Jervis, John. "Notes." *Sensational Subjects: The Dramatization of Experience in the Modern World*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015. 183–224. The WISH List. *Bloomsbury Collections*. Web. 26 Apr. 2023. <<http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781472593023.0007>>.

Downloaded from Bloomsbury Collections, www.bloomsburycollections.com, 26 April 2023, 02:06 UTC.

Copyright © John Jervis 2015. You may share this work for non-commercial purposes only, provided you give attribution to the copyright holder and the publisher, and provide a link to the Creative Commons licence.

Notes

Sensation and Sensationalism

- 1 E. A. Poe, 'The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar', in E. A. Poe, *Tales of Mystery and Imagination* (Everyman, 1984 [1845]), pp. 303–4, 311.
- 2 Ibid., p. 304.
- 3 Ibid., p. 307.
- 4 Ibid., p. 309.
- 5 J. Elmer, *Reading at the Social Limit: Affect, Mass Culture, and Edgar Allan Poe* (Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 123, 125, 125.
- 6 Poe, p. 312.
- 7 K. Halttunen, *Murder Most Foul: The Killer and the American Gothic Imagination* (Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 70.
- 8 See M. Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World* (Indiana University Press, 1984 [1965]), on the 'grotesque body' and Carnival.
- 9 S. D. Moeller, *Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War and Death* (Routledge, 1999), pp. 82, 94; and see the full account, pp. 80–95.
- 10 W. Smith, *Advertise. How? When? Where?* (Routledge, Warne and Routledge, 1863) pp. 34, 122.
- 11 Ibid., pp. 108, 108, 110, 83.
- 12 Both cit. M. Diamond, *Victorian Sensation* (Anthem Press, 2003), pp. 10–11, 253.
- 13 It is the *conjunction* of these dimensions of 'sensation' that is most important here; any literal-minded search for origins is bound to be never-ending. For example, we find that the invention of the kaleidoscope in 1815 was greeted in these terms by a poet, just a year or two later: 'Need I tell you, indeed, that with such preparation, / So lovely a bauble has caused a *Sensation*?'. This is quoted in H. Groth, 'Kaleidoscopic Vision and Literary Invention in an "Age of Things"', *English Language History* (2007), 74, p. 223. The emphasis in the original again suggests an element of novelty, or fashion, in the use of the word, and the article does suggest that a connection with commercialism is being hinted at.
- 14 See J. Flanders, *The Invention of Murder* (Harper, 2010), who also examines other famous cases, notably William Corder's murder of Maria Marten in 1827.
- 15 Rebecca Gowers has written an account of this connection, in fictional form, as *The Twisted Heart* (Canongate, 2009). An original source is B. D. Cousins, *Eliza Grimwood, A Domestic Legend of the Waterloo Road* (c. 1840). The case is outlined

- by M. Brown in an article in the *Guardian*, 11 April 2009, p. 15. For the press sensationalism surrounding the 1888 Whitechapel murders, see A. Warwick and M. Willis (eds), *Jack the Ripper: Media, Culture, History* (Manchester University Press, 2007), Chs 2–6; and A. Smith, *Victorian Demons: Medicine, Masculinity and the Gothic at the Fin de Siècle* (Manchester University Press, 2004), Ch. 3.
- 16 Halttunen, p. 70. See pp. 199–203 for her discussion of the specific case. There is also an account in J. D. Stephens, *Sensationalism and the New York Press* (Columbia University Press, 1991), Ch. 5, confirming the media and popular interest, and presenting it as the first significant case of investigative journalism. He also confirms the general significance of the 1830s in the origins of media sensationalism. Thomas Boyle argues that as late as the 1820s, in the UK, most journalistic accounts of murder trials tended to be relatively brief and restrained, although with quasi-religious moralizing, rather in the eighteenth-century style documented in Halttunen: see his *Black Swine in the Sewers of Hampstead: Beneath the Surface of Victorian Sensationalism* (Hodder & Stoughton, 1990), pp. 42–4.
 - 17 S. Streeby, *American Sensations: Class, Empire and the Production of Popular Culture* (California University Press, 2002), pp. 52, 52, 54.
 - 18 K. Tester, *Compassion, Morality and the Media* (Open University Press, 2001), p. 62.
 - 19 K. Theweleit, *Male Fantasies* (Minnesota University Press, 1987), vol. I, p. 303.
 - 20 O. Barfield, *History in English Words* (Faber and Faber, 1954), pp. 169–70.
 - 21 Elmer, p. 94.
 - 22 A. Cvetkovich, *Mixed Feelings: Feminism, Mass Culture and Victorian Sensationalism* (Rutgers University Press, 1992), p. 2.
 - 23 Halttunen, pp. 3–6, 66–7.
 - 24 W. Wordsworth, Preface to *Lyrical Ballads* (2nd edn, 1800), in D. Wu (ed.), *Romanticism: An Anthology* (Blackwell, 3rd edn, 2006), p. 500.
 - 25 Halttunen, p. 67.
 - 26 T. Gunning, ‘The Horror of Opacity: The Melodrama of Sensation in the Plays of André de Lorde’, in J. Bratton et al., *Melodrama: Stage, Picture, Screen* (British Film Institute, 1994), pp. 51, 51, 52.
 - 27 B. Singer, *Melodrama and Modernity: Early Sensational Cinema and Its Contexts* (Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 48.
 - 28 Diamond, pp. 218–19.
 - 29 D. Reynolds, *Beneath the American Renaissance* (Harvard University Press, 1988), pp. 171, 183.
 - 30 L. Pykett, *The Sensation Novel* (Northcote House, 1994), p. 4.
 - 31 L. Pykett, *The ‘Improper’ Feminine: The Women’s Sensation Novel and the New Woman Writing* (Routledge, 1992), p. 51. Other sources include N. Daly, *Sensation*

and *Modernity in the 1860s* (Cambridge University Press, 2009) and, for gender aspects, A. Mangham, *Violent Women and Sensation Fiction: Crime, Medicine and Victorian Popular Culture* (Palgrave, 2007); Ch. 1 gives a useful overall review. On the sensation novel and popular controversy see also Boyle, Chs 12, 14–16.

32 Pykett, *Sensation*, p. 5.

33 Cit. *ibid.*, p. 3.

34 Cvetkovich, p. 13. For further elaboration, see K. Harrison and R. Fantina (eds), *Victorian Sensations* (Ohio State University Press, 2006).

35 Cit. Boyle, p. 188.

36 J. Sloan, *Oscar Wilde* (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 64.

37 See J. Walkowitz, *City of Dreadful Delight: Narratives of Sexual Danger in Late-Victorian London* (Virago, 1992) p. 86; and, on the Wilde trials, A. Sinfield, *The Wilde Century* (Cassell, 1994).

38 Gunning, p. 52.

39 Cvetkovich, p. 168.

40 N. Rosenthal, 'The Blood Must Continue to Flow', in B. Adams et al., *Sensation: Young British Artists from the Saatchi Collection* (Thames and Hudson, 1998), p. 11.

41 Diamond, p. 288.

42 Elmer, pp. 93, 94.

43 E. K. Sedgwick, *Epistemology of the Closet* (Penguin, 1994), p. 143.

44 R. F. Brissenden, *Virtue in Distress: Studies in the Novel of Sentiment from Richardson to Sade* (Macmillan, 1974), pp. 14–15; R. Williams, *Keywords* (Fontana, 1988), pp. 281–2. For my own more extended discussion of sentimentalism, see *Sympathetic Sentiments: Affect, Emotion and Spectacle in the Modern World* (Bloomsbury, 2014), esp. Chs 2, 8.

45 Williams, p. 281.

46 Streeby, p. 31.

47 These rueful retrospective reflections are actually incorporated into Ch. 11 of *Good Wives*: see L. M. Alcott, *Little Women and Good Wives* (Wordsworth Classics, 2006 [1868–9]). Jo needed money for her charitable aspirations, so 'She took to writing sensation stories, for in those dark ages, even all-perfect America read rubbish' (p. 327); writing, she found herself 'living in bad society, and imaginary though it was, its influence affected her, for she was feeding heart and fancy on dangerous and insubstantial food', losing her 'innocent bloom' (p. 331). Luckily, no lasting damage was done: she came to see that her stories were 'trash', and 'will soon be worse trash if I go on, for each is more sensational than the last' (p. 337), hinting again at the necessity for sensation to become ever more sensational.

- 48 Halttunen, pp. 160, 140; and see S. Clark, *Sentimental Modernism: Women Writers and the Revolution of the Word* (Indiana University Press, 1991) p. 21.
- 49 B. Burgett, *Sentimental Bodies: Sex, Gender and Citizenship in the Early Republic* (Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 16.
- 50 E. Barnes, *States of Sympathy: Education and Democracy in the American Novel* (Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 12.
- 51 K. Sánchez-Eppler, *Touching Liberty: Abolition, Feminism, and the Politics of the Body* (California University Press, 1993), p. 100.
- 52 Elmer, p. 14.
- 53 M. Warner, 'The Mass Public and the Mass Subject', in C. Calhoun (ed.), *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (MIT Press, 1992), p. 394.
- 54 Elmer, p. 95.
- 55 Elmer, p. 103.
- 56 Clark, p. 21.
- 57 Streeby, p. 54; and see M. Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics* (Zone Books, 2002).
- 58 B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (Verso, 1983).
- 59 D. A. Miller, *The Novel and the Police* (California University Press, 1988), pp. 162, 162, 163.
- 60 A. Cvetkovich, 'Ghostlier Determinations: The Economy of Sensation and *The Woman in White*', in L. Pykett (ed.), *Wilkie Collins* (Macmillan, 1998), p. 110.
- 61 M. E. Braddon, *Eleanor's Victory* (Tinsley Bros., 1863), cit. Pykett, *Improper*, p. 83.
- 62 E. Showalter, 'Family Secrets and Domestic Subversion: rebellion in the novels of the eighteen-sixties', in A. Wohl (ed.), *The Victorian Family: Structure and Stresses* (Croom Helm, 1978), p. 104.
- 63 See S. Bruhm, *Gothic Bodies: The Politics of Pain in Romantic Fiction* (Pennsylvania University Press, 1994), Chs 1, 2, for useful background on cultural assumptions about pain in the period, particularly in literature and philosophy.
- 64 Halttunen, pp. 62, 79.
- 65 B. Singer, 'Modernity, Hyperstimulus and the Rise of Popular Sensationalism', in L. Charney and V. R. Schwartz (eds), *Cinema and the Invention of Modern Life* (California University Press, 1995), p. 87.
- 66 Cit. Pykett, *Sensation*, p. 4.
- 67 Singer, 'Modernity', p. 88.
- 68 Gunning, p. 52.
- 69 Pykett, *Improper*, p. 35.
- 70 Cvetkovich, *Mixed Feelings*, pp. 20, 21, 23.
- 71 J. B. Taylor, *In the Secret Theatre of Home: Wilkie Collins, Sensation Narrative, and Nineteenth-century Psychology* (Routledge, 1988), p. 4.
- 72 Pykett, *Improper*, p. 97.

- 73 Cit. J. M. Goulemot, *Forbidden Texts: Erotic Literature and Its Readers in Eighteenth-Century France* (Polity, 1994), p. 56.
- 74 P. Falk, 'The Representation of Presence: Outlining the Anti-Aesthetics of Pornography', *Theory Culture and Society* (1993), 10:2, p. 10, also reproduced in his book *The Consuming Body* (Sage, 1994), Ch. 7.
- 75 Goulemot, p. 57.
- 76 Halttunen, p. 69.
- 77 S. de Beauvoir, 'Must We Burn Sade?', in her *Marquis de Sade* (Calder, 1962), p. 69.
- 78 G. S. Rousseau, *Nervous Acts: Essays on Literature, Culture and Sensibility* (Palgrave, 2004), pp. 202–4.
- 79 Marquis de Sade, *Justine*, cit. and trans. Rousseau, p. 203.
- 80 *Byron's Letters and Journals*, ed. L. Marchand (Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), vol. III, p. 109. For further discussion, see Bruhm.
- 81 I. Kant, *Critique of Judgement* (Hafner, 1951 [1790]), trans. J. H. Bernard, p. 155.
- 82 Miller, p. 147.
- 83 Cvetkovich, 'Ghostlier', p. 122.
- 84 Miller, pp. 164, 148.
- 85 Wolfgang Schivelbusch argues that 'pre-industrial catastrophes were natural events, natural accidents', whereas technology introduces the idea that catastrophes can be 'self-induced', products of the technology itself: see his *The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19th Century* (Berg, 1986), p. 131.
- 86 This dynamic is of course also apparent in disaster movies, a major Hollywood genre since the 1950s: see S. Keane, *Disaster Movies: The Cinema of Catastrophe* (Wallflower Press, 2001), or the compendious G. Kay and M. Rose, *Disaster Movies: The Ultimate Guide* (Mosaic Press, 2005).
- 87 M. A. Doane, 'Information, Crisis, Catastrophe', in P. Mellencamp (ed.), *Logics of Television: Essays in Cultural Criticism* (Indiana University Press, 1990), pp. 231, 230.
- 88 K. Rozario, *The Culture of Calamity: Disaster and the Making of Modern America* (Chicago University Press, 2007), p. 111.
- 89 See Schivelbusch, Chs 7–9.
- 90 Rozario, p. 257n. 33.
- 91 Useful sources on amusement parks are J. F. Kasson, *Amusing the Million: Coney Island at the Turn of the Century* (Hill and Wang, 1978); K. Peiss, *Cheap Amusements: Working Women and Leisure in Turn-of-the-Century New York* (Temple University Press, 1986), pp. 115–38; and D. M. Lubin, *Titanic* (British Film Institute, 1999), pp. 98–108, a brief survey.
- 92 Rozario, p. 125.
- 93 Lubin, p. 105.
- 94 Rozario, p. 224n. 47.

