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Notes

Chapter 1

- 1 Koni has his own Wikipedia page [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Koni_\(dog\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Koni_(dog)) This is how the Merkel incident was reported in *Der Spiegel* A popular anecdote is of when the chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel met Vladimir Putin, Putin brought Koni to their meetings. On January 21, 2007, the two leaders met at Bocharov Ruchei, the president's summer residence in Sochiand; at the beginning of their meeting, Koni wandered into the room, leading Putin to ask Merkel, who was afraid of dogs, "The dog does not bother you, does it? It's a friendly dog and I'm sure it will behave itself." Merkel responded in Russian, a language in which she is fluent, "It doesn't eat journalists, after all." (24). Koni then proceeded to sniff the German chancellor and sat at her feet. Merkel was reported to have shown "apparent discomfort," but the two quickly became friends. "Germany and Russia Try to Smooth Over Energy Tensions." *Der Spiegel*. January 22, 2007. Retrieved 12-21-2008.
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- 12 See KOF Swiss Economic Institute, 2010; <http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/> Weber 2007; OSW 2010; Financial Times, August 16, 2010.
- 13 Horst Köhler, President of the Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in interview with Deutschlandradio May 22, 2010.
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- 15 Edward Luttwak, "From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics," *The National Interest*, 17 (Summer 1990); for a broad survey of the concept, see Paul Aligica, "Geo-economics As A Geo-Strategic Paradigm: An Assessment," The Hudson Institute, August 9, 2002.
- 16 Pascal Lorot, *Introduction à la géoéconomie* (Paris: Economica, 1999) quoted in Aligica, "geo-Economics."
- 17 Robert Cooper, *The Postmodern State and the World Order* (London: Demos, 2000).
- 18 See Hans Kundnani, "Germany as a Geo-economic Power," pp. 31–45.
- 19 For more on Germany as a normative power, see Beverly Crawford, "The Normative Power of a Normal State," in Jeffrey Anderson and Eric Langenbacher, eds, *From the Bonn to the Berlin Republic: Germany at the Twentieth Anniversary of Unification* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), pp. 287–305.
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- 21 Edward Luttwak, "From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics," pp. 17–24; see also Kundnani, "Germany as a Geo-economic Power."
- 22 See Gideon Rachman, *Zero Sum World: Politics, Power and Prosperity after the Crash* (London, 2011).
- 23 Joachim Bitterlich, "Berlin and Paris Need a Revitalized Relationship," *Financial Times*, January 22, 2013, p. 11.
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Chapter 2

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- 2 Judy Dempsey, "Exhibition Traces Ties Between Germany and Russia," *New York Times*, December 20, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/21/arts/21iht-russgerman21.html?ref=judydempsey>
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- 4 Gerd Koenen, *Der Russland Komplex: Die Deutschen und der Osten 1900–1945* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2005), p. 9.
- 5 Angela E. Stent, *Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse and the New Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 5.
- 6 Stent, *Russia and Germany Reborn*, p. 7.
- 7 Koenen, *Der Russland Komplex*, pp. 10–11: on the historians debate see Charles Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988).
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- 9 Stent, *Russia and Germany*, p. 13.
- 10 In 2011, there were 2.4 million people living in Germany with a so-called "migration background," who arrived from the former USSR. This included 566,000 "real" immigrants, that is people still holding their original citizenship and 380,000 naturalized citizens. The majority, however, were ethnic Germans (so-called Spätaussiedler), that is, the descendants of Germans who had emigrated to Russia as early as the eighteenth century. The ethnic Germans' return to Germany and their right to citizenship is guaranteed under the German constitution. At the end of the cold war, hundreds of thousands of Spätaussiedler arrived from the USSR, Poland, and Romania to Germany. However, the inflow from Poland and Romania quickly fell to a few thousands per year, while Russlanddeutschen kept arriving in large numbers until 2005. Besides ethnic Germans, Jews also enjoyed a special standing in German immigration law, and therefore represent a distinct category. Between 1990 and 2005, approximately 200,000 Jews arrived to Germany from the former USSR. Unlike ethnic Germans, Jews did not receive citizenship upon arrival, but until 2005 they enjoyed a privileged quota status.
- 11 Statistics from the Federal Agency for Tourism, Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation, <http://www.russiatourism.ru/en>
- 12 There are a number of polls measuring how Germans perceive Russia and what they think about its current state of affairs. The following discussion refers to data from The Transatlantic Trends (TT) Survey, commissioned annually by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, which measures public opinion in the United States, in 12 European countries, and recently in Turkey and Russia as well. The Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, includes among a whole array of other questions, a survey on opinions of Russia. Besides these well-known and regularly repeated surveys, a few other relevant studies will be mentioned below as

well. For example, in 2008, a German public opinion organization, the Allensbach Institute conducted a special survey on behalf of the German–Russian Forum on how people in the two countries view each other. More recently the Bertelsmann Stiftung conducted a survey on German public views of Poland and Russia, Jacek Kucharczyk, et al., *Im Osten was Neues? Das Bild Polens und Russlands in Deutschland 2013* (Berlesmann Stiftung, 2013).

