Jappy, Tony. "Notes." *Peirce's Twenty-Eight Classes of Signs and the Philosophy of Representation: Rhetoric, Interpretation and Hexadic Semiosis*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017. 144–161. Bloomsbury Advances in Semiotics. *Bloomsbury Collections*. Web. 26 Apr. 2023. <<http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781474264860.0007>>.

Downloaded from Bloomsbury Collections, www.bloomsburycollections.com, 26 April 2023, 14:30 UTC.

Copyright © Tony Jappy 2017. Released under a CC BY-NC-ND licence (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/>). You may share this work for non-commercial purposes only, provided you give attribution to the copyright holder and the publisher, and provide a link to the Creative Commons licence.

Notes

Placeholder for back of book note content Introduction

- 1 From R343, 1902, and quoted in Fisch (1983: xxvii).
- 2 The *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition* (1982–), Peirce Edition Project (Eds), Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Volume Eight, the latest in the series, covers the period 1890–1892.
- 3 ‘[T]he numerical spinning of classes of signs is most confusing, and I suspect, like Gary Sanders (1970), that attempts to detail all classes of signs is counter-productive.’ Spinks (1991: 235n).
- 4 ‘The final typology adds four new trichotomies, bringing the total to 10. However, although the final typology is an interesting experiment, it is rather underdeveloped and tentative in Peirce. For this reason, and for the reason that the most detailed classification of signs is associated with the interim typology, focus on the 1903 typology might be the most fruitful.’ Liszka (1996: 35).
- 5 Although it does reappear as one of four supplementary divisions of the 66-class system.
- 6 Peirce’s terminology varied between ‘semiotic’ and ‘semeiotic’, but I have retained the more usual term ‘semiotics’ in this study.

Chapter 1

- 1 It was, in fact, finalized in the first few months of 1904 but this is of little consequence since Peirce expanded the system to six correlates the following October.
- 2 In the manuscript R465 there are no commas in the final sentence but it has uppercase T, P and R, which the editors of the *Collected Papers* have ‘corrected’. I have retained the original spelling and punctuation.
- 3 ‘As to my terminology, I confine the word representation to the operation of a sign or its relation to the object for the interpreter of the representation.’ (CP 1.540, 1903)
- 4 For the reader not familiar with Peirce the *Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic* was a pamphlet published as a supplement to the lectures themselves. It ran to 23 pages and consequently omitted much of the material of the lectures.

- 5 'Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic. A definition of a sign will be given which no more refers to human thought than does the definition of a line as the place which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time. Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C. It is from this definition, together with a definition of "formal", that I deduce mathematically the principles of logic. I also make a historical review of all the definitions and conceptions of logic, and show, not merely that my definition is no novelty, but that my non-psychological conception of logic has virtually been quite generally held, though not generally recognized' (NEM4 20–21, 1902).
- 6 See, too, Peirce (1982: xxxiii).
- 7 Max Fisch, Introduction to *Writings, Volume One*, page xxxiii, and (1986: 338–341).
- 8 Quotations from the *Critique of Pure Reason* are by reference to Meiklejohn's 1855 translation of the second edition (1787), the text used by Peirce himself, and not by the more conventional reference to the A and B page numbers of, respectively, the first and second editions.
- 9 Later to be titled 'phaneroscopy', which studies the 'phaneron'. This, Peirce suggests, bears similarities to the 'ideas' of, for example, a philosopher like Locke: see CP 1.285. Peirce also referred to the science as 'ideoscopy' in a letter to Lady Welby, and to the categories as 'cenopythagorean', that is, determined by number (SS 23–24, 1904).
- 10 Peirce had suggested as early as 1866 that Kant's deduction of the categories from the faculty of judgement is flawed in that there is no guarantee that the table of judgements itself is correct (cf. W1 351).
- 11 Peirce never actually proved the theorem, but cf. Herzberger (1981).
- 12 'And so you will find out that it is a universal rule that to have a *testing art* we need no other knowledge than a *classifying science*. And, accordingly, if we wish to be able to test arguments, what we have to do, is to take all the arguments we can find, scrutinize them and put those which are alike in a class by themselves and then examine these different kinds and learn their properties. Now the classificatory science of reasons so produced is the science of Logic.' (W1 359)
- 13 By 'ground' Peirce seems to mean qualitative continuity: 'The *ground* is the self abstracted from the concreteness which implies the possibility of another.' (CP 1.556, 1867)
- 14 Peirce himself likened the cognitive process to dipping a triangle apex-first into water. Before the triangle touches the water, there is no cognition, but subsequently, the lines drawn by the water on the triangle represent degrees of ever-increasing 'liveliness'. There is no first line, and as each successive line is greater, each successive cognition more lively than the one before. Cf. CP 5.263 (1868).

