Boréus, Kristina. "Nationalism and Discursive Discrimination against Immigrants in Austria, Denmark and Sweden." *Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse*. Ed. Ruth Wodak, Majid KhosraviNik and Brigitte Mral. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. 293–308. *Bloomsbury Collections*. Web. 26 Apr. 2023. <<http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781472544940.ch-020>>.

Downloaded from Bloomsbury Collections, www.bloomsburycollections.com, 26 April 2023, 14:41 UTC.

Copyright © Ruth Wodak, Majid KhosraviNik and Brigitte Mral and the contributors 2013. You may share this work for non-commercial purposes only, provided you give attribution to the copyright holder and the publisher, and provide a link to the Creative Commons licence.

Nationalism and Discursive Discrimination against Immigrants in Austria, Denmark and Sweden

Kristina Boréus

In a TV debate prior to the 2006 general election in Austria, the leader of the BZÖ, one of two parties on the far right in that election campaign, stated in reference to people receiving social assistance in Vienna that: ‘ . . . 25% are foreigners . . . I think that’s unfair. In my opinion social spending should be for Austrians and not for foreigners’.¹

This statement is clearly discriminatory against people living in the city who are considered to be ‘foreign’, most likely including people who immigrated long ago as well as their children who were born in the country. First, it is discriminatory since exclusion from social rights is proposed for a particular group of citizens of Vienna. Second, the statement is discriminatory since it is an example of how ‘foreigners’ were constantly presented in a negative light (in this case, as living on welfare) by the party. Proposals for unfavourable treatment and negative other-presentation are two kinds of discrimination that can be performed linguistically. The quote also expresses a kind of nationalism in which native Austrians are seen as rightful receivers of benefits that non-natives should not be entitled to.

Discrimination against immigrants by native populations is a serious problem in Europe. The rise of populist parties on the far right – such as the BZÖ – in several European countries (Merkl & Weinberg 2003, Mudde 2007) increases the risk of immigrants being discriminated against. So do certain kinds of nationalism. This chapter is about how different aspects of nationalism might contribute to a specific kind of discrimination against immigrants, that is, discursive discrimination (DD), both by making a more fertile breeding ground for parties like the BZÖ and by creating general discursive frames that permit DD. This chapter is a contribution to an empirically based understanding of how different forms of nationalism might be related to discursive discrimination.

¹ In *Wahlkonfrontation 06*, 6 September 2006. All quotes from election propaganda in this chapter are my translations from German, Danish or Swedish.

The argument of the chapter proceeds in three steps. First, I clarify some connections between certain aspects of nationalism and DD at the conceptual level. Second, I reveal some similarities and differences in relation to DD in corpora from three countries that have witnessed varying degrees of success for far-right parties: Austria, Denmark and Sweden. Third, the empirical findings regarding DD are discussed in the light of scholarly literature on nationalism in these countries.

Discursive discrimination and nationalism

Discrimination is defined here as the unfavourable treatment of people due to their (alleged) belonging to a particular group. Discrimination can be carried out by different means (e.g. by violence and force, by economic means or by the use of language, as in the quote above) and in different contexts. *Discursive* discrimination is unfavourable treatment through the use of language; it is discrimination manifested in discourse.

The term 'discourse' refers to patterns of language use, the more or less strict rules that regulate what categories are used and what tends to be stated about a subject in a particular context. Thus, a discourse is a kind of social practice (see Reisigl & Wodak 2001: 36). DD is normally entangled with other forms of discriminatory social practice in a society: the BZÖ and other parties do not only *propose* infringements of immigrants' social rights, they also support social practices that actually disfavour non-natives economically by means other than the merely discursive. DD and racism in discourse have been studied by means of different analytical concepts (e.g. Blommaert & Verschuere 1998, van Dijk 1993, 2002, Reisigl and Wodak 2001, Boréus 2006a). Two concepts, referring to different kinds of DD, are used here: proposals for unfavourable treatment and negative other-presentation.

Proposals for unfavourable treatment are claims to the effect that a group of people should be denied the rights that others in society have as well as the defence of ongoing treatment of this kind. In the case of immigrants, the right of abode, political rights, social rights and cultural rights are often at stake. Of importance in the empirical results presented below are issues having to do with the right of abode and cultural rights. People have a *right of abode* when they have the right to live in a certain territory. *Cultural rights* include the rights to engage in cultural practices that are customary within the group that an individual identifies with. Attempts at forced assimilation conflict with cultural rights.