- 95 Ibid., p. 128; and see Ch. 3.
- 96 Cit. *ibid.*, p. 102; and see pp. 101–8, for other accounts by survivors.
- 97 Ibid., pp. 130 and 128–9.
- 98 S. Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space 1880–1918* (Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 107.
- 99 R. Howells, *The Myth of the Titanic* (Macmillan, 1997), Ch. 7. See also S. Biel, *Down With the Old Canoe* (Norton, 1996), Chs 2, 4, 7. He documents how, in the Reagan era, the rediscovery and partial salvage of the wreckage was presented as a technological success to redeem the original failure: ‘The story of the *Titanic* had to have a happy ending’ (p. 225).
- 100 Kern, pp. 67–8.
- 101 J. Sconce, *Haunted Media: Electronic Presence from Telegraphy to Television* (Duke University Press, 2000), p. 109. See also pp. 110–18, where he documents the 1938 panic when some listeners thought a broadcast of the H. G. Wells novel *The War of the Worlds* was a news report on a real Martian invasion ...
- 102 Doane, p. 222, *passim*.
- 103 Lubin, p. 72. On the film, see also K. S. Sandler and G. Studlar (eds), *Titanic: Anatomy of a Blockbuster* (Rutgers University Press, 1999), and R. Maltby, *Hollywood Cinema: An Introduction* (Blackwell, 2nd edn, 2003), pp. 10–14; and, more generally, T. Bergfelder and S. Street (eds), *The Titanic in Myth and Memory: Representations in Visual and Literary Culture* (I. B. Tauris, 2004).
- 104 N. Klein, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism* (Penguin, 2007), p. 6. On the ‘Shock and Awe’ document, see pp. 3, 7–9, 329–33. For the 2004 Asian tsunami as an example of how natural disasters can be appropriated in this way, see Ch. 19. Some of this may go back further than she recognizes: see Rozario, for example, on the aftermath of the San Francisco earthquake.
- 105 Klein, pp. 15–17.
- 106 For intriguing reflections on the fate of the fragmented ‘mass body’ in disasters of these kinds, see M. Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics* (Zone, 2002), pp. 177–9.
- 107 R. L. Hart, in *Atlantic Monthly*, 1907, cit. Rozario, p. 126.
- 108 S. Sontag, ‘The Imagination of Disaster’, in *Against Interpretation and Other Essays* (Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1966), p. 224.
- 109 D. Boothroyd, ‘Cultural Studies and the Extreme’, in G. Hall and C. Birchall (eds), *New Cultural Studies: Adventures in Theory* (Edinburgh University Press, 2006), p. 277.
- 110 Boothroyd argues that transgression is central to this. Certainly it is important, but perhaps the risk-taking, and the implicit testing of the *reality* of self, in relation to ‘the real’, is more basic. Transgression is indeed a defining feature of the less usual sexual practices and their representation as pornography, but only a certain range of these, around aspects of sado-masochism, could plausibly count

as sexual ‘extreme sports’. For interesting reflections, see J. Benjamin, ‘Master and Slave: The Fantasy of Erotic Domination’, in A. Snitow et al. (eds), *Desire: The Politics of Sexuality* (Virago, 1984).

111 Doane, p. 233.

112 Lubin, p. 107.

113 Hence Rozario’s suggestion that ‘the postmodern culture of calamity may well be defined by a collision or collusion between the apocalyptic and the sublime’ (p. 188) is very interesting, but we have suggested that the collusion may be the more plausible version, as the two may not be fully distinguishable in the first place.

114 J. Crane, *Terror and Everyday Life: Singular Moments in the History of the Horror Film* (Sage, 1994), pp. 9, 9, 141, 37. See also A. Tudor, ‘Why Horror? The Peculiar Pleasures of a Popular Genre’, in M. Jancovich (ed.), *The Horror Film Reader* (Routledge, 2001).

115 R. C. Solomon, *In Defence of Sentimentality* (Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 110, from Ch. 5 (‘Real Horror’).

116 C. J. Clover, ‘Her Body, Himself: Gender in the Slasher Film’, in J. Donald (ed.), *Fantasy and the Cinema* (British Film Institute, 1989), p. 93, also reproduced in Jancovich.

117 S. de Beauvoir, p. 69.

118 If this suggests self-torture, there is also a parallel with surgery: Marilee Strong, in *A Bright Red Scream: Self-Mutilation and the Language of Pain* (Virago, 2000), suggests the scars ‘provide a permanent, physical record not only of pain and injury but also of healing’ (p. 150). This is oddly parallel with the logic of ‘shock and awe’ seen in Klein’s argument.

119 See Benjamin, ‘Master and Slave’, for a view of this that draws on Hegel and Bataille.

120 Z. Bauman, *Postmodernity and Its Discontents* (Polity, 1997), p. 146.

121 All this implies some reservations about the rightly influential account of the rise of modern consumerism in C. Campbell, *The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism* (Blackwell, 1989), esp. Chs 4–5. For Campbell, sensation and emotion are in some sense opposed, and as sensation can only give limited and transient pleasures, the cultivation of emotion as a central feature of the modern self, largely *replacing* sensation, opens up greater scope for the ‘imaginative hedonism’ essential to modern consumerism. One might reply, however, that this downplays the significance of sensation in two ways: that sensation, *coupled* with emotion and imagination, has the potential for even *greater* pleasure, readily linked to the longings and dreams associated with consumerism; and that sensation can be *symbolically* powerful, engaging the body in intimate relation to the sense of self.

Sensational Processes

- 1 Cit. A. Cvetkovich, *Mixed Feelings: Feminism, Mass Culture, and Victorian Sensationalism* (Rutgers University Press, 1992), p. 21.
- 2 C. Campbell, *The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism* (Blackwell, 1989), p. 63.
- 3 Cvetkovich, *Mixed Feelings*, p. 21.
- 4 All this is what both contributes to the plausibility of theories of ‘compassion fatigue’ while yet also contributing to their limitations: the most influential advocate is S. D. Moeller, in her *Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War and Death* (Routledge, 1999).
- 5 S. During, *Modern Enchantments: The Cultural Power of Secular Magic* (Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 161, 163.
- 6 Ibid., p. 165.
- 7 D. A. Miller, *The Novel and the Police* (California University Press, 1988), pp. 150, 146.
- 8 A. Rabinbach, *The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue and the Origins of Modernity* (California University Press, 1990), pp. 154, 160, 160.
- 9 Miller, p. 148.
- 10 M. Henning, “‘Don’t Touch Me (I’m Electric)’”: On Gender and Sensation in Modernity’, in J. Arthurs and J. Grimshaw (eds), *Women’s Bodies: Discipline and Transgression* (Cassell, 1999), pp. 18, 26.
- 11 E. Showalter, *The Female Malady: Women, Madness and English Culture, 1830–1980* (Virago, 1987), Chs 6, 7. Following up this recent interest in cultural and gender aspects of hysteria, see S. L. Gilman et al., *Hysteria Beyond Freud* (California University Press, 1993); M. S. Micale, *Approaching Hysteria: Disease and Its Interpretations* (Princeton University Press, 1995); and E. Bronfen, *The Knotted Subject: Hysteria and Its Discontents* (Princeton University Press, 1998). For hysteria, trauma and ‘shell-shock’, see also my *Sympathetic Sentiments: Affect, Emotion and Spectacle in the Modern World* (Bloomsbury, 2014), Ch. 7.
- 12 Miller, pp. 154, 163.
- 13 Henning, pp. 26, 41.
- 14 R. Sennett, *The Fall of Public Man* (Faber and Faber, 1986), p. 110. For Diderot, great acting is about the simulation of feeling, not the reality.
- 15 P. Falk, ‘The Representation of Presence: Outlining the Anti-Aesthetics of Pornography’, *Theory, Culture and Society* (1993), 10:2, pp. 16, 18, also reprinted as Ch. 7 of his *The Consuming Body* (Sage, 1994).
- 16 S. Connor, *Postmodernist Culture* (Blackwell, 1997), p. 144.
- 17 M. Fried, ‘Art and Objecthood’, in G. Bantock (ed.), *Minimal Art* (Dutton, 1968), p. 142.

- 18 Cvetkovich, *Mixed Feelings*, pp. 23, 6.
- 19 S. Streeby, *American Sensations: Class, Empire and the Production of Popular Culture* (California University Press 2002), pp. 27, 43.
- 20 T. Adorno, *Minima Moralia* (Verso, 1978), pp. 235–6, 238, 237.
- 21 A. Cvetkovich, 'Ghostlier Determinations: The Economy of Sensation and *The Woman in White*', in L. Pykett (ed.), *Wilkie Collins* (Macmillan, 1998), p. 127; and see *Mixed Feelings*, Ch. 7.
- 22 B. Singer, *Melodrama and Modernity: Early Sensational Cinema and Its Contexts* (Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 9. For his extended discussion of this, see pp. 8–10 and Ch. 4.
- 23 *Ibid.*, p. 117.
- 24 R. Crawford, 'A Cultural Account of "Health": Control, Release and the Social Body', in J. B. McKinlay (ed.), *Issues in the Political Economy of Health Care* (Tavistock, 1984); and see A. Young, 'The discourse on stress and the reproduction of conventional knowledge', in *Social Science and Medicine* (1980), 148.
- 25 Singer, *Melodrama*, p. 119.
- 26 M. Hansen, *Babel and Babylon: Spectatorship in American Silent Film* (Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 29.
- 27 Cit. B. Singer, 'Modernity, Hyperstimulus and the Rise of Popular Sensationalism', in L. Charney and V. R. Schwartz (eds), *Cinema and the Invention of Modern Life* (California University Press, 1995), p. 90.
- 28 *Ibid.*, p. 88.
- 29 Singer, *Melodrama*, p. 90.
- 30 G. Simmel, 'The Metropolis and Mental Life', in *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, ed. K. H. Wolff (Free Press, 1950), p. 414.
- 31 W. Schivelbusch, *The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the Nineteenth Century* (Berg, 1986), pp. 159–70.
- 32 Singer, 'Modernity', p. 93; *Melodrama*, p. 126.
- 33 Singer, *Melodrama*, p. 105.
- 34 L. Charney, *Empty Moments: Cinema, Modernity, and Drift* (Duke University Press, 1998), p. 77.
- 35 Cvetkovich, 'Ghostlier', pp. 111, 111, 116.
- 36 Charney, p. 8.
- 37 C. N. Serematakis, *The Senses Still: Perception and Memory as Material Culture in Modernity* (Chicago University Press, 1994), p. 19.
- 38 Rabinbach, p. 63.
- 39 Cit. Rabinbach, p. 26.
- 40 L. Pykett, *The 'Improper' Feminine: The Women's Sensation Novel and the New Woman Writing* (Routledge, 1992), p. 53.
- 41 W. B. Carpenter, *Principles of Mental Physiology* (1876), cit. J. L. Matus, 'Emergent

- Theories of Victorian Mind Shock', in A. Stiles (ed.), *Neurology and Literature, 1860–1920* (Palgrave, 2007), p. 174.
- 42 Rabinbach, p. 66.
- 43 E. Mach, *Analysis of Sensations* (1886), cit. C. Asendorf, *Batteries of Life: On the History of Things and Their Perception in Modernity* (California University Press, 1993), p. 170. The echoes of Hume's work in these claims by Mach are unmistakable ... For the sources in Hume etc. see my *Sympathetic Sentiments*, Ch. 5.
- 44 Henning, p. 32.
- 45 Asendorf, p. 176.
- 46 Rabinbach, p. 4.
- 47 T. Gunning, 'Phantom Images and Modern Manifestations: Spirit Photography, Magic Theater, Trick Films, and Photography's Uncanny', in P. Petro (ed.), *Fugitive Images: From Photography to Video* (Indiana University Press, 1995); and T. Gunning, 'An Aesthetic of Astonishment: Early Film and the (In)Credulous Spectator', in L. Williams (ed.), *Viewing Positions: Ways of Seeing Films* (Rutgers University Press, 1994). Gunning's work is an invaluable resource for 'sensational' aspects of early film and popular culture.
- 48 P. Thurschwell, *Literature, Technology and Magical Thinking, 1880–1920* (Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 2, 4, 7.
- 49 R. Kaye, 'Sexual Identity at the *fin de siècle*', in G. Marshall (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Fin de Siècle* (Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 63.
- 50 J. Crary, *Suspensions of Perception: Attention, Spectacle and Modern Culture* (MIT Press, 2001), pp. 170, 13, 13; and see pp. 164–72, *passim*.
- 51 Crary, *Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century* (MIT Press, 1990), pp. 24, 92.
- 52 *Ibid.*, pp. 145, 147, 92.
- 53 Crary, *Suspensions*, pp. 17–19, 27; and see H. Ferguson, *The Science of Pleasure: Cosmos and Psyche in the Bourgeois World View* (Routledge, 1990), pp. 178–84. Crary adds that 'sensation became an effect or set of effects that were technologically produced and were used to describe a subject who was compatible with those technical conditions' (pp. 26–7), which, as I shall argue, goes rather too far towards technological determinism.
- 54 E. Meyerson, *Identity and Reality* (Allen and Unwin, 1930 [1908]), pp. 291, 297–8.
- 55 *Ibid.*, p. 298.
- 56 Crary, *Suspensions*, p. 27; *Techniques*, p. 72.
- 57 Rabinbach, p. 41.
- 58 Crary, *Suspensions*, p. 169.
- 59 Cit. Ferguson, pp. 179, 180. There is reference to the 'vibrations' of sensations in these earlier accounts (Hartley, Hume), but this is rather static in relation to the emphasis in nineteenth-century science.

