Tully, James. "On Global Citizenship: Replies to Interlocutors." *On Global Citizenship: James Tully in Dialogue*. By James Tully. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014. 269–328. *Bloomsbury Collections*. Web. 26 Apr. 2023. <<http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781472544827.ch-009>>.

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On Global Citizenship: Replies to Interlocutors

James Tully

1. Introduction

I am humbled and grateful beyond words to the authors of this edited volume for their outstanding chapters on various aspects of local and global citizenship.¹ Each contribution raises issues that advance our understanding of this immensely complex and important field of practice and research on which living democracy, peace, social justice and ecological well-being depend here and now and in the future. It is a great privilege to be asked to respond and a daunting task to do so. I cannot hope to reply to all the rich insights the authors bring to light from different perspectives. Rather, I would like to comment on the challenging arguments that have enabled me to see the mistakes and limits of the tentative sketch I offered in *On Global Citizenship* and the *Afterword*. In my responses I have tried to show how mistakes can be corrected, questions addressed, limits overcome and how we might work together in moving forward. Echoing the spirit of Duncan Bell's concluding paragraph, I hope this dialogue becomes part of an ongoing reciprocal elucidation of practices of local and global citizenship among scholars and active citizens around the world: that is, an engaged public philosophy for our times.

¹ For the sake of simplicity I will refer to 'local and global citizenship' as 'global' citizenship hereafter.

Public philosophy

I would like to begin with a short note on the type of public philosophy I employ in the study of global citizenship. The contributors bring out several features of it with great clarity by contrasting it with other better-known approaches. Laden, Celikates and Mason contrast it with civil philosophy and ideal theory; Honig and Stears with Raymond Geuss's realism and their own agonistic realism; Norval with Ernesto Laclau's method; Bell with republican and other historical-critical approaches; and Dunn and Owen with institution-based theory. To expand just slightly, public philosophy as I practice it is a type of academic research that aims to enter into interdisciplinary dialogues of mutual learning not only with other academics but also with citizens of the world, in the broadest sense of this polysemic term, who are engaged in the problems and struggles we are trying to understand. Researchers listen to and learn from the often marginalized or silenced ways that those suffering from injustices experience and articulate them and the practices of reasoning and acting together they develop in response. Reciprocally, researchers bring to the discussion academic research that throws critical light on the problematic situation by explicating its history and contemporary configuration, and which helps to disclose and clarify the range of possible ways of thinking and acting in relation to it. As Michael Temelini puts it, rather than 'talking about' what citizens can or should do, this approach consists in 'talking with' citizens in dialogues of reciprocal enlightenment.²

Civil and civic citizenship

In addition to the exploration of a multiplicity of local and global practices of citizenship in the introductory essay, I also attempt to

² M. Temelini, 'Dialogical Approaches to Political Struggles over Recognition and Distribution', *Critical Review of Social and Political Philosophy*, 13 April 2013. For a more detailed explanation see J. Tully, *Public Philosophy in a New Key, Two Volumes*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, Volume I, chapters 1–3.

explicate two very general action-guiding modes of disclosure of the field or 'world' of citizenship under which these practices are experienced by citizens and studied by researchers.³ For historical and philological reasons I call these civil and civic modes of citizenship, but also representative and cooperative (direct), modern and diverse, institutional and activity-based and so on when I draw attention to their specific features. I would like to present a brief synopsis of my lengthy account of civil and civic citizenship in *On Global Citizenship* before responding to the questions about them.

Civil citizenship discloses the field of global citizenship as constituted by the legal, political and economic rights and duties, institutions and processes of historical development of modern states with representative governments, the international system of states under international law, the institutions of global governance and the traditions of democratic theory that have developed forms of critical reflection on these rights, institutions and processes. Civil citizenship exists within these rights, institutions and processes. Civil citizens participate by exercising their communicative powers in elections, political parties, deliberation in official public spheres and civil disobedience with the hopes of exercising influence on elected representatives who exercise governmental power through legislative deliberation and law-making. The laws are seen as imperatives enforced by coercion that can be justified to citizens or challenged by them in the courts and public spheres. This model is standardly seen as a universal model of citizenship and democracy in the civil tradition.

Civic citizenship discloses the field in a much broader and pluralistic manner, even taking the self-organization of the ecosphere as the commonwealth of all forms of life in which human citizenship has its home. The institutional form of modern representative civil

³ I refer to these two modes of citizenship here as action-guiding modes of disclosure of a field of practice and study. Depending on the context, I also often use Wittgenstein's term 'picture' and Foucault's term 'form of problematization' to refer to both the languages of disclosure of a field of human experience and the activities and institutions in which it is woven. I take these three terms of art to be complementary tools of analysis of the same phenomena.

citizenship appears as one type of governor-citizen relationship among many types and even the representation of it in civil theories is seen as misrepresenting its history and the activities of citizens within it. From the civic perspective, citizenship comes into being whenever and wherever people who are subject to or affected by practices of governance become active co-agents within them; exercising the powers of having a say (negotiating) and having a hand (powers of self-organization and self-government) in and over the relationships that govern their interaction. 'Civic freedom' is the situated, relational freedom manifest in the countless activities of bringing the relationships of disputation and resolution, recognition and distribution, and action-coordination that comprise practices of governance in this broad sense under the shared democratic agency and authority of those subject to or affected by them.

The primary examples of civic citizenship are everyday practices of grass-roots political, social, economic and ecological democracy where the members discuss and exercise powers of self-organization and self-government themselves (citizen-citizen relationships) prior to any separation of ruler and ruled or governor and citizen in representative practices of government. They become citizens by democratizing or 'cooperating' their relationships of living and working together. These activities of reasoning and acting together provide the ground for civic relationships of representative government in which citizens conditionally delegate some of their powers of self-government to representatives (citizen-governor relationships). These dialogical relationships of representation extend civic practices of democratic governance from the local to the state-centred and the global. The relationships within institutions of modern representative government are acceptable insofar as they enable the exercise of civic freedom within and on them. Civic citizenship practices of these two broad types are the means by which cooperative practices of self-government can be brought into being and the means by which unjust practices of governance can be challenged, reformed and transformed by those

who suffer under them, becoming co-agents of them (practices of negotiation).

2. Anthony Simon Laden

Civil and civic authority and reasoning

Beginning with a quotation of one of my comparative synopses of these two pictures of citizenship, Laden presents a comparative explication of the different types of authority relations characteristic of civil and civic citizenship: command and connection respectively. He brings to light and analyses in detail five differentiating features of authority, as well as their contrasting features of public reasoning, in civil and civic ways of disclosing, enacting, institutionalizing and governing the world of citizenship. His explication deepens and broadens our understanding of these crucial dimensions of civil and civic citizenship beyond my analysis. I would like to discuss it first because it brings out features of civic and civil citizenship that are helpful in my responses to some of the other contributions.

As Laden notes, the authority of command of civil citizenship is the standard model of authority in general, whereas the authority of connection of civic citizenship is barely recognized, and when it is, it is not even seen as a relation of authority. Yet the authority of connection is the conversational ground of more formal types of authority. It takes a concerted effort to bracket the authority of command and bring the underlying phenomena of civic authority to reflective awareness. Laden is able to engage in this kind of phenomenology of authorizing and reasoning together because he focuses on citizenship as *activities* of citizens-being-in-the-world with each other, conversing, dissenting, challenging, reasoning and acting together for the sake of common or public good in everyday practices, and thus the corresponding relationships of authority they bring into being and sustain, or fail to do so, come into view.

He investigates authoritative relationships of connection in examples of self-government (citizen-citizen relationships) and representative government (citizen-governor relationships).⁴

This important work on authority is part of Laden's broader project of approaching practical reason, not as a faculty that constructs universally binding imperatives or discovers strategically rational means to defeat opponents, but as the underlying informal and embedded activities and interactive norms of reasoning-in-practice-with-others. Unlike civil philosophers, he also takes practical reasoning to encompass the embodied afflictive and positive emotions (such as empathy and compassion) and the human senses that connect and attune humans to each other and social and ecological lifeworlds.⁵ On this civic view, the shared authority of connection arises within everyday non-coercive and non-imperative ways of conversing and reasoning by means of open-ended proposals and responses, and acting-with others. These ways of 'working and living together' make up a complex form of life out of which more specialized forms of reasoning and authority arise and on which they depend. If, in contrast, one begins from a disembedded and formalized civil perspective, the inter-subjective world of civic citizenship inside and outside institutions of civil citizenship – 'the *praxis* of practice' – disappears from view.⁶ In taking this turn, Laden follows Hannah Arendt and others who, since the early twentieth century, have sought to recover the lifeworld of conversing, reasoning, authorizing and exercising power in concert that often goes without saying in standard accounts.⁷

One striking feature of Laden's chapter is the extent to which the authority of command pervades the relations of modern representative democracy and civil citizenship. In the transition from dictatorship to representative democracy the model of a ruler unilaterally commanding

⁴ As he points out, the seeds of representation are already present in the exchange of opinions between citizens.

⁵ Laden sets out this philosophical approach in A. S. Laden, *Reasoning: A Social Picture*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

⁶ As Adam Dunn and David Owen mention in their chapter.

⁷ For a recent survey of this field of research from Edmund Husserl to the present see E. Thompson, *Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology and the Sciences of Mind*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007.

the ruled was (and is) roundly criticized and partially abandoned. Notwithstanding, the command-obedience model of authority and the force of reason decreeing unconditionally binding imperatives (civil principles and laws) continue to inform the three elements that distinguish representative democracy from dictatorship and the five axes of authority within them that Laden explicates. These continuities of unilateral and hierarchical ruler-ruled relations are legitimated by the fiction that the people under modern representative democracy are simultaneously ruler and ruled – sovereign and subject – and thus ‘self-governing’. They impose the fundamental principles of justice and constitutional laws on themselves, and representatives legislate in accord with these principles and fundamental laws. This modern picture of civil democratic authority comes in two immensely influential forms. The people actually engage in ‘general will’ formation and obey the basic imperative laws of which they are the authors (Rousseau) or the hypothetical idea of the possibility of the ‘omnilateral’ construction and coercive imposition of the basic private and public laws on each other guides elected representatives in making laws, influenced by, but not obligated to, public sphere deliberation of civil citizens (Kant).

Laden’s chapter unsettles this standard model of representative democracy by presenting another way of thinking about the freedom and authority of citizens and governments that abjures the sovereign-subject model and the non-democratic relations it legitimates. He brings to light five features of relationships of civic freedom that render them authoritative and are genuinely reciprocal, mutual, forward-looking, distributive of authority among participants and ongoing. The resulting authoritative yet non-imperative and non-coercive relationships of mutual connection are manifestly more democratic and egalitarian than the contrasting authoritative relationships of command along all five axes. It is not too much to say that the series of contrasts in itself calls into question, and perhaps undermines, the authoritativeness of command relationships and presents a democratic alternative to them; one that is not only possible but actual, if we would only look and see. This is an important contribution to the civic tradition of Arendt and

Foucault, who, for different reasons, argued that we should reject the sovereign-subject model of citizenship if we wish to be free; and of the millions of civic citizens who have done this in practice.⁸

Moreover, Laden, like Arendt, argues that this civic way of reasoning, authorizing and exercising power together in addressing local and global injustices is not based on command or consensus, but on cooperation and contestation. Ongoing practices of agreement and disagreement, contestation and conflict, reform and transformation, take place within its shared way of life: that is, its members' commitment to challenge and to transform injustices and resolve disputes by the arts of civic engagement he describes. This shared authoritative way of life is sustained, as Wittgenstein puts it, by the creative agonistics of reciprocal disagreement and agreement both within and over its shared norms and objectives of cooperation.⁹ It is worth noting that perhaps the most successful social movement of the last 100 years, the feminist movement, brought into being and continues to sustain this tricky civic mode of ongoing cooperation, contestation and non-consensus. Feminists enact in their own self-organizations the civic freedom they seek to bring about in the hierarchical gender relationships they confront and work to transform.¹⁰

Two transformation questions

Of course, one has to bring out and analyse other types of power relations and dynamics that are present in the civic forms of reasoning and acting together. Laden discusses, especially, but not only, the governmentality or protocolic power relations in communication mediated by technologies and networks.¹¹ Furthermore, two central

⁸ On Arendt and Foucault on sovereignty, see J. Havercroft, *Captives of Sovereignty*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

⁹ See Tully, *Public Philosophy II*, chapter 2.

