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The English individualists

There is a conventional historical narrative that portrays the incremental growth of collectivist political economy as something promoted and fought for by popular movements, an almost inevitable part of the process of industrial modernization. Whether described in class terms as the ‘forward march of labour’ or ideologically as the rise of socialism, the narrative is broadly the same. The old certainties had to give way in the face of modern mass societies. This poses no problem for anarcho-communism. It can be accommodated comfortably on the libertarian wing of collectivism. But what of individualism? It seems out of place, a curiosity; the last gasp of a liberal England that was about to die. Perhaps that explains its comparative neglect. Yet seen as part of the radical milieu of the time, it seems neither anomalous nor a fringe movement. It stood firmly in the tradition of a left libertarian radicalism that was a serious competitor of the collectivist left.

There were two main groupings of individualists in late Victorian Britain. Those who identified themselves explicitly as anarchists are the subjects of the next chapter. This one concerns itself with a group of thinkers strongly influenced by the ideas of Herbert Spencer¹ and clustered around a number of individuals and organizations, of which three stand out: Wordsworth Donisthorpe’s Liberty and Property Defence League (LPDL); the Personal Rights Association, closely associated with Joseph Hiam Levy; and Auberon Herbert’s Voluntarist movement. Their place as part of the anarchist movement is contested. For many, they have appeared to be conservatives rather than radicals, Max Nettlau was particularly scathing:

... the anti-socialist bourgeoisie ... and the greed of unlimited exploitation, had stirred up in England a certain agitation in favour of pseudo-individualism, an unrestrained exploitation. To this end, they enlisted the services of a mercenary pseudo-literature. I refer to the ‘*Liberty and Property Defence League*’ of the years 1880–1890, and

other similar publications, which played with doctrinaire and fanatical ideas in order to project a species of 'non-interventionism' that would let a man die of hunger rather than offend his dignity.²

Later, Nettlau is kinder to Auberon Herbert than he is to the League but he remains distinctly unimpressed by his effectiveness.³

One of the reasons for this hostility is that they identified themselves as strongly anti-socialist, but this is easy to misunderstand, both today and when they were active. Despite their eager adoption of this label, their definition of the word 'socialism' was restrictive. They were solely *anti-state socialism* and it is also possible to establish an association between individualism and a libertarian approach to early socialist thought.⁴ One historian who has paid attention to individualism is Edward Bristow, who has written the only history of the LPDL, though he doesn't think much of them either:

For this was a doctrine so absolutely unrealizable in form, and so based on the virtues of free competition and private property in content, that it became in practice a defense of the status quo.⁵

Bristow mainly looked at individualism in the context of Spencer's ideas, but he also saw it as part of anarchism, though again he isn't particularly sympathetic.

Individualism also called upon and contributed to the anarchist tradition. It was a millenarian doctrine which anticipated a future anarchist utopia made possible by the withering away of the state ...⁶

Meanwhile, the prominent American individualist anarchist, Benjamin Tucker, was eager, in his usual condescending way, to claim the individualists for anarchism in his journal, *Liberty*:

One of the most interesting papers that come into this office is the *Personal Rights Journal* of London. Largely written by men like J. H. Levy and Wordsworth Donisthorpe, it could not be otherwise. Virtually it champions the same political faith that finds an advocate in *Liberty*. It means by individualism what *Liberty* means by Anarchism. That it does not realize this fact, and that it assumes Anarchism to be something other than complete individualism, is the principal difference between us.⁷

As with earlier studies of anarchism itself, we have to pick our way through misunderstandings caused by a lack of familiarity and see why something that appears superficially to be a species of Tory radicalism should feature in a book with anti-capitalism in its title.

The growth of this variant of individualism can be seen as a reaction to the expansion of the state through both an extension of government intervention and regulation and the 'New Imperialism' of the latter half of the nineteenth century. This was a major impetus to their activism and a target of their critique, but they were not solely reactive. As we have seen, individualism also had a direct link to Hodgskin and the intellectual ferment of the 1820s and 1830s. As well as being part of an older tradition of political thought, they were also coterminous with a range of individualist radicals who linked them with other movements such as the co-operator George Jacob Holyoake,⁸ and the former 'moral force' Chartist W. E. Adams.⁹ In addition, some feminists of the Langham Place Group, who initially came together in the 1850s, were very active in later individualist organizations such as the Personal Rights Association.

Even more interestingly, the sentiments that informed individualism were not the sole preserve of intellectuals. There was a strong working-class attachment to the idea of the 'free-born Englishman' that saw compulsion and regulation as an imposition. At this time, the doctrine of self-help was not a Victorian fantasy but a daily reality of working-class life. The existence of self-help organizations, owned and controlled by their members, was one of the reasons why it has been suggested that the call for social reform and state welfare originally emanated from the middle, rather than the working, classes.¹⁰ Self-help was also accompanied by 'self-improvement' and a strong working-class autodidact tradition.¹¹ The result was the expression of widespread distrust and resentment of regulation, which was seen as being the imposition of the values of one class on another. It seemed to many that social reform was both a form of social control and an attempt to eradicate pleasure. This was particularly so with the opposition to temperance, which forged a strictly tactical alliance between brewers and drinkers.¹²

Stephen Reynolds captured this sentiment beautifully in his book *'Seems So!'* (co-authored with two Devon fishermen, Bob and Tom Wooley),¹³ about the lives and opinions of working people in Devon. Reynolds recognized that working-class political consciousness existed, but insisted it was not socialist.¹⁴ Instead, he reckoned that it was based on a cluster of attitudes, which 'tend ... towards a New Toryism or Nationalism, a Nationalism founded on respect for the poor; less bent on "raising them out of their station" than on providing them with justice in that station, and the chance of bettering themselves whenever by their own efforts they can do it.'¹⁵ Crucial to that consciousness is a rejection of the imposition of middle-class values on the working classes. According to Reynolds, Victorian values, even where they informed reform, were instruments of class oppression. He wrote:

They know very well that in almost everything there is one law for the rich and another for themselves; and they are beginning to realize that

much of the so-called democratic legislation of recent years (above all, that of the grandmotherly sort) has increased the injustice, has more heavily penalized poverty, has intruded further into their homes, has interfered less and less tolerantly with their own habits and customs.¹⁶

Reynolds' book is innovative social reportage in which he recorded the views of his two co-authors in their own Devonshire dialect. Their opinions consistently supported non-interference. None more so than in their attitudes to temperance:

There's lots o' things concerning drink that they an't worked out eet, for all they tries to force 'ee from it. An' if they close public-houses, they'll only lead people to take it in house 'long wi' 'em, which is ten thousand times worse, 'cause they nips at it all day till 'tis gone ... They says that drink is the ruin of thousands, don' 'em; but if you looks into it you'll generally find there's summut besides the drink ... I don't think people mostly drinks for drinking's sake. You goes in for the company – for to see a bit o' life. There's a lot to be learnt in pubs, an' 'tis a fine affair, I reckon, for to hae a good chatter over a glass or two o' beer. If you didn't do that you'd go to bed an' sleep. An' that's all some o'em wants 'ee to do, seems so – work an' sleep – an' never enjoy no life.¹⁷

This outlook was allied to a suspicion of the police, a well-founded cynicism of the vested interests embodied in electoral politics, and an awareness of the power of wealth and its propensity to deprive the poor of their independence. Reynolds was quite clear that self-regulation and economic justice for manual workers was the underpinning of working-class political awareness. These are precisely the issues addressed by the individualists.

These attitudes also produced popular political organizations and pressure group activity. The most prominent one was the campaign that was set up to resist the Compulsory Vaccination Act of 1853.¹⁸ Its supporters were often active in other radical movements; former Chartists were early supporters and, inevitably, it drew in individualists later. In some ways, this resistance seems strange to modern eyes, but given the state of medical knowledge at the time and the method of vaccination used, often arm-in-arm with danger of cross-infection, it is understandable. What is more significant is that it had considerable working-class support. Partly, this was down to ignorance and misinformation, but much else related to working-class political attitudes. Two were important. The first was the attachment to what we would now call 'alternative medicine'.¹⁹ There was certainly suspicion of the professionalization of medical practice, but there was also an attraction to the idea of 'medical liberty',²⁰ a free market in medical care between professional medicine, seen as 'a tyrannical system of state-sanctioned interference with the lives and health of an oppressed people',²¹

and self-medication, the free choice of a free people. The second was more important, the assertion of the right of the working classes to govern their own families and to control their own bodies. This was expressed in terms of individual ownership of both their own children and of the self,²² a key individualist concept. Overall, the opponents of compulsory vaccination did not see the law as a public health measure, but as class legislation. This was fertile ground for individualists, although the main movement germinated in another campaign, the one against the Contagious Diseases Acts, whose leading figure was Josephine Butler.

Josephine Butler – libertarian feminist

The Contagious Diseases Acts applied to garrison towns and were aimed at the prevention of the spread of venereal disease among the armed forces. They enabled the forcible medical inspection of women suspected of prostitution and their detention if found to be infected. Moral campaigners were highly critical as they argued that the laws, in effect, amounted to an acceptance, licensing and regulation of prostitution. A National Association had been formed to campaign against the laws, but it excluded women from membership. As a result, Butler set up the Ladies National Association for the Repeal of the Contagious Diseases Acts in 1869 and came to dominate the movement, bringing a different perspective with her.

Butler is now a widely admired figure and rightly so. Conventionally, her activism is seen as being the product of both her evangelical Christianity and grief at the accidental death of her daughter in 1863, though I find it hard to see how someone with her upbringing in a politically active liberal family and personal convictions would not have become involved in some form of activity anyway. Despite frequent ill-health and continual crises of faith, Butler threw herself into public life, first through the campaign for women's education and then into one of the great causes of Victorian philanthropy, the rescue of 'fallen women' – prostitutes. Yet, shaped by observation, experience and her already well-formed feminism, Butler's concerns were not conventional. It was the physical, not the spiritual welfare of prostitutes that concerned her. Her work began with her caring for individuals, exhausted and ill prostitutes in her own home, before moving on to her political campaigns. It became clear to her that prostitution was not a moral issue, at least not on the part of the prostitutes themselves, but one of exploitation – specifically, the exploitation of women.

