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PREFACE

New politics in a time of crisis

It was back in 1996 that Brian Morris wrote: ‘I think that Socialist Anarchism is the only viable political tradition that complements ecology, and offers a genuine response to the social and ecological crisis that we now face.’³⁵ In the same year, the Zapatista rebels of the Chiapas region in Mexico, who had first emerged two years previously, held the International Encounter for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism. As economies boomed and the brash confidence of market fundamentalists laid claim to the future, these two disparate movements bore witness to the fact that all was not well. The one reminded us of the natural limits of the capacity of the planet to sustain human activity; the other that famine was the constant companion of feast. More surprisingly, both elevated anarchist ideas from a fringe enthusiasm to play a central role in developing a new political strategy to combat both environmental degradation and global poverty. Today in 2012, the confidence of the boom years has evaporated. The financial bubble has burst, Arctic sea ice is melting at an alarming rate and a new politics is emerging, of which, as the activist and anthropologist David Graeber optimistically wrote, ‘Anarchism is the heart of the movement, its soul; the source of what’s new and hopeful about it’.³⁶

As a movement, this new politics has two main strands, economic and ecological, which have both taken many different forms. The movement for economic change was initially described as anti-globalization; it then tried to reclaim a positive image by referring to itself as the global justice movement; later it once again began to be described in terms of what it is against, becoming anti-capitalism. Most recently, the crisis in the Eurozone has created the Indignant Citizens Movement whose actions were copied by Occupy Wall Street, becoming known as the Occupy Movement after its model of protest by camping out in significant public spaces.³⁷ This youthful and noticeably leftist movement certainly draws on anarchism, despite efforts to co-opt it in more orthodox directions. What is more, the movement as a whole has not coalesced around a single, identifiable ideology or programme and has not spawned any centralized organization, much to the confusion of mainstream commentators who really don’t know what to make of it.

Green politics, in contrast, is older, better established and has a number of recognizable organizations and political parties standing for office in liberal democracies. Yet, even though Green organizations are becoming more conventional in the way they operate, Green politics itself has generated a variety of perspectives, many of which still sit way outside the comfort zone of mainstream politics. The convergence point of the two movements is scepticism about the direction of contemporary industrial societies and the urgent need to place the primary focus on the universal well-being of the person and the planet. However, on the specifics, there is little agreement and there is a sense that what both branches of this new politics have created is not a coherent movement but a radical milieu, a place of experiment and discussion – one similar in many ways to the milieu of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Before concentrating on its historical antecedents, it is good to hold some of the modern ideas fresh in our minds so that we can sense the resonances of the past running through the ideas of the radicals of today.

The origins of modern Green politics are conventionally traced back to the publication of Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring*, one of the first attempts to popularize worries about the use of chemicals in agriculture, although one of the aims of this book is to show that the politics of ecology is the offspring of a much older response to the rise of industrial society. Meanwhile, serious research into the consequences of increasing greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere had commenced more than a decade previously. Though global warming is top of the list of environmental threats today, in the 1960s this did not impact on the public imagination in the same way as the death of birds. Popularized environmentalism became the force behind new pressure groups, but, of course, the only real implication of Carson's book was to stop using DDT, not to revolutionize society. That environmentalism developed a political and social analysis to accompany its ecological one was by no means inevitable, nor was it necessary that it should have taken the form that it did. After all, romantic nature worship had played a part in Nazi ideology. Fortunately, eco-fascism has mainly confined itself to fictional dystopias and Greens chose to gaze leftwards, seeing that the environmental issues that had energized them were linked to the social, economic and cultural conflicts highlighted by the political left. To solve the former meant dealing with the latter. And so, ecology, as with nuclear weapons and peace politics before it, provided a vehicle for the activism of left-leaning radicals who were uncomfortable with both conventional mainstream politics and the constraining orthodoxies of the Marxist left. Left libertarians could now rally behind a green flag.