Negative other-presentation is often a focal point in studies on discursive discrimination (e.g. van Dijk 1993) and is expressed when one group portrays another group as inferior. This can be done in several more or less explicit linguistic ways. In this chapter I exemplify negative other-presentation with *presumptions*, that is, information for which it is taken for granted that receivers of a message delivered in a particular context will know and accept (Chilton 2004: 64–5, 80). An example of this is when a party demands, as part of its election campaign, that 'foreigners' that commit crimes be deported. Presumed knowledge here could mean that the demands that a party chooses to present in its election campaigns are justified by what the party wants to portray as serious problems, hence that the criminality of foreign residents is a

serious problem. In this way 'foreigners' are presented by that party as causing a serious problem through their criminal activities, but without explicit statements being made to that effect.

Nationalism might be related to DD, since it involves drawing borders between 'us' and 'them', thus allowing for differential treatment of groups. My starting point is theories on nationalism according to which nations are anything but natural entities: they are *constructed* through social practice, ranging from physical border controls to the patterns of what is said and written. Nations are *imagined communities* (Anderson 1991), to a large extent discursively constructed (Wodak et al. 2009). An imagined national community rests on the idea that we belong together with people that we do not know but who share our nation, including people of other generations, even those not yet born.

Nationalism changes over time (Hall 1998) and is often diffuse. It is also context-bound (see Suszycki 2007 for a study of how different kinds of Swedish nationalism are expressed in different contexts). Despite this, there is a certain stability in the way a particular imagined community constructs itself. The construction of people and country can vary between imagined communities in at least three ways which are of relevance to DD.

The first important way in which imagined communities differ is in accordance with the strength of *ethnic nationalism*. Members might, in principle, see themselves as united only by certain political principles and include everyone living in a territory in the imagined community, what is referred to in the literature as civic or state nationalism (see, for example, Hall 1998: 23–4, Wodak et al. 2009: 18–21). Most or perhaps all imagined communities, however, display more or less strong elements of ethnic nationalism, sometimes used as the only definition of nationalism, such as that by Gellner (1983: 1), according to whom nationalism is a political principle which holds that political and national units should be congruent. Despite such definitions, the criteria for inclusion that accompany civic nationalism are also at work in discourses having to do with the nation. Commonly, criteria for inclusion based on civic and ethnic nationalism are expressed in different discursive contexts within the same country, and even the same speaker might express both kinds of nationalism (see Reisigl 2007 for examples of this).

The strength of ethnic nationalism in the national cocktail of self-definition has consequences for attitudes to immigrants. A very strong form of ethnic nationalism is *nativism*, defined by Mudde (2007: 19) as an ideology that 'holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ("the nation") and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state'. Strong ethnic nationalism makes it difficult for immigrants to become insiders; the imagined community is more closed if ethnic nationalism is strong than if it is weak. The linguistic categories chosen for the separating of outsiders from insiders and how they are discursively related can emphasize the otherness of immigrants if ethnic nationalism is strong.

Being an outsider is not the same as being discriminated against: immigrants *might* be treated as honoured guests. The outsider position is, however, seldom safe: hospitality can easily be exhausted. For that reason, the ease or difficulty with which

one can be accepted as a member is relevant for discrimination. Furthermore, strong ethnic nationalism might motivate assimilation politics – if they want to be here they have to adapt – and other treatment based on the understanding that the presence of non-natives is a threat, such as keeping them out in the first place or trying to get rid of them. Strong ethnic nationalism is thus commonly expressed as discursive discrimination either in the form of negative other-presentation (outsiders are presented as threats) or as proposals for unfavorable treatment, such as pushing for assimilation or keeping threatening outsiders at bay by other means.

The second and third ways in which imagined communities might differ in terms of importance regarding the attitudes towards immigrants, and thus DD, are related to the cultural and political traits considered important in the self-construction of the community. How does an imagined community construct its members in relation to outsiders – what is its ‘*homo nationalis*’ (Wodak et al. 2009: 4) like? The *construction of the nation-state* that the members inhabit also matters. Some constructions of the members of an imagined community and their country are more compatible with DD than others. Again, both negative other-presentation and proposals for unfavourable treatment are at stake here. The former might be expressed when outsiders are compared to the ‘we’-construction. The two kinds of construction will also affect what

Table 20.1 Connections between the characteristics of imagined communities, treatment of immigrants and discursive expressions

Character of imagined community	Relation to treatment of immigrants	Discursive expressions
strength of ethnic nationalism	strong ethnic nationalism: (1) makes it difficult to become a member, which increases the risk of discrimination (2) justifies attempts to keep immigrants out, to assimilate or to get rid of them	strong ethnic nationalism: (1) the categories separating outsiders from insiders that emphasize outsiders’ otherness are chosen (2) DD as negative other-presentation: immigrants as threatening (3) DD as proposals for unfavourable treatment in line with attempts to assimilate or get rid of immigrants
characteristics of the <i>homo nationalis</i>	different self-constructions compatible with different ways of conceptualizing and treating immigrants	(1) other-presentation in relation to construction of the self (2) proposals for treatment in accordance with the characteristics of <i>homo nationalis</i>
characteristics of the nation-state/ country	different constructions compatible with different ways of treating immigrants	proposals for treatment in accordance with the characteristics of the nation-state

'we' consider as legitimate treatment of 'them'. Table 20.1 summarizes the discussion. Before I turn to the second step of the argument, I will briefly present the study from which the empirical examples of DD are drawn.

