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Enemies: Citizenship as a Trigger of Violence

One could safely conclude that there is an intimate historic affinity between citizenship and war. From the antique city-states where full citizenship status was acquired by serving in war (Anderson 1996: 28, 33; Pocock 1998), via the traditional military draft for men (and in some places for women) to contemporary practices that enable immigrants and foreigners serving in the armed forces, such as the US army or in the *Légion étrangère*, an easier access to citizenship. There is a historic relationship between ‘blood’, either inherited or spilled (one’s own or of other people), and citizenship. However, violence related to citizenship is not only physical but often invisible. It is the violence of administrative decisions, hierarchy of different statuses, ‘wrong’ passports and ‘papers’ or deprivations of citizenship. In the following chapter, I will also tackle the issue of physically invisible but nonetheless effective violence caused by the post-Yugoslav citizenship regimes. In this chapter though, I will turn to the outbreak of that ‘visible’ violence that spread across almost all corners of the former Yugoslavia. To examine why and how this violence happened, and what was the role of citizenship, we need to cast the net more widely all over post-socialist post-partition European states.

The dark side of 1989: Violence in post-socialist Europe

The two decades after 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe might be branded *les années 89*. Here I paraphrase what is in France nowadays called *les années 68*, the years of 1968, to underline the long-lasting effect of a historic turning point. The fall of the Berlin Wall heralded sweeping changes in the ‘other Europe’. These included the end of decaying state socialist regimes between

1989 and 1991, the end of the Cold War, the re-unification of Germany, the introduction of liberal democracy, the beginning of a hasty 'transition' to a free market economy and, eventually, the unification of most of the European East and West under the administrative umbrella of the European Union. However, from this vantage point, perceptions on the years of 1989 depend on diverse political, social and economic consequences of these profound changes that affected in different ways different parts of the former socialist Eurasia. When the real, political and symbolic walls started to crumble in 1989, it was difficult to predict – nor would the euphoria of those days allow this kind of pessimism – that the change would also bring many unwanted consequences. Not only did these unwanted consequences involve economic hardships, travesties of a new democratic order and painful social shocks, but also – at the moment of Western European unification – disintegrative political trends which swept away three former socialist federations during 1991 and 1992. This process was followed by the outbreaks of violence, destructive and bloody wars, the return of concentration camps in Europe, massacres and ethnic cleansing which culminated with the Srebrenica genocide in 1995, as well as the brutal destruction of cities such as Vukovar, Sarajevo, Mostar and Grozny. This dark side of 1989 found one of its most horrifying manifestations in the almost four-year-long siege of Sarajevo. When asked about the fall of the Berlin Wall, a citizen of besieged Sarajevo allegedly said that, on the one hand, it had been a good thing, but, on the other, the Wall had unfortunately 'crumbled down upon our heads'.

The question of why these federations disintegrated so soon after the collapse of the socialist regimes is followed by more puzzles. Why did violence occur in some places and not in others? Where, under what circumstances, and when was violence most likely to happen? Finally, why was the disintegration of Yugoslavia so uniquely brutal? I start my analysis by asking two crucial questions. The possible answers to these determined the fate of many citizens of the former socialist federations in the context of their imminent disintegration: *Did the federal centre and the incipient states (republics) accept the separation and the existing borders? Did all groups and all regions accept independence and the authorities of the new states?* The analysis of the possible answers to these questions will bring us to what I call three decisive *triggers of violence*: first citizenship, then borders and territories, and, finally in the early 1990s, the role of the military apparatus of defunct federations.