- 60 Henning, p. 19.
- 61 From *Contre Sainte-Beuve* (Pléiade, 1971) p. 154, cit. and trans. M. R. Finn, *Proust, The Body and Literary Form* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 23.
- 62 G. S. Rousseau, *Nervous Acts: Essays on Literature, Culture and Sensibility* (Palgrave, 2004), p. 54.
- 63 Cit. Asendorf, p. 171.
- 64 Asendorf, p. 177. One might add here that it was only late in the century that psychological causation came to rival ‘nerves’ as an explanation of mental stresses and illness, nor were they seen as necessarily incompatible. Overall, as Athena Vrettos claims, ‘nervousness ... was used to describe emotional exhaustion as well as unexplained physical pain and to define evolutionary progress as well as the debilitating effects of modern civilization’: see her *Somatic Fictions: Imagining Illness in Victorian Culture* (Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 12.
- 65 Rabinbach, p. 4.
- 66 Ibid., pp. 153–61; Finn, pp. 38–41.
- 67 Asendorf, p. 173.
- 68 Rabinbach, p. 40.
- 69 Finn, p. 1.
- 70 Finn, pp. 4, 179; and see p. 8.
- 71 W. Benjamin, *Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism* (Verso, 1983), p. 175.
- 72 W. Benjamin, ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’, in his *Selected Writings*, vol. 4: 1938–40 (Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 328, also in *Illuminations* (Fontana, 1992), p. 171.
- 73 On Eisenstein, particularly in relation to Deleuze, see G. Lambert, ‘Cinema and the Outside’, in G. Flaxman (ed.), *The Brain is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema* (Minnesota University Press, 2000); D. Frampton, *Filmosophy* (Wallflower Press, 2006), Ch. 4; and Charney, pp. 128–38.
- 74 G. Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (Athlone, 1989), pp. 161, 161, 156. The shock thus *induces*, but cannot *control*, the reflective process; there is a disjunction here, the further implications of which will be explored in the later chapters of this book.
- 75 *The Diary of Beatrice Webb*, vol. 4: 1924–43, *The Wheel of Life* (Virago, 1985), p. 1, cit. J. Seaton, *Carnage and the Media: The Making and Breaking of News about Violence* (Allen Lane, 2005), p. 248.
- 76 J. Sconce, *Haunted Media: Electronic Presence from Telepathy to Television* (Duke University Press, 2000), pp. 21, 14, and see Ch. 1, *passim*.
- 77 Cit. *ibid.*, p. 47.
- 78 S. Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space, 1880–1918* (Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 183.

- 79 'On Action at a Distance', in *Scientific Papers* (Cambridge University Press, 1890), 2: 322, cit. J. D. Peters, *Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication* (Chicago University Press, 2000), p. 102. For discussion, see B. Clarke, *Energy Forms: Allegory and Science in the Era of Classical Thermodynamics* (Michigan University Press, 2001), Ch. 7. See also Kern, p. 154.
- 80 Cit. Peters, p. 102.
- 81 *Shorter Oxford Dictionary*, entry for 'ether'.
- 82 Sconce, p. 63.
- 83 *Ibid.*, p. 28.
- 84 Peters, pp. 160–4.
- 85 L. Rickels, *Aberrations of Mourning: Writing on German Crypts* (Wayne State University Press, 1988).
- 86 For accounts that emphasize gender, see A. Braude, *Radical Spirits: Spiritualism and Women's Rights in Nineteenth-Century America* (Beacon press, 1989); A. Owen, *The Darkened Room: Women, Power, and Spiritualism in Nineteenth-Century England* (Virago, 1989); and Sconce, pp. 12–14 and Ch. 1.
- 87 S. Connor, 'The Machine in the Ghost: Spiritualism, Technology, and the "Direct Voice"', in P. Buse and A. Stott (eds), *Ghosts: Deconstruction, Psychoanalysis, History* (Palgrave, 1999). On the relation to science, see also Thurschwell. On spiritualism, the telegraph, and contacting 'others' generally, see Peters, Chs 2, 6. In this context, one might just observe, in passing, that W. T. Stead, as responsible as anyone for developing newspaper sensationalism in the 1880s and later, went down with the *Titanic*, but – sensational to the last, and beyond – subsequently made contact with his daughter through a medium: see Connor, 'Machine', p. 213.
- 88 E. d'Esperance, *What I Know of Materialisations from Personal Experience* ('Light' Publishing Co., London, 1904), cit. Connor, p. 209.
- 89 R. Kipling, 'Wireless', in *Traffics and Discoveries* (Macmillan, 1908 [1902]).
- 90 *Ibid.*, p. 229.
- 91 *Ibid.*, p. 239.
- 92 G. Beer, "'Wireless': Popular Physics, Radio and Modernism", in F. Spufford and J. Uglow (eds), *Cultural Babbage: Technology, Time and Invention* (Faber, 1996), p. 156. See also the discussion in Sconce, pp. 69–70.
- 93 Kipling, p. 230.
- 94 *Ibid.*, p. 219.
- 95 As an appropriate postscript, one can note that as late as the 1960s Konstantin Raudive used various recording techniques, including receivers tuned to the 'white noise' between channels, enhanced playback, and microphones in silent rooms, to capture voices, sounding like a fragmentary, jammed overload, that were, he claimed, the voices of the dead. Not surprisingly, this caused a minor media sensation. See Connor, 'Machine', pp. 217–18, and Sconce, pp. 85–90.

- 96 J. Donald, 'As It Happened ... *Borderline*, the Uncanny and the Cosmopolitan', in J. Collins and J. Jervis (eds), *Uncanny Modernity: Cultural Theories, Modern Anxieties* (Palgrave, 2008), p. 97.
- 97 M. Cuddy-Keane, 'Virginia Woolf, Sound Technologies, and the New Aurality', in P. L. Caughie (ed.), *Virginia Woolf in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction* (Garland, 2000), pp. 85, 85 (my italics), 90.
- 98 J. Joyce, *Finnegans Wake* (Faber and Faber, 1975 [1939]), p. 407, cit. J. Lewty, "'What They Had Heard Said Written": Joyce, Pound and the Cross-Correspondence of Radio', in D. R. Cohen et al. (eds), *Broadcasting Modernism* (Florida University Press, 2009).
- 99 Peters, p. 23. One might add that if Marshall McLuhan, in the 1960s, saw telecommunications media as extensions of the 'nervous system', that might seem a rather nineteenth-century preference; for a version that seems to reverse this – more in tune, perhaps, with 'posthuman' fashion – see the comments in F. Kittler, *Optical Media* (Polity, 2010), Ch. 1.
- 100 Peters, p. 24.
- 101 Sconce, p. 8. Since he suggests that the postmodern, also, is concerned with 'the transmutability of electricity, information and consciousness within electronic telecommunications' (p. 18), this might imply that the postmodern might better be seen as an aspect or mode of the modern, rather than deeply antithetical to it, a possibility that will be hinted at elsewhere in this book.
- 102 On the history of radio, see Peters, pp. 206–25, and Sconce, Chs 2, 3.
- 103 Peters, p. 211.
- 104 See, for example, Sconce (pp. 206–25) on the episode in 1938 when a broadcast of the H. G. Wells novel *The War of the Worlds* on the radio led to panic among sections of the audience; and Ch. 4, on television as an 'alien' medium.
- 105 S. Jonsson, 'Masses, Mind, Matter: Political Passions and Collective Violence in Post-Imperial Austria', in P. Meyer (ed.), *Representing the Passions: Histories, Bodies, Visions* (Getty Research Institute, 2003), p. 79. Most influential of these early theorists were Gustave Le Bon, particularly for *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* (1895, and much reprinted since), and Gabriel Tarde.
- 106 S. Moscovici, *The Invention of Society: Psychological Explanations for Social Phenomena* (Polity, 1996), pp. 20, 21.
- 107 T. Brennan, *The Transmission of Affect* (Cornell University Press, 2004).
- 108 Peters, p. 218.
- 109 *Shorter Oxford Dictionary*, entry for 'live'.

The Aesthetics of Sensation

- 1 J. Crary, *Suspensions of Perception: Attention, Spectacle, and Modern Culture* (MIT Press, 2001), pp. 174, 344.
- 2 P. Cézanne, *Letters*, ed. J. Rewald (Cassirer, 1941 [1906]), p. 262.
- 3 W. Pater, *Studies in the History of the Renaissance* (Oxford University Press, 2010 [1873]), p. 3. (Other editions may be entitled *The Renaissance*, with different pagination. Quotes given are from the Preface, Conclusion and the page preceding the latter.)
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 117.
- 5 *Ibid.*, pp. 118, 119, 119.
- 6 *Ibid.*, pp. 119, 120, 121.
- 7 J. Loesberg, *Aestheticism and Deconstruction* (Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 20, 22, 23, 24. See also the whole of Loesberg's invigorating discussion: Ch. 1, esp. sec. II. The claim of J. Matz, in his *Literary Impressionism and Modernist Aesthetics* (Cambridge University Press, 2001), Ch. 2, that Pater aestheticizes the empiricist tension between impression and idea, thus constituting literary Impressionism's 'moment of genius' (p. 64), is also pertinent here.
- 8 It is evident enough that the rigorous separation of art from other 'passions' is highly problematical; and even before the trial of Pater's best-known follower, Oscar Wilde, with the intensifying homophobia, Aestheticism as a whole had come under suspicion. Pater himself had removed these passages from the second edition of the book, lest they 'might possibly mislead some of those young men into whose hands it might fall' (*ibid.*, p. 177). Recent scholarship has suggested some young women might have been led astray, too: discussing Pater, Ruth Vanita identifies the gem as a clitoral image, giving other examples, such as Clarissa describing her love for Sally Seton in Virginia Woolf's *Mrs Dalloway* as a 'burning diamond' (Granada, 1977 [1925], p. 164), thus neatly linking Pater's two images. Vanita concludes that this conjunction constitutes 'an immensely influential trope for homoerotic and ... lesbian love'; see her *Sappho and the Virgin Mary: Same-sex Love and the English Literary Imagination* (Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 69. See also R. Dellamora, *Masculine Desire: The Sexual Politics of Victorian Aestheticism* (North Carolina University Press, 1990). That Aestheticism influenced early modernism is evident enough, as is the modernist disavowal of all this. One can also note that an early, hostile review compared Pater's attitude to that of housemaids addicted to 'sensation fiction'; see M. Beaumont's introduction to Pater, p. xx.
- 9 V. Shklovsky, 'Art as Technique', in *Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays*, trans. L. T. Lemon and M. J. Reis (Nebraska University Press, 1965), p. 12.
- 10 L. Charney, *Empty Moments: Cinema, Modernity and Drift* (Duke University Press, 1998), p. 8.

- 11 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?* (Verso, 2004), pp. 164 (italics in the original), 164, 176, 176. (Cited henceforth as *WP*.)
- 12 Deleuze, *WP*, p. 176.
- 13 Cit. Charney, p. 22, page ref. not given.
- 14 J. Rajchman, *The Deleuze Connections* (MIT Press, 2000) p. 133; and see G. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (Athlone Press, 1994), pp. 222–4 (henceforth *DR*).
- 15 D. W. Smith, 'Deleuze's Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality', in P. Patton (ed.), *Deleuze: A Critical Reader* (Blackwell, 1996), p. 41.
- 16 Deleuze, *WP*, p. 177.
- 17 J. Williams, *Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide* (Edinburgh University Press, 2003) p. 199.
- 18 D. Polan, 'Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation', in C. V. Boundas and D. Olkowski (eds), *Gilles Deleuze and the Theater of Philosophy* (Routledge, 1994), p. 231.
- 19 G. Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation* (Continuum, 2003), p. 45 (henceforth *FB*).
- 20 C. Colebrook, *Gilles Deleuze* (Routledge, 2002), pp. 39, 106, 106.
- 21 Deleuze, *FB*, p. 85.
- 22 G. Flaxman, 'Cinema Year Zero', in G. Flaxman (ed.), *The Brain Is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema* (Minnesota University Press, 2000), p. 94.
- 23 Smith, p. 49.
- 24 B. Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Duke University Press, 2002), p. 13.
- 25 Deleuze, *DR*, pp. 46, 251; and see Williams, pp. 187–9.
- 26 S. Shaviri, *The Cinematic Body* (Minnesota University Press, 1993), pp. vii, 255.
- 27 B. M. Kennedy, *Deleuze and Cinema: The Aesthetics of Sensation* (Edinburgh University Press, 2000), pp. 3, 4, 5, 5.
- 28 R. Newman, '(Re)Imaging the Grotesque: Francis Bacon's Crucifixion Triptychs', in D. Andrew (ed.), *The Image in Dispute: Art and Cinema in the Age of Photography* (Texas University Press, 1997), p. 217.
- 29 M. Leiris, *Francis Bacon: Full Face and In Profile* (Phaidon, 1983), pp. 24, 27.
- 30 Deleuze, *FB*, p. 56; and see *WP*, pp. 182–3.
- 31 Deleuze, *FB*, pp. xiv, 34; and see p. 58. One can add that Deleuze's concept of figure is indebted to the Lyotard of *Discours, Figure* (Klincksieck, 1971).
- 32 Smith, p. 44.
- 33 Deleuze, *FB*, p. 36.
- 34 Kennedy, p. 110.
- 35 Interview in D. Sylvester, *The Brutality of Fact: Interviews with Francis Bacon* (Thames and Hudson, 1975), p. 17.

