Reinisch, Jessica, and Matthew Frank. "'The Story Stays the Same'? Refugees in Europe from the 'Forty Years' Crisis' to the Present." *Refugees in Europe, 1919–1959: A Forty Years' Crisis?*. By Matthew Frank and Jessica Reinisch. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017. 1–20. *Bloomsbury Collections*. Web. 26 Apr. 2023. <<http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781474295734.0005>>.

Downloaded from Bloomsbury Collections, www.bloomsburycollections.com, 26 April 2023, 12:58 UTC.

Copyright © Matthew Frank, Jessica Reinisch and Contributors 2017. Released under a CC BY-NC-ND licence (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/>). You may share this work for non-commercial purposes only, provided you give attribution to the copyright holder and the publisher, and provide a link to the Creative Commons licence.

‘The Story Stays the Same’? Refugees in Europe from the ‘Forty Years’ Crisis’ to the Present

Jessica Reinisch and Matthew Frank

In the time it has taken us to put this book together, refugees have forced themselves back into European consciousness. In the last three years, barely a day has gone by without our screens and newspapers being filled with pictures of refugees and migrants seeking sanctuary in Europe, and with the accompanying talk of ‘crisis’. The largest numbers of refugees are coming from Syria. Estimates from summer 2016 suggest that to date at least 11 million Syrians have left their homes since the beginning of the civil war in March 2011. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the international refugee agency, has registered 4.8 million Syrian refugees, while another 6.6 million are internally displaced within the country. The vast majority of those who left Syria sought refuge in neighbouring countries. Turkey has taken in 2.5 million; tiny Lebanon 1.1 million. Just over one million Syrians have to date applied for asylum in Europe.¹ They are joined by people leaving Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan, among other places. Though still only a fraction of the record estimate of currently over 65.3 million displaced people globally,² the growing number of arrivals at European borders has put refugees and migrants back on the political agenda.³

European governments on the whole have responded slowly and warily. Far-right protest parties standing on anti-immigration platforms have significantly increased their share of the votes across the continent since 2014. A series of EU conferences on ‘burden sharing’ have come and gone, largely without any noteworthy results. However, these intergovernmental discussions and the wider public debate on refugees revealed deep divisions between and within European countries about how to respond to the ‘migrant crisis’, the political consequences of which have been profound and are ongoing. While we were putting the final touches to the manuscript, yet another diplomatic conference came to an end, and with it yet another attempt to put the ‘solution’ of current refugee crises on the political agenda. On 19 September 2016, the UN General Assembly and the outgoing UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon hosted a high-level Summit for Refugees and Migrants at the UN Headquarters in New York.⁴ The following day, the outgoing

US president Barack Obama convened a Leaders' Summit on Refugees, which focused on specific international pledges on and commitments to refugees.⁵ The meetings began to fade into historical oblivion even before the assembled guests had left New York. The summits failed to generate any clear or binding commitments; they merely launched two years of further negotiations. Accompanying publicity stunts, like the display in London's Parliament Square of 2,500 life jackets worn by those who had attempted to cross the seas to Europe, were quickly forgotten.

Forgettable, too, was the accompanying hype about 'watershed moments'. Ban Ki-moon reportedly hailed the meeting as 'historic' and a 'breakthrough'.⁶ The summit was a 'unique opportunity for creating a more responsible, predictable system for responding to large movements of refugees and migrants', gushed the New York-based *International Business Times*.⁷ UNHCR press releases were just as upbeat. In the run-up to the meetings, a UNHCR spokesperson declared that there was 'huge momentum towards trying to make the 19th of September a really meaningful summit that will be a game changer for refugee protection and for migrants who are on the move'. Concretely, the summit was on target 'to adopt key commitments to enhance protection'.⁸ On the day, Volker Türk, UNHCR's Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, thought the talks were 'the beginning of an exciting process' and had helpfully produced 'a response framework that consolidates the nuts and bolts of what is needed if a country is faced with a large-scale [refugee] situation'.⁹ After a month of reflection, Türk added that 'at a time when borders are being fortified to keep refugees out and when refugees are accused wrongly of being terrorists, it is nothing short of a miracle that the United Nations unanimously adopted the New York Declaration which affirms and strengthens the protection of refugees'. Facing criticism over the absence of concrete commitments and boldness, Türk argued that 'in the real and imperfect world in which we struggle to advance the rights of refugees', the declaration provided 'a strong endorsement of the basic principles of refugee protection' and offered 'the possibility for further progress in the coming two years'.¹⁰ 'We're not disappointed in any way,' agreed Leonard Doyle, chief spokesman of the International Organization for Migration (IOM).¹¹

By contrast, plenty of NGOs and refugee activists were highly critical of the lack of any concrete agreements or outcomes of the New York summits. David Miliband, president of the International Rescue Committee, noted that 'any refugee reading the conclusions of Monday's summit is bound to say "what is going to change?" and the answer they would have to be given is "very little"'.¹² Salil Shetty, Amnesty International's secretary general, thought that 'we already know the U.N. summit is doomed to abject failure', and 'the Obama summit looks unlikely to pick up the pieces'.¹³ Amnesty's Advisor on Refugee and Migrants' Rights, Charlotte Philips, was just as scathing. 'Faced with the worst refugee crisis in seventy years,' she declared, 'world leaders have failed to bear the weight of responsibility.' They had 'delayed any chance of a deal until 2018, procrastinating over crucial decisions even as refugees drown at sea and languish in camps with no hopes for the future'.¹⁴ Perhaps the only memorable moment of the summit concerned the public announcement that the celebrity couple Angelina Jolie (who is a UNHCR 'Special Envoy') and Brad Pitt had split up, which overshadowed the meeting's final hours and aftermath.

If nothing else, the summits in New York remind us just how strangely cyclical and ahistorical the debate about refugees in Europe has become, where, on the surface at least, nothing ever seems to change. We are by now familiar with timeless images of bedraggled men, women and children, carrying a few bags of possessions, cramming into whatever transport is available, tired, hungry and sick from the disasters they left behind and the long journeys they endured, sleeping rough on the way, herded into reception centres or camps, receiving blankets or food from a handful of volunteers, and causing fear and panic wherever they arrive. Just as commonplace is the accompanying imagery of statesmen and stateswomen in suits, watched over by the world's media as they sign non-binding gestures of goodwill. It is no coincidence that matters of international refugee policy are usually championed, as they were at the two New York summits, by lame duck politicians, who have little political capital to lose and a last wish to make inroads on an entrenched humanitarian problem they have failed to confront during their tenure of office.

Just as familiar is the polarized, binary nature of public debate about migration and potential solutions to refugee crises. Recent arguments advanced by the north-western European governments against taking in more refugees and migrants do not sound substantially different from those put forward by their predecessors seventy or eighty years ago, nor do those of their opponents. It is a long-established dance, and everyone knows the moves. While one side talks about the dangers of 'uncontrolled migration' and the primacy of national interests,¹⁵ the other points to moral duties and humanitarian responsibilities, and condemns responses that are 'too slow, too low and too narrow'.¹⁶ While one side paints pictures of anonymous masses breaking through European borders,¹⁷ the other makes reference to the plight of innocent victims – such as Omran Daqneesh, the young Syrian boy injured in an airstrike on Aleppo on 17 August 2016, who became known as 'the boy in the ambulance';¹⁸ or Alan Kurdi, the three-year-old Syrian boy of Kurdish descent who washed up dead on a Turkish beach in September 2015.¹⁹ While one side tries to narrow and limit the pool of legitimate candidates for inclusion in the category of people on the move who qualify for international protection, the other attempts to broaden it.

The contributors to this book highlight the familiarity of these features in their own case studies drawn from 'the forty years' crisis' of Europe's encounters with refugees during the interwar and immediate post-war decades of the twentieth century. The chapters also identify significant history and assumptions shared by both sides of this polarized debate. Importantly, this common ground goes far beyond shared pat phrases about 'great global challenges' that have to be dealt with 'as an international community' in the form of a 'truly global response to the mass movement of people across the world' – vacuous language that is difficult to take offence at, but that offers nothing.²⁰ Ultimately, both sides often reinforce the distinction between so-called 'legitimate' political refugees and 'illegitimate' economic migrants, even if some rightly point out that the lines between these categories can be blurred in practice. The International Refugee Organization (IRO), founded in 1946, was the first to make explicit reference in its legal statute to 'genuine' and 'bona fide refugees and displaced persons', thereby making clear that there were others who were neither 'genuine' nor 'bona fide'.²¹ The distinction was then enshrined in law by the 1951 Convention Relating

to the Status of Refugees, which remains, along with the 1967 amending Protocol, the fundamental legal document that defines who a refugee is (and is not) and the kind of legal and political protection refugees are entitled to.²² It defined a refugee as a person outside of his or her country of birth because of ‘a well-founded fear of persecution’, to whom the host state is obliged to provide asylum. Persecution as the main pillar of the refugee status was adopted in 1951 by Western states to privilege those migrants who were fleeing communist regimes. That such a specific historical moment as 1951 produced a framework of refugee protection which has long outlived the context of its creation has had important lasting consequences. The most significant legacy concerns its separation of political ‘push’ factors from economic ‘pull’ factors – which have become more blurred since the end of the Cold War than ever before. Every political refugee is seeking a better life, and every economic migrant is fleeing a number of explicit or implicit threats or disasters. Whether any particular country grants them asylum is often more a result of its political priorities than the ‘genuineness’ of the asylum seekers.²³ As a result, UNHCR, the UN agency created as guardian of the 1951 Convention, is a peculiar and desperate kind of anachronism, charged with protecting ‘refugees’ as defined in 1951, in a world where this definition has become impossible to sustain, let alone enforce, in practice. The organization’s lack of institutional or financial autonomy and methods of sanction further add to its predicament.²⁴

It is therefore both significant and deceptive that many people on both sides of today’s debate about refugees and migrants agree that the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol have to stay, in spite of their obsolete priorities and unintended consequences, because without them we would be a lot worse off. Even British prime minister Theresa May, known for her tough stance against immigration, declared at New York that the Convention and Protocol ‘must remain the bedrock of our response’, even if ‘the context in which they must be applied has dramatically changed’.²⁵ To date, although there have been a series of local and national attempts to ‘reinterpret’ or simply disregard key provisions of the Convention and Protocol, there have been surprisingly few calls from countries to free themselves from the shackles and obligations of these treaties altogether.²⁶ Even the United States is, at the point of writing, still formally bound by this legislation, despite the desire of the Trump administration to undermine and disregard it in practice. Perhaps this zero-sum game of refugee policy is one of the most enduring features of modern refugee crises. Although governments perpetually resist the external imposition of obligations for refugees and migrants, they consider it to be even more dangerous to be out of the loop altogether.

2

The striking similarities and familiar iconography of refugee crises throughout time have presented public commentators and historians with a peculiar conundrum, which this book necessarily grapples with: what, if anything, can we learn from previous refugee crises? What can history tell us about current population movements? In recent coverage, commentators have revelled in the apparent timelessness of refugee crises – concerning the plight of refugees as much as the processes that make people

flee their homes and turn them into refugees in the first place. As a result, they see themselves powerless in the face of seemingly unstoppable and ever-repeating history. As a post on Ghost Boat, a blog that investigates the disappearance of 243 migrants on a boat in the Mediterranean Sea in June 2014, put it: 'Everything changes, but nothing changes at all. Refugees and migrants keep searching for an escape, and Europe keeps closing the doors. But underneath it all, the story stays the same.'²⁷

Journalists, politicians and other contemporary observers have also gone in search of historical yardsticks, often in the explicit hope that they can help them to identify, justify and encourage particular kinds of responses in the present. One supposed historical 'precedent' – the so-called Kindertransport (children's transport) – has given comfort and encouragement to those arguing for greater compassion and more generous policies towards refugees arriving in Europe today. The term refers to the rescue efforts which brought around 10,000 mostly Jewish children from central Europe to the UK in late 1938 and 1939.²⁸ In recent British parliamentary debates, these rescue efforts have been regularly evoked as evidence of Britain's 'proud tradition' of support for 'those fleeing persecution and seeking sanctuary',²⁹ often in conjunction with the argument that the UK should take responsibility for more new arrivals. The Kindertransport has also become a 'teachable moment' in the British history curriculum.³⁰

Earlier this year, this 'precedent' was directly invoked in support of a proposal by Labour peer Lord Alfred Dubs, himself a former Kindertransport survivor, to allow unaccompanied child refugees already in Europe to come to Britain. Dubs' Amendment 87 to the Immigration Bill proposed that the UK was to take in 3,000 of them. Although Dubs himself said he did not want to overstate the similarities between his own experiences as a child refugee and those of current unaccompanied children in Europe, he did not shy away from identifying a clear historical precedent for political purposes: 'It was important, politically, to remember that Britain had set a strong humanitarian example in 1938, which undoubtedly saved the lives of many people who would otherwise have ended up in the gas chambers,' he explained in a recent *Guardian* interview.³¹ Other child survivors from the Kindertransport, such as Aryeh Neier, co-founder of monitoring group Human Rights Watch, also lent their name to Dubs' initiative. 'During the Second World War, Britain did more than lead the way,' Neier argued. 'It accepted far more refugees than any other country. The British saw the danger. They saved my life, the life of my sister and the life of my family.'³²