- 15 'Thought, however, is in itself essentially of the nature of a sign. But a sign is not a sign unless it translates itself into another sign in which it is more developed' (CP 5.594, 1898). Note that although Locke does not state the matter in such terms, by making ideas the signs of other ideas, he anticipates Peirce's theory of the interpretant as expounded in the early years of the century.
- 16 Cf., too, 'The easiest of those which are of philosophical interest is the idea of a sign, or representation. A sign stands *for* something *to* the idea which it produces, or modifies. Or, it is a vehicle conveying into the mind something from without. That for which it stands is called its *object*; that which it conveys, its *meaning*; and the idea to which it gives rise, its *interpretant*. The object of representation can be nothing but a representation of which the first representation is the interpretant. But an endless series of representations, each representing the one behind it, may be conceived to have an absolute object at its limit. The meaning of a representation can be nothing but a representation. In fact, it is nothing but the representation itself conceived as stripped of irrelevant clothing. But this clothing never can be completely stripped off; it is only changed for something more diaphanous. So there is an infinite regression here. Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another representation to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series.' (NEM4 309–10, 1894?)
- 17 Titled respectively, 'Sundry Logical Conceptions' and 'Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations, as Far as They are Determined'.
- 18 'By an application of Categorical, I show that the primary division of logic should be into Stechiology [Speculative grammar], Critic and Methodetic.' Memoir 13 (NEM4 21, 1902).
- 19 Jakobson ([1965] 1971).
- 20 Marty (nd.).
- 21 Deely (2014): 'Appendix A: Table and Texts of the 85 Peirce Definitions of Sign in Chronological Order'.

Chapter 2

- 1 Some unpublished material in this chapter was presented at the Charles S. Peirce International Centennial Congress in Lowell in September 2014, and at the International Symposium on Cultural and Communication Semiotics, Sichuan University, Chengdu, China, in July, 2015.
- 2 Cf., too, this by Max Fisch: 'We may add now that logic also is a classificatory science .... and that in his own lifetime as a whole, he devoted more labor to the classification of signs than to any other single field of research.' (1982: xxii)

- 3 Short (2007: 191), suggests that the two objects have their origin in the work of the Stoics. Cf. 'It will do no harm to note here that philosophists are in the habit of distinguishing two objects of many signs, the immediate and the real. The former is an image, or notion, which the interpreter is supposed to have already formed in his mind before the sign is uttered.' (R318 399–401, 1907)
- 4 Cf., too: 'Objects of many signs: the immediate and the real object. The former is the notion the interpreter is presumed already to have of the object.' (R318 529, 1907)
- 5 'The thought-sign stands for its object in the respect which is thought; that is to say this respect is the immediate object of consciousness in the thought, or, in other words, it is the thought itself, or at least what the thought is thought to be in the subsequent thought to which it is a sign.' (EP1 38–39, 1868)
- 6 'Now the reason why there should be three meanings but only two objects must lie in the difference between the nature of the relation of the one and the other to the sign. The principal difference of this kind is that the object, being the determining cause of the sign, is previous to it, while the meaning, or interpretant, being determined by the sign as its essential effect, is subsequent to it. This sought for something must be of a mental nature, because such is the nature of the sign.' (R318 407–409, 1907)
- 7 It is difficult to date this particular page and typology. It occurs on the verso of page 239 dated 10 July 1903 (H450), facing a similar hexadic typology on 240r (H451) dated 7 August 1904. Peirce seems to have added it after the August typology, which is why I have added a question mark. In any case, it is obvious it is from 1904 and not 1903.
- 8 See, for a different point of view, Joseph Ransdell's essay 'On the Use and Abuse of the Immediate/Dynamical Object Distinction' on the Arisbe site: <http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/useabuse.htm> (Accessed March 2016).
- 9 Note that an intervening classification of 7 August 1904 (R339, 240r (H451)) sets out the divisions as **(S), Oi, S–Od, Ii, Id, If** (the latter is referred to as 'signified interpretant' in the typology), with the three interpretants relating to different ways of distinguishing between rheme, dicent and argument. **S–Od** is the only relational division in this typology.
- 10 Note that Peirce appears to be inconsistent at this point, although it is more likely that the sentence is simply elliptical. The general introduction to the typology reads: 'Now signs may be divided as to their own material nature, as to their relations to their objects, and as to their relations to their interpretants' (CP 8.333), but he refers to the **Oi** division as though it is independent: 'In respect to its immediate object a sign ... [Emphasis added]' (CP 8.336). References to this division will simply show the relation **S–Oi** as in Figure 2.1.