- 36 Deleuze, *FB*, p. xiv.
- 37 Interview in H. M. Davies, *Francis Bacon: The Papal Portraits of 1953* (Museum of Contemporary Art, San Diego, and Lund Humphries, 2002), pp. 40, 59.
- 38 Newman, pp. 212, 214. Not surprisingly, Newman finds the concept of abjection useful here: see pp. 209–11, 215.
- 39 Deleuze, *WP*, pp. 178, 179, 183.
- 40 In Sylvester, pp. 105–7.
- 41 Deleuze, *WP*, p. 213.
- 42 Deleuze, *FB*, Ch. 7.
- 43 *Ibid.*, p. 45; and see pp. 45–9. See also my discussion of hysteria in *Sympathetic Sentiments: Affect, Emotion and Spectacle in the Modern World* (Bloomsbury, 2014), Ch. 7.
- 44 Deleuze, *FB*, pp. 51, 51–2, 51, 50, 51.
- 45 David Morris articulates this perspective, while moving somewhat towards Bacon, in his claim that ‘the scream might serve as a potent image for the metaphorical silence at the heart of suffering. A scream is not speech but the most intense possible negation of language: sound and terror approaching the limits of absolute muteness.’ The continuation of the quote, implying continuity with conventional film, would, however, doubtless have been rejected by both Bacon and Deleuze: ‘A typical Hollywood scream, while it often shatters a preceding silence or calm, also deepens the silence it shatters, as if gesturing toward something radically inexpressible.’ See. D. B. Morris, ‘About Suffering: Voice, Genre, and Moral Community’, *Daedalus* (1996) 125:1, p. 27.
- 46 In Sylvester, pp. 82, 48.
- 47 L. Ficacci, *Francis Bacon* (Taschen, 2003), p. 16.
- 48 Deleuze, *FB*, p. 60.
- 49 Deleuze, *DR*, p. 260.
- 50 Williams, p. 208. ‘Ideas’ in Deleuze are conditions for changes in our actual ideas, ‘relations between things in the virtual’ (Williams, p. 112), hence not ‘transcendental’ in any Kantian sense.
- 51 Smith, p. 42.
- 52 Deleuze, *FB*, pp. 45, 38.
- 53 A. Brighton, *Francis Bacon* (Tate, 2001) p. 65.
- 54 In Sylvester, pp. 56, 62.
- 55 C. Greenberg, interview with E. Lucie-Smith, in *Clement Greenberg: Collected Essays and Criticism* (Chicago University Press, 1993), vol. IV, p. 278.
- 56 In Sylvester, pp. 60, 126; and see p. 40.
- 57 Brighton, pp. 65, 67, 67.
- 58 Newman suggests that a tension between ‘grotesque as narrative form’ and ‘grotesque as cognitive disruptor’ runs through Bacon’s work (p. 207); and

Ernst van Alphen sees Bacon's work as a struggle against Western traditions of representation, and, referring to the triptychs, claims that 'it is the inevitable consequence of representation, the tearing apart of the body, the destructive effect of reproductive mimesis, which the crucifixion betokens': see his *Francis Bacon and the Loss of Self* (Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 93.

- 59 Ibid., p. 67.
- 60 Deleuze, *WP*, p. 193.
- 61 Deleuze, *FB*, pp. 97, 98, 115.
- 62 Deleuze, *DR*, Ch. VIII. See also *WP*, pp. 144–6, for a critique of everyday 'opinion', linked through the hold over it of 'recognition' to the critique of representation.
- 63 Deleuze, *FB*, pp. 39, 34.
- 64 Ibid., p. 87.
- 65 Ibid., pp. 87, 93–4, 100–2.
- 66 Ibid., p. 89. This obsession with cliché continues in his work on film: see, for examples and commentary, G. Flaxman, 'Introduction', pp. 11, 17, 35–9, and G. Lambert, 'Cinema and the Outside', pp. 264–5, 273, 275, 278, 287–8, in Flaxman, *Brain*; and R. Bogue, *Deleuze on Cinema* (Routledge, 2003), pp. 108–11, 170–1. Parallel with his analysis of Bacon, one reason for his concerns comes out clearly in his acknowledgement, in *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (Athlone, 1989), that 'modernist shock' might not have the desired effect: 'The shock would be confused, in bad cinema, with the figurative violence of the represented instead of achieving that other violence of a movement-image developing its vibrations in a moving sequence which embeds itself within us ...' (p. 157).
- 67 J. Rancière, *The Emancipated Spectator* (Verso, 2009), p. 66.
- 68 Polan, pp. 245, 254.
- 69 V. Woolf, *To the Lighthouse* (Penguin, 1992 [1927]), p. 209.
- 70 *The Eye's Mind: Bridget Riley, Collected Writings 1965–1999*, ed. R. Kudielka (Thames & Hudson, 1999), p. 66. Unless otherwise indicated, all Riley quotes are from this source.
- 71 F. Follin, *Embodied Visions: Bridget Riley, Op Art and the Sixties* (Thames & Hudson, 2004), p. 9. For further discussion, see also J. Houston, *Optic Nerve: Perceptual Art of the 1960s* (Merrell, 2007).
- 72 Riley, pp. 76, 76, 78.
- 73 Ibid., pp. 118, 120.
- 74 Ibid., pp. 120, 128, 130. Riley is aware of Proust, and glosses his insight as the paradox that 'you must give up that which you love in order to recreate it'; see Riley, *Dialogues on Art*, ed. R. Kudielka (Zwemmer, 1995), p. 89.
- 75 M. Merleau-Ponty, *The Phenomenology of Perception* (Routledge, 1962 [1945]), p. 68; and see Riley, p. 122.

- 76 Riley, pp. 118, 88, 99, 123, 116.
- 77 Ibid., pp. 95, 127.
- 78 This implies a certain parallel to the constitution of the cinematic experience, explored later in this book.
- 79 Riley, pp. 132, 132, 134, 118 (and see p. 188).
- 80 'Modernist Painting' (1960), from Greenberg, vol. IV, p. 86.
- 81 Riley, p. 83.
- 82 Follin, pp. 83, 18.
- 83 Riley, p. 122.
- 84 Cit. H. Spurling, Review of Bridget Riley exhibition, *Guardian Review*, 27/11/10, p. 17.
- 85 Riley, pp. 122, 190, 125.
- 86 Ibid., p. 116.
- 87 Ibid., p. 147. Riley uses the term 'plastic' here, in a sense influenced by Mondrian: 'By plastic I mean that which hangs between the cognitive reading of an image and its perceptions' (p. 147; see also pp. 116–18, 147, 154, 188–90).
- 88 For discussion, see Follin, esp. pp. 66–7 and Chs 1, 2, 5, 6, *passim*.
- 89 Riley, p. 122.

The Distractions of the Modern

- 1 See J. D. Stevens, *Sensationalism and the New York Press* (Columbia University Press, 1991), esp. Part 2, for background.
- 2 New York *World* magazine, 15 November 1914, in D. Barnes, *New York* (Sun & Moon Press, 1989), p. 187 (a collection of her newspaper articles, ed. Alyce Barry). For general accounts of Barnes's journalism see D. Warren, *Djuna Barnes' Consuming Fictions* (Ashgate, 2008), Ch. 2, and D. Parsons, *Djuna Barnes* (Northcote House, 2003), Ch. 1.
- 3 Appropriately, Daniela Caselli suggests that her journalism shows that, for Barnes, 'any form of representation is ... inherently spectacular'; see *Improper Modernism: Djuna Barnes's Bewildering Corpus* (Ashgate, 2009), p. 39.
- 4 6 September 1914, in Barnes, pp. 174–9.
- 5 Ibid., pp. 175, 176, 177.
- 6 Ibid., pp. 178, 178, 179.
- 7 Ibid., pp. 174–5, 178, 178.
- 8 L. Boltanski, *Distant Suffering: Morality, Media and Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 30, and see pp. 21–32. One might indicate a reservation about Boltanski's 'pure' spectator, 'without ties and prior commitments' (p. 29), which makes it sound as though 'absolute' impartiality is possible. These issues are

- discussed further in my *Sympathetic Sentiments: Affect, Emotion and Spectacle in the Modern World* (Bloomsbury, 2014), Ch. 4.
- 9 For sources on the US, see S. A. Glenn, *Female Spectacle: The Theatrical Roots of Modern Feminism* (Harvard University Press, 2000), Ch. 5, and A. Auster, *Actresses and Suffragists: Women in the American Theater, 1890–1920* (New York, 1984). On the UK, see L. Tickner, *The Spectacle of Women: Imagery of the Suffrage Campaign, 1907–14* (Chicago University Press, 1988), and V. Gardner and S. Rutherford (eds), *The New Woman and Her Sisters: Feminism and Theatre, 1850–1914* (Michigan University Press, 1992).
 - 10 Boltanski, pp. 186–7.
 - 11 Glenn, pp. 128, 12, 13.
 - 12 Ibid., p. 147, and see pp. 145–8.
 - 13 W. Benjamin, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility’, in *Selected Writings*, vol. 4: 1938–40 (Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 282. (*Selected Writings* henceforth cited as SW.) The earlier translation, in *Illuminations* (Fontana, 1992) p. 244, gives ‘mechanical equipment’.
 - 14 In I. Kant, *Political Writings* (ed. H. Reiss), 2nd edn (Cambridge University Press, 1991 [1798]).
 - 15 J. and S. Donald, ‘The Publicness of Cinema’, in C. Gledhill and L. Williams (eds), *Reinventing Film Studies* (Arnold, 2000), p. 116.
 - 16 M. Hansen, *Babel & Babylon: Spectatorship in American Silent Film* (Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 116–17. See also Ch. 3, on cinema as an alternative public sphere.
 - 17 M. Hansen, ‘America, Paris, the Alps: Kracauer (and Benjamin) on Cinema and Modernity’, in L. Charney and V. R. Schwartz (eds), *Cinema and the Invention of Modern Life* (California University Press, 1995), p. 366.
 - 18 Hansen, *Babel*, p. 1.
 - 19 New York *World* magazine, 23 August 1914, in Barnes, p. 171.
 - 20 B. Green, ‘Spectacular Confessions: “How It Feels To Be Forcibly Fed”’, *Review of Contemporary Fiction* (1993), 13:3, pp. 85, 71, 71.
 - 21 Tickner, pp. 81, 38. Laura Hinton explores the sado-masochistic undertones of contemporary popular culture – particularly television – in her *The Perverse Gaze of Sympathy* (New York State University Press, 1999).
 - 22 Glenn, p. 82.
 - 23 Green actually implies that Barnes *intended* the article as critique (pp. 80–3), but I could not find any grounds for this. It is, however, true that the overall pattern of her life does not make Barnes seem to be a natural supporter of causes ... One might add that the relative distance Barnes adopts here could *enhance* her appeal as a ‘witness’, given the significance of the appearance of witness impartiality as a condition of the transition from spectator to activist.

- 24 Glenn, p. 162; and see Ch. 6.
- 25 There is, of course, a strand of feminist theory – and, in particular, feminist film theory – that would argue to the contrary, usually developing out of a reading of Freud. The *locus classicus* remains L. Mulvey, ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,’ *Screen* (1975), 16:3; see also her later collection, *Visual and Other Pleasures* (Indiana University Press 1989).
- 26 W. James, *Principles of Psychology* (Dover, 1950 [1890]), vol. I, p. 424.
- 27 Cit. G. Bennington, *Lyotard: Writing the Event* (Manchester University Press, 1988), p. 73.
- 28 J. Crary, *Suspensions of Perception: Attention, Spectacle, and Modern Culture* (MIT Press, 2001), pp. 1–2, *passim*.
- 29 J. Seaton, *Carnage and the Media: The Making and Breaking of News About Violence* (Penguin, 2005), p. 247, and see pp. 247–50.
- 30 Crary, pp. 35–7.
- 31 E. Titchener, *Experimental Psychology* (Macmillan, 1901), p. 186, cit. Crary, p. 21.
- 32 Crary, pp. 4, 18.
- 33 L. Charney, *Empty Moments: Cinema, Modernity, and Drift* (Duke University Press, 1998), p. 6.
- 34 T. Armstrong, ‘Two types of Shock in Modernity,’ *Critical Quarterly* (2000), 42:1, pp. 65, 66.
- 35 Charney, p. 7.
- 36 James, pp. 402, 402, 288, 288.
- 37 *Ibid.*, p. 444, cit. Crary, p. 101.
- 38 Charney, pp. 8, 20.
- 39 Crary, pp. 45–6, 49.
- 40 *Ibid.*, pp. 288, 288, 78.
- 41 L. Sass, *Madness and Modernism* (Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 66, *passim*.
- 42 Charney, p. 82.
- 43 I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N. K. Smith (Macmillan, 1979/1929 [1781]), A96, p. 129.
- 44 *Ibid.*, A112, p. 139. Note that ‘perceptions,’ in Kant’s terminology, are conscious representations.
- 45 L. Aragon, *Paris Peasant* (Exact Change, Boston, 1994 [1926]), p. 7.
- 46 On dissociation, see Crary, pp. 67–8, 96, and the discussion in my *Sympathetic Sentiments*, Ch. 7.
- 47 *Illustrated Guide to Paris* (Cassell, 1884), p. 111, cit. V. R. Schwartz, *Spectacular Realities: Early Mass Culture in Fin-de-Siècle Paris* (California University Press, 1998), p. 1.
- 48 It can be related to aspects of sound, for example: see G. Beer, “Wireless”:

- Popular Physics, Radio and Modernism', in F. Spufford and J. Uglow (eds), *Cultural Babbage: Technology, Time and Invention* (Faber, 1996); and S. Connor, 'The Modern Auditory I', in R. Porter (ed.), *Rewriting the Self: Histories from the Renaissance to the Present* (Routledge, 1997). The term can also be related to others, notably 'dissipation', which also manifests a range of connotations, positive and negative. For a fascinating account, see M. H. Whitworth, *Einstein's Wake: Relativity, Metaphor and Modernist Literature* (Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 64–71.
- 49 V. Woolf, 'Sketch of the Past', from *Moments of Being: Autobiographical Writings* (Pimlico, 2002 [1939–40]), p. 86. On this theme, see also R. Barthes, 'The Reality Effect', in his *The Rustle of Language* (California University Press, 1989), where he explores 'narrative luxury' (p. 141), and the 'significance of this insignificance' (p. 143).
- 50 W. Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama* (Verso, 1985 [1928]), p. 188.
- 51 Ibid., pp. 185–9. See also the illuminating discussion in S. Weber, 'Mass Mediauras, or: Art, Aura and Media in the Work of Walter Benjamin', in his *Mass Mediauras: Form, Technics, Media* (Stanford University Press, 1996).
- 52 W. Benjamin, *The Arcades Project* (Harvard University Press, 1999), Convolute R2, 3, p. 540. See also the 'Work of Art' essay, on the tactile appropriation of architecture as a form of distraction, and how distraction can become habit: SW 4, p. 268, and in *Illuminations*, pp. 232–3.
- 53 Benjamin, *Arcades*, H4a, 1, p. 211. On 'distraction' in Benjamin and other writers, see T. Armstrong, *Modernism, Technology and the Body* (Cambridge University Press, 1998), Ch. 7, and p. 293n. 118.
- 54 Ibid., H5, 1, p. 211. For further discussion of 'involuntary memory' in Benjamin and Proust, see my *Sympathetic Sentiments*, Ch. 6.
- 55 H. Eiland, 'Reception in Distraction', in A. Benjamin (ed.), *Walter Benjamin and Art* (Continuum, 2005), p. 11.
- 56 Benjamin, *Arcades*, M1a, 2, p. 418. See also D. Boothroyd, *Culture on Drugs: Narco-Cultural Studies of High Modernity* (Manchester University Press, 2006), Ch. 5.
- 57 Benjamin, *Arcades*, R2, 3, p. 540.
- 58 W. Benjamin, 'On Some Motifs in Baudelaire', in SW 4, sec. X. (Also in *Illuminations*.)
- 59 Eiland, p. 11.
- 60 Benjamin, *Origin*, p. 28.
- 61 Ibid., p. 29. See also the discussion by D. S. Ferris, 'Introduction: Reading Benjamin' in D. S. Ferris (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Walter Benjamin* (Cambridge University Press, 2004).
- 62 Eiland, p. 11.

- 63 Benjamin, 'Work of Art', SW 4, p. 269 (first sentence in italics), and in *Illuminations*, p. 233 (no italics).
- 64 W. Benjamin, 'Theory of Distraction', *Selected Writings*, vol. 3: 1935–8 (Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 141.
- 65 Benjamin, 'Work of Art', SW 4, p. 267. The translation in *Illuminations*, p. 232, is slightly but intriguingly different, giving 'should be cushioned by heightened presence of mind', a formulation that implies an element of protectiveness, and an element of doubt over *Geistesgegenwart*, raising the issue of the relation between 'presence of mind', attention and consciousness – all discussed in the following paragraphs.
- 66 S. Shaviro, *The Cinematic Body* (Minnesota University Press, 1993), p. 47.
- 67 Cit. S. Kracauer, *Theory of Film: The Redemption of Physical Reality* (Princeton University Press, 1977 [1960]), p. 159.
- 68 Charney, p. 82.
- 69 T. Gunning, 'An Aesthetic of Astonishment: Early Film and the (In)Credulous Spectator', *Art and Text* (1989), 34, and in L. Williams (ed.), *Viewing Positions: Ways of Seeing Films* (Rutgers University Press, 1994). See also Hansen, *Babel*, pp. 76–86, on spectatorship, cinema and film between early and classical cinema.
- 70 Charney, pp. 77, 77, 7.
- 71 H. Münsterberg, *The Photoplay: A Psychological Study* (D. Appleton, New York, 1916), cit. D. Frampton, *Filmosophy* (Wallflower Press, 2006), p. 162.
- 72 Frampton, p. 150. This Deleuze-inflected account is useful on the way the filmgoer engages actively with the film; see Ch. 8.
- 73 Kracauer is the less subtle thinker, and some of his formulations tend towards the crude, but a good case for his significance is made by T. Y. Levin's introduction to S. Kracauer, *The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays* (Harvard University Press, 1995); Hansen, 'America, Paris'; and D. N. Rodowick, *Reading the Figural, or, Philosophy After the New Media* (Duke University Press, 2001), Ch. 5.
- 74 Kracauer, *Theory*, p. 159. This is a reason why film can be powerful propaganda; see pp. 160–3.
- 75 *Ibid.*, p. 165.
- 76 *Ibid.*, p. 166.
- 77 For interesting background on 'shock' see J. Matus, 'Emergent Theories of Victorian Mind Shock: From War and Railway Accident to Nerves, Electricity and Emotion', in A. Stiles (ed.), *Neurology and Literature, 1860-1920* (Palgrave, 2007).
- 78 On the notion of trauma, and its ambiguities, see my discussion in *Sympathetic Sentiments*, Ch. 7.
- 79 Benjamin, 'Work of Art', sec. XIII; and 'Little History of Photography', in *Selected Writings*, vol. 2: 1927–34 (Harvard University Press, 1999). See also C. Lury, *Prosthetic Culture: Photography, Memory and Identity* (Routledge, 1998),

- pp. 204–12, and, for critical discussion and a different perspective, R. Krauss, *The Optical Unconscious* (MIT Press, 1994).
- 80 S. Buck-Morss, 'Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter Benjamin's Artwork Essay Reconsidered', *October* (1992), 62.
- 81 See S. Bruhm, *Gothic Bodies: The Politics of Pain in Romantic Fiction* (Pennsylvania University Press, 1994), pp. 4–7, 17–20, 124–8.
- 82 W. Benjamin, 'The Author as Producer', in SW 2, p. 775.
- 83 W. Benjamin, 'This Space for Rent', from *One-Way Street*, in *Selected Writings*, vol. 1: 1913–26 (Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 476. One might add that in his own explicit discussion of distraction, along similar lines to Benjamin, Kracauer, too, mentions sentimentality: see 'Cult of Distraction' [1926], in his *Mass Ornament*, p. 327.
- 84 Benjamin, 'Work of Art', SW 4, p. 269, and *Illuminations*, p. 234 (using 'critical' and 'absent-minded' respectively). Benjamin adds that we find, in audience response, an 'immediate fusion of pleasure' with 'expert appraisal' (ibid. p. 264 and *Illuminations*, p. 227), which seems to fit Frampton's claim that 'Even when we are "losing ourselves" in the film we are still thinking with and against the film', hence our 'particularly filmic mode of attention' (p. 163).
- 85 M. Jennings, 'Walter Benjamin and the European avant-garde', in Ferris, p. 30.
- 86 J. Mieczkowski, 'Art Forms', in Ferris, p. 42.
- 87 Weber, p. 96.
- 88 Benjamin, 'Work of Art', SW 4, p. 268, and *Illuminations*, p. 232.
- 89 Ibid., p. 264, and *Illuminations*, pp. 227–8, which gives 'individual reactions are predetermined by the mass audience response they are about to produce', a translation that retains the sense of anticipatory response that is central to the suggestion of the reflexive here.
- 90 Ibid., p. 262, in italics, and *Illuminations*, p. 225, no italics.
- 91 Kracauer, *Theory*, pp. 71, 168.
- 92 Ibid., p. 169.
- 93 Benjamin, 'Work of Art', SW 4, p. 265, and *Illuminations*, p. 229.
- 94 Ibid., p. 263, and *Illuminations*, p. 226, which gives 'orchid' here, a translation that comprehensively misses the allusion; see M. Hansen, 'Benjamin, Cinema and Experience: "The Blue Flower in the Land of Technology"', *New German Critique* (1987), 40, pp. 204–5, and SW 4, n. 30, pp. 278–9.
- 95 Benjamin, 'Work of Art', SW 4, p. 264, and *Illuminations*, p. 227; and see sec. XI, *passim*.
- 96 Ibid., p. 273n. 14, second part in italics; and *Illuminations*, p. 237n. 14, no italics.
- 97 Ibid., p. 254, and *Illuminations*, p. 215, respectively.
- 98 Weber, p. 84.
- 99 Benjamin, 'Work of Art', SW 4, p. 267, and *Illuminations*, p. 232.

- 100 Ibid., p. 282n. 47, first quote in italics; and *Illuminations*, p. 243n. 21, no italics.
- 101 Ibid., p. 277n. 27, and *Illuminations*, p. 240n. 12. The classic case of the potential for propaganda in all this is doubtless Leni Riefenstahl's film of the Nuremberg rallies, *Triumph of the Will*. For discussion, see S. Sontag, 'Fascinating Fascism', in *A Susan Sontag Reader* (Penguin, 1983).
- 102 Weber, p. 90.
- 103 See Benjamin, 'Work of Art', sec. IX, SW 4, esp. pp. 260–2, and *Illuminations*, pp. 223–4.
- 104 For discussion, see C. Gledhill (ed.), *Stardom: Industry of Desire* (Routledge, 1991), esp. C. Gledhill, 'Signs of Melodrama'.
- 105 For a fascinating exploration of this, see J. Elmer, *Reading at the Social Limit: Affect, Mass Culture, and Edgar Allan Poe* (Stanford University Press, 1995); and for further aspects of 'mass culture' as the denounced other of modernism in the arts, see A. Huyssen, *After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture and Postmodernism* (Macmillan, 1986), esp. Chs 1–3.

Cinematic Sensation: The Sublime and the Spectacle

- 1 For a general account, see M. Myrone, 'John Martin: art, taste and the spectacle of culture', in M. Myrone (ed.), *John Martin: Apocalypse* (Tate, 2011). Useful also are M. Meisel, *Realizations: Narrative, Pictorial and Theatrical Arts in Nineteenth-Century England* (Princeton University Press, 1992), and M. D. Paley, *The Apocalyptic Sublime* (Yale University Press, 1986).
- 2 On the conflict between catastrophists and uniformitarians in early nineteenth-century science, see D. Bindman, 'Deep time, dragons and dinosaurs', in Myrone.
- 3 S. Morley, 'Staring into the Contemporary Abyss', *Tate Etc.* (2010), 20, p. 72. See also his more extended account, in *The Sublime: Documents of Contemporary Art* (Whitechapel Art Gallery, 2010).
- 4 Highly pertinent here is Scott Lash's suggestion that, in considering the sublime, as the source of our deepest experiences, we should, *pace* Kant, circumvent imagination and understanding, since judgements of the sublime spring 'direct from the sphere of sensation', where subjectivity finds its ground. Hence sensation, as ground, lies 'beyond the discourse of reason and the figure of the imagination'. See *Another Modernity: A Different Rationality* (Blackwell, 1999), p. 233. Leaving aside Lash's ambitious attempt to locate this 'ground' in terms of social theory, one might argue that sensation cannot be adequately located 'beyond' discourse and imagination, even if irreducible to them; indeed, 'figuration' is an important mode of its manifestation (see Ch. 3 above).
- 5 Cit. J. Griffin, 'John Martin I', *Tate Etc.* (2011), 23, p. 34.

- 6 J. Milne, 'The abyss that abides', in Myrone, p. 53.
- 7 Indeed, the large Tate Britain exhibition of his work (2011–12), testifying to the revival of interest, featured a light and sound spectacle around the *Last Judgement* triptych, in the spirit of the nineteenth-century popular appropriation of his work.
- 8 In S. Kracauer, *The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays* (Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 78, 84.
- 9 Hence self-harming as 'cutting': see Ch. 2, above.
- 10 J. Derrida, *The Truth in Painting* (Chicago University Press, 1987), from 'Parergon', sec. IV, p. 120.
- 11 G. Bennington and I. McLeod, in *ibid.*, p. 120n. 32.
- 12 Derrida, pp. 122, 123.
- 13 Derrida proceeds to subsume the sublime into his theory of the parergon, the frame that appears to be 'outside' but is actually constitutive of the (art) work, hence is as much 'inside'; but one might respond that this does not *exhaust* the sublime, in that a necessary condition for the experience of the sublime is nonetheless not constitutive of it. For a useful account, see D. Carroll, *Paraesthetics: Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida* (Routledge, 1989), Ch. 6:1.
- 14 R. Maltby, with I. Craven, *Hollywood Cinema: An Introduction* (Blackwell, 1995), p. 210.
- 15 C. Colebrook, *Gilles Deleuze* (Routledge, 2002), p. 31.
- 16 G. Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* (Minnesota University Press, 1986), p. 40; and see Chs 2, 3, for useful reflections on cutting, framing and montage. Deleuze is influenced here by the Soviet film-maker and theorist Dziga Vertov, for whom the movement of the camera eye could adapt to or even merge with the movement of matter; for further discussion, see F. Zourabichvili, 'The Eye of Montage: Dziga Vertov and Bergsonian Materialism', in G. Flaxman (ed.), *The Brain Is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema* (Minnesota University Press, 2000).
- 17 G. Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (Minnesota University Press, 1989), p. 156, in italics from 'producing ...'
- 18 I. Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, trans. P. Guyer and E. Matthews (Cambridge University Press, 2001 [1790]), §24, p. 131. For the full discussion of the sublime, see §§23–9.
- 19 *Ibid.*, §27, p. 141.
- 20 See my *Sympathetic Sentiments: Affect, Emotion and Spectacle in the Modern World* (Bloomsbury, 2014), Ch. 5.
- 21 Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, p. 110. In his cinema books, Deleuze distinguishes the 'classic' cinema of the 1920s and 1930s, committed to film as an 'expressive totality', and 'modern' cinema, centred on the French 'New Wave' of the 1950s, with its self-conscious exploration of the relationship between gap and image, manifested