- 13 Bertelsmann study, *Im Osten was Neues*.
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- 15 Pew Research, Global Attitudes Project, “Global Opinion of Russia Mixed,” <http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/09/03/global-opinion-of-russia-mixed/>
- 16 In a Pew poll taken 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, 48 percent of West Germans and 40 percent of East Germans viewed Russia’s influence in Germany as negative. Forty-four percent of East compared to 42 percent of West Germans thought the United States had a negative influence on their country. The Pulse of Europe 2009: 20 Years After the Fall of the Berlin Wall. <http://pewglobal.org/2009/11/02/end-of-communism-cheered-but-now-with-more-reservations/>
- 17 Those holding the most negative views of Russia in the 2011 edition of Transatlantic Trends (60% negative compared to 36% positive) were in the 25–34-year cohort (born between 1977 and 1986) and were socialized during the Putin era. The oldest cohort (65 years and older) held the least negative views, but here only 54 percent had a positive view compared to 39 percent negative.
- 18 Dr Renate Köcher, *The Russlandbild der Deutschen-das Deutschlandbild der Russen* (Berlin: Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, September 18, 2008).
- 19 On the energy dependence issue, the Allensbach surveys found that 67 percent of Germans feared that Russia would use its energy resources to push through its goals with Germany while in the TT a robust 38 percent approve of the notion of increasing cooperation with energy producers even if they are undemocratic, with 35 percent looking to reduce energy dependence and 22 percent for increasing diplomatic pressure. While 35 percent of Europeans in the survey would agree to continue dependence, only 23 percent of Americans would.
- 20 Thirty-five percent of Germans were very concerned compared to an EU 12 average of 21 percent and a US average of 32 percent. They were also more supportive than the European average of the idea of the EU increasing support for democratic forces in Russia (34% approving very much in Germany, compared to 25% in the Euro 12 and 21% in the United States). See *Transatlantic Trends 2008* (www.transatlantictrends.org).
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- 22 www.transatlantictrends.org q.4.4

- 23 *Transatlantic Trends 2011*, www.transatlantictrends.org
- 24 http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/views_on_countriesregions_bt/660.php?lb=btvoc&pnt=660&. Among Americans, negative views dropped by 18 points bringing it below half (down to 46%, from 64%). Among Germans, negative views fell by 16 points (to 54%, down from 70%), and among the French by 11 points (to 55%, down from 66%).
- 25 According to the Transatlantic Trends survey, following Putin's return for a third term as president and the recent crackdown on civil society, both in the United States and in 11 out of the 12 European countries participating in the survey showed a very significant worsening of views on Russia. The EU-12 average of unfavorable views jumped from 39 to 55, the US figure increased from 42 to 48 percent. Germans reacted even stronger with an increase from 45 to 63 percent. Germans seemed to be especially concerned about the elections in Russia: only 11 percent of them were confident that the results represent the will of Russian voters. Europeans in general were slightly more confident (16%), while in the United States one-third trusted the democratic process in Russia.
- 26 "Troubled by Loss of Standing in the World, Americans Support Major Foreign Policy Changes," (Chicago: The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2008).
- 27 *Ibid.*, p. 6. Only 17 percent in the Chicago survey considered democracy promotion as a very important goal in American foreign policy.
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- 30 <http://www.wintershall.com/pi-forsa-071207.html?&L=0>
- 31 Quoted in Judy Dempsey, "Exhibition Traces Ties Between Germany and Russia."
- 32 *Ibid.*
- 33 Ost-Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft, *Geschäftsklima Russland 2013: 10. Umfrage des Ost-Ausschusses der Deutschen Wirtschaft und der Deutsch-Russischen Auslandshandelskammer* (Berlin, 2013).
- 34 Rede von Außenminister Guido Westerwelle, "Ostpolitik im Zeitalter der Globalisierung" vor dem Politischen Club der Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing, June 29, 2013.
- 35 Rede von Außenminister Guido Westerwelle, "Ostpolitik im Zeitalter der Globalisierung" p. 3.
- 36 Alexander Rahr, *Russland gibt Gas: Die Rückkehr einer Weltmacht* (Munich: Hanser, 2008), p. 49.