This Green ideology bore strong echoes of the past. Partly, this was a simple case of reinvention; arguments were put forward that reached similar conclusions to forgotten nineteenth-century discourses. However, there was also a process of rediscovery, a conscious choice to revive that

analysis, sometimes with the participation of people who connected the old and new movements. The most conspicuous of these was Murray Bookchin's attempt to combine anarchism and environmentalism into what he called Social Ecology,³⁸ despite his disdain for the 'tyranny of ossuary guardians ... who can be expected to lift a bony finger from out of the crypt and reprove us for ignoring nineteenth-century anarchists' passages on ecologically oriented social relationships and humanity's relationship to nature'.³⁹

The traditional divide in Green political thinking has conventionally been described as being between deep and shallow ecology. The coining of these terms is widely accredited to the Norwegian writer Arne Naess, who described shallow ecology, somewhat unfairly, as being concerned with 'the health and affluence of people in the developed countries' through fighting pollution and resource depletion. Deep ecology, however, is based on 'biospherical egalitarianism' ... 'a deep-seated respect, even veneration, for ways and forms of life [and] the equal right to live and blossom'.⁴⁰ Naess was making a clear distinction between an anthropocentric and ecocentric approach, one that has human well-being as the central concern and the other that sees the planet, or a sacralized nature, as the heart of environmental politics, of which humans are merely a dependent part.

One way to comprehend the scope of Green thought is to think of it as a spectrum. Each point on the scale reflects the extent to which contemporary industrial societies are accepted or rejected, each with a differing explanation as to the nature of oppression. Feminist critiques of patriarchy, socialist notions of exploitation, opposition to the domination of other species by humans and many other perspectives combine and recombine into a range of different variants of Green thought. At each end sits two sharply polarized extremes, the buoyant celebration of modernity of the 'new ecologists' and the decidedly gloomy outlook of the neo-primitivists.

'New ecology' is a combination of Green and ethical consumerism with an acceptance of the controlling role of humans in the biosphere. Because of this, it falls to the very people who have created the crisis to fix it. Modernity and advanced technology are not the problem; they provide the solution. 'New ecologists' are not anti-state or anti-capitalist; they favour nuclear energy to combat global warming, genetically engineered food to eliminate hunger and malnutrition; and, above all, urbanization as the most ecologically sustainable form of human habitation, promoting sociability, community and inventiveness. It is as if they were being deliberately heretical. They may be thoroughly realistic about the environmental dangers we face, but they are also hugely optimistic about our ability to solve the problems through continuing advances in technology. The environment requires the problem-solving skills of the engineer, not the romantic dreams of the social revolutionary. As one of their leading lights, Stewart Brand puts it,

If Greens don't embrace science and technology and jump ahead to a leading role in both, they may follow the Reds into oblivion.⁴¹

In contrast, deep green anarcho-primitivists are utterly hostile to modernity. For them, there is a dystopia and it is now; we are living in it. In fact it isn't just modernity that concerns them, they think that it all went wrong in the Neolithic era. They base much of their thinking on an historical narrative that combines a partial reading of archaeological and anthropological evidence to assert that 'life before domestication/agriculture was in fact largely one of leisure, intimacy with nature, sensual wisdom, sexual equality, and health'.⁴² This is contrasted with modernity, which is written of as a catalogue of alienation, mental illness, misery and despair.⁴³ That humans were expelled from Eden is not down to the displeasure of God, but the rise of the state, itself intrinsically linked to settled agriculture, as a system of domination, slavery and exploitation.

In all anarcho-primitivist writing two themes are present throughout. The first is the Traditionalist notion of 'inversion', the idea that progress is, in fact, regression and that everything is getting worse. In this way, the Renaissance is seen as another step in the death of human communities and the Enlightenment as a further elimination of wisdom. The second is an existential notion of nature, not seeing it as being merely our material environment, but as something integral, spiritual and life-enhancing. Both are evident in this extract from Fredy Perlman's idiosyncratic account of human history:

Reduced to blank slates by school, we cannot know what it was to grow up heirs to thousands of generations of vision, insight, experience.

We cannot know what it was to learn to hear the plants grow, and to feel the growth.

We cannot know what it was to feel the seed in the womb and learn to feel the seed in earth's womb, to feel as the Earth feels, and at last to abandon oneself and let Earth possess one, to Become Earth, to become the first mother of all life. We're truly poor. Thousands of generations of vision, insight and experience have been erased.⁴⁴

These sweeping generalization do not impress; however, at least they do not lapse into the misanthropy of nostalgic conservatism.⁴⁵ Neo-primitivists advocate human freedom, though seeing it as freedom *from* civilisation, and argue that individual and communal self-realization can only take place in 'wilderness'.