An analysis of discursive discrimination in election campaigns

The results presented below are drawn from a discourse analysis of texts from general election campaigns in Austria, Denmark and Sweden after 1985.² The corpora were analysed using coding instructions designed to identify ways in which people are categorized and the expressions of DD. The rhetoric of all parliamentary parties was analysed. The choice of these particular countries was motivated by a research design according to which discourses in countries that have seen varying degrees of success of populist radical-right parties could be compared. As shown in Figure 20.1, radical-right parties have, comparatively, been very strong in Austria, fairly strong in Denmark and weak in Sweden.

Nationalism of certain kinds may provide a good breeding ground for radical-right parties, as well as being conducive to DD: the modern radical-right parties have generally been ethnic nationalist and highly critical of both immigration and immigrants. These

Figure 20.1 Percentage of votes in general elections for radical-right parties since 1985 (when receiving more than 2% of the vote)³

² The general election campaigns in Austria 1986, 1994 and 2006, the Danish campaigns in 1987, 1994, 2007 and 2011, and the Swedish campaigns in 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 and 2010 were analysed. The corpora include transcripts from interviews with party representatives and debates between them arranged by the leading public service TV channels, election platforms, programmes on immigration and immigrant politics, etc.

³ The parties represented in Figure 20.1 are the Austrian Freedom Party (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*), FPÖ and BZÖ (*Bündnis Zukunft Österreich*) in Austria, Denmark's Progress Party (*Fremskridtspartiet*), the Danish People's Party (*Dansk Folkeparti*) and, in Sweden, New Democracy (*Ny Demokrati*) and the Sweden Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna*).

aspects of the parties' policies have been well studied (e.g. for Austria Reisigl & Wodak 2001, Heinisch 2002, Wodak & Pelinka 2002, Krzyżanowski & Wodak 2009, Meret 2009; for Denmark Trads 2002, Ringsmose 2003, Meret 2009; for Sweden Westlind 1996, Rydgren 2005, von Essen & Fleischer 2006 and several others). However, the European radical-right parties do not stand alone in formulating policies that curb immigration and affect immigrants negatively. Examples of such policies are on the agendas of several of the mainstream parties, as will be shown below.

The discourse analysis shows that DD was expressed in the election campaigns in all three countries. In general, this was more explicit and more common in the countries with stronger radical-right parties (see Boréus 2010 for a comparison of proposals for the exclusion of immigrants from various rights and of negative other-presentation in four Danish and Swedish election campaigns). There are differences between the Austrian and Danish discourses. The results reported here reveal differences, in particular between Austria and Denmark on the one hand, and Sweden on the other.

Insiders and outsiders in the imagined community

Although there are also references in all the corpora to particular ethnic or religious groups among immigrants (not least to Muslims in the later election campaigns), a much more common way to separate people is into categories that lump together national outsiders. These categories are basically of two kinds:

1. Categories that highlight the migration process or the sorting criteria used by authorities. 'Immigrant', 'refugee', 'asylum-seeker' and many different subcategories of 'refugee' (e.g. 'convention refugee') were used in all three countries.
2. Categories that highlight how people sorted into them *do not belong* to the nation. In all the Austrian campaigns, the label *Ausländer*, 'foreigner', was commonly used, while the more strongly distance-creating *Fremden*, 'aliens'/'foreigners', was used by the radical-right parties. In the Danish corpus, *udlænding*, 'foreigner', was used, particularly by the parties most critical of immigration, and the word *fremmede* (corresponding to *Fremden*) was regularly used by the radical right. In the Swedish corpus, categories of this kind were not used, not even by the radical-right parties.

Thus, the acceptance of expressions that highlight the 'otherness' of non-natives in the Austrian and Danish public debates might indicate that the imagined communities in Austria and Denmark are more closed than the Swedish one, and thus that the presence of ethnic nationalism is stronger in the former countries.

The way groups are related to each other in all three countries indicates however that it might not be an easy task to become a member of the imagined community in any of them. All the corpora include examples of those who have immigrated being related to original insiders in a way that shows that the groups are non-overlapping – that the immigrants are not insiders – even when they have lived in the country for a long time. An example from the Austrian Social Democrats, the SPÖ, is: '... to contribute to a

coexistence of *natives* /*Inländer*/ and *foreigners* /*Ausländer*/ based on understanding'.⁴ A Danish example is '... some of the *foreigners* /*udlændinge*/ that there is so much talk about, there are actually some that contribute . . . to *Danes* being able to get work at Danish enterprises, to workplaces not moving out but staying in this country'.⁵

An example from the Swedish campaigns is a party leader claiming that '... the *immigrant* group. They're incredibly enterprising and they're much more enterprising than *Swedes* are'.⁶ Even more telling is: 'A group of *Swedish citizens with a foreign background* have worked actively in the Czech Republic, Poland and in the Baltic republics together with *Swedish workmates*'.⁷ Here, Swedish citizens 'with a foreign background' are not among the Swedish workmates: apparently it takes more than citizenship to become Swedish.

None of the quotes above express DD: they are neither proposals for unfavourable treatment nor negative other-presentations. However, discrimination against immigrants is made possible by the sorting mechanism at work: discursive discrimination against immigrants as immigrants would be impossible were they not conceptually separated from the rest of the population, as in the examples. In the following sections I provide several examples of how those including themselves among the national 'we' discriminate discursively against immigrants. Here, the differences between the countries are more salient. Central themes in the Austrian and Danish – but not Swedish – election campaigns were the importance of keeping immigrants out and assimilating those living in the country, as well as claims to the effect that 'foreigners' should be thrown out.

Keep them out!

The radical-right parties in all three countries campaigned on policies of reduced immigration. In Austria and Denmark, though not in Sweden, immigrants, particularly refugees, were clearly talked about as being *unwanted*, even by mainstream parties. It was made clear that keeping them out is good. Where they have managed to get in, it is a good thing if they do not get the chance to stay permanently.

The Austrian 2006 campaign provides clear examples. The Austrian People's Party, ÖVP, the dominating right-wing party, described the good achievements of the government they had been leading. Under the heading 'Austria. It is going well for us here', it was claimed that the number of asylum applicants had decreased between 2005 and 2006, that the number of naturalized persons had decreased and that the number of residence permits was decreasing. In other words, the right-wing government had managed to keep 'them' out, or at least keep them in a position where they were easy to get rid of, as is the case with non-citizens and even more so with those lacking permanent residence permits.⁸ The Social Democrats in opposition did not agree. According to them, the proportion of foreigners was very high in Austria, compared to that in other countries, and the influx had

⁴ *Das Wahlprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Österreichs. Es geht um viel. Es geht um Österreich*, 1994. All italics in quotes have been added by me.

⁵ Representative of the Left Liberal Party (*Radikale Venstre*) in the TV interview *Mød partierne*, 28 August 2011.

⁶ Leader of the Centre Party in the final TV debate, *Slutdebatten*, 17 September 2010.

⁷ The programme *En offensiv mot diskrimineringen i arbetslivet*, the Liberal Party, 1994.

⁸ In *Kursbuch. Zukunft*.

been higher under the right-wing government than during the previous SPÖ government. 'Immigration must serve Austrian interests,' it was stated.⁹(See also Figure 20.2.)

The radical right in all of the countries campaigned on limiting immigration. Here, asylum applicants and refugees who have obtained asylum are presented as a threat if the presumptions are interpreted as stating that (a) the asylum process and the reception of refugees in Austria is very costly, which (b) threatens the possibility for Austrian society to pay out (old-age) pensions, entailing (c) a threat to the security of the pensioners. Another presumption is that the economic security of Austrian pensioners should be privileged over spending millions of Euros on asylum seekers.

As Michał Krzyżanowski shows in his chapter in this volume, the FPÖ rhetoric has shifted to targeting Muslims since 2005. The transition from the phase when 'the political elite' was portrayed as the main enemy of the Austrian people to one during which labour immigrants, refugees and asylum applicants were constructed as the most important enemies (Heinisch 2002: 113ff) is clearly visible when the election campaigns of 1986 and 1994 are compared. The change towards targeting Muslims is apparent in the 2006 campaign. Immigrants were still made main targets in 2006, however. The two posters depicted in this chapter were part of a series of three 'statt' ('instead of') posters,

Figure 20.2 FPÖ poster in Vienna in September 2006: 'Secure pensions instead of millions for asylum'.

⁹ In the folder *AUS VERANTWORTUNG FÜR ÖSTERREICH: Integration beschleunigen. Zuwanderung steuern. Illegalität stoppen.*

of which a variety of the poster *Daham statt Islam* described in Krzyżanowski's chapter (in that case as used in the 2008 election campaign), was the third.