¹⁰ See J. Tully, 'Thinking along with Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom', unpublished presentation at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, 30 August 2008.

¹¹ See Tully, *Public Philosophy II*, chapters 3, 4 and 6, and A. Galloway, *Protocol: How Control Exists after Decentralization*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004.

questions need to be addressed. First, why and how should the most vulnerable subalterns take the risk of speaking and acting and inviting a response in the radically unequal and uncivic relationships in which they find themselves when they try to do so? Second, how is it possible to move the commanders and third-party beneficiaries of the non-democratic and unjust relationships of command that structure the world of informal imperialism in which we live, and which are backed up by vast means of legitimation, manipulation and violence, to listen and respond truthfully? That is, how can they possibly be moved to enter into relationships of connection with those they exploit and oppress and to treat these negotiations as authoritative, rather than as opportunities for dissimulation, manipulation, inclusion and assimilation or marginalization?

These two ‘transformation questions’ are raised by Bonnie Honig and Mark Stears, Robin Celikates, Aletta Norval and Duncan Bell. They are, in many respects, the classic questions of democratic citizenship. Michel Foucault, for example, found them to be at the centre of the reflection on Athenian democracy in the classical period and suggested that they have been central to the civic tradition of democracy ever since.¹² *Public Philosophy in a New Key* is a series of attempts at responses to them in different contexts and forms in which they arise. Before I respond to the contributors’ formulations of them, I will point out how Laden’s analysis of civic and civil authority complements Hannah Arendt’s analysis of civic and civil power, for my response turns in part on this important distinction.

Arendt on civil and civic power

If, as Laden argues, the standard picture of authority is the command model, then, from Arendt’s perspective, this would be because power is standardly misconstrued in terms of command in the first place. In

¹² M. Foucault, *The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France*, F. Gros, ed., New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010; and M. Foucault, *The Courage of Truth*, F. Gros, ed., New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

On Violence she argues that almost all theories and models of power are based on the command-obedience model of one individual or collective agent exercising control, directly or indirectly, over another agent.¹³ The exercise of power through the law in representative government replicates this model by construing laws as commands (imperatives) and the practical reason that discovers them and their background universal principles of justice is said to exercise the analogous unconditionally binding force of reason on the subject. This, she argues, is not a type of power at all, but rather, the confusion of power with monological relations of violence, domination and force. Power as 'power-over' self and others is modelled after the violent act by which one agent imposes its will over another and the other submits, which thereby lays the foundation for civil order, as, for example, in the influential theories of Hobbes and Kant. Prior to this violent act there is a war of all against all or antagonistic relationships. As Kant succinctly summarizes this violent and anti-democratic presupposition, man 'thus requires a master to break his self-will and force him to obey a universally valid will under which everyone can be free'.¹⁴ This then provides the prototype for the model of law as command. Modern theorists try to demarcate a difference in kind between control by violence and institutional rule by command by calling the latter 'coercion', but it remains a difference in degree, not in kind. This is why the command relationships in civil law and governance are often seen as not much more than the 'velvet glove' of force with a patina of legitimation. Thus, Arendt argues, it should not be called power at all, but force of various kinds.

This whole way of thinking about power as power-over presupposes and builds on the prior separation of ruler and ruled. In the West it has its historical origins in Plato's separation of ruler and ruled. Once this picture is accepted, it obscures and eclipses the type of power

¹³ H. Arendt, *On Violence*, New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1970. For my interpretation of Arendt on power and on violence and non-violence in this classic text, see J. Tully, 'Hannah Arendt on Violence and Nonviolence', President's lecture Series, University of Oklahoma, 25 April 2011.

¹⁴ I. Kant, 'Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose', in H. S. Reiss, ed., *Political Writings*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 41–53, and 46.

constitutive of government and citizenship in the sense of participatory democratic self-organization and self-government, since its initial conditions render non-violent and democratic self-organization and self-government impossible. The power of people to organize, reason, act and improvise together 'in concert' (i.e. without violence or a master) is what she calls 'power' in the proper sense and I call 'power-with'.

The power-with constitutive of democratic self-government is different in kind from power-over. It is the inter-subjective power people with an irreducible yet negotiable plurality of reasonable opinions of the public good bring into being and carry on non-violently by speaking and reasoning non-imperatively (exchanging persuasive stories, opinions, arguments, proposals and counter-proposals, compromises and so on) *and* by exercising powers of self-organization and self-government together in direct and representative forms of government.¹⁵ Power-with is not only different from but also incompatible with violence and the power of command. It is the power of non-violence and connection. This civic form of power and freedom is the living basis of government and citizenship. Violence, power-over and the authority of command can exact compliance and often control dissent, but they cannot bring into being the underlying cooperative and connective relationships of citizenship and governance on which power-over relations of governance depend and simultaneously occlude and devour. This complex phenomenon, Arendt argues, is illustrated in revolutions where the people withdraw their coerced cooperation in the operation of an unjust regime – in campaigns of boycott, strike, non-cooperation and acting otherwise – and the authority of the regime collapses (as in the non-violent Egyptian Spring).

Arendt's analysis of civil power-over and civic power-with seems to me to be the complement to Laden's analysis of civil and civic authority and reasoning. They both argue that power-with and authority relationships of civic freedom are the basis of the mutual understanding, trust and fraternity necessary to respond effectively to the injustices we

¹⁵ H. Arendt, 'Socrates', in J. Kohn, ed., *The Promise of Politics*, New York: Schocken, 2005.

face. And they both argue that we cannot even begin to imagine *how* to respond justly to concrete instances of injustice without entering into these dialogical relationships of mutual learning with those who suffer the injustices.¹⁶

The crisis of global citizenship

If Laden and Arendt are correct, civil and civic relationships are co-present in the institutions of modern citizenship. Civic activities are occluded and limited by the institutionalized and enframing command relationships of the civil citizenship, the separation of public reasoning from the exercise of powers of self-government and the protection of monumental concentrations of power from democratization by placing them in the private sphere, under the protection of the primary right of non-interference by the demos. These limits of the official institutions of citizen participation give rise to what I call the crisis of global citizenship. In *On Global Citizenship* and *Afterword* I show how both civil and civic citizens respond to the crisis and how the civic responses seek to address the two transformation questions.

In her response, Norval sets out a chart of these experiments in civic citizenship and critically assesses them in her chapter. Honig and Stears argue that, to be effective, civic citizens need to abandon their commitment to non-violence and be prepared to use violent means when necessary. Celikates explores civic practices of negotiation as alternatives to the limits of civil disobedience and raises the first transformation question. Bell scrutinizes all of the civic practices of negotiation and cooperation, finds them inadequate to the task of the second transformation question and recommends the use of violence. Mason probes the various ways in which civic and civil citizens can join hands and support each other. Dunn and Owen analyse the role of

¹⁶ For a complementary argument from another tradition, see M. Johnson, *Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.

three types of institutions in enabling civic participation. To these we now turn.

3. Bonnie Honig and Mark Stears

Agonistic realism

I am grateful to Bonnie Honig and Marc Stears for comparing my practice-based and dialogical approach to politics with the realism of Raymond Geuss and their own agonistic realism. I have learned a great deal from their chapter, their other works and an earlier exchange with Honig on violence and non-violence.¹⁷ I particularly appreciate the careful work of comparing and contrasting these three approaches because I am constantly testing the perspectival hypothesis of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein: that is, there is a plurality of approaches to the study of politics, each of which has its own disclosive insights and limitations and, consequently, humans learn about politics by comparing and contrasting a variety of perspectives on the aspectival world of politics.¹⁸

The main difference between Geuss's realism and my approach, according to Honig and Stears, is that I include in the 'real' not only violence, self-interest, political chicanery and instability, as do realists, but also non-violence, action in concert, mutuality in practice and justice and freedom, which realists tend to construe as always empty and dangerous 'legitimatory mechanisms' that cloak self-interested motives and actions. And, they continue, 'if realism means a commitment to describing what we see, then surely realists must concede that politics includes violence and non-violence, strife and agreement, murderousness and reasonableness'. Since I agree with this and also with the role of agonistics in politics, my approach overlaps

¹⁷ B. Honig, '[Un]Dazzled by the Ideal: Tully's Politics and Humanism in Tragic Perspective', *Political Theory* 39 (1): 131–44, 2011; J. Tully, 'Dialogue', *Political Theory* 39 (1): 145–60, 2011.

¹⁸ Tully, *Public Philosophy* I, chapter 1.

with the category they use to describe their own approach – agonistic realism – in these two respects. However, this is where the similarities end. They draw attention to a number of dissimilarities between our two approaches that set them apart.

First, Honig and Stears assert that my approach rests on a language of disclosure of the ‘factual real’ that is uncontested, whereas they argue that contestations of the real are part of politics and so of their approach. I do not see how they draw this conclusion from my work or from their own careful description of it.

My approach begins with listening carefully to those suffering the lived experience of injustices in their own ways of knowing and articulating them. This application of the norm of always listening to the other side helps to free us from our own sedimented descriptions of the real and disclose new possibilities, as they note. It brings these perspectives into dialogue and negotiation in an open-ended variety of sites with defenders of the status-quo and the best available academic research; it presents a wide variety of formal and informal democratic ways these conflicts can be provisionally resolved locally and globally, yet always open to dissent, review and renegotiation in the future.¹⁹ In this ongoing cycle of always beginning again, there is no proposition, discourse or practice that is not open to be tested by the best available testing practices, and these too are open to challenge. However, the testing of aspects of the given itself always takes place against a whole background network of presuppositions and ways of acting that cannot be called into question at the same time, since they provide the shared ground against which the norm, practice or mode of disclosure is tested. We can always turn and call into question some aspect of the ground of our testing practices, but this requires in turn some shared background practice of testing that is not in question, as a condition of intelligibility of the test or contestation, and so on, no matter how radical the challenge to the rules of the prevailing norms of contestation is, such as overthrowing them, refusing to play, and inventing a

¹⁹ Ibid., chapter 9.

new game (i.e. acting otherwise). Contestation and cooperation are equiprimordial in this interdependent sense.²⁰ Thus, the civic approach to the contestability of what is given to us as the real (or the ideal) is different from Honig and Stears's poststructural view that contestation goes all the way down.²¹

Violence and non-violence

The second difference is not in method but a fundamental difference regarding the role of violence in politics. I suggest that one defining feature of contemporary civic citizens is that they 'are learning to be non-violent game players, and one of their most important civic activities today is the teaching and practice of non-violent dispute resolution and disarmament'.²² In my writing and lectures since 2009 I have put forward for debate the best arguments and evidence for a politics of non-violence and against the violent power politics of modern states and revolutionary movements that have been advanced over the last century by the civic non-violent peace and justice movements. The preparation for and use of violence is one of the greatest injustices on the planet today. It leads to the slaughter of hundreds of millions of humans and massive destruction of the environment. Its logic is self-perpetuating and self-escalating; it is employed to protect other global social, economic, ecological and political injustices from democratic change; it draws science, technology, social science, education, funding and human cooperation away from addressing these other problems; it generates fear and hatred of others; it undermines non-violent diplomacy and dispute resolution; it requires command relationships and it has many other blowback effects on everyday life. In *On Violence* Arendt presents four good arguments that the cumulative effects of violence

²⁰ Ibid., chapter 2, and see J. Tully, 'Testing Freedom Clarified: Reply to Daniel Weinstock', *Literary Review of Canada*, February 2010.

²¹ Celikates and Bell make a similar point about the situated approach to contestation of the civic tradition. See my response to Norval for more on cooperation in this volume.

²² Tully, *On Global Citizenship*.

in the twentieth century render the further use of violence irrational and calls for fundamental change.²³ The only reason it continues to be used, she argues, is that no substitute has been found. The argument of non-violent civic theorists and practitioners from the same decade onwards is that the substitute for violence and power politics was found in the early twentieth century and has been undergoing testing and development in theory and practice ever since. It is the politics of non-violence and it has the capacity to bring about the fundamental change that is called for. My aim is to bring these case studies and arguments back into mainstream political theory and to have them tested in critical dialogues with the defenders of violence.

Honig and Stears acknowledge that traditions of non-violence exist. Within the dominant world of violent power politics, non-violent, self-organized communities exist; they have invented hundreds of techniques of non-violent agonistics for negotiating with and transforming of violent actors and regimes and bringing into being power-with relationships. Some of these have been successful and significant. This is all part of the real for them. However, they assert that violence not only exists all around us, which no one denies, but that violence must be seen as a normatively acceptable means of politics in certain circumstances, alongside non-violence, and thus a necessary feature of agonistic realism and of the realist mode of agonistic citizenship they endorse.