The possible combinations of the answers to the two questions above produce four scenarios:

		Did the federal centre and other incipient states (republics) accept separation and existing borders?	
		YES	NO
Did all groups and all regions accept independence and the authorities of the new states?	YES	Czech Republic, Slovakia (<i>no violence</i>)	Slovenia, Lithuania (<i>limited violence</i>)
	NO	Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia), Russia (Chechnya), Moldova (Transnistria), Serbia (Kosovo) (<i>high likelihood of violence</i>)	Croatia/Bosnia/Serbia/Montenegro; Armenia/Azerbaijan (<i>inevitable violence</i>)

If the answer to both questions is positive, then clearly there is little room for conflict, as in the case of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak Federation dissolved by the mutual agreement of the Czech and Slovak political elites on 1 January 1993. There was no interference from the federal centre. Although many citizens were sympathetic to the former federation, there was no significant opposition to the disintegration coming from groups of citizens, regions or ethnic groups. A small percentage of Czechs living in Slovakia and Slovaks living in the Czech Republic – and there were no concentrations in any particular region – did not pose a problem in mutual relations. Slovakia is, however, home to a sizable Magyar minority but the Czech–Slovak divorce was not a concern for them nor did it change much their relationship with the Slovak majority.

The second possible scenario in our matrix can also generate violence, but on a smaller scale. This situation arises when citizens largely obey the authorities of the new state and agree with independence and the borders of the new state. In such a situation, there are no regional or ethnic protests, or, if a minority is not content with independence (as was the case in the Baltic states), it does not act to prevent it or rebel against the new authorities. The federal centre's institutions do however question the decision to separate. The Yugoslav army's (JNA) one-week intervention in Slovenia and the Soviet army's intervention in Lithuania in 1991 are examples. Since both federal centres were politically weak at that point and since other republics did not directly oppose independence of the republics in

question, the violence was ultimately short-lived and resulted in withdrawal of the federal troops.

However, if the answer to both questions is negative, then violence is almost inevitable, as in the former Yugoslavia where war broke out among the republics with Serbia and Montenegro on one side and Croatia and Bosnia on the other from 1991 until 1995. From 1993 to 1994, Croatia was also militarily engaged against the Bosnian government. Violence also erupted between two republics in the former USSR, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The majority of Croatian and Bosnian Serbs did not accept the independence of Croatia and Bosnia and refused loyalty to the authorities. It is important to note that they did not have any regional autonomy, unlike Nagorno-Karabakh, and were dispersed over Croatian and Bosnian territory. Their rebellion meant conquering territories which they claimed as belonging to Serbs, or which they managed to conquer with their at that time overwhelming military power, with the idea of attaching them to Serbia or the Serbian-Montenegrin state in the making. They were backed by Serbia, Montenegro and the Serb-dominated JNA, who did not accept the independence and existing borders of the neighbouring republics.

Although the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh resembles the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia insofar as it involved direct violence between the former republics over borders and territories, there is a significant difference. Nagorno-Karabakh is an Armenian-populated former autonomous region within Azerbaijan. It opted for independence from Azerbaijan with the obvious intention of joining the Armenian state, a goal supported by Armenia itself. The only problem was how to attach the region surrounded by ethnic Azeri territories that Armenia eventually 'solved' by simply occupying these territories. In this case, we can see both an autonomous region populated by an ethnically different group than the rest of the republic rebelling against the republican centre, and the neighbouring republic demanding a change of borders and claiming the region for itself.

If the former republics mostly agree among themselves on their territorial shape but (ethnic) groups and/or regions within the republics either disobey the newly independent authorities or express discontent with independence or with their position within the new state – or even attempt secession, with or without the intention of joining another state – there is a high likelihood of violence occurring. This was the case with Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Moldova (Transnistria), Russia (Chechnya), and Serbia (Kosovo). In Georgia and Moldova, the new authorities were unable to quell the rebellion, whereas Russia succeeded after almost a decade to crush the Chechen uprising after a horrible

price was paid in human lives and material destruction. Special attention should be paid to the case of Serbia. In an open expansionist campaign, Serbia militarily questioned the territorial shape of the western neighbouring republics (Croatia and especially Bosnia), but no other republic challenged its own administrative borders. The case of Kosovo appears different from the other cases in this category since Serbia *initially* managed to suppress Albanian demands for autonomy and even independence after Kosovo's autonomy was revoked in 1989. Kosovo Albanians opted for a peaceful rebellion against the Serbian state and built their own parallel institutions until 1998 when the conflict erupted between the Serbian authorities and the Albanian guerrillas. It ended with the NATO intervention and withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosovo in 1999.