These mark the extremes of the Green movement. So, what do the subjects of this book have in common with them? Well, despite the shared view of the state as an imposed form of oppression, very little with anarcho-primitivists. They do have contemporary antecedents in the 'back

to the land' movement and some of their esoteric notions can be found in Theosophy, but nineteenth-century ecological anarchism was actually closer to the 'new ecologists'. For instance, the celebration of the city is to be found in Kropotkin, Reclus and Geddes. They too felt that a living city was an organic community shaped by the actions of its people rather than being ruled, or even planned, from above. Both groups also supported city gardening and bio-regionalism. Importantly, the 'new ecologists' are advocates of the rights of urban squatters to security of tenure, giving them possession and/or property rights to their living space. Most of all, the anarchists discussed here were hugely enthusiastic about advanced and ever-improving technologies, seeing in them the potential for human liberation and social evolution. Many came from the secular rationalist Freethought tradition. They were enlightenment thinkers who would have shared the despair of Murray Bookchin, who raged against what he called 'the current apostles of irrationality'.⁴⁶

Where these early anarchist would diverge from 'new ecology' is in its failure to develop an emancipatory political economy and its complacency about existing power structures. This is what Bookchin attempted to redress with his Social Ecology, firmly rooted in a critique of the hierarchical nature of capitalism and capitalist society and the need to replace it with a form of ecological socialism, administered through a decentralized municipal libertarianism.

Bookchin's refusal to countenance the philosophy of deep ecology led him to finally break with anarchism, advocating a new (and thoroughly anarchistic) communalism in its place. A bridge between the two was suggested by John Clark, who argued for 'An authentic social ecology ... inspired by a vision of human communities achieving their fulfilment as an integral part of the larger, self-realizing earth community'.⁴⁷ And it is this that best characterizes mainstream modern Green politics, bringing together opposition to hierarchy with the idea of self-regulating sustainable communities, sitting within ecologically coherent bio-regions whose borders are determined by natural features rather than political and ethnic divisions. It is a picture that envisages humans living freely as an equal partner with nature, rather than being its sovereign. It is a broad church, more critical of modern industrial society than the 'new ecologists', accommodating a range of positions, and it has also been a spur for activism. Its political model is participatory, communal and non-hierarchical. Its focus on environmental issues meant that it could reach out beyond its ideological soul mates, creating, for example, a coalition with conservationists over road building, as well as with one with animal welfare organizations to campaign against fox hunting and the use of animals in scientific research. The impact of its broader political style and ideological message has been more limited, however. Rather than convert mainstream politics to a distinctly Green non-hierarchical approach, it is the mainstream that has reformed Green

political parties in its own image. As a result, there was space for another political movement that would articulate more than ecological issues.

This new movement would be a voice for political and economic change concentrating on the impact on people and the planet of turbo-capitalism and growing corrosive inequality. Its target was the elite consensus around neo-liberal political economy, often described as 'free market economics', it saw it as anything but free. Instead, its opponents argued that just as the state reduced its role in social welfare and demand management, it was active in creating and policing an environment that allowed transnational corporations to operate as they wished, whilst reducing social protection against corporate power and the ability of people to resist. Neo-liberalism was also an international project, with rules enforced by international organizations, going by the shorthand term of 'globalization'. The movement was to gain renewed strength and purpose in reaction to the austerity programmes adopted in the wake of the financial crash of 2008. But its first manifestation was as a rural protest, right at the intersection between ecology and political economy.

The Zapatista rising is often seen as the inspiration for the mass protests that developed against a particular version of global capitalism. It bore all the familiar hallmarks of a Latin American insurgency, but it actually subverted the genre. The young urban intellectuals who went into the Lacandón jungle were changed by the experience and abandoned Marxist/Leninist revolutionary orthodoxy in favour of an acceptance of the limits of ideology and of revolutionary violence. Instead, they have tried to establish a localized, participatory, non-hierarchical movement, supporting the land rights of indigenous peoples and peasants against the impact of globalized free trade. Their revolutionary experiment struck a chord with many younger activists who were increasingly disillusioned with the mainstream and were seeking alternatives. Its lack of a prescriptive ideology also allowed a wide range of individuals and groups to vest their hopes in *Zapatismo*.