The view that it is normatively acceptable and strategically effective to use both violent and non-violent means to struggle for freedom, justice and peace is a distinct third mode of citizenship, different from both civic and civil citizenship. It is endorsed by Celikates, Norval and Bell as well. Agonistic realists share the acceptability of violence with both the realist and civil traditions; yet, whereas the latter restrict violence to an instrument of states, agonistic realists endorse the use of violence by agonistic citizens. I would say that these three traditions are dominant in contemporary political theory. Non-violence is rarely discussed in

²³ Arendt, *On Violence*, pp. 4–9.

mainstream political theory and the study of examples of non-violent practice is equally marginal in empirical political science.

Honig and Stears state their thesis of violence as a sometimes legitimate and effective means of political action in two different ways. First, they say that 'sometimes, non-violence is not apt' in reference to Gandhi's comment on the Palestinians use of violence in resisting overwhelming odds. However, I think this is a misinterpretation of the point Gandhi is making. Gandhi always argued that if one does not have the training, organization and courage to resist non-violently, then it is better, in terms of the virtue of courage, to resist with violence than to engage in passive non-resistance, which is cowardly. He is not saying that non-violence is not 'apt' in this case. Rather he is repeating what he says many times elsewhere. Non-violence is the tool of the strong, not of the weak, and if you do not have the courageous strength and training to overcome violent opponents with non-violent means – 'to be prepared to die, but never to kill' – then it is better (i.e. more courageous) to stand up and use violence in response to violence in some specific cases, than to be cowardly and not resist at all.²⁴

The second and seemingly most important argument for Honig and Stears is a quotation from Simon Critchley:

Violence 'is never a question of a single act, but of one's insertion into a historical process saturated by a cycle of violence and counter-violence.' Violence is always a double act 'between human subjects, subjects whose experience of violence interpolates them in a repetition effect from which they cannot free themselves.'

I do not see how this justification of the use of violence differs at all from the realist tradition of violence of Geuss and others. The standard justification of violence in modern power politics is that it is an unavoidable response to the violence of others or the preparation for violence of others, and it is undertaken only for the sake of self-defence. On this view, one must use non-violence as much as possible,

²⁴ For instance, T. Merton, ed., *Gandhi on Nonviolence*, New York, New Directions, 1964, pp. 46–7.

but nevertheless prepare for and use violence if the other prepares for violence or attacks. In times of peace, prepare for war. Yet, the reciprocal preparation for violence undercuts the mutual trust on which peaceful relations depend and generates the security dilemma, which leads to mutual distrust, fear and hatred, war preparation, arms races and indebtedness, pre-emptive or responsive violence and counter-violence, victory of one side, war preparation to defend the new regime and so on. This is precisely the logic that Critchley and other realists describe. The quotation concedes and endorses interpolation into the security dilemma logic of the 'repetition effect' of the preparation for and use of violence.²⁵

Honig and Stears put this assertion forward as if it were an uncontestable truth about the real. This not only goes against the grain of their commitment to the contestation of any aspect of the real, but the civic tradition of non-violence has contested this reigning dogma for over a century. Why can people not free themselves from subjection to this repetition effect by ethical practices of the self, non-cooperating with violence, living non-violently in their own community-based organizations and engaging in non-violent agonistics against violent opponents, when we now have examples, research and theories that show that humans can and do exercise this kind of civic freedom and change their world?

For example, Gene Sharp has shown that non-violent movements around the world have developed hundreds of techniques of non-violent agonistics that are capable of converting violent adversaries

²⁵ This security dilemma lies at the centre of the modern system of armed states and state-seeking revolutionary movements and terrorist networks and at the centre of security studies. One of the first and most incisive diagnosis of its repetitious effect and call for complete unilateral disarmament by the strongest is F. Nietzsche, 'The Means to Real Peace', in *Human, All too Human: A Book for Free Spirits*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Like Gandhi, he concludes: 'To disarm while being the best armed, out of an elevation of sensibility – that is the means to real peace, which must always rest on a disposition for peace: whereas the so-called armed peace such as now parades about in every country is a disposition to fractiousness which trusts neither itself nor its neighbor and fails to lay down its arms half out of hatred, half out of fear. Better to perish than to hate and fear, and twofold better to perish than to make oneself hated and feared – this must one day become the supreme maxim of every individual state.'

into actors willing to negotiate their differences non-violently. He has also shown that techniques of non-violent civic defence can replace armed forces. Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan have shown that these non-violent negotiation techniques, backed by broad-based participation, can be effective in transforming small and large unjust regimes, backed by violence, by examining over 300 cases in the last 100 years.²⁶ The power of non-violence, they argue, is more powerful than violence. Richard Gregg, H. J. N. Horsburgh, Joan Bondurant and Jonathan Schell – four theorists of non-violence – have explained in detail the unique transformative power of non-violent agonistics and shown how it can be used to replace violence across the board. The Dalai Lama and Thich Nhat Hahn have explicated the practices of a global ethics of negative and positive non-violence (non-harm and active compassion) as a comprehensive way of life. The non-violent movements in the Middle East and Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar have furnished yet more examples. These are authors and actors who are scarcely unfamiliar with the reality of violence and counter-violence. Yet, contra Critchley, they are able to free themselves from it in practice and theory, to put non-violence into practice and theory and to test continuously non-violent ways of being in the world.²⁷

Moreover, one of the key lessons of a century of non-violent civic agonistics is that even occasional recourse to violence has the effect of undermining the higher ethical and transformative plane that

²⁶ E. Chenoweth and M. J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2011. They examine 323 violent and non-violent cases. More than 100 cases are non-violent and roughly three-quarters of these (83 or so) are ranked as partial successes or successes (pp. 9–11).

²⁷ G. Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973; G. Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, Boston: Porter Sargent, 2005; G. Sharp, *From Dictatorship to Democracy*, 4th edn, Boston: Albert Einstein Institute, 2010; R. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, New York: Schocken, 1966; H. J. N. Horsburgh, *Non-Violence and Aggression: A Study of Gandhi's Moral Equivalent of War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968; J. V. Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989; J. Schell, *The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence and the Will of the People*, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2003; Dalai Lama, *Beyond Religion: Ethics for a Whole World*, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2011; T. Nhat Hahn, *Peace Is Every Step: The Path of Mindfulness in Everyday Life*, New York: Bantam, 1992; M. J. Stephan, ed., *Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization and Governance in the Middle East*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

non-violent actors bring into being through their non-violent interaction with violent opponents, discrediting them in the eyes of potential third-party supporters and legitimating the further use of violence by the powers-that-be. This is why violent defenders of unjust power structures routinely plant *agents provocateurs* in non-violent organizations. This first effect then tends to lead either to submission or set in motion the 'repetition effect', and the violent means then 'overwhelm the ends' as Arendt puts it.²⁸

Despite this evidence, Honig and Stears, as well as Norval and Bell, ask without further ado if Malcolm X's advocacy of violence helped, rather than harmed, the non-violent civil rights movement of Martin Luther King Jr and the supportive non-violent students' movement. Yet, Malcolm X himself said that he was a 'zombie' when he advocated violence as a member of the Nation of Islam. After his returned from Mecca in March 1964, he advocated an alliance with non-racist whites and said he was for violence only if non-violence means postponing addressing the 'American black man's problem' just to avoid violence or if it means delaying the solution.²⁹ According to the non-violent movement neither of these were the case in 1964 and violence would only delay the solution. This speech was then followed by his astonishing 'Bloodless Revolution' speech. Here he argued that all previous and contemporary revolutions have been violent, but the United States is in a unique position of being 'the first country . . . that can actually have a bloodless revolution'. The reason for this is the destructive impotence of American military power in response to popular revolts throughout the world. It is able to deliver horrendous destructiveness from the air, yet it is powerless to stop popular revolution in hearts and minds of the people, and, if necessary, in hand-to-hand combat on the ground. As Americans come to realize the futility of counter-revolutionary violence, non-violent revolution will become possible. He then went on to outline

²⁸ See the analysis in Gregg, *Nonviolence*, pp. 87–9.

²⁹ See Malcolm X: Biography, note 9, at www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/USAmalcolmX.htm.

his new strategy: black community empowerment, voter registration and education, economic self-sufficiency, independent politics and international support networks (a constructive programme).³⁰ He was brutally assassinated shortly after.

Thus, from the perspective of the civic traditions of non-violent agonistics, Honig and Stears's realist agonistics that includes both violence and non-violence appears to remain uncritically within the dominant realist tradition and to interpolate us into its cycles of violence and counter-violence. It is by disclosing the world of politics from other languages and epistemologies of the lived experience of non-violence and entering into them by imaginative empathy that we can free ourselves from the seeming inescapability of violence and disclose the possibilities and actualities of a world of non-violence. Yet, the language of agonistic realism, as it is presented in this chapter, forecloses this possibility.³¹

Civic ethics and constitutive means

Honig and Stears also suggest that I portray the civic practitioners of non-violence as acting 'as if' they have already achieved the world that they seek to build together in order to bring it about in reality. This may be an accurate description of the self-understanding of some non-violent activists, especially those who take a more instrumental attitude to non-violent means. However, I do not think it captures the phenomenology of non-violence as an ethical and political way of life as a whole – as a different mode of being-in-the-world with others. Let me try to sketch this out briefly or we are going to miss the revolutionary

³⁰ The 'Bloodless Revolution' speech is readily available on YouTube. For the new strategy see 'The African Sojourner', The Life of Malcolm X, The Malcolm X Project at Columbia University, www.columbia.edu/cu/ccbh/mxp/africa.html. For the revolutionary power of constructive programmes see my response to Bell in this volume.

³¹ For another formulation of agonistic realism that is closer to civic citizenship, see M. Stears and M. Humphrey, 'Public Reason and Political Action: Justifying Citizen Behavior in Actually Existing Democracies', *The Review of Politics* 74 (2): 285–306, 2012. I address some of their concerns about the civil tradition of public reasoning in my response to Mason in this volume.

character of non-violent politics and the challenge it poses to some fundamental assumptions of modern politics.³²

Non-violent civic citizens strive to organize, interact, exercise power together and resolve their disputes non-violently in the communities in which they live and in agonistic negotiations with violent defenders of the injustices of the world. And these two types of non-violent civic freedom are grounded in more personal practices of non-violent relations to themselves: curbing afflictive emotions, cultivating empathy and compassion, non-harm of other living beings in one's diet and relation to the living earth and so on. Of course, these three general types of non-violent practice prefigure a larger world if their activities have transformative effects beyond the small-scale practices in which they are enacted.³³ However, I do not think it is correct to say that their 'attitude' is to act 'as if' the larger non-violent world 'to come' is already actual. Rather, their ethical orientation is focused on bringing into being and carrying on a non-violent world here and now: that is, the 'world' they are actualizing in every breath and step they take.³⁴ This non-modernist mode of being and temporality is expressed in the ethical norm of 'non-attachment to ends'.

Participants do not see non-violence as a means instrumental to some future end. There is no separation of means and ends and no modernist temporality of some good 'to come' that goes along with this separation. Once these two assumptions are accepted, it is possible to think of the means as instrumentally related to an end that is different in kind from the means, and thus to argue that either non-violent or violent means can lead to a non-violent and democratic future, as in the dominant theories of global peace and justice by means of violence of Hobbes and Kant on one side and Franz Fanon and Che Guevara on the other hand. In contrast, the ethos of non-violence is that the means are everything, as the seed is to the full grown plant. Peace is

³² See Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence*.

³³ For more on these types of non-violent practice see my response to Bell in this volume.

³⁴ Nhat Hahn, *Keeping the Peace*.

not an end. Peace is the way. On this view, means are 'constitutive' rather than instrumental. Non-violent civic freedom is the only way to a non-violent and democratic future. Accordingly, practitioners are not oriented to some future to come as if it were actual. They are oriented to the present. To care for the future is to care for what one is saying and doing here and now.