Macedonia deserves a special status in our analysis and therefore it does not find a place in our matrix. It exemplifies a situation in which the ethnic Macedonian majority and the ethnic Albanian minority *initially* – at the moment of Yugoslavia's break-up in 1991 – accepted independence. The state was thus not threatened with external intervention and it secured the loyalty of its ethnic minority. However, over the years – ten years later and under different circumstances – the Albanians' discontent with their position in Macedonia, coupled with political demands and secessionist threats, resulted in an armed rebellion, backed by armed groups from Kosovo, and open defiance of the Macedonian state authorities in 2001.

Although it was not part of the initial implosion of the Yugoslav Federation and it took place fifteen years later, it is necessary to mention here Montenegro's independence from the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2006 as well as Kosovo's independence from Serbia in 2008. Many expected and perceived Montenegro's independence as a final stage of fragmentation along the republican lines of what had been Yugoslavia. First steps towards independence had already been taken in the late 1990s when the Montenegrin leadership – comprising many people such as Montenegrin current Prime Minister Milo Đukanović who enthusiastically supported Milošević and his war campaigns in early 1990s – turned their back on Belgrade (Džankić 2010: 10). By 2003, when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was replaced by a malfunctioning State Union, Montenegro was already a semi-independent country. Although it opposed Montenegrin independence, Serbia did not dispute the territorial shape of Montenegro and furthermore decided to respect the outcome of the referendum on independence in 2006. As for the Serbs in Montenegro, they expressed their discontent with independence rather peacefully, and did not rebel against the authorities. However, many Montenegrin Serbs continue to

press for special status and special relations with Serbia. Once again, the case of Montenegro's independence in 2006 must be placed in the context of an entirely different political setting than the one that dominated Yugoslavia's disintegration in the early 1990s. Finally, in February 2008 Kosovo declared independence from Serbia and acquired only partial but significant international recognition: the move was opposed by both Serbia and the ethnic Serb minority. Since Kosovo has been completely separated from Serbia for almost a decade and governed by international bodies (UN), with their strong international military and police presence (NATO, EU, UN), and, since Serbia renounced the use of violence, violence has been limited to an ethnic Serb enclave in North Kosovo.

Only one case does not fit this matrix at all because of the entirely different nature of the conflict. From 1992 to 1997, the Central Asian republic of Tajikistan was plunged into a conflict between the government and an opposition that ranged from liberal-democrats to Islamists. All sides accepted independence and there were no challenges to Tajikistan's borders or the state. Although the war was in some aspects characterized by mostly regional and some ethnic rivalries, Tajikistan clearly constitutes a separate case of civil ideological war for political power.

It is important to add here that in the post-1989 international arena, the international community generally accepted only the former republics as independent states that were therefore entitled to join international organizations such as the United Nations. The only major exception to this unwritten rule came seventeen years later with Kosovo's independence. Both the US and the EU members who recognized Kosovo insisted that it was an *exceptional* case. The move was opposed by some EU members (such as Spain, Slovakia and Romania) and, most staunchly, by Russia. In response, and coming to the conclusion that the rule was irretrievably broken, Russia recognized the independence of the Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the war with Georgia in August 2008. The NATO deployment in Kosovo in 1999 was used as justification for Russia's own takeover of the Crimea in 2014.

Triggers of violence: Citizenship, borders and territories, and the role of the federal military

Trigger 1: Citizenship

The first question – *did the incipient states (republics) and the federal centre accept the separation and the existing borders?* – is intimately related to future territorial shapes and thus borders of incipient states and, inevitably, to the role of the

federal military in the initial phase of the break-up. The second question – *did all groups and all regions accept the independence and the authorities of the new states?* In other words, *did they attempt rebellion, secession or even integration with another state?* – is intrinsically bound with citizenship or, generally, with the relationship between state and individuals and/or groups involving, among other things, political inclusion or exclusion, citizens' loyalty, duties and rights, and personal security.