Yet, the Zapatistas were not the first to fight for the right to land ownership and the preservation of the cultures of indigenous peoples. They shared prominence within the protest movement with groups like the Brazilian landless peasants movement, *Sem Terra*, but I want to concentrate on something very different, communities that not only came into conflict with global trade and resource depletion, but also with the environmental movement. These are northern peoples who earned their living through whale and seal hunting.

Unlike agricultural land, where forms of ownership or secure occupation can be more easily defined, the seas are typical of what Elinor Ostrom called 'common-pool resources'.⁴⁸ These are theoretically open to all to use. Ostrom's most celebrated work was to show how seemingly unrestrained access to the commons, conventionally thought to result in overuse and

ecological damage, was, in reality, limited by the users acting collectively through institutions of their own making that were very different to either the state or the market. In this way, people have managed local ecosystems with considerable success.

This is precisely what Terry Glavin's book, *The Lost and Left Behind*,⁴⁹ describes. The book is a defence of diversity and reports on some of the damage being done by our era, the age of the Sixth Great Extinction. Glavin does not confine himself to bio-diversity and the loss of different species; he also includes the loss of cultures and languages together with the stories that unfold from them, a vernacular literature that is slowly slipping from our grasp. And culture is one of the tools of ecological self-regulation. It is because of this that he writes in support of rural communities that have lived off hunting and trading in the products of marine mammals in the far north. Consequently, he pits himself against Greens on some of their most emotive causes: the Canadian seal hunt, Norse whaling and the Faroe Islanders' harvesting of pilot whales. There's a reason for this. The preservation of human communities against the forces of exploitation and the conservation of natural species go hand-in-hand. For example, some of the first protests against industrial-scale whaling were riots by Norse whalers against Norway's new whaling stations in the early twentieth century. They had a vested interest. The unsustainable slaughter of whales being ushered in would not only deprive them of their livelihoods, but of their culture. The two were bound together in the practice of sustainability. The contrast between the ecological expertise of small whaling communities and the industrialized whaling fleets, together with the blunderings of international regulatory organizations makes one point clear: human liberty, self-determination and ecological sustainability are inextricably linked, something that would not have been lost on the earlier ecological anarchists.⁵⁰

Rural communities and developing countries were the cradle of protest. They had felt the impact of neo-liberalism first, mainly as a result of the structural adjustment packages forced on them as a result of the earlier debt crisis that followed the Mexico default of 1982. At the World Trade Organization convention in Seattle in 1999, the developed world caught up. The mass demonstrations and the battles with the police presaged a period of fluctuating outbursts of urban protest that continues to this day. The financial crisis has brought a new dimension. The movements in Greece and Spain have a direct cause and target – the austerity programmes imposed by international lenders in response to the Eurozone debt crisis – but the broader Occupy movement is harder to pin down. Some of the ideas being pitched seem to be simply a nostalgia for paternalistic capitalism, some call for a revival of Keynesian social democracy, others indulge anti-industrialist ideas such as degrowth, Marxists hope that this is the start of the final crisis of capitalism, anarchists that think they can subvert the state. It is indeed a 'movement of movements' and this seeming lack of coherence

has been a target of its enemies and critical friends alike. For example, Featherstone, Henwood and Parenti describe the protesters as ‘activists’ who see self-righteous and purposeless activism as their sole aim.⁵¹ This sentiment reflects one of the main criticisms of Occupy, that it has failed to incorporate older established organizations, such as labour unions, and to develop a coherent political and economic strategy. This is a cogent argument, but one based on a misapprehension. What it really shows is that political commentators are uncomfortable with the messiness of a milieu.