- in 'irrational' cuts and bizarre juxtapositions, a contrast which arguably downplays the continuities between innovative strands in both. Indeed, narrative coherence and expressive totality might be more appropriately located in the mainstream Hollywood tradition – but this, of course, for Deleuze, is not worth serious consideration ... For a thorough account, see R. Bogue, *Deleuze on Cinema* (Routledge, 2003), and the discussions in Flaxman.
- 22 G. Lambert, 'Cinema and the Outside', in Flaxman, pp. 261, 285, and see pp. 259–63, on the Kantian sublime in relation to Deleuze. Lambert points out that what in Kant is seen as an impasse of the imagination is reconfigured by Deleuze, following Bergson, by seeing the brain itself as an interval or gap that opens onto a 'virtual whole' (p. 285). In his discussion, Ronald Bogue suggests (p. 173) that 'The images cannot be integrated within the concept of an internal self-consciousness, nor can they be treated as differentiations of a whole within a coherent external world'; and see his account in Ch. 2.
- 23 Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, p. 181.
- 24 And this is one area where one might have reservations about Deleuze, who tends – as in the quotes given above – to subsume the latter under the former.
- 25 *Critique of Practical Reason* [1788], in I. Kant, *Practical Philosophy* (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 269.
- 26 *Ibid.*, p. 270.
- 27 G. Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties* (Minnesota University Press, 1984), p. 51 (and see pp. 50–2).
- 28 *Ibid.*, p. 50.
- 29 Kant, *Judgment*, §25, p. 133; §28, p. 144; §28, p. 144.
- 30 See Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, pp. 49–55 for discussion of the mathematical sublime and the dynamical sublime in the context of film, and Bogue, Ch. 2. One further area of comparison, in relation to this distinction, is the part played by the contrast of light and dark: Deleuze uses German expressionism (Fritz Lang, F. W. Murnau) as exemplifying the dynamical sublime, where we find that light and shadow become warring forces, clashing intensities, hence distorting perspectives, coming alive in the very objects they constitute, producing eerie, charged atmospheres ...
- 31 Kracauer, p. 76.
- 32 Kant, *Judgment*, §26, p. 136.
- 33 See S. Bordo, 'Reading the Slender Body', in M. Jacobus et al. (eds), *Body/Politics: Women and the Discourses of Science* (Routledge, 1990); and A. Synnott, *The Body Social: Symbolism, Self and Society* (Routledge, 1993), Ch. 3.
- 34 Given the stigmatization of the sentimental, this could also be a contribution to the meaning of that expression 'from the sublime to the ridiculous': your experience of being 'moved' by the sublime can seem bathos, self-indulgence, to me ...

- 35 L. Berlant, 'Poor Eliza', *American Literature* (1998) 70:3, p. 645, and in her *The Female Complaint* (Duke University Press, 2008), Ch. 1.
- 36 S. Cubitt, 'Introduction. *Le réel, c'est l'impossible*: the sublime time of special effects', *Screen* (1999), 40:2, p. 129.
- 37 See J. Baudrillard, 'The Precession of Simulacra', in his *Simulacra and Simulation* (Michigan University Press, 1994 [1981]), esp. p. 3, distinguishing simulation from pretence. For discussion, see R. Butler, *Jean Baudrillard: The Defence of the Real* (Sage, 1999), Ch. 1.
- 38 F. Léger, 'The Spectacle', in *Functions of Painting* (Viking, 1973), p. 35. For a history of the concept of spectacle, see J. Crary, 'Spectacle, Attention, Counter-Memory', *October* (1989), 50.
- 39 N. Abercrombie and B. Longhurst, *Audiences: A Sociological Theory of Performance and Imagination* (Sage, 1998), p. 97.
- 40 D. Kellner, *Media Spectacle* (Routledge, 2003), p. 11.
- 41 See my discussion in *Sympathetic Sentiments*, Ch. 3, and, for later issues raised by spectacle, Ch. 8.
- 42 S. Neale, 'Triumph of the Will: notes on documentary and spectacle', *Screen* (1979), 20:1, p. 66.
- 43 V. R. Schwartz, *Spectacular Realities: Early Mass Culture in Fin-de-Siècle Paris* (California University Press, 1998), pp. 157, 16.
- 44 Ibid., p. 130, and Ch. 3. See also T. J. Clark, *The Painting of Modern Life: Paris in the Art of Manet and His Followers* (Thames and Hudson, 1990), Introduction, for an account of the origins of Parisian spectacle that draws on Debord; and J. Drucker, *Theorizing Modernism* (Columbia University Press, 1994), Ch. 2, for discussion of simulation and spectacle in relation to modern art.
- 45 T. Brown, 'Spectacle/gender/history: the case of *Gone With the Wind*', *Screen* (2008), 49:2, p. 159.
- 46 T. Richards, *The Commodity Culture of Victorian England: Advertising and Spectacle 1851–1914* (Verso, 1991), pp. 111–12.
- 47 S. Buck-Morss, *The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project* (MIT Press, 1991).
- 48 Aspects of this are discussed in S. Stewart, *On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection* (Duke University Press, 1993).
- 49 Richards, p. 203.
- 50 Schwartz, p. 190.
- 51 J. Rancière, *The Emancipated Spectator* (Verso, 2009), p. 14.
- 52 G. Debord, *Society of the Spectacle* (Black & Red, Detroit, 1970), ¶¶1, 8, 30. (There are several translations, none authorized, so Debord's numbered paragraphs are given.)
- 53 Ibid., ¶29.

- 54 For discussions of Debord in this wider context, see Rancière, pp. 6–7, 44–6, and S. Cubitt, *Simulation and Social Theory* (Sage, 2001), Ch. 3:1.
- 55 Debord, ¶1.
- 56 Ibid., ¶¶69, 66, 68.
- 57 And, indeed, more speculatively, Adam Smith: see my *Sympathetic Sentiments*, Ch. 4. Overall, Debord's theory is surely more subtle and insightful than many summaries or rival accounts that over-emphasize the abstraction, positing an abstract spectacle, reduced to an effect of power, that positions and confronts a subject, passive and featureless save as object of power – an analysis that also manages to reify spectacle, detaching it from the relations in which it is embedded.
- 58 Debord, ¶65, and see ¶¶63–5 overall.
- 59 Abercrombie and Longhurst, p. 84.
- 60 Kellner, p. 11.
- 61 G. Debord, *Comments on the Society of the Spectacle* (Verso, 1990).
- 62 *New York Times*, 3 April 2003, cit. E. A. Kaplan, *Trauma Culture: The Politics of Terror and Loss in Media and Literature* (Rutgers University Press, 2005), p. 99. Paul Virilio would of course answer Boxer's question with an unequivocal affirmative; see his *War and Cinema: The logistics of Perception* (Verso, 1989).
- 63 J. Seaton, *Carnage and the Media: The Making and Breaking of News About Violence* (Penguin, 2005), p. 140.

Sensational Affect

- 1 W. E. Connolly, *Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed* (Minnesota University Press, 2002), p. 67. Elsewhere (notably Ch. 3) this book offers some useful insights.
- 2 It should be added that much of the recent discussion of 'affect' oddly echoes earlier discussions, from the eighteenth century, and some of the controversies have recognizable continuities. On this, and for a critique of efforts by affect theorists to reposition Spinoza as an ancestor, see my *Sympathetic Sentiments: Affect, Emotion and Spectacle* (Bloomsbury, 2014), Ch. 5.
- 3 T. Brennan, *The Transmission of Affect* (Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 5, 116.
- 4 L. Grossberg, 'Is There a Fan in the House? The Affective Sensibility of Fandom', in L. A. Lewis (ed.), *The Adoring Audience: Fan Culture and Popular Media* (Routledge, 1992), pp. 60, 57, 57.
- 5 M. Kavka, *Reality Television, Affect and Intimacy: Reality Matters* (Palgrave, 2008), pp. xii, 34.
- 6 M. Wetherell, *Affect and Emotion: A New Social Science Understanding* (Sage, 2012), p. 45. This is a useful survey of the field, critical but fair-minded.

- 7 Brennan, p. 183n. 5.
- 8 Kavka, p. 35.
- 9 Lisa Blackman argues that the affect/cognition distinction is difficult to sustain if one accepts that the two hemispheres of the brain disclose ‘interdependency and parallelism, rather than separation and hierarchy’. See her *Immaterial Bodies: Affect, Embodiment, Mediation* (Sage, 2012), p. 181, and the further references given there. For this issue, and more discussion of ‘feeling’ and ‘emotion’, see *Sympathetic Sentiments*, Ch. 4.
- 10 B. Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Duke University Press, 2002), p. 4.
- 11 B. Massumi, ‘Introduction: Like a Thought’, in B. Massumi (ed.), *A Shock to Thought: Expression after Deleuze and Guattari* (Routledge, 2002), p. xxiv.
- 12 Wetherell, p. 87.
- 13 Massumi, ‘Introduction’, p. xxiv.
- 14 G. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (Continuum, 2004 [1968]), p. 144.
- 15 Ibid., p. xxx.
- 16 Brennan, p. 157.
- 17 Massumi, *Parables*, pp. 28, 29, 30.
- 18 One might insert another example, from a latter-day Zeus. Demanding the execution of Louis XVIII, Robespierre claimed that ‘the people’ do not judge like a court of law: ‘they do not hand down sentences, they throw thunderbolts ...’. See M. Robespierre, *Virtue and Terror* (Verso, 2007), p. 129.
- 19 Massumi, ‘Introduction’, p. xxv. In his book *Violence* (Profile, 2009) Slavoj Žižek, coming from a different direction (Hegel, Lacan), shows an intriguingly similar hostility to language: it ‘dismembers the thing, destroys its organic unity’. If we take ‘gold’, for example, with the very name ‘we violently extract a metal from its natural texture, investing into it our dreams of wealth, power, spiritual purity’, which have nothing to do with its ‘immediate reality’ (p. 52). As with Massumi, the effect of this is to disregard any imaginative or creative powers of language itself in favour of reducing language to the power of something external, whether affect (Massumi) or the master-signifier as exercise of the paternal law (Žižek, Lacan). The difference is that, for Massumi, language, as representation, becomes conservative, inert, whereas for Žižek, it inherently manifests the ‘violent imposition’ of the master-signifier (p. 53), hence is violent in itself – a sweeping perspective that proves far too broad to make a useful contribution to a theory of violence, and leaves Žižek (like Massumi) unable to account for the non-violent *metaphorical* power of his own language.
- 20 Massumi, *Parables*, p. 7.
- 21 Ibid., p. 98. Massumi often uses ‘sensation’ and ‘affect’ interchangeably (e.g. p. 98), sometimes using sensation more narrowly, as the affective contrast to perception.

- 22 G. Seigworth, 'From affection to soul', in C. J. Stivale (ed.), *Gilles Deleuze: Key Concepts* (Acumen, 2005), p. 161.
- 23 P. T. Clough, 'The Affective Turn: Political Economy, Biomedica, and Bodies', in G. J. Seigworth and M. Gregg (eds), *The Affect Theory Reader* (Duke University Press, 2010), p. 209. See also her introduction to P. T. Clough and J. Halley (eds), *The Affective Turn* (Duke University Press, 2007).
- 24 Massumi, *Parables*, p. 30.
- 25 Wetherell, p. 59.
- 26 Massumi, *Parables*, pp. 28, 35.
- 27 Ibid., p. 123.
- 28 This is the title of the particularly influential first chapter of *Parables*; it was published, in an earlier form, in *Cultural Critique* (1995) 31.
- 29 Massumi, *Parables*, p. 25.
- 30 Ibid., pp. 58–61; 265–6n. 13; 266n. 16.
- 31 One can cite here the increasingly influential work of Silvan Tomkins, spanning the period from the 1960s onwards, providing detailed studies of the workings of affect and drawing out the implications. Claiming to separate out nine different affects, in all their embodied and emotional complexity, along with 'affect scripts' to show how these unfold in relation to one another and the problems they raise, he derives a critique of the over-valuation of Western rationality and its dependence on the priority of consciousness, concluding that there can be no cognition purified of affective content. See S. S. Tomkins, *Exploring Affect: The Selected Writings of S. S. Tomkins* (Cambridge University Press, 1995), esp. Parts I and IV; and see also the introduction by V. Demos to Part I, surveying his theory.
- 32 G. J. Seigworth and M. Gregg, 'An Inventory of Shimmers', in Seigworth and Gregg, p. 1.
- 33 Massumi, *Parables*, pp. 43, 217, 35.
- 34 Wetherell, p. 59.
- 35 Massumi, *Parables*, pp. 138, 139. It should be added that, in practice, Massumi frequently offers more wide-ranging analyses than his theoretical presuppositions would seem to allow, suggesting an implicit awareness that his ostensible framework of assumptions is too restrictive.
- 36 Anyway, as we saw earlier, 'heartbeat' is only tenuously 'affect' at all – it is not quite autonomic enough.
- 37 Wetherell, pp. 46, 47. Her criticisms of Massumi are developed in Ch. 3, pp. 54–67. For critique, see also C. Hemmings, 'Invoking Affect: Cultural Theory and the Ontological Turn', *Cultural Studies* (2005) 19:5, and, for a particularly wide-ranging discussion, R. Leys, 'The Turn to Affect: a critique', *Critical Inquiry* (2011) 37:3.
- 38 In an excellent overview, written from *within* the 'affective turn', Anna Gibbs

registers something of this tension, telling us that ‘Whether an affect is coming or going is information that is then conscripted into semiotic systems of meaning’, and agreeing that language ‘enables a reflective handle on experience’. Elsewhere, unsurprisingly, a rather cruder approach can be apparent: for example, she refers to ‘corporeally based forms of imitation, both voluntary and involuntary (and on which literary representation ultimately depends)’, where the claim in brackets could range from the completely vacuous to the implausibly reductionist, cutting out any relative autonomy of language altogether. See A. Gibbs, ‘After Affect: Sympathy, Synchrony, and Mimetic Communication’, in Seigworth and Gregg, pp. 192, 201, 186.