Another perspective on violence in the post-1989 post-communist space opens up if we look at it through the lenses of citizenship, the struggle over borders and territories, and the role of the federal military that I define as main, though not the sole *triggers of violence*. By the triggers of violence I understand stakes (in this case disagreements on the citizenship issue and the territorial shape of the new states) and actors (in our analysis we focus on partial or full engagement of the federal military during the period of disintegration) that could facilitate or initiate the use of violence by the parties in conflict having opposing political agendas. The role of the federal forces as the major military formation and their active involvement in the events, or their non-involvement, certainly determines the level of violence, although the federal army competed – collaborated or confronted – with less powerful police forces, territorial defence forces in Yugoslav republics and diverse paramilitaries often related to political parties or mafia gangs.

Needless to say, if all three triggers of violence are *pulled*, large-scale violence occurs. An example of this is the war in which five of the six Yugoslav republics participated together with the disintegrating federal army which sided with Serbia and Montenegro and ethnic Serbs' paramilitaries in Croatia and Bosnia in 1991–1992. The war was finally brought to an end by the general peace agreement in 1995 sponsored by the United States and the EU and signed by Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The Serb rebellion in Croatia failed, but Bosnia was internally divided into the Serb republic and the Croat-Bosniak Federation, which was further divided into mixed and ethnic cantons. Regardless of widespread destruction and the serious loss of human life (as many as 100,000 in Bosnia and around 20,000 in Croatia),¹ the former republican borders were not changed.

The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, on the other hand, involved two triggers of violence: citizenship (the rebellion of ethnic Armenian citizens against Azerbaijan as a state) and conflict over disputed territories and new borders among states (the intervention of Armenia with the intention to annex the Azeri territory). Although initially the Soviet army was militarily involved in the conflict – that started already in 1988! – it was played out among two

neighbouring republics and an autonomous province. The final result was a frozen conflict which lasts until this very day: a *de facto* annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh by Armenia together with Armenian control over the regions outside Nagorno-Karabakh linking the region to Armenia.

If you pull the trigger of citizenship involving refusal of loyalty to a new state and if you couple it with the secessionist demands, this inevitably means pulling also the trigger of control over territories and borders, then the result is internal conflicts between the new states and one or more rebellious regions. The outcome is likely to be, as in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, a frozen conflict. Only internationally supervised Kosovo managed to achieve a partial but significant international recognition. This recognition is not the case for some of the rebellious regions in the former USSR, such as Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia (the latter two indeed recognized by only Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru), which are *de facto* self-ruled statelets or, for that matter, Chechnya which has been brought under Moscow's control again. In many of these regions, the federal military or its remnants and the Russian army as its successor played a highly controversial role. For example, the former Fourteenth Soviet army generously helped the rebellion in Transnistria, the Soviet army was implicated in the first phase of the Armenian-Azerbaijani war and Russia militarily backed Abkhaz and South Ossetian secessionism.

Macedonia is a special case for the reasons discussed above. It escaped initial violence, but faced an Albanian rebellion in 2001 that pulled *only* the trigger of citizenship and played with the prospect of secession. Albanians perceived themselves as 'second-class' citizens in the state constitutionally defined as ethnic Macedonian state, complained about the discriminatory citizenship law and demanded more autonomy for municipalities with an Albanian majority and some important cultural rights such as higher education in the Albanian language. The uprising started in the area inhabited mostly by Albanians who did not have a previous autonomous region within Macedonia. In this regard, their armed rebellion was similar in some respects to that of Croatian and Bosnian Serbs, or to the one in Transnistria where the Slavic speakers (Ukrainians and Russians) unilaterally declared autonomy and secession from Moldova in the municipalities of the Dniester region. With Albania not interested and Kosovo not a state, and without international sympathies, the armed insurgency was welcomed only in Albanian nationalist circles. The Macedonian case ended in settlement. For their acceptance of citizenship and loyalty, the Macedonian state offered Albanians concessions in citizenship matters, linguistic and educational policy, and internal administrative divisions which consolidated the Albanian

majority in the Western Macedonia. Also included were significant political concessions such as re-definition of the constitution and the larger participation of Albanians in government.

