superpowers like the United States and United Kingdom, offered evidence of the end of ‘post-colonialism’. This activity marked new economic

and political agency for the world's previously marginalized countries and populations. According to Saunders, these former colonized nations are no longer relegated to marginal or peripheral status. In turn, the notion that the post-colonial regions and people of the world are still beholden to northern dominance is increasingly contestable, particularly as evidenced through the economic success and geopolitical authority of emerging powers like Brazil, China, Russia and India (the so-called BRIC nations). To some degree, analyses of the type put forth by Saunders are indisputable and the centrality of nations like China in the twenty-first century must be acknowledged in any analysis of the contemporary political economy of development. However, for the critical analysis of SDP, I argue that a post-colonial framework still maintains an important, if not requisite, set of theoretical and political insights for at least four reasons.

One, while the dispute has never been completely reconciled over what is specifically and definitively referred to by the term 'post-colonial', it is impossible, if not irresponsible, to ignore that international relations today – which include the relations of inequality to which development initiatives and SDP programmes and organizations respond – are still constructed via vectors of power that have existed since the fifteenth century and the height of colonialism proper (McEwan 2009). In understanding the machinations of global inequality, and in coming to terms with the political implications of SFD and SDP, we do ourselves a disservice to ignore such relations. Two, there is a case to be made that contemporary development initiatives as organized and implemented by global institutions and/or relatively powerful nations stand largely as a continuation of colonialism and a history of Empire, not a shift or break from colonial practices (Biccum 2010). In fact, Biccum argues that development did not begin with Truman's speech in 1949, as the orthodoxy of development scholarship suggests, but instead that it has been reinvented through a series of cultural and political ruptures, which include Truman's speech. These ruptures serve continuously to secure northern dominance, and construct subjectivities that justify northern privilege, through re-engaging northern promises and attempts to 'bestow' development to marginalized people and places. Biccum's thesis raises the importance of a post-colonial framework in order to examine where and how sport has been connected to social improvement and to remind that the events that have precipitated the momentum of SDP may be simply ruptures in the history of sport and development, not inventions (see Kidd 2008; Levermore and Beacom 2009; Saavedra 2009, among others).

Third, while Saunders's analysis suggests that the political realities and organizations of colonization have changed (though not always for the better given that imperial sensibilities, if not the same structural colonization of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, continue to underpin much of the unequal economics and distributive injustice of the contemporary moment)

the *logic* of colonization – what Heron (2007) refers to as development's 'colonial continuities' – continues to permeate development knowledge, practice and subjectivity particularly at a micro-level as subjects are hailed into development service. The critical insights and theories of post-colonial analyses of development are germane and insightful for deconstructing how relations of power/knowledge affect SDP practice and the sociological implications thereof. Finally, then, as McEwan (2009) has illustrated, despite the fact that development studies and post-colonial theory have traditionally constituted combative schools of thought, there are productive synergies between the two, and I suggest that the study of SDP would benefit from post-colonial theory and a decolonizing practice (also see Darnell and Hayhurst 2011; Kay 2009).

To this end, it is important to recognize that for much of the 1990s, development scholars were forced to confront issues of decolonizing knowledge and post-colonial politics (McEwan 2009). Claims to a universal humanism, belief in northern stewardship, faith in linear and scientific progress, and policies of economic imperialism have all been challenged and deconstructed by post-colonial, post-development scholars (see McEwan 2009). McEwan (2009) in particular argues for the importance of six interconnections between post-colonial theorizing and critical development studies. I explore each here in some detail before suggesting some key elements of a post-colonial agenda for SDP research and practice.

First, McEwan argues that within the post-colonial analysis of development, sociological understandings of place and space are important for understanding relations of power. Indeed, 'underpinning many development interventions are the ways in which the South is perceived and represented in the North' (McEwan 2009: 28). Such critical insights hold purchase for the study of SDP. Not only does SDP in practice constitute a site at which colonizing knowledge of the Other can be constructed, or reconstructed (Darnell 2007, 2010b), but equally important is that northern institutions are still in relative positions of authority in relation to global sport and, in turn, in relatively privileged positions within the political and cultural economy of SFD and the SDP sector (see Maguire 2008). As a result, the North comes to be the place – literally and metaphorically – that stands as the developed sporting world, and the place in position to deliver SDP programming, through both sport plus and plus sport approaches.