- 39 Controversies in the sociological theorizing of charisma do indeed run intriguingly parallel here: does the ‘charismatic authority’ of the revolutionary leader reside in his personal, psychological qualities, hence his affective powers, or in the transformations he proclaims in established doctrines? In the light of this discussion, we might want to say that it lies in the awkward disjunction of both. For the classic source, see M. Weber, ‘The Nature of Charismatic Domination’ [1922], in *Max Weber: Selections in Translation*, ed. W. G. Runciman (Cambridge University Press, 1978), Ch. 11.
- 40 Deleuze, p. 176.
- 41 C. Colebrook, *Gilles Deleuze* (Routledge, 2002), pp. 111, 115. In keeping with her conscientious exposition of Deleuze, Colebrook makes some contentious statements, such as: ‘Language is not about representation, naming or propositions, but rather about creating worlds of sense that interact with other material worlds ...’ (p. 111). Surely it is about *all* of these?!
- 42 An interesting account that brings this out well is B. J. Gold, *ThermoPoetics: Energy in Victorian Literature and Science* (MIT Press, 2010).
- 43 D. Stern, ‘Applying Developmental and Neuroscience Findings on Other-Centred Participation to the Process of Change in Psychotherapy’, in S. Braten (ed.), *On Being Moved: From Mirror Neurons to Empathy* (John Benjamin’s, 2007), p. 37. For sympathetic accounts of the mirror neurons evidence, see G. Rizzolatti and C. Sinigaglia, *Mirrors in the Brain: How Our Minds Share Actions and Emotions* (Oxford University Press, 2007); and, ranging more widely, J. Decety and W. Ickes (eds), *The Social Neuroscience of Empathy* (MIT Press, 2011). For short critical assessments, see Wetherell, Ch. 2, and Blackman, Ch. 7; and, for a thorough critique, J. Coulter et al., *Brain, Mind, and Human Behaviour in Contemporary Cognitive Science: Critical Assessments of the Philosophy of Psychology* (Edwin Mullen Press, 2007). We might also note that in these ‘scientific’ usages, ‘empathy’ is shifting in meaning, becoming de-moralized, anaesthetized, losing its remaining links to ‘sympathy’.
- 44 It has also been taken up elsewhere, notably in N. Thrift, *Non-Representational*

- Theory: Space, Politics and Affect* (Routledge, 2008). For critical observations, see Wetherell, pp. 55–8, 66, 123–7.
- 45 R. Terada, *Feeling in Theory: Emotion after the 'Death of the Subject'* (Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 17, 29.
- 46 Massumi, *Parables*, pp. 14, 16, 36. Massumi describes this relational, rather than substantive, conception of the self as an instance of the 'incorporeal materialism' he espouses (p. 16). He adds that this conception of the self, involving the 'doubling' implied by the 'feeling of having a feeling', does not necessarily involve being self-reflexive, or the splitting and distancing this involves (pp. 13, 14), but this again leaves us unable to theorize the intervention of language and concept, and the very fact of *intervention* here.
- 47 Massumi uses 'resonation' more frequently than 'resonance', but there does not seem to be any difference between them; since the latter is in wider use, and is also used in the translations of Deleuze, it is adopted here.
- 48 Massumi, *Parables*, p. 14.
- 49 Ibid., p. 33.
- 50 G. Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation* (Continuum, 2003 [1981]), pp. 65, 66. For Deleuze's treatment and use of resonance elsewhere, see, for example, *Difference*, pp. 144–5, 148–9, 151, 281, 363–4, where resonance between levels, systems or series is emphasized; and *What Is Philosophy?* (Verso, 1994 [1991], with F. Guattari), p. 211, where the link between sensation, vibration and resonance is explicit.
- 51 In the context of language, indeed, 'evocation', with its hint of temporal depth, might be a term that overlaps significantly.
- 52 Thus Adam Phillips and Barbara Taylor remind us that Hume compared the transmission of feelings with the vibration of violin strings, 'with each individual resonating with the pains and pleasures of others': see *On Kindness* (Penguin, 2010), p. 29.
- 53 Kafka, p. 29.
- 54 In his early *Empiricism and Subjectivity* (Columbia University Press, 1991 [1953]), on Hume, Deleuze offers intriguing reflections on how the mind's two characteristics, resonance and vividness, come to constitute it as *subject* when the part containing vivid impressions communicates with the part containing less vivid ideas, and when '*all the parts taken together resonate in the act of producing something new*' (p. 132, italics in the original). Belief and invention are hence 'modes of transcendence' whereby mind rises above itself.
- 55 Terada, p. 156.
- 56 Gibbs, p. 186.
- 57 Not surprisingly, there has been some revival of interest in 'crowd psychology' as part of these developments; see Blackman, Chs 2, 3, and Wetherell, Ch. 7, for

discussion. Blackman shows an interest in the ‘power of suggestion’, and theories of porous boundaries and ‘multiple selves’ and calls for a revival of nineteenth-century ‘subliminal psychology’.

- 58 F. Jameson, *Postmodernism, or, the Logic of Late Capitalism* (Duke University Press, 1991), pp. 10, 15.
- 59 Again, one sometimes suspects another revival here, that of nineteenth-century evolutionism. Thus Gibbs argues that movement, sound and rhythm are not ‘vestigial’, superfluous to language and its modes: ‘they also inhabit and actively shape them’ (p. 199). Indeed so; but the use of ‘vestigial’ here is interesting. It was a favourite of evolutionary discourse: ‘vestiges’ of previous stages could linger on, possibly presenting dangers. And the article is much preoccupied with mother–infant interaction, clearly seen as fundamental to the affect paradigm: do we see here a revival of ‘ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny’, the idea that the history of evolution can be mapped onto the development of the child? Certainly the cultural politics of the affective turn is intriguing, caught between a dubious repetition of old cultural motifs and a reflection of more contemporary, green ones, a willingness to accept the necessary immersion of the human in a broader conception of organic nature (even though, as argued here, ‘culture’ – whatever it is – can get somewhat lost in the process).

The Melodrama of the Modern

- 1 Kevin Rozario points out that ‘Within a week, indeed, the spectacular and the sentimental had been woven into an ethical and aesthetic hybrid entirely familiar to audiences of disaster movies’; see his *The Culture of Calamity: Disaster and the Making of Modern America* (Chicago University Press, 2007), p. 193, and see pp. 180, 193–5. See also N. Klein, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism* (Penguin, 2007), Ch. 14, and, for an emphasis on the representational dynamics of 9/11, S. Žižek, *The Desert of the Real* (Verso, 2002), Ch. 1.
- 2 L. Williams, ‘Melodrama Revised’, in N. Browne (ed.), *Refiguring American Film Genres: History and Theory* (California University Press, 1998), p. 52.
- 3 It is important to remember that we are doing cultural history or cultural theory here, not philosophy or theology. From the viewpoint of Christian theology, Manichaeism – the dualism of good and evil as cosmic forces – is heresy, seeming to elevate Satan to equal status with God, and was driven out by St Augustine in the earliest phase of Christian institutionalization. This doesn’t alter the fact that, in popular belief and practice, Christian culture has always been deeply dualist, as has the church itself, when persecuting ‘heretics’.
- 4 And pornography can emerge as the excess of this in representation itself,

- pushing representation into the real, even as it reveals the excess of the real in its transgression of the distinction itself. This also shows the inseparable link between Enlightenment thought and its ‘other side’, from Sade to Bataille; see S. Sontag, ‘The Pornographic Imagination’, in *A Susan Sontag Reader* (Penguin, 1982).
- 5 It is important to emphasize that what matters here is not a critique of ‘reason’ as such, in any conceivable use of the term, but an examination of the implications, in practice, of a particular, universalizing model of reason that has been particularly important in Western philosophy and culture. One should add that appeals to universal notions of ‘human rights’ do, of course, have their place, when embedded in *particular* contexts of liberation struggles.
 - 6 See the reflections in J. Baudrillard, *The Spirit of Terrorism* (Verso, 2012 [2002]), where he claims that ‘Good and Evil advance together, as part of the same movement’, and that, ultimately, ‘Good could thwart Evil only by ceasing to be Good since, by seizing for itself a global monopoly of power, it gives rise, by that very act, to a blowback of a proportionate violence’ (pp. 10, 11). He adds that universalizing value makes it self-subverting (pp. 67–70). Elsewhere, he adds a further possible consequence, namely that Evil can be positioned as what resists hegemonic domination, the ‘non-unification of things ...’; see his *Passwords* (Verso, 2003), p. 33. Despite their contrasting overall frameworks, there is a convergence here with Badiou, for whom Good is only such if it accepts self-limitation: ‘Every absolutization of a power of truth organizes an Evil.’ See A. Badiou, *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil* (Verso, 2012 [1993]), p. 85.
 - 7 Postmodern readings of Kant, stemming from Lyotard, have perhaps distracted attention from the link here by portraying the sublime as a crisis of representation in the arts, separate from an account of the fate of reason in the ‘collapse of grand narratives.’ See J.-F. Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (Manchester University Press, 1984), and ‘Answering the Question: what is Postmodernism?’, in *ibid.*, and re-translated in his *The Postmodern Explained: Correspondence 1982–85* (Minnesota University Press, 1992).
 - 8 A. MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (Duckworth, 1985), Ch. 2 (see also Chs 4, 5). Coming from a different tradition, Lyotard’s concept of the differend attempts to grapple with similar issues; see J.-F. Lyotard, *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute* (Manchester University Press, 1988).
 - 9 Cit. D. J. Denby, *Sentimental Narrative and the Social Order in France, 1760–1820* (Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 160, my trans.
 - 10 P. Brooks, *The Melodramatic Imagination: Balzac, Henry James, Melodrama, and the Mode of Excess* (Yale University Press, 1995 [1976]), p. 101. This is the founding text of modern melodrama studies, still indispensable. For another insightful literary treatment, see C. Williams, ‘Moving Pictures: George Eliot

and Melodrama', in L. Berlant (ed.), *Compassion: The Culture and Politics of an Emotion* (Routledge, 2004).

- 11 M. Gluck, *Popular Bohemia: Modernism and Urban Culture in Nineteenth-Century Paris* (Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 44, 45. See Ch. 2, *passim*.
- 12 E. Hadley, *Melodramatic Tactics: Theatricalized Dissent in the English Marketplace, 1800–1885* (Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 211, 225. Hadley is concerned to display melodrama as basically a reactionary form (pp. 3, 11), but here as elsewhere her examples don't always seem to confirm this; she concedes that it is not easily categorized (p. 12). On the 'Maiden Tribute' episode, see also J. R. Walkowitz, *City of Dreadful Delight: Narratives of Sexual Danger in Late-Victorian London* (Chicago University Press, 1992), Chs 3, 4; and, for a comparable American experience, in the context of the politics of anti-semitism, anti-immigration and implicit racism, see R. Maltby, 'The Social Evil, the Moral Order, and the Melodramatic Imagination, 1890–1915', in J. Bratton et al. (eds), *Melodrama: Stage, Picture, Screen* (BFI, 1994).
- 13 Williams, 'Melodrama', p. 42. See also the useful discussion in B. Singer, *Melodrama and Modernity: Early Sensational Cinema and Its Contexts* (Columbia University Press, 2001), esp. Ch. 2. Singer's identification of 'moral polarization and sensational action and spectacle' (p. 58) as the two essential elements of melodrama would command general assent.
- 14 See C. Gledhill (ed.), *Home is Where the Heart Is: Studies in Melodrama and the Woman's Film* (BFI, 1987).
- 15 One might note here that in the two Gulf Wars, George Bush, Senior and Junior, both battled the Satanic Saddam, and it was as if the Son took it on himself to carry on (avenge or upstage) the work of the Father, who had not won the ultimate victory, thus presenting us with a scenario that the protagonists, and the media alike, already presented in melodramatic terms, as a battle of good and evil – but now re-imagined as a sort of ghastly 'domestic melodrama' beyond Hollywood's wildest imaginings, projected onto the political stage. The reader can pursue the psychoanalytical/theological complexities here, if so inclined ...
- 16 Williams, 'Melodrama', p. 51.
- 17 See discussion of these themes in S. Jeffords, *The Remasculinization of America: Gender and the Vietnam War* (Indiana University Press, 1989).
- 18 Williams, 'Melodrama', p. 59.
- 19 This also reveals continuities with the tableau of nineteenth-century stage melodrama, and its eighteenth-century predecessors; see Williams, 'Melodrama'.
- 20 See the exploration of this in C. Gledhill, 'Signs of Melodrama', in C. Gledhill (ed.), *Stardom: Industry of Desire* (Routledge, 1991), emphasizing the role of 'excess' both in stardom and in the modern construction of personality.
- 21 O. Bartov, 'Spielberg's Oskar: Hollywood Tries Evil', in Y. Loshitzky (ed.),