Trigger 2: Territory and borders

The previous paragraphs clearly show how the questions of citizenship, the control of territory and the territorial shape, i.e. the borders of new states, are closely related. The conflict over territories and borders is an infallible trigger for violence both in cases where a region or a group inhabiting a certain territory refuses loyalty to the authorities of a new state and furthermore declares secession, and in cases when the (usually) neighbouring country questions the existing borders claiming more often than not that its minority in neighbouring country should join the 'homeland'. As mentioned above, the arguments for re-arranging political borders are often centred on the argument about the 'artificiality' of the existing territorial divisions. These socialist 'solutions' did not correspond, it was claimed, to 'natural' ethnic territories. Once the communist regimes had imploded the legitimacy of political and territorial arrangements made under their rule was also called into question. However, any separation according to the ethnic lines had to solve the 'problem' of many ethnically mixed regions. Therefore, the physical separation of ethnic communities was to be created in these zones by the use of mass violence, executions, expulsions and 'ethnic cleansing'.

Although the post-Soviet states, except in the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan, recognized the existing republican borders as new borders between independent states,² the internal borders became the blueprint for fragmentation where autonomous regions rebelled against the republican centre. However, in the former Yugoslavia one witnessed conflicts where there were no previous intra-republican administrative borders, except in the case of Kosovo, and some republics (Serbia and Montenegro) openly challenged the existing inter-republican divisions. In all cases, the project of creating ethnically homogenized independent states on a territory inhabited by co-members of an ethnicity put in question the inherited political geography.

The wars between the Yugoslav republics over territories and borders were the most intensive and destructive ones. Therefore, a closer look is needed to explain the logic behind the wars for territories. Initially, in Yugoslavia, the motivation for the conflict over territory was the position of Serbs outside Serbia (in Croatia and Bosnia). On the other hand, Serbia itself had the largest proportion of

minorities on its soil in Kosovo and Vojvodina. But both Albania and Hungary renounced any claims to Serbian territory inhabited by ethnic Albanians and Magyars, whereas ethnic Muslims from the Sandžak region (divided between Serbia and Montenegro) lacked a kin state in the conventional sense and never formed a political platform to advocate secession or integration with their ethnic kin in Bosnia. As for the Macedonian Albanians, they struggled in the 1990s to have their minority rights and equal position alongside the Slav majority recognized.

In other words, the possibility of violent conflict opened up in the former Yugoslavia when a kin-state supported or engineered the irredentist ambitions of its kin-minority in neighbouring republics with the more or less explicit intention of annexing a certain portion of their territories. In the context of Serbia's expansionist policies, the conflict in Croatia was facilitated, as explained by Rogers Brubaker, by a nationalizing Croatian state that threatened and reduced the political, social and economic rights of local Serbs (downgrading them from a constituent people of Croatia to a minority), and which itself refused to shun its own expansionist policies in neighbouring Bosnia. The war 'was a contingent outcome of the interplay of mutually suspicious, mutually monitoring, mutually misrepresenting political elites in the incipient Croatian nationalizing state, the incipient Serb national minority in that state, and the incipient Serbian "homeland" state' (Brubaker 1996: 76).

But if Croatia represents a textbook example of Brubaker's triadic relationship between a 'nationalizing state', a 'national minority' and a 'national homeland', the devastating war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as the only true multiethnic country with no titular nationality, defies the model. Indeed, Brubaker admits in his above-mentioned study that he does not intend to deal with the conflict in Bosnia. Nonetheless, since the triadic relationship – though in the case of Bosnia it was more of an *imagined* triadic relationship – is considered a hotbed of ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe, it is necessary to explain the Bosnian situation in exactly these terms.

Bosnia was not a 'nationalizing state' to start with nor could it later qualify as one. Bosnian Serbs and Croats were not 'national minorities' in this truly multinational country with, regardless of actual percentages, no majorities and no minorities. So far as Brubaker's triangle is concerned, only Serbia and Croatia were perceived as 'external homelands' by nationalist Bosnian Serbs and Croats. The mobilization of Bosnian Serbs for war was mostly motivated by the Greater Serbia project that had already begun in Croatia in 1991 and was territorially inconceivable without the acquisition of Bosnian territories. However, Bosnian

Figure 8.1 The post-Yugoslav States in 1992 (Source: Wikimedia Commons, transferred from en.wikipedia, author: Paweł Goleniowski, SwPawel).