- 37 The German public is surprisingly open to democracy promotion. The Transatlantic Trends 2011 survey asked a number of questions about democracy promotion in the wake of the Arab Spring and found that 60 percent believed that we should promote democracy even if it leads to periods of instability as opposed to 32 percent with the opposite view. This view held consistently across the political spectrum. However 67 percent believed that it is not possible to export democracy compared to only 32 percent who thought it was possible.
- 38 Jan Peters, "Russland in den Augen deutscher Experten," p. 81.
- 39 Ibid., pp. 83–6.
- 40 Dr Lars Peter Schmidt, Johan Böls, "Wandel durch Ahnährung-Utopie oder Wirklichkeit?: Russland und Deutschland im 21. Jahrhundert," (KAS Moskau)—November 4, 2010, http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_21026-1522-1-30.pdf?101104131040
- 41 Bernhard Kastner, MdB (CDU)—March 2011 [http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_22504-1522-1-30.pdf?110412163602]
- 42 Gernor Erler, MdB, in Interview mit der Saarbruecker Zeitung: <http://www.saarbruecker-zeitung.de/sz-berichte/politik/Schulterschluss-trotz-Verstimmung-Erler-Politik-droht-in-Rituale-zu-verfallen;art2815,3854872#.Tjl3D2FRW1s>
- 43 Interview mit Sascha Tamm, Leiter des Moskauer Büros der Naumann-Stiftung—March 13, 2011, <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,6473973,00.html>; for the work of the Böll Foundation see: Pressemitteilung der Böll-Stiftung zum Petersburger Dialog: Für freie Wahlen in Russland—July 19, 2011, <http://www.boell.de/presse/presse-fuer-freie-wahlen-in-russland-12618.html>; The Böll-Foundation has its own blog to cover to current human rights situation as well as special occurrences, <http://blog.boell-net.de/blogs/russland-blog/default.aspx>
- 44 The Human Rights Watch keeps a periodically updated list of NGOs targeted by the "Foreign Agents" Law here: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/14/russia-foreign-agents-law-hits-hundreds-ngos-updated-july-8-2013>
- 45 Daniel Brössler, "Russische Staatsanwälte ermitteln gegen deutsche Stiftungen"—*Süddeutsche Zeitung* March 26, 2013, <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/strenges-vorgehen-gegen-nichtregierungsorganisationen-russische-staatsanwaelte-ermitteln-gegen-deutsche-stiftungen-1.1633479>
- 46 Lang, Susanne; Härtel, Alexandra und Bürsch, Michael: Zivilgesellschaft und bürgerschaftliches Engagement in Russland—April 2010, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/07173.pdf>
- 47 In the period from October 2010 to August 2011, the Foreign Office issued 16 interviews and statements on human rights in Russia compared to 19 on Belarus.
- 48 Speech of Chancellor Merkel to the annual meeting of the Ost-Ausschusses der Deutschen Wirtschaft, October 14, 2010 in Berlin.
- 49 Statement on the need to clarify the murder of a Russian human rights activist, July 15, 2010.

- 50 Cited by Deutsche Welle, <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,15581878,00.html>
- 51 Speech by Guido Westerwelle, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Political Club of the Protestant Academy Tutzing on June 29, 2013 “Ostpolitik in the age of globalization.” http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2013/130629-BM-EA_Tutzing.html
- 52 Steltzenmüller, Constanze (2009): Germany’s Russia Question, in: *Foreign Affairs*, 88(2), 89–100.
- 53 Johannes Voswinkel, “Menschenrecht in Russland,” *Bundeszentral für Politische Bildung*, October 12, 2009; Information provided by the Bundeszentrale fuer politische Bildung, http://www.bpb.de/themen/IVYKPD,0,0,Menschenrechte_in_Russland.html
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- 55 For the classic study of the German democratic idea, see Leonard Kreeger, *The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957).
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- 57 Interview with political foundation representative, August 2013.
- 58 Ibid.
- 59 Krastev, “Paradoxes of the new Authoritarianism,” p. 13.