- Spielberg's Holocaust: Critical Perspectives on Schindler's List* (Indiana University Press, 1997), pp. 44, 45, 45.
- 22 Ibid., p. 49.
- 23 Williams, 'Melodrama', p. 54.
- 24 Ibid., pp. 62, 61. One might add that Jean Seaton argues that the tragic hero, and tragedy generally, should be distinguished from melodrama, the lazy use of 'tragic' in the media obscuring this; see her *Carnage and the Media: The Making and Breaking of News about Violence* (Penguin, 2005), pp. 241–5.
- 25 C. Guignon, Introduction to F. Dostoevsky, *The Grand Inquisitor* (Hackett, 1993, an extended excerpt from *The Brothers Karamazov* [1879]), p. xx.
- 26 *Observer*, 18 January 2004, cit. P. Cole, *The Myth of Evil* (Edinburgh University Press, 2006), p. 126.
- 27 Cole, pp. 93, 8. The conclusion of his thoughtful account is that 'evil' constitutes 'a highly dangerous and inhumane discourse and we are better off without it' (p. 21). See Chs 4, 5, on the 'enemy within'.
- 28 What has sometimes happened, to reinforce the uniqueness case, is the presentation of the Holocaust itself as 'traumatic' – which seems fair enough in itself – and to link this with a specific *theory* of trauma whereby it 'infects' those who later attempt to debate, reflect on, or represent it, obliterating the gap between reality and representation in the literalness of repetition. This trauma theme is discussed in my *Sympathetic Sentiments: Affect, Emotion, and Spectacle in the Modern World* (Bloomsbury, 2014), Ch. 7, and I will merely observe here that it can, in some ways, be seen to *reinforce* the melodrama perspective. For discussions that shows an awareness that Holocaust studies do indeed constitute a *discourse*, and an awareness of trauma issues, see D. LaCapra, *Writing History, Writing Trauma* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), and his earlier *Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma* (Cornell University Press, 1994). See also T. Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (Bodley Head, 2010), an important account of the wider context.
- 29 P. Knight, *Conspiracy Culture: From Kennedy to The X-Files* (Routledge, 2000), p. 117.
- 30 Ibid., p. 244.
- 31 Ibid., Ch. 2.
- 32 Knight points out that 'everything is connected' could be a slogan in a wide range of fields, beyond conspiracy theory: epidemiology, ecology, systems theory, risk theory, globalization theory, the internet, theories of intertextuality (p. 205). One might add that it features as a symptom of mental illness ...
- 33 Intriguing ramifications of all this can be traced in the horror film. Jonathan Crane argues that the 'nihilism' of these films reveal 'overt codes that explicitly deny the possibility of knowledge or collective action producing a remotely viable

future'; indeed, the eternal return of the 'menace' seems to be part of the spectacle of pleasure here. Expertise is no use when the potential for disaster is omnipresent and we can all potentially be monsters ... See his *Terror and Everyday Life: Singular Moments in the History of the Horror Film* (Sage, 1994), pp. 8, 10.

- 34 See U. Beck, *Risk Society* (Sage, 1992).
- 35 D. N. Rodowick, *Reading the Figural, or, Philosophy After the New Media* (Duke University Press, 2001), p. 209. Influenced by the Deleuze and Guattari of *A Thousand Plateaus*, Rodowick presents this language of 'flows', 'tides', 'waves' and 'currents' as the appropriate language of contemporary societies of 'control' (rather than of earlier 'disciplinary' societies); but as we have seen in previous chapters, since the eighteenth century this figuration of energy as flow or current has been just as central as the more mechanical language of impact or atom.
- 36 Dramatization can involve a kind of 'realization', a 'making real' through an intensification of the process of enactment discussed above (Ch. 3). This has some relation to Deleuze's use of the term: 'Intensity is the determinant in the process of actualisation. It is intensity which *dramatises*.' See his *Difference and Repetition* (Continuum, 2004 [1968]), pp. 306–7. In Deleuze, however, it is linked to his theory of Ideas and the critique of representation.
- 37 Williams, 'Melodrama', p. 42.
- 38 Brooks, p. 203. See also J. Gripsrud, 'The Aesthetics and Politics of Melodrama', in P. Dahlgren and C. Sparks (eds), *Journalism and Popular Culture* (Sage, 1992), arguing that personalization and sensationalism are two defining attributes of melodrama in popular journalism.
- 39 Keith Tester suggests that 'Sentimentality is an emotion which requires that the world become melodrama', an interesting observation that might even imply that 'sentimentality', as supposedly distinct from sensibility or 'sentiment' more generally, can only ever be identified as such in relation to melodrama; see his *Moral Culture* (Sage, 1997), p. 68. For a more extended discussion of sentimentality, see my *Sympathetic Sentiments*, Chs 2, 8.
- 40 Singer, p. 44.
- 41 For examples from literature, see S. Thornton, 'The Vanity of Childhood: Constructing, Deconstructing, and Destroying the Child in the Novel of the 1840s', in M. Lesnik-Oberstein (ed.), *Children in Culture: Approaches to Childhood* (Macmillan, 1998).
- 42 M. Warner, *Managing Monsters* (Vintage, 1994), p. 35.
- 43 For a historical overview of the modern Western construction of childhood, see A. Higonnet, *Pictures of Innocence: The History and Crisis of Ideal Childhood* (Thames & Hudson, 1998); and, for a controversial comparison of past and present, J. R. Kincaid, *Child-Loving: The Erotic Child in Victorian Culture* (Routledge, 1992). For recent controversies, particularly the James Bulger case, see

- Cole, Ch. 6; K. Farrell, *Post-Traumatic Culture* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), Ch. 7; and Warner, Ch. 3.
- 44 P. Brooks, 'Melodrama, Body, Revolution', in Bratton, p. 18.
- 45 Hadley, p. 73.
- 46 Brooks, *Melodramatic Imagination*, pp. 72, 11. On the eighteenth-century cult of the (universal) 'language of the body' see also my *Sympathetic Sentiments*, Ch. 3.
- 47 M. Hansen, *Babel & Babylon: Spectatorship in American Silent Film* (Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 80. See also pp. 76–81.
- 48 Williams, 'Melodrama', p. 80. She adds that the 'paradoxical power of the victim' has become important in other areas, such as litigation (p. 83n. 15).
- 49 Brooks, *Melodramatic Imagination*, preface to 2nd (1995) edn, p. xii. He adds that psychoanalysis, too, can be seen as an example of melodrama (p. xi).
- 50 For elaboration, see *Sympathetic Sentiments*, Ch. 3, also relevant to the discussion of the public sphere in the following section.
- 51 See M. Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics* (Zone, 2002), p. 176, where he points out that 'Part of the bad faith of the *res publica* of letters was that it required a denial of the bodies that gave access to it', a principle of abstraction seen as differentially distributed by class and gender. See also, on broadly similar lines, B. Burgett, *Sentimental Bodies: Sex, Gender, and Citizenship in the Early Republic* (Princeton University Press, 1998). It needs to be added that the work of Habermas remains indispensable for understanding the foundations of the public sphere, and he is more aware of problems than his critics acknowledge; it is perhaps his 'narrative of decline' that is most in need of revision, closing off as it does the possibility that *some* of the subsequent changes, at least, could be said to transform rather than corrupt the public sphere, just as they may require that we rethink it. See J. Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (Polity, 1992).
- 52 W. Benjamin, *The Arcades Project* (Harvard University Press, 1999 [1930s]), M3, 2, p. 422, and M3a, 4, p. 423.
- 53 G. Beer, "'Wireless': Popular Physics, Radio and Modernism', in F. Spufford and J. Uglow (eds), *Cultural Babbage: Technology, Time and Invention* (Faber, 1996), pp. 150, 166.
- 54 D. Morley, 'Television: Not so much a visual medium, more a visible object', in C. Jenks (ed.), *Visual Culture* (Routledge, 1995), p. 181.
- 55 M. Kavka, *Reality Television, Affect and Intimacy: Reality Matters* (Palgrave, 2008), p. 67.
- 56 *Ibid.*, pp. 67–74, and see the thoughtful discussion of related themes elsewhere in the book. One might add that internet sites like Facebook reveal further evidence of this dynamic.
- 57 This body focus suggests a sense in which the private is indeed a private *sphere*,

with the local, spatial connotations of the latter, whereas the public ‘sphere’ always points beyond this. The German term *Öffentlichkeit*, used by Habermas, could perhaps, therefore, be better seen as ‘publicness’, the public *aspect* of something.

58 Kavka, pp. 55, x.

59 The emphasis here on intimacy could become problematical, as it does, arguably, in Lauren Berlant’s ongoing exploration of what she has called the ‘intimate public sphere’, based on the idea that ‘Publics presume intimacy’. When she argues that ‘What makes a public sphere intimate is an expectation that the consumers of its particular stuff *already* share a worldview and emotional knowledge that they have derived from a broadly common historical experience’, one might suspect a certain conservatism here, an emphasis on identity as pre-given, and on a closed circuit of mutual identification as the basis of community. However, she adds that if, from a theoretical angle, ‘an intimate public is a space of mediation in which the personal is refracted through the general’, then ‘what’s salient for its consumers is that ... it flourishes as a porous, affective scene of identification among strangers that promises a certain experience of belonging’; and here, the emphasis on mediation, porous boundaries, and relations among ‘strangers’ seems to redress the balance. See *The Female Complaint: The Unfinished Business of Sentimentality in American Culture* (Duke University Press, 2008), pp. vii, viii.

60 L. Chouliaraki, *The Spectatorship of Suffering* (Sage, 2006), p. 190.

61 Chouliaraki’s category of ‘emergency news’ comes close to this; see Ch. 6.

62 Kavka, pp. 35, x, 51.

63 Chouliaraki, p. 39.

64 This is not to deny the significance of verticality in other contexts, notably that of power in relation to surveillance, but, however important, this cannot suffice to furnish an adequate account of the public sphere and its role in Western culture and ideas.

65 B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (Verso, 1991), Ch. 2, from p. 22.

66 Burgett, p. 15.

67 J. Thompson, *The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media* (Polity, 1995), pp. 125, 32 (in italics), 244. See Chs 3, 4, 7, 8, for further exploration; and also A. Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (Polity, 1991), pp. 16–27.

68 Rodowick, p. 212.

69 P. Virilio, *Polar Inertia* (Sage, 1999). For discussion, see J. Armitage, *Virilio and the Media* (Polity, 2012), Chs 3, 4; and S. Lash, *Another Modernity, A Different Rationality* (Blackwell, 1999), pp. 302–7.

70 Thompson, p. 228.

71 S. Weber, ‘Television: Set and Screen’, in his *Mediauras: Form, Technics, Media* (Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 116, 117, 122.

- 72 Thompson, p. 231. One might add that this suggests an element of truth in Marshall McLuhan's much-derided 'global village'; for discussion, see J. Marchessault, *Marshall McLuhan* (Sage, 2005), Ch. 12.
- 73 Ibid., p. 98.
- 74 Kavka, p. 7. Weber makes a similar claim: television 'does not transmit representations but rather the semblance of presentation as such' (p. 117).
- 75 J. Sconce, *Haunted Media: Electronic Presence from Telepathy to Television* (Duke University Press, 2000), p. 173.
- 76 See S. Heath and G. Skirrow, 'Television: A World in Action,' *Screen* (1977) 18:2, esp. pp. 53–4.
- 77 Kavka, p. 17.
- 78 Kavka, p. 23. And this fits the case of the father who cries at his daughter's wedding – but does so when he sees the video *subsequently*, rather than at the time (p. 1). It could also be that if we know in advance that there will be a video, this could distance us from the experience of the event itself (pp. 5–6) – though it might be more appropriate to suggest that the whole notion of 'the event itself' is what comes into question here. The event is what becomes present in its effects; it is the 'presence' of the experience as vicarious that makes the event what it is, in its significance.
- 79 Kavka, pp. 29, 48; and see Chs 1, 4, *passim*. For other discussions of reality television that touch on these issues, see A. Fetveit, 'Reality TV in the Digital Era: A Paradox in Visual Culture?', in J. Friedman (ed.), *Reality Squared: Televisual Discourse on the Real* (Rutgers University Press, 2002); A. Biressi and H. Nunn, *Reality TV: Realism and Revelation* (Wallflower Press, 2005), which discusses the wider context (therapy culture, narcissism); and the introduction to S. Holmes and D. Jermyn (eds), *Understanding Reality Television* (Routledge, 2004), which surveys the field.
- 80 One might note, in passing, that all this might seem to exemplify what Rousseau detested about emergent modernity: above all, the betrayal of the authenticity of face-to-face communal presence. But it could be argued that this is not the most basic dimension of his critique, and that one can harness the notions of extended co-presence and mediated spectacle being developed here to pinpoint its continued power as a critique of the narcissistic self, under the sway of a self-serving but self-deluded pursuit of identity as entailing identification with the appearance of others under the aegis of fashion and consumerism, encouraging deceit and hypocrisy and a lack of autonomy that ultimately subverts the reflexive, self-constituting basis of communal life and leaves us subservient to the reified abstractions of state and market (reflected, for Rousseau, in the 'theatre' as an institution where an 'entertainment' is imposed on passive spectators). This is the Rousseau who can denounce the modern city, where each of us 'shows himself

only by his reputation and is esteemed only for his riches', but who can also see beyond this: 'The heart of man is always right concerning that which has no personal relation to himself. In the quarrel at which we are purely spectators, we immediately take the side of justice ... But when our interest is involved, our sentiments are soon corrupted. And it is only then that we prefer the evil which is useful to us to the good that nature makes us love.' (From the *Letter to M. d'Alembert on the Theatre* [1758], translated by A. Bloom as *Politics and the Arts*, Cornell University Press, 1968, pp. 59, 24.)

- 81 This can also, though, open up possibilities of irony, parody, and distancing, as 'postmodern' modes of experiencing this otherness of experience to itself.
- 82 J. D. Peters, *Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication* (Chicago University Press, 2000), pp. 60, 60–1, 61; and see the extended discussion in Ch. 1.
- 83 Kafka, p. 30.
- 84 Peters, Ch. 5, esp. pp. 206–25; and see Sconce, Ch. 3.