Serbs could have not claimed to be in the same position as the Croatian Serbs, that is to say, a ‘national minority’ whose rights were threatened by a ‘nationalizing’ state. Moreover, their representatives shared power with Croat and Muslim ethnonationalist parties. Serb nationalistic propaganda therefore concentrated on portraying Bosnia as an incipient Muslim nationalizing state and in portraying Bosnian Muslim leaders as ‘fundamentalist’ plotters who wanted to subjugate or eliminate Serbs in a future Islamic state. Eventually, the main political party of Bosnian Serbs, led by Radovan Karadžić and supported by the federal army and Serbia, rejected Bosnia as an independent multinational state, formed ‘Serb autonomous regions’ brought together into a ‘Serb republic’ and decided to join Serbia, taking with them as much Bosnian territory as they could conquer.

As for Bosnian Croats, their tactic, in 1991 and 1992, was initially to support Bosnia’s statehood. During this period, the reinforcement of Bosnian statehood also entailed the reinforcement of Croatia’s bid for independence from Belgrade. However, as the war progressed, in 1993, Bosnian Croats – under direct influence and control from Tudjman’s government in Zagreb – adopted a position similar to that of the Bosnian Serbs. They rejected Bosnia as a state, portrayed Bosnian Muslims as fundamentalists, entered into an open conflict with Sarajevo and

tried to get as much territory as possible with the intention of attaching it to Croatia. Again, it is impossible to speak about a *real* triadic relationship. It is only possible to speak of how the triad was *simulated* in order to legitimize Serbs' and Croats' ambitions to join their 'national homelands'.

Finally, what were the results of these devastating wars over territories and borders? The internationally recognized borders are still those that separated the republics within the former socialist federations, except in the case of Kosovo. When it comes to the contested territories the situation on the ground is quite different: Serbs in Croatia lost their short-lived republic, Serbs in Bosnia obtained an autonomous Serb Republic but failed to join Serbia, the Chechen rebellion failed, Kosovo eventually separated from Serbia thanks to international intervention, Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are internationally unrecognized quasi-independent territories, as well as Nagorno-Karabakh which is *de facto* attached to Armenia.

Trigger 3: The role of the federal military

Finally, it is necessary to return to the role of the federal military as discussed above. The federal armies, by the simple fact of their 'monopoly on violence', played one of the crucial roles in the violent clashes that occurred during the progressive disappearance of the socialist federations. The federal army stayed in the barracks in Czechoslovakia and, unlike the Yugoslav federal army, was not interested in any kind of intervention into political affairs (Rupnik 2000). Valerie Bunce argues that the bloc provides the answer and that violence was likely to occur in countries such as Yugoslavia, Romania and Albania whose military apparatus was not controlled by Moscow (1999: 71). Although Moscow decided not to use its huge army to keep the Soviet Union together and Russia later accepted the independence of other republics and the often unfavourable position of Russians living outside Russia, the Soviet army was implicated in violent events occurring in the former Soviet space. It *did* intervene in Lithuania in 1991, some of its generals staged a coup against Gorbachev in 1991, it was implicated initially in the conflict in Azerbaijan and its remnants in Moldova helped the rebellion in Transnistria. In addition, Russia, as the sole successor of the Soviet army later on played an important role in the conflicts in Georgia.

I concur with Bunce that an independent and powerful military in Yugoslavia, Albania and Romania succumbed to the temptation to enter into an already volatile political arena in order to defend their own privileges.

However, violence in Albania and Romania resulted from short-term conflicts that ended in democratic changes demanded by citizens themselves. This did not endanger the existence of the state as such. Whereas the intervention of the Soviet army was relatively limited, the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) fully participated in the inter-republican and inter-ethnic conflicts by choosing not to defend the Yugoslav federation (although in Slovenia it intervened to protect the federation's borders and it portrayed its role there and in Croatia as a defence of Yugoslavia). Instead, its leadership decided to support the Serb nationalist programme of creating – on the ruins of Yugoslavia once it became clear it was about to collapse – a greater Serbian state out of Serbia, Montenegro and the Serb-populated areas of Croatia and Bosnia.