Butler's contribution to Victorian feminism is now widely acknowledged, but even the best of her biographers²³ underplay something that is just as important – her libertarianism. This fusion of feminism and libertarianism is particularly evident in her surprising hostility to purity campaigners, despite her agreement with their goals. When W. T. Stead set up the National

Vigilance Association, Jane Jordan comments that Butler wrote ‘protesting against the purity campaigners and their “coercive and degrading treatment” of prostitutes, “in the fatuous belief that you can oblige human beings to be moral by *force*”’.²⁴ What is more, she was aware that the issue of exploitation was not just a matter of gender but also of class. This critique of class and gender exploitation is crucial to individualism.

Feminism was an explicit part of the Campaign’s first Declaration of Policy, which stated that: ‘The Law, in safeguarding individual liberty outside the home, had not, hitherto, discriminated between men and women. The Acts, however, constituted just such a gender discrimination.’²⁵ Not only that, but the difference in the accepted norms of male and female sexual conduct, one of the central hypocrisies of Victorian Britain, were now established by Acts of Parliament. Males were unaffected by the laws and free to infect whom they chose. The Acts were to protect men alone against venereal disease. Furthermore, women were to be effectively punished for being infected by men.

The application of the law led to celebrated cases of ‘innocent’ women caught and effectively sexually abused by medical examination. However, it was not individual injustices that drove the campaign but the legal, institutionalized injustice against women as a social group. The laws were an effective constraint on women’s freedom of movement unescorted by men, restricting their rights to independence outside the home. But there were much more profound implications; the campaign had to confront the fundamental Victorian notions of sexuality and gender. As Petrie writes, the double standard in morality was

shrouded in a vast conspiracy of silence. The onerous duty of any reformer who wished to strike at the roots of prostitution as practised in mid-Victorian England was to shatter that silence. In doing so her actions must, inevitably, be harshly opposed and bitterly resented, for it must seem that she was striking at the very fabric of society.²⁶

Thus, despite Butler holding a somewhat orthodox view of female sexuality, the campaign was deeply subversive.

Butler’s targets were the institutions of patriarchy and so it was inevitable that she should campaign against other discriminatory legislation. One example, in a jointly authored pamphlet,²⁷ is Butler’s attack on the Factory Acts Amendment Bill and the Shop Hours Regulation Bill. Both forms of ‘protective’ legislation sought to limit women’s working hours. Whilst acknowledging the desirability of a general reduction in hours of employment, these Bills were seen as another legislative attack on women’s social rights to employment and an independent income. But the pamphlet didn’t stop there; it set out to attack the hidden assumptions and misogynist intentions that underlay the Bill.

We have said that the ostensible purpose of the Bill is to reduce the hours of women's labour from ten to nine a day; but it, in fact, merely provides for reducing the *paid* labour of women by that one hour daily, and as one of the chief reasons given for this reduction is, that 'the comfort of the home is greatly affected by the prolonged absence of the mother from the family', it is fair to infer that the one hour spared from paid labour at the factory, is spared in order that the mother may employ it in unpaid labour at home.²⁸

This legislation was seen as one of the first steps in the intended removal of women from work, ending any prospect of female independence. The result, the authors insisted, 'would be not to protect, but to oppress women'.²⁹ However, the pamphlet's greatest fury was reserved for the attitudes that both belittled and dehumanized women. It is worth quoting at length.

A Mr G. W. Hastings had given a speech in support of the legislation at the annual meeting of the British Medical Association and Butler was scathing. Hastings' endorsement of the Bill was based on 'a fact which any old nurse in the land could have told them, viz., that mothers' milk is the best food for babes'.

Mr. Hastings proceeded to argue therefrom that it was the duty of our legislators, not – as might have been supposed – to compel married men to provide the nursing mothers of their children with such sufficiency of food as might enable them to supply 'natural nourishment' to their offspring, but to forbid mothers from earning food for themselves. He did not say by what means deserted wives and mothers were to procure food without work.³⁰

Butler was clear that, given liberty, 'nursing mothers would gladly stay at home and perform ... the noble maternal duties with which God has crowned and sanctified womanhood'.³¹ She was no advocate of androgyny, but this did not amount to an acceptance of female inferiority. The pamphlet quotes Hastings again:

Mr. Hastings further said:- 'The argument which is drawn from men to married women ... is largely fallacious, and for this reason, that their destiny in life is dissimilar. Man ... is eminently a working animal, one intended to earn wages to maintain himself and those dependent on him; whereas a MARRIED woman is eminently, ESSENTIALLY, and primarily a child-bearing animal, and it is from that point of view that public policy must look upon her and insist that that view should occupy the foremost place in any legislation affecting her destinies ...

Butler was furious, claiming that Hastings had put women on the same plane as cattle:

Could it be possible that a woman should come forward to declare that 'man is eminently, *essentially*, and primarily a child-begetting animal', the degrading immorality of the assertion would be recognized at once. But it is, perhaps, well that Mr. Hastings has stripped off the veil of false sentiment, and exposed in its ugly nakedness, the base doctrine which does, in fact, secretly underlie the existing and prospective legislation for the assumed protection of our sex.

We protest against this doctrine. Reproduction is not the essential aim of existence for either half of the human race. To declare it such for a woman is to deny the unity of the moral law ... The faculties of reason and conscience are the signs of the *human* nature, and of the right of the human being to voluntary and responsible self-government.³²

The right to 'voluntary and responsible self-government' is a theme that runs through much of her work, alongside her dissection of the prejudiced assumptions of the Victorian male establishment.

A typical example of what she was up against was the ludicrous view of William Acton that women did not have sexual desires. This was based on his observation of prostitutes' failure to experience satisfaction after intercourse with their clients.³³ The obvious conclusion, that prostitutes did not desire sex but needed the money, did not occur to Acton. It certainly did to Butler. In reclaiming the definition of female sexuality for themselves, women could show that prostitution was an expression of destitution, not of a perverted nature. Women were drawn into prostitution by economic injustice, inadequate education, the lack of opportunities for employment and, critically, the psychological damage of long-term sexual abuse inherent in overcrowded housing. Thus a campaign against prostitution, rather than one against prostitutes, would inevitably lead to demands for social change.

The recognition of the systemic nature of poverty undermined the comfortable and conventional charitable impulses of the middle-class philanthropist and meant that the campaign recognized that if legislation was aimed at prostitutes, it was, by definition directed against the poor. Therefore, it was also *class legislation*, whereby one class attempted to subjugate another. The issue of class and gender were thus united. Butler consciously organized her campaigns amongst the working classes and her libertarianism came into play when she insisted that the instrument for class and gender oppression was legislation, even legislation that was supposed to improve working-class conditions. It was undermined fatally by the assumptions of a complacent ruling elite and would always be in their interests alone.

It was a short step from opposition to specific legislation to questioning government itself, especially after Butler had witnessed the brutality of the French 'Police des Mœurs'. Her view of government as a body that enforces the values of a dominant class and gender on the people against both

their wishes and interests led to a profound libertarian critique of state oppression. The crucial point for Butler is that regulation always has to be policed and, as she wrote:

The more absolute a government is, the more will the police be developed; whilst the freer the country is, the more it will follow the principle that everything which can be possibly be left to care of itself should so be left.³⁴

Increasing legislation, however well-intentioned, would have the consequence of corrupting and tyrannizing the state, especially if the police are constituted as ‘an organized body of women-hunters’.³⁵

And so, for Butler, with increasing levels of regulation came the vested interests relying on enforcement for their living, matched by a growth in what we would now call dependency culture.³⁶ She felt that ‘a certain mutual incompetence, languor, almost atrophy grows upon a people which has continued to be over-ridden by a bureaucracy’.³⁷ For Butler, legislation was corrupting and inefficient. Social policy should aim to ‘*prevent* these great evils which our law-makers show themselves so ready to *regulate*’.³⁸ To paraphrase the celebrated political sound bite, Butler was far tougher on the causes of crime than on crime itself. She may have believed in Christian redemption, but her libertarian social policy was firmly utilitarian.

Butler’s own advocacy of radical decentralization was not fully anarchist, yet her class and gender critique would clearly make such an association intellectually comfortable, whilst her combination of feminism and libertarianism with a class analysis was the basis of individualism. It was the source of the concern with ‘over-regulation’. It prompted the foundation of organizations such as the splendidly named ‘Vigilance Association for the Defence of Personal Rights and for the Amendment of the Law wherein it is Injurious to Women’. Better known unsurprisingly by its short title, the Personal Rights Association, it widened the scope of its action to embrace many liberal causes, including anti-vivisection – an early manifestation of animal rights.³⁹ Individualism clearly identified itself as part of a radical and progressive movement and was, at least, in a critical dialogue with early Fabianism, especially when the influence of Charlotte Wilson gave the society a distinctive libertarian tinge.⁴⁰ As a result, the individualists must be seen as part of the late Victorian radical milieu, but one that swam against the tide of the growing influence of Marxism, democratic socialism and the New Liberalism of T. H. Green, L. T. Hobhouse, J. A. Hobson and others.

Individualism was not a coherent movement with a central doctrine; instead, somewhat appropriately, it was represented by the work of a cluster of individuals and associated organizations who shared a number of core assumptions, though they differed as to their application. To

understand individualism and its influence, we need to look at each of the main protagonists in turn.