To put this in the language of civic citizenship, civic citizens are committed ethically to always interacting with others as free in the civic sense: that is, as capable of entering into relationships in which they work out their differences and forms of cooperation through non-violent negotiations and contestation, even if the other initially tries to use violence to settle differences and impose cooperation. This mode of being in the world with others rules out seeking to master others. It also rules out treating others violently, since violence involves treating oneself and others as things to be manipulated and killed, no matter what end one invokes to justify this dehumanization. A defender of violent-non-violent agonistics might respond that war is a contest, so violence is nevertheless consistent with a commitment to contestation all the way down. But, this is not so. To kill the other is not to respect contestation but to end it.³⁵

On preparation

Another objection Honig and Stears, Norval and Bell raise to non-violent politics is that those who engage in it would be 'unprepared' if they trained only for the various types of non-violent dialogue. This is true. However, education in the wide variety of types of dialogue is only one important part of the world of non-violent negotiation. Non-violent civic activists prepare for agonistics with violent opponents in five main ways that I discuss in my response to Bell. Moreover, they

³⁵ And, the objective of modern violence is to avoid any actual contest of combat by technological means as much as possible. As Norval notes, this was one of Johan Huizinga's main criticisms of modern warfare in *Homo Ludens*. It is no longer a game.

prepare from an early age and in all sorts of contexts. They do this by rejecting 'Rousseau's paradox' that Honig and Stears and Norval raise.

Like many modern political theorists Rousseau assumes that humans step from a pre-civil state of nature into the general will and political society, and thus have no experience of reasoning together to form a general will or to act as good citizens. Hence the paradox.³⁶ But the picture is false. Children begin to question the rules, goals and effects of the games in which they find themselves and to negotiate their change as early as five years old. These are activities of proto-civic citizenship. Moreover, as Foucault disclosed in his historical studies of governmentality, the world is composed of practices of governance and governmentality in which humans exercise their civic freedoms to various degrees. The formal institutions of centralized states that are standardly treated as the sole realm of government and citizenship in modern political theory and practice are one small subset of these practices of governance within and beyond states. Acting for public good in building or reforming the formal institutions of states is a continuation of modes of thought and action already acquired elsewhere, either in everyday practices of governance in which proto-civic activities are encouraged or in resistances to practices where they are discouraged.³⁷

I take up further questions of violence and non-violence in the responses to follow. For all the reasons I give in these responses, I believe that the use of violence is incompatible with civic freedom and thus with civic citizenship. Although Honig and Stears's agonistic realism shares many features with the tradition of civic citizenship, the acceptance of violence makes it a distinct tradition of active citizenship, more strategic and militant and less ethical than civic. These two traditions overlap throughout the twentieth century in complex ways, but, for the reasons I give in this section and in response to Norval and

³⁶ Rousseau states the paradox in book 2, section 7 of J. Rousseau, *The Social Contract: Or Principles of Political Right*, London: Wordsworth Editions, 1998.

³⁷ Tully, *On Global Citizenship*.

Bell, it is important to distinguish them.³⁸ I am grateful to Honig and Stears for provoking me to realize this.

Treaty negotiations

In conclusion, Honig and Stears and Bell criticize me for ‘sometimes presenting treaties as transformative instruments of mutuality and not as, also and undecidably, mechanisms of domination.’ I would like comment on this because my treatment of treaties is illustrative of my practice-based and dialogical approach to the study of politics and I believe that practices of treaty negotiations are one of the most important non-violent practices for resolving disputes and coordinating the interaction of the diverse peoples of the world.

In *Strange Multiplicity* and ‘Struggles of Indigenous Peoples for and of Freedom’ I present the many ways that treaty negotiations have been abused to dispossess indigenous peoples of their traditional territories, relocate on reserve the tiny minority who survived dispossession, war and disease, and subject them to the laws of settler societies and capitalist economic development.³⁹ Perpetrators and defenders of these abuses have tried to justify them on the grounds that these ‘processes’ subdue, cultivate and improve the wild earth, by turning it into private property, and civilize pre-civil peoples, by assimilating them into civilization and modernization. These developmental stories and the impositional theories of justice that accompany them continue to be widely accepted today. It is difficult for settlers to see their basic injustice unless they can move around and see them from an indigenous perspective. Along with Taiaiake Alfred (Haudenosaunee) and Dale Turner (Anishnaabek) I spent three years at the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples listening to indigenous people tell their stories about treaties. Although

³⁸ In D. Cortright, *Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, David Cortright argues that it is one of the central tensions within European peace movements throughout the twentieth century.

³⁹ J. Tully, *Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995; Tully, *Public Philosophy* I, chapter 7.

they are perfectly aware of how the treaties have been abused and surrounded by violence, they argue that these were violations of the spirit and intent of the treaties. Treaties were used in the early 'peace and friendship' period and should be used today to settle disputes and work out non-violently forms of shared rule and separate rule over their respective territories between equal, self-governing and co-existing native and non-native peoples or nations (as in the Two Row Wampum treaty relationship). Moreover, when they criticize modern treaty processes, they do so on the grounds that these pseudo-treaty processes fail to live up to the immanent norms of practices of treaty negotiations. Once treaties are seen from both the norms immanent in treaty negotiations and indigenous understandings of the place of humans in the world, the injustice of the grand legitimations of dispossession and imposition of 'primitive accumulation' become obvious.

In contrast to the anthropocentric and impositional view of justice of the settler side, many indigenous people hold the view that justice is attunement to the normative and reciprocal gift relationships among all living beings. Humans take care of all their non-human relations and they reciprocate. These interdependent relationships of mutual care sustain life on earth: hence 'mother earth'. Justice consists in the continuous attunement of human relationships and practices to the more-than-human biological and ecological relationships in which they already participate. This is the way of life indigenous to Great Turtle Island, the 'profound America'. In contrast, relating to the living earth as private property is the fundamental injustice from which all others follow; akin to treating your mother as a thing to be owned and exploited.⁴⁰

It is difficult to imagine two more different civilizations trying to live together on one continent. How do indigenous peoples imagine that

⁴⁰ A. J. Hall, *Earth into Property: Colonization, Decolonization and Capitalism*, Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2010; J. Borrows, 'Landed Citizenship: An Indigenous Declaration of Interdependence', in *Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002; T. Alfred, 'Acknowledgements', in *Wasase: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009.

treaty negotiations can conciliate them? The answer many give is not only that treaty negotiations enable justice as imposition-modernization on settler territory and justice as attunement to continue on indigenous earth, it is also that indigenous ways of continuously trying to live in better attunement with the biotic relationships on which we depend will provide an example that settlers will come to see as less destructive than the one they brought with them. Just as importantly, indigenous people argue that participation in the non-violent relationships of treaty negotiations are themselves transformative.⁴¹ Participation in reciprocal relationships of cooperation, ceremonies, contestation, conciliation and repolishing constitutive of treaty negotiations gives participants the potentially transformative experience of interacting in civic practices that are a micro-polis of the macro-polis they inhabit as earthlings.⁴² These are non-violent ways indigenous peoples resist assimilation and try to indigenize settlers.

I wrote up this vision of treaties and showed how it could be reciprocally endorsed by non-indigenous peoples from within their Western traditions of justice, including justice as attunement, and thus provide the basis for redress of past violations and norms for future treaty negotiations.⁴³ A version of this is published in *Public Philosophy*.⁴⁴ Taiaiake and I have gone on to criticize modern treaty processes that fail to live up to the immanent standards in our writing, public speaking and lectures.⁴⁵ Thanks to centuries of contestation by indigenous peoples, the Royal Commission and many other activists and scholars, indigenous and non-indigenous, common law courts and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

⁴¹ For the transformative power of non-violence, see my response to Bell below.

⁴² R. A. Williams, *Linking Arms Together: American Indian Treaty Visions of Law and Peace 1600–1800*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

⁴³ For Western traditions of justice as receptivity and attunement, see R. Dawson, *Justice as Attunement: Transforming Constitutions in Law, Literature, Philosophy and the Rest of Life*, Oxford: Routledge, 2013.

⁴⁴ Tully, *Public Philosophy* I, chapter 8.

⁴⁵ For example, J. Tully, 'Reconsidering the BC Treaty Process', *Speaking Truth to Power: A Treaty Forum*, Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada and BC Treaty Commission, 2001, pp. 3–19.

(2007) have begun to see treaties in this way to some extent and to strike down dispossession and extinguishment treaties as invalid. Those involved in treaty negotiations, networks of civic citizens in local communities and ecologists have formed alliances with indigenous peoples in these struggles for justice with respect to land claims, self-government and the environment.⁴⁶ Many of the leading environmental and earth scientists and activists now see their new Gaia hypothesis as similar to the much older mother earth working hypothesis of indigenous peoples. These practices of decolonization face continuous resistance and require continuous civic practices of freedom within and alongside treaty negotiations to keep them going. Nevertheless, despite all the centuries of force and fraud that surround treaty negotiations and undermine indigenous ways of life, both survive and appear to be gaining strength.⁴⁷

These are the reasons I 'sometimes' mention the transformative power of non-violent treaty negotiations more than the abuses of them. I agree with Robert Williams and John Borrows that looking at treaty negotiation from this perspective brings to light the empowering history of civic agency of indigenous peoples for over 500 years, in contrast to the victimization picture of the 'mechanisms of domination' perspective.⁴⁸ Moreover, Williams argues that the non-violent practices of treaty negotiations provide a way of resolving disputes and coordinating the interaction among peoples and their diverse ways of life throughout the world that could replace the recourse to violence. In favouring this perspective, I share with Honig and Stears their admirable 'partiality' for stories that 'are most empowering for dissidents and for their shared futures of co-governance.'

⁴⁶ For examples see L. Davis, ed., *Alliances: Re/envisioning Indigenous-non-Indigenous Relationships*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010.

⁴⁷ For this qualified hypothesis, see J. Tully, 'Consent, Hegemony, and Dissent in Treaty Negotiations', in J. Webber, and C. M. Macleod, eds, *Between Consenting Peoples*, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010.

⁴⁸ Williams, *Linking Arms Together*, and J. Borrows, *Drawing out Law: A Spirit Guide*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011.

4. Aletta J. Norval

The critical and collaborative dimensions of civil and civic citizenship

Aletta Norval presents a characteristically incisive and insightful comparison of my work on global citizenship with the exciting work of Ernesto Laclau. I have learned from Laclau and Chantal Mouffe for many years and Norval's comparison enables us to see clearly the similarities and dissimilarities. Moreover, I have learned and borrowed from Norval's groundbreaking work on aversive democracy. Her summary of civic citizenship and of the specific sense of 'democracy' that I associate with it are excellent. She also raises some characteristically insightful questions that I will try to address. However, before I do so, I would like to clarify one misunderstanding concerning civil citizenship and its interrelationships to civic citizenship.

Norval claims, first, that I portray civil citizenship as uncritical and passive and, second, as dichotomous to civic citizenship. Civil citizens are neither uncritical nor passive and their participation overlaps and joins hands with civic citizenship in complex ways. Civil theorists, especially in the Critical Theory tradition, are critical of institutions and agents that fail to live up to the universal ideals of justice immanent within the institutions and processes of modernization of the modern module of citizenship. They present and debate theories of justice and their justifications and proposals for reform of the civil institutions and processes. Their critiques have been central to progressive politics in Europe for over 200 years.⁴⁹ The objection civic citizens raise is that the tradition is often not critical of basic assumptions and features of the civil institutions, such as those that shield the causes of global injustices from civic democratization by placing them in the private sphere, the presumption that the ideal is already immanent within modern

⁴⁹ For this estimation, see J. Tully, 'The Crisis of Global Citizenship', *Radical Politics Today*, July 2009.

institutions and their theoretical representations of them renders critique self-limiting and these limits constrain them to treat any other global tradition of political thought or organization as on the path to this institutional form or as being illegitimate.⁵⁰

In practice, reform-minded civil citizens are active. They work within the institutions of modern institutions, almost always in alliances with civic citizens, to reform these institutions: to enfranchise the excluded, to extend rights of participation in official public spheres, social and economic rights and rights of participation domestically and internationally, and to bring these institutions to those that do not have them by policies of transitional justice. As unquestionably important as these great civil reform movements are, the objection civic citizens raise is that working within the official institutions runs up against unjustifiable limits to democratic participation. It tends to channel and appropriate all kinds of creative civic practices of grass roots democracy in what the civil tradition calls 'civil society' into the restrictive and often incapacitating procedures of the official public spheres and thus into mere influence power. When the limits to reform within are reached, civil citizens carry on within as best they can and civic citizens carry on by going beyond these limits and engaging in the negotiation and cooperation activities Norval summarizes, which they continue to see as citizenship practices.