The Serbian member of the Yugoslav Presidency Borisav Jović writes in his memoir about the plan 'to attack Yugoslavia' which was discussed among Serbian leaders as early as March 1990 after the failure of the Fourteenth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). The plan involved a change of internal borders if Slovenia and Croatia decided to defect from the federation (Gordy 2008: 285). The JNA confirmed its close ties with Milošević after the army, on his orders, crushed the Belgrade demonstrations of 9 March 1991. 'At this moment, the JNA ceased to function as the defence force of the Yugoslav federation, and transformed itself into the military wing of a political faction' (Gordy 2008: 285). Numerous reports and testimonies confirm the JNA's submission to Milošević and to the close and secret collaboration and planning of the war between the army's chiefs and Serbian and Montenegrin leaders. Belgrade's lawyer Srđa Popović draws on an enormous number of documents (memoirs, transcripts and testimonies) to show that this was – according to the Yugoslav Constitution and laws still in force at that time – an anti-constitutional conspiracy of the above-mentioned leaders which had as its goal the creation of a Serbia-dominated state on the ruins of the Yugoslav federation (2008).

The JNA and Milošević himself often claimed that they were actually defending Yugoslavia against separatists whether they were Albanian, Croatian or Slovenian. The fact that their 'defence' of Yugoslavia went hand in hand with Serbian nationalist expansion progressively alienated non-Serbs from any idea of a common South-Slavic state. The JNA, therefore, became a key player in the inter-republic strife, not as an independent actor, but rather as 'an army without a state' as it was dubbed by its last military commander Veljko Kadijević in the subtitle of his 1993 memoir 'My View of the Break-up'. Indeed, 'an army without a state' – in search of a state.

Conclusion: The price of war

The consequences of the wide-scale violence that occurred in the former Yugoslavia and USSR are still felt. Croatia ended the Serb rebellion in 1995 with a military takeover that left large portions of Croatia empty of its Serb minority. Bosnia-Herzegovina is internally divided and supervised by international bodies. Although local nationalist leaders often invoke partition of the country, there has been no significant inter-ethnic violence since 1995. Serbia is still a country with no consensus on its borders and is still fighting its nationalist ghosts, the consequences of its engagement in Croatia and Bosnia and the loss of Kosovo as well as Montenegro's departure. The recent fragmentation turned it into a landlocked country much smaller in size than it was before its expansionist campaigns. In the post-Soviet world, meanwhile, one finds a series of self-governed entities and frozen conflicts that erupt from time to time, such as that in Georgia in summer 2008. There is no strong will by local actors or by the international community – which is unprepared to tackle the issues in Russia's immediate zone of interests and engagement – to solve the conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Chechnya seems to be forgotten and the brutal Russian governance of the region forgiven in a post-September 11 world. The Ukrainian crisis, the *de facto* annexation of the Crimea by Russia and a conflict in Eastern Ukraine come as a delayed replay of what was already seen elsewhere after the dissolution of socialist multinational federations.

In this chapter, I have suggested that the eruption of violence and its intensity largely depend on questions related to citizenship and individual's citizenship status, his or her rights and security, conflicting interpretations about who should 'own' certain territories and where inter-state borders should be drawn, and, finally, the role of the federal military, its successors or remnants, as the only force possessing the overwhelming means of warfare during the period of dissolution. Obviously, other factors that are closely related to the proposed analysis should be taken into consideration. Any multifactor analysis of each individual case needs to include regional particularities, historical experience, economic concerns, relations between democratic procedures and violence, functioning and forming of political elites, their manipulation of the above-mentioned issues, their armament of loyal formations and paramilitaries, as well as general international context and involvement.

More than twenty years on from that *annus mirabilis*, this analysis has tried to tackle the darker side of the fall of the Wall that has involved the mass destruction of human lives as a consequence of profound changes in the post-socialist world. Finally, a very general lesson from that gloomy side is very simple: when the walls crumble down, no matter where and when, they tend to crumble down on somebody's head. Ironically, the walls sometimes fall down on the heads of the very people who dreamed of tearing them down.