Wordsworth Donisthorpe and labour capitalization

Of the three main individualist writers, Wordsworth Donisthorpe, Auberon Herbert and Joseph Hiam Levy, Donisthorpe was probably the most interesting, if the easiest to misrepresent. This is partly because his writing can be inconsistent and uncomfortable, being infused with the prejudices of his time and class, and partly due to his role in founding the Liberty and Property Defence League.

Donisthorpe himself was a Victorian polymath and a descendant of William Wordsworth (his mother was the poet's great-niece). Cushioned by family wealth, initially earned through the Yorkshire woollen industry, Donisthorpe qualified as a barrister, though doesn't seem to have practised. His independent income meant that he could devote his time to a wide range of personal obsessions. He was a founder member of the British Chess Association in 1885 and was a pioneer of cinema, inventing a moving picture camera, which he called a Kinesigraph, with his cousin and lifelong collaborator W. C. Crofts.⁴¹ Donisthorpe had already published a book on political economy⁴² before he came to individualism and helped to form the Liberty and Property Defence League. Whilst the League's general aim was the limited one of resisting 'over-legislation', Donisthorpe invested its foundation with great idealism and optimism. It was intended to be the 'embodiment of the absolute principle of civil liberty, or the greatest possible liberty of each compatible with the liberty of all'.⁴³ From the League's earliest days, he was determined to see the organization become one based on political principles and cautioned against 'men who are open to the charge of protesting against State interference with the industry in which they are themselves interested, lest such interference should favour their weaker fellow workers'.⁴⁴

Unfortunately for Donisthorpe, the attendance at the League's founding conference seemed to consist of just such people. It included no less than ten directors of railway companies, who were all facing the possibility of the regulation of fares. They were joined by the representatives of employers' associations and businessmen from Pawnbrokers to the National Federation of Employers of Labour.⁴⁵ So, Nettlau's criticism is not without justification, especially in the light of some of the League's stranger campaigns. It certainly tilted at some odd windmills, as evidenced by its short-lived journal, *Jus*. One example is its campaign against free public libraries:

Everybody knows in his heart that the Free Libraries Act is the legalization of robbery with violence; for it empowers the majority to compel the minority to pay for what they don't want.⁴⁶

There were also some extraordinary misjudgements, such as the description of Kropotkin as a state centralist.⁴⁷ Many assertions were overstated and verged on the bizarre, such as the contention that the reason for the disproportionately higher number of boiler explosions at sea than on land was 'that marine engines are examined by the State and "minded" by State-certificated engineers, while on land they are not – not yet!'.⁴⁸ Sadly, these eccentricities eclipsed criticism of low wages⁴⁹ and its radical political philosophy.

Amongst some of the turgid prose of the League's pamphlets Donisthorpe's originality stands out. He clung hard to his principles and it became clear that a breach was likely. There were a few disagreements that brought this about, but the most significant was the drift of the League to the right and its neglect of the interests of the working classes.⁵⁰ It is hard to disagree with Donisthorpe's pessimistic final editorial in the last issue of *Jus* that 'the League seems to be fast degenerating into a sort of Harassed Interests Defence League'.⁵¹ Shortly after, Donisthorpe resigned from the League, signifying what Wendy McElroy believed was his 'explicit embrace of anarchism'.⁵²

How far Donisthorpe can be described as an anarchist is open to conjecture. There is no doubt, however, that he aspired to anarchism and believed it to be the final destination of human evolution. There are two main elements to his thought, a broad anti-statism and a political economy, which accepts a fairly conventional view of property and the market, but then develops a bitter criticism of the exploitative nature of wage labour that gives it a much more radical twist. He saw his libertarian political economy as an alternative to legislation as a way of dealing with the inequities of Victorian Britain. This alternative provided a link with early British radicalism, together with the continental anarchist tradition derived from Proudhon. By rejecting natural rights and accepting the market, Donisthorpe produced a modernization of these traditions, adapting them to late capitalist society.

Donisthorpe's anti-statism was consistently anti-authoritarian. Consequently, he rejected any possibility of a legislative solution to social problems. He wrote:

... of those who have faith in State-action, it is probable that none follow up the principle to its extreme logical conclusion, and look forward to the time when every man in the land shall have his own inspector to follow him about, to carry his goloshes, and to see that he puts them on before crossing the road; to take notes on what he says; to correct his grammar

and his religious opinions when out of harmony with authorised usage; to see that he drinks what is good for him and no more; to put out his candle at nine at night, and to accompany him twice to church every Sunday. Consistency wavers before such a prospect.⁵³

Of course, this is a very common rhetorical trick. His conclusion may well be 'extreme' but it is by no means 'logical'. He is extending the argument, taking it away from the specific topic of real regulation into a dystopia of Donisthorpe's own making.⁵⁴ No one considered the extreme conclusion because they had not the slightest intention of going there. The legislator's inconsistency was both pragmatic and a virtue. Such rhetoric exemplifies the failure to distinguish between what is now known as social democracy (Donisthorpe called it 'neo-radicalism') and the totalitarian variant of socialism, something that had yet to emerge. This way of arguing was one source of the more curious judgements expressed by the League as well as being a convenient justification for the protection of the self-interest of some of its supporters. That said, Donisthorpe's critique of incremental moral authoritarianism has a modern resonance and is a reflection on his views on the development of the state.

The problem he poses about the state is how we get from what he saw as initially a necessary concentration of power⁵⁵ to liberty. Liberty is the culmination of a process of historical evolution drawing on a Hobbesian understanding of human nature and the possibility of improvement through a process of natural selection. Donisthorpe did not share Proudhon's view of the state as an alien imposition; he saw it as the result of organic growth. As society changes so does the state. His starting point was Hobbes. A state of nature is a state of absolute liberty. This is not to be recommended:

A state of full liberty then, is one in which the strong are free to rob the weak, and the weak are free to rob the strong. Clearly this is an unenviable state of things for the weak. The strong may call it liberty, but the weak call it anarchy. The two are identical.⁵⁶

This is why the social compact arises, together with a form of primitive collectivism, to enable the protection of the weak and the integration of society. This integration ensured the successful evolution of cohesive groups.

The first requisite for social integration was a strong central power which should effectually suppress all forms of individual activity calculated to injure the group as a whole. Tribes which developed this form of organisation waxed strong, while tribes which consisted of undisciplined and *disorderly* numbers were crushed out in the struggle for existence.⁵⁷

But then he parted company with Hobbes. He did not assume that the need for strong, centralized power and the restriction of absolute liberty is permanent. Once established, the state has a tendency to repress the weak in favour of the strong and thus becomes dysfunctional, completely reversing its original purpose. It has to evolve again.

A true Victorian, Donisthorpe saw social evolution as a process leading to ever-higher forms of society. He did not share Kropotkin's views about social regression, each stage of development is better than the previous one, thus he was disparaging of other cultures in a way Kropotkin was not. Like Spencer, he saw progress as passing through identifiable stages. As to government, its earliest form was the family, authoritarian but independent. With social development comes the tendency for power to devolve into increasing number of hands, firstly through the grouping of heads of families and then through other forms of combination such as tribes and nations. Although this tendency leads to the dispersal of power to ever-larger oligarchies, Donisthorpe argued, 'all history shows an increasing tendency towards a democratic form of government, and, moreover ... democracy is not only inevitable, but desirable in all respects'.⁵⁸ But then Donisthorpe departed from his Liberal contemporaries. Nineteenth-century political democracy was nothing of the sort. It was the rule of an oligarchy – in this case, a ruling class.

The end, aim, and test of all government – such is human nature – is the welfare of the ruling class. All history proves it. Human nature is such that it is absolutely impossible to provide against it.⁵⁹

Logically, government can never be democratic and progress will lead us to live without it. Whilst acutely aware of class oppression, Donisthorpe rejected the idea that justice and liberty could be obtained through working-class rule. 'The process of breaking his own fetters is a very different process from that of forging shackles for his neighbours.'⁶⁰

Evolution towards a stateless democracy is partly achieved through a process of natural selection, but his was not a crude social Darwinism. The type of Victorian non-interference that Nettlau castigated would abandon the poor, seeing them as the weakest of the species that nature is weeding out. Not so Donisthorpe, who saw the fitness of the individual to be related to the type of society in which they were living. As he wittily wrote:

... only the careless and unobservant can express doubt as to the existence of real and terrible distress among the working classes all over the world at the present time. There are economists who are ready to say, 'True, at such times the fit must survive and the weak go to the wall; it can't be helped, and therefore it is no use talking.' But this hardly an argument likely to commend itself to the classes who are chiefly interested in the

problem. Besides is there not a weak link in it? Doubtless the unfit will be eliminated, and the fit will survive. But is it quite certain that under existing arrangements it is the absolutely unfit who go to the wall? ... That they are unfit under the present system of industrial organisation is proved by the fact that they are short of means of subsistence. The unfit are those who fail. Shipwrecked on a desert island well tenanted by wild beasts, who would be the fittest in the following crew – Socrates, Seneca, Shakespeare, Spenser, and Sykes (the world-renowned Bill)? I would venture to take Bill for choice. But transplant them to another country, under another and a higher social system, and Sykes takes rank with the unfit, and is forcibly or indirectly eliminated. Is it not possible that under a better system of industrial organisation many of those whom the callous political economist stigmatises as the unfit might turn out to be the cream of the race?⁶¹

Social progress changes the nature of competition and survival. The current state of evolution was far from complete; it was one that witnessed the oppression and debasement of the working classes.

When it comes to the method of transition, Donisthorpe is far less convincing. He offered a series of reformist ‘canons’⁶² for Parliament that seem to be more the product of an inveterate desire to pontificate on policy rather than develop a consistent theoretical model. Yet, he saw even his reformed system of liberal democracy as merely a transitional stage in the evolution of a free society. Evolution was leading history in the direction of ‘ever-increasing political integration’.⁶³ His unbounded confidence in progress and European civilization led him to discount nationalism and the staying power of the nation state. For instance, Donisthorpe insisted that ‘Denmark is disappearing; Holland and Belgium have not many years of independent existence left to them’.⁶⁴ Even more absurdly, he talked of ‘agitation ... in the Colonies in favour of some kind of closer union between the mother country and her offspring’.⁶⁵ His writing is riddled with Victorian Eurocentric and racial assumptions about, for example, ‘the predominant need of the superior race’⁶⁶ in Ireland and his view that ‘the Hindus are somewhat backward in civilisation’.⁶⁷

It is easy to criticize Donisthorpe in the light of twentieth and twenty-first century historical experience, yet few in the late nineteenth century were prepared to admit the possibility of anti-colonial national liberation movements and even fewer would have predicted that faltering steps towards European union would have only been taken after two cataclysmic wars. Calls for federalism and international law were commonplace in Victorian liberalism, especially in the peace movement.⁶⁸ What distinguishes Donisthorpe from mainstream liberalism is his insistence on decentralization as part of the process of integration. This decentralization was not a federation of nation states resting on a process of national

self-determination. It was more radical than that. 'Decentralise down to the unit itself, the individual.'⁶⁹ Social integration and decentralization, seemingly contradictory, are intrinsically linked and together they will have another effect. They will break down the class oppression inherent in the state.

Whilst Donisthorpe's writing displays a robust Victorian confidence in Anglo-Saxon civilization and the concept of historical progress, he was neither historicist nor determinist. A libertarian society is not an automatic end to historical processes; it is a choice. And for Donisthorpe the choice was now one of urgency. Only two options were viable, socialism or individualism. One secures increasing authority, the other greater liberty. It was not just a personal ideological preference that drove Donisthorpe to declare for liberty, but his view that it is functional for social development. Liberty, in higher forms of civilization, tends to permit the voluntary development of features of that civilization. For instance, Donisthorpe's pamphlet arguing for 'free marriage'⁷⁰ is not based on wilder anarchic concepts of free love but on the fact that free, equal and readily dissolvable marriage would, in an advanced society, tend towards monogamy. The evils of Victorian marriage, with its repression of women and encouragement of prostitution, were based on inequity enforced by law.

In fact Donisthorpe was – if this is not a contradiction in terms – a systematic pragmatist. His pragmatism was not the calculating 'triangulation' of twenty-first century political discourse. It was rooted in his concept of a free and tolerant society. Social evolution advances, he thought, 'through a long process of generalisation and friction',⁷¹ vaguely similar to Proudhon's antinomies. Fixed political prescriptions are of little use given the ever-changing nature of society and Donisthorpe avoided them. For example, he refused to be tied to any one definition of justice, despite its importance to his vision of a self-regulating society. Donisthorpe wrote: 'Justice has no meaning at all: that is to say it conveys no definite meaning to the general understanding.'⁷² He continued in a thoroughly Burkeian vein:

I have tried to show that the right course for the State to adopt towards its own citizens – Group Morals – cannot be discovered by deduction from any abstract principles, such as Justice or Liberty; any more than individual morals can be deduced from some underlying law of Virtue. The rules of conduct by which States should be guided are intelligible cannons based on centuries of experience, very much like the rules by which our own private lives are guided; not absolutely trustworthy but better than no general rules at all.⁷³

Donisthorpe was being somewhat disingenuous here. He had a firm principle of emerging justice, the roots of which lie in Spencer's Law of

Equal Freedom.⁷⁴ Hence, he saw a concept of justice as praxis emerging from two sources. One was a compromise between two opposing interests, resulting in a Proudhonian contract based on self-interest. The second was the offspring of 'parental love' in the 'patriarchal stage of social development'. The parent intervenes to prevent an elder child using its superior strength against a younger one; this is in reality 'an arbitrary State interference'.⁷⁵ For Donisthorpe, justice has a double origin and two incompatible meanings, both reflecting the stark choice facing society that infuses all his writing:

One is socialism: the other is individualism. The one is based originally on parental sympathy which slowly expands from the family to humanity; the other based on selfish compromise, and tends finally to absorb the whole field of law. Altruism tends to become wholly voluntary and law to become wholly based on average individual advantage and implied voluntary contract. Thus scientific anarchy is shown to be the end towards which society is moving. That is to say, we are approaching a state in which law, based on the rights of the selfish, will be tempered not by paternal despotism and compulsory *charity* (a contradiction in terms), but by true voluntary altruism.⁷⁶

Unusually for a barrister, Donisthorpe was explicit about the right to ignore law where it conflicts with liberty, though he does at times deem it imprudent,⁷⁷ but increasingly law ceases to be class imposition as society evolves and conflict progressively diminishes. 'The State or Voluntary Association, by whatever name known, will cease to compel unwilling individuals to join its ranks, because coercion will be no longer required';⁷⁸ whilst state power will be restricted through imbuing 'the hearts of our fellow countrymen with the doctrine of individualism'.⁷⁹

Despite his confidence in the future, Donisthorpe did not feel that we had reached this stage yet and he had a growing sense of urgency about the choices facing society. State intervention was increasingly seen as the solution to the most obvious fact facing all Victorian reformers, the plight of the working classes. For Donisthorpe, intervention and regulation would only perpetuate oppression; what was required was to move to a higher stage of industrial evolution. We have passed through Serfdom, but now Wagedom must go as well, to be replaced by Freedom.⁸⁰ Donisthorpe had no doubt about the cause of workers suffering; it was the wage system. Abolishing wage labour was central to his political economy.

Donisthorpe worked within a liberal economic paradigm, discussing, in turn, the three pillars of political economy: property, capital and labour. Donisthorpe saw property as a legal rather than a natural right, but it was still essential to a free society. In addressing the ownership of land, there are strong echoes of Proudhon.⁸¹ Donisthorpe, in contrast to Kropotkin's

preoccupations with the creation of large-scale agriculture, echoed Proudhon by praising the success of continental peasant proprietorship and argued that the concentration of land ownership in Britain is purely the result of 'socialistic legislation'. He was clearly no historian of enclosure. There were further limits on his radicalism when it came to property, such as defending unearned rents as 'the reward of successful risk'.⁸² He rejected the anarchist argument for a property based on trusteeship by dismissing the ultimate right of proprietors to dispose of property as they please as 'accidental'.⁸³ Thus, his concept of property would be a conservative one if it were not for his insistence that it should be universal, thereby guaranteeing individual liberty. However, Donisthorpe was writing in a developed industrial society and accordingly he had to try and define property within that context. To do so, he needed to address the relationship of property to capital.

Donisthorpe tries to define capital by constructing a debate between – to twenty-first century eyes – unequals. He contrasts the work of John Stuart Mill with that of a Mr G. Poulett Scrope.⁸⁴ After sixteen pages of excruciating prose, he finally comes to a conclusion as to the nature of capital: 'Capital is that value of which is *due* to the value of its products.' He continues:

Anything which owes its value to the demand, not for itself, as calculated to afford immediate gratification to the consumer, but for some other commodity into the creation of which it enters as an element, whether as raw material, as tool or machine, as worker, brute or human – such a thing is capital.⁸⁵

And here his solution to the problems facing the working class becomes evident. If labour is a form of capital then there has to be a way for it to become the property of the labourer. Donisthorpe's solution was something he called Labour Capitalization.

Labour Capitalization was one of Donisthorpe's obsessions. The idea was recycled and republished with little textual alteration in numerous pamphlets and books. The root of it is his horror at the condition of the working classes. He was certain as to the cause – exploitation. 'The Truth is that economically the free labourer is no better than a slave. The *whole* of the profits of his contribution to production are appropriated by the capitalist.'⁸⁶ The links with earlier radical thought are striking. He wrote:

The rise of the great middle class under the industrial *régime* about the end of the fifteenth century; its conflicts with the ancient landed aristocracy and eventual triumph...; its subdivision into two distinct parties, employers and employed, masters and men, or superintending labourers and manual labourers, are grand historical facts, and they bring us down to the present day. The battle is now between the

employer and the employed; year by year the strife waxes hotter. We are in the midst of it.⁸⁷

Donisthorpe fully accepted the analysis of the socialist movement: the degrading nature of repetitive drudgery, the alienation of workers from the products of their labour, the resultant cyclical nature of the economy with its periodic recessions and unemployment, the all-pervading misery and poverty, and the retardation of social progress. However, both the revolutionary socialist cure, the dispossession of the bourgeoisie, and the social democratic remedy, increasing regulation, were anathema to him. Both diminish rather than enhance liberty. The system failed not because the workers did not have full ownership of the means of production and owned only their own labour. It failed because they did *not* own their labour. They had sold it. They had sold it in return for wages. It was a terrible bargain.

Wages may provide a guarantee of income regardless of the consequences of work, but as the risk of failure is thereby transferred to the employer, they seek compensation by extracting as much of the value of that work as possible for themselves. The workers' guarantee of future earnings is bought at their own expense and can be arbitrarily ended in times of crisis. The result is exploitation.

Donisthorpe was writing at a time of capitalist development where the rising collective power of the corporation was becoming apparent. Though Donisthorpe still saw the state as paramount, he was aware that individualism had to grasp with the need for labour to act collaboratively whilst maintaining their liberty. Therefore, to break the slavery of wagedom, without swapping it for the slavery of state socialism, Donisthorpe saw only one possibility, Labour Capitalization.

Labour Capitalization is premised on the worker's 'right to the whole profits of his labour', not that the employer gives him a share of profits as a bonus. 'The profits on labour belong to the labourer by *right* and not by favour.'⁸⁸ Workers, by treating their labour power as capital, enter into a form of collaborative self-employment, working for the full value of their labour, great or small. They themselves become capitalists and share an identity of interest with the employer in the success or failure of the enterprise, of which they are part-owners. Class conflict ends not with proletarianization or embourgeoisement but with Capitalization.