I am not sure how Norval came to her disjuncture assumption that civic citizens do not also participate within the official institutions of participation, but *solely* alongside or outside and I apologize if it was an infelicitous phrase on my part. It is definitely not the case. Civil and civic citizens work together in these institutions until they run up against their limits, as I show in the *Afterword*.⁵¹ For instance, she mentions

⁵⁰ For this objection in more detail than Tully, *On Global Citizenship*, see Tully, *Public Philosophy* II, chapters 4, 5 and 8. For limitations of civil theories of the public sphere, see J. Tully, 'On the Multiplicity of Global Public Spheres', in C. Emden and D. Midgley, eds, *Beyond Habermas: Democracy, Knowledge and the Public Sphere*, New York: Berghahn, 2012.

⁵¹ See also my response to Mason in this volume.

a number of examples of citizens working within the institutions of modern states to reform them as if these are solely examples of civil citizenship, whereas they are good examples of civic and civil citizens working together. They are working for reform of the legal and political institutions by legal and political means *and* by actors (illegal immigrants) and by diverse means that are not recognized as legal, which are, by definition, practices of civic engagement.⁵² As Howard Zinn has shown, the traditions of civic citizenship have their own histories of the struggles that built and continue to reform the institutions of modern citizenship. They do not see them as preconditions and containers of citizenship, the outcome of inevitable processes, Rousseauian founding moments or top-down processes of transitional justice. As Dunn and Owen note, they see them as the ongoing creation of civic citizens struggling for participatory, social, economic and minority rights before they have these rights to do so, and, so, eo ipso, by civic means. I do not think that Norval would disagree with this once the misunderstanding is clarified.

Cooperation and contestation

Norval argues that civic agonistics should not be constrained by an orientation to cooperation with those who are or will be subject to or affected by the contestation and by the change the contesters are arguing for. She finds this too prescriptive. I disagree. A condition of civic agonistics being the exercise of civic freedom is that the others affected are treated as partners with the capacity of civic freedom, of having a voice and being co-negotiators with the contesters. This entails treating them, and not others in the agonistic struggles, in certain ways; showing them how the proposed reform or revolution of the current system of unjust action-coordination will affect them and be willing to

⁵² Many of the examples in Tully, *Public Philosophy* I, chapters 4–8 and Tully, *Public Philosophy* II, chapters 3, 4 and 8 are of this general type.

listen and respond to their reply. If this condition is bypassed and some of those affected are ignored or treated as things to be manipulated, mastered or treated violently, or if contestation is seen as good and an end in itself, then these forms of agonistics fall outside what I consider to be the field of civic agonistics. Far from being incompatible with diversity, as Norval suggests, this commitment to taking into account the views of those you disagree with is the only way to recognize and work out acceptable modes of cooperative federalism and other types of recognition and accommodation among the diverse forms of human organization on the planet.⁵³

I realize how challenging this responsibility is in practice and how often it is ignored on the grounds that the others affected are somehow less than worthy of consideration, the contesters know what is good for them, the contesters are just and the others unjust so there is no reason to listen any further, there is not enough time to consult, or that the 'all affected' principle is utopian and contradictory. In addition, these sorts of arguments against listening to the other often rest on the dubious presumption that such non-democratic means will somehow lead to democratic outcomes. Like Arendt, I believe we should reject these specious arguments if we are to free ourselves from the destruction of human and non-human life that has been unleashed under their authority.⁵⁴

For these reasons of non-violent and cooperatively oriented contestation I would say that the kind of agonistic citizenship Norval presents is different in kind from civic citizenship and similar to Honig and Stears's agonistic realism. Nevertheless, I would also say that civic citizenship belongs to a larger family of what Norval calls 'aversive citizenship,' albeit a gentler and more conciliatory member.

⁵³ See also my response to Honig and Stears on cooperation and contestation in this volume.

⁵⁴ For an acute analysis of the 'all affected' principle to which I am indebted, see D. Owen, 'Constituting the Polity, Constituting the Demos: On the Place of the All Affected Interests Principle in Democratic Theory and in Resolving the Democratic Boundary Problem', *Ethics and Global Politics* 5 (3): 129–52, 2012.

5. Duncan Bell

Civic citizenship, sociality and informal imperialism

Duncan Bell and I come from the same historically oriented school of political thought. I have learned an enormous amount from his groundbreaking scholarship in the history of European political thought and of the history of Western imperialism in particular. Perhaps because we share so much he has done a masterful job of summarizing my work on the history of globalization: that is, the rise and triumph of informal imperialism over colonial imperialism after decolonization. I am relieved to read that he too thinks this way of disclosing the present state of globalization helps us to see some of the limits and possibilities of theories and practices of global citizenship more clearly than other representations and theories, or so I argue. I am also grateful to him for his elucidation of the working hypothesis of civic citizenship and giving it the name 'social unsociability' in contrast with the Hobbes-Kant premise of unsocial sociability all the way down. Social unsociability is the social, ecological and spiritual working hypothesis of autopoiesis or Gaia: that the ground of our being is interdependent relationships of mutual aid or compassionate cooperation: of cooperating through exercising civic freedom in and on the imperfect practices of cooperation (in the sense of compliance) in which we find ourselves and act. This is of course a much older working hypothesis than the modern antagonistic premise that marginalized it in the West, yet it has its own tradition in the modern period as well.⁵⁵

Bell suggests that my approach to citizenship is republican, and he is not alone in this. It is certainly true that the republican tradition has civil and civic wings, the former associated with Philip Pettit and the latter with Hannah Arendt in our time. However, I hope that both modes disclose a field of histories, institutions and practices of citizenship that is much broader and diverse than this important tradition. Moreover,

⁵⁵ See *Afterword* and references.

while the participatory wing of republicanism shares some of the 15 features of civic citizenship, it tends to be exclusively state-centred, to accept violence and coercively imposed duties and to share many of the institutional conditions of the civil tradition.⁵⁶

The civic tradition includes the diversity of practices of citizenship in practices of governance throughout the world, whether state or non-state. Many of its contemporary features have developed over the last 200 years out of worldwide traditions of grass-roots, community-based and cooperative economic and social democracies, innovations in party politics, participatory budgeting, union movements, economic, social and ecological movements, anti-war movements, decolonization, revolution, non-governmental organizations, networking and practices of governance and citizenship of indigenous peoples. Moreover, civic citizens reflect on and test in practice not only their understanding of violence and non-violence, as above, but also, and equally fundamentally, their practices and provisional theories and representations of their practices of 'doing democracy' as they go along. These reflective practices of subjecting their practices and representations of them to negotiation en passant constitute the signature characteristic of civic citizenship in contrast to the civil understanding of the role of theoretical frameworks above the demoï.⁵⁷ For this reason the global phenomena of civic citizenship cannot be represented and studied accurately under a republican framework or any other framework, for any framework is brought into the practices of reciprocal elucidation as a condition of the civic freedom of those working with it, as Laden, Celikates, Dunn and Owen and Bell note. This condition holds as well for using and testing the family resemblance features of the concept of civic citizenship I propose; some of which will no doubt not survive the testing. To quote Nietzsche: 'all concepts in which an entire process is semiotically concentrated elude definition: only that which has no history is definable.'⁵⁸

⁵⁶ See Tully, *On Global Citizenship*.

⁵⁷ See Mason and my response. For how this works in practice, see Tully, *Multiplicity of Global Public Spheres*.

⁵⁸ F. Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, K. Ansell-Pearson, ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Bell's central objection to my analysis of the arts of civic citizenship is that it is an inadequate remedy to my diagnosis of informal imperialism. He presents such a careful interpretation of my work and such well-argued objections to it that I was swept away by his persuasiveness. Nevertheless, now that I have had time to reflect, I would like to try to persuade him to reconsider his conclusion, as he points out I am constrained to do by my own method. A full response is given in the non-violent and democratic literature I have referred to. I will try to briefly summarize some main themes.

The transformative power of non-violence

The initial step is, as Bell suggests, to say something about non-violent civic education. This is a well-developed field of counter-mainstream civics in communities, social movements, schools and engaged teaching and research universities throughout the world. There are five areas of civic education in the five main, interdependent and mutually supportive types of practices of civic citizenship. These five types of practices of acting in concert and the corresponding types of education embody five modalities of the transformative power of non-violence.

The first area of civic education comprises meditative and group practices of care of the self. These educate children and adults to deal with their harmful emotions, habits and reactions; to cultivate the four stages of empathy that enable them to attend to and understand the suffering of oneself and others and to cultivate compassion that moves them to act to alleviate that suffering. This is the first axis of the transformative power of non-violence: non-violent relations of the self on the self (self-compassion). Education and exercise in the transformative, non-violent practices of the ethics of the self is the ground of all other non-violent practices: being peace. This is not only the ethical teaching of the great practitioners of non-violence such as Gandhi, ThichNhat Hahn, Dalai Lama, Martin Luther King Jr and Thomas Merton. The same fundamental point concerning the primacy

of ethics of the self in relation to practices of freedom in the world of power relations is also made by Michel Foucault:

If we take the question of power, of political power, situating it in the more general question of governmentality understood as a strategic field of power relations in the broadest and not merely political sense of the term, if we understand by governmentality a strategic field of power relations in their mobility, transformability, and reversibility, then I do not think that reflection on this notion of governmentality can avoid passing through, theoretically and practically, the element of a subject defined by the relationship of self to self . . . an ethics of the subject.⁵⁹

The second area of education is civic engagement in self-organizing and self-governing practices of bringing about common goods. These begin in looking after the classroom or hood, growing vegetables, making and cleaning up after meals, making utensils, studying where food, clothing, shelter and funding come from and under what conditions and how other humans and the environment are affected by what they are doing. These civic communities are extended out to larger constructive programmes through networking with others schools, cooperatives and community-based organizations.⁶⁰ This axis is pertains to the transformative power of non-violence: engagement in power-with practices.

The third area of civic education is in the arts of cooperation and non-violent contestation in dialogue. This begins with non-violent techniques of classroom communication and civic dialogues between teachers and students: questioning what is being taught, how it is being taught and non-violent practices of disputation and resolution. These civic practices of contestation do not necessarily transform all

⁵⁹ M. Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981–1982*, New York: Palgrave, 2005, p. 252. For more detail see, M. Foucault, 'The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom', in P. Rabinow, ed., *Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth*, New York: New Press, 1997. In a manner somewhat similar to Arendt, Foucault came to conceptualize power independent of and in contrast to violence and force from 1979 to his death in 1984 (see M. Foucault, 'The Subject and Power', in J. B. Faubion, ed., *Power: Essential Works of Foucault*, New York: New Press, 2000).

⁶⁰ For one approach to this, see B. Moyer, *Doing Democracy: The MAP Model for Organising Social Movements*, Gabriola Island: New Society, 2001.

master-pupil relationships, but they teach students and teachers how to enter into various types of dialogues and to challenge command authority relationships and demand justifications that they can test and accept or reject. This area comprises education in the wide variety of verbal and non-verbal (performative) types of dialogue available in Western and non-Western cultures. Moreover, as we have seen, these include the varieties of dialogical relationships among humans and non-human beings as fellow citizens of an ecological commonwealth of all forms of life.⁶¹ This is the most familiar axis of the transformative power of non-violence: the power of receptive, reciprocal and critical dialogues.

The fourth and most difficult area of education is in the types of civic negotiations that involve non-violent agonistics with violent others. These are oriented to moving violent actors around by non-violent ways to see the superiority of non-violent, cooperative and contestatory ways of settling disputes through negotiation and dialogue. That is, these are negotiations with actors who have not had the advantage of a civic education. There are over 200 techniques for different situations. One of the most basic in my opinion is an education in the non-violent martial arts that enable an individual or collective agent: (1) to discourage a potential attacker from attacking just in the way they comport themselves; (2) to disarm and overthrow violent opponents by using their aggressive behaviour to throw them off balance, into dis-equilibrium and undermine their confidence in the efficacy of violence; (3) to be able to withstand blows and continue to uphold the stance of concern and readiness to settle things by negotiation and compromise; (4) to be willing to die for a negotiable just cause but never to kill (self-suffering) and (5) thereby to implant the suggestion in others that there is a superior, ethical and

⁶¹ See A. S. Laden, 'Learning to be Equal: Just Schools and Schools of Justice', in D. Allen and R. Reich, eds, *Democracy, Education and Justice*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012. For this broad and deep sense of dialogical human relationships, see J. Stout, *Democracy and Tradition*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. For my capacious conception of verbal and non-verbal practices of dialogue, see J. Tully, 'Deparochializing Political Theory: The Dialogue and Interbeing Approach', *The Conference on Deparochializing Political Theory*, University of Victoria, 2–4 August 2012.

reasonable way to resolve the dispute – by being moved and moving to non-violent agonistics of types three, two and one above. In all five dimensions, the power of non-violence is acting on both opponents and bystanders by the experience and sight of an entirely different and ethically superior way of interacting and resolving differences.

