Manasek, Jared. "The Imperial Refugee: Refugees and Refugee—Creation in the Ottoman Empire and Europe." *Refugees in Europe, 1919–1959: A Forty Years' Crisis?*. By Matthew Frank and Jessica Reinisch. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017. 67–84. *Bloomsbury Collections*. Web. 26 Apr. 2023. <<http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781474295734.0009>>.

Downloaded from Bloomsbury Collections, www.bloomsburycollections.com, 26 April 2023, 15:21 UTC.

Copyright © Matthew Frank, Jessica Reinisch and Contributors 2017. Released under a CC BY-NC-ND licence (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/>). You may share this work for non-commercial purposes only, provided you give attribution to the copyright holder and the publisher, and provide a link to the Creative Commons licence.

The Imperial Refugee: Refugees and Refugee-Creation in the Ottoman Empire and Europe

Jared Manasek

On 2 July 1875, the district commissioner of Metković, a border-town in Habsburg Dalmatia, sent an urgent cable to Gabriel Rodich, the province's governor general, regarding disturbances across the border in Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina, and what to do should Ottoman Christians 'flee to our territory'.¹ The night before, two Muslims reportedly attacked the Herzegovinian town of Dracevo. After the attack, two townsmen fled to join a new and loosely organized uprising against allegedly abusive Muslim landowners.² Along the way, the young men escorted Dracevo's women and children across the Habsburg border to safety. Given the circumstances, the Metković district commissioner thought more villagers might soon come.

In his report to Habsburg foreign minister Gyula Andrásy, Rodich interpreted the event primarily as a security matter: Ottoman Christians crossing into Austria-Hungary were to be disarmed, 'in order to maintain [Habsburg] neutrality.'³ Neither the crossing nor the Habsburg response was particularly out of the ordinary: Ottoman subjects fled across the border most recently in 1873, but also in 1862, 1858, 1842 and earlier, while the principle that neutral receiving states maintain their status by disarming refugees and removing them from the border had long since been enshrined in international law.⁴ The news from Metković brought no indication that within a matter of months the commander of the Habsburg's military border with northern Bosnia would have cause to describe the worst aspect of the rapidly spreading uprising as 'the massive entry of Bosnian refugees onto Austrian-Hungarian soil', without precedent in the past century.⁵ By late September, 23,000 Ottoman Christians had fled across Bosnia's northern border; by the time the violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina ended, a quarter of the population had left and over a third of its Christian population had crossed into Austria-Hungary.⁶

The refugees at Metković internationalized the small peasant uprising that triggered the Eastern Crisis of 1875–8 – three years of violence and war across the Balkans and beyond. The crisis became one of nineteenth-century Europe's most serious, with the Russian Army reaching the outskirts of Istanbul and Europe on the brink of a general war. It ended with the 1878 Treaty of Berlin – the big bang of nation-state creation that yielded an independent Montenegro, Romania and Serbia as well as a nearly independent Bulgaria, while placing Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina under

Habsburg occupation.⁷ The crisis was also a watershed moment in the history of European population politics, and in particular the history of the modern refugee. Flight and forced removal became a central feature of the violence across the region, leading to demographic shifts that were ‘an ominous portent of what was to come with subsequent imperial collapses’.⁸ In the eastern Balkans, well over a 100,000 Christians were displaced, although the violence disproportionately affected Balkan Muslims, of whom 250,000–300,000 were killed and another 1.5 million were displaced.⁹

The violent displacement of 1875–8 typically lacked a consistent and overarching intentionality of nation-state creation. In carving new nation-states out of the Ottoman Empire’s European provinces, however, the Treaty of Berlin explicitly tied these new states’ sovereignty to dominant nations. At the same time, the great powers inserted language to protect the civil, religious and property rights of minorities. Romania’s treatment of its Jewish minority was a particular concern at Berlin, and while the treaty language was intended to protect Balkan Muslims and Christians as well, it was in a great part thanks to pressure from Jewish organizations that minority protection became a central obligation for all of the newly created Balkan states.¹⁰ Romania’s subsequent disregard for its minority protection obligations became a prime example of the toothless gears of international protection. Nevertheless, with its focus on dominant nationalities and minority protection, the Treaty of Berlin concretely made ‘populations, not just territory, the central object of the international system’.¹¹

In her contribution to this book, Zara Steiner cautions against reading a linear development into the successive refugee crises of twentieth-century Europe. The warning stands for the nineteenth century, too, when the links between imperial collapse and refugees or between nation-state formation and ethnic cleansing were hardly straightforward. To be sure, forced migration was endemic to the unwinding of European empire, but neither the nation-state nor the ethno-national refugee burst into European modernity with a clear, fully formed place in the international system. Instead, in the second half of the nineteenth century the relationship between displacement and state was dynamic, with nation-state formation neither the exclusive driver of displacement nor the necessary outcome.

By the late nineteenth century European empires were quite familiar with refugees, and at least in some respects had become good at both creating and managing displaced populations in ways that did not destabilize the international order, even in the face of human tragedy. As Nora Lafi has observed of Ottoman attempts to bolster the empire’s economy and security through refugee settlement, the treatment of refugees by authorities offers ‘many indications of the very conception of imperial governance’.¹² Refugees, and in particular refugee management, could in fact be constitutive of empire.

This chapter begins at the European centre with the creation of an international regime for political asylum, before turning to the periphery – to the area of imperial contact Mark Levene has dubbed the ‘rimlands’ – where in a wide arc stretching from the Russian to the Ottoman Empires, unprecedented mass forced removal challenged the emergent refugee regime.¹³ Europe’s western core was not wholly unfamiliar with sudden and large-scale refugee movements triggered by wartime violence. But the principles of neutrality and protection that came to define a ‘refugee status’ emerged

during Europe's revolutionary years from the late eighteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries in response to individuals fleeing prosecution for 'political crimes' – a category largely understood to mean revolutionary activity.¹⁴ Political asylum came to provide a framework for states to protect those fleeing persecution for their politics while preserving comity and international stability by preventing asylum questions from inciting acrimonious international disputes.¹⁵

Criminality and state obligations to combat political crime were a central element of nineteenth-century international relations, and the interstate regulation of refugees fleeing political persecution lent itself well to management by treaty law. This was particularly the case after the revolutions and uprisings of the 1830s, when countries of the European core consolidated an extensive body of treaty law and international norms that described and governed state responses to political refugees.¹⁶ In the Russian, Habsburg and Ottoman periphery, several centuries of war and peacemaking regulated various forms of population movement – in particular prisoners of war and deserters.¹⁷ Viewed from the rimlands, the international refugee and asylum regime was particularly relevant, not least because many of the political refugees in the European core – such as the 29,000-strong Polish army that fled through Prussia after Russia crushed the 1831 insurrection – were, in fact, from the periphery.¹⁸

As a standard of international relations that helped maintain the European order, asylum policy could create new diplomatic possibilities: the Ottoman Empire based its refusal to surrender Hungarian and Polish refugees from the revolutions of 1848–9 on the expectations of political asylum as an international institution, thereby using European norms to assert its sovereign rights and international legitimacy.¹⁹ And yet, in the following decades, forced displacement in the rimlands became more common, more complicated and larger than before. The 1850s and 1860s saw the migration of over one million Russian Muslims to the Ottoman Empire, followed by the demographically disastrous Eastern Crisis of the 1870s. The size and rapidity of the flights as well as the ethno-national homogeneity of the Black Sea and Balkan refugees laid bare the inadequacies of the existing asylum system and anticipated the challenges posed by mass movements and ethnic cleansing in the twentieth century.

The internationalist institutions that came to embody twentieth-century refugee policy supplanted the normative and national refugee regime of the nineteenth century, and many of the values and principles were carried over. Yet as this chapter shows, no single straight line of historical development can be drawn between the imperial and post-imperial refugee. The radicalized politics of the twentieth century helped ensure that political asylum endured as an international institution even as the context changed. Large-scale refugee movements tagged to ethno-national identity occupied different international and domestic political space in the nineteenth century than they would occupy in the twentieth century, thanks in part to the flexible linkages between demography and the imperial state. Governments still drew on much older utilitarian views of refugee immigration as potentially providing populations for colonization and economic growth without viewing such immigration as an existential threat to the integrity of the empire; at the same time, the forced removal of populations could also serve the interests of a modernizing imperial state. Even in the face of growing territorial nationalism in the late nineteenth century, refugees could

still fit into the imperial world order, while their management, aid and repatriation not only legitimized imperial rule but also offered, if only temporarily, alternative models for nation-state construction.

From criminal to victim

The refugee regime that emerged in the first half of the nineteenth century was, in the first instance, an international criminal law regime.²⁰ Europe's liberal revolutions had forced a reassessment of the nature of criminality – particularly illegal activities against the state carried out in the name of a political ideology. Liberal reformers, many of whom had themselves been persecuted for political activity, created a new category of 'political crime' in which the perpetrator did not completely lose his honour through his actions: buried in the 'right of revolution' was the possibility that one could have honourable motives but misguided goals.²¹ The new category had a profound impact on extradition, once a rare practice that became more frequent in the eighteenth century thanks to growing cross-border mobility and resultant international crime. New treaties covering the 'surrender of deserters, robbers, murderers, arsonists and vagrants' proliferated after the French Revolution and in the decades following the Congress of Vienna (1814–15), making extradition a central component of international criminal law.²² And while extradition for general criminality became the norm, by the 1830s, states had begun to recognize a 'political offence exception' to protect individuals accused of committing political crime by granting them something new: political asylum.

The refugee question of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had little to do with the earlier linkage between refugees and political crime; Herbert Reiter has argued the fundamental change in forced migration in Europe's nineteenth century was in fact a transition from ideology to identity as the driving force behind flight.²³ Nevertheless, political asylum and the political offence exception served as a model, and delineated much of the state responses to later refugee movements. Asylum created an architecture of refugee protection that was a core component of the European system of states and strengthened basic and enduring protocols for states responding to the arrival of refugees. In short, political asylum normalized refugees and 'refugeedom' as a phenomenon to be managed internationally.

The Congress of Vienna undermined French revolutionary ideas of political criminality as Austria, Russia and Prussia pressured European countries to surrender revolutionaries and rebels seeking asylum. It was public opinion and the July Revolution of 1830 that revived the question of a political offence exception and changed the direction of French, and ultimately European, asylum policy.²⁴ In 1829, France extradited Antonio Galotti, a Neapolitan officer and revolutionary, after Naples promised to try him only for common crimes and not for political criminality. When Naples promptly sentenced the man to death, public outrage was such that the French government requested the officer's return and, after failing to obtain it, threatened war.²⁵

In the wake of the July Revolution, liberal lawmakers refined and institutionalized the concept of political crime, and in April 1831, a circular declared the French government would no longer request or grant extradition for political crimes.²⁶ The following year

French law moved beyond criminality and extradition to focus on refugees themselves. In debate, lawmakers defined the term 'refugee' as someone residing in France without the 'protection of their government' or 'without a passport or contact with any kind of ambassador'. Statelessness became the defining characteristic of the refugee.²⁷ The law also articulated a sense of individual dependence and state responsibility by narrowly focusing on managing refugee populations. It empowered the government to compel refugees to assemble in designated towns as well as to expel refugees should they disturb public order.²⁸ Moreover, as one lawmaker opined, refugees were people whose presence came at a cost to the host.²⁹ In the case of Polish refugees from the November Uprising (1830–1), that amounted to two million francs in 1832; for the first quarter of 1833, the interior ministry budgeted 375,000 francs – over one-third of the ministry's entire budget.³⁰

On 1 October 1833, Belgian lawmakers passed an extradition law that for the first time codified political asylum – or rather, the political offence exception to extradition. The law viewed extradition as an exception to the rule, permitted it only in specific circumstances and subjected all extradition claims to judicial control. It also governed the contents of any extradition treaties Belgium might sign, requiring for example that a foreigner 'shall not be prosecuted nor punished for any political offence [committed] before extradition, nor for any fact connected to such a crime'³¹ The Belgian principles spread quickly through European treaty law, and the process seemed to depoliticize extradition. Even though host countries continued to restrict movements, intern refugees or even transport them to penal colonies, the institution of political asylum acquired an idealized veneer as an expression of universal human values.³² It was this characteristic, with its civilizational undertones, that helped to make extradition a powerful tool of Great Power diplomacy during one of the most dramatic episodes of nineteenth-century political emigration – the flight of Polish and Hungarian revolutionaries to the Ottoman Empire in 1848–9.

The exact number of individuals who fled to Ottoman territory is unclear. Ottoman and European sources broadly agree on around 5,000 Hungarian soldiers although when dependents and civilians are included the number might have been as large as 16,000. There were as many as 6,000 Poles.³³ While refugees were already the subject of Austro-Ottoman negotiations in late 1848, the majority of them did not arrive on Ottoman territory until the final defeat of the Hungarian army on 13 August 1849 at Világos. By the end of August both Russia and Austria had submitted extradition requests to an unreceptive Ottoman government. Russia requested the return of ten individuals who had fled after the collapse of the Hungarian revolt; Austria issued a blanket demand for the return of all who had fled to the Ottoman Empire.³⁴

Russia and Austria based their demands on existing treaties forbidding the contracting powers from sheltering fugitives.³⁵ The Ottoman government viewed the claims as unfounded; in the case of Russia, the Ottomans argued that according to the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774) they needed only to expel, not extradite, fugitives in order to meet obligations.³⁶ For its part, Austria quickly realized its treaties left it with little hope for anything more than the fugitives being removed from the border zone.³⁷

The Ottoman's rejection of the Austrian and Russian extradition requests precipitated an international crisis. Both Russia and Austria broke off diplomatic relations on 17 September, with the former threatening that the escape of even one

refugee from Ottoman custody would be a *casus belli*.³⁸ Fearing any concessions would further undermine Ottoman sovereignty, France and Britain pledged to support the sultan. Russia and Austria backed down after Britain and France clarified their position by sending their Mediterranean fleets into the Dardanelles.³⁹ Austria, for its part, finally agreed to allow the Ottomans to send some refugees into inner Anatolia, and allow some 3,000 more to go home.⁴⁰

Extradition and asylum were embedded in balance-of-power politics and the emerging 'Eastern Question,' but they were also more than the kernel of an international crisis: they formed a language for diplomatic pressure. The Ottoman's success in repulsing Russian and Austrian extradition demands underlined the strength of political asylum as an institution, while enabling the Ottoman Empire to assert international legitimacy and membership in the European family of nations. Beyond the political offence exception as a new international legal trump, asylum was discussed in reference to the standards of 'humanity'. Humanitarian language had long appeared in relation to political asylum, but in 1848–9 it became central. The sultan defined his motives not as political, but as an 'effect of the sentiments of humanity and compassion', while the foreign diplomatic corps invoked humanity to articulate concerns over likely punishments should the revolutionaries be extradited.⁴¹

For the Ottomans and their supporters, the concept of humanity informed and buttressed the idea of an 'honourable' policy that would elevate European sympathies for the Ottoman Empire while reifying and universalizing an emerging European standard.⁴² For legal scholars, the Ottoman resistance was a key moment in the history of political asylum: the involvement of all Europe's great powers, the threat of war and the display of force clearly demonstrated the centrality of asylum to the functioning of the international system. The German jurist Franz von Holtzendorff saw the willingness of the 'Islamic government' to protect Christians against despotic Christian states as a source of European sympathy during the Crimean War.⁴³ Hyperbolic, but the point drew a broader lesson about civilization: not only were there 'civilized despots' in Europe, but countries that 'typically count as uncivilized' could nevertheless display 'political honor'.⁴⁴

Removal and resettlement

Less than a decade later, the Ottoman Empire faced a refugee crisis of a different nature and on a different scale: from 1855 to 1866, somewhere between 500,000 and nearly 1 million Muslims left Russia for the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁵ The emigration of Crimean Tatars and Circassians from the Caucasus was one of the largest and most concentrated mass migrations in European history up to that point, and while these populations were frequently described as 'emigrants', the violence of their expulsion and the misery of their flight has helped to insert the population movements into a 'death and exile' narrative that feeds into the twentieth-century history of forced migration and ethnic cleansing.⁴⁶ Yet displacement was not based simply on identity, and particularly in Crimea, Russia lacked a clear policy on expulsion and emigration.⁴⁷

Russia's relationship to its Muslim population was determined as much by location and imperial planning as by religion, and removal was not an empire-wide project:

elsewhere, the Russian government and Muslims cooperated.⁴⁸ In the Caucasus, for example, the 'cleansing' was part of a modernization project that foresaw resettlement of the region by Orthodox Russian colonists, but was also intended to civilize Muslims after their relocation elsewhere in the Empire.⁴⁹ Similarly, the Ottoman Empire viewed the migrants as both a burden and a resource for its own modernization projects.⁵⁰ More than just prefiguring nation-state demographic politics, the expulsion and slaughter of Russian Muslims was also deeply, inherently, constitutive of empire – informing and expanding on seemingly viable imperial models of rule in the Russian and the Ottoman empires.

The emigration of Crimean Tatars to the Ottoman Empire began in the eighteenth century, but grew rapidly during the Crimean War.⁵¹ Conflict among Russian and Tatar peasants, confusion during military operations and suspicion that Tatars were cooperating with the enemy led some Russian officials to propose mass deportation of Tatars from the conflict zone. These plans were never put in effect, even though removals did take place in an ad hoc manner at the local level.⁵² Land speculators spread many of the stories of collusion in the hope of ousting Tatar landholders, while wartime flight of Tatars – possibly at Ottoman invitation – reinforced the rumours of collaboration.⁵³

It was, instead, government reaction and local circumstances that prompted Tatar flight. Alexander II's response to the emigration convinced many Tatars they were no longer welcome in Russia; in June 1856 an order came down that Crimean officials were not to block any emigration, which should instead be viewed as beneficial because it would free the land of a 'harmful element'.⁵⁴ The Tatars, reported one Russian general, 'accepted this as a forced measure of eviction, concluding that they had forever lost the favor of the tsar'.⁵⁵ The emigration took on new proportions in 1860 with the arrival in Crimea of Nogai Tatars from the Caucasus. The Nogais's stories of Russian military victories and forced displacement spurred the Crimean Tatar 'great migration' of 1860, when the majority of the 200,000 post-war emigrants actually left.⁵⁶

In the Caucasus, ongoing Russian military operations against indigenous mountain tribes complicated Muslim emigration. Russian claims to the territory went back to the late nineteenth century, but it was only at the end of the Crimean War that the Russian Army began its final push into the restive Caucasian highlands. Circassians and members of other tribes had started to leave in noticeable numbers not long after the end of the Crimean War, but Russian Army tactics and an imperial decree from September 1861 giving the Caucasian mountaineers one month either to emigrate or resettle accelerated the process: between 1856 and 1862 fewer than 100,000 Circassians left for the Ottoman Empire; in the following three years, 300,000–400,000 fled, and possibly many more.⁵⁷ The Caucasian highlands were virtually depopulated.⁵⁸

As with the Crimean Tatars, Russian policy seemed muddled. Officials initially sought to restrict emigration of some groups from the Caucasus while allowing those seen as less compliant to depart; in both cases, among the first to leave were the elite.⁵⁹ Even though the Russian government tried to prevent return migration from the Ottoman Empire, it also took measures – such as more closely regulating individuals who claimed they were performing Hajj to Mecca – to prevent the Muslim population from leaving.⁶⁰ Starting in 1862, this approach gradually changed and the state took

on an increasing role in organizing departures, including by 1863, opening bidding to shipping companies for the transportation of 200,000 Circassians from various ports to the Ottoman Empire.⁶¹ For their part, the Ottomans had little choice in the matter. They helped Tatar populations leave after the Crimean War, and throughout the period there were constant rumours of secret Russian–Ottoman population transfer agreements. In the Circassian case, there was less active support for emigration. The Ottomans were surprised by the bidding for shipping companies in 1863, but they took their role in protecting Muslim populations seriously and were ultimately unable to say no to new immigrants – the best they could hope for was some control over how many refugees would arrive where and when. Partly for this reason, the Ottomans and Russians concluded a set of agreements for using both civilian and military ships to transfer people.⁶²

Russia's policies of removal in the Caucasus were central to a colonial civilizing mission that was part of a broader project of imperial modernization. Once cleared of the mountaineers, land would be put to better use by Orthodox Russian settlers, while the highlanders would be resettled in areas where they could farm and be culturally elevated. The fact that so many Circassians died in the process was, Irma Kreiten argues, beside the point: forced removal would eliminate the radicals while helping the state to 'mould' those who remained.⁶³

The Black Sea migrations in the decade after the Crimean War put extraordinary pressure on the Ottoman Empire, its institutions and its infrastructure. And while the sheer number of refugees arriving in the empire – particularly during the peak years of 1864–5 – resulted in overwhelming loss of life, the Ottoman government began a massive aid project designed to receive incoming refugees and then resettle them in strategically important locations across the empire. The refugees, it was hoped, would help strengthen border security and contribute to the Ottoman agricultural industry. In this way, just as the Circassians' removal served Russia's modernizers, their arrival in the Ottoman Empire might well help to strengthen the Ottoman state and increase agricultural output.⁶⁴

An early manifestation of this combined refugee and modernization programme came in 1856 with a large-scale Ottoman effort to settle Tatars in the eastern Balkans. Among the most dramatic undertaking was the creation of a new town, Mecidiye, in Dobruja.⁶⁵ Lying at the intersection of major trade routes, the town was intended to offer housing to refugees as well as become a commercial and administrative hub. Engineers and builders were brought in from across the empire to build a modern planned community, laid out on a grid, with housing and commercial areas. Construction went quickly and by November, some 1,000 houses had been built.⁶⁶ Refugees were offered land for free, agricultural tax holidays, exemption from military service and money to pay for construction and agricultural tools.⁶⁷ While profiteering marred the pilot project, Mecidiye quickly became a successful community – by 1864 the population was 15,000–20,000.⁶⁸

The Ottoman refugee aid project was predicated on permanently settling refugees in strategically important locations and providing the settlers with similar terms as those offered to the people of Mecidiye. Though clever on paper, the system bred discontent on the ground: migrants were expected to start farming in unfamiliar climates and

with inadequate supplies, while in Bulgaria, for example, the land they were offered had often been seized from Christian peasants expressly for the purpose of aid.⁶⁹ As the scale of migration grew, settlement projects such as Mecidiye became an impossible luxury. The lack of preparation and the limits of Ottoman resources and weaknesses of the project appeared early: unpaid bills meant shipping companies stopped providing transportation for refugees to their settlement locations and provisions did not arrive.⁷⁰

Up through 1860, the Ottomans had been processing refugees at the regional level. But with the rate of arrival increasing as Russia pressed into the Caucasus, the government established an empire-wide Emigrant Commission in January, 1860 to centralize responsibility for all aspects of refugee management.⁷¹ The Commission was strained severely. By February 1864 in the port city of Trabzon, 2,500 refugees had been arriving each week with another 40,000–50,000 expected not long thereafter.⁷² The refugees had in many cases been camped out in the open for months while waiting for transport on rickety ships to the Ottoman Empire and on arrival were again forced to camp. Contagious disease, starvation and exposure killed hundreds of refugees per day, while Anatolian towns started reporting destitute, starving and naked refugees wandering aimlessly.⁷³

The summer of 1864 brought with it better weather and more experience on the side of the Emigrant Commission. More provisions were reaching the port cities, and refugees were transported in a more orderly fashion to inland metropolitan centres, and were then settled in outlying areas. In the early years of the migration, refugees had largely been settled on the border regions with the intent to shore up Ottoman defensive lines. By 1863–4, the Emigrant Commission was settling refugees, especially in Anatolia, with an eye towards agricultural production – a tactic that was repeated with Balkan refugees during the Eastern Crisis. While innovative for managing large numbers of refugees, settlement programmes of this sort were hardly new, and the Emigrant Commission's programme placed the refugees very clearly in the long-term project of Ottoman economic modernization through the sedentarization of nomadic tribes.⁷⁴ In the Ottoman case, refugee settlement and nomadic sedentarization were intimately entwined at a functional level, and the growing competition over land resources encouraged nomads to settle and turn to farming.⁷⁵ By 1914, the Ottoman government had formally recognized the similarities when it merged refugee settlement with its nomadic civilizing mission in the new General Directorate for Tribes and Refugees.⁷⁶

Nations, states and refugees

The Ottoman Empire continued strategic settlement as a means of relieving the pressure of refugee populations well into the twentieth century. Yet despite the continuity in some patterns of refugee management, by the late nineteenth century refugee movement was becoming an unfamiliar and new challenge to the international system. With the Eastern Crisis of 1875–8 came an unprecedented intertwining of territorial nationalism and forced removal. The minority rights clauses inserted into the 1878 Treaty of Berlin were an early international attempt to minimize the impact of demands for popular

sovereignty in emergent nation-states; by the end of the Great War, what Eric Weitz calls the 'Paris System' of international guarantees for minorities and restricted sovereignties for the post-imperial rimland nation-states had – at least conceptually – fulfilled the promise of Berlin. Moreover, the Berlin Treaty's concern with not only protecting the minority populations at hand but also extending rights and protections to those who were displaced helped to create a new framework that explicitly tied international refugee politics with the development of minority rights regimes.

Read backwards, the displacements of the Eastern Crisis and the international response to them appear to mark a turning point at which forced removal and territorial nationalism intersect, and map out the path towards the forty years' crisis of the twentieth century and the failure of the international minority rights regime. Read forwards, a different picture emerges. The violence of the Eastern Crisis revived the great powers' long-standing concerns over how to maintain a European balance of power in the face of Ottoman military defeats and territorial fragmentation. Nationalist aspirations were certainly important in 1875–8, but they are easy to overemphasize.⁷⁷ Moreover, the home-grown and nationalizing nature of the violence as well as the ensuing mass displacement were new, and at the time they were not obviously the first step towards a new normal. The sheer size and intensity of the displacement opened new political possibilities as populations – and by extension the ability to manage population movement – became increasingly tied to state sovereignty.

The emerging link between population, displacement and sovereignty cut in two directions. Increasingly, expulsion and disenfranchisement of some accompanied by the inclusion of others might secure domestic legitimacy. Yet the terms of the Berlin Treaty were intended to discourage a 'great unweaving' of populations, and that meant international legitimacy might be claimed through incorporation – including through refugee management, repatriation and settlement.⁷⁸ While the outcome of Berlin does suggest an important turn towards the link between displacement and territorial sovereignty, the essential characteristic of exclusion that took hold in the twentieth century had not yet been fully formed.

The examples of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Eastern Rumelia demonstrate alternatives to the homogenizing model of territorial nationalism.⁷⁹ In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the number of Orthodox Christian refugees increased on the Habsburg side of the border, both the Habsburgs and the Ottomans at first saw common purpose in repatriation, which would have relieved Habsburg border populations while demonstrating internationally an Ottoman ability to meet the needs of its Christian population.⁸⁰ Early joint attempts to repatriate the refugees seem to have been in earnest, but as the violence continued, Austria-Hungary saw in the uprising an opportunity to realize long-standing designs on the provinces. The failure to return refugees became a key bargaining chip at Berlin, where Austria-Hungary used the Ottoman inability to repatriate refugees to win support for an expansionist plan to seize Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Ottomans.⁸¹

Austria-Hungary gained control over Bosnia and Herzegovina through what amounted to a legal trick, in which the Ottoman Empire maintained nominal sovereignty even as the provinces came under a Habsburg administrative occupation. But Habsburg designs extended beyond acquisition to an imperial civilizing mission

that included the restoration of the earlier demographics through repatriation of Christian refugees, and support for the existing Bosnian Muslim community.⁸² Austria-Hungary's premise that Ottoman 'misrule' had inhibited the cultural development not only of Christians but also the Muslim community put the new administration in a situation analogous to the one faced by the Ottomans: failure to ensure Muslim well-being would directly challenge claims to administrative legitimacy. Although Abdul Hamid II, the Ottoman sultan, had reluctantly consented to the occupation, he had little influence over the local population, which resisted. What officials in Vienna had assumed would be a peaceful transfer of power instead turned into a bloody fight to take the capital.⁸³ The violence perpetrated by both sides caused many Muslims to leave, and the rate of emigration increased with the establishment of the Habsburg martial government, which swiftly and often indiscriminately executed members of the resistance and others suspected of having opposed the occupation. Even after the violence subsided, Muslim emigration continued for a variety of reasons, ranging from family affairs to concerns over Muslims' status under Christian rule.⁸⁴

The question of Muslim migration mattered not only to the Habsburg government and its civilizing mission, but also to the Ottomans, who justifiably worried about the total loss of Ottoman influence in the provinces. In fact, Ottoman policy underwent a reversal: after first encouraging Muslim emigration as a form of protest against the occupation and to undermine Habsburg claims to effective administration and legitimate rule, the Ottoman council of ministers realized preserving a Bosnian Muslim population was essential to maintaining Ottoman claims for sovereignty in the provinces.⁸⁵ Both of the Ottoman approaches as well as Habsburg policy goals point not just to the increasingly important link between population and sovereignty, but to population politics that, in the face of growing territorial nationalism, stood as a bulwark of the imperial system itself.

The circumstances in Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia offer a counterpoint to those of Bosnia and Herzegovina and complicate traditional narratives of how non-national populations figure into the emergent nation-state. The Treaty of Berlin was a multilateral revision to the March 1878 Treaty of San Stefano that had actually ended the war. The other great powers particularly disliked San Stefano's creation of a so-called 'Greater Bulgaria': a large, autonomous principality that would owe its very existence to Russia. San Stefano included guarantees for Muslim landowners and non-Bulgarian populations in the new territory, but even though Russian negotiators pointed out that large swaths of territory had been depopulated of Muslims through mass flight, they also flatly rejected Ottoman requests for refugee return and settlement.⁸⁶ In the face of Russian efforts to reduce the Muslim population of a new Bulgaria, Ottoman negotiators offered a population and territorial exchange: The Ottomans would maintain control over the southern section of San Stefano Bulgaria, and would then facilitate a trade, in which the Muslims in the north would move south, and the non-Muslims in the south would move north.

Russia rejected the Ottoman proposal and the Great Powers overturned San Stefano months later at Berlin, which created a Bulgarian principality under Ottoman suzerainty in the north and returned Eastern Rumelia to Ottoman control as a province with a Christian governor and a liberal autonomy. San Stefano had given the Orthodox

Southern Slavs a taste of what could have been, but the Berlin solution to Eastern Rumelia changed the calculations of how to achieve it. Even more so than in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the well-being of minority populations – and Muslims in particular – was linked explicitly to international legitimacy. For Bulgaria, that meant putting in place the mechanisms for repatriation while actively discouraging emigration.⁸⁷ A similar phenomenon played out in Eastern Rumelia, where the Ottoman government, trying to maintain suzerainty, and the provincial government, aspiring to full independence, both saw refugee return and long-term settlement as primary tools for staking claims of sovereignty over the territory.⁸⁸

At least in principle, the Eastern Rumelian model of territorial national sovereignty was to be characterized by a level of inclusivity not apparent among other emergent Balkan nation-states, in particular Romania. To be sure, Eastern Rumelia was marked by anti-Muslim violence at the local level and a pervasive structural exclusion of Muslims – for example, in the use of Bulgarian in the government. But the leadership was invested in demonstrating its ability to govern both Christians and Muslims in the hopes of securing eventual independence while couching their policies in the language of civilization.⁸⁹ For their part, the Ottomans tried to demonstrate the provincial government's inability to rule effectively over Muslims. The Ottomans pointed to bureaucratic obstacles to refugee return, the settlement of Christians on Muslims' land and to petitions from Muslims seeking protection.⁹⁰ Eastern Rumelia did provide some aid for Muslim refugees to return, but could not stem the steady departure of Muslims for the Ottoman Empire, a fact that led to mutual recriminations from the imperial and provincial governments.⁹¹ Nevertheless, the back-and-forth over the treatment of Muslims and the return of refugees – regardless of the veracity of claims – was indicative of the terms set up by the Treaty of Berlin: emerging nation-states could try to curry international favour through refugee return.

Conclusion

If the major transformation in the cause of refugee flight over the course of the nineteenth century was a shift from people fleeing and seeking protection based on ideology to flight based on identity, the corollary was this: the language of national homogeneity as an 'ideal of state sovereignty' forged new connections between forced migration, sovereignty and legitimacy.⁹² This chapter has examined Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman imperial experiences with forced migration to argue that throughout much of the nineteenth century, flight and asylum were central to the international system, and that refugees and their management could be instrumentalized to serve domestic and foreign policy goals. As national identity and the demands of homogeneity took hold, however, the nature of the relationship between refugees and the state changed. With the fracturing of empire into nation-states, forced migration and control over refugees could be used to stake claims to contested territory. The Habsburg and Ottoman empires both argued the imperial case by trying to maintain 'multi-ethnic' populations, while emergent and presumptive nation-states saw in international agreements means of using refugee return and protection in their claims to sovereignty.

There is no mention of refugees in the Treaty of Berlin, yet in discussions of land ownership claims and civic protections their departure is acknowledged and potential return anticipated. The Berlin Treaty is also less than explicit when it comes specifically to nationality. For all the talk of Greeks, Bulgarians, Romanians, Turks and others, the actual protections Berlin put in place were exclusively religious and did not therefore define protected groups in the light of an official 'state people'. And yet, while the nomenclature of Versailles had yet to be fixed, it is clear that as nationalization in the Balkans fell along religious lines, the arbitrary creation of European minorities in the wake of the Great War that Hannah Arendt described was already under way in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.⁹³ Even in the language, the continuities are hard to overlook: the text from Article 7 of the 'Little Versailles' minorities treaty with Poland guaranteeing 'the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as for instance the admission to public employments, functions, and honors, or the exercise of professions and industries' is almost verbatim lifted from the guarantees imposed on Bulgaria in 1878.⁹⁴

The Berlin Treaty has been described as a 'paper threat' the great powers failed to stand behind: a harbinger of the failures of the interwar minorities treaties yet to come. Indeed, in the treaties ending the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, many of Berlin's principles were walked back; the bilateral treaty between Bulgaria and Turkey proposed population transfer.⁹⁵ Yet, after the signing of the Berlin Treaty, the persistence of refugee return and management policies among some emerging Balkan states and the Habsburg and Ottoman empires points to a precarious viability of minority protection, despite the lack of the transnational structures created in 1919. From this perspective at least, the Berlin Treaty was more than just paper. It was a tenuous framework that emerging states did, in fact, try to use.

Notes

- 1 Haus, Hof und Staats Archiv/HHStA. Politisches Archiv/PA XII 1875-1876, box 234, folder 'Korr. mit FZM Rodich u. d. Statthalterei in Zara, 1875-1876', 02 VII 1875, Statthalterei Dalmatiens/SHD Zara to Ministerium des Äusseren/MdÄ.
- 2 On the causes of the uprising see, for example, Milorad Ekmečić, *Ustanak u Bosni 1875-1878* (Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1973). More recent and nuanced is Hannes Grandits, *Herrschaft und Loyalität in der spätosmanischen Gesellschaft* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2008).
- 3 HHStA PA XII 1875-1876, box 234, folder 'Korr. mit FZM Rodich u. d. Statthalterei in Zara, 1875-1876' 02 VII 1875, SHD Zara to MdÄ.
- 4 Theodor von Sosnosky, *Die Balkanpolitik Österreich-Ungarns seit 1866* (Berlin: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1913), 95–126. On states' rights and responsibilities, see James Lorimer, *The Institutes of the Law of Nations: A Treatise of the Jural Relations of Separate Political Communities* (London: W. Blackwood and Sons, 1883), 334–47.
- 5 HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133, folder 'Agramer Generalcommando', 23 IX 1875, General Kommando/GK Agram to Hofburg.
- 6 Figures for the first month are likely reliable; HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133, folder 'Agramer Generalcommando', 23 IX 1875, GK Agram to Hofburg. In early 1878, some 230,000 refugees awaited return from Austria-Hungary, a number that does not include the dead and those who fled elsewhere. HHStA PA XII box 131, Weisungen. Andrassy to Zichy, 28 III 1878.

- 7 Classic on the Eastern Question is J. A. R. Marriott, *The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1940). A more detailed take on the crisis is David Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878: The First Year* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1936).
- 8 Donald Bloxham, 'The Great Unweaving: The Removal of Peoples in Europe, 1875-1949', in Richard Bessel and Claudia B. Haake (eds), *Removing Peoples: Forced Removal in the Modern World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). See also the introduction in Donald Bloxham and Robert Gerwarth (eds), *Political Violence in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
- 9 Milena Bogomilova Methodieva, 'Reform, Politics and Culture Among the Muslims in Bulgaria, 1878-1908', PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, 2010, 29. Kemal Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics*, Turkish and Ottoman Studies (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 75.
- 10 See Carole Fink, *Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Rights Protection, 1878-1938* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Also Fritz Stern, *Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichröder, and the Building of the German Empire* (New York: Knopf, 1977). Fink and Stern underemphasize the great powers' interest in protecting Muslim populations as well; similar language was used to guarantee Muslim rights in emergent post-Ottoman states since Greek independence.
- 11 Eric Weitz, 'From the Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the Entangled Histories of Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing Missions', *American Historical Review* 113, 5 (2008), 1322.
- 12 Nora Lafi, 'The Ottoman Urban Governance of Migrations and the Stakes of Modernity', in Malte Fuhrmann, Ulrike Freitag and Nora Lafi (eds), *City in the Ottoman Empire: Migration and the Making of Urban Modernity* (Florence, KY: Routledge, 2010), 19.
- 13 Mark Levene, *Devastation Volume I: The European Rimlands 1912-1938* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). I borrow the useful phrase 'forced removal' from Bessel and Haake, *Removing Peoples*.
- 14 Christine Van den Wijngaert, *The Political Offence Exception to Extradiction: The Delicate Problem of Balancing the Rights of the Individual and the International Public Order* (Antwerp: Kluwer-Deventer, 1980), 4–9.
- 15 The centrality of asylum to the nineteenth-century international system is often overlooked and remains understudied; see Wijngaert, *Political Offence Exception* and, more comprehensively, Herbert Reiter, *Politisches Asyl im 19. Jahrhundert*, Historische Forschungen (Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt, 1992). A recent analysis of the spread of asylum norms in international society is Phil Orchard, *A Right to Flee: Refugees, States, and the Construction of International Cooperation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
- 16 See Reiter, *Politisches Asyl*, 28–48.
- 17 Will Smiley, 'The Burdens of Subjecthood: The Ottoman State, Russian Fugitives, and International Law 1774-1869', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 46, (2014), 73–93.
- 18 Another 20,000 military and civilian refugees went to Austria. Svjatoslav Pacholkiv, 'Das Werden Einer Grenze: Galizien 1772-1867', in Waltraud Heindl et al. (eds), *Grenze Und Staat: Passwesen, Staatsbürgerschaft, Heimatrecht Und Fremden gesetzgebung in Der Österreichischen Monarchie 1750-1867*, (Vienna: Böhlau, 2000), 519–618.

- 19 Ottoman claims to international legitimacy relied heavily on the empire's adherence to European norms and acceptance into institutions; after the Crimean War the guarantees extended in the Treaty of Paris were particularly important. Roderic Davison, 'The Ottoman Empire and the Congress of Berlin', in Ralph Melville and Hans-Jürgen Schröder (eds), *Der Berliner Kongress Von 1878: Die Politik Der Grossmächte Und Die Probleme Der Modernisierung in Südosteuropa in Der Zweiten Hälfte Des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1982), 205–23.
- 20 On the connection between refugees, asylum and international criminal law is Robert von Mohl, *Revision der völkerrechtlichen Lehre vom Asyle* (Tübingen: Laupp, 1853).
- 21 Barton L. Ingraham, *Political Crime in Europe: A Comparative Study of France, Germany, and England* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 84.
- 22 F. W. Gibbs, *Extradition Treaties* (London: Ridgeway, 1868), 10–2. Also, Wijngaert, *Political Offence*, 4–6.
- 23 Reiter, *Politisches Asyl*, 67–8.
- 24 Reiter, *Politisches Asyl*, 24–5; Wijngaert, *Political Offence Exception*, 10–1.
- 25 Reiter, *Politisches Asyl*, 25–6; Wijngaert, *Political Offence Exception*, 11–2.
- 26 Wijngaert, *Political Offence Exception*: 12. Christopher H. Pyle, *Extradition, Politics, and Human Rights* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001), 80. See also Jürgen Osterhammel and Patrick Camiller, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 137.
- 27 Atle Grahl-Madsen, 'The European Tradition of Asylum and the Development of Refugee Law', *Journal of Peace Research* 3, 3 (1966), 280.
- 28 France, *Collection complète des lois, décrets, ordonnances, réglemens avis du Conseil d'Etat*, vol. 32, 1832 (Paris, 1833), 210–1.
- 29 *Ibid.*, 255, 545–6.
- 30 *Ibid.*, 210–1.
- 31 Quoted in Wijngaert, *The Political Offence Exception to Extradition*: 13.
- 32 Lora L. Deere, 'Political Offenses in the Law and Practice of Extradition', *The American Journal of International Law* 27, 2 (April 1933), 249. Reiter, *Politisches Asyl*: 33–4.
- 33 György Csorba, 'Hungarian Emigrants of 1848–49 in the Ottoman Empire', in Hasan Celal Güzel, C. Cem Oğuz and Osman Karatay (eds), *The Turks* (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Publications, 2002), 224. At the start of September, the Austrian government estimated there were 3,500 Hungarians at the main refugee camp in Vidin. Protocol 164, 7 September 1849. Waltraud Heindl (ed.), *Die Protokolle des Österreichischen Ministerrates 1848–1867: Das Ministerium Schwarzenberg*, Vol. 1 (öbv & hpt, 2002), 670.
- 34 Requests enclosed in No. 268, Canning to Palmerston, 3 September 1849, in *Correspondence Respecting Refugees from Hungary within the Turkish Dominions, Presented to Both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty, February 28, 1851* (London: Harrison and Son, 1851), Vol. FO 424/5, 9–11.
- 35 These treaties were signed between the Ottoman Empire and Russia (Küçük Kaynarca, 1774) and Austria (Passarowitz, 1718 and Belgrade, 1739). See also Schwarzenberg's instructions to Stürmer 14 August 1849, enclosed in No. 258, Canning to Palmerston, 25 August 1849, all in *Correspondence*, FO 424/5: 3–4.
- 36 Heinrich Lammasch, *Das Recht der Auslieferung wegen politischer Verbrechen* (Vienna: Manz'sche k. k. Hof-Verlags- und Universitaets-Buchhandlung, 1884), 40–1. Also see No. 241, Palmerston to Canning, 6 October 1849, in *Correspondence*, FO 424/5, 42–3.

- 37 Protocol 157, 27 August 1849 and Protocol 161, 3 September 1849, *Die Protokolle des Österreichischen Ministerrates 1848–1867*, 1, 636, 56.
- 38 Wilhelm Alter, *Die auswärtige Politik der ungarischen Revolution 1848–1849 unter Benutzung neuer Quellen* (Berlin: Gebrüder Paetel, 1912), 225. No. 282 Canning to Palmerston 17 September 1849, in *Correspondence*, FO 424/5: 27–8.
- 39 British instructions: No. 32, Palmerston to Admiralty, 6 October 1849, in *Correspondence*, FO 424/5, 49. French order: No. 505, Normanby to Palmerston, 18 October 1849, in *Correspondence*, FO 424/5, 79.
- 40 Austrian acceptance: No. 259, Ponsonby to Palmerston, 23 October 1849, in *Correspondence*, FO 424/5, 111–2.
- 41 Inclosure in No. 270, Canning to Palmerston, 5 September 1849. *Correspondence*, FO 424/5, 17.
- 42 On the global expansion of European international law, see Antony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law*, Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Gerrit W. Gong, *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Davide Rodogno, *Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815–191* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012), especially 18–62.
- 43 Franz von Holtzendorff, *Die Auslieferung der Verbrecher und das Asylrecht* (Berlin: Carl Habel, 1881), 29.
- 44 Quoted in Gibbs, *Extradition Treaties*, 29.
- 45 Alan W. Fisher, 'Emigration of Muslims from the Russian Empire in the Years After the Crimean War', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 35, 3 (1987), 356; Mark Pinson, 'Demographic Warfare: An Aspect of Ottoman and Russian Policy, 1854–1866', PhD Dissertation, Harvard, 1970, 55–6, 122; Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821–1922* (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1995), 35–6. Karpát, *Ottoman Population, 1830–1914*, 65–8.
- 46 I draw the phrase from the title of McCarthy, *Death and Exile*.
- 47 James Meyer, 'Immigration, Return, and the Politics of Citizenship: Russian Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, 1860–1914', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 39, 1 (2007).
- 48 Robert Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia* (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2006).
- 49 Irma Kreiten, 'A Colonial Experiment in Cleansing: the Russian Conquest of Western Caucasus, 1856–65', *Journal of Genocide Research* 11, 2–3 (2009); Dana Sherry, 'Social Alchemy on the Black Sea Coast, 1860–65', *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 10, 1 (2009).
- 50 David Cuthell, 'The Muhacirin Komisyonu: an Agent in the Transformantion of Ottoman Anatolia 1860–1866', PhD Dissertation, Columbia, 2005.
- 51 Karpát, *Ottoman Population, 1830–1914*: 66. Also Mara Kozelsky, 'Casualties of Conflict: Crimean Tatars During the Crimean War', *Slavic Review* 67, 4 (2008). Brian Glyn Williams, 'Hijra and Forced Migration from Nineteenth-century Russia to the Ottoman Empire', *Cahiers du Monde russe* 41, 1 (2000).
- 52 Kozelsky, 'Casualties of Conflict', 882–5.
- 53 Fisher, 'Emigration of Muslims from the Russian Empire', 358–9. Williams, 'Hijra and Forced Migration', 90.
- 54 Pinson, 'Demographic Warfare', 31–2; Williams, 'Hijra and Forced Migration', 92.
- 55 Quoted in Williams, 'Hijra and Forced Migration', 92.

- 56 Ibid., 94–8.
- 57 Kemal Karpat, for example, says 400,000 left in Spring 1864 alone. Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830-191*, 67; Kreiten, 'A Colonial Experiment in Cleansing', 222.
- 58 Peter Holquist, 'To Count, to Extract, and to Exterminate: Population Statistics and Population Politics in Late Imperial and Soviet Russia' in Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin (eds), *A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 111–44.
- 59 David Cuthell, 'The Circassian Sürgün', *Ab Imperio* 2 (2003), 147.
- 60 Pinson, 'Demographic Warfare', 101–13.
- 61 Ibid., 119.
- 62 Pinson, 'Demographic Warfare', 126.
- 63 Kreiten, 'A Colonial Experiment in Cleansing', 226.
- 64 For migration and modernization see Reşat Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire: Ottoman Nomads, Migrants, and Refugees* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009).
- 65 See Kemal Karpat, 'Ottoman Urbanism: The Crimean Emigration to Dobruca and the Founding of Mecidiye, 1856-1878', in *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 202–34.
- 66 Pinson, 'Demographic Warfare', 68.
- 67 Ahmet Cevat Eren, *Türkiye'de Göç ve Göçmen Meseleleri* (İstanbul: Nurgök Matbaası, 1966), 42–9.
- 68 Pinson, 'Demographic Warfare', 68.
- 69 Ibid., 67–84.
- 70 Ibid., 78.
- 71 Cuthell, 'The Circassian Sürgün', 146.
- 72 Ibid.
- 73 Ibid., 156; Kreiten, 'A Colonial Experiment in Cleansing', 220.
- 74 For sedentarization and modernism, see Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire*.
- 75 Yücel Terzibaşoğlu, 'Landlords, Nomads, and Refugees: Struggles over Land and Population Movements in North-Western Anatolia, 1877-1914', PhD Dissertation, Birkbeck College, University of London, 2003, 131.
- 76 Cengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Aşiretlerin İskanı* (İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık ve Kitapçılık, 1987), 119–20.
- 77 L.L. Farrar, 'Realpolitik versus Nationalpolitik: Rethinking nationalism during the Eastern Crisis, 1875-1878', *East European Quarterly*, 30, 1 (1996), 27–45.
- 78 Bloxham, 'Unweaving', 179.
- 79 For Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Robin Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); on Bulgaria, R. J Crampton, *Bulgaria, 1878-1918: A History* (East European Monographs, Boulder: Columbia University Press: 1983).
- 80 Roderic Davison, 'The Ottoman Empire'.
- 81 For the nut of the argument, see HHStA PAXII box 131 Weisungen, Andrassy to Zichy, 14 V 1878.
- 82 For an exhortation to civilize, see Joseph Freiherr von Helfert, *Bosnisches* (Vienna: Manzschens Hof-Verlags und Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1879); on the process, Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism*, also Peter Sugar, *Industrialization of Bosnia-Herzegovina 1878-1918* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1963). On the persistent ties between Bosnian Muslims and the Ottoman Empire, see Leyla Amzi-Erdoğdular, 'Afterlife of Empire: Muslim-Ottoman Relations in Habsburg Bosnia Herzegovina, 1878-1914', PhD Dissertation: Columbia University, 2013.

- 83 It took the Habsburg army two months to put down resistance movements, at a cost of some 5,000 missing, dead or wounded soldiers. Sosnosky, *Balkanpolitik*, 205–86.
- 84 Kemal Karpāt, ‘The Migration of the Bosnian Muslims to the Ottoman State, 1878–1914: An Account Based on Turkish Sources’ in Markus Koller and Kemal Karpāt (eds), *Ottoman Bosnia: A History in Peril*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 121–40.
- 85 Karpāt, ‘Migration of the Bosnian Muslims.’
- 86 Methodieva, ‘Reform, Politics and Culture’, 17.
- 87 Methodieva, ‘Reform, Politics and Culture’, 69–86.
- 88 Methodieva, ‘Reform, Politics and Culture’; Anna Mirkova, “Population Politics” at the End of Empire: Migration and Sovereignty in Ottoman Eastern Rumelia, 1877–1886’, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 55, 4 (2013).
- 89 Mirkova, ‘Population Politics’, 967.
- 90 Ibid.
- 91 Ibid., 971.
- 92 Weitz, ‘Vienna to Paris’, 1314.
- 93 Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 2nd edition (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1979), 270.
- 94 Reprinted in Micheline Ishay, *The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 190.
- 95 Fink, *Defending*, 37, 39–65.