Of course, there is more to it than that. No movement would be self-sustaining if all it had was a vacuum at its heart. There are two factors animating it. I find the first worrying; it is that the movement is an expression of growing disillusion with liberal democracy. An elite ideological consensus creates the illusion that there is no difference and no choice between parties and politicians. It is an overstatement. There are real differences in many areas and electoral politics holds out the promise of more than illusory change, however limited. Added to this is the sense that political elites are part of an oligarchy, self-serving representatives of corporate rather than popular interests. It is easy to be cynical, but the difference between dictatorship and democracy is still profound. Just try mounting mass demonstrations in Syria. However, there is a more convincing case to be made about the undermining of democracy by corporate and financial power, especially for indebted nations. Debt is a power relationship; the creditor can dictate terms to the debtor. When national states are reduced to the role of supplicant, representative democracy is compromised. Thus, Occupy is attempting to restore it by other means. Its alternative method is the practice of ‘horizontality’, a participatory system of decision-making through committee structures without fixed hierarchies. Whether the enthusiasm and stamina needed to maintain the consequent myriad of meetings could be sustained outside an activist network must be in doubt. But there is a sense that this offers an antidote to managerialism within smaller organizations, without the risk of co-option and careerism inherent in representation.

The second factor is much more important. Occupy never set out to be the starting point for the creation of a social alternative; it is the product of one that already existed. The Spanish sociologist, Manuel Castells has studied empirical examples of what he calls ‘network societies’. For Castells, culture is at the heart of economics and rather than seeing counter-culture as dilettante self-indulgence, he thought it was a measured response to a sense of dissatisfaction with contemporary political economy. People began to seek greater freedom and fulfilment, rather than financial reward, through a growing informal economy and the communication networks that made it possible. When the financial system imploded, those operating in the informal economy felt vindicated in their beliefs and began to look outwards to respond positively to the crisis. This is how the Indignant

Citizens Movement was born, only joined later by those distressed by the sudden loss of their security and expectations.

In a study of alternative networks in Catalonia in the midst of the Eurozone crisis,⁵² Castells and his team of researchers identified a vast range of alternative economic action. These included ecological food production and distribution; independent markets and networks to barter goods and services; new social currencies and small-scale ethical banking; free universities; free Wi-Fi networks; and a range of cultural and social activities, particularly around music. People were beginning to fill the void left by the withdrawal of the state and the failing economy. They were making a new world within the old. Occupy is its political expression.

Castells makes it clear that the foundation of these networks is very middle-class, producing activities that reflected middle-class pretensions. The test for Occupy and the like is whether these actions can prove to be as appealing to broader sections of society. If some of the cultural aspects remain exclusive and unappealing, there are signs that other economic activities, such as local currencies and alternative distribution networks, are proving to be vital in sustaining areas that have been badly affected by the economic crisis.⁵³

Today's activists look to the present and the future, but if they had a glance over their shoulders they would see some figures of the past advocating precisely what they are doing. The grand revolutionary narratives of the Victorian era may not now be in vogue, but the ideals of liberty and independence, of mutual action and mutual aid were all there, as were those of ecology and sustainability. It is now time to look back at the extraordinarily inventive intellectual climate of radical Britain in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as those other generations of activists and thinkers set out on their own path to try and make another world possible.

Notes

- 1 D. Urquhart, *The Spirit of the East, Illustrated in a Journal of Travels Through Roumeli During an Eventful Period*, Volume 1 (Carey and Hart: Philadelphia, 1839), p.198.
- 2 See Jon Henley's series of reports for the Guardian newspaper, *Greece on the Breadline*, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/series/greece-on-the-breadline> (accessed 15 May 2012).
- 3 Samuel Clark provides a useful taxonomy of five common misrepresentations of anarchism: violence, nihilism, political skepticism, nostalgic primitivism, and finally, impossible utopianism. His book is a defence of utopianism against the charge of impossibility. Samuel Clark, *Living Without*

Domination: The Possibility of an Anarchist Utopia (Ashgate: Aldershot and Burlington, 2007), see pp.8–11.