Evoking history here becomes a bargaining tool, an attempt to give moral weight to a contemporary project. As Labour MP Keir Starmer put it, 'Lord Dubs arrived in this country in 1939 as an unaccompanied child under the Kindertransport system, so he speaks with particular authority.'³³ However, the chapters in this book show that a strong moral case alone does not make for good history. The Kindertransport has been cemented as a 'beacon' in British consciousness largely as a result of selective memory; the reality was more complex and far less flattering. The Kindertransport was a rescue operation organized by a number of private, philanthropic and religious organizations, not an official state programme. Under pressure from these groups, Neville Chamberlain's Conservative government temporarily waived immigration visa requirements for a limited number of unaccompanied children from central Europe. The organizations had to fund the operation and find sponsors and homes

for the children themselves; they stopped when their money ran out, and when the outbreak of war made their task impossible. Those children who were granted entry were admitted on the condition that their sponsors would bear all expenses of their accommodation, living and education, and guaranteed their emigration from Britain as soon as they could return to their families. Parents were not allowed to accompany the children. Many of those children later wrote about personal experiences of British anti-Semitism. In 1940, around 1,000 of these children were interned by the British authorities as so-called ‘enemy aliens’.³⁴

As Lyndsey Stonebridge recently argued, ‘We’re on shaky ground indeed if we think we simply need to retrieve a lost humanitarian impulse.’³⁵ As a number of chapters in this book spell out, no European country in a position to offer shelter has reason to be proud of its history of rescue. Countries such as Britain and the United States did much to prevent immigration by turning desperate people away. In 1938, at a conference in the French spa town of Evian, delegations from thirty-two participating nations – Britain among them – failed to come to any agreement about accepting the Jewish refugees fleeing the Third Reich. Delegates were sympathetic to their plight, they said, and urged others to find a long-term solution, but were unwilling to ease their own immigration restrictions. The outbreak of war then made any joint agreement even more unlikely. Throughout this time, most European borders remained tightly shut, and millions of people were turned away, often to certain death. Comparisons of 1938 with today might be justified, but are hardly a cause for celebration; for millions, much worse was to come. Nor was this wishful memory enough to win the argument in 2016, as Lord Dubs’ amendment was initially defeated by a House of Commons vote. Eventually, an amended version was passed, but this no longer specified a number of unaccompanied children to be resettled in the UK, and instead provided for long consultations with local authorities who were to determine the final number. With limited funding available, few councils were keen to start a process of welcoming these children. By September 2016 still no child had arrived in the UK under the scheme.³⁶

The Kindertransport is only one of the several popular ‘feel good’ historical precedents for the current migrants and refugee crisis. In recent years, commentators and refugee activists have identified and utilized other examples of past refugees receiving warm welcomes in the UK or other Western countries, such as the refugees leaving Hungary in the wake of the uprising of 1956; those fleeing the war in Vietnam in the course of the 1970s; the Ugandan Asians leaving after the Ugandan president Idi Amin expelled all Asians from the country in 1972; and the Bosnian refugees escaping the civil war following the breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. The numbers of refugees taken in by various host countries, and the contexts in which their resettlements were agreed, varied widely in each of those cases, as did the strength of claims for a successful and emulatable ‘precedent’. Stripping historical yardsticks of their context renders them misleading and ultimately meaningless.

In recent months, notably less upbeat historical precedents have gained currency, as examples from history are increasingly paraded not as an inspiration but as a cautionary tale. Comparisons with the 1930s abound and reflect the general gloom of 2016 – the year that saw a failed coup in Turkey, a worsening war in Syria, a British referendum vote to exit the European Union, the election of the anti-establishment, anti-liberal

Donald Trump as president of the United States, and accompanying economic turmoil. 'We think that the current macroeconomic environment has a number of significant similarities with the 1930s,' a *Bloomberg* piece maintained in June 2016, 'and the experiences then are particularly relevant for today.'³⁷ A *Forbes* contributor agreed that there were a number of 'scary similarities between now and the 1930s,' particularly as far as economic and geopolitical factors were concerned.³⁸ An even bleaker reference to history was made by the president of the European Council and former Polish prime minister, Donald Tusk, in a speech at the European Policy Centre in August. Tusk referred to the 1930s as a great warning to liberals in the present about the spread of the 'anti-liberal virus' and the impending 'disintegration of Europe, in a liberal and ideological sense.' 'We remember from the past,' Tusk went on,

that in the most dramatic moment of our history, in the 1930s, the advocates of a liberal order gave up virtually without a fight, even though they had all the cards in their hands. Ordinary people turned their backs on them, seeing how weak and hesitant they were. People didn't turn away from freedom because they were fed up with it. No, they simply lost faith that the freedom camp was able to put a stop to evil, however they understood it. They no longer believed that the moderate centre was a guarantee of security. And I am sure you remember who took their place.³⁹

Refugees are playing a central role in these comparisons with the 1930s. For example, in October the *Washington Post* declared that Russian president Vladimir Putin was 'bringing back the 1930s,' and the migrant crisis was a crucial part of this. Europe has been 'politically destabilized and socially convulsed by the arrival of a million Syrian migrants seeking asylum,' the argument went, with the consequence of 'undermining the West's confident sense of itself,' and thereby directly playing into Putin's hand. As a result, it concluded, in 'many worrisome ways, the 1930s are being reprised. In Europe, Russia is playing the role of Germany in fomenting anti-democratic factions. In inward-turning, distracted America, the role of Charles Lindbergh is played by a presidential candidate smitten by Putin and too ignorant to know the pedigree of his slogan "America First".'⁴⁰ In another *Washington Post* article, Ishaan Tharoor juxtaposed British tabloid coverage of the flight of tens of thousands of stateless people and Jews in the 1930s with more recent discussions about the influx of Muslim refugees. 'It's important to recognize that this is hardly the first time the West has warily eyed masses of refugees,' Tharoor explained. 'The xenophobia of the present carries direct echoes of a very different moment: The years before World War II, when tens of thousands of German Jews were compelled to flee Nazi Germany.'⁴¹ Daniel Victor in the *New York Times* identified similar historical parallels, and concluded that although the groups of today's Syrians and the Jews of the 1930s were not identical, there was a clear 'moral connection' and crucial 'lessons to be drawn.'⁴²

So it is clear that commentators regularly invoke history to explain current developments. They also frequently look to historians to provide answers and make explicit links between past and present, and the migrant crisis is no exception. During our preparations in 2012 for a special issue on 'Refugees and the Nation-State in Europe,' we were asked whether it was 'possible for historians to suffer from refugee fatigue'⁴³ – notably, that question has not come up again since. But what do historians have to offer

in the current search for historical yardsticks that can explain the present? History matters; that seems a truism. And indeed, a number of the historical comparisons currently circulating seem very apt: the 1930s was the last time that globalization was in retreat, and refugee crises were an important part of those developments, as they are now. However, the process of using history to explain what is going on today is a complicated and often very unsatisfactory one; it is a road full of potholes and diversions. Examples from history can suggest alternatives (both better and worse) to the status quo. But every historical precedent has a particular context, without which it becomes ambiguous and inaccurate. Historians have to identify both the particular and the ways in which the particular can be transcended. As Jane Caplan has argued in a blog post about the election of Donald Trump:

Anyone who studies modern history always has at least one corner of one eye trained on the present; and there are moments when the encounter between present and past suddenly forces itself to the centre of our field of vision. The moment of Trump is one of these. But this eruption does not mean simply that we should paste bits of the past onto the present and see if they fit. The point is how the history we already know can be used to make sense of the present.⁴⁴

The migrant crisis and unravelling of familiar national and international structures is all around us. Nonetheless, the contributors in this book deliberately shy away from a facile reading of the present into the past, and instead set out to identify and understand broader patterns and dynamics of the refugee crises of the early and mid-twentieth century. Some of those patterns and dynamics will undoubtedly be useful for understanding our present world.

3

History matters, perhaps, but do academic historians? Traditionally, historians have made only a scant contribution to the wider field of refugee and forced migration studies that emerged in the 1980s. Historians of Europe have been particularly absent. Reasons include the fact that the main sites of displacement and reception have for some time now been outside of Europe. There has also been an overwhelming presentism within the field of refugee studies, which tends to focus on current policy and practice at the expense of understanding past migrations. These factors help explain why, despite its origins in Europe and the centrality of the continent to the early history of refugees, the labels ‘Europe(an)’ and ‘refugees’ had largely become uncoupled by the 1980s. But they also point to the reasons why academic historians have not played a more prominent role in narrating the bigger picture of how and why refugees become a matter of international politics over the course of the twentieth century – of how, in other words, we got to where we are now. Tellingly, in a 2007 overview of sixty years of scholarship that led to the emergence of the field of refugee studies, only a handful of historians were included among the dozens of scholars surveyed.⁴⁵ Until quite recently, the flagship academic journals in refugee studies – a diverse field that traverses

international relations, political science, law, sociology and anthropology, as well as other disciplines – contained very few articles on 'historical issues', and almost none by historians.⁴⁶ Efforts to remedy the liminal role of historians in the field of refugee studies often seem half-hearted and ineffective, and those appealing for the inclusion of more history sometimes are guilty of the same sins of omission that they level at others.⁴⁷ The 2014 *Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies* includes a chapter by a historian who makes a convincing case for 'meaningful engagement' between historians and the 'wider refugee and forced migration studies community' – who, he says, need to 'start taking history seriously'.⁴⁸ But the fact that it is one of only two contributions from historians in a collected work of over fifty scholars goes to show how much distance there is still to cover to make this 'ahistorical field' less 'averse to history'.⁴⁹

From the other side of the disciplinary divide, the impression given by historians is that they have mostly ignored refugee movements and failed to integrate them into 'mainstream history', in contrast to other previously marginalized groups.⁵⁰ But if you knew where to look, you could always find historians writing about refugees in some contexts. More often than not, this work is positioned within and speaks to nation-state-bounded historiographies. For example, the work undertaken since the 1980s by historians of Germany on the impact of migration on German history and the integration of successive waves of refugees in the post-war decades is extensive.⁵¹ Other national historiographies have similarly shed light on the roles played by refugees and refugee crises during key chapters of national history.⁵² In fact, historians of Europe have long been writing about refugees, refugee crises and related displacements, even before the fractures created by the end of the Cold War reawakened scholarly and popular interest in the 'dark side' of the nation-state and democracy in Europe.

Even if this literature undeniably existed before 1989 and 1991, the events of the late 1990s and beyond did much to revive historians' interest in population movements more generally and on a broader scale. In the search for continuity and antecedents for the violence and displacement following the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and the return of hyper-nationalism and the clamour for statehood, historians frequently returned to the years before the Cold War froze borders, ethnicities and national identities, and found a (distorted) mirror image in the 1940s. As scholarly research on the 1940s blossomed in the last decade of the twentieth century and the first of the twenty first, so, too, did research and publications on the vast displacement of population that accompanied the end of the Second World War. A particular focus of many of these studies was the so-called Displaced Persons (DP) problem in Europe and the interaction of national and international initiatives to protect and 'rehabilitate' these populations, whose numbers ran into several millions.

Our own interests originally came from a similar source. As historians of mid-twentieth-century Europe who were both working on projects on the immediate aftermath of the Second World War in central Europe – the epicentre of mid-century displacement and the DP crisis – we were both struck at the time, now almost a decade ago, on the one hand, by the growing body of research on displacement, particularly on the lives and post-1945 experiences of some groups of DPs, and, on the other, by the lack of a common framework for understanding the phenomenon

of mass displacement in twentieth-century Europe. Much of this work was original and exciting, tapping into new archival material, not only from the former Eastern bloc but also from international institutions whose archives had been underutilized or had had restricted access. But in spite of growing academic interest in both world wars and post-war periods, there was still no consistent historiography that placed the many different kinds of refugees, migrants and uprooted people within a common framework, or situated the often conflicting national and international priorities in the management of the refugee threat within their wider historical context; it was mostly episodic or nationally bounded or concerned with a specific group of displaced people or sites of displacement. The last attempt at a grand narrative – Michael Marrus's influential *The Unwanted* – was by this point, in 2009, over two decades old. Although it remained (and remains) an important entry point to many themes central to the study of refugees in twentieth-century Europe – and perhaps more importantly a highly accessible and readable one – its focus rested primarily with the experience of Jewish refugees in the 1930s and 1940s.⁵³ The last major academic conference of historians on refugees, and the essay collection emerging from one, also dated back to the mid-1980s.⁵⁴ We felt that an international symposium that brought together the latest research on attempts to manage the many different refugee groups in twentieth-century Europe, with particular reference to the initiatives and work conducted by the United Nations, its precursor organizations and other international bodies, was long overdue.

The resulting conference in London in September 2010 coincided with the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations' first-ever 'World Refugee Year' (WRY) of 1959–60, an initiative designed to raise funds for the cash-strapped UNHCR and heighten awareness of international efforts in support of refugees.⁵⁵ We considered WRY to be a fitting marker from which to survey the turbulent and crucial middle decades of Europe's twentieth century, which had seen many millions of people on the move. As well as having the aim of drawing a line under the post-war European refugee problem by resettling the remaining core of the wartime displaced still languishing in refugee camps, WRY also signalled that refugees were no longer strictly a European problem, nor a temporary one that could be dealt with by various piecemeal, largely technical and ad hoc, solutions. In reassessing the development of national, and increasingly international, responses to the problem of refugees, and examining the parameters, consequences and implications of policies, from the First World War until the late 1950s, the conference examined the role that European refugee crises played in the creation of the new international architecture after 1919 and the following four decades. Much of the debate centred on the question of when, why and how focus shifted from the identification of an apparently European refugee problem to a global one during what we termed the 'forty years' crisis'.

Since that conference took place, there has been a steady growth of research and publications on the history of refugees from multiple perspectives, a number of which were first tested out as works-in-progress at the London conference. Refugee-related articles have begun to appear with greater frequency in Anglophone general history journals,⁵⁶ as well as in refugee studies publications.⁵⁷ Recent interest from publishers and journals suggests that the ongoing 'migrant crisis' in Europe will act as a spur to

further academic inquiry into the origins, course and significance of refugee crises past and present, in the same way that the Kosovo crisis in the late 1990s revived interest in earlier cases.⁵⁸ But although it is certainly easier today to make the case that the history of refugees matters, the fragmentation of the causes, experiences and consequences of migration and displacement still limits our understanding of why and how it does.⁵⁹

This is where we hope this book will make a positive contribution. By presenting research on a range of different contexts of refugee policy and groups of refugees in one book, we hope to shed light on the common assumptions and frameworks that underpinned the history of refugees and refugee policy throughout the period under consideration. In commissioning the case studies for this book, we decided to retain the idea of a 'forty years' crisis' as a tool for conceptualizing the succession of refugee crises of European origin during the tumultuous half century of military and diplomatic conflict from the end of the First World War to the late 1950s. Our debt here obviously is to E. H. Carr's *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, first published in 1939. We have borrowed his central conceit as a way of presenting the two post-war eras as a single 'crisis' of the established order, and through it to explore the continuities and disjunctures across the period, and to challenge established historiographical certainties and master narratives.⁶⁰ Although Carr in his writings did not concern himself with the 'refugee problem', as it was then becoming known, his abiding interest in the nation-state and the difficulty of maintaining an international equilibrium in a system of proliferating and competing nation-states is a fitting one for the study of the international history of refugees.⁶¹ As the authors in this book make abundantly clear, the rise of the nation-state is central to understanding the creation of refugees as an international problem from the early twentieth century onwards. Indeed, Carr understood acutely what the Versailles order meant for the nationalities of central and eastern Europe, many of whom would become minorities in the new state system, and thereby refugees-in-waiting. As a member of the British delegation at what he later called the 'fiasco' of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, he had been partly responsible for shaping the legal mechanisms to safeguard threatened populations in the new 'immature' states of east-central Europe – the so-called 'Minorities Treaties', which first Poland, and then thirteen other states, were obliged to sign as a condition of international acceptance of statehood and/or territorial expansion.⁶² As we know from the discussions at Paris in 1919, it was largely a fear that these new minorities would become refugees that led to the massive expansion of international minority rights, and the minorities rights regime became one of the principal preventative mechanisms for managing the refugee problem internationally for at least the first decade and a half afterwards.⁶³ That this innovation failed, as had the other 'utopian' innovations of Paris, served in the eyes of Carr as proof of the bankruptcy and short-sightedness of the liberal order, in this as in so many other areas, and further convinced him of the fallacy of the principle of national self-determination in contemporary Europe.⁶⁴ As he wrote in his short 1945 study *Nationalism and After*, the vast displacement of populations accompanying the tracing of European frontiers was 'the most explicit exaltation of the nation over the individual as an end in itself, the mass sacrifice of human beings to the idol of nationalism.'⁶⁵

We are by no means unique in employing Carr's device of a single 'crisis' in order to impose a periodization on a set of related international developments.⁶⁶ Nor are we blind to the limitations of such an approach. We had always considered the idea of a 'forty years' crisis' as a useful tool for opening up discussion about periodization and causation, and it is for this reason that we have asked the contributors to this book to reflect on the utility and limitations of this frame for understanding the development of national and international responses to refugees in the twentieth century. As Zara Steiner, one of the leading practitioners of diplomatic and international history of the last fifty years, argues in her chapter, the idea of a 'forty years' crisis' certainly has its merits, but it also imposes a somewhat counter-intuitive periodization on the first half of the twentieth century. Steiner instead offers an alternative chronology that reaches back to the late nineteenth century and the pogroms in Russia, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and mass immigration to the New World. The 'refugee problem' formed not so much an overarching crisis as a succession of distinct crises, each shaped by their own dynamic. It is, in Steiner's view, a history that is as cyclical as it is linear. 'There is no Whig history of the refugee problem,' she argues, as much as current writers and consumers of 'feel good' refugee history are trying to argue otherwise.

Other contributors to this book have also tested the temporal and geographical parameters we have laid out. Jared Manasek's chapter looks to the mid-nineteenth-century displacements in the Ottoman Empire for origins of twentieth-century patterns and helpfully cautions that 'no single line of historical development can be drawn between the imperial and post-imperial refugee'. Glen Peterson, meanwhile, warns of the limitations of studying the 'forty years' crisis' solely from a European perspective and offers instead an 'alternative history of the international refugee regime' that foregrounds the colonial origins of international law and the global history of population displacement. Seen from the perspective of the United States, the very idea of a 'forty years' crisis,' Carl Bon Tempo argues persuasively, is a 'misnomer', given that American isolationism and restrictive immigration policy 'put ... [it] on the side-lines' for the first two decades.

What, then, for the purposes of discussion, was the 'crisis'? It was above all a crisis of a European-dominated international order of nation-states, in the face of successive refugee crises, which were both the direct consequence of that system and a challenge to it to deal with populations that were 'forced ... into the gaps between nation-states', as one scholar has elsewhere put it.⁶⁷ The nature of refugee crises, and national and international responses to them, changed fundamentally in the period between the end of the First World War, which inaugurated a series of new international structures and policies, and the late 1950s when Europe's home-grown refugee problems were supposedly 'solved'. By 1960, focus had shifted from the identification of an apparently European refugee problem to a global one. The authors identify a series of key events and tipping points in this narrative, such as the appointment of Fridtjof Nansen as head of the first international refugee agency in 1921, as well as his death in 1930; the 1933 Refugee Convention; James McDonald's widely publicized resignation as High Commissioner for Refugees Coming from Germany in 1935; the Evian conference of 1938; the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939; a number of the wartime meetings of the wartime

Allies, such as the Bermuda Conference in 1943; the 1951 Refugee Convention; or World Refugee Year itself in 1959–60.

The continuities of the parameters of national and international refugee policies, and the basic pillars and assumptions upon which they rested, are striking. What Peter Gatrell in his chapter calls the 'threads' that connect countries, ideas and personnel run through the seemingly disparate and ad hoc responses to successive mid-century refugee crises. While global in its reach and responsibilities, the institutions and practices of the international refugee regime nevertheless remained predominantly European in origin. Gatrell and Tony Kushner both identify long-standing assumptions that underpinned the period, such as that refugees were invariably a threat and nuisance to their hosts and had limited rights that could be dispensed with, if necessary. Or as Manasek points out, already in the mid-nineteenth century it was clear to French lawmakers that 'refugees were people whose presence came at a cost to the host'. Occasionally, the chapters offer glimpses into another world, for example the Ottoman government's hope that incoming refugees could help to strengthen border security and agricultural industry (Manasek), or the realization by a number of governments in 1945 that refugees could be of significant economic benefit (Reinisch), as they had been in Greece in the 1920s (Frank). However, here, too, not all refugees were equal. While governments could see the usefulness of young, healthy and white refugees, few of them wanted those of other skin colours, let alone those who were old or sick, who soon made up that immovable 'hard core' that, eventually, campaigns such as WRY attempted to dislodge.

As the chapters in this book show, the story of the 'forty years' crisis' can be told in very different ways: as one of upheaval, disintegration and suffering, or as one of newly emerging national and international solutions and possibilities; as a 'top-down' history of nations, institutions and policies (Metzger on interwar rights; Frank on group resettlement; Reinisch on UNRRA), or as a 'bottom-up' history of refugees, relief workers and refugee advocates (Kushner on refugee history); as a story of a specific population groups (Levene on Jews) or of states and their increasing involvement and entanglement with developments in Europe (Bon Tempo on the United States); or of who was not a refugee, as much as who was (Eldridge on France and Algeria). This book's principal aim is to put these different perspectives into the same frame and encourage the identification of linkages. At its core for the period under study, it remains, however, a story centred on and defined by Europe and the experience of European states and populations. 'Quite simply', as Bon Tempo writes in his chapter, 'there would not have been an American refugee regime without the European refugee problems of the mid-twentieth century'. The 'forty years' crisis' provides further evidence, then, of how 'European history was written into the world' and onto the international institutions that helped construct and maintain the idea of an interconnected world in a post-European age.⁶⁸

21 November 2016

Jessica Reinisch and Matthew Frank

Notes

- 1 UNHCR stated that 1,151,865 Syrian asylum applications were filed in Europe between April 2011 and August 2016. <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php> [last visited 19 September 2016]. Other figures listed on <http://www.unocha.org/syria> [last visited 19 September 2016].
- 2 UNHCR reported on 20 June 2016 that wars and persecution had driven more people from their homes than at any time since UNHCR records began: <http://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/latest/2016/6/5763b65a4/global-forced-displacement-hits-record-high.html> [last visited 19 September 2016]. The report, *Global Trends – Forced Displacement in 2015*, listed 65.3 million people forcibly displaced worldwide, of whom 21.3 million were registered as ‘refugees’, a further 3.2 million were still in the process of seeking asylum (and therefore not yet legally recognized as ‘refugees’) and 40.8 million were displaced within their own countries.
- 3 Frontex, the European border and coast guard agency, reported on 3 October 2016 that the illegal border-crossings between border crossing points in the last quarter of 2015 reached 978,300, the highest level on record: <http://frontex.europa.eu/news/fran-quarterly-number-of-illegal-border-crossings-at-record-high-in-q4-trfbnB> [last visited 5 October 2016].
- 4 For details of the UN General Assembly Summit, see the UN website, <http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/summit> [last visited 22 September 2016].
- 5 For details of Obama’s Leaders’ Summit on Refugees see the US State Department’s website, <http://www.state.gov/p/io/c71574.htm> [last visited 19 September 2016].
- 6 ‘World Leaders at UN Approve Plan for Refugee Crisis,’ *New York Times*, 19 September 2016: http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2016/09/19/world/ap-un-united-nations-refugee-summit.html?_r=0 [last visited 22 September 2016].
- 7 Elsa Buchanan, ‘Drowned teen girl’s body bag a visceral reminder of lives lost ahead of UN Refugee Summit,’ *International Business Times*, 19 September 2016, <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/drowned-teen-girls-body-bag-visceral-reminder-lives-lost-ahead-un-refugee-summit-1582068> [last visited 22 September 2016].
- 8 UNHCR briefing quoting Melissa Fleming, UNHCR spokesperson, 6 September 2016, <http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2016/9/57ceb07e4/un-summit-milestone-refugee-migrant-protection.html> [last visited 22 September 2016].
- 9 Julian Borger and Patrick Kingsley, ‘Swift Response to refugee crisis rests on Obama summit after UN talks fail,’ *Guardian*, 19 September 2016: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/18/refugee-crisis-rests-on-obama-summit-un-talks-fail> [last visited 19 September 2016].
- 10 Volker Türk, Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, ‘The New York Declaration: Once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to enhance refugee protection,’ 12 October 2016: <http://www.unhcr.org/admin/dipstatements/57fe577b4/new-york-declaration-once-lifetime-opportunity-enhance-refugee-protection.html> [last visited 14 October 2016].
- 11 Julian Borger and Patrick Kingsley, ‘Swift Response to refugee crisis rests on Obama summit after UN talks fail,’ *Guardian*, 19 September 2016: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/18/refugee-crisis-rests-on-obama-summit-un-talks-fail> [last visited 19 September 2016].
- 12 David Miliband quoted in *ibid*.
- 13 CBN News, 19 September 2016, <http://www1.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2016/sepember/first-ever-un-summit-on-refugees-takes-place-in-new-york> [last visited 19 September 2016].

- 14 Amnesty International, 'UN Refugee Summit talks end in abject failure', 3 August 2016 [*sic*, piece gives account of 19 September 2016 summit], <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/08/un-refugee-summit-talks-end-in-abject-failure/> [last visited 22 September 2016].
- 15 BBC news quoting Theresa May's speech at UN Summit, 19 September 2016: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-37405598> [last visited 22 September 2016].
- 16 As proclaimed by former archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams, for example, quoted by Paul Waugh, *The Huffington Post*, 19 September 2016: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2016/09/19/the-waugh-zone-september-_26_n_12080354.html [last visited 22 September 2016].
- 17 A notorious example is the poster, entitled 'Breaking Point: the EU has failed us all', released by the UK Independence Party in June 2016 in advance of the UK's referendum on EU membership. It received wide media coverage, for example, see Media Mole in the *New Statesman* on 16 June 2016: <http://www.newstatesman.com/2016/06/nigel Farage-s-anti-eu-poster-depicting-migrants-resembles-nazi-propaganda> [last visited 19 September 2016]; Oliver Wright's commentary in the *Independent* on 19 June 2016: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-referendum-poster-nigel-farage-polls-michael-gove-a7089946.html> [last visited 19 September 2016]; Ben Riley-Smith's commentary in the *Daily Telegraph*, 19 June 2016: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/19/eu-referendum-campaigning-resumes-as-jeremy-corbryn-and-michael-g2/> [last visited 19 September 2016].
- 18 See for example Elle Hunt, 'Boy in the ambulance: shocking image emerges of Syrian child pulled from Aleppo rubble', *Guardian*, 18 August 2016: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/18/boy-in-the-ambulance-image-emerges-syrian-child-aleppo-rubble> [last visited 22 September 2016].
- 19 See for example Joel Gunter, 'Alan Kurdi death: A Syrian Kurdish family forced to flee', BBC news, 4 September 2015: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34141716> [last visited 22 September 2016].
- 20 Theresa May's speech to the UN General Assembly, 20 September 2016: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/theresa-mays-speech-to-the-un-general-assembly> [last visited 22 September 2016].
- 21 Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, adopted by the United Nations at Flushing Meadow on 15 December 1946, entry into force on 20 August 1948. Text reproduced in UNHCR, *Collection of International Instruments and Legal Texts Concerning Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHRC*, I: *International Instruments* (Geneva: UNHCR, 2007), 53–65: <http://www.unhcr.org/455c71de2.pdf> [last visited 1 November 2016]. See also Jessica Reinisch's chapter in this book.
- 22 Full text of both Convention and Protocol can be found here: <http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf> [last visited 14 October 2016].
- 23 This passage borrows from Jessica Reinisch, '“Forever temporary”: Migrants in Calais, Then and Now', *Political Quarterly*, 86, 4 (2015), 515–22.
- 24 For a historical perspective on UNHCR, its 'unpromising beginning' and its subsequent struggle to find a global role, see Gil Loescher, *The UNHCR and World Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
- 25 Theresa May's speech to the UN General Assembly, 20 September 2016: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/theresa-mays-speech-to-the-un-general-assembly> [last visited 22 September 2016].
- 26 See states party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, as of April 2015: <http://www.unhcr.org/uk/protection/basic/>

- 3b73b0d63/states-parties-1951-convention-its-1967-protocol.html [last visited 1 October 2016].
- 27 Ghost Boat, 22 June 2016: <https://medium.com/ghostboat/everything-changes-but-nothing-changes-at-all-b52f7c9f36b#.73z187c65> [last visited 10 November 2016]. The Missing Migrants Project (an initiative of the International Organization for Migration, IOM) estimates that 11,327 migrants had died in the Mediterranean en route to Europe from 2014 to mid-November 2016: <https://missingmigrants.iom.int/> [last visited 16 November 2016].
 - 28 The following passage draws on Jessica Reinisch's 'History matters ... but which one? Every refugee crisis has a context', first published on as a History & Policy paper on 29 September 2015: <http://www.historyandpolicy.org/policy-papers/papers/history-matters-but-which-one-every-refugee-crisis-has-a-context> [last visited 15 November 2016].
 - 29 Yvette Cooper, Home Affairs and Justice debate on 28 May 2015: <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2015-05-28/debates/15052828000003/HomeAffairsAndJustice?highlight=Kindertransport#contribution-15052828000320>. Similar references to the Kindertransport were made on 4 and 9 May 2016, 25 April 2016, 21 March 2016, 9 and 10 February 2016, 5, 21, 25 and 27 January 2016, 8 and 22 December 2015, 6–9 September 2015, 22 July 2015, 3, 24 and 29 June 2015, 24 June 2015; see <https://hansard.parliament.uk/> [last visited 15 October 2016].
 - 30 See for example the National Archives' teaching sources on the Kindertransport and links to the curriculum, <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resources/kindertransport/#teachers-notes> [last visited 1 November 2016].
 - 31 Amelia Gentleman, 'It is a disgrace to Europe': former child refugee Lord Dubs on the Calais camp', *Guardian*, 5 September 2016: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/sep/05/disgrace-to-europe-former-child-refugee-lord-dubs-calais-camp> [last visited 10 November 2016].
 - 32 Aryeh Neier quoted in Will Worley, 'Kindertransport survivor calls for British government to do more to help refugees', *Independent*, 23 April 2016: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/kindertransport-survivor-calls-for-british-government-to-do-more-to-help-refugees-a6998071.html> [last visited 1 November 2016].
 - 33 Keir Starmer MP during debate about the Immigration Bill, 25 April 2016: <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2016-04-25/debates/16042535000002/ImmigrationBill?highlight=Kindertransport%20Dubs#contribution-16042535000104> [last visited 10 November 2016].
 - 34 See the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum 'Holocaust Encyclopedia': <https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005260> [last visited 1 November 2016]. There is by now a sizeable literature of personal memoirs and academic studies on the Kindertransport. For context, see Louise London, *Whitehall and the Jews, 1933-1948: British Immigration Policy, Jewish Refugees and the Holocaust* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Recent academic works include Andrea Hammel and Bea Lewkowicz (eds), *The Kindertransport to Britain 1938/39: New Perspectives* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2012); Vera Fast, *Children's Exodus: A History of the Kindertransport* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011); Judith Tydor Baumel-Schwartz, *Never Look Back: The Jewish Refugee Children in Great Britain, 1938-1945* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2012).
 - 35 Lyndsey Stonebridge, 'What history tells us about the refugee crisis', *New Humanist*, Winter 2015, 14 December 2015, <https://newhumanist.org.uk/articles/4972/what-history-tells-us-about-the-refugee-crisis> [last visited 19 November 2016].
 - 36 Amelia Gentleman, "'It is a disgrace to Europe': former child refugee Lord Dubs on the Calais camp", *Guardian*, 5 September 2016: <https://www.theguardian.com/>

- uk-news/2016/sep/05/disgrace-to-europe-former-child-refugee-lord-dubs-calais-camp [last visited 20 September 2016]. 'UK "not keeping pledge to take child refugees" – Lord Dubs', *Guardian*, 10 July 2016: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-36756693> [last visited 20 September 2016]. The first 54 children to come from Calais under the Dubs agreement arrived in the UK on 22 October 2016.
- 37 Enda Curran, 'The World Economy Looks a Bit Like It's the 1930s – Now, like then, a financial crisis has left deep scars', 16 June 2016: <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-16/world-economy-flashes-hint-of-1937-38-redux-says-morgan-stanley> [last visited 10 November 2016].
- 38 Panos Mourdoukoutas, 'Global Economy: Three Scary Similarities Between Now and The 1930s', *Forbes*, 24 August 2015: <http://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2015/08/24/global-economy-three-scary-similarities-between-now-and-the-1930s/#537125359bf6> [last visited 1 October 2016].
- 39 Speech by President Donald Tusk at the European Policy Centre Conference, 13 October 2016: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/president/> [last visited 14 October 2016].
- 40 George F. Will, 'Vladimir Putin is bringing back the 1930s', *Washington Post*, 7 October 2016: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/vladimir-putin-is-bringing-back-the-1930s/2016/10/07/0d91a1c8-8c0a-11e6-875e-2c1bfe943b66_story.html?utm_term=.a1345f1a8692 [last visited 14 October 2016].
- 41 Ishaan Tharoor, 'Europe's fear of Muslim refugees echoes rhetoric of 1930s anti-Semitism', *Washington Post*, 2 September 2015: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/02/europes-current-anti-migrant-rhetoric-carries-echoes-of-1930s-anti-semitism/> [last visited 10 November 2016].
- 42 Daniel Victor, 'Comparing Jewish Refugees of the 1930s with Syrians Today', *New York Times*, 19 November 2015: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/20/us/comparing-jewish-refugees-of-the-1930s-with-syrians-today.html?_r=0 [last visited 10 November 2016].
- 43 See our introduction to the special issue: Matthew Frank and Jessica Reinisch, 'Refugees and the Nation-State in Europe, 1919-1959', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 49, 3 (2014), 477–90.
- 44 Jane Caplan, 'Trump and Fascism: A View from the Past', *History Workshop*, 17 November 2016: <http://www.historyworkshop.org.uk/trump-and-fascism-a-view-from-the-past/> [last visited 17 November 2016].
- 45 Claudena Skran and Carla N. Daughtry, 'The Study of Refugees Before "Refugee Studies"', *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, 26, 3 (2007), 15–35.
- 46 Roger Zetter, 'Refugees and Refugee Studies – A Valedictory Editorial', *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 13, 4 (2000), 352.
- 47 See the limited number of historians and key works of historical references on the theme cited in Philip Marfleet, 'Refugees and History: Why We Must Address the Past', *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, 26, 3 (2007), 136–48.
- 48 Jérôme Elie, 'Histories of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies', in Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long and Nando Sigona (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 24–32.
- 49 Marfleet, 'Refugees and History', 136.
- 50 See Tony Kushner's chapter in this book.
- 51 See, especially, the work of Klaus J. Bade; for example, *Vom Auswanderungsland zum Einwanderungsland? Deutschland 1880-1980* (Berlin: Colloquium, 1983); idem. (ed.), *Deutsche im Ausland – Fremde in Deutschland: Migration in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Munich: Beck, 1992). See also, Ulrich Herbert, *A History of Foreign Labour in*

- Germany, 1880–1980, trans. by William Templer (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1990); Knuth Dohse, *Ausländische Arbeiter und bürgerlicher Staat: Genese und Funktion von staatlicher Ausländerpolitik und Ausländerrecht: Vom Kaiserreich bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Königstein: Hain, 1981). On the political aspects of refugee integration, see Ian Connor, *Refugees and Expellees in Post-War Germany* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007); Pertti Ahonen, *After the Expulsion: West German and Eastern Europe, 1945–1990* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). See the special issue on ‘Migration in Modern Germany’, in *Journal of Contemporary History*, 49, 1 (2014), as well as the virtual special issue of *German History* on ‘Refugees and Migrants’: http://www.oxfordjournals.org/our_journals/gh/refugees_migrants.html [last visited 28 October 2016].
- 52 On France, for example, see Gérard Noiriel, *Réfugiés et sans papiers: La République face aux droit d'asile, XIXe-XXe siècle* (Paris: Fayard, 1998); Vicki Caron, *Uneasy Asylum: France and the Jewish Refugee Crisis, 1933–1942* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); Hannah Diamond, *Fleeing Hitler: France 1940* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Mary Dewhurst Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic: Migrant Rights and the Limits of Universalism in France, 1918–1940* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); Greg Burgess, *Refuge in the Land of Liberty: France and its Refugees from the Revolution to the End of Asylum* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008); Scott Soo, *Routes to Exile: France and the Spanish Civil War Refugees, 1929–2009* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012). For a recent comparison of post-imperial ‘return migrations’ to Germany and France, see Jan C. Jansen and Manuel Borutta (eds), *Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs in Postwar Germany and France: Comparative Perspectives* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2016).
 - 53 Michael R. Marrus, *The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).
 - 54 See Anna Bramwell (ed.), *Refugees in the Age of Total War* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988).
 - 55 See the report on the conference by Mira Siegelberg in *History Workshop Journal*, 71, 1 (2011), 279–83. For a study of World Refugee Year, see Peter Gatrell, *Free World? The Campaign to Save the World's Refugees, 1956–1963* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
 - 56 See, in particular, recent articles in the *Journal of Contemporary History*: Antonio Ferrara, ‘Eugene Kulischer, Joseph Schechtman and the Historiography of European Forced Migrations’, 46, 4 (2011), 715–40; Ari Joskowicz, ‘Romani Refugees and the Postwar Order’, 51, 4 (2016), 760–87; Laure Humbert, ‘French Politics of Relief and International Aid: France, UNRRA and the Rescue of European Displaced Persons in Postwar Germany, 1945–47’, 51, 3 (2016), 606–34; and the special issue ‘Refugees and the Nation-State’, 49, 3 (2014). See also Andrew Paul Janco, ‘“Unwilling”: The One-Word Revolution in Refugee Status, 1940–51’, *Contemporary European History*, 23, 3 (2014), 429–46.
 - 57 See the special issue on ‘Refugees and the Post-War World, 1945–1960’, in *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 25, 3 (2012), and the forthcoming special issue on the history of refugee protection in the same journal.
 - 58 See Aristide R. Zolberg’s foreword in the reissued edition of Michael Marrus, *The Unwanted: European Refugees from the First World War Through the Cold War* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002), xii. See also the forthcoming special issue of the journal *Patterns of Prejudice* on ‘Echoes of the Past: The Refugee Crisis and

European Collective Memory': <http://explore.tandfonline.com/cfp/bes/rpop-echoes-of-the-past> [last visited 17 October 2016].

- 59 A compelling set of answers is provided by Peter Gatrell in *The Making of the Modern Refugee* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), which represents the first single-authored global history of modern refugee movements and offers a new conceptual framework for understanding them through the notion of 'refugeedom'.
- 60 E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1939).
- 61 References to refugees in Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis*, 79, 197. Cf. John Hope Simpson, *The Refugee Problem: Report of a Survey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1939). For background on Carr, see Michael Cox's introductory essay in E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, reissued edition with a new introduction and additional material (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), ix–viii. See also Jonathan Haslam, *The Vices of Integrity: E. H. Carr, 1892-1982* (London: Verso, 1999).
- 62 Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis*, x. On Carr at Paris, see Haslam, *Vices*, 24–34. Cf. The National Archives (TNA), London, FO371/4353, File 33/PC33: Carr memorandum, 20 November 1918.
- 63 See Carole Fink, *Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878-1938* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Mark Levene, *War, Jews and the New Europe: The Diplomacy of Lucien Wolf, 1914-1919* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
- 64 See E. H. Carr, *Conditions of Peace* (London: Macmillan, 1942), 39–69.
- 65 E. H. Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London: Macmillan, 1945), 34.
- 66 See, for example, Alexander Anievas, *Capital, the State and War: Class Conflict and Geopolitics in the Thirty Years' Crisis, 1914-1945* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2014); Mark Hewitson and Matthew D'Auria (eds), *Europe in Crisis: Intellectuals and the European Idea, 1917-1957* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2012).
- 67 Emma Haddad, 'The Refugee: Forging National Identities', *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 2, 2 (2002), 23.
- 68 For a discussion of this idea, see Patricia Clavin, 'Time, Manner, Place: Writing Modern European History in Global, Transnational and International Contexts', *European History Quarterly*, 40, 4 (2010), 630.