Chapter 3

- 1 Stefan Meister, *An Alienated Partnership: German-Russian Relations After Putin’s Return*, *FIFA Briefing Paper 105* (The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, May 10, 2012), p. 3.
- 2 See Lilia Shevtsova and David Kramer, “Germany and Russia: The End of Ostpolitik?” *The American Interest*, November 13, 2012.
- 3 For details see Stephen F. Szabo, *Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2008).
- 4 See Hans-Joachim Spanger, “Die deutsche Russlandpolitik, in: Thomas Jäger/ Alexander Höse/ Kai Oppermann (Hg.), *Deutsche Außenpolitik*, Wiesbaden, 2010, p. 652.
- 5 Interview with author May 2013.
- 6 Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder (SPD) hat Rußlands Präsident Wladimir Putin vor Vorwürfen in Schutz genommen, demokratische Grundsätze zu mißachten. Schröder antwortete in der ARD-Sendung “Beckmann” laut vorab veröffentlichten

Interview-Auszügen auf die Frage, ob Putin ein lupenreiner Demokrat sei: “Ja, ich bin überzeugt, daß er das ist.” Er sei sicher, daß Putin Rußland “zu einer ordentlichen Demokratie machen will und machen wird,” meinte Schröder. Das Land habe 75 Jahre kommunistischer Herrschaft hinter sich sowie zehn Jahre, in denen alle Staatlichkeit zerfallen sei. “Putin schafft es jetzt, den Staat wieder in seine Funktion zu setzen.” Es sei klar, “daß dabei nicht alles idealtypisch laufe.” “Schröder: ‘Putin ist lupenreiner Demokrat’” *Hamburger Abendblatt*, November 23, 2004. Auf die Frage, ob er Russlands Präsidenten immer noch als “lupenreinen Demokraten” sehe, sagte Schröder im Deutschlandfunk: “Ich habe nichts daran abzustreichen. Ich glaube, dass er ernsthaft sein Land auf eine wirkliche Demokratie hin orientiert. Dass da noch eine Menge zu tun ist, weiß niemand besser als er selber. Auch die Leute, die um ihn herum sind, wissen das.” <http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/schroederputin100.html>

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- 13 Hans-Joachim Spanger, “Die deutsche Russlandpolitik,” p. 655.
- 14 <http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=06BERLIN3354>
- 15 Meister, *An Alienated Partnership*, p. 4.
- 16 Quoted in Spanger, “Die deutsche Russlandpolitik,” p. 654.
- 17 Constanze Steltzenmüller, “Germany’s Russia Question,” *Foreign Affairs*, 88(2) (2009), 89–100.
- 18 CDU-Wahlprogramm, <http://www.cdu.de/doc/pdfc/090628-beschluss-regierungsprogramm-cducsu.pdf>, Ein gutes nachbarschaftliches Verhältnis zu Russland liegt im Interesse Deutschlands und seiner europäischen Partner und Verbündeten. Wir wollen so enge Beziehungen zu Russland wie möglich. Die Tiefe und Breite dieser Beziehungen hängt insbesondere davon ab, ob und wie weit Russland bereit ist, seinen Verpflichtungen im Rahmen der Vereinten Nationen, der OSZE, des Europarats und der Europäischen Energie-Charta sowie aus den Vereinbarungen mit der Europäischen Union nachzukommen. Wir treten für eine zuverlässige, in der Europäischen Union eng abgestimmte Energie-Zusammenarbeit mit Russland auf der Grundlage transparenter und nicht diskriminierender Bedingungen ein. Grundsatzprogramm: http://www.spd.de/linkableblob/1778/data/hamburger_programm.pdf. Die strategische Partnerschaft

mit Russland ist für Deutschland und die Europäische Union unverzichtbar. Die Öffnung Russlands sichert Frieden und Stabilität auf unserem Kontinent. Allgemeine Auffuehrung der Menschenrechtsproblematik, allerdings ohne konkreten Bezug zu Russland.

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- 28 Ralf Neukirch and Matthias Schepp, "German-Russian Relations Enter a New Ice Age," *Spiegel Online*, May 30, 2012; <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-and-russian-relations-are-at-an-impasse-a-835862.html>
- 29 Susan Stewart, *Germany's Relationship with Russia: Buisness First?* (Berlin:Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2012), p. 11.
- 30 Condoleezza Rice, *No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington* (New York: Crown, 2011), p. 672.
- 31 Steven Erlanger and Steven Lee Meyers, "NATO Allies Oppose Bush on Georgia and Ukraine," *The New York Times*, April 3, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/03/world/europe/03nato.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
- 32 Interview with the author, May 2013.
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compromise and producing the language, which promised NATO membership in the future.

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- 36 "SPIEGEL Interview with Gerhard Schröder: 'Serious Mistakes by the West,'" *Spiegel Online*, August 18, 2008. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-interview-with-gerhard-schroeder-serious-mistakes-by-the-west-a-572686.html>
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- 40 Steve Coll, "Hard on Obama," *The New York Review of Books*, July 11, 2013, 10.
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- 42 *Natural gas*. The Nord Stream gas pipeline is to be completed; EU financial resources for that purpose are to be tