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The Empire Returns: 'Repatriates' and 'Refugees' from French Algeria

Claire Eldridge

From 1954 until 1962, France fought a protracted and brutal colonial war in an attempt to retain control over the territory of Algeria. There were many reasons why France sought to deny the forces of the National Liberation Front (FLN) the independence they were seeking, among them were Algeria's geographical proximity; its unique status as an integral part of the nation since 1848 rather than just a colony; the importance of a global territorial reach to France's post-1945 claims to great power status; and the presence of over one million Europeans who regularly and forcefully made clear their ardent wish that Algeria remain part of France. Infamous for the extreme tactics used by both sides, including the systematic use of torture by the French army, this politically destabilizing conflict brought down the Fourth Republic, occasioned the return to power of General Charles de Gaulle in 1958, and led to the creation of the Fifth Republic. Arousing strong emotions, the Algerian War pitted French men and women against each other in ways that transcended traditional political, religious and social cleavages, even prompting some to commit illegal acts in the name of their beliefs. Consequently, as Algerians celebrated their hard-won independence on 5 July 1962, the predominant feeling in France was one of relief that the conflict was finally over.

For others, however, a new drama was beginning as one million people abandoned their homes in Algeria and crossed the Mediterranean to France.¹ Dominated by the European settler population, or *pieds-noirs*, this migratory wave also included 100,000 Jews and tens of thousands of Muslim Algerians who had served the colonial power in some capacity, notably the *harkis* who had been enrolled as auxiliaries in the French army. Summarizing the difficulties categorizing this diverse group of people, one journalist wrote at the time: 'Repatriates, migrants, evacuees, the destitute, the dispossessed, they're a bit of everything.'² Forced to abandon their homes as a result of political events and amid a climate of intense violence, those who left Algeria in 1962 can be regarded as part of an estimated twelve million refugees created in Africa alone as a result of decolonization.³ In this sense, they exemplify the changing character of the 'refugee problem', straddling the transition in international preoccupations from the European to the non-European world.

The reception of refugees in France

As the self-styled 'land of liberty', France had traditionally welcomed large numbers of refugees. Yet such decisions were often driven more by practicalities – a need for foreign workers – than principles. This is reflected in the fact that refugees were subject to the same legal regime as foreign workers with no special administrative measures attesting to their specific status. The criteria for obtaining a residence permit, for example, made no distinction between labour migrants and refugees. Assessments were based on the individual's perceived suitability to reside in France rather than their need for humanitarian protection. In the early 1920s, refugees were thus addressed in terms of foreign labour and, since the economy was sufficiently buoyant to absorb and support additional workers, their presence was not a problem. However, as the economy faltered in the mid-1920s and into the 1930s, attitudes changed. Amid anxieties about jobs and security, as well as a resurgence of fears of national decline, those seeking refuge were increasingly cast as threats rather than assets – people to be excluded rather than embraced. The result was a progressive closing of French borders and a curtailment of refugee rights at the very moment that the numbers seeking asylum were rising dramatically across Europe.⁴

Having decided that neither the French workforce nor the French population could accommodate additional refugees, in 1933 the government declared that it would offer only temporary passage rather than settlement to those fleeing fascist persecution. Although the left-wing Popular Front government signed the League of Nations' provisional arrangement for refugees in July 1936, which recognized refugees as a specific legal category of people as well as committing France to existing international norms of protection, the nation's borders remained closed to new arrivals. Entry restrictions were further tightened by successive decree laws in May and November of 1938, which also put in place additional measures to police those refugees already present in France.⁵ The hardening of attitudes and policies over the course of the 1930s was most starkly illustrated by the treatment of almost half a million Spanish refugees who streamed across the border into France in early 1939 as General Franco's forces emerged victorious. The French state, for the first time ever, responded to this influx with a policy of mass internment, confining the Spanish refugees in a series of camps where men were separated from their families and which became notorious for their terrible conditions as overcrowding, malnourishment and disease all took their toll.⁶ These same spaces would subsequently be used during the Second World War by the Vichy government to intern a variety of refugee populations including Germans, Jews, Spaniards and Hungarian gypsies, alongside French Jews, anarchists and communists.⁷

The inadequacies of French responses to the various refugee populations of the 1930s and 1940s were recognized at the end of the Second World War when the newly constituted Fourth Republic reaffirmed France's commitment to human rights and willingness to participate in the creation of an international refugee regime.⁸ Nonetheless, this support was tempered by a determination to retain as much control as possible over who was entitled to asylum in France so as not to open the nation to a 'flood' of post-war refugees. During negotiations over the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, French delegates consequently insisted that the remit be restricted

to the pre-1951 era and to Europe. This stance was strongly influenced by a wider concern to keep the UNHCR and, by extension, the international community, out of France's increasingly turbulent colonial affairs; something the government regarded as a purely domestic matter.⁹

In 1954, not long after the 1951 Convention became law in France, the Algerian conflict erupted. This was also the year in which French Indochina – present-day Vietnam and parts of Laos and Cambodia – was 'lost' in the wake of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, prompting the first in a series of large-scale population displacements as decolonization gathered pace. As the World Refugee Year got underway in June 1959, pressure mounted, particularly from the growing Third World block in the United Nations, to refocus the remit of the UNHCR on African and Asian refugees. At the same time as resisting such moves, France stepped up its attempts to retain control of Algeria through a carrot-and-stick combination of economic development initiatives and large-scale military repression. Less than two years later, however, Algeria was independent and France was faced with a one million strong migratory population that was simultaneously European and North African.

Yet, although clearly connected to the evolving nature of the 'refugee problem', the novel context of decolonization and the unique characteristics of the Algerian situation meant that the one million migrants of 1962 also stood outside recent refugee history. In particular, those who left Algeria, irrespective of their religion or ethnicity, were French citizens. Following the French conquest of Algeria in 1830, settlers migrated to the new colonial territory from across Europe during the nineteenth century. Concerned about the loyalties of this multinational population, the state passed laws in 1889 and 1893, making these Europeans and their descendants into French citizens. This complemented the 1870 Crémieux Decree, which had unilaterally naturalized Algeria's 34,500 Jewish inhabitants. Citizenship had notionally been open to Algeria's Muslim population since 1865, but very few were able or wanted to take this step. Not until 1944 did the law affirm that 'Muslims' in Algeria were 'French citizens', although not with the same rights as other citizens. Full equality was only introduced with the 1958 Constitution of the Fifth Republic, which guaranteed the same rights and duties to all French citizens, whether in metropolitan France or the empire. The collective result of these legal developments was that those on the move in 1962 were defined not as refugees, but rather as 'returning' French citizens or 'repatriates', even though many had never previously set foot in metropolitan France.

The distinction between refugees and repatriates would prove crucial in shaping the response of the French state to the migrants from Algeria. Determined to avoid the negative socioeconomic consequences usually associated with refugee status, the government put in place an unprecedented raft of measures designed to integrate the repatriates into the national body as swiftly as possible. Here, Europe's recent refugee history served as a warning, one the government sought to heed as it embarked upon a deliberately new and alternative path.¹⁰ At the same time, although framed with respect to universal values and notions of national solidarity, these measures were heavily driven by economic imperatives, continuing the traditional association in French policy between asylum and employment. However, when it came to dealing with those classed as 'Muslim French repatriates', primarily the *harkis*, a different strategy was

adopted. Despite theoretical equality with other repatriates, *harkis* increasingly found themselves referred to in official discourse in ways that emphasized their difference, including the use of the term ‘refugees’. More than just semantics, this differentiation translated into treating *harkis* not as individual citizens, but as a group apart who were confined to camps in isolated rural locations where they were deprived of basic rights and freedoms. The historical echoes of such treatment were particularly strong, given that many of these sites had earlier housed twentieth-century refugee populations such as Spanish Republican exiles and Jews fleeing Nazi Germany. It was also in keeping with the French practice of dealing with refugees instrumentally on a case-by-case basis, even going so far as to treat those with the same national origins differently according to when they arrived in France.

Prior experience of the ‘refugee problem’ therefore informed and framed the French state’s dealings with those repatriated from Algeria in the 1960s. In exploring these, often inconsistent, responses, this chapter will show how the end of empire prompted modes of thinking about large-scale population movements that broke new ground, while simultaneously referring back to established ideas and methods. The first half of the chapter will discuss ‘French repatriates’, that is to say the European settlers, while the second half will address the situation of *harkis*. By focusing on both official policies and the experiences of the migrants themselves, this case study allows for reflection on the often-blurred lines between the categories of ‘refugee’ and ‘repatriate’ at a crucial historical juncture when the ‘refugee problem’ was increasingly conceived of in global terms.

Resettling the settlers

The French repatriates from Algeria were only the latest in a series of citizens displaced by decolonization to arrive in France. Between 1952 and 1962, an estimated 1.3 million individuals migrated back to metropolitan France as a result of events in Indochina, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Guinea.¹¹ In the late 1950s and early 1960s, there was no standardized repatriation policy in France. Rather, what one commentator called the ‘human factor’ of decolonization was dealt with by the French authorities in a piecemeal fashion that varied depending on the territory in question, the circumstances of departure, whether the repatriate was a government or private employee and the decisions of the relevant embassy or consular officials.¹² Assistance consisted of emergency financial aid and limited support aimed at economic reintegration. As a result, charitable institutions played a considerable role in the resettlement process, providing a set of services similar to those they had historically offered to refugees.¹³ By contrast, there was no involvement from the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA), the body in France responsible for ensuring the application of international measures protecting refugees. As these population movements were regarded as domestic matters, there was no international repatriation regime equivalent to the UNHCR.

The rising number of repatriates placed an increasing strain upon these partial mechanisms, even after reforms in 1957 and 1958. With one eye firmly on developments

in Algeria, in 1961 existing measures were consolidated into a new and comprehensive regime to be overseen by a dedicated secretary of state. The legal cornerstone of this approach was the Boulin Law of December 1961. Named after the first Secretary of State for Repatriates, Robert Boulin, the law simplified and broadened the definition of those able to benefit from state aid to all Frenchmen and women 'having or expecting to have to leave, as a result of political events, a land where they were settled and which was previously placed under the sovereignty, protectorate or administration of France'. The law also expanded the type of assistance available. In place of emergency aid, the state now promised 'a collection of measures' to 'integrate French repatriates into the social and economic structures of the nation' in conformity with the principle of 'national solidarity'.¹⁴ What exactly repatriates were entitled to was clarified on 10 March 1962 in a decree that also formally extended the provisions of the Boulin Law to the French of Algeria.¹⁵ Paradoxically, the generosity of the proposed provisions was designed to encourage the settler community to remain in Algeria by reassuring them that, if the worst came to pass, they would be taken care of. As Louis Joxe, Minister for Algerian Affairs, noted on 28 March 1961 during preparatory discussions for the Boulin Law, 'The certainty given to the French who feel threatened in Algeria of finding in metropolitan France an efficient welcome, available housing and, above all, the possibility of professional reintegration would serve to calm the anxieties of most and remove the reasons for political agitation'.¹⁶ But such reassurances proved insufficiently convincing in the face of the escalating violence that marked the final months of the Algerian conflict and which, ultimately, pushed the majority of the European population to leave.

In response to the unprecedented scale of the migration from Algeria, the foundational measures of the Boulin Law and the decree of March 1962 were supplemented by a further 323 legal texts between 1962 and 1970 as the state refined and expanded its support for the substantial numbers of 'returning' citizens now within its metropolitan borders. This support included a range of measures, but was principally centred on the three elements outlined by Joxe: an effective welcome, housing and economic integration. Perhaps the most significant innovation was the provision of a monthly cash subsidy of 350 francs, slightly above the minimum wage, for up to one year. This was designed to alleviate pressure on those seeking work, enabling them to search for employment commensurate with their skills and experience rather than being forced to take the first job that came along. This was in addition to regular forms of social aid for metropolitan French citizens that were made available to repatriates without the usual stipulations regarding residency periods and documentation. Extra financial aid was provided to those unable to work or in other vulnerable situations. By 1970, an estimated ten billion francs had been spent on monthly benefits and social aid, alongside another twelve billion francs on diverse grants and subsidies and a further four billion on aid loans.¹⁷

Underpinning these exceptional measures was the French citizenship of the repatriates. Above all, the authorities were concerned to protect the repatriates from the risks of pauperization that mass displacement inherently carried and to ensure that, as French citizens, they were not treated as if they were foreign immigrants or refugees. The importance of nationality becomes apparent when the situation of the

repatriates is compared to that of the 60,000 individuals from Algeria who did not possess French citizenship. These 'foreign repatriates' were entitled to benefits for three months, but, beyond this temporary aid, were reduced to the same restricted levels of assistance provided to non-French immigrants.¹⁸ While willing to support the most socioeconomically vulnerable, the state did not want thousands of 'dependent' citizens on its hands, hence the emphasis on inserting repatriates into appropriate positions in the workforce as quickly as possible. This was not only for the sake of national prosperity. The French state equally wanted to limit any dissent or protest on the part of the repatriate population. Such fears were well grounded: during and immediately after the Algerian War, radical settlers had vented their anger at decolonization in the form of terrorist violence against the state, most famously through the Secret Army Organization (OAS) who were determined to keep Algeria part of France at all costs. Finally, government assistance was seen as a way to hasten the assimilation process, helping to overcome any lingering collective cultural particularities.

The French state was fortunate that, in contrast to the 1930s, the last time France had been called upon to absorb large numbers of migrants, the economy was booming in the early 1960s, enjoying average growth rates of 5.7 per cent a year between 1955 and 1968.¹⁹ This prosperity helped allay many of the anxieties surrounding the incorporation of the French from Algeria, not least by providing much of the finance for government schemes. Moreover, the state was keen to emphasize the ways in which the repatriates represented an asset to the nation as opposed to a drain on its resources. One of the most frequently drawn parallels was with post-1945 West Germany whose successful absorption of over twelve million refugees and expellees was seen to lie at the heart of the 'German miracle' of economic growth in the 1950s.²⁰ Boulin's successor, Alain Peyrefitte, used this example when seeking to persuade a somewhat sceptical President de Gaulle that 'one million repatriates' could also 'be an opportunity for an expanding France', providing that their integration was actively managed and supported by the state.²¹ Consequently, although the state drew to some extent on philosophies that had been applied to previous migrant populations – such as the importance of economic integration as a motor for broader assimilation – the treatment of repatriates from Algeria was distinct. In particular, the level of cross-party political will behind the project was unique, driven by the status of the repatriates as French citizens as opposed to 'foreigners'. This, in combination with the vast numbers involved, compelled the state to create a repatriation policy that was unparalleled in its reach. In spite of gaps and problems, especially in early years when the demands placed upon these new structures were at their most acute, the state succeeded in its fundamental aim of avoiding the marginalization of the repatriates; within a decade there was no discernible socioeconomic difference between a repatriate from Algeria and a metropolitan French person.

Experiential continuities

At the cultural level, however, the sense of otherness, of not quite belonging in spite of their legal status as Frenchmen and women, lingered long after socioeconomic

data indicated assimilation had occurred. This legacy created experiential similarities between the repatriates and refugee communities. Of course, French repatriates from Algeria were at no point denied the protection of the nation-state to which they belonged. Nor were they ever outside the territory of their nation, thus excluding them from contemporary international definitions of refugee status. However, many did flee their homes owing – in the words of the 1951 Convention – to a ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ since, ironically, levels of violence in Algeria actually increased following the signature of ceasefire accords at Evian on 19 March 1962. This was due primarily to the scorched earth policy undertaken by the OAS in a bid to derail ongoing independence negotiations between France and the FLN. After 19 March, OAS violence became more indiscriminate, targeting both French and Algerian civilians as they sought to provoke the FLN into retaliatory acts that would nullify the peace deal, while also terrifying the settlers into remaining, as a way of displaying their authority over the community. In the post-ceasefire period, more Europeans were killed in Algeria than in the previous seven years of conflict. Coming on the back of years of violence which had already strained settler nerves to breaking point, this climate of terror left the community feeling as if their only choice was, to use the common phrase of the time, ‘the suitcase or the coffin’.

After the decision to leave had been taken came the arduous process of physically departing. The sheer scale of the population movement, which saw 355,000 people leave in June 1962 alone, meant queuing, often over several days, to secure passage to France and doing so under constant fear of attack, particularly as by this point the OAS was targeting ports and airports.²² Each passenger was restricted in the amount of luggage they could take, leaving families trying to cram entire lives into two allotted suitcases. Photographs show people bundled up in jumpers, hats, scarves and winter coats even though it was the height of summer as they sought to wear what they could not pack. The Algerian-born writer Jules Roy gave a particularly vivid account of the toll departure took on his fellow settlers when he stated:

Dazed, silent, despondent, they can't grasp what is happening to them with this brutal uprooting. Mothers no longer have the energy to watch their children, old men remain immobile, their suitcases at their feet, as if they have nowhere to go and their life has stopped there ... tears run down their leathery and wrinkled cheeks which they don't even bother to brush away with their hand.²³

Those who flew to France were at least assured of a seat since there was a strict passenger limit for each aircraft. Those who travelled by boat, however, faced unpleasant and dangerous levels of overcrowding as they crossed the Mediterranean. On 7 June 1962, seven ships docked in Marseille, disembarking a total of 10,437 passengers. This included the *El Djezaïr*, which carried 1,627 people, in spite of an official capacity of only 984, and the *Kairouan*, whose 2,630 voyagers were more than double the ship's stipulated 1,172 places.²⁴

The iconography of this well-documented population movement, which included long queues and large crowds of visibly distressed men, women and children clutching their meagre possessions, inevitably recalled previous waves of refugees into France. Keen to avoid historical comparisons and thus any link in the public imagination

between the repatriates from Algeria and refugee populations such as the Spanish Republican exiles of 1939, officials consistently downplayed the significance of what was happening. This strategy included claiming that rather than an exceptional and permanent displacement, the number of departures was in line with normal patterns of summer travel. Speaking to the council of ministers at the end of May 1962, Boulin asserted that press reports of 'a flood of pathetic refugees, destitute and without shelter' were untrue. Supporting his argument with statistics, Boulin compared the 100,000 departures from Algeria registered that month with 71,500 in May 1960 and 99,500 in May 1961. His claims prompted the Education Minister Pierre Sudreau to ask: 'Are they holidaymakers, as the Secretary of State would have us believe, or refugees, or repatriates?'²⁵ Boulin's denials formed part of a broader governmental mindset which proved unwilling to accept that, contrary to their initial plans and hopes, the majority of settlers were not going to remain in Algeria and, having largely been spared the mass migrations of the post-1945 era, France would now face a substantial and disruptive influx of people.

These denials were also a political tactic whereby the loss of Algeria was reconfigured not as a humiliating blow to national prestige, but rather as an opportunity for France to divest itself of cumbersome colonial commitments so as better to turn its attention to modernization and Europe. Within this schema, the governments of Michel Debré (January 1959 to April 1962) and Georges Pompidou (April 1962 to July 1968) interpreted the migration of the repatriates from Algeria as 'the logical integration of a population into its country of origin' and therefore of limited political and national consequences.²⁶ For the French repatriates, however, 'return' was experienced as a 'rupture', especially given that a large proportion had no ancestral connection to metropolitan France, nor had they spent much time there, if any. Although the legal designation of repatriate brought with it protection and the promise of financial assistance, it was also not a label that sat easily with individuals who felt themselves to have been 'expatriated' in 1962. 'I don't use the term "repatriates,"' explained former settler Nicole Giraud, 'because we are not repatriates, we are the de-patriated and refugees.'²⁷ In common with other 'exiled' communities, repatriate accounts stressed the trauma of losing their emotional and material bearings, of suddenly being deprived of everything that had constituted the daily fabric of their lives. More than simply having been forced from a land they considered their own, what repatriates found particularly destabilizing was the sense that, with Algerian independence, their country of birth no longer existed.

In seeking to assuage the grief of this irreversible loss, many repatriates looked to their metropolitan compatriots for support. Writing in the weekly newspaper of ANFANOMA, one of the largest repatriate associations of the time, Paul Coste-Floret argued for the union of all French people so that the 'difficult world' of the exodus could 'transform into a fraternal and heart-warming welcome'.²⁸ His appeals were echoed by the government and by the mainstream press, both of which repeatedly emphasized the 'Frenchness' of the repatriates and their right to solidarity and hospitality on this basis. Raised 'with the idea that Algeria is France, like Brittany or Alsace', repatriates like Philippe Mendes equally had expectations regarding how they would be received.²⁹ The problem with homecomings is that the imagined return almost always falls short

of the reality, not least in terms of the reactions of those to whom one is returning.³⁰ For repatriates, this sentiment was exacerbated by the gap between the language of 'return' and their actual sense of belonging and attachment, which lay outside of France. Equally, for the metropolitan population, there was a disjuncture between people they were told were French, just like them, and the repatriates in front of them whose appearance, accents and behaviour they found to be distinctly foreign.

Consequently, in spite of government propaganda, the dominant sentiment among repatriates in 1962 was one of rejection. Everyday treatment revealed the hollowness of the rhetoric of national solidarity as repatriate status repeatedly proved insufficient to grant full access to public hospitality.³¹ Instead, as the repatriate Monsieur Ferreira explained, 'We felt rejected as if we were foreigners.'³² The scale of the migration from Algeria magnified all the usual fears associated with an influx of unknown 'foreign' peoples. This was particularly true in Marseille, which bore the brunt of the arrivals, stretching local resources and tempers to breaking point. Suddenly forced to compete with thousands of additional people for access to shops and services, residents of Marseille resented the disruption caused by the repatriates, especially when this was manifested in rising prices and crime rates. The vocal expression of these frustrations left repatriates feeling distinctly unwelcome, if not actively victimized. 'They blame everything on us,' complained one man. 'If there's a robbery, it's a repatriate, if traffic is difficult, it's because of repatriates. If rents go up and the cost of a weekly shop becomes unaffordable, again, it's because of us.'³³ In a bid to ameliorate tensions, the local press reportedly suppressed stories of clashes between the two communities. However, as *France-Observateur* noted, that did not stop the inhabitants of Provence and the Languedoc 'passing on by word of mouth stories about the cheeky, loud, rude, always dissatisfied "pieds-noirs." They complain about their insolence; they complain about their forwardness with women; above all, they complain about their presence.'³⁴

In the face of local hostility, repatriates came together in informal groups in places such as the Place de la Bourse in Marseille. Although comforting, assembling in this way only heightened their visibility, strengthening the hand of those questioning the ability and willingness of the repatriates to integrate. For Aline M., suspicions about her Frenchness translated into her classmates repeatedly asking her to take off her shoes so they could see if she really did have 'pieds-noirs' (black feet).³⁵ Even more forthright was an anonymous, handwritten pamphlet distributed in the Bouches-du-Rhône area and attributed, by the repatriate association ANFANOMA, to the local Communist Party:

Out of France ... foreign scum
Fuck off back where you came from
We don't want you here.³⁶

Anxieties surrounding the presence of repatriates were enhanced by the connection drawn in metropolitan minds between the French from Algeria and the OAS, the terroristic remnants of which were still active on both sides of the Mediterranean. Earlier in the year, a survey revealed that 57 per cent of the metropolitan French believed that over half the settlers were affiliated to the OAS.³⁷ It is true that many within the settler community initially supported the organization's fundamental aim,

which was to keep Algeria as part of France. However, this largely symbolic support waned as the violence of the OAS intensified and became more indiscriminate in the spring and summer of 1962. Nonetheless, as Sung Choi notes, ‘The political climate was hardly propitious to receive the very same individuals most metropolitans believed were involved in threatening the lives of the French on the continent.’³⁸

The sense of rejection by their fellow countrymen, on top of their own sense of displacement, disorientation and loss, led to significant psychological trauma among the repatriates. There were numerous accounts of people committing suicide on the voyage to France by throwing themselves into the sea, while Daniel Leconte claims that obituary notices for repatriates during the winter of 1962–63 failed to specify that many of these deaths were self-inflicted.³⁹ Academic studies conducted at the time also drew explicit parallels between psychological symptoms displayed by repatriates – severe anxiety, depression, paranoia and delirium – and conditions observed among refugee populations in the aftermath of the Second World War.⁴⁰ These challenges notwithstanding, there was still an important difference between repatriates from Algeria and refugees. The French state could not erase the emotional trauma of exile, but the legal protection afforded by repatriate status and the far-reaching measures accompanying this did shield the French of Algeria from the worst material hardships of displacement. This, in turn, lessened the psychological toll imposed by migration.

Marginalizing ‘Muslim repatriates’

The relatively privileged position of the French from Algeria becomes particularly apparent when their fate is compared to that of the ‘French Muslim Repatriates’, especially the *harkis* and their families. Recruited systematically by the French army from February 1956 into mobile units to undertake offensive military operations against the FLN, the number of *harkis* had reached 61,600 by January 1961. As the Algerian War progressed and France drew more heavily upon indigenous manpower in both civilian and military capacities, *harki* became a generic term signifying all native auxiliaries, which is the sense in which it is used here. The number of *harkis* so defined fluctuated throughout the war, peaking at 210,000 in 1958, but falling considerably in the final months of the conflict.⁴¹ Principally of rural origin, illiterate and unskilled, *harkis* were motivated to enrol in the French army by a combination of factors including financial necessity, fear of FLN violence, family loyalties, and coercion or entrapment.

When the ceasefire was proclaimed, *harkis* were given three options: engage in the regular French army, which would mean going wherever the army went, resign with a small financial payment, or enrol for six months on a civilian contract. Even amid considerable concern for their safety in a soon-to-be FLN ruled Algeria, *harkis* were reluctant to leave their lives and families. Clauses in the Evian Accords offering general guarantees of safety for civilians, in combination with the substantial number of French troops still present and promises of protection from senior military officials, proved sufficiently reassuring for 21,000, or 81.2 per cent of those still in active service, to accept their final pay and hand over their uniforms.⁴² Never having wanted to get

caught up in the war in the first place, these men were keen to return to the lives they had been forced to suspend. Sadly, such hopes were quickly shattered as waves of terrible revenge violence broke out across the country, much of it believed to be carried out by *marsiens*, last-minute FLN recruits. Beginning in April 1962, the massacres of the *harkis* and their families were most intense during July and August. Between 60,000 and 75,000 are believed to have been killed, although the exact death toll will never be known.⁴³

In the face of such persecution, *harkis* sought refuge in France. This should have been relatively straightforward since the *harkis* possessed French nationality and, as the Evian Accords promised, no French person would be deprived of citizenship against that person's wishes. The April decree that extended the provisions of the Boulin Law to inhabitants of Algeria further stipulated that 'anyone in Algeria wishing to return to metropolitan France, will be able to benefit from repatriate status.'⁴⁴ In practice, however, legal equality was progressively undermined by government rhetoric and policy, which cast the *harkis* as different, both from other repatriates and from the metropolitan French.⁴⁵ One of the clearest signs of this was the disappearance of the phrase 'Muslim repatriates' along with that of 'citizens' from official documentation and its replacement with terms such as 'refugees' or 'harkis', labels with no obvious link to either citizenship or Frenchness. Even de Gaulle asserted on 25 July 1962 that 'obviously' the term 'repatriate' did not apply to 'Muslims', adding 'in their case, we are dealing only with refugees'.⁴⁶ Todd Shepard regards this change in language as an attempt by the government to bring the legal situation into line with the popular and official belief that 'Muslims' from Algeria could not be French, even though this position contradicted the Evian Accords, the Boulin Law and long-standing colonial rhetoric.⁴⁷ On 21 June 1962 these semantic practices were codified in a new law which differentiated between 'French of European origin' (FSE) – essentially the settlers and the naturalized Jewish population – and 'French of North African origin' (FSNA). The former were allowed to keep their nationality following Algerian independence, while the latter were stripped of their citizenship. Now classed as Algerians, *harkis* were informed that if they wished to reclaim French nationality they would have to request this before a judge in France.⁴⁸ As a result, rather than 'returning' citizens possessed of equal rights, by the summer of 1962, the *harkis* were presented as 'outsiders whom the French Republic welcomed and assisted only out of charity and only in unavoidable circumstances'.⁴⁹

The practical consequences of this differentiation were far-reaching. The most immediate impact in the summer of 1962 was to make it difficult for *harkis* to flee the violence sweeping Algeria. Correspondence reveals that officials were well aware of the dangers faced by *harkis* with reports in June describing the 'tragic' situation whereby 'kidnappings, summary executions, ostracism, forced labour in prison camps have made [the *harkis*] into pariahs'.⁵⁰ But the need to help those who had rendered the nation considerable service and who were now in danger was balanced against the French state's desire to control the flow of *harkis* into France and their hope that the majority would remain in Algeria. Directives were thus issued to ensure that those who came to France did so only via official channels and were 'genuinely' in danger, as opposed to extremists, of either FLN or OAS persuasion, who might pose a threat

to domestic security, or opportunists looking for ‘work that Algeria cannot provide.’⁵¹ Individual officers who, out of a sense of loyalty and responsibility, attempted to bring *harkis* to France on their own initiative were warned on 12 May through a top-secret telegram from Louis Joxe that ‘all auxiliaries landing in the metropole outside of the official repatriation programme will be sent back.’⁵² It was this perceived need to maintain order in France that prevailed over humanitarian concerns, especially as the numbers of *harkis* seeking refuge in France rose rapidly. In any case, humanitarian concerns and the responsibility to intervene were limited by the fact that those in danger were now regarded as Algerians being menaced by their fellow countrymen rather than French citizens.⁵³ When deciding which *harkis* to admit to the metropole, officials also took into account factors such as age, fitness and perceived ability to assimilate. For historian François-Xavier Hautreux this indicates that, in addition to an operation to welcome refugees, the state saw the transfer of the *harkis* to France as an economic migration whose costs and benefits to the nation needed to be factored in.⁵⁴ Moreover, the existence of any explicit selection process belies the ways in which the treatment of the *harkis* differed from that of other repatriates. As Shepard pointedly notes, the authorities were much more concerned about OAS infiltration within the settler population than among *harkis*, yet there was never any suggestion that certain Europeans should be refused right of entry on grounds of national security.⁵⁵

As with the number of *harkis* killed, it is not possible to determine exactly how many made it to France; estimates range from 65,000 to 100,000.⁵⁶ Whereas the goal of the state with respect to the European repatriates was to integrate them into the wider French population as quickly as possible, the *harkis* and their families, especially those who came via official channels, were grouped together and kept apart. Initially, *harkis* were placed in two former military camps: Larzac (Puy-de-Dôme) and Bourg-Lastic (Auvergne). Both these spaces quickly exceeded their maximum capacities, prompting the creation, in autumn 1962, of four ‘accommodation camps’ in the isolated, rural locations of Rivesaltes (Pyrénées-Orientales), Saint-Maurice-l’Ardoise (Gard), Bias (Lot et Garonne) and La Rye Vigéant (Vienne). Several of these sites had long histories of housing those the Republic deemed ‘undesirable’, often ‘foreign’ populations that the state wished to keep separate from the rest of society. The Rivesaltes camp, for example, opened in May 1939. Over the next two decades it housed Spanish Civil War exiles, German and Jewish refugees, Jews awaiting deportation, German POWs, FLN prisoners and, finally, the *harkis*. Placing them in such spaces symbolically connected the *harkis* to these previous populations, strengthening the idea that they were refugees rather than citizens. On the basis that ‘one must adapt them gradually to a totally different way of life’, camps were advocated by officials so that the *harkis* might ‘continue to benefit from a certain supervision [*encadrement*] in their work and accommodation’. As a result, the aid to which the *harkis* were entitled was not distributed to them on an individual basis as it was to other repatriates. Instead, it was retained by the authorities and used to pay for running the camps, including the costs associated with social and cultural education programmes to hasten the assimilation process.⁵⁷

Historical parallels with other refugees extended beyond geographical coincidences. Unprepared for the large influx of *harkis*, conditions in the camps were rudimentary at best. Georgette Berthes, a social assistant who had accompanied

harki families from Algeria to France, was shocked to discover upon arrival at Larzac that 'nothing has been prepared for receiving our brave people. The huts were in a pitiful state, windows broken, doors missing, brambles climbing the walls.'⁵⁸ At first, however, most *harkis* were housed not in permanent structures but in tents even as autumn approached and the weather worsened. Conditions in the barracks into which the *harkis* were moved by January 1963 were little better, with neither heat nor electricity. Even after funds were unlocked for renovations, significant issues still remained. One persistent problem was overcrowding. All camps held more than their maximum capacity at certain points. In January 1963, 5,542 inhabitants were resident in Rivesaltes, a space designed for no more than 4,000.⁵⁹ As with previous populations, overcrowding inevitably led to insanitary conditions, ill health and the rapid transmission of diseases such as TB.⁶⁰

The organization and administration of the camps subjected the *harkis* to constant surveillance and interference from state agents, reminiscent of the measures used to control refugee populations in these same spaces. Equipped with everything from schools and medical facilities to post offices, the camps were self-enclosed worlds. Military discipline, including being present for the raising of the flag in the morning, was combined with set times for meals and showers, electricity only between specified hours, and post being opened and read by camp staff. Permission was required to leave the camps, even temporarily, while the barrack-like accommodation surrounded, in some cases, by barbed wire served as constant reminders for their *harkis* of the lack of control over their lives. Contact between *harkis* and wider French society was strictly regulated, inhibiting the integration process the camps were supposed to be effecting. Upon discovering conditions at Rivesaltes, Dalila Kerchouché's parents were among several *harki* families prompted to ask: 'Why have they put us in prison? What crime have we committed?'⁶¹

In total, an estimated 42,500 people passed through *harki* camps between 1962 and 1969.⁶² Although most camps were closed in the mid-1960s, Saint-Maurice-l'Ardoise and Bias remained open until the mid-1970s. In 1974, more than a decade after arriving in France, 16,000 people were still resident on these two sites.⁶³ The number of *harkis* who spent a sustained period of time in one or more camps was small. However, often departure simply signalled a transfer to alternative institutional environments such as forest hamlets, temporary estates or purpose-built social housing. Although each of these settings had different purposes, all adhered to the principle of treating the *harkis* as a collective entity and keeping them physically and socially separate from mainstream society. In particular, the forest hamlets maintained similarly strict rules and monitoring processes to the camps. Typical was the experience of the Kerchouché family who passed through a number of sites including Bourg-Lastic, Rivesaltes and the forest hamlet of Lozère, before finally moving into their own home in 1974.⁶⁴ The repercussions of these initial exilic and isolated years in France continue to this day, particularly among descendants of *harkis*, many of whom have struggled to integrate in spite of their French citizenship. This explains the sustained campaigns waged by *harki* children, who have demanded material assistance alongside official recognition of the history of their community, particularly the sacrifices made by their fathers for France.⁶⁵

The placement of the *harkis* within the prison-like spaces of the camps underlines the extent to which they were viewed as ‘aliens’ and outsiders whose status most closely resembled that of refugees. Yet the *harkis* were never formally granted refugee status, which would at least have afforded them certain rights and protections under the aegis of the UNHCR.⁶⁶ Instead, they were left stranded in a no man’s land between the categories of repatriate and refugee. By comparison, although questions were posed about the ‘Frenchness’ of the former settlers, the hostility that greeted this community in 1962 was primarily connected to the scale and suddenness of their arrival and the disruption it caused. Even outside of government and press exhortations to welcome the repatriates as fellow countrymen, there was sufficient racial and cultural similitude for assimilation to never really be in doubt. Nor, crucially, was their legal status as citizens ever disputed. Instead, this privileged position gave them access to exceptional levels of state support that were denied to the *harkis*. Official and popular distinctions made between European repatriates and the *harkis* thus split the ‘exodus’ from Algeria into two components, assigning different, often racialized, attributes and values to each.

The ways in which the *harkis* were first rhetorically and then legally detached from their French citizenship was both a cause and consequence of reservations about their ability to assimilate. These reservations were indicative of wider anxieties about the prospect of large numbers of formerly colonized peoples migrating to France as decolonization globalized conceptions of the ‘refugee problem’. For while the Algerian case was unique in many ways, France was not the only imperial power to be faced with the ‘return’ of sizeable numbers of its overseas citizens alongside other inhabitants from the ex-colonies. Although settlers in the British territories of Kenya and Rhodesia largely opted to remain after independence or to relocate elsewhere within Africa, Europeans in both Dutch and Portuguese colonies overwhelmingly made their way back to their respective metropolises. Between 1975 and 1976, for example, half a million *retornados* (returnees) from Angola and Mozambique swelled the Portuguese population by approximately 7 per cent, the largest increase of any postcolonial repatriation.⁶⁷ Like the repatriates from Algeria, these men and women also felt rejected by their fellow countrymen who bristled at the additional burdens their sudden arrival placed upon the already scarce national resources.⁶⁸ Moreover, a distinction was made by the state and the general population between white *retornados* who were able, through considerable personal effort, to integrate themselves back into the national fold, and returnees with African heritage whose ‘Portugueseness’ was denied. Instead, they were marginalized, placed within the same category as black immigrants from ex-colonial territories such as Cape Verde who had no citizenship rights. This, Stephen Lubkemann argues, was part of a process of postcolonial identity construction whereby Portugal sought to stake a claim to influence and leadership over the wider Lusophone world without acknowledging the impact of its former colonies upon its own national composition and identity.⁶⁹

In many respects the Algerian case study stands at odds with the narrative set out by Zara Steiner in her chapter in this volume, not least because the men and women concerned were never legally defined as refugees. At a moment when international structures and regimes were becoming increasingly formalized, migration from Algeria was treated by the French as a purely domestic matter. However, keen

international interest in the unfolding situation in Algeria, combined with astute diplomatic manoeuvring by the FLN, enmeshed the War of Independence, and those who were displaced as result of it, in the politics of both decolonization and the Cold War, highlighting the overlap between these two pivotal historical processes.⁷⁰ The *pièdes-noirs* and *harkis* furthermore serve as an exception to Steiner's observation that, at least at first, those on the move in Africa as empire ended 'barely affected Europe'. In the wake of decolonization, 'returning' citizens from across the European empires, dubbed 'invisible migrants' by Andrea Smith, emerged as sites of negotiation, even contestation, in their respective metropolises.⁷¹ Their presence provoked similar anxieties and debates within European nations that were forced to grapple anew with questions of identity, belonging, exclusion and diversity as they sought to redefine themselves as postcolonial entities. The Algerian case study is therefore not alone in demonstrating that, during the closing stages of the 'forty years' crisis, it was not only the composition of the populations on the move that had undergone a shift but also the priorities – social, political, economic, cultural and racial – of the European nations who were attempting to come to terms with the realities of a reconfigured postcolonial international system and their own place within this.

Notes

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- 1 In 1962, 1,064,000 people arrived in France from Algeria, with the months of May through to August comprising the peak transit period. Of these, 421,000 returned to Algeria, at least temporarily, leaving more than 650,000 in France at the end of the year. This was in addition to over 100,000 who had departed prior to 1962 and the further 200,000 who would leave between 1963 and 1967. Jean-Jacques Jordi, 'L'été 62 à Marseille: tensions et incompréhensions', in Jean-Jacques Jordi and Emile Temime (eds), *Marseille et le choc des décolonisations*, (Aix-en-Provence: Edisud, 1996), 66.
- 2 'Le temps de retour', *Le Monde*, 16 May 1962, 3.
- 3 Jean-Louis Miège and Colette Dubois (eds), *L'Europe retrouvée: les migrations de la décolonisation* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1994), 9.
- 4 Greg Burgess, *Refuge in the Land of Liberty: France and its Refugees from the Revolution to the End of Asylum* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008), 145–63.
- 5 Burgess, *Refuge in the Land of Liberty*, 166–98; Mary Dewhurst Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic: Migrant Rights and the Limits of Universalism in France, 1918–1940* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 155–87.
- 6 For further discussion of the Spanish case study, see Scott Soo, *The Routes to Exile: France and the Spanish Civil War Refugees, 1939–2009* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013).
- 7 Jeanette E. Miller, 'A Camp for Foreigners and "Aliens": The Harkis' Exile at the Rivesaltes Camp (1962–1964)', *French Politics, Culture and Society*, 31, 2 (2013), 22.
- 8 Gérard Noiriel, *Réfugiés et sans papiers: la République face aux droit d'asile, XIXe-XXe siècle* (Paris: Fayard, 1998, reprinted 2006, 2012).
- 9 Noiriel, *Réfugiés*, 150.

- 10 This was also the case for the French Jewish community who, conscious of their shortcomings in the 1930s when faced with their European co-religionists in flight, sought to actively welcome Jews from Algeria. Unfortunately, the experiences of Algerian Jews are beyond the scope of this chapter, but for further discussion see, in particular, Sarah Beth Sussman, 'Changing Lands, Changing Identities: The Migration of Algerian Jewry to France, 1954-1967', PhD Dissertation, Stanford University, 2002; Colette Zytnicki, 'L'accueil des Juifs d'Afrique du Nord par les institutions communautaires (1961-1965)', *Archives Juives*, 31, 2 (1998), 95–109.
- 11 This figure includes 100,000 settlers who left Algeria prior to 1962. Colette Dubois, 'La Nation et les Français d'outre-mer: Rapatriés ou sinistrés de la décolonisation?', in *L'Europe retrouvée*, 76.
- 12 Jean Vacher-Desvernais, *L'Avenir des Français d'outre-mer* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), 10.
- 13 Dubois, 'La Nation', 98–9.
- 14 Loi 61-1429, *Journal Officiel de la République française*, 28 December 1961.
- 15 Since Algeria had been legally part of France since 1848, inhabitants were initially excluded from repatriate status on the grounds that any movement by them would technically consist of migrating from one part of the nation to another, rather than 'returning' from an overseas territory.
- 16 Yann Scioldo-Zürcher, 'La loi du 26 décembre 1961: une anticipation du rapatriement des Français d'Algérie', in Abderahmane Bouchène et al. (eds), *Histoire de l'Algérie à la période coloniale (1830-1962)* (Paris: La Découverte, 2012), 569.
- 17 Yann Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir métropolitain: politique d'intégration et parcours de rapatriés d'Algérie en métropole (1954-2005)* (Paris: Éditions EHESS, 2010), 300.
- 18 Exceptions were made, mostly for military service or other examples of 'exceptional devotion' to the nation, but these were limited in number. *Ibid.*, 198.
- 19 *Ibid.*, 300.
- 20 For a comparative discussion of *Vertriebene* and settlers from Algeria, see Jan C. Jansen and Manuel Borutta (eds), *Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs in Postwar Germany and France: Comparative Perspectives* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2016).
- 21 Alain Peyrefitte, *C'était de Gaulle* (Paris: Gallimard, 2002), 266.
- 22 Jordi, 'L'été 62', 67.
- 23 Jules Roy, 'Rapatriés: la panique', *L'Express*, 31 May 1962, 23.
- 24 Jordi, 'L'été 62', 69.
- 25 Peyrefitte, *C'était de Gaulle*, 152; Guy Pervillé, 'Robert Boulin secrétaire d'État aux Rapatriés', in Hubert Bonin et al. (eds), *Robert Boulin: itinéraires d'un gaulliste (Libourne, Paris)* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2011), 136.
- 26 Yann Scioldo-Zürcher, 'Reflections on Return and the "Migratory Projects" of the Français d'Algérie', in Scott Soo and Sharif Gemie (eds), *Coming Home? Vol. 2: Conflict and Postcolonial Return Migration in the Context of France and North Africa, 1962-2009* (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), 53.
- 27 Nicole Giraud in Dominique Fargues, *Mémoires de Pieds-Noirs* (Paris: Flammarion, 2008), 201.
- 28 Paul Coste-Floret, 'L'exode', *France Horizon*, 46 (June 1962), 24.
- 29 Philippe Mendes in René Domergue, *L'intégration des pieds-noirs dans les villages du Midi* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2005), 34–6.
- 30 Fran Markowitz, 'The Homes of Homecoming', in Fran Markowitz and Andres H. Stefansson (eds), *Homecomings: Unsettling Paths of Return* (Lanham MD: Lexington, 2004), 23.

