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CHAPTER SEVEN

Diminishing Returns? Globalization and the Limits of Citizenship

Introduction

Globalization, for many critics, is a 'key culprit in explaining the diminishing returns of citizenship' (Nyers 2004: 204). Citizenship, in this context, being synonymous with the institution of national citizenship: namely, that bundle of rights, responsibilities, obligations, entitlements and loyalties which constitute membership of a territorially bounded political community. Under conditions of contemporary globalization, it is argued, governments are no longer capable of guaranteeing their citizens' security or prosperity whilst citizens' loyalties are no longer defined solely by national loyalties and sentiments. The result is that the historic covenant between state and citizen, forged in the long twentieth century, has been seriously destabilized. For Nyers (2004) the condition of really existing citizenship today provokes the pressing question: 'What's left of citizenship?' In responding to this question, this chapter seeks to distinguish between the various challenges which globalization presents to contemporary citizenship: namely, challenges to the conditions, practices and the institution of citizenship. Developing a modest critique of the 'declinist' thesis it argues for a more nuanced position which recognizes the complex ways in which citizenship is being reconfigured by the related processes of globalization and securitization.

Much of the literature on the demise of citizenship has its intellectual origins in what Holton refers to as the 'first wave' of globalization theory (Holton 2005). This 'first wave' tended towards a 'one-dimensional' or economic interpretation of globalization, emphasizing the primacy of global markets over national politics (McGrew 2007). It unleashed an intense academic debate within international relations and political science as to the relative decline or demise of the nation state in world politics. Whether explicitly or implicitly, the demise of citizenship literature draws upon quite similar readings of the consequences of economic globalization. In the first section of this chapter we explore this declinist thesis, identifying some of the key contributions and primary arguments. We consider some of the principal responses to the question of why globalization is considered to undermine the necessary conditions of modern citizenship. Developing

this analysis further, in the second section we consider the connections between globalization and securitization: in particular why and how the global movement of people and ideas has contributed to expanded restrictions on the practices of citizenship. The third section draws together the preceding discussion through a critical reflection upon the prospects for the institution of citizenship under conditions of contemporary globalization. This suggests a more complex reading of globalization as neither the principal culprit in the purported demise of citizenship nor the harbinger of the progressive transformation of citizenship. The latter issue is taken up in the final section, which identifies agendas for future citizenship research.

Globalization and the Decline of Citizenship

Globalization refers to processes of growing worldwide interconnectedness such that events and decisions in one region of the world can come to have significant consequences for distant communities. It is expressed in, amongst other things, the emergence of a single global capitalist economy in which webs of finance, production and trade bind together the economic fate of nations. As the current financial crisis (2008/2009) demonstrates, in a highly integrated world economy few governments are able to insulate their citizens from the pernicious consequences of global market forces. Beyond the economic domain the same technological and communication infrastructures which underpin the globalization of finance and production facilitate the global movement of people, cultures, ideas and information, as well as the organization of transnational relations and networks, from the Triads to the World Social Forum. Accordingly, globalization is articulated in multiple domains from the economic, the political, to the military. In the political domain the business of government has become globalized in response to the rapidly dissolving distinctions between domestic and external affairs. States increasingly share power with an array of public and private *supra*-state authorities as public policy making acquires a regional and global dimension. Moreover, in a more interconnected world the 'death of distance' makes proximate even the most distant potential dangers, giving urgency to new systemic risks from global warming to pandemics and state failure. In all these respects globalization contributes to a process of denationalization: as social, political and economic activities are increasingly 'stretched' across national frontiers they are no longer organized according to a strictly national territorial logic. Since modern citizenship has been constituted historically by such a logic there is clear reason to suspect that

contemporary globalization is a 'key culprit' in eroding the conditions of national citizenship.

In an article which captures the essence of the declinist thesis, Richard Falk argues that 'Economic globalization, and its diverse impacts, seems likely to produce a decline in the quality and significance of citizenship' (Falk 2000: 7). Falk traces this decline to a number of factors which are mediated by globalization: the changing role of the state; the demise of conventional warfare; the rise of civilizational, religious and ethnic identities; and the growth of transnational social forces. In combination, he argues, these factors undermine the essential foundations of national citizenship.

Globalizing forces, observes Falk, have been reorienting the state along with the perspectives and allegiances of elites which have taken an increasingly transnational outlook, weakening the primacy once accorded to national attachments. The emergence of a worldwide network of elites committed to the neoliberal globalization project has advanced global corporate capitalism to some extent at the expense of national interests and attachments. Governments have increasingly adapted their role and function to the precepts and prerequisites of neoliberal globalization by creating an environment conducive to free trade, prudent fiscal and macro-economic policy, capital mobility and deregulation. Such policies create new winners and losers in society, weakening the bonds of solidarity or affinity amongst the citizenry as a result of an increasing gulf between the haves and have-nots. In short, the differential social impact of economic globalization on citizens produces passivity, despair and alienation on the part of those who are most disadvantaged or lose out by it. This sense of alienation and despair is reinforced by the growing significance of arenas of decision making and the exercise of power beyond the control of the state. These developments not only erode state autonomy, but also weaken the traditional bonds of loyalty between citizens and the state – especially in western liberal democracies where modern conceptions of citizenship based on affiliation with a territorial state emerged (Falk 2000).

War, and in particular the total warfare of the twentieth century, was crucial in forging the historic covenant between states and their subjects, and gave substance to the idea of modern citizenship. However the current epoch of globalization is associated with the demise of classical warfare, the end of mass conscription and the relative demilitarization, by comparison with the Cold War era, of western democracies (Shaw 1997). Since the 1980s, citizenship has been stripped progressively of its martial attributes and practices – e.g. military service. Many factors contribute to this complex

phenomenon including the declining importance of territorial expansion as an underlying source of power and influence, thus rendering warfare less central to contemporary geopolitics. For Falk, the demise of total war combined with a more pacific geopolitics has devalued the functionality of the patriotic citizen, thereby further eroding citizenship in the era of globalization (Falk 2000).

In response to this partial displacement of the state as a source of political identity, Falk suggests that cultural globalization contributes to the strengthening of other sources of identity and loyalties which are rooted in transnational religious, cultural or ethnic attachments. Increased migration and a real-time global communications infrastructure reinforce tendencies towards greater cultural and ethnic diversity within western democracies. Controversy rages within and beyond the academy as to whether or not such diversity enhances or undermines a coherent sense of national citizenship. The fact of such controversy, however, illustrates the politically contested nature of citizenship; contestation which to varying degrees may undermine the ideal of social solidarity which has been regarded traditionally as an essential condition of national citizenship.

Finally, Falk associates the decline of traditional citizenship with the rise of transnational social forces and political activism in furtherance of notable causes such as the environment, human rights, feminism, indigenous peoples and global justice. This transnational activism relies upon the cultivation of more cosmopolitan, as opposed to national, loyalties and obligations which contributes further to the erosion of civic solidarity. Transnational civil society and transnational activism are argued to divert citizens' political energy and commitment from what Miller has referred to as their special responsibilities to their compatriots (Miller 2007). For Falk, these various pathologies of contemporary globalization destabilize the necessary conditions of modern citizenship, weakening the traditional bonds between citizens and the state, and thereby reinforcing the diminishing returns to citizenship evident in western democracies today (Falk 2000).

Similar conclusions are reached by Castles and Davidson (2000). Following Falk, they contend that globalization impacts on citizenship in three main ways. First, since global forces erode the power and autonomy of the nation state to control and regulate domestic affairs, citizenship is undermined to the degree that governments are unable to provide effective social protection. Global capital markets impose significant constraints on the capacity of governments to provide the levels of social protection for their citizens which arguably are necessary in response to intensifying

global economic competition. Furthermore, governments have restricted access to welfare protection to contain social spending, reinforcing the perception of diminishing returns to citizenship. In effect, citizenship acquires an increasingly symbolic as opposed to material function (Castles and Davidson 2000).

Second, associated with the above argument, Castles and Davidson observe that the diffusion of global norms and ideals – notably universal human rights – has acquired greater legal and political salience. This may have the effect of displacing the significance attached to national citizenship insofar as a universal concept of citizens' rights is enshrined in international treaties and agreements – for example the Schengen Agreement within the EU that ensures the freedom of movement for EU nationals within the Union. As a consequence, the primacy of national citizenship is no longer so self-evident since universal rights regimes have promoted the extension of rights to non-citizens and blurred the distinctions between citizen and non-citizen. The growth of dual citizenship is one notable illustration of this phenomenon. Such developments appear to reduce the significance and benefits of citizenship (Castles and Davidson 2000; cf. Soysal 1994).

Third, Castles and Davidson argue that the global movement of peoples erodes national homogeneity and social solidarity. Migration produces growing ethnic diversity which challenges assimilationist notions of citizenship. To the extent that multiculturalism is perceived as a dilution of national identity, migration is considered to undermine the social cohesion and sense of shared identity which are regarded as being amongst the essential conditions of effective citizenship. Furthermore, the existence of global communications and transport infrastructures contributes to the strengthening of diaspora and transnational cultures, sometimes at the expense of social cohesion and national identity (Castles and Davidson 2000; cf. Schuler 1999). For Castles and Davidson, as for Falk, globalization undermines key conditions of effective citizenship (Castles and Davidson 2000). Furthermore, more recent contributions by Lister and Pia (2008), as well as Judith Gans (2005), elaborate on many of the principal claims of Castles and Davidson, reinforcing the general thesis concerning the erosion of national citizenship.

Relating some of these more general claims to the US context, Spiro (2008) analyses how globalization has impacted on the legalities of American citizenship – that is how the conditions of really existing citizenship in the United States (US) have altered in response to neoliberal globalization. He argues that, historically, citizenship in the US has been predominantly

associated with membership of the larger American community either through birth or residence. In effect, American citizenship and identity have always been rooted in the ties of place and community. However, he contends that, in the era of globalization, this traditional sense of American identity is becoming unsustainable to the extent to which these ties are becoming detached from their territorial moorings. The evidence for this is to be found in the altered legal foundations of American citizenship. The granting of dual citizenship, naturalization and the like – plural yet partial citizenships – undermines the basis and indeed the very meaning and significance attached to American citizenship. Indeed, Spiro questions the legitimacy of the status ascribed not only to immigrants who become US citizens but also fellow Americans who emigrate and/or are born outside of the country. The argument is that all of these developments are eroding the legal basis of American citizenship. Hence, he concludes that, as a consequence of globalization, citizenship is in irreversible decline (Spiro 2008).