- 11 Cf. R793 9, which reads 'this triadic relation being such as to determine C to be in a relation ...'
- 12 The actual quotation is from pages numbered by Peirce as '26' and '27', but the sequences themselves are numbers 39 and 40 out of eighty-one pages of manuscript. The two objects in each case refer to the immediate and dynamic objects: '-killed-' is composed of two partial objects and therefore has two dynamic and two immediate objects in each place-marker; the second, a monad, had one dynamic and one immediate object.
- 13 'But if my words (can) be the seed (of infamy's fruit) ...'
- 14 The page is numbered '14' by Peirce but the quotation appears on sequence 17 of the manuscript.
- 15 In 1903 'seme' was an alternative term for the index (CP 2.283).
- 16 'From the summer of 1905 to the same time in 1906, I devoted much study to my ten trichotomies of signs.' (CP 8.363, 1908)
- 17 Hardwick (SS 35n) notes that the order in the last two trichotomies of the hexad of 12 October 1904 is unusual for Peirce. This is because subsequently Peirce opted for an ordering of the divisions based upon the 'order of occurrence' of the correlates in semiosis.
- 18 Extracts from this draft are to be found in two pages of EP2 196–197, and seven in SS 195–201.
- 19 Note that the page numbers in the references are those of Peirce himself.
- 20 EP2 544 n22.
- 21 'Analysis of the 76 definitions of the sign' <http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/resources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM> (Accessed March 2016).
- 22 Cf., too, the entry in the Logic Notebook for 30 January 1906: 'A sign is a species of medium for intercommunication' (R339 271r (H515)).
- 23 See, too, Bergman (2009: 128–129) for a discussion.
- 24 Cf. EP2 407 for a similar remark.
- 25 But see, too, 'It seems best to regard a sign as a determination of a quasi-mind; for if we regard it as an outward object, and as addressing itself to a human mind, that mind must first apprehend it as an object in itself, and only after that consider it in its significance; and the like must happen if the sign addresses itself to any quasi-mind. It must begin by forming a determination of that quasi-mind, and nothing will be lost by regarding that determination as the sign.' (EP2 391, 1905)
- 26 A slightly different version of the concept of the commens is to be found in the 'Prolegomena' text of 1906: 'Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer* and a *Quasi-interpreter*; and although these two are at one (i.e. are one mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, welded. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should be dialogic.' (CP 4.551, 1906)

- 27 See the table for August 31, 1906, in the Appendix.
- 28 Cf. 'and more than these ten I don't enquire into, not because I don't think they are in truth there, but simply because it will be all I possibly can do to *define* and to *prove* these ten'. (R339 360r (H674))
- 29 See Liszka (1996: 120–123) for a useful discussion of the problem.
- 30 'Eventual' and 'normal' are terms to which he returns on consecutive days in December 1908 (CP 8.344, 8.372).
- 31 R339 271r (H515), 30 January 1906.

Chapter 3

- 1 The **S–Ii** division is one that Peirce subsequently dropped.
- 2 The letter is also reproduced in EP2 478–81.
- 3 'Traditionally the three modes of being are possibility, actuality, and necessity, and it was natural that Peirce should have tried to correlate his categories with the classic triad (6.342) The correlation, however leaves much to be desired. There is no problem in matching Secondness with actuality, but Firstness and Thirdness do not correspond easily with possibility and necessity ... Thus any First is a description of a possible object. But if this is all that is meant, it is obvious that there are two kinds of possibility – relational and nonrelational – so the possibility is not confined to Firstness but must be reintroduced in the other categories as well. In respect to Thirdness and necessity the lack of correlation is even more obvious. Peirce seeks to justify his position by arguing that just as the logical verb reappears in metaphysics as quality, and the individual subject as a thing, "so the logical reason, or premiss, reappears in metaphysics as a reason, an *ens* having a *reality* consisting in a ruling both of the outward and the inward world, as its mode of being" (CP 1.515).' Murphey (1993: 394).
- 4 Note, too, the rather curious entry in R339 concerning Peirce's cosmological investigations in 1908, the year of 'The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God': 'Scheme of a Series of Papers, On the Cosmology of the Here and Hereafter .... I now state the purpose of these papers. It is to show what logic demands that our hypotheses should be in order to explain the most general phenomena of the three Universes, in view of what science has hitherto brought to light and assuming that we are sometimes able to communicate with the dead, and in view of the general nature of such apparent communications. I mean, especially that 999 out of' [incomplete], R339 305v (H569), 2 September 1908.
- 5 The designation 'token' had already been introduced in 1885 along with index and icon, but as an alternative to 'symbol': 'A sign is in a conjoint relation to the thing denoted and to the mind ... Such signs are always abstract and general, because

habits are general rules to which the organism has become subjected. They are, for the most part, conventional or arbitrary. They include all general words, the main body of speech, and any mode of conveying a judgment. For the sake of brevity I will call them *tokens*.' (CP 3.360)

- 6 Cf., too, a letter to William James (EP2 497).
- 7 Stjernfelt suggests that what Peirce means by this rather surprising reservation is that the immediate object necessarily leaves part of the dynamic object unspecified (2014: 99). Since the immediate object acts as a filter in the sequence, and determines which parts of the dynamic object 'reach' the sign, this seems a very plausible explanation.
- 8 In his analysis of the 70-plus definitions of the sign, Robert Marty distinguishes between the original three correlates of the triadic relation as 'global triadic' and the later six-element definition as being 'analytic triadic'. See his very useful 'Analysis of the 76 definitions of the sign' <http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/resources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM> (Accessed March 2016).
- 9 The order in the case of the three 'additional' divisions being **S–Od**, **S–Id**, **S–Od–If**, and **S–If**.
- 10 It must be understood that Peirce did not isolate the six correlates in this way, they were included in the ten, but in a problematic order. Nor did he ever set out a table in this 'orthogonal' manner.
- 11 The icon-index-symbol division is one of four divisions appended to the description of the hexad in the 23 December letter (SS 84–85), and becomes the fourth trichotomy in the ten Peirce describes in the draft of 25 December 1908 (EP2 489).
- 12 Andrew Diversey, personal communication.
- 13 Here again, as with Savan, the order presented for Lieb by Hardwick depends crucially upon how we interpret the terms 'destinate' and 'explicit': for Weiss and Burks, for Lieb and for the position adopted in this book, the terms correspond, respectively, to immediate and final. Diversey (2014), like Savan, has mistakenly inverted the order.
- 14 Cf. CP 8.347, where he is describing actisigns, this particular draft's version of the token: 'B. *Actisigns*, or Objects which are Signs as Experienced *hic et nunc*; such as any single word in a single place in a single sentence of a single paragraph of a single page of a single copy of a book. There may be repetition of the whole paragraph, this word included, in another place. But that other occurrence is not this word. The book may be printed in an edition of ten thousand; but THIS word is only in my copy.' In other words, the legisign – replica distinction of 1903 seems to have been, if not completely discarded, at least neutralized temporarily.

- 15 Savan quoted Peirce from Buchler's selection (Buchler [1940] 2011), presumably for copyright reasons. In this instance the reference to Buchler 275–276 corresponds to CP 5.473.
- 16 See Chapter 2, n 7.
- 17 Cf. *OED*, entry 'Destinate: 2.2 Set apart for a particular purpose; ordained; intended'.
- 18 Within his later systems, in which the type/instance distinction seems less important (CP 8.347), the noun could conceivably have been placed at existent 'level', so to speak, as a token. In CP 8.359 he maintains the distinction between the 'general' word and its instances. Note, too, that it is immaterial whether the immediate object division precedes or follows that of the dynamic. It is the interpretant sequence determined by a possible dynamic object which counts.
- 19 This was the reasoning I suggested in Jappy (1985), and thirty years later I see no reason to change my point of view.
- 20 'The verbal expression "If—, then—" is a Famisign, as all words are (in the sense in which two that are just alike are the very same "word").' (CP 8.359)
- 21 Peirce had already used this denomination in the typology of 31 August 1906 (Table 8 in the Appendix).
- 22 The justification given for the contents of this particular division is to be found in the preceding paragraphs, given here (CP 8.346): 'I. A Sign is necessarily in itself present to the Mind of its Interpreter. Now there are three entirely different ways in which Objects are present to minds:
First, in themselves as they are in themselves. Namely, Feelings are so present. At the first instant of waking from profound sleep when thought, or even distinct perception, is not yet awake, if one has gone to bed more asleep than awake in a large, strange room with one dim candle. At the instant of waking the *tout ensemble* is felt as a unit. The feeling of the skylark's song in the morning, of one's first hearing of the English nightingale.
Secondly, the sense of something opposing one's Effort, something preventing one from opening a door slightly ajar; which is known in its individuality by the actual shock, the Surprising element, in any Experience which makes it *sui generis*. Thirdly, that which is stored away in one's Memory; Familiar, and as such, General.'
- 23 See Chapter 2, n 10.
- 24 Savan has suggested convincingly that Peirce was influenced at this stage by the Greek concept of 'καλος' (1988: 64).
- 25 Remember that in 1908 the earlier distinction between sinsign and replica of a legisign is less rigorously stated since the token doubles for both, in spite of some references to 'instances' (compare CP 8.345 and CP 8.347, for example).

Chapter 4

- 1 'Resemblance is an identity of characters; and this is the same as to say that the mind gathers the resembling ideas together into one conception' (CP 1.365, c. 1890).
- 2 Even before working on the various drafts for the Lowell Lectures on logic, Peirce had already envisaged employing the categories to trichotomize the icon in his Harvard Lectures on pragmatism presented earlier in the year: 'Now the *Icon* may undoubtedly be divided according to the categories; but the mere completeness of the notion of the icon does not imperatively call for any such division. For a pure icon does not draw any distinction between itself and its object. It represents whatever it may represent, and whatever it is like, it in so far is. It is an affair of suchness only' (CP 5.74, 1903).
- 3 There is also an earlier version of this particular statement: 'Icons may be distinguished, though only roughly, into those which [represent] are icons in respect to the qualities of sense, being *images*, and those which are icons in respect to the dyadic relations of their parts to one another being *diagrams* or dyadic analogues, and those which are icons in respect to their intellectual characters, being *examples*' (Lattmann 2012, 536n2). According to André de Tienne, director of the Peirce Edition Project (personal communication), the passage is not a variant, as Lattmann suggests, but is in fact part of a text that precedes the composition of what was published as CP 2.277. I assume, therefore, that Peirce preferred the version to be found in volume two of *The Essential Peirce* (274) and the *Collected Papers* and which I have quoted in the main text.
- 4 'Slaughter-house workers' would have been more appropriate but would have complicated Figure 4.5. Hence 'butchers'.
- 5 See chapter five of Jappy (2013) for a fuller discussion.
- 6 It would be irrelevant to give the details of this linguistic movement here, but the interested reader can consult Jappy (1999) and references.
- 7 Note that it has to be a universe of existence; otherwise we should be unable to perceive it. A universe of necessitants would be invisible, and a universe of ideas and qualities would be an indefinite chaos.
- 8 The notion was not entirely new: 'All propositions relate to the same ever-reacting singular; namely, to the totality of all real objects. It is true that when the Arabian romancer tells us that there was a lady named Scherherazade, he does not mean to be understood as speaking of the world of outward realities, and there is a great deal of fiction in what he is talking about. For the *fictive* is that whose characters depend upon what characters somebody attributes to it; and the story is, of course, the mere creation of the poet's thought. Nevertheless, once he has imagined Scherherazade and made her young, beautiful, and endowed with a gift of spinning

- stories, it becomes a real fact that so he has imagined her, which fact he cannot destroy by pretending or thinking that he imagined her to be otherwise. What he wishes us to understand is what he might have expressed in plain prose by saying, "I have imagined a lady, Scherherazade by name, young, beautiful and a tireless teller of tales, and I am going on to imagine what tales she told." This would have been a plain expression of professed fact relating to the sum total of realities' (CP 5.152, 1903). The association seems to have been inspired initially by his work on the graphs. See, for example, CP 4.421 of 1903.
- 9 A figure much favoured by Dylan Thomas: 'Fern Hill' begins with a number of cases.
  - 10 See, for example, Jerry Uelsmann's contemporary art photography in Uelsmann et al. (2013).
  - 11 If the analysis is correct, the photograph is a gratific, concussive, collective copulant token, a rather soulless label for such a magnificent image.
  - 12 The image is set, in fact, in the City of London's financial district. The portrait is first made in the studio and then mapped digitally onto settings like the one in *Flower Seller*. For a general introduction to the series the reader can consult, as I have, Professor Mark Durden's essay on how Goto's tableaux subvert conventional documentary photography: Mark Durden, 'Mixed Messages: Disordering Documentary' <http://www.johngoto.org.uk/essays/%20Gilt%20City%20essay/Durden.htm> (Accessed March 2016).
  - 13 Sontag (1977).
  - 14 Briefly, shifters are verbal items whose meaning is determined by their relation to a 'deictic centre' composed of speaker, place and time of utterance. In other words, instead of there being a reference in the utterance to something outside the utterance, the reference is to the act of uttering. This relation is obviously existential, hence their classification by Peircean linguists as lexical. Peirce himself suggests that an index is a sign of 'direct experience so far as it directs attention to an Object' (CP 2.255). See, too, CP 2.287–290, for a detailed discussion and examples.
  - 15 'Simulacra and Simulations', from Jean Baudrillard, *Selected Writings*, Mark Poster (ed.), Stanford; Stanford University Press (1988: 166–184).
  - 16 Similarly, Barbara Kruger was to subvert and at the same time emasculate, so to speak, the existential power of the index by photographing other peoples' photographs, generally from the 1950s, and placing lines of text on them, a strategy which destroys their deictic character by lowering their indexical status in the hierarchy and turning them into icons. We see, then, that although the photograph is a truly indexical medium, the existential nature of the relation holding between model and camera is, in fact, anything but tyrannical.

- 17 Lakoff and Johnson (1980) was *the* groundbreaking study in the field, and it showed how combinations of the universes of everyday experience contributed to the construction and production of metaphor.
- 18 Cf. CP 6.338–348 and EP2 478–79.

Chapter 5

- 1 As mentioned in the Acknowledgements, some of the ideas in this chapter were worked out in a paper published in *Semiotics and Language Studies*, Volume 1, No. 4, 2015 (Jappy 2015).
- 2 It is an ‘icon of dissent’ (2007: 148).
- 3 The National Gallery Podcast: Episode 81, July 2013. <http://www.nationalgallery.org.uk/podcasts/the-national-gallery-podcast-episode-eighty-one> (Accessed March 2016). The extract from the podcast and the painting itself can be seen in Jappy (2015: 2).
- 4 <http://www.nationalgallery.org.uk/paintings/jan-miense-molenaer-a-young-man-and-woman-making-music> (Accessed March 2016).
- 5 Peirce did not, of course, suggest that symbols were fixed once and for all. ‘Symbols grow’, he wrote in 1894 (EP2 10). In 1903 he made the following remark: ‘For every symbol is a living thing, in a very strict sense that is no mere figure of speech. The body of the symbol changes slowly, but its meaning inevitably grows, incorporates new elements and throws off old ones ... Every symbol is, in its origin, either an image of the idea signified, or a reminiscence of some individual occurrence, person or thing, connected with its meaning, or is a metaphor’ (CP 2.222). This does not mean, however, that it can represent two distinct objects at the same time as a theory of indirection requires: for this we really need the distinction between immediate and dynamic object.
- 6 EP2 300.
- 7 If Short had investigated the hypoicons, metaphor in particular, he might not have made this statement.
- 8 Short’s remark is possibly due in part to the fact that Peirce uses the term ‘immediate object’ in at least three distinct manners. The first is the familiar semiotic distinction that he made in 1908 between the dynamic and immediate objects of any sign and is an important subject of the present study. The second, earlier, conception was used in a metaphysical sense in relation to cognition in general: ‘Every cognition involves something represented, or that of which we are conscious, and some action or passion of the self whereby it becomes represented. The former shall be termed the objective, the latter the subjective, element of the cognition. The cognition itself is an intuition of its objective element, which may

therefore be called, also, the immediate object' (CP 5.238, 1868), while almost forty years later, as in this extract from 'Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism,' he was to write: 'The Immediate Object of all knowledge and all thought is, in the last analysis, the Percept. This doctrine in no wise conflicts with Pragmaticism, which holds that the Immediate Interpretant of all thought proper is Conduct' (CP 4.539, 1906). The third is confusing, and seems to be a mirror image of the immediate interpretant inasmuch as it is the idea or notion the interpreter of, say, a verbal utterance is supposed by the utterer to have of the dynamic object of the utterance: 'Objects of many signs; the immediate and the real object. The former is the notion the interpreter is presumed already to have of the object' (R318 529 and also at R318 401, 1907). This comes from the complex 'Pragmatism' text in which Peirce is principally concerned with conceptions for which, as we saw in Chapter 2, he suggested in his pursuit of the logical interpretant that the dynamic and immediate objects were the determinants of the energetic and emotional interpretants, respectively.

- 9 Note, however, when a label such as 'Nocturne' or 'Serenade' or 'Symphony No. 9' is attached to them, the classification, even in hexadb, would be different.
- 10 'The different members of the set which is the object of a verb, – its *partial* objects as they may be called, – often have distinctive characters which are the same for large numbers of verbs' (R318 627, 1907).
- 11 The Gallery label describes the mural thus: **'Emanuel Leutze's mural celebrates the western expansion of the United States.** A group of pioneers and their train of covered wagons are pictured at the continental divide, looking towards the sunset and the Pacific Ocean. The border depicts vignettes of exploration and frontier mythology. Beneath the central composition is a panoramic view of their destination "Golden Gate," in San Francisco Bay. The mural's title is a verse from the poem "On the Prospect of Planting Arts and Learning in America" by Bishop George Berkeley (1685–1753)' <http://americanart.si.edu/collections/search/artwork/?id=14569> (Accessed March 2016).
- 12 <http://www.aoc.gov/capitol-hill/other-paintings-and-murals/westward-course-empire-takes-its-way> (Accessed March 2016).
- 13 The coloured original can be seen here: <http://www.philamuseum.org/collections/permanent/308328.html> (Accessed March 2016).
- 14 Turner (1893), 'The Significance of the Frontier in American History' (PDF). <http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/pds/gilded/empire/text1/turner.pdf> (Accessed March 2016).
- 15 Within the 10-class system all three would be classified as replicas of dicent indexical legisigns with their respective captions, and iconic sinsigns without. To identify what they represent, we have to have recourse to the 1908 hexad.

- 16 <http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=usde;cc=usde;rgn=full%20text;idno=usde0006-4;didno=usde0006-4;view=image;seq=0350;node=usde0006-4%3A6> (Accessed March 2016).
- 17 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Lady_of_Shalott (Accessed March 2016).
- 18 <http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/waterhouse-the-lady-of-shalott-n01543> (Accessed March 2016).
- 19 <http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/egg-past-and-present-no-1-n03278> (Accessed March 2016).
- 20 <http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/hunt-the-awakening-conscience-t02075/text-summary> (Accessed March 2016).
- 21 <http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/stanhope-thoughts-of-the-past-n03338> (Accessed March 2016).
- 22 See Roberts (1972) for a review of how Victorian artists portrayed the often severely restricted roles Victorian society reserved for women, and the retribution visited on the poor creatures who failed to respect them by stony-hearted fathers and husbands.
- 23 It should be noted that 'ideology' was not a term that Peirce used – his version was the first branch of philosophy and was variously titled 'phenomenology' and 'phaneroscopy' (he follows the French 'Idéologues' from the French Revolution and their 'science of ideas') and was oriented towards 'conventional' phenomenology.
- 24 <http://www.johngoto.org.uk/summer/8.htm> (Accessed March 2016).