Donisthorpe painted a Ruskinian picture of the future worker, highly skilled in their craft, independent, working for their own direct benefit in a democratic workplace. He had no schema for the introduction of such a process other than seeing it as both necessary and an inevitable choice of the most socially advanced of the skilled working classes. Unfortunately for him, most workers did not see it the same way. Collective bargaining, social insurance and protective legislation, achieved through a democratic state,

seemed the most relevant tools to secure their immediate needs. It was not only Marxists who were to be disappointed by the working class.

In his enthusiasm for his scheme, Donisthorpe may have overestimated the immediate attraction of risk over security at a time when the collective power of the state was seen as able to offer the latter. But one industry did operate in such a way throughout most of the twentieth century: the Hull North Sea trawler fleet. Fishermen's pay was based on a share payment agreed before embarkation on a sliding scale according to the degree of responsibility of the worker. It varied in accordance with the success and profitability of the catch. It was no equal bargain. It was a byword for exploitation, unsafe working conditions and was a contributory cause of the over-fishing of the North Sea.⁸⁹ Donisthorpe underestimated both the market as a system of power and the effectiveness of employers' collective economic power. The bargain was worse than wages.

Donisthorpe's writings have to be seen as a failed attempt to integrate individualism into an advanced industrial society. But many of his critiques of regulation ring true and the concept of collaborative self-employment has most definitely not gone away. It is the cornerstone of much radical thought and alternative economics. It is just that corporations have the power to resist any worker wishing to gain the full value of their labour. If wages are such a good deal for employers then it is one that they would not willingly relinquish. To be independent, workers have to rely entirely on themselves.

Auberon Herbert and the voluntary state

The individualist with the strongest claim on anarchism was the one most determined to avoid the label, Auberon Herbert. Whereas Donisthorpe was a beneficiary of the wealth of the industrial bourgeoisie, Herbert was a product of the aristocracy. He was the third son of the third Earl of Carnarvon, married the daughter of the sixth Earl Cowper and travelled a considerable political distance from his family's conservatism, through liberalism, until he reached his final destination of individualism. He can certainly be described, using the old cliché, as a man of action. After Eton and Oxford, he held a commission in the Seventh Hussars. He was an observer of wars – something that no doubt influenced his later near-pacifism – including the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian war, witnessed the Paris Commune, and was decorated by the Danish government for the rescue of wounded during the Prussian-Danish War of 1864. He was a keen sailor and mountaineer, and was decorated by Austria for the rescue of the crew of an Austrian ship off the coast of Devon.⁹⁰ Despite his elite background, he was anything other than a cloistered intellectual. Herbert also served as a liberal MP for Nottingham between 1870 and 1874, where

he supported Dilke's republicanism and Arch's trade unionism. He would have been likely to continue on this path towards social liberalism if it had not been for a meeting with Herbert Spencer in 1873, which led him to declare for liberty and against the state.

Max Nettlau's coruscating judgement of Donisthorpe and the League was balanced by a far more generous assessment of Herbert. He described his 'Voluntaryism' as 'a humane and vigorously anti-statist idea'.⁹¹ It certainly is libertarian. For Herbert liberty was the source of all virtues both intrinsically and as an educative process. Property was at the centre of individual liberty, though his rudimentary political economy contained a concept of property that is scarcely more radical than Donisthorpe and clearly less well conceived. Nettlau's judgement is rendered more curious by Herbert's explicit rejection of anarchism as 'one more creed of force' which, he surprisingly comments, 'we can never rightly class among the creeds of liberty'.⁹²

There is a graphic instance of this hostility to be seen in his response to a request from Charlotte Wilson for support for the defence fund set up to support Cantwell and Quinn in fighting their prosecution for offences arising from speeches at a public meeting, which supposedly included incitement to murder members of the Royal Family and assorted politicians. Herbert's ardent opposition to violence of all kinds and his acceptance of the popular association of anarchism with 'outrage' meant that he was unable to simply accept Wilson's assurances that the defendants were not associated with any form of violence. He wrote, somewhat pompously, that he would only give money if the defendants signed and returned an enclosed slip of paper saying 'I the undersigned disassociate myself from all so called outrages or acts of violence ...'. He then went on to complain about the Royal Family being called 'swine'.⁹³ The declaration remains in the archives unsigned and his name is missing from the list of contributors.

Despite this conditional element to his commitment to free speech, Herbert's fluid writing made him first and foremost an articulate and passionate advocate for individual liberty. For him, liberty is simple and indivisible. Government, rooted in compulsion, is its enemy. Herbert held no candle for representative democracy, which was purely 'the rule of the majority and the suppression of the minority'.⁹⁴ And, for him, state power was infinitely corruptible.

You cannot devote yourself to the winning of power, and remain faithful to the great principles. The great principles, and the tactics of the political campaign, can never be made one, never reconciled ...

When you strive for power, you may form a temporary, fleeting alliance with the great principles, if they happen to serve your purpose of the moment, but the hour soon comes ... when they will not only cease to be serviceable to you, but are likely to prove highly inconvenient and embarrassing.⁹⁵

Herbert had moved beyond the studied pragmatism of Donisthorpe to assign a higher, romantic role for liberty. For liberty is the only condition where those 'great principles' can flourish. But what are they? Herbert summarized them thus:

And now, if these principles, as I have tried to set them before you, are true; if men have no rightful claim to possess any sovereignty over the bodies and minds of each other; if that sovereignty only belongs to the man's own self; if the attempt to have and to exercise power over each other has been the most fruitful cause both of the past and the present misery of the world; if force has never permanently bettered and never can permanently better any of us, but only unfits us for our struggle in a world, where we must depend for our success, sooner or later, at some point or other, notwithstanding all ingenious systems of external protection, upon the selves that are within us, upon our own choice of what is right, and our own power to abide by that choice ...⁹⁶

These are the two pillars of his thought, the right of self-ownership and, to ensure that right is respected, the absence of direct coercion. Herbert was not interested in utilitarian justifications; instead he returned to the idea of natural rights, 'rooted in the very nature of our being'.⁹⁷ These rights were then married to the idea of evolutionary advantage to produce an ideology of liberty that sees it as central to human evolutionary progress. His romantic idealization of liberty led him to reject the Hobbesian assumptions about human nature that Donisthorpe held.

It is liberty alone, broad as the sky above our heads, and planted deep and strong as the great mountains, that allows the better and higher part of our nature to rule in us, and subdues those passions that we share with animals.⁹⁸

In contrast, authority is dysfunctional:

Set men up to rule their fellow men, to treat them as mere soulless material with which they may deal as they please, and the consequence is that you sweep away every moral landmark and turn this world into a place of selfish striving, hopeless confusion, trickery and violence, a mere scrambling-ground for the strongest or the most cunning or the most numerous.⁹⁹

This complete belief in liberty as the deepest human value precluded all forms of coercion and that, in turn, led to his advocacy of the voluntary principle in all social policy, together with the primacy of private property and free trade.

Herbert's rejection of coercion is absolute, even down to the extent of denying the necessary existence of conflict. He argued that 'all forms of war – whether between nations, or political parties, or classes, or employers and employed' were 'mere survivals of barbarism' and 'outbursts of senselessness'.¹⁰⁰ At the high point of the British Empire, this drew Herbert into the anti-imperialist stances of a nascent liberal peace movement.¹⁰¹ His opposition was not just to war or revolutionary violence, he also expressed moral disgust at state socialist regulation and taxation. The carnage of the twentieth century unleashed by the cult of the state suggests these targets were relatively harmless in comparison; indeed this is one of the prime criticisms of the individualists. It is also possible to see his libertarianism as merely sophistry for the preservation of privilege. This would be to do him a disservice. He saw liberty as the only way to emancipate the working class, though his concept of power is not as rooted in an analysis of class and gender oppression as the other individualists.

Herbert did not admit to the possibility that the complexity of human relations required compromising liberty. All aspects of liberty are indivisible. For Herbert, 'private property and free trade' are both 'essential and indivisible parts of liberty, both depending on rights, which no body of men, whether called governments or anything else, can justly take from the individual'.¹⁰² This is not just a case of economic justice. 'As the foundation of all morality is respect for the free choice and the free choice of others, the essence of the true offence against person or property seems to be the violent interference with a man's faculties, the constraining of his will and actions.'¹⁰³

It seems a curious morality that equates property with human life but he made a clear connection between individual self-ownership and property more generally, which associates the two. He argued that 'property is directly or indirectly the product of faculties', a notable distinction with the early natural rights theorists who saw property as the product of labour alone, and so he concluded that 'Personal ownership of our own selves, of our own faculties, necessarily includes personal ownership of property'.¹⁰⁴ The implication is clear; an act of coercive violence against property, such as taxation, is as morally obnoxious as violence against the person. And Herbert romanticized property, endowing it with almost supernatural powers.

The control of his own property by the individual, and the liberty of the individual can never be separated from each other. They must stand, or fall together ... Destroy the rights of property, and you will also destroy both the material and the moral foundations of liberty.

Preserve, then, at its best and strongest the magic of property; leave to it all its stimulating and transforming virtues. It is one of the great master keys that open the door to all that in a material sense you rightly and proudly wish to do and to be.¹⁰⁵

Property endows the owner with virtue and thus Herbert argued that the salvation of the working class is through the acquisition of property. However unlikely Donisthorpe's scheme for the capitalization of labour, it was certainly more realistic than Herbert's methods of turning workers into owners – saving. Despite the proliferation of working-class self-help institutions, Herbert was surely too optimistic in asserting,

The working body of the people must no longer be content – not for a single day – to be the property-less class. In every city and town and village they must form their associations for the gaining of property; they must put their irresistible pence and shillings together, so that step by step, effort upon effort, they may become the owners of land, of farms, of houses, of shops, of mills, and trading ships; they must take shares in the great well-managed trading companies and railways, until the time comes, as their capital increases, when they will be able to become the owners at first of small trading concerns, established by themselves, and then later of larger and more important concerns.¹⁰⁶

It is the acquisition of property that ends the class war. A classless society arrives through the peaceful collaboration engendered by trade and property, not through the victory of one class over another. Worker's associations will be reorganized on a 'peace basis' and 'enter into friendly alliances with capital'. These would engage in forms of voluntary intervention at times of unemployment, providing employment and supporting the unemployed 'to enable them to spend their unoccupied time usefully in study and education'.¹⁰⁷ Herbert's picture of free trade, competition and anti-imperialism is placed in the context of independent self-regulating associations and communities in a curious variety of syndicalist capitalism. As coercion is to be admitted only in so far as it is necessary for self-defence, no interests can be advanced by force. This caused Herbert to reject redistributive socialism. State socialists only sought to use systematic robbery to achieve their ends. Herbert commented, 'all these generous impulses and large ideas turn, like fairy gold, to dust and ashes, because they are wedded to compulsion, which degrades all that it touches.'¹⁰⁸ State socialism is not only coercive; it is morally corrupting. This is because people will give up their natural rights to self-ownership and receive, instead, what the state deigns to give them in exchange. It is a system based on compulsion and forced obedience.

Herbert's political economy is, in fact, moral theory. His primary concern was with a virtuous society, arguing that virtue springs from liberty. Liberty engenders the best in human nature and Herbert placed all his trust in the generous instincts of free people. It follows that taxation is permissible, but only if it is voluntary. Herbert did recognize the existence of collective interests and the possibility of collective action

for compassionate ends, but again would only sanction it if done freely without coercion. As a result, taxation needed to be transformed into giving on a purely voluntary basis. 'Under that voluntary system alone can a nation live in peace and friendship and work together happily and profitably for common ends.'¹⁰⁹

Herbert, therefore, advocated a form of mutualism within a fully developed capitalist society in which private property held a central and sacred place. The contrast with liberals and collectivists could hardly be clearer. Christian moralists saw in property the corruption of wealth; collectivists saw it as systematic theft. For Herbert it is the source of all virtue. Whereas Adam Smith felt that selfishness was the secret to the effective working of a market economy, Herbert believed that, to the contrary, such a free economy produced a noble unselfishness. This takes the idea of the market as a system of collaboration to a new hyperbolic level as the source of morality. This is the complete opposite of the way he saw state socialism, which was a doctrine that ensured 'the certain degradation of the human character'.¹¹⁰

Aside from the association of anarchism with violence, there was another reason why Herbert rejected label anarchist. It is because he saw a role for a residual state. Firstly, this is needed to protect the self-ownership and rights of the people against the use of force by others. The important thing for Herbert is that this is exercised collectively and impersonally rather than through individual vigilantism or revenge. Secondly, it would manage external relations with other nations, though without the right to declare war or enter into binding treaties. And finally it would be there as a 'useful friend to the people', capable of providing services as long as 'it renounced all use of compulsion' and never demanded 'compulsory services or compulsory contributions'.¹¹¹ A residual state would act where there were collective needs to be addressed – he gives the examples of education and sanitation for example; however, he insisted that any action should be entirely voluntary. This is what he thought distinguished him from the anarchists, even the individualist anarchists, though surely what he was advocating is not a government as commonly understood, but the very self-regulating community that stands at the heart of all anarchist thought. His disavowal of anarchism is unconvincing to say the least.

The individualists felt that they were writing at a turning point in history and Herbert is no exception. He joined the chorus warning against the growing appeal of state collectivism, writing passionately of its dangers and of the urgency of his appeal to liberty.

The great choice lies before you. No nation stands still. It must move in one direction or the other. Either the State must grow in power, imposing new burdens and compulsions, and the nation sink lower and lower into a helpless quarrelling crowd, or the individual must gain his own

rightful freedom, become master of himself, creature of none, confident in himself and in his own qualities, confident in his power to plan and to do, and determined to end this old-world, profitless and worn-out system of restrictions and compulsions, which is not good or healthy even for the children. Once we realize the waste and the folly of striving against each other, once we feel in our hearts that the worst use to which we can turn human energies is gaining victories over each other, then we shall at last begin in true earnest to turn the wilderness into a garden, and to plant all the best and fairest of the flowers where now only the nettles and the briars grow.¹¹²

Of course, the growth of collectivism proved irresistible regardless of Herbert's passionate advocacy.

Joseph Hiam Levy and the defence of personal rights

J. H. Levy was a sharp critic of Herbert's Voluntarism, despite their professed friendship, and is arguably one of the least anarchistic of the prominent advocates of individualism. He did not share Donisthorpe's criticism of the wage system or Herbert's negation of the state. A prolific lecturer and pamphleteer, he frequently recycled his writings, often word for word, in a multitude of publications, just as Donisthorpe did. His criticism of the concept of voluntary taxation was based less on the practical consideration that given the choice most would not contribute, but that it would transform the state into a voluntary association rather than a government.¹¹³ Arguably, this was Herbert's intention, and it was this that drew the approval of the anarchist Nettlau. However, Levy's Hobbesian conception of human nature led him into a position that denied any possible anarchy. Self-regulation is unfeasible, as it requires that all contributors would be agreed on the principles of regulation. This is impossible for Levy as there 'can be no singleness of aim, either political or personal, among the citizens of any country in the world'.¹¹⁴ In no way can he share Herbert's romantic utopianism or even Donisthorpe's pragmatic anti-statism. None the less, a picture of late Victorian libertarianism would not be complete without him.

Levy's life had none of the intellectual spread of Donisthorpe's, nor the adventurousness of Herbert's. In part, this was because he was not cushioned by private wealth and actually had to earn his living. His employment as a civil servant was such that it gave him time for all his external activities: journalism, teaching in adult education and political organization and campaigning. Arguably, it made him less prone to utopian speculation and more grounded in reality. He was a committed feminist,

active in the campaigns against the Contagious Diseases Acts and against compulsory vaccination, and joined the committee of what became the Personal Rights Association, defending the liberty of the individual against state compulsion.¹¹⁵ He was also proudly Jewish and spoke both to and on behalf of British Jewry.¹¹⁶ It is likely that his prominence helped prevent individualism from acquiring the taint of anti-Semitism that permeated other parts of the radical milieu.

Levy's approach can best be described as rigidly positivist. This positivism made him an economic reductionist. For instance, he based his critique of socialism on a rigid and narrow definition that it was simply 'the active or direct distribution of products by the State'.¹¹⁷ The omission of any ethical component to socialism is not an accident; it is something that he claims to ruthlessly exclude from all aspects from his thought. In his essay on the *Economics of Labour Remuneration* he wrote:

Be as warm, ladies and gentlemen – as sympathetic as you like; you cannot be too much so for me, so long as you restrict your warmth to your heart, and do not let it mount to another organ which it is very much better to keep cool, if one wishes to distinguish between fact and fiction ... Love of our fellows is an excellent guide to conduct; but it is a snare when substituted for accurate knowledge of the facts and laws of our economic environment.¹¹⁸

This approach to economics is a curious one for a social scientist. He denied that there was any social content in economics:

... economic laws are not products of human will or design, but permanent relations in the order of the phenomena of wealth, which we may learn or not learn, but which we can no more alter than King Cnut could annihilate the force of the tide.¹¹⁹

Thus, for instance, he defended Malthus on the basis that Malthus' linkage of population growth to poverty was scientifically correct.

It is, no doubt very annoying to be reminded that the great cause of the misery existing in our midst is our own ignorance or want of self-control ... Mr Malthus' researches are not the cause of poverty: but an explanation of the reasons of its existence.¹²⁰

In doing so, Levy lazily brushed aside opponents of Malthus by diminishing their real quarrels with the validity of Malthus' analysis as a prejudiced objection to a finding that they may find disagreeable. The unqualified assertion of conjecture as scientific fact is a common rhetorical trick and one on which Levy based much of his rejection of socialism. Yet, this

positivism did not mean that he lapsed into crude economic determinism. Instead, he argued that, within those prescribed and immutable economic laws, human beings have a choice about how they react and structure their societies. And so, in apparent contradiction, he concluded, 'the battle between Socialism and Individualism must be mainly fought out on ethical grounds'.¹²¹

Levy was a critic of socialism as a solution, but he shared all the same concerns as socialists. Rather than being a propagandist for plutocracy, he decried those 'who use Individualism as a cloak for the maintenance of privilege'¹²² and understood that 'the moral springs of Socialism are not ... envy and greed' but a 'noble impatience of the misery of their fellow men'.¹²³ The ethical arguments for individualism he deployed are now familiar from the debates over command economies. His economic utilitarianism suggested that wage-earners would be better off under a free market and that socialism, as he strictly defined it, would be debilitating. Individuals would be 'drained of ... individuality and drilled into mere machines'.¹²⁴ As such, Levy was not original, but, from the point of view of this study, it is his approach to property that is distinctive.

Levy's theory of property derived from both J. S. Mill and Herbert Spencer. Spencer had written in *Social Statics* that the ownership of land offended his law of equal liberty in that it permitted the possibility that 'our planet may ... lapse altogether into private hands' and in doing so would deprive the landless of the liberty to use it.¹²⁵ In other words, he saw land ownership as bestowing power over others. Once again, we see property understood as a social relationship. Mill had developed this further and Levy took up Mill's criticism of Locke. Whilst prepared to robustly defend private property in the products of labour, he argued against the appropriation of the raw materials necessary to manufacture those products. Locke's safeguard, that mixing labour with land to make it private property is only allowable where there is sufficient remaining for others, is a logical nonsense in a finite world. Property in land permanently denies its use by others. Levy wrote:

John Stuart Mill says:- 'It is no hardship to anyone to be excluded from what others have produced: they were not bound to produce it for his use, and he loses nothing by not sharing in what otherwise would not have existed at all. But it is some hardship to be born into the world and to find all Nature's gifts previously engrossed, and no place left for the newcomer.' It is more than a hardship. It is injustice so gross that, were it carried out in its entirety, rebellion against it would be instantaneous and general. Had not the principle of nationalization of land been partly carried out, by public roads, streets, footpaths, waterways, and open spaces, the landless poor would not only be unable to move about without payments, which they might not be able to afford, but would

have no place on which to rest the soles of their feet. To some extent this state of things has been read by the Vagrancy Acts; for the poor, driven off the land, have had their homeless wandering turned into a legal offence and have been forced into the ranks of the criminal classes.¹²⁶

Levy further radicalized his view by defining land as ‘the raw material of the globe, of whatever kind’.¹²⁷ Humanity’s relationship with nature has to be one of collective ownership rather than private property. Levy makes a cogent argument against privatization (later qualified by a rejection of renationalization):

It is not necessary that I should tell my present audience that I hold, and have always held during my long public life, that the State should not sell or otherwise alienate any portion of the storehouse of Nature commonly called ‘land’; and that, if it sells any of the materials extracted from it, such as coal, the purchase money should not be considered as current income, but should be capitalized, so that the benefit derived from it may be used for the advantage, not merely of the present generation, but also of future ones.¹²⁸

Levy comes close to Godwin’s notion of trusteeship, but perhaps it is more interesting to project his thinking forwards. There was just such a debate in the 1970s in the UK over the proceeds of North Sea oil. The left unsuccessfully argued that the receipts should be used as a national fund for investment rather than to support recurrent spending. However prescient he turned out to be, Levy was proud in his time to be recognized as having advocated ‘Land Municipalization here before Henry George was politically born’.¹²⁹

The American individualist anarchist, Victor Yarros, echoed the modern Green and Global Justice movements when he linked the land question to what was then called the conservation movement, identifying it as an ‘anti-monopoly movement’ against the ‘wasting or greedy private exploitation of national assets’. He wrote that ‘the old “liberal” policy of permitting individuals or corporations to grab and appropriate natural resources is dead. The people of the United States have realized that such a policy is as criminal as it is absurd.’¹³⁰ Unfortunately, criminal and absurd policies are both tempting and rewarding, ensuring that Levy’s defence of collective rights in economic resources remains highly pertinent to this day where the doctrine of privatization reigns supreme.

The English individualists' place in history

Intellectual historians have mostly ignored the English Individualists. They have attracted some attention amongst North American libertarians, but otherwise both their contribution to political economy and their connection to anarchism have been broadly overlooked. There are three main reasons why this should be so. One is an anachronistic misinterpretation of them as conservatives rather than the radicals they actually were. Their anti-socialist rhetoric has masked their trenchant critiques of gender inequality and class exploitation. And though they embraced the market and private property, they did so whilst questioning the nature of corporate capitalism, often expressing hostility to the limited liability company and offering a libertarian alternative. And this was also obscured by the subsequent history of individualism. The radical moment was brief. Under the influence of W. H. Mallock later individualists embraced capitalism with an almost evangelical enthusiasm¹³¹ and were to emerge as fully-fledged anarcho-capitalists. Looking back from today, it is too easy to see the English Individualists as proto-neoliberals.

Secondly, their obsession with the state as an agent of coercion blinded them to the appeal of state protection, security and welfare, especially to those in desperate need. A seeming irrelevance was added to misunderstanding. Grippled by a perception of an apocalyptic choice facing people between liberty and state domination, they failed to engage with the possibility of a compromise position between the two, which was already entering nineteenth-century political discourse as social liberalism. Most importantly, they underestimated the importance of economic security to the exercise of liberty and the powerful coercive force of the fear of penury. Pure economic liberty could appear a very limited form of freedom indeed. It was certainly easier to preach the virtues of a free economy from a position of wealth.

Finally, though the individualists' perception was acute, their solutions were unrealistic. The market was coming to be seen as an instrument of power to be used against workers rather than a facilitator of collaboration. Most importantly, the state was no longer the sole source of collective power; it now had a rival, the modern corporation. This new form of private collectivization squeezed out the possibilities of universal self-employment that individualism saw as the future. Radicals began to see the need to confront that power and the democratic socialist state seemed to offer a collective champion against corporate exploitation. Ultimately, their timing was bad.

So, should they be included in our picture of late nineteenth-century anarchism? Though they may seem semi-detached, they were, at the least, anarchist fellow travellers. The residual state they favoured was hardly

government as we know it, whilst they rejected the hypocrisies and injustices of Victorian class and gender hierarchies. And at a time when our faith in 'scientific' management is failing, individualists' identification of the repressive tendencies in some forms of social regulation appears to be strikingly modern. Most important of all, they were there. They were part of that radical milieu; they influenced it and debated with it. They sat outside the mainstream of political thought and swam in the turbulent waters of alternative ideas. And whilst Levy might be the one person least likely to be seen as part of anarchism, he provided a coherent defence of the commons from a libertarian perspective that still impresses. An account of nineteenth-century libertarian intellectual movements would not be complete without their resuscitation from the 'condescension of history', though it was left to the individualist anarchists to develop an unambiguously anarchist and anti-capitalist ideology, and they are the subject of the next chapter.

Notes

- 1 See M. W. Taylor, *Men Versus the State. Herbert Spencer and Late Victorian Individualism* (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1992).
- 2 Max Nettlau, *A Short History of Anarchism*, Heiner M. Becker (ed.), trans. by Ida Pilat Isca: (Freedom Press: London, 1996), p.39.
- 3 Ibid p.40.
- 4 See Frank H. Brooks (ed.), *The Individualist Anarchists. An Anthology of Liberty (1881–1908)* (Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick and London, 1994), esp. Chapters 3 and 4.
- 5 Edward Bristow, *Individualism versus Socialism in Britain, 1880–1914* (Garland Publishing Inc.: New York and London, 1987), p.217.
- 6 Ibid p.176.
- 7 Benjamin Tucker, *Instead of a Book, By a Man too Busy to Write One: A Fragmentary Exposition of Philosophical Anarchism* (Benj. R. Tucker: New York, 1897, repr. Gordon Press: New York, 1972), p.38.
- 8 George Jacob Holyoake, *Sixty Years of an Agitator's Life* (T. Fisher Unwin: London, 1892). For a good secondary account, see Lee E. Grugel, *George Jacob Holyoake: A Study in the Evolution of a Victorian Radical* (Porcupine Press: Philadelphia, 1976).
- 9 W. E. Adams, *Memoirs of a Social Atom*, first edn 1903 repr. with an introduction by John Saville (Augustus M. Kelley: New York, 1968).
- 10 Discussed intelligently here: Pat Thane, 'The Working Class and State "Welfare" in Britain, 1880–1914', *The Historical Journal* (Vol. 27, No. 4, December 1984), pp.877–900.
- 11 For a brilliant account of popular working-class self-education, see Jonathan

Rose, *The Intellectual Life of the British Working Classes* (Yale University Press, 2002).

- 12 A good example of this type of aristocratic anti-temperance campaigner is Lord Elcho, discussed here: Alastair Paynter, 'Francis Wemyss-Charteris-Douglas: Champion of Late-Victorian Individualism', *Libertarian Papers* (Vol. 4, Issue 1, 2012), pp.119–46. Online at: libertarianpapers.org (accessed 2 August 2012).
- 13 Stephen Reynolds with Bob and Tom Wooley, *Seems So! A Working Class View of Politics* (MacMillan and Co.: London, 1911).
- 14 Of the criticisms aimed at Reynolds' book, the one that Devon fishermen were hardly typical of the industrial working class strikes me as the most pertinent.
- 15 Stephen Reynolds, *Seems So!*, p.320.
- 16 Ibid pp.244–5.
- 17 Ibid pp.73–4.
- 18 See Nadja Durbach, *Bodily Matters: The Anti-Vaccination Movement in England, 1853–1907* (Duke University Press: Durham and London, 2005).
- 19 So called because it is an alternative to medicine that actually works.
- 20 Nadja Durbach, *Bodily Matters*, p.26.
- 21 Ibid p.27.
- 22 Ibid pp.69–72.
- 23 Such as the excellent biography by Jane Jordan, *Josephine Butler* (John Murray: London, 2001).
- 24 Ibid pp.276–7.
- 25 In Glen Petrie, *A Singular Iniquity: The Campaigns of Josephine Butler* (Macmillan: London, 1971), p.93.
- 26 Ibid pp.85–6.
- 27 Josephine E. Butler, Ada Smith, Elizabeth C. Wolstenholme, Dinah Goodall, Emilie A. Venturi, *Legislative Restrictions on the Industry of Women considered from the Women's Point of View* (Matthews & Sons: London, 1874).
- 28 Ibid p.6.
- 29 Ibid p.4.
- 30 Ibid p.16.
- 31 Ibid p.17.
- 32 Ibid pp.17–18.
- 33 Glen Petrie, *A Singular Iniquity*, p.84. There is no suggestion of how he managed to observe this.
- 34 Josephine Butler, *Government by Police* (2nd edn, Dyer Brothers: London, 1880), p.16.