This leads to McEwan's second connection between post-colonial theory and development, namely that the ways in which the marginality and poverty of the South is constructed and represented has significant implications for development policy and practice. Such representations – such as the ubiquitous visual (re)presentations of poor, Black children in mainstream development discourse or, in SDP, the regular depictions of rural, poor children kicking a football as evidence of the importance and success of SDP interventions – are not false or wrong in and of themselves. However, such simplistic yet powerful

representations constantly run the risk of essentializing poverty, or reducing it to the natural plight of the Third World Other, and/or reifying the power and ability of northern institutions to effect or bestow change as a response. As a result, Eurocentrism/Western-centrism needs to be examined and challenged consistently in critical studies of development – McEwan’s third connection – for the extent to which development privileges and secures the norms of northern political culture but also for the ways in which development constitutes an opportunity for northern subjects in relative positions of power and privilege to ‘learn’ the relations of power that substantiate and normalize such privilege. As post-colonial theorists like Stoler (1995) have demonstrated, the spaces and encounters of colonialism were intimately connected to the construction of the northern subject as dominant through race, gender and class. Development discourses and encounters, particularly when supported by universal notions of sport, continue to ‘offer’ northern subjects a chance to know themselves as dominant yet benevolent, as much as they offer an opportunity to deconstruct relations of power and support equality of condition.

In this sense, development is inextricably connected to relations and machinations of power, as McEwan argues, particularly through the opportunities to construct the agenda of development and to mobilize the responses to development inequalities. While notable exceptions to top-down development, and top-down SDP, do exist, they are always, to at least some extent, affected by relations of power, whether economic, social, political or some combination thereof. The example of the Mathare Youth Sport Association (MYSA) in Nairobi, Kenya is illustrative. Rightly held up as an example of southern agency in development struggles for its work in supporting local youth empowerment and community development in the Mathare slum (see Coalter 2009; Willis 2000), MYSA’s success has led to significant financial support from northern charities and corporate benefactors. While few would begrudge MYSA for accepting financial support to continue its work, from a post-colonial perspective, such ‘financing’ of SDP inevitably shapes the context of power that underpins SDP efforts. While analysis of the impact of northern financing cannot be reduced to a simply anti/pro binary (McEwan 2009), neither should the reliance of southern development efforts on northern funds be dismissed as unimportant or immaterial. Rather, it reminds that mainstream or dominant development constitutes, for all intents and purposes, a ‘global industry’ constitutive of, and constituted by, neoliberal development policy (McEwan 2009: 29–30). Organizations like the World Bank and IMF are in relative positions of power and authority to determine the context and practice of international development, despite the complexities of global politics and resistance. Similarly, the organization of global sport still rests primarily with dominant organizations like the IOC and FIFA, organizations that have in recent years taken an increased interest in the promotion and practice of SFD.

From this point of view, post-colonial theory lends critical insights into how development and SDP initiatives serve particular economic and political interests but also reminds that the power to oversee the development industry is the political power to define the parameters and orientations of development (see Hayhurst 2009). For example, as I explore further in Chapter 6, the invocation of sports mega-events as part of a broad-based international development agenda should be analysed critically to the extent that it affords organizations like FIFA and the IOC, organizations with dubious records of transparency and ethics (Jennings 1996; Sugden and Tomlinson 2005), inroads into defining the organization and implementation of SFD in the Global South. At the very least, understanding both sport and international development as global industries goes some way towards the critical analysis of how or whether dominant modes of global sport, often based on commercialization and a profit motive, align with the sustainable development agenda regularly espoused in and through SDP.⁹