This complex logic of non-violent interaction with violence is the fourth axis of the transformative power of non-violence. It is often considered the fundamental transformative power of non-violence since it transforms the opponents and the relationship between them from one mode of being to another. Along with constructive programmes it is at the core of Gandhi's Satyagraha. It is called the jiu-jitsu logic of non-violence because it uses the movements and dis-equilibrium of the opponent to bring about the transformation. The non-violent actors are not only offering and suggesting a non-violent alternative in which they can combine their energy and work together rather than wasting it in futile conflict, they also manifest this alternative in their interaction *and* envelope the violent others in these non-violent and potentially transformative relationships. They are being peace and making peace at one and the same time. Most of the more complex and mediated techniques and strategies of non-violent agonistics are derived from and extend the bodily logic of interaction and transformation of this famous phenomenological prototype.⁶² It is the non-violent tradition's alternative to the violent tradition's prototype of the 'repetition effect' of violence and counter-violence: the means of freeing ourselves from this allegedly inescapable effect and weaving ourselves into non-violent relationships at the same time.⁶³

The other technique that is equally important is non-cooperation. As we have seen, the civic tradition claims that unjust regimes rest

⁶² See Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, for the classic presentation of the phenomenological analysis of the transformative jiu-jitsu logic on non-violence. Gregg studied with Gandhi and then brought this analysis to North America and it was adopted by Martin Luther King Jr. For an excellent example of training in martial arts as a preparation for and manifestation of peaceful social relationships, see *Thousand Waves Martial Arts and Self-Defense Center*, Chicago, IL, www.thousandwaves.org.

⁶³ For the 'repetition effect' of violence, see my response to Honig and Stears in this volume.

not on violence or manufactured consensus but on cooperation in the sense of compliance. Therefore, the basic technique of dealing with an unjust regime from Étienne de la Boétie to the Egyptian Spring and non-violent Intifada is to withdraw cooperation in the everyday reproduction of the unjust system of cooperation.⁶⁴ Non-cooperation includes techniques of slowdowns, work-to-rule, absenteeism, strikes, boycotts, complete withdrawal of support, encouraging others to join the campaign (especially the military), civic disobedience practices and so on; as long as these evince concern for the opponents and the readiness to negotiate. That is, non-cooperation campaigns are organized cooperatively in accord with the demands of civic freedom and this spectacle of the high moral ground also helps to undermine the authority and power, and so the support, of the violent regime in contrast.

Research shows that non-cooperation requires the reciprocal support of the other types of civic practice: practices of the self, constructive programmes of community-based organizations and unions that provide the food, shelter and so on that the unjust regime formerly provided, and the negotiation practices towards which non-cooperation aims to move the contest. Community-based organizations provide a non-violent way of life for supporters and safe haven to which the campaigners can return during the long spells between campaigns and jail terms. They regain their strength, engage in constructive work and discuss strategy.⁶⁵ The failure to coordinate all types of non-violent practice is what Gandhi called his Himalayan blunder.⁶⁶ Cooperative non-cooperation is fairly easy to teach in practice and there are

⁶⁴ For Étienne de la Boétie, see E. La Boétie, *Discourse on Voluntary Servitude*, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2012.

⁶⁵ For an excellent analysis of the synergy of non-violent agonistics and community-based organizations, see M. E. King, *A Quiet Revolution: The Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance*, New York: Nation Books, 2007, and M. E. King, 'Palestinian Civil Resistance against Israeli Military Occupation', in Stephan, *Civilian Jihad*, pp. 131–56. For similar findings in the non-violent Egyptian revolution, see J. Tully, 'Middle East Legal and Governmental Pluralism: A View of the Field from the Demos', *Middle East Law and Governance*, 4: 1–39, 2012.

⁶⁶ Merton, *Gandhi on Non-violence*, p. 90.

hundreds of examples to learn from since the great anti-war movements after World War I.⁶⁷ If they are organized at the neighbourhood, city, national, regional and international level through the United Nations, such non-violent networks have the capacity to remove unjust rulers and to deter their rise to power in the first place – as peaceniks from Albert Einstein, Aldous Huxley, Bertrand Russell and Gene Sharp to the millions who research and practice it today have argued as against the proponents of war and the means to peace and justice.

The fifth area of non-violent education is in anti-war research on the global problem of war. This consists in the history and present of the escalating global system of war, war preparation and arms trading among the states and state-seeking revolutionary and terrorist movements, and the limits of official disarmament talks. As I mentioned in response to Honig and Stears, it brings into relief the diabolical global complex of war and militarization and how it is mobilized to protect the structural causes of other global problems – of poverty, exploitation, environmental destruction and climate change – from being brought under the democratic authority of the billions who suffer and die under them. This is the fifth axis of the transformative power of non-violence. This kind of critical education has the capacity to free students from taking the modern political system of violence and counter-violence for granted and being interpolated into it. And it enables them to see the other four transformative practices of a non-violent way of life as both the replacement for this life-destroying system and the means of replacing its root and branch.

This is a very crude sketch of a vast literature. However, I hope it begins to address Bell's question concerning education by bringing to light the contours of the field of non-violent civic education and practice and its transformative potential.

Of course this counter-mainstream civic education is up against the hegemonic education in command relationships, consumerism

⁶⁷ See P. Ackerman and J. Duvall, *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Non-Violent Conflict*, New York: St Martin's, 2000; Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*; and Sharp, *Politics of Nonviolent Action*.

and violence in mainstream institutions and media. Children are bombarded by images of violence and consumption from an early age. They also grow up with video games in which they kill thousands of people yet remain untouched by it, mirroring operators of unmanned drones. This constant experience can generate a form of subjectivity that turns adversaries into non-human enemies easily, sees killing as ordinary and has few if any moral qualms about it; a pathological form of subjectivity that used to take years of military training and indoctrination to instil. The powerful and privileged tell them that violence and collateral damage are necessary to protect their negative freedom to consume and they employ the poor to do the killing for them. In university, students are mostly taught that violence is necessary either to uphold their free way of life or to contest it, and non-violence is effective only within and between Western-style democracies (the democratic peace thesis). In these ways they are almost interpolated into the repetition-effect picture of the real shared by the right and left, and, *eo ipso*, into inadvertently reproducing the global injustices that the logic of violence and counter-violence holds in place. Unfortunately for the status quo and fortunately for life on earth, even this military-industrial-university-media complex is unable to interpolate us all the way down. Inquisitive students begin to ask questions, not only within this captivating picture of the real, but about the picture itself (even in Cambridge). This initial exercise of civic freedom leads them to explore non-violent alternatives, to experiment with them in practice and so to create the non-violent counter-world of practices and education I have just sketched.

Violence and non-violence

Bell claims that the examples I give of non-violent practices of civic citizenship and education are inadequate, ineffective and insufficient in addressing the global injustices I diagnose. They 'barely ruffle the hegemonic forms of politics'. It appears to me that Bell sees the non-violent practices of civic citizenship in this dismal light because he

discloses them from within some of the unquestioned institutional assumptions of civil citizenship and instrumental assumptions of Geussian and agonistic realism. This framework occludes their presence and transformative possibilities. In response, I would like to try to bring these incapacitating background assumptions into the space of questions and, in so doing, bring into a better light the transformative possibilities inhabiting the real.

For example, Bell asserts that practices of non-violent civic citizenship take place only within certain institutional and normative preconditions of modern states.⁶⁸ This is one of the basic assumptions of the civil tradition: violence outside modern states and non-violence within and between states. Yet, this classic binary of modern politics has been called into question and rendered dubious by critical international relations theorists over the last 20 years. Moreover, there is ample evidence from the empirical social sciences that there is more violence within and by modern states, state-seekers and the global institutions of the system of states than there is outside of them or their reach. He also claims that civic citizenship is only possible as an 'internal modification of existing, partially realised democratic norms'.⁶⁹ Why is this and how was the pre-existing democratic norm brought into practice in the first place? It seems to rest on the civil and realist assumption that humans are incapable of self-organization and thus require a master to impose the institutional conditions. But, again, this is surely a questionable assumption – challenged by countless examples of self-organizing democratic communities in the worst of contexts.

He cites Mandela in support of the use of violence. Yet, recent research suggests that the failure of non-violence in this case was due to the five practices of non-violent civic citizenship and education not being sufficiently established.⁷⁰ The politics of non-violence is less than 100 years old, whereas the politics of violence is over 2,000 years old. Non-violence should not be rejected on the basis of one failure in

⁶⁸ Bell, in this volume.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ For example, Ackerman and DuVall, *A Force More Powerful*, pp. 335–68.

its early years, but, rather the failure should be learned from and the lessons applied in the future (as the Palestinian non-violent movement is now doing).⁷¹ Reciprocally, Bell does not reject violence even though he points out that it fails many times. He also cites Fanon as giving him another reason to embrace violence. Yet, he does not ask if the violent struggle created the 'new man' in Algeria that Fanon theorized it would, or if it created an armed state and a male elite dependent on external financial and military support and at odds with the majority of its own citizens, as Fanon feared it would?⁷²

Instrumental and constitutive means

The largest assumption that appears to underlie Bell's analysis of examples of regime change is that violence and non-violence are taken to be instrumental and non-constitutive means to an end, and thus they can be judged solely by their effectiveness in seizing power. In his analysis of examples of the relative effectiveness of violence and non-violence he does not ask the following questions of violent regime change. What is the relative destructiveness of human life (combatants and civilians, directly and indirectly), infrastructure and the environment of violent versus non-violent regime change? What does it do to the psyches of humans to teach them to hate, fear and dehumanize each other to such an extent that the mass killing of combatants and innocent civilians of modern warfare are seen as acceptable means and victory as the justifiable ends?⁷³ What is the effect of the use of violence, military command-obedience relations and external support required to seize power on the leaders of the new regime and the institutional structures

⁷¹ For the experience of non-violence in the First Intifada, see M. E. King, *A Quiet Revolution: The Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance*, New York: Nation, 2007.

⁷² For the definitive non-violent agonistic response to Fanon, see B. Deming, 'Revolution and Equilibrium', in *Revolution and Equilibrium*, New York: Grossman, 1971.

⁷³ See D. Grossman, *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society*, New York: Little Brown and Company, 1995. In contrast, according to Nietzsche (and Gandhi and King) one of the most important ethical norms of non-violence is that it is 'better to perish than to hate and fear, and twofold better to perish than to make oneself hated and feared' (note 25 *supra*).

they put in place, or which continue through from the old regime (the Lenin effect)? How democratic and just is the new regime? None of these standard criteria of comparison are employed, leaving the sole criterion of effectiveness as the de facto seizure of power. Yet, it surely is impossible to compare violence and non-violence without addressing these questions.

In addition, Bell does not mention the tragedy of decolonization that is the central theme of postcolonial studies.⁷⁴ All the 'effective' violence of decolonization and the combined efforts of the non-aligned movement were unable to create states that are significantly less violent, or more democratic and egalitarian than any other modern state. Violence may put new rulers in place, modify the structures of inequality to some extent in changes and even change the ordering of hegemonic and subaltern states in the global system, but in effectively addressing any of the global problems that are the concern of progressive civil and civic citizens and agonistic realists, the results are not too promising. And where there are significant improvements, are these the results of violence or are they results of civic movements, community-based organizations and power-with relationships that derive from other sources? Whether one considers the evidence of decolonization or the current wars in the Middle East, Iraq and Afghanistan in light of these questions, the evidence seems to suggest that 'violent regime change doesn't work'.⁷⁵

More fundamentally, non-violent movements have a completely different view of victory. They do not see victory as defeating an opponent and taking power. Their aim is the transformation of

⁷⁴ For the tragedy of decolonization, see D. Scott, *Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment*, Chapel Hill: Duke University Press, 2004; V. Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World*, New York: New Press, 2007. For a Gandhian responses to it, see D. Jefferess, *Postcolonial Resistance: Culture, Liberation and Transformation*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008; R. J. Young, *Postcolonialism: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003; and J. Singh, *Beyond Free and Equal: Subalternity and the Limits of Liberal Democracy*, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto PhD Dissertation, 2012.

⁷⁵ See A. B. Downes, G. Grandin, J. S. Nye, N. C. Crawford, J. D. Fearon, M. Kaldor, J. Tirman, T. Lindberg and J. Landy, 'Regime Change Doesn't Work', *Boston Review* 36 (5): 16–34, October 2011.

the world system of violence and power-over that holds inequality, exploitation and environmental injustice in place. They work to convert unjust and violent adversaries to non-violent dispute resolution and to transform the unjust power relationship between them into one that is open to negotiation by its partners. This movement transforms, rather than seizes, power-over into power-with. Non-violent actors *require* this active participation of their opponent in order to test the validity of their claim of justice, which, prior to the negotiations is one-sided and monological. In the course of transforming power-over to power-with and reasoning-over to reasoning-with, the partners come to combine their creative energy in the construction of a new relationship of shared authority of connection. This is ‘another realism.’⁷⁶

I would propose therefore, that, contrary to Bell, the overwhelming evidence suggests that it is not non-violence but violence that cannot be the answer to the transformation question. It can make only minor modifications to the existing national and global systems of power. What continues to make war and command relations appear to be the means to peace and democracy, despite the evidence, is the unexamined assumption that they are instrumental means to these ends. Once the assumption is examined it becomes evident that they cannot be the transformative means for the simple reason that they are the constitutive means of the present system.⁷⁷ Once we realize that means are pre-figurative it also becomes evident that non-violent practices of civic citizenship are the constitutive means to peace and democracy. Peace and power-with democracy do not grow out of the barrel of a gun or the binding force of an imposed system of imperatives, but in and out of the ‘grass-roots’ of everyday practices of civic freedom.⁷⁸

Bell and many others argue that the non-violent and democratic step-by-step approach to change is too little too late. It merely ruffles the

⁷⁶ For this analysis, see H. J. N. Horsburgh, ‘The Distinctiveness of Satyagraha’, *Philosophy East and West* 19 (2): 171–80, 1969; Gregg, *Power of Nonviolence*, pp. 52–66, K. Mantena, “‘Another Realism’ The Politics of Gandhian Nonviolence”, *American Political Science Review* 106 (2): 455–70, 2012; and Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*.

⁷⁷ See *Afterword* and my response to Honig and Stears in this volume.

⁷⁸ This is also Arendt’s view in Arendt, *On Violence*.

feathers of the hegemons. The big problems we face need big solutions. From the perspective of cooperative citizenship this response is just more of the same thinking that has given rise to the problems we face.⁷⁹ Vandana Shiva, drawing on her experience in the Chipko movement, puts the cooperative reply in the following way:

As Gandhi showed in his life, and as we experience in earth democracy, small scale responses become necessary in times of dictatorship and totalitarian rule because large scale structures and processes are controlled by the dominant power. The small becomes powerful in rebuilding living cultures and living democracies because small victories can be claimed by millions. The large is small in terms of the range of people's alternatives. The small is large where unleashing people's energies are concerned.⁸⁰

Finally, it is worth mentioning that none of the pro-violence contributors discuss the central question of the anti-war movement. Like the critics of non-violence, and often in response to them, anti-war authors and activists discuss the extraordinary circumstances in which individual acts of violence in self-defence might or might not be acceptable if and only if they do not initiate a slippery slope to more violence. Although, as we have seen, for most this consideration takes second place to the fundamental ethical, moral and spiritual teaching that you should not kill another human being.⁸¹ However, focusing exclusively on these individual or small-scale cases overlooks a much larger global problem of which individual cases are constituent elements. This central question is how to disarm the violent and destructive system of states and state-seekers and put in place a substitute before it destroys life on earth. This has been the central question since World War I.⁸² A non-violent substitute and means of substitution have been slowly

⁷⁹ Tully, *On Global Citizenship*.

⁸⁰ V. Shiva, *Earth Democracy: Justice, Sustainability and Peace*, Cambridge: South End, 2005, p. 183.

⁸¹ Although none of the defenders of violence saw this moral issue as a question they needed to address in their contributions, Bell discusses it from a realist perspective in D. Bell, ed., *Ethics and World Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 93–110.

⁸² See the articles in H. Zinn, ed., *The Power of Nonviolence*, Boston: Beacon, 2002, for the persistence of this central question.

brought into being and experimented with ever since. And, as we have seen throughout, the role of individual conduct is central to this transformative solution. Yet this central issue is neither mentioned or examined by the contributors, as if violence and counter-violence can either go on forever as a basic feature of the real or guarantee perpetual peace by the ‘mechanical process of nature.’⁸³ This shows how people like me have failed to carry on the academic non-violent tradition and how much work we need to do to bring this central global problem and the non-violent response back into mainstream discussions and subject it to reciprocal elucidation. I hope this exchange with the trenchant questions posed by Bell helps to move one small step in this direction.

6. Robin Celikates

Civil disobedience and civic agonistics

I am most grateful for this exceptionally careful interpretation and interrogation of my work on global citizenship. He shows with a striking example how ideal theory can undermine democratic action unless a theory is dethroned and seen as democratic advice offered by a fellow citizen to other citizens engaged in democratic action and subject to reciprocal elucidation.⁸⁴ I agree with the analysis of the limits of civil disobedience and the strengths of his alternative way of thinking about resistance to unjust laws.⁸⁵ I also agree with his emphasis on the collective character of many practices of freedom that are characterized as civil disobedience. I wonder if we could describe his alternative as civic agonistics in relation to civic law. By ‘civic law’ I mean the view of law not as a formal or autonomous system of imperatives that subjects

⁸³ The latter is Kant’s view in the guarantee section of ‘Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch’, Kant, *Political Writings*, 108.

⁸⁴ See Tully, *Public Philosophy* I, chapter 9 and my response to Mason below for this civic role of ideal theory.

⁸⁵ Celikates does not take up the question of whether Rawls can be interpreted as closer to his own civic perspective, even in the quotations he cites, as, for example, Laden interprets Rawls.

simply obey, but as a negotiated system of norms (of various kinds) with which all the different actors who are subject to the laws interact as active agents of the law's unfolding in practice. The law in the first instance is not a written document but the interaction that takes place under the written law as signpost. This interactional or manifestation view of the nature of law seems a more accurate representation of the real world of law than the imperative theory.⁸⁶ It also seems more appropriate to Celikates's interpretation of the kinds of civic negotiation that the ideal theory of civil disobedience both conceals and pre-emptively designates as illegal. Many of these practices may well show up as not only ethical in the civic sense but also as legal under the interactional representation of law.

What are violence and non-violence?

Celikates says I sidestepped the question of the definition of violence and non-violence. This is correct. It is an important question with a long-contested history in philosophy and practice, as with all important concepts, and I am working on a critical and genealogical response to it. In the meantime, let me provide an initial response. In my provisional opinion, non-violent movements do not see themselves as working under a general theory that gives definitive definitions to their key concepts and definitive answers to all question that arise. They reject this approach for the same reasons as Celikates does in his chapter. Rather, they see themselves as a self-critical movement that is trying to bring into being and carrying on a mode of being in the world (of non-violence) and, as such, that mode of being is always self-critically in question in everything they say and do. The priority of conduct to theory and the testing relationship internal to conduct is what Gandhi called Satyagraha and 'experiments in truth' and Foucault called 'the courage of truth'.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ Tully, *On Global Citizenship*; Tully, *Public Philosophy* II, chapter 7; and see J. Bruneau, and S. J. Toope, *Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

⁸⁷ See my response to Honig and Stears in this volume.

At the centre of this ethos is the constant questioning of the distinction between violence and non-violence within the non-violent movements and along a spectrum of ways people inhabit non-violence as a way of life. At one end of the spectrum are the great non-violent movements such as Jainism, engaged Buddhism, Quakers, the followers of Jesus in the beatitudes, deep ecologists, vegetarians and Gandhians who strive to hold to the truth of their being that non-harm and compassion (the two main axes of non-violence) must be evinced in all one's relationship to oneself and to all other living beings. At the other end of the spectrum are the strategic non-violent movements that exercise non-harm and compassion exclusively in relation to human beings and as a mode of action exercised primarily in the political realm to overthrow unjust regimes and disarm states.⁸⁸ There is also, as Celikates mentions, the axis of analysis of structural forms of violence and non-violent responses to them.⁸⁹ Despite the differences and disagreements, I would say that there is general agreement on the negative or non-harm norm that you should not kill any human being and on the positive or compassionate norm that you should always do unto others as you would have them do unto you in similar circumstances.

These two norms demarcate the basic distinction between violence and non-violence. They are also two of the most enduring, tried and true ethical maxims in the world and they appear in most ethical and spiritual traditions. The difference is that the non-violent movements strive to realize them in every step they take. The more specific questions Celikates raises are taken up within these two norms and in relation to the way one inhabits the spectrum within them. They are then debated, tested in practice, reformulated and debated again, generation after generation, in an ongoing learning process.⁹⁰ This is no different

⁸⁸ Gene Sharp, Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan are good examples of this wing of peace studies.

⁸⁹ The leading non-violent theorist of structural violence is Johan Galtung: see J. Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Power and Conflict, Development and Civilization*, London: Sage, 1996, and www.transcend.org.

⁹⁰ For example, some argue there are exceptions to not using violence against humans in exceptional and containable circumstances, either by individuals or states. For an introduction to these questions within non-violent traditions, see K. R. Christensen, *Nonviolence, Peace, and Justice*, Toronto: Broadview, 2010.

than any other self-critical praxis-based movement that subjects its ways of being to continuous questioning and reciprocal elucidation. The feminist movement is another good example of a movement of this civic approach; an approach that Celikates endorses and employs superbly himself.⁹¹

The first transformation question

Celikates asks *who* is able to engage in acts of dissent and disobedience to bring the powerful to the negotiation table or to reclaim the commons and exercise their powers of self-organization. My answer is that many more people are able than the already recognized and privileged groups of citizens he mentions. When, where, by whom and how civic freedom emerges into the light of day is unpredictable and its effects are also unpredictable. The reason why it is possible is the 'Achilles' heel' of relations of power: the fact that they are exercised over agents who have a constrained room to manoeuvre to some extent and the exercise of civic freedom within them can effect not only the power relations but also the background structures of domination that hold them in place.⁹² I have drawn attention to hundreds of examples that surprise theorists and social scientists. They can emerge in what appear to be the most impossible conditions (the phenomenon of 'paradise in hell') or the most privileged.⁹³ Who predicted Gandhi, King, micro-credit, the global renaissance of local social and economic cooperatives, reclaiming the commons, the Egyptian non-violent spring, the occupy movements, the Italian 'benicomuni' movement or countless other less visible examples? We do not need yet another theory that purports to tell us beforehand the necessary and sufficient conditions of the

⁹¹ Celikates seems at times to be asking for my own opinion on his specific questions. I have opinions but what I am trying to do is to describe a whole field of non-violent citizenship, not my opinions within its shared yet questionable and questioned norms.

⁹² Tully, *On Global Citizenship*.

⁹³ For an exemplary anti-Hobbes and pro-Kropotkin argument that people in the worst of situations can be self-organizing and self-governing, see R. Solnit, *A Paradise Built in Hell: The Extraordinary Communities that Arise in Disasters*, New York: Penguin, 2009.

emergence of the legitimate and effective agent of change. We need instead humbler forms of engaged academic research that are attentive to what people are trying to say and do in such practices of freedom, how they do it and the ways they are marginalized and misrepresented. This is precisely the kind of research Celikates presents so well in his chapter.⁹⁴

7. Andrew Mason

Civil and civic philosophy

Andrew Mason's contribution is the finest example of the openness of the tradition of civil philosophy to enter into a critical dialogue with the tradition of civic or public philosophy. The aim of the dialogue is not to win out over the other but to learn the strengths and weaknesses of each. They are, as he says, 'complementary'. I would like to explore how these two approaches can join hands just as civil and civic citizens join hands in practice.

Mason defines the central difference clearly. It is the role of civil philosophers to set out the general theory of justice that provides a normative framework for democracy and citizenship independent of the demos: that is, of those who are subject to this general framework. Citizenship is 'derivate' of justice. Civil philosophers are 'experts' in this epistemic sense. Civil philosophy can allow for a robust degree of democratic participation within this framework and for legal and political pluralism. Mason goes further in this democratic and pluralist direction than any other contemporary civil philosopher. His willingness to put into the space of questions many enduring features of the civil tradition, including private property, and to learn from criticisms of the history and imperialism of the civil tradition, bring immensely important reforms to the civil tradition and, if accepted, would reform

⁹⁴ I respond to his question of the effectiveness of such practices in my response to Bell in this volume.

civil institutions from the inside in a formidable way. The five revisions of the civil tradition he suggests complement similar revisions that civic philosophers have recommended and thus provide an example of how the two approaches can be complementary.