- 35 Ibid p.48.
- 36 I have strong doubts about the validity of this notion drawn from my work in community and outreach education. It seems to me to rest on speculation and spurious observation rather than hard empirical evidence. That Butler indulged in it is not, to my mind, a strength.
- 37 Josephine Butler, *Government by Police*, pp.19–20.
- 38 Ibid p.60.
- 39 Edward Bristow, *Individualism versus Socialism in Britain*, p.61.
- 40 Hermia Oliver, *The International Anarchist Movement in Late Victorian London* (Croom Helm: London and Canberra; St Martin's Press: New York, 1983), p.36.
- 41 Stephen Herbert, *Industry, Liberty, and a Vision: Wordsworth Donisthorpe's Kinesigraph* (Projection Box: London, 1998).
- 42 Wordsworth Donisthorpe, *Principles of Plutology* (Williams and Norgate: London and Edinburgh, 1876).
- 43 Wordsworth Donisthorpe, 'Self Help v. State Help', in *The Liberty and Property Defence League: Its Origins, Objects and Inaugural Meeting* (The Liberty and Property Defence League: London, 1882), p.9. This is, of course, Herbert Spencer's law of equal freedom.
- 44 Ibid p.18.
- 45 Ibid p.7.
- 46 *Jus: A Weekly Organ of Individualism*, 7 January–30 March 1888, Vol. 1, No. 15, 1 April 1887, *Anti-Socialist Organisations in Britain 1870–1914, Anti-Socialist Journals 1874–1914* (Harvester Microform: Brighton, 1986). Donisthorpe was nothing if not persistent. The theme is continued in later works. See, for example, Wordsworth Donisthorpe, *Law in a Free State* (Macmillan and Co: London and New York, 1895), pp.40–5.
- 47 *Jus*, Vol. 1, No. 8, 25 February 1887.
- 48 *Jus*, Vol. 1, No. 6, 11 February 1887.
- 49 *Jus*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 14 January 1887.
- 50 Stephen Herbert, *Industry, Liberty, and a Vision*, p.41.
- 51 *Jus*, Vol. 2, No. 65, 30 March 1888. A judgement shared by others sympathetic to individualism. See George Howell, 'Liberty for Labour', in Thomas Mackay (ed.), *A Plea for Liberty. An Argument Against Socialism and Socialistic Legislation: Consisting of an introduction by Herbert Spencer and various writers* (John Murray: London, 1891), p.122.
- 52 Wendy McElroy, *Liberty's Connection to Other Publications*, unpublished manuscript, nd, online at <http://www.wendymcelroy.com/libdebates/apx1pubs.html> (accessed 3 August 2012).
- 53 Wordsworth Donisthorpe, *Individualism: A System of Politics* (Macmillan, London, 1889), p.69.

- 54 You can find the same way of arguing in Hayek's *The Road to Serfdom*, in that he sees totalitarianism as a potential outcome of economic planning. F. A. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (Routledge: London, 1976).
- 55 Wordsworth Donisthorpe, *Individualism*, p.299.
- 56 Ibid p.294.
- 57 Ibid p.299.
- 58 Wordsworth Donisthorpe, *Individualism*, p.46.
- 59 Ibid pp.42–4.
- 60 Ibid p.42.
- 61 Wordsworth Donisthorpe, *Law in a Free State*, p.39. Bill Sykes is the cunning villain in Charles Dickens' novel, *Oliver Twist*.
- 62 Wordsworth Donisthorpe, *Individualism*, p.50.
- 63 Ibid p.7.
- 64 Ibid p.9.
- 65 Ibid p.10.
- 66 Ibid p.19.
- 67 Ibid p.16.
- 68 See for example Michael Howard, *War and the Liberal Conscience* (Oxford University Press, 1978) and Martin Ceadel, *Thinking About Peace and War* (Oxford University Press, 1987).
- 69 Wordsworth Donisthorpe, *Individualism*, p.28.
- 70 Wordsworth Donisthorpe, *Love and Law: An Essay on Marriage* (W. Reeves: London, 1893).
- 71 Wordsworth Donisthorpe, *Individualism*, p.296.
- 72 Wordsworth Donisthorpe, *Law in a Free State*, p.113.
- 73 Ibid p.120.
- 74 M. W. Taylor, *Men Against the State*, p.3.
- 75 Wordsworth Donisthorpe, *Individualism*, p.280.
- 76 Ibid p.282.
- 77 Wordsworth Donisthorpe, *Law in a Free State*, p.120.
- 78 Ibid p.121.
- 79 Wordsworth Donisthorpe, 'The Limits of Liberty', in Thomas Mackay (ed.), *A Plea for Liberty*, pp.63–4.
- 80 Wordsworth Donisthorpe, *The Claims of Labour; or Serfdom, Wagedom and Freedom* (Samuel Tinsley & Co.: London, 1880).
- 81 Wordsworth Donisthorpe, *Individualism*, pp.90–127. He consciously calls this chapter 'What is Property?'.
- 82 Ibid p.105.
- 83 Ibid p.93.

- 84 Despite one attempt at rehabilitation, Scrope remains stubbornly obscure. See Redvers Opie, 'A Neglected English Economist: George Poulett Scrope', *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 44, Issue 1, (November 1929), pp.101–37.
- 85 Wordsworth Donisthorpe, *Individualism*, p.144.
- 86 Wordsworth Donisthorpe, *Labour Capitalization* (G. Harmsworth & Co.: London, 1887), p.9.
- 87 Wordsworth Donisthorpe, *Serfdom, Wagedom and Freedom*, p.2.
- 88 Wordsworth Donisthorpe, *Individualism*, p.215.
- 89 See Rupert Creed, *Turning the Tide: The 1968 Trawler Tragedy and the Wives' Campaign for Safety* (Back Door Press: Hull, 1998), Chapter 1.
- 90 M. W. Taylor, 'Herbert, Auberon Edward William Molyneux (1838–1906)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, January 2008) [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/33828> (accessed 10 August 2012)].
- 91 Max Nettlau, *A Short History of Anarchism*, p.40.
- 92 Auberon Herbert, *The Voluntarist Creed* (W. J. Simpson at the Oxford University Press: London. 1918), p.54.
- 93 Herbert to Wilson, 10 July 1894, Pressburg Archive IISH.
- 94 Auberon Herbert, *The Voluntarist Creed*, p.19.
- 95 Ibid pp.8–9.
- 96 Auberon Herbert, *The Rights and Wrongs of Compulsion by the State, and Other Essays*, ed. and with an introduction by Eric Mack, (Liberty Fund: Indianapolis, 1978), pp.150–1.
- 97 Herbert, *A Plea for Voluntarism*, p.68.
- 98 Ibid p.70.
- 99 Ibid pp.67–8.
- 100 Auberon Herbert, *The Principles of Voluntarism and Free Life* (Free Press Association: Burlington, VE, 1897), pp.21–2.
- 101 Eric Mack, 'Voluntarism: The Political Thought of Auberon Herbert', *Journal of Libertarian Studies* (Vol. 2, No. 4, 1978), pp. 299–309, 300. There is an interesting contrast between Herbert and Butler that mirrors the anarchist split over Kropotkin's support for the First World War. Whereas Herbert opposed the Boer War, Butler supported the British on the grounds that British rule would be far less disadvantageous to the indigenous people. Butler had spotted the racism in the Boers that would eventually give us apartheid.
- 102 Auberon Herbert, *The Rights and Wrongs of Compulsion by the State*, p.152.
- 103 Ibid p.154.
- 104 Auberon Herbert, *The Principles of Voluntarism*, p.5.
- 105 Auberon Herbert, *The Voluntarist Creed*, pp.87–91.
- 106 Ibid pp.88–9.

- 107 Ibid pp.96–7.
- 108 Auberon Herbert, *The Rights and Wrongs of Compulsion by the State*, p.253.
- 109 Auberon Herbert, *The Voluntarist Creed*, p.106.
- 110 Auberon Herbert, *The Principles of Voluntarism*, p.22.
- 111 Ibid p.10.
- 112 Ibid p.107.
- 113 E. Belfort Bax and J. Hiam Levy, *Socialism and Individualism* (The Personal Rights Association, P. S. King and Son: London, 1904), p.76.
- 114 Ibid p.76.
- 115 M. J. D. Roberts, 'Levy, Joseph Hiam (1838–1913)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford University Press, 2004) <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/63248> (accessed 14 August 2012).
- 116 Even relating Judaism to his opposition to compulsory vaccination. See J. H. Levy, *State Vaccination: with Special Reference to Some Principles of Ancient Judaism* (P. S. King and Son: London, 1896).
- 117 Bax and Levy, *Socialism and Individualism*, p.73.
- 118 J. H. Levy, *The Economics of Labour Remuneration* (P. S. King and Son: London, 1894), pp.1–2.
- 119 J. H. Levy, *The Outcome of Individualism* (3rd edn, P. S. King and Son: London, 1890), p.15.
- 120 Joseph Hiam Levy, *Wealthy and Wise: A Lecture Introductory to the Study of Political Economy* (P. S. King and Son: London, 1879), pp.24–5.
- 121 J. H. Levy, *The Economics of Labour Remuneration*, p.16.
- 122 J. H. Levy, *The Outcome of Individualism*, p.5.
- 123 Ibid p.5.
- 124 Ibid p.47.
- 125 Herbert Spencer, *Social Statics: or, The Conditions essential to Happiness specified, and the First of them Developed* (John Chapman: London, 1851), Chapter IX: the right to the use of the earth. <http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/273/6246> (accessed 14 August 2012). Spencer goes on to argue for collective ownership of land together with private leasing from a national corporation.
- 126 J. H. Levy in Sir Roland K Wilson, J. H. Levy, and Others, *Individualism and the Land Question: A Discussion* (The Personal Rights Association, P. S. King and Son: London, 1912), p.41.
- 127 Ibid p.43.
- 128 Ibid p.47.
- 129 Ibid p.50.
- 130 Victor S. Yarros, 'The Land Question in the United States', in Wilson et al., *Individualism and the Land Question*, p.107.
- 131 Edward Bristow, *Individualism versus Socialism in Britain*, pp.219–23.