The preference for policies intended to 'keep them out' is also visible in the Danish 2007 campaign. The leader of the Social Democrats was criticized by the right-wing parties for having proposed that refugees from Iraq, residing in asylum centres and who could not be sent back due to the situation in the country they had fled from, should be allowed to live and work outside the centres until they could be sent back. The accusation, repeated throughout the campaign, was that such policies would turn Denmark into a 'magnet' for immigrants, clearly an unwanted effect.¹⁰

Although the 'keep them out' rhetoric does not explicitly express a negative other-presentation, it rests on presumptions that are derogative. Even if we are not told why, 'they' are presumably problematic and threatening.

'Keep them out' rhetoric is not expressed by mainstream parties anywhere in the Swedish corpus.¹¹ Thus, these results also indicate stronger ethnic nationalism in Austria and Denmark than in Sweden, as do the results presented in the next section.

Assimilate them!

The radical-right parties in all three countries called for the assimilation of immigrants. In Austria and Denmark, though not in Sweden, assimilation (under the label of 'integration') was demanded of immigrants, even by mainstream parties, especially in the later campaigns. In the Austrian 2006 campaign, the ÖVP, in particular, focused on integration. A central slogan of theirs was 'Promote and require integration.'¹² What then were immigrants obliged to do? A central claim was that they should learn German, but the demands did not end there: 'This includes for us, however, also assuming the historic and cultural background of our country and accepting the fundamental social order that is based on freedom, tolerance and equality in chances for all people. . . .'¹³ The SPÖ stated that '[w]e expect that immigrants accept their own responsibility to learn German and to learn and accept common values, equal citizen rights and the rights of women.' (See also Figure 20.3.)¹⁴

During Denmark's 2007 elections, similarly vague calls for 'integration' were made by the mainstream parties. The leading right-wing party, *Venstre*, expressed that 'Danes with [an] immigrant background should not only speak Danish and work or educate themselves. They should also know and respect the principles that the Danish democracy rests upon.'¹⁵

¹⁰ In *Duellen Valg 07*, the TV debate between the right-wing prime minister and the leader of the Social Democrats, 4 November 2007 and in the final TV debate, *Afslutningsdebat*, 11 November.

¹¹ Although the Social Democrats were against a proposal by some right-wing parties in the campaign of 2002 to permit labour immigration from outside the EU, refugee immigration has not been contested by any of the mainstream parties, and parties in government have not taken credit for measures that keep immigration down in their propaganda material.

¹² In *Kursbuch. Zukunft*, the folder *Wolfgang Schüssel*, at www.oevp.at in September 2006 and in other material.

¹³ www.oevp.at in September 2006.

¹⁴ *AUS VERANTWORTUNG FÜR ÖSTERREICH: Integration beschleunigen. Zuwanderung steuern. Illegalität stoppen*, 2006.

¹⁵ www.venstre.dk in November 2007.

Figure 20.3 FPÖ poster in Vienna in September 2006: ‘German instead of “nix understand”’.

The radical right parties made explicit demands for assimilation. Several things could be interpreted as presumed with regard to this vague demand for knowledge of German to replace answers to the effect that someone does not understand German at all, for example, that many immigrants either know very little German or refuse to learn or to communicate in German, all of which could be interpreted as negative other-presentation in a discourse where it is taken for granted that all immigrants have an obligation to learn the language. How this replacement should be realized is not indicated, however the demand is in line with explicit FPÖ proposals in the campaign, such as the possibility of repealing citizenship due to poor knowledge of German (*FPÖ Wahlprogramm*).

Since there were no explicit policy proposals made in this context, these were not proposals for assimilation proper. This rhetoric is best analysed as a kind of non-explicit negative other-presentation. First, for these to be central points in election campaigns (as they were in Austria in 2006) the presumption is that there is a problem, namely that immigrants resist integration, something clearly seen as negative. Second, statements regarding the things that immigrants should learn to respect – freedom, tolerance, women’s rights, democracy – presume that these highly respected values are threatened by the presence of immigrants who might not respect them.

Throw them out!

Another way to cope with the threat of ethnic others is to get rid of them and restrict their right of abode. The Austrian 2006 campaign stands out for its particularly strong

calls for limitations on the right of abode. The FPÖ had split the year before, the splinter party, the BZÖ, was still in government and both parties were in parliament. Thus there were two far-right parties with similar programmes competing on the same ground, most of all over immigration and immigrant policy. A salient call made by both parties in the campaign was: Throw them out! Among particular proposals were the following: expel 30 per cent of the foreigners in Austria (BZÖ); make it possible to expel foreigners who have committed a serious crime (BZÖ); expel foreign criminals (FPÖ); recall residence permits for unemployed guest workers (FPÖ); expel people without residence permits (FPÖ); expel foreigners that work illegally (FPÖ); make abuse of the social system grounds for expulsion (FPÖ).¹⁶

Make use of them!