This claim that globalization erodes the privileged legal basis and valorization of national citizenship has been developed further by Jacobson (1997). He argues that the traditional basis of nation-state membership and especially citizenship is being eroded by transnational migration (Jacobson 1997). As rights are based increasingly on residency rather than membership – following the developing separation of the issue of rights from the context of belonging – the distinction between ‘citizen’ and ‘alien’ has been eroded. This is increasingly the case given the international legal duties of the state to uphold the rights of all inhabitants – citizens and non-citizens alike – in respect of international human rights law. For example, Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) stipulates, amongst other things, that signatories must guarantee the right to family life. This implies that migrants must be allowed to reside with their spouse and children in host countries. If a European government decides to stem the flow of migrants by restricting family reunification, those aggrieved have the right to challenge such decisions by taking their case to the ECHR. The ECHR has adjudicated cases of aliens residing in European countries, ruling that signatory-states must uphold the rights of all inhabitants – not just citizens – as enshrined in the Convention. Thus, Jacobson’s main contention is that the *supra*-state protection of human rights poses major challenges to the effective conditions of national citizenship, whilst migration blurs the distinctions between ‘citizens’ and ‘alien’ (Walzer uses the term ‘denizen’ to describe those persons who lie between the categories of citizens and aliens). As a result, national citizenship is devalued – that is citizenship is

rendered of less significance given the declining value attached to the actual rights delivered by the acquisition of citizenship status (Jacobson 1997).

Sassen (2003) too affirms key aspects of Jacobson's claim that globalization is eroding the privileged legal status of citizens – in the sense that aliens in most western democracies can claim legal rights traditionally only accorded to citizens. She identifies several developments in this regard, namely the expansion of:

- *Dual citizenship* – the granting and/or recognition of this status by many countries in the last decade amounts to a diminution of exclusive rights. In short, it is argued that such a status weakens the sense of belonging to the nation state;
- *Universal rights* – whereas in the past rights were linked to ownership of property or membership of a political community, rights are now deemed inalienable and universal by the fact of individual humanity – in effect, the body is now the site for claiming rights. Hence, the rights of aliens (non-citizens) not just citizens, are/should be protected and/or guaranteed, blurring the distinction between citizens and non-citizens;
- *Denizen status* – rights that traditionally used to be accorded only to citizens are now also being claimed by non-citizens. Indeed, international human rights law requires states to grant certain rights to people within their territory irrespective of their citizenship status (cf. Jacobson 1997). These include, amongst others, the right to be paid for work done and the right to own property. The argument here is that these *de facto* rights amount to what has been called 'informal citizenship'. In fact, many countries – for example, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the US – go further to regularize or legalize the status of illegal immigrants by granting them citizenship on the basis of stipulated conditions or criteria including amongst others demonstration of good conduct (Sassen 2003; Evans 2004).

However, for Sassen, as for Falk and others, globalization displays its most pernicious effects by eroding the conditions of 'Marshallian citizenship'. As Sassen observes: 'The growing emphasis on notions of the "competitive state" and the associated emphasis on markets have brought into question the foundations of the welfare state ... For Marshall and many others the welfare state is an important ingredient of social citizenship ... [which has] been severely diluted under the impact of globalization' (Sassen 2006). This is an argument that neoliberal globalization has undermined the 'embedded liberalism' which Ruggie notes was the foundation of the

post-war multilateral order which in turn facilitated the creation of the modern welfare state (Ruggie 1982). In effect, 'embedded liberalism' involved the internationalization of the New Deal state in the form of multilateral institutions which regulated the world economy in ways which accorded with national welfare goals such as full employment, etc. As the neoliberal revolution took hold in the 1980s, international regulation gave way to the promotion of competition and the market with the consequent demise of the Keynesian welfare state (Harvey 2006). Under conditions of neoliberal globalization, governments, responding to the disciplinary power of financial markets and the growing mobility of capital, sought to promote national economic competitiveness at the expense of costly welfare provision and social protectionism. As Sassen suggests, the form taken by this particular '... articulation of globalization with national economies' is characterized by '... the associated withdrawal of the state from various spheres of citizenship entitlements, with the possibility of a corresponding dilution of loyalty to the state' (Sassen 2006).

Of course, globalization has undoubtedly contributed to global economic growth and wealth creation (i.e. increased levels of global prosperity), lifting many out of poverty and economic insecurity (Bhagwati 2004; Wolf 2004). However, it is the highly uneven distribution of its benefits and costs both globally and between different socio-economic groups within states that generates new pressures on welfare regimes. Even before the onset of the current global financial crisis, economic globalization – in the form of capital mobility, offshoring and outsourcing – has been a major source of social dislocation, unemployment (especially amongst the low-skilled) and growing wage and income inequality (Cramme and Diamond 2009b). In the US and Europe, for example, globalization has contributed, along with technological change, to slow wage growth for the unskilled and increasing income inequality. Over the last two decades, most advanced industrialized economies have reported growing income inequality and economic insecurity as well as an expanding gap in employment and unemployment rates between high-skilled and low-skilled groups (Hassel 2009).

Milanovic's pathbreaking studies covering the period 1950 to 2000, for example, conclude that international (between country) and global (between households across the globe) inequality increased as the economic fortunes of both countries and households diverged (Milanovic 2002a,b, 2005). International inequality (measured by the GINI coefficient) rose from 0.44 in 1950 to 0.55 whilst global inequality rose from 0.62 in 1988 to 0.64 in 1998 (Milanovic 2005). If this were converted into actual dollars then the

ratio of the top 10 per cent of incomes to the bottom 10 per cent would be approximately 320:1 and '... probably among the highest, or perhaps the highest, inequality level ever recorded' (Milanovic 2005). This pattern is reproduced in relation to industrial pay inequalities within countries which have widened significantly since 1982 according to Galbraith (2002). In 1960, the income of the richest 20 per cent of the world's people stood at about thirty times that of the poorest 20 per cent; by 1997 the corresponding figure was seventy-four (UNDP 1997). Global wealth or assets are even more unequally distributed too. Estimates indicate that the top 10 per cent own 85 per cent of the world's wealth – a GINI of 0.89 – compared to most countries where the top 10 per cent own 50 per cent of total wealth – a GINI of 0.7 but only a few are above 0.8 (Davies *et al.* 2006).

Such studies identify economic globalization as a significant – although not sole – cause of growing national and world inequality. For mobile capital relocates jobs and production in the world economy, trade intensifies international competitive pressures and global finance constrains the welfare and redistributive capacities of states (Rodrik 1997; Thomas 1997; Castells 1998; Tanzi 2001; Wade 2004; Kaplinsky 2006). This produces four mutually reinforcing dynamics: the increasing segmentation of the national workforce into winners and losers from productive and financial integration; the growing marginalization, exclusion and impoverishment of the losers; the erosion of social solidarity as welfare regimes are unable, or politicians unwilling, to bear the growing costs of protecting the most vulnerable; and the intensification of economic polarization and exclusion within, between and across states (Lawrence 1996; Dickson 1997; Thomas 1997; Birdsall 1998; Castells 1998; Gray 1998; Sklair 2001). For those most exposed to the unevenness of economic globalization the combined effects of the erosion of welfare provision and heightened insecurity reinforce a growing sense of the diminishing returns to citizenship insofar as it effectively creates different classes of citizens (Rodrik 1997; Hassel 2009; Perrons 2009). In short, globalization increases the risk of polarization within and across societies and regions (Cramme and Diamond 2009b). Hence, one could argue that such widening inequalities (including income and access to resources and services) create a situation of 'unequal citizenship'.

In sum, the declinist thesis asserts a causal association (both direct and indirect) between the rise of neoliberal globalization and the demise of citizenship in western democracies. This decline is articulated in the erosion of the cultural, legal, economic and political conditions which gave meaning to, as well as valorized, national citizenship for much of the twentieth

century. To the extent that globalization weakens bonds of social solidarity and national identity, the legal distinctions between citizens and aliens, welfare regimes and entitlements, the economic security of households and the political accountability of the state, it undermines the vital conditions of effective national citizenship (Jacobson 1997; Castles and Davidson 2000; Falk 2000; Sassen 2003; Gans 2005; Lister and Pia 2008; Spiro 2008). In effect, globalization contributes to a significant dilution of citizenship, from a substantive to a more formal ensemble of rights, obligations and entitlements: namely, a form of 'low-intensity citizenship' (to borrow a phrase). Neoliberal globalization is thus considered a 'key culprit' in redefining the limits of citizenship to fit with the new rationalities of the 'competition state' and the 'global market'. Of course, such claims are open to dispute as is the wider argument concerning the causal significance attached to globalization. This critique will be taken up in the penultimate section of the chapter following a consideration of the connection between globalization and the securitization of citizenship.

Globalization and the Securitization of Citizenship

During the Cold War, global Armageddon was never much more than thirty minutes away – the dispatch time of intercontinental missiles. By the same token, the 'death of distance' today transforms far-off conflicts and potential threats into proximate dangers, as the events of 9/11 cruelly demonstrated. Moreover, it is no longer simply military threats which contribute to this globalized insecurity since, amongst other things, environmental degradation, pandemics and organized crime transcend national frontiers. Paradoxically, the same global infrastructures which make it possible to organize finance on a worldwide basis can also be exploited to lethal effect. The globalization of the means of production and the globalization of means of destruction share much in common.

Modern societies are extremely vulnerable to the disruption of those complex systems which enable them to function effectively, from transport to banking. Although this has always been the case, it is perhaps compounded today by greater reliance on vital trade networks (from food to energy), the transnationalization of production, and the critical role of communications and transport infrastructures. Whereas total war implied the 'destruction' of the enemy, contemporary societies are seriously vulnerable to those who with minimal coercive capability may threaten or seek societal disruption as opposed to societal destruction. Using the 'weapons of the weak', from box-cutters to home-made explosives, the potential for non-state groups to exert

'informal violence' presents a potentially significant threat to open societies. Furthermore, the potential of this 'informal violence' is magnified for two reasons. First, because borders are no longer barriers, such that disruption of critical infrastructures by cyber-attacks or alternatively the perpetration of terrorist attacks can be organized effectively from distant regions of the globe (Lukasik *et al.* 2003). In Keohane's view, the 'barrier conception of geographical space, already anachronistic with respect to thermonuclear war ... was finally shown to be thoroughly obsolete on September 11th' (Keohane 2002: 276). Second, the proliferation of highly lethal weapons systems, not to mention technologies of mass destruction, radically alters the scale of potential threats. Globalization multiplies and transforms the potential threats confronting states whilst orthodox notions of territorial security are made problematic. For if potential threats can be organized, resourced or directed from multiple sites across the globe countering them requires more than simply a global surveillance infrastructure but heightened domestic security measures too. In effect, 'as disorder in one part of the world has combined with IT and the speed of travel to feed insecurity in another, security has become increasingly diffuse and borders more complicated to defend' (Avant 2005: 33).

Al Qaeda, the Triads, narco-terrorism and the illicit arms trade are very much part of what Keohane refers to as agencies of informal organized violence, or what Ferguson and Mansbach call post-international violence (i.e. non-state, privatized, outsourced, globalized) (Keohane 2002; Ferguson and Mansbach 2004). Transnational terrorist and criminal organizations, alongside those transnational social forces operating within the shadow global economy, have been able to exploit the infrastructures of globalization for their own illicit and destructive purposes. So much so that some conclude 'the transnational expansion of these dangerous trades has come to form part of the essential machinery of globalization' (Bhattacharya 2005: 32). Domestic policing increasingly has a transnational dimension. Deadly criminal violence on the streets of the world's major cities can often be traced to the distant interventions of transnational organized criminal and gang networks. This globalization of informal violence has contributed to the globalization of insecurity. Whereas the end of the Cold War produced a rapid demilitarization of western societies, the era of globalization has been associated with their growing securitization. This has had profound consequences for the governance and practice of citizenship which, Huysmans amongst others argues, have become a prime focus of such securitization (Nyers 2004; Huysmans 2006; Diez and Squire 2008).

A considerable literature has developed analysing and critiquing this growing securitization of citizenship. This literature emphasizes the social or discursive construction, as opposed to the objective determination, of the threats and dangers posed by globalization to societal and existential security. Drawing upon various analytical traditions, from the Copenhagen School to Foucault, this literature explores how official discourses come to construct global threats to societal security so normalizing an 'exceptional politics' in which citizenship increasingly is securitized (Waever *et al.* 1993; Buzan *et al.* 1998; Muller 2004; Huysmans 2006). This securitization has taken a number of forms including the emergence of what Bigo refers to as 'an internal security field' in which an ensemble of discrete activities – from terrorism to migration, organized crime and asylum seekers – is increasingly conflated within official discourses as a 'continuum of threats' to societal and national security requiring (in some contexts) exceptional responses (Bigo 1994). Such responses, from expanded surveillance to securing borders and restricting civil liberties, often have the consequence of constructing citizens as the 'target of securitisation' (Diez and Squire 2008). To the degree that the rights of citizens are traded for public security, the practice of citizenship is inevitably damaged (Waldron 2003). This is evident in several different contexts.

Since 9/11 there has been a steady rise in state surveillance measures within all western democracies (Lyon 2007). New technologies of surveillance, profiling and monitoring have been increasingly utilized by various state agencies – police, intelligence and security, etc. – from DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid – the technology that uncovers genetic details/profiles) databases, biometrics, to closed circuit television (CCTV), automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) and related electronic tracking and eavesdropping systems. Furthermore, anti-terrorism legislation and associated policies create potential restrictions on civil liberties whilst the growing securitization of (territorial and electronic) borders infringes on the equal treatment of nationals and citizens (Muller 2004; Sassen 2006: Chapter 4; Gilbert 2007; Pallito and Heyman 2008). As Sassen, amongst others, notes, anti-terror legislation, such as the US Patriot Act, and its modes of implementation have curtailed the civil liberties and rights to privacy of citizens and aliens alike (Sassen, 2006: 180; cf. Sullivan 2003; Whitaker 2003; Rosati 2004; Stanley and Steinhardt 2004; Brown 2009). Moreover, as Muller observes, since 9/11 there has been '... a dramatic – and often draconian – securitization of the politics of borders' whilst new biometric border control technologies '... attempt to transform citizenship

into a quest for verifying/authenticating “identity” for the purposes of access to rights ... stripping away the cultural and ethnic attributes of citizenship’ (Muller 2004: 280). As Pallito and Heyman argue, these new border control technologies and practices differentiate between citizens on the basis of profiling and threat assessments (Pallito and Heyman 2008). Both the technologies and practices of ‘securitized citizenship’ not only infringe the civil liberties of all citizens but also differentiate citizens on the basis of their attributes, identities, ethnic or religious associations. This differentiation is especially the case in relation to Muslims, for as Diez and Squire note, since 9/11 ‘... the target of securitization ... has increasingly focused on the figure of the Muslim’ (Diez and Squire 2008: 577). Underlying such practices is the construction and public perception of migration and immigrant communities as sources of insecurity.

A recent World Migration Organization report noted that ‘no country remained untouched by international migration’ (Organization 2006: 381). Outward migration is a predominantly developing country phenomenon and, despite greater restrictions, it is currently on a scale of the mass migrations of the early twentieth century (Chiswick and Hatton 2003: 74). Though complex in origin and destination, global, as opposed to intraregional, migration has expanded enormously over the period 1950 to 2000 (Chiswick and Hatton 2003). According to the United Nations (UN) estimates, there are more than 200 million people living and working outside their country of birth – this is reportedly twice the level of twenty-five years ago (Cramme and Diamond 2009a). Such migration is geographically concentrated, with significant migrant communities in all western democracies – in 2006, 23 per cent of Parisians, 28 per cent of Londoners and a similar proportion of New Yorkers had been born abroad (Freeman 2006: 4–5). The scale of recent migration has made it a highly contentious political issue in western states. Public perceptions of migration have been shaped by wider fears about pandemics, transnational crime, terrorism and unemployment, as well as the perceived burdens imposed on the welfare state (cf. Dottori 2009). As Buonfino asserts, ‘Immigration has turned into one of the greatest security concerns of 21st Century Europe’ (Buonfino 2004). This securitization of migration superficially conflates concerns about illegal migration, people trafficking, organized crime, social cohesion and employment opportunities with immigration more generally (Vucetic 2002). In so doing it has significant implications for the practice of citizenship.

Constructing migration as a threat to societal security reinforces the ‘... resentments of those made insecure by their vulnerability to global

competition ... further subverting the protections of citizenship' (Jordan and Duvell quoted in Buonfino 2004: 38). In effect, the growing perception amongst those most disadvantaged by globalization and migration that citizenship status affords them limited protections inevitably contributes to perceptions of its limited value. By comparison, for immigrants, the acquisition of citizenship in most western democracies has been made more demanding, more prescriptive and more restricted (Walters 2004; Diez and Squire 2008). In effect, the securitization of migration – the alien as potential threat – has become inextricably implicated in the practice of citizenship. This is conspicuously evident today in a number of contexts. Stasiulis and Ross, for instance, recount the significant 'perils of dual nationality' – multiple citizenships – illustrated by a number of recent cases involving rendition and other exceptional circumstances in which, despite their citizenship status, individuals have found '... themselves as unprotected persons existing in a vacuum devoid of diplomatic protection' (Stasiulis and Ross 2006). Under conditions of heightened securitization the practice of citizenship becomes imbued with an 'exceptional politics'. Citizenship is thereby increasingly differentiated and differentially experienced. Moreover, the state and its security agencies acquire the privilege to interpret more flexibly their obligations to protect their own citizens or to avoid infringing their liberties (Stasiulis and Ross 2006).

Processes of securitization normalize the exceptional treatment of citizens and bring into focus the limits to citizenship. To the extent that globalization creates the conditions of insecurity which belie such processes, logic dictates it is a key culprit in accounting for the 'diminishing returns to citizenship'. Yet, as the analysis above indicates, threats and dangers to societal security are not objectively given but on the contrary are 'socially constructed'. This is not to argue that such securitization moves are simply arbitrary. On the contrary they are contingent upon the existence of dominant discourses of danger and threat, such as the 'war on terror', which are the basis of collectively shared interpretations of, and interventions in, the 'real world'. Accordingly, the securitization of citizenship is not an inevitable consequence of globalization. Rather it is the contingent product of a unique combination of historical and political circumstances and choices. The implication, as Hacking observes of constructivist logic more generally, is that different choices and outcomes are always possible: the world may have been different (Hacking 1999). What then of the prospects for the institution of national citizenship?

Globalization and the Prospects for Citizenship

As the discussion so far has revealed, there is an extensive literature which implicates globalization in the decline of citizenship in western democracies. Within this literature, neoliberal globalization is charged with diluting the value of, and significance attached to, citizenship whilst the globalization of insecurity is associated with a securitization of citizenship which involves expanding restrictions on its practice. Of course, this is a considerable simplification of the theoretically and empirically rich arguments of a diverse literature. Nevertheless, it captures the essence of the broader thesis concerning the impact of globalization on citizenship in western democracies which is implicit in much of this work. However, before drawing firm conclusions about the prospects for the institution of national citizenship, under the conditions of contemporary globalization, some further scrutiny of these arguments, in relation to both their substantive claims and theoretical framing, is warranted.

Much of the declinist literature, as noted previously, draws upon an account of globalization which emphasizes both the structural constraints it imposes on states and the leakage of power from states to global agencies and markets. Yet far from globalization necessarily eroding national autonomy or sovereignty, it can be argued that it has enhanced the national capabilities of many states. Openness to global markets, many economists argue, provides greater opportunities for sustained national economic growth and prosperity. As the experience of the East Asian 'tigers' highlights, global markets by no means are incompatible with strong states (Weiss 1998, 2003). Moreover, even where state sovereignty is circumscribed by multilateral institutions, as in the case of the European Union, national governments effectively pool sovereignty in order to extend, through collective action, national control over external forces. Although the limits to, and the constraints upon, national economic autonomy and sovereignty have become more salient, especially in western democratic states, they have not extinguished the scope for states to '... continue to exercise their autonomy in very different ways, reflecting their different political cultures' (Kymlicka 1999).

These different national political cultures have produced different traditions and regimes of citizenship. And these different traditions have important implications for the analysis of the consequences of globalization for citizenship. As discussed earlier, one argument is that globalization, in creating new social divisions between its winners and losers as well as facilitating mass migration, undermines both the social cohesion and the

sense of coherent national identity – the subjectivities – which are critical to the institution of national citizenship. However, states have responded in different ways to these pressures shaped by different national traditions and regimes of citizenship. The differences between *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli* traditions in respect of responses to migration are significant (Diez and Squire 2008). Moreover, the apparent decline of social cohesion may be due less to globalization than the rise of identity politics and other factors. Indeed, globalization's impact is more complex in that it can also reinforce social solidarity, for instance French civic responses to globalization, insofar as '... citizens still want to confront the challenges of globalization as national collectivities' (Kymlicka 1999: 116). Thus, it remains debatable whether or not these new social divisions and alternative conceptions of identity actually strengthen or undermine a sense of national citizenship; and meanwhile, as Falk acknowledges (or cautions), the precise chain of causal linkages with globalization is difficult, if not impossible, to establish (Falk 2000).

Civic responses to globalization reinforce this causal complexity. For globalization is associated with a dramatic rise in transnational civic activism. In recent decades a plethora of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), transnational organizations, advocacy networks and citizens groups have come to play a significant role in mobilizing, organizing and exercising people-power across national boundaries. Official sources record the existence of over 50,000 NGOs in 2006 as citizens and collectivities, in the pursuit of common interests, cooperate across national frontiers (see Held and McGrew 2007: Chapter 2). Despite the biases and exclusions of this emerging transnational civil society, some argue that such transnational activism serves as an instrument for encouraging alternative forms of citizen participation and engagement (Rothkopf 1998; Economist 2000; Smith 2001; Kellner 2002). Moreover, global and regional human rights regimes have provided new arenas in which citizens and groups denied their rights, such as indigenous peoples, have been able to publicize their predicament and to assert claims to the protections inscribed in international human rights law. Furthermore, the existence of strong regional human rights regimes, such as the ECHR, has acquired a significant role in providing redress for citizens against their own governments. Though deficient in crucial ways, this international machinery and legal structure of universal human rights functions in large measure to reinforce, rather than to erode, the institution of citizenship.

Although Falk and others make much of the association between globalization and growing inequality within states, the presumption of

causality is the subject of intense academic controversy (Falk 2000; Garrett 2001; Firebaugh 2003; Milanovic 2005). This controversy is important since it concerns the relative significance of economic globalization, as opposed to technological innovation and other factors such as economic policy, in the determination of widening income inequality in advanced western democracies. No consensus has emerged other than that globalization is neither the sole nor necessarily the prime causal factor (Lawrence 1996; Milanovic 2002c, 2005; Lindert and Williamson 2003; Atkinson 2009). Such complexity suggests the need for some caution in making direct causal inferences between globalization, trends in inequality and the decline of citizenship. This is further reinforced by studies of the impact of globalization upon welfare regimes and spending.

World financial markets and global competitive pressures may well impose similar kinds of disciplines on all governments, but this has not resulted in either a convergence or decline of welfare regimes amongst advanced industrial states. Such pressures are mediated by domestic structures and institutional arrangements which produce significant variations in outcomes (Garrett and Lange 1996; Weiss 1998; Swank 2002). States can and do make a difference, as the continuing diversity of national capitalist formations confirms. This is especially the case in relation to welfare regimes and spending (Garrett 1996, 1998; Rieger and Liebfried 1998; Hirst and Thompson 1999; Swank 2002). Indeed, welfare spending has grown most rapidly in the most open economies whilst actual levels of national welfare spending and social protection continue to diverge, even within the EU, suggesting that Marshallian social citizenship and economic globalization are not incompatible (Rodrik 1997; Mosley 2000, 2003; Hay 2001, 2005; Garrett and Nickerson 2003). In explaining this apparent contradiction Rieger and Liebfried, amongst others, reverse the standard logic of causation to argue that it is strong welfare regimes that make globalization possible precisely because they provide protection for its losers which makes such openness politically sustainable (Rieger and Liebfried 2003). Perhaps the more important point, however, is that the consequences of globalization for states, as for citizens, have not been uniform. Yet assertions of its causal power in explaining the general decline or erosion of citizenship tend to overlook this significant variation in both its impact and citizenship traditions and regimes.

These problems are much less in evidence in studies of the securitization of citizenship, although these are not devoid of criticism. In particular there is a tendency for such studies to lack historical depth, which has two

consequences. First, the globalization–securitization nexus tends to be portrayed as a novel development with the implication that citizenship, under conditions of contemporary globalization, is becoming increasingly securitized. Yet only three decades ago the world was divided into rival camps in which the securitization of societies and citizenship, in varying degrees, was a normal feature of the political landscape. Second, it leads to an implied comparison of the present with some mythical ‘golden age of citizenship’ in which, as Hindess notes, it was ‘... unsecuritized, pre-neoliberal ... clearly a good thing’ (Hindess 2004). This inevitably distorts reflections upon the condition of contemporary citizenship. Lack of historical depth invites some caution in uncritically accepting narratives connecting contemporary globalization with securitization and the decline of citizenship. If this absence of historical depth is a concern, so too is the parochialism of much of this literature which focuses primarily upon a restricted set of western states or cases of ‘exceptional politics’. Scholarly and convincing as such work may be, it is important to recognize that these may not be ‘... typical of the condition of citizenship in the world today’ (Hindess 2004: 305). Finally, there is tendency in much of this literature to under-theorize the relationship between globalization and securitization. Whilst in certain respects these are mutually constitutive processes, they are also in dynamic tension, if not contradiction, insofar as globalization promotes migration whilst securitization seeks to restrict it. These tensions between the dominant discourses and practices of globalization and securitization are little explored yet clearly significant in understanding the prospects for citizenship.

As this brief excursion into some of the more critical reflections on the declinist thesis demonstrates, there is good reason to be cautious in attributing to globalization the status of a ‘key culprit in explaining the diminishing returns of citizenship’ (Nyers 2004). It also gives rise to significant wider methodological issues. Four in particular are worth mentioning. First, there are tendencies in some of this literature both to exaggerate the impact of globalization and to underestimate its differential consequences. Second, there is a tendency to poorly specify the causal mechanisms linking globalization to the decline of citizenship. Third, there is danger of generalizing from a quite restricted set of cases and evidence. Finally, the lack of historical depth may well distort some of the analyses and conclusions reached. Such factors reinforce the requirement for caution in making definitive claims concerning the limits to citizenship engendered by globalization. Whilst not going so far as to agree with

Kymlicka that '... the main sources of dissatisfaction with citizenship in Western democracies has little to do with globalization', neither is it self-evident that globalization is the 'key culprit' in precipitating such dissatisfaction (Kymlicka 1999: 116). Globalization is not only the factor putting the institution of citizenship at risk.

Lastly, it is important not to overlook the ways in which globalization is expanding, rather than contracting, the limits of citizenship (Smith 2001). As Scholte comments, globalization demands 'substantial shifts in the ways that we theorize and practise politics' (Scholte 2000: 61). Many of the same works which assert the decline of national citizenship also emphasize the potential of globalization in transforming citizenship. As Falk concludes:

Global forces are thus argued to be reshaping the meaning and institution of citizenship in the sense that multiple loyalties or allegiances are being created. As such, globalization is transforming the monolithic conception of citizenship often associated with the Westphalian system of world public order. (Falk 2000)

The technologies of globalization have facilitated new forms of political expression and created new or alternative public spaces and possibilities of citizen engagement (Rothkopf 1998; Economist 2000; Smith 2001; Kellner 2002). New forms of citizenship as transnational, cosmopolitan or global citizenship are the focus of much academic scrutiny and reflection (see Chapters Six and Eight) (Delanty 2000; Carter 2001; Caney 2005). These are not simply academic constructs but, on the contrary, emerging practices and discourses of citizenship which find expression in diverse political settings, from the EU to global justice campaigns (Beck 2004; Held 2004; Schattle 2007). In the same manner in which globalization has contributed to the (relative) deterritorialization of economic and political activities, similar tendencies are evident in the discourses and practices of contemporary citizenship. The dramatic expansion of dual nationality is just one expression of such tendencies. Another is the growing salience of the corporate social responsibility movement, which has given rise to debates about corporate citizenship, as intimated in the UN Global Compact (Andriof and McIntosh 2001). In contrast to the obituaries for citizenship, globalization has arguably contributed to both a renaissance of normative theorizing about citizenship as well as potentially transforming (the scale and scope of) its practice.

The Limits to Citizenship: Future Research Agendas

This chapter has cautioned against attributing the crisis of citizenship either solely or primarily to globalization. As Kymlicka observes, many of citizenship's discontents '... predate the current wave of globalization' (Kymlicka 1999: 116). This is not to deny that globalization is implicated in this crisis but rather to suggest that its role may not be pivotal. It is unlikely, for instance, that should the current financial crisis tip the world into a period of deglobalization then this would necessarily improve the condition of citizenship. The causal pathology is much more complex. In this respect we take issue with the claim that globalization is a 'key culprit' in the decline of citizenship. Indeed, its impacts have been contradictory insofar as it has contributed to both a narrowing (from social to neoliberal citizenship) and a broadening of citizenship (from national to global) both as an institution and a practice. In the process the limits to citizenship have been exposed. However, the role of globalization in constituting or transforming these limits invites further study.

Some of the gaps in current research have been discussed in the previous section. At the risk of repetition, three aspects of the current study of globalization and citizenship deserve further development. First, the whole issue of the causal mechanisms and the causal significance of globalization in explaining the crisis of citizenship requires further reflection. This suggests both multi-country quantitative studies (of the relationship between global trends and citizenship decline) as well as more comparative country studies. Second, more historical scholarship is required both to calibrate more rigorously evidence of decline but also, more important, to examine earlier phases of nineteenth and twentieth-century globalization and the emergence and consolidation of national citizenship regimes. Third, given the restricted focus in much of this literature on a small number of western states, there would be much value in extending the scope of comparisons to include countries from other regions, especially Latin America and Asia.