- 31 On this point, see Sung E. Choi, 'From Colonial Settler to Postcolonial Repatriate: The Integration of the French from Algeria, 1962 to the Present', unpublished doctoral dissertation, UCLA, 2007, 127.
- 32 Monsieur Fereira in Domergue (ed.), *L'intégration des pieds-noirs*, 34–6.
- 33 Jordi, 'L'été 62', 71.
- 34 'L'isolement des pieds-noirs', *France-Observateur*, 643 (30 August 1962), 4.
- 35 Aline M. in Philippe Bouba, *L'Arrivée des pieds-noirs en Roussillon en 1962* (Canet: Trabucaire, 2009), 128.
- 36 It is probable that ANFANOMA's own strongly anti-communist leanings influenced their decision to reproduce this tract in full as part of a wider argument that much of the hostility the repatriates were still facing in 1964 was ideologically driven. 'Les "cocos" n'aiment pas les Pieds-Noirs', *France Horizon*, 63 (March 1964), 24.
- 37 Bouba, *L'Arrivée*, 145.
- 38 Choi, 'From Colonial Settler', 117.
- 39 'La France est aussi leur patrie', *L'Aurore*, 7 May 1962, 1; Jean-Jacques Jordi, '1962: l'arrivée des Pieds-Noirs', *Français d'ailleurs, people d'ici*, Special Issue 81 (1995), 26; Daniel Leconte, *Les pieds-noirs: histoire et portrait d'une communauté* (Paris: Seuil, 1980), 244.
- 40 Jean-Jacques Jordi, *De l'exode à l'exil: rapatriés et Pieds-Noirs en France* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1993), 187.
- 41 Charles-Robert Ageron, 'Le "drame des Harkis": mémoire ou histoire?', *Vingtième siècle*, 68 (2000), 3.
- 42 Ibid., 4.
- 43 William B. Cohen, 'The Harkis: History and Memory', in Patricia M. E. Lorcin (ed.), *Algeria and France 1800–2000: Identity, Memory, Nostalgia* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 168.
- 44 Dubois, 'La Nation', 99.
- 45 Yann Scioldo-Zürcher, 'Les harkis sont-ils des rapatriés comme les autres?', *Les Temps modernes*, 666 (November–December 2011), 90–104; Todd Shepard, 'La République face aux harkis: questions aux historiens', *Les Temps modernes*, 666 (November–December 2011), 53–64.
- 46 Peyrefitte, *C'était de Gaulle*, 209; Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006), 231.
- 47 Todd Shepard, 'Excluding the Harkis from Repatriate Status, Excluding Muslim Algerians from French Identity', in Hafid Gafaiti et al. (eds), *Transnational Spaces and Identities in the Francophone World* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 95–8.
- 48 François-Xavier Hautreux, *La guerre d'Algérie des harkis, 1954–1962* (Paris: Perrin, 2013), 367–8; Shepard, 'Excluding the Harkis', 103.
- 49 Shepard, 'Excluding the Harkis', 101.
- 50 Hautreux, *La guerre d'Algérie*, 329.
- 51 Peyrefitte, *C'était de Gaulle*, 263. See also Hautreux, *La guerre d'Algérie*, 306–22; Chantal Morelle, 'Les pouvoirs publics français et le rapatriement des harkis en 1961–1962', *Vingtième siècle*, 83, 3 (2004), 113–9.
- 52 Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*, 233.
- 53 Ibid., 232.
- 54 Hautreux, *La guerre d'Algérie*, 321–2.
- 55 Shepard, 'Excluding the Harkis', 106.

- 56 The largest disembarkations were in 1962. After this point there was a steady stream of arrivals, including spikes in 1965 and 1968 when many *harkis* taken prisoner by the FLN were released. Cohen, 'The Harkis', 169; Hautreux, *La guerre d'Algérie*, 340–5.
- 57 Peyrefitte, *C'était de Gaulle*, 187; Hautreux, *La guerre d'Algérie*, 377.
- 58 Maurice Faivre, *L'Action sociale de l'armée en faveur des musulmans, 1830–1996* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2007), 136.
- 59 Abderahmen Moumen, 'Camp de Rivesaltes, Camp Saint-Maurice-l'Ardoise: l'accueil et le reclassement des harkis en France', *Les Temps modernes*, 666 (November–December 2011), 107.
- 60 Miller, 'A Camp for Foreigners and "Aliens"', 30.
- 61 Dalila Kerchouche, *Mon père, ce harki* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2003), 56.
- 62 Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, 'Harkis: le paradoxe identitaire', *Regards sur l'actualité*, 175 (November 1991), 36.
- 63 Miller, 'A Camp for Foreigners and "Aliens"', 37.
- 64 Kerchouche, *Mon père*, 15.
- 65 Among the rapidly growing body of literature on this topic, see Stéphanie Abrial, *Les enfants de harkis de la révolte à l'intégration* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001); Claire Eldridge, "'We've never had a voice'. Memory Construction and the Children of the Harkis, 1962–1991', *French History*, 23, 1 (2009), 88–107; Régis Pierret, *Les filles et fils de Harkis: entre double rejet et triple appartenance* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2008); Vincent Crapanzano, *The Harkis: The Wound that Never Heals* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).
- 66 Miller, 'A Camp for Foreigners and "Aliens"', 27.
- 67 Stephen C. Lubkemann, 'Unsettling the Metropole: Race and Settler Reincorporation in Postcolonial Portugal', in Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen (eds), *Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century: Projects, Practices, Legacies* (London: Routledge, 2005), 259.
- 68 Underlining the importance of context, the serious economic crisis of the mid-1970s and political turbulence in the wake of Salazar's overthrow meant that Portuguese *retornados* were afforded only minimal state support, leaving them heavily reliant on their own family and kinship networks. *Ibid.*, 259.
- 69 *Ibid.*, 268.
- 70 For further discussion of this, see Matthew Connolly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Mathilde von Bülow, *West Germany, Cold War Europe and the Algerian War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Yahia Zoubir, 'U.S. and Soviet Policies towards France's Struggle with Anticolonial Nationalism in North Africa', *Canadian Journal of History*, 30, 3 (1995), 439–66.
- 71 Andrea L. Smith (ed.), *Europe's Invisible Migrants* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2003).