- 4 Which is why Purkis and Bowen avoid a single definition in favour of the idea of diverse and developing anarchisms. Jonathan Purkis and James Bowen, *Changing Anarchism: Anarchist Theory and Practice in a Global Age* (Manchester University Press: Manchester and New York, 2004).
- 5 John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1980), p.63.
- 6 John Moore, ‘Lived Poetry: Stirner, Anarchy, Subjectivity and the Art of Living’, in Purkis and Bowen, *Changing Anarchism*, pp.55–72.
- 7 Ruth Kinna, *Anarchism: A Beginner’s Guide* (One World: Oxford, 2005), p.3.
- 8 Randall Amster et al., *Contemporary Anarchist Studies: An Introductory Anthology of Anarchy in the Academy* (Routledge: London and New York 2009), p.3.
- 9 Seán M. Sheehan, *Anarchism* (Reaktion Books: London 2003), p.42.
- 10 Ibid p.159.
- 11 Colin Ward, *Anarchism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford University Press: Oxford and New York, 2004), p.69.
- 12 David Goodway, *Anarchist Seeds Beneath the Snow: Left Libertarian Thought and British Writers from William Morris to Colin Ward* (Liverpool University Press, 2006), p.3.
- 13 Though the American individualist anarchist Benjamin Tucker tried to – see the discussion in Chapter Four.
- 14 David Graeber, *Debt: The First 5,000 Years* (Melville House: New York, 2011) Kindle Edition.
- 15 Ibid Kindle location 1914 (Chapter Five).
- 16 Ibid Kindle location 5001 (Chapter Nine).
- 17 Paul Seabright, *The Company of Strangers: A Natural History of Economic Life* (Princeton University Press: Princeton and Oxford, 2005).
- 18 Ibid p.4.
- 19 For Graeber the real issue is between the personal and impersonal nature of markets. For example, he argues that in the Islamic societies of the Middle Ages with exchange based on the personal principles of extensive trust, rather than self-interest and law, markets did operate as such an instrument of cooperation. Graeber, *Debt*, Kindle locations 5948–55.
- 20 Two good accounts are to be found in Jan Marsh, *Back to the Land. The Pastoral Impulse in Victorian England from 1880 to 1914* (Quartet, London, 1982) and Peter C. Gould, *Early Green Politics. Back to Nature, Back to the Land & Socialism in Britain 1880–1900* (Harvester Press: Sussex and St Martin’s Press: New York, 1988).
- 21 For a comprehensive history see Mark Sedgwick, *Against the Modern World: Traditionalism and the Secret Intellectual History of the Twentieth Century* (Oxford University Press: Oxford and New York, 2004).

- 22 Andre Gunder Frank, *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age* (University of California Press: Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1998).
- 23 Frank goes further and argues that capitalism and socialism are ideological constructs based on the idea of the Industrial Revolution as being solely a product of Western societies. Instead he argues for an holistic approach to economic history that would show that the rise of the West was as part of a global economy and not due to specifically Western conditions. In other words, the capitalist society derided by Traditionalists is as much a product of their eulogized East as of the West.
- 24 Michael Bywater, *Lost Worlds: What Have We Lost and Where Did it Go?* (Granta: London, 2004), pp.32–3.
- 25 Allan Antliff, *Anarchist Modernism: Art, Politics, and the First American Avant-Garde* (University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London, 2001), see in particular pp.123–39.
- 26 Sedgwick, *Against the Modern World*, pp.34–6 and 51–3.
- 27 Arthur Versluis, ‘A Conversation with Peter Lamborn Wilson’, *Journal for the Study of Radicalism*, Vol. 4, no2 (Fall 2010), pp.139–65.
- 28 *Anarchist Traditionalism: Hakim Bey*, <http://traditionalistblog.blogspot.co.uk/2012/01/anarchist-traditionalism-hakim-bey.html> (accessed 17 May 2012).
- 29 Fredy Perlman, *Against His-story, Against Leviathan* (e-book, The Anarchist Library, 2011), p.13. Retrieved on 23 February 2012 from: http://theanarchistlibrary.org/HTML/Fredy_Perlman__Against_His-story__Against_Leviathan.html
- 30 John Stuart Mill, *Principles of Political Economy: With Some of their Applications to Social Philosophy* (Longmans, Green and Co.: London, 1920), p.751.
- 31 Frank, *ReOrientation*, p.331.
- 32 For an excellent summary see Stephen Davies, *Empiricism and History* (Palgrave: Basingstoke and New York, 2003), pp.110–25.
- 33 Though not always, the split in the Social Democratic Federation and the subsequent ousting of William Morris from the Socialist League, his own creation, by the anarchist faction was a particular example of vicious factionalism in action.
- 34 Carissa Honeywell, *A British Anarchist Tradition: Herbert Read, Alex Comfort and Colin Ward* (Continuum: New York and London, 2011).
- 35 Brian Morris, *Ecology and Anarchism: Essays and Reviews on Contemporary Thought* (Images Publishing (Malvern) Ltd: Worcestershire, 1996), p.5.
- 36 David Graeber, ‘The New Anarchists’, in Tom Mertes (ed.), *A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible?* (Verso: London and New York, 2004), p.203.
- 37 A friend and fellow researcher into anarchist history was part of Occupy Tunbridge Wells. Those unfamiliar with the UK need to know that this is one of the most affluent, genteel and conservative towns in Kent, within commuting distance of London.

- 38 For the most comprehensive expression of his views, see Murray Bookchin, *The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy* (Black Rose Books: Montréal, 1991).
- 39 In Murray Bookchin, Brian Morris, Rodney Aitchtey, Graham Purchase, Robert Hart, Chris Wilbert, *Deep Ecology & Anarchism: A Polemic* (Freedom Press: London, 1993), p.57. Sadly for the late Bookchin, this book is precisely such an exercise in ossuary guardianship.
- 40 Arne Naess, *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy*, trans. David Rothenberg (Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.28.
- 41 Stewart Brand, *Whole Earth Discipline: Why Dense Cities, Nuclear Power, Transgenic Crops, Restored Wildlands, Radical Science, and Geoengineering are Necessary* (Atlantic Books: London, 2010), p.232.
- 42 John Zerzan, *Future Primitive and Other Essays* (Autonomedia: New York, 1994), p.16.
- 43 Again, this is based on highly selective readings that ignore anything positive about contemporary life and, as Zerzan has done, lumps together disparate aspects of modern life – drugs dependency, suicide rates, obesity and credit card fraud – to create an image of all-pervading unhappiness. See Zerzan's essay, 'The Mass Psychology of Misery', in *Future Primitive and Other Essays*, pp.47–73. As a person of a rather sunny disposition, it is reading Zerzan rather than modernity that I find depressing.
- 44 Fredy Perlman, *Against His-story*, p.13. Personally, I find his reading of history preposterous.
- 45 A classic example of this is the late Tory MP Alan Clark, who was close to the circle around the Goldsmiths and the zoo-keeper John Aspinall. A supporter of animal rights, one of his diary entries discusses his reaction to shooting a heron which had been taking his fish: 'I cursed and blubbed up in my bedroom, as I changed into jeans and a T-shirt. I was near a nervous breakdown. Yet if it had been a burglar or a vandal I wouldn't have given a toss. It's human beings that are the vermin.' Alan Clark, *Diaries* (Phoenix: London, 1994), p.304.
- 46 Murray Bookchin, *The Philosophy of Social Ecology: Essays on Dialectical Naturalism* (Black Rose Books: Montréal, 1994), p.179.
- 47 John Clark, *Municipal Dreams: a Social Ecological Critique of Bookchin's Politics* (Anarchy Archives, CD burned 3 October 2001), p.1.
- 48 Elinor Ostrom, *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action* (Cambridge University Press, 1990), see especially Chapter One.
- 49 Terry Glavin, *The Lost and Left Behind: Stories from the Age of Extinctions* (Saqi: London, San Francisco and Beirut, 2007).
- 50 Of course Reclus would have demurred in this case, given his vegetarianism, as would others such as the Humane Socialist, Henry Salt.
- 51 Liza Featherstone, Doug Henwood and Christine Parenti, 'Activism: Left Anti-Intellectualism and its Discontents', in Eddie Yuen, Daniel Burton-Rose

and George Katsiaficas (eds), *Confronting Capitalism: Dispatches from a Global Movement* (Soft Skull Press: Brooklyn, 2004), p.309.

- 52 Joana Conill, Manuel Castells, Amalia Cardenas and Lisa Servon, 'Beyond the Crisis: The Emergence of Alternative Economic Practices', in Manuel Castells, João Caraça and Gustavo Cardoso (eds), *Aftermath: The Cultures of the Economic Crisis* (Oxford University Press, 2012).
- 53 A good example is the alternative currency TEM, now in widespread use in the nearest city to my Greek house, Volos in Magnesia. See <http://www.tem-magnisia.gr/> (Greek language only).