The Swedish corpus differs from those of the other two countries in terms of a certain representation often being made, that of immigrants as national assets:

One could also consider the utility aspect. When our international contacts multiply, there is an increasing need in our country for more well-educated people with good language skills. With immigrant children we get these skills. The Centre Party holds that immigrant children constitute a resource for our society that we ought to make better use of.¹⁷

This rhetoric is certainly another example of the unwillingness or incapacity to let new members of society into the imagined community – ‘immigrant children’ might even refer to people who were born and raised in Sweden by parents who once immigrated – and it is objectifying. It is, however, not discriminatory in the sense used here: no proposal for unfavourable treatment is made, and it is a case of positive rather than negative other-presentation. ‘Immigrants as an asset to the nation’ is not found in the corpora from the other countries.¹⁸ The construction of immigrants as a resource for the nation was a discursive pattern in neither case.

Different nationalisms – different discrimination?

The differences relating to DD in the three corpora indicate that there are also differences in the broader discursive frames relating to nationalism. In the third and concluding step of the argument, I will discuss the empirical findings in relation to the

¹⁶ The calls were made in different propaganda materials, for example, *FPÖ Wahlprogramm* and *Freiheitlicher Parlamentsklub-BZÖ. Zukunftsprogramm 2010. Unser Beitrag für eine bürgerliche Regierung*.

¹⁷ *Invandrarpolitiskt program*, the Centre Party, 1994.

¹⁸ Although it was sometimes stated that labour immigration was needed, immigrants in the countries are not described as resources for society.

literature on nationalism. Since what was focused on above was certain ways in which Sweden seemingly differs from the other countries, this section will focus particularly on Swedish nationalism.

The empirical examples showed how the imagined community produces outsiders and insiders in three countries, which points to the presence of ethnic nationalism in all of them. In Austria and Denmark labels for outsiders that emphasize their otherness were used, but not in Sweden. From all three corpora, however, it is clear that even immigrants who had lived in the country for a long time were not always part of the in-group. DD was documented in the corpora in several ways. 'Keep them out' rhetoric was produced by Austrian and Danish mainstream parties but not by the Swedish ones. Such rhetoric was interpreted as resting on negative other-presentation. Vague assimilation demands were expressed by the mainstream parties in Austria and Denmark, but not in Sweden, and were also interpreted as negative other-presentation. The blunt demands to throw 'them' out expressed by the radical right in Austria were clearly proposals for unfavourable treatment. A representation found only in the Swedish corpus was that of immigrants as a national asset, which is objectifying but not discriminatory.

If Table 20.1 makes sense, the differences with regard to DD indicate that ethnic nationalism might be weaker in Sweden. These findings are in line with the literature. Wodak et al. (2009) report, based on a review of the literature on Austrian nationalism, strong feelings for the German language to be part of the 'we'-construction. Pride in being an Austrian was often brought up in the focus groups they themselves conducted. In his study of political speeches, Reisigl (2007) points to the presence of ethnic nationalism (politicians referring to Austria as a *Kulturnation*) alongside expressions of Austria as a civic nation, in the 1990s. According to Hedetoft (2006), Danes have long felt proud of being Danes and have strengthened this feeling by differentiating themselves from various 'others' over time: the Germans, the Swedes and, more recently, immigrants within the country. Underlying Danish political debates among the mainstream parties is the understanding that a common national culture is necessary in order to maintain democracy, freedom and security, while Danish culture is seen as being particularly vulnerable to heterogeneity (Mouritsen 2006: 124).

In contrast to the signs of fairly strong ethnic nationalism pointed to in the literature on Austria and Denmark, Swedish nationalism has been characterized as taking pride in opposing the kind of nationalism that is ethnocentric and oppressive of minorities (Edquist 2008: 4). Swedes in the post-war period are described as considering themselves to have 'overcome the ills of nationalism once and for all' (Johansson 2004: 180). Swedes can even believe themselves not to have a particular culture but only values, such as democracy, rationality and modernity (Daun 2005: 17–18; see also Boréus 2006b). Swedish interest in ethnic Swedes in other countries has been limited; 'blood has not been a significant tie' in that context (Berggren 2004: 72). Swedes are described as easily provoked by the question of what they feel proud of as Swedes – as they tend to see themselves as people who have overcome that kind of nationalism (Johansson 2001: 8). This is also a part of the self-identity that arises in focus groups (Jansson et al. 2011).

The Swedish *homo nationalis* and construction of the nation state may also have characteristics that check assimilation and 'keep them out' rhetoric to some extent, and that are difficult to reconcile with blunt demands to throw immigrants out. The characteristics of the Swedish *homo nationalis* are, according to recurrent descriptions, *modern* and *equality-loving* (Hall 2000: 277, Johansson 2001: 8). It can be difficult to combine that kind of self-identity with ethnic nationalism, often seen as atavistic and causing inequality. Sweden is described in official documentation as a positive example for the world with regard to refugee policy, and as generous, with strong respect for human rights and with a policy that expresses international solidarity (Johansson 2008: 117). If this construction of the nation is felt to be important enough, it will be difficult to reconcile it with a 'keep them out' or 'throw them out' rhetoric but compatible with the positive other-presentation inherent in the construction of immigrants as a national asset.

Yet, Swedish nationalism is hardly purely civic and free of ethnic aspects. The Swedish *homo nationalis* also has its 'others'. Several studies indicate a tendency to polarize Swedes, understood to be modern, sexually liberated and in favour of women's emancipation, with immigrants, seen as lacking in these respects (Runcis 2001: chs 4, 5, Towns 2002, Brune 2004: part III). And after all, the Sweden Democrats, a radical-right party that expresses a far more explicit ethnic nationalism than the mainstream parties, were voted into Parliament in 2010. Ethnic nationalism is seldom explicit or strong in Swedish public debate, but it is there for the radical-right parties to exploit.

The full picture of the conditions for radical-right parties to grow and for discursive discrimination to be expressed is, of course, much more complex than has been presented here. The research literature on radical-right parties offers a considerable number of explanations for the differences in success of these parties (for a review see Mudde 2007: chs 9–11). There are also conditions that influence the kind and level of DD against immigrants not related to nationalism. A further complication involves the relationship between nationalism on the one hand, and the growth of radical-right parties and DD on the other, being dialectic rather than one way.

These complexities should not be disregarded. However, when trying to understand why and how immigrants are discursively discriminated against and why the radical-right parties meet with greater or less success, it is wise to look at wider discursive frames, especially the extent to which ethnic nationalism is expressed and which characteristics of *homo nationalis* and the nation state are at play.

Note: I want to thank Maria Jansson, Ulf Mörkenstam and Cecilia Åse for their very valuable comments on earlier drafts of this text.

References

- Anderson, B. (1991), *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso.
- Berggren, H. (2004), 'The forward-looking angel: Nationalism and modernity in Sweden in the twentieth century', in K. Almqvist and K. Glans (eds), *The Swedish Success Story?* Stockholm: Axel and Margaret Ax:son Johnson Foundation.

- Blommaert, J. and Verschueren, J. (1998), *Debating Diversity: Analysing the Discourse of Tolerance*, London, New York: Routledge.
- Boréus, K. (2006a), 'Discursive Discrimination: A Typology', *European Journal of Social Theory*, 9(3): 405–24.
- (2006b), 'En analys av kulturbegreppet i debatten om "det mångkulturella samhället"', in L. Roxell and E. Tiby (eds), *Frågor, fält och filter. Kriminologisk metodbok*, Lund: Studentlitteratur, pp. 207–30.
- (2010), 'Including or excluding immigrants? The impact of right-wing populism in Denmark and Sweden', in B. Bengtsson, P. Strömblad and A-H Bay (eds), *Diversity, Inclusion and Citizenship in Scandinavia*, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp. 127–57.
- Brune, Y. (2004), *Nyheter från gränsen: tre studier i journalistik om 'invandrare', flyktingar och rasism*, Stockholm: Carlssons.
- Chilton, P. (2004), *Analysing Political Discourse. Theory and Practice*, London, New York: Routledge.
- Daun, Å. (2005), *En stuga på sjätte våningen. Svensk mentalitet i en mångkulturell värld*, Stockholm: Symposion.
- Edquist, S. (2008), 'En folklig svenskhet? Nationalismen och folkrörelserna i vår tid', in U. Lundberg and M. Tydén (eds), *Sverigebilder. Det nationellas betydelser i politik och vardag*, Stockholm: Institute for Futures Studies, pp. 29–48.
- Ekström von Essen, U. and Fleischer, R. (2006), *Sverigedemokraterna i de svenska kommunerna 2002–2006. En studie av politisk aktivitet, strategi och mobilisering*, Norrköping: Integrationsverket.
- Gellner, E. (1983), *Nations and Nationalism*, Malden, Oxford, Carlton: Blackwell.
- Hall, P. (1998), *The Social Construction of Nationalism: Sweden as an Example*, Lund: Lund University Press.
- (2000), *Den svenskaste historien. Nationalism i Sverige under sex sekler*, Stockholm: Carlsson Bokförlag.
- Hedetoft, U. (2006), 'Divergens eller konvergens', in U. Hedetoft, B. Pettersson and L. Sturfelt (eds), *Bortom stereotyperna? Invandrare och integration i Danmark och Sverige*, Malmö: Centrum för Danmarksstudier, pp. 390–407.
- Heinisch, R. (2002), *Populism, Proporz, Pariah: Austria Turns Right. Austrian Political Change, Its Causes and Repercussions*, New York: Nova Science Publishers.
- Jansson, M., Wendt, M. and Åse, C. (2011), 'Tre nyanser av Sverige', in D. Sainsbury and M. Soininen (eds), *Kön makt nation*, Stockholm: Stockholm University, pp. 122–43.
- Johansson, A. W. (2001), 'Inledning. Svensk nationalism och identitet efter andra världskriget', in A. W. Johansson (ed.), *Vad är Sverige? Röster om svensk nationell identitet*, Stockholm: Prisma, pp. 7–17.
- (2004), 'If you seek his monument, look around! Reflections on national identity and collective memory in Sweden after the Second World War', in K. Almqvist and K. Glans (eds), *The Swedish Success Story?* Stockholm: Axel and Margaret Ax:son Johnson Foundation, pp. 175–86.
- Johansson, C. (2008), 'Svenska flyktingpolitiska visioner. Självbild eller verklighet?', in U. Lundberg and M. Tydén (eds), *Sverigebilder. Det nationellas betydelser i politik och vardag*, Stockholm: Institute for Futures Studies, pp. 113–29.
- Krzyżanowski, M. and Wodak, R. (2009), *The Politics of Exclusion. Debating Migration in Austria*, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Meret, S. (2009), *The Danish People's Party, the Italian Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party in a Comparative Perspective: Party Ideology and Electoral Support*, Aalborg: Aalborg University.

- Merkel, P. H. and Weinberg, L. (2003), *Right-wing Extremism in the Twenty-first Century*, London, New York: Routledge.
- Mouritsen, P. (2006), 'Fælles værdier, statsreligion og islam i dansk politisk kultur', in U. Hedetoft, B. Petterson and L. Sturfelt (eds), *Bortom stereotyperna? Invandrare och integration i Danmark och Sverige*, Malmö: Centrum för Danmarksstudier, pp. 109–47.
- Mudde, C. (2007), *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Reisigl, M. (2007), *Nationale Rhetorik in Fest- und Gedenkreden. Eine diskursanalytische Studie zum 'österreichischen Millennium' in den Jahren 1946 und 1996*, Tübingen: Stauffenburg Verlag.
- Reisigl, M. and Wodak, R. (2001), *Discourse and Discrimination. Rhetorics of racism and antisemitism*, London, New York: Routledge.
- Ringsmose, J. (2003), 'Kedeligt har det i hvert fald ikke været . . .' *Fremskridtspartiet 1989–1995*, Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag.
- Runcis, M. (2001), 'Sverige är inte hela världen'. *Folkbildning för och om invandrare i utbildningsprogrammen*, Stiftelsen etermedierna i Sverige.
- Rydgren, J. (2005), *Från skattemissnöje till etnisk nationalism. Högerpopulism och parlamentarisk högerextremism i Sverige*, Lund: Studentlitteratur.
- Suszycki, A. M. (2007), 'Nationalism in Sweden and the EU Membership', in I. P. Karolewski and A. M. Suszycki (eds), *Nationalism and European Integration. The Need for New Theoretical and Empirical Insights*, New York, London: Continuum, pp. 85–100.
- Towns, A. (2002), 'Paradoxes of (In)Equality: Something is Rotten in the Gender Equal State of Sweden', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 37(2): 157–79.
- Trads, D. (2002), *Danskerne først! En historie om Dansk Folkeparti*, Copenhagen: Gyldendal.
- van Dijk, T. A. (1993), *Elite Discourse and Racism*, Newbury Park, London, New Delhi: Sage.
- (2002), 'Discourse and Racism', in D. T. Goldberg and J. Solomos (eds), *A Companion to Racial and Ethnic Studies*, Malden, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 191–205.
- Westlind, D. (1996), *Politics and Popular Identity. Understanding Recent Populist Movements in Sweden and the United States*, Lund: Lund University Press.
- Wodak, R., de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M. and Liebhart, K. (2009), *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Wodak, R. and Pelinka, A. (eds) (2002), *The Haider Phenomenon in Austria*, New Brunswick, London: Transaction Publishers.