The central difference between the two remains. In the civic tradition, philosophers do not have the status of an expert. Their formulation of a general theory of justice is treated as a proposal or clarification by one citizen to fellow citizens, to be discussed, tried out in practice, revised or rejected, just like any other proposal, as Laden explains. The modes of practical reasoning in philosophy departments are not of a higher order and authoritative over the modes of practical reasoning in practices of democratic self-government. Through reciprocal elucidation they work together to take advantage of the best of each. The basis of justice is democracy: a people subject to a system of rules have a say on them and a hand in cooperating and changing them (including their philosophers). Of course there are rules that make the exchange of reasons among citizens over rival theories of justice themselves just, but these too are questionable in the course of the discussions *en passant*, in the way I mentioned in response to Honig and Stears, or the citizens would be unfree, and this would be unjust. Since there is always 'reasonable disagreement' over theories of justice in theory and concrete practice, for the reasons Rawls gave, this doubly reflexive feature of civic deliberation is a necessary condition of both freedom and justice.⁹⁵ This is a non-derivative or equiprimordial approach to justice and democracy. Justice is dialogical all the way down, whereas for Mason, dialogue is absent from his principle of what justice requires (p. 9). Mason recognizes this central difference between the two traditions and responds that the two traditions can work together and be mutually corrective. I agree with him. In the final section of the *Afterword* I set out a number of ways in which civil and civic citizens can join hands and work together.

⁹⁵ Tully, *Public Philosophy* II, chapter 4.

Mason gives some examples of unjust civic citizenship practices to show that I have an uncritical bias towards the civic tradition. Yet, all the examples fall foul of the *audialterampartem*, or 'all subject to and all affected', feature of civic citizenship. Those 'excluded' are not only affected by being subject to the exercise of power, and the power in the examples is power-over, not power-with. He is correct to say that civic and civil citizenship are family resemblance concepts and thus not all instances have the same features. However, the 'having a say' norm in civic citizenship is so basic to the civic freedom family that its absence is sufficient grounds for criticizing and transforming the practices by means of critical and practical civic freedom. The family resemblance with respect to this feature is the diversity of ways of having a say in democratic practices versus the tendency of the civil tradition to make one small institutional set of ways essential. There are certainly less and more appealing examples of civic citizenship.

Conversely, Mason suggests that I characterize the civil tradition historically and emphasize its bad features in practice. This is partially correct. I have tried to write a genealogy of the module of civil institutions and the tradition of theoretical reflection on them and the roles they have played and continue to play in Western imperialism. I make no apology for that. I have also tried to show how critical theorists within the tradition have criticized and tried to reform some of the imperial and exploitive features of civil institutions and theories from Locke to Habermas. However, I have also tried to show that reforms of the institutions and criticisms of the theories have been self-limiting: specific institutions and theoretical presuppositions have remained as necessary pre-conditions and presuppositions beyond question. I have discussed several of these in my response to other contributors. I am not the first to point out these limits. The motley crew I call civic citizens and civic philosophers have pointed these limits out before me and shown how to go beyond them in practice and theory far better than I have done myself. I have tried to carry out this critical project in two ways: first by starting within the conventions of the civil tradition and showing how a radical immanent critique can bring the pre-conditions

and presuppositions into question and go beyond them; and, second, by showing how an external critique from the civic tradition can expose the same limits and alternatives to them.⁹⁶ I find the critical work of Mason to be complementary to this project I am engaged in. His five revisions of the civil tradition, for example, constitute an immanent critique that is more radical than any other contemporary civil philosopher I have come across. I do not think that these revisions are 'beside the point' (p. 11). They are the beginning of a dialogue.

Joining hands and working together to change the world

Finally, Mason suggests that civil and civic citizens can join hands and work together. I agree. When I wrote 'A Dilemma of Global Citizenship', I did not see how they could work together. This is the article that Mason read and commented on. However, I came to see afterwards various ways in which they can work together in practice and in academic research. I included these ways in the final section of the *Afterword*. They seem to me to be complementary to Mason's suggestion. I hope that this too is the beginning of a dialogue among civil and civic researchers and in which Mason's work plays a major role.

8. Adam Dunn and David Owen

Civic and civil understandings of institutions, rights and representation

I appreciate the exceptionally careful explication and exploration of civic freedom carried out by Adam Dunn and David Owen in their contribution. They show how civic citizenship is enhanced by three types of political institution: rights, citizenship as a legal status and participatory democratic councils and representative democratic federations. This

⁹⁶ Ibid., chapter 5.

continues the exploration of the ways in which civil and civic citizens can join hands and change the world in the *Afterword*, Mason's chapter and my response. Dunn and Owen make the crucial qualification that such institutional forms of governor-citizen relationships are not necessary or sufficient conditions of civic citizenship, since, as they point out, citizens historically and presently struggle by civic means for such institutions (and others) before they have them. They are rather 'enabling conditions' in many circumstances. Let us examine this more closely.

In response to their question of what institutions are appropriate to civic citizenship, especially governor-citizen relationships, I would like to make a distinction between two ways of inhabiting institutions by drawing on Laden's chapter. Civil and civic citizens inhabit the same institutions of the modern module, yet in different ways. Civil citizens tend to make a categorical distinction between the institutions and the activities that take place within them: the structure-agency distinction. The background relationship constitutive of the institutions can often be command relationships and members often interact informally in everyday relations of connection within them (in ministries, private corporations, constitutional orders and so on). If they wish to challenge the command-obedience relationships, they standardly have recourse to courts and legislatures in hopes of regulating them from the outside. This accords with the civil understanding of law and of rule-following more generally.

Civic citizens inhabit the same institutions in a different way. They attempt to exercise their civic freedom not only in everyday informal connection relations with their co-workers but also in having a say and a hand in the background institutional and command relationships as well. They make attempts to democratize or civicize the institutions from the inside and they see the institutions as legitimate just insofar as the powers-that-be within them are responsive to their attempts.⁹⁷ That is, institutional structures are internally related to the activities that take

⁹⁷ Of course, a democratic test of a command relationship may provide good reasons to leave it in place under certain conditions, but this is to place it under the authority of those subject to it in an indirect or trustee way.

place within them.⁹⁸ This thesis accords with the civic understanding of law and rule-following, as Dunn and Owen point out. This is what I call democratic constitutionalism in contrast to the constitutional democracy of the civil tradition.⁹⁹

Democratically minded civil participants join democratizing co-workers insofar as legal means to do so are in place. Civic citizens go further and engage in extra-legal civic activities to win these kinds of legal means, as Celikates illustrates in his chapter. The classic contemporary example of working together in this regard is the spread of the legal 'duty to consult' the members of a governmental or private institution. This is a revolutionary extension of participatory duties and rights into institutions formerly protected from democratization. Its reach also spreads beyond the members of an institution to the local communities and stakeholders affected by its policies.

Thus, civil and civic citizens have these two different yet overlapping and often complementary ways of disclosing and acting within the three types of institutions Dunn and Owen mention. The civic tradition has a more demanding account of the representative relationship than the standard civil one of elections and public deliberation. The relationship between citizens and governors itself is a cooperative and parrhesiastic relationship, as I illustrate with the dialogue between Polyneices and Jocasta.¹⁰⁰ The civic account of federal relationships also enables the reciprocal civic freedom of the individual and group members of the federation.¹⁰¹ I also think that these traditions provide two different ways of thinking about rights and that the civic way has not received the attention it merits.¹⁰²

The civil tradition standardly claims that human rights are something that can be unilaterally declared by an authority because they are self-evident or universal. These human rights presuppose and are exercised

⁹⁸ See Tully, *On Global Citizenship*; Tully, *Public Philosophy* I, introduction.

⁹⁹ Tully, *Public Philosophy* II, chapter 4.

¹⁰⁰ Tully, *On Global Citizenship*.

¹⁰¹ Tully, *Public Philosophy* I, chapter 5.

¹⁰² See J. Tully, 'Human Rights and Enlightenment: A View from the Twenty-First Century', in K. E. Tunstall, ed., *Self-Evident Truths? Human Rights and the Enlightenment: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures*, New York: Bloomsbury, 2012.

in a canonical set of modern legal, political and economic institutions. These institutions have to be coercively imposed prior to the exercise of human rights since they are the pre-condition of the exercise of human rights. Among these institutions is the modern state, which establishes the basis for human rights and coercively remedies their violations. To declare, project and then spread these institutions around the world, to be socialized into them and to exercise human rights within them is to be on the path of development. This tradition became dominant in the nineteenth century and it remains paramount today. It is the view of human rights from the perspective of a legislator who has the power to project rights and institutions over the world. It is the Enlightenment project.

The civic tradition treats human rights as proposals. They need to be proposed to fellow citizens by fellow citizens, rather than declared by an authority. The reason for this is that human rights are not self-evident, but, rather, they are always open to question and critical examination by the humans who are subject to them. They gain their normative force by being exercised, reflexively tested, interpreted and negotiated *en passant*. Moreover, there is not one universal set of institutions in which human rights can be exercised. There is a plurality of political, economic and legal institutions in which human rights can be realized and these too gain their legitimacy from being open to the contestation of self-determining persons and peoples who are subject to them. Human rights and their institutions are not prior to democratic participation, but, rather, human rights and democracy go together, hand in hand. It follows that human rights and their institutions cannot be coercively imposed. They have to be both spread and enforced by democratic and non-violent means, or else they have to be retrospectively democratized and transformed by those subject to them if they are initially imposed unilaterally. Enlightenment does not consist in a developmental and institutional endpoint, but rather in the continuous deepening of the co-articulation of human rights and democratic participation in exercising and improving them, world without end. This is a civic tradition of rights.

I suggest that this way of thinking about rights should be studied, not because it has all the answers, but because it has responses to many of the current objections to the dominant way of thinking about rights and alternatives to them. As with the other two types of institution Dunn and Owen discuss, these two traditions of rights overlap to some extent. Many rights theorists and activists within the civil tradition work to make the articulation, application and exercise of rights regimes more participatory. There is no reason why they cannot listen to and learn from civic citizens exercising a say and a hand in transforming the narrow neoliberal rights regimes imposed on them around the world and especially in the Third World. And, if they are serious about reform, they can also learn from civic activists how to exercise their correlative responsibility to walk the talk and help to bring them about: by, for example, joining global boycotts of and non-cooperation with violators of the rights they profess in the civil sphere. These mutually supportive alliances between civil reformers and civic activists have been indispensable in advancing human rights in conjunction with democratic participation – the only way they have democratic legitimacy – over the last 200 years.

9. Conclusion

Between thoroughly self-organizing and self-governing cooperatives and Weberian institutions that function as sedimented structures of domination lies a vast field of intermediate cases that exhibit degrees of institutionalization. Dunn and Owen are correct in arguing that the three types of institution, each with degrees of institutionalization, can help to enable civic and civil citizens to engage in activities for public good in the relationships of the institutions. Civil theorists are correct to emphasize that such institutions provide stability for these activities. However, it remains important not to reify institutions as ‘preconditions’ of the activities: that is, as institutions that are prior to and independent containers of them. The activities that take place within the relationships

of these types of institution cannot be explained entirely from this institutional perspective. Activities within institutions interact not only within, but also *with* the institutional conditions. Institutional conditions and activities are internally related.

The civic perspective brings this interaction to light. Institutions are negotiated practices to varying degrees and their history is accordingly unpredictable. This is important for global citizens for the following reason. Institutions always enable certain forms of activity and disable others. The questions for citizens are: what kinds of activity do they enable and disable, for whom, for what goods and to what effects? For example, institutionalized neoliberal rights enable individual and corporate market freedoms (for some) while disabling social and economic rights, collective cooperation and self-determination and democratic diversity. For citizens to be free and institutions just, those who are subject to them and their effects have to be able to test these institutions in the course of their activities within them: to raise these questions, reason together about them and be able to modify or transform them. When these interactions between institutional conditions and civic freedom are in operation the institutions are stable 'for the right reasons'. They are degrees of democratization that civic citizens bring to institutionalization. I thank Dunn and Owen for enabling us to see this crucial connection clearly.¹⁰³

I would like to thank the contributors once more for their outstanding contributions and the four series editors, especially David Owen, for bringing together such a rich and challenging collection.

¹⁰³ For their helpful comments I am grateful to Michael Carpenter, Karuna Mantena, Anthony Laden, David Owen and Timothy Smith.