With these six connections in mind, then, I suggest that it is both possible and important to establish a post-colonial development agenda for the study of SDP. This would have at least four parts: First, issues of top-down versus bottom-up development should be central to post-colonial analyses of SDP (Black 2010). While reduction of any such analyses to binary status is problematic and unnecessary given the ambiguities of development policy and practice (Black 2010), post-colonial theory reminds that the people, organizations and political orientations that underpin any development initiative are illustrative of power in development and call for analysis of the extent to which they privilege stewardship over self-determination. More specifically, amidst recent calls to rethink traditional, top-down development policies that privilege or normalize economic growth, a post-colonial ethos for SDP could champion sport in ways that support alternative development orientations, such as ones that approach economic growth as a by-product, not goal, of development (Woodward and Sims 2007). Such an orientation logically extends to social issues as well. Recognizing the differences in gender performativity around the world and the ways in which SFD is often mobilized to challenge hierarchies of gender (see Saavedra 2009) would call for struggles to support gender-based agency rather than to 'educate' or 'emancipate' marginalized women from the structures of their existence.

Of course, such critical analyses require a measure of self-reflexivity as to why people and organizations in relatively privileged positions are drawn to SDP work in the first place. Second, then, and following Biccum (2010), a post-colonial analysis of SDP needs to attend to the ways in which discourses and policies of development as the benevolent response to inequality simultaneously work to construct subjectivities that normalize, or even tacitly support, the global order of unequal development. This is particularly important, I suggest, given the recent institutionalization of SDP and the fact that it tends to be led by young, sports-minded activists (Kidd 2008) who likely have little significant

practical engagement or life experience with anything but the orthodoxy of neoliberal development or the commercialization and globalization of competitive world sport. It is not necessarily a surprise, then, that SDP programmes and policies operate primarily within, and not against, the political parameters of neoliberal philosophy. Nevertheless, sustained critical analysis of the particular political orientations employed in SDP is called for in order to make sense of its contributions and limitations in achieving sustainable and broad development.

In turn, and third, a post-colonial analysis of SDP calls for an understanding of the ways in which social and cultural hierarchies are constructed in and through development. Here the study of race and racism is paramount. Rather than a fact of human life that needs to be negotiated and/or reconciled in encounters between people from groups that are racialized with differential effects, race is better understood as a technology of power within the spaces and discourses of geopolitics, a technology that often, if not regularly, stigmatizes one form of humanity for the benefit of another's development (Arat Koc 2010: 148). In this way, race, as it interlocks with other social hierarchies, comes to stand as a marker of modernity and development, one that the invocation of SFD does not necessarily challenge and may in fact reify. This is not to suggest colonial conspiracy but rather to recognize the normative power of Whiteness in connection to the colonial project of modernity as it is mobilized *throughout* the Third World and not just *over* the Third World (Arat Koc 2010). As I have argued elsewhere, the relatively non-threatening politics of sport as a basis for development make such racial politics difficult to extricate (Darnell 2010b), which has implications for SDP as a site for the construction and maintenance of Whiteness as sociopolitical power (Darnell 2007).

Finally, then, clarity is required regarding what it means to invoke and mobilize cultural forms like sport, particularly under the banner of sport's universal status, as the basis for international development. Recently, Taylor (2010: 561) explored the tendencies (and contradictions) of global institutions, like the World Bank, that attempt to reorganize the values and cultural forms of 'post-colonial citizenries' deemed atavistic and irrational and therefore at odds with the apparent rationalities of capitalism and competitive exchange. Such attempts break down when the desire for rational exchange is confronted, if not usurped, by the 'uneven incorporation of production relations within the circuits of capital' (Taylor 2010: 571). This type of critical analysis fundamentally (and beneficially) complicates the analysis of SDP by bringing into question the orientation of sport for facilitating improved development and by suggesting further development tensions. Specifically, if cultural forms (here presumed to include sport) can be deemed to be part of the 'problem' of modernizing development because they are atavistic and irrational, then sport itself is part of the problem of development. Alternatively, rational, modern, universal sports should be used exclusively in SDP. Or perhaps SDP is actually a

process of cultural stewardship in and through sport. Or the self-determination of relatively marginalized people is secondary to the discourse of facilitating rational exchange. Or perhaps some combination of all of these is most accurate. Yet, from a critical, post-colonial perspective, none of these positions are acceptable as a basis for sustainable and self-determined development. In sum, the invocation and mobilization of cultural forms, like sport, as central to development processes, is not simply transcendent of, nor subordinate to, global processes but rather constitutive of them (Da Costa 2010). Given, then, that development interventions constitute the ongoing outcome of struggles over meanings and values in social life, and that programmes and policies under the banner of development can be used to institute inequality as much as challenge it (Da Costa 2010), the issue for SDP is not the utility or applicability of SFD but the extent to, or ways in, which sport supports or refutes a political engagement with development. Rather than supporting the application of sport, we need to more fully engage with sport in support of development struggles.

Development as struggle

The critical deconstruction of international development has often led to destabilization in development studies (Schuurman 1993). The intention of this chapter is not to contribute to such an impasse for the study of SDP but to support the ongoing critical analysis of sport in relation to development inequality. Perhaps no justification for the importance of equality of condition as a basis for development is more significant than the understanding that equality of condition does not have to choose universalism or relativism as a political ethos because it aligns with solidarity and anti-dominance (Baker *et al.* 2004). In this way, equality as a basis of development philosophy and practice responds productively to the criticism that a 'postmodern' approach to development is limited in its utility and applicability (Nederveen Pieterse 2010). It also supports the continuous critical analysis and deconstruction of power in development (Nederveen Pieterse 2010). Equality, therefore, suggests an alternative theory/methodology for supporting SFD, one based not on the 'power' of sport to secure development change but sport as a basis for social and political solidarity with the struggles of the relatively poor and marginalized.

Solidarity with those in struggle links to a commitment to equality of condition in three ways: by supporting a common humanity, by recognizing the overlaps in condition among disparate peoples and by privileging justice, which recognizes and values diversity (Baker *et al.* 2004: 52). It also aligns with contemporary views on development that challenge the notion of top-down initiatives and instead argues for understandings of critical struggles for

development, struggles that take place throughout the world on a regular basis. These critical struggles for development can be understood in a double sense: People struggle against their disempowerment within the structural context of inequality, and people regularly contest the ways in which the dominant social reality (in which they are positioned as marginalized if not the clear 'losers') is represented as inevitable and natural (McMichael 2009). In other words, struggles for development need not be considered alternatives to development but examples of development itself (McEwan 2009, drawing on Hickey and Mohan 2005). Such struggles for development already take place when and where there is inequality; it is likely only a colonizing dismissal of agency and cultural worth – dismissals that take place within and between national borders (D. Kapoor 2009b) – that precludes us from taking such struggles seriously. Attention needs to be paid to deconstructing the various machinations of class dominance, Whiteness and universal humanism that lead to a dismissal of culture, as opposed to devising new programmes and policies designed to help poor people.

I am advocating here for an understanding in SDP of development as struggle. Two issues are important: One, progressive theoretical notions of development as struggle understand it less as a paradigm, programme or policy to be implemented and more an ongoing and continuous act of organized resistance. Development becomes the process of articulating concerns, unifying and organizing a presence, and acting against marginalization (D. Kapoor 2009a: 16).¹⁰ Similarly, while development cannot be abandoned in the face of stark inequality, the praxis of development as struggle is one of confronting and destabilizing the cultural and economic forces that construct development struggles as necessary. This type of development aligns with the solidarity model of equality supported here in that it emphasizes action not only in response to objective poverty but also in recognition of northern implication or complicity in development inequalities, both historical and contemporary, in an effort to move beyond ethnocentrism, stewardship and the colonial gaze (McEwan 2009: 288).

Two, support for development as struggle requires coming to terms with the fact that such struggles are ambiguous and non-linear in their politics and actions. Asher (2009) has argued that understanding struggles for sustainable development – in her case within the geography of the Colombian Pacific and at the confluence of ethnic, economic, political and environmental justice – requires consideration of how political economy, social forces and struggles for change interact and shape each other in paradoxical ways. There is rarely a clearly defined 'invade and resist' relationship in struggles for development that pits, for example, corporate and/or state forces against a plainly distinguishable group who resist (Asher 2009). This perspective supports the critical rejoinder of early post-development theory and research that it failed to appreciate the diversity of struggles for development or

that it assumed a fixed political orientation (see I. Kapoor 2004). While post-colonial theory remains important for illuminating, for example, how stereotypes and regimes of power/knowledge of the inferior racial Other can dismiss agency or secure the notion of one path to development for marginalized people, the actual struggles for development are regularly complicated by cultural agency and the diversity of interests that construct the development agenda.

This notion of development as struggle as articulated by those like McMichael, D. Kapoor and Asher (among many others) aligns in productive ways with the critiques of SDP by scholars like Coalter (2009). As Coalter (2009: 65) has demonstrated, the contributions or successes of sport in relation to international development are not causal; they are best explained and understood with regard to the *process* of participation. Supporting opportunities to participate in sport or to construct sport in a way that aligns with an individual or community's development are not development ends but rather means. Furthermore, sport may offer the social or cultural hub around which development struggles are articulated and mobilized, furthering the importance of process, not results. The politics of development brought to bear on SDP and attempts to make sense of, if not evaluate, the effectiveness of SFD need to be focused on processes and the agency of people who struggle for self-determination and material well-being through the mobilization of sport.¹¹

There is likely a role for external and/or privileged people in SDP if approached this way. Of central importance to development as struggle is not only the ability or knowledge amongst marginalized people to define, determine and achieve their own success but also investment therein and support thereof. As Saunders (2010) illustrated in his recent accounts of migratory populations, the world's poorest people are constantly and consistently active – socially, economically and politically – in the slums or 'arrival cities' of the world. The determining factor in the success of such marginalized people is not simply their resiliency, their motivation or their conduct but the commitment to challenging the 'structural context' that secures their outsider status (literally for many migrants) and the implementation of policies of inclusive citizenship through which they can secure long-term benefits. In Saunders' analysis, this calls for progressive immigration policy that supports people rather than chooses between dispelling and saving them. It also calls for a balanced understanding of people's marginalization with/against their agency in struggling to build a better life. People and organizations connected to sport could become (more) active in supporting these kinds of progressive policies. For the SDP sector, this would require rejecting the seductive binary of progress versus destitution and coming to terms with peoples struggles for development (as well as the structural context that operates against such struggles) as a basis for imagining and implementing sport in ways that support development as struggle.

Conclusion

To summarize, I have argued in this chapter that sustainable and self-determined development for the world's relatively marginalized, key precepts and goals of the SDP sector, calls for better understandings of the history of development power and politics and the often ambiguous and non-linear struggles of social and political actors to secure their own well-being within this structural context.¹² Thus, while there is always resistance to the structures of unequal development within particular regions, amongst particular groups and led by particular organizations, resistance does not constitute compelling evidence of the absence of hegemonic relations (see Darnell and Hayhurst, in press). The activities and struggles of agents in relatively disempowered positions need constantly to be reconciled against the politically dominant mode of development. Even in the important cases where sport has been linked to achieving positive outcomes in line with an international development mandate (e.g. Burnett 2006; Fokwang 2009; Kay 2009; Lindsey and Grattan, in press) critical development theory calls for an analysis of the structures of inequality, the agency of actors and the processes, not just results, of resistance to inequality and progressive change. Anything less constitutes a disservice to those who struggle for equality of condition and runs the risk of usurping the political contestability of development through recourse to the development outcomes that sport can provide.

The study and practice of SDP therefore requires a critical understanding of, and engagement with, development *politics* in and through sport, as much as development *outcomes* through sport. In turn, this notion of sport in support of a politics of equality of condition potentially feeds back, in progressive ways, into the notion of democratizing sport itself towards social and political equity and sustainability (Donnelly 1993; Kidd 1995). For the purposes of the remainder of this text, then, I take it as foundational that the challenges of international development are the challenges of understanding and redressing global inequality as it manifest through power and politics. These relations of inequality are stark in depth and breadth, hold significant material consequences for people that are relatively marginalized as a result and have historical, social and political underpinnings. In Chapters 3 to 6, I use this perspective as a departure point from which to explore, and critically examine, the deployment of sport-based programming as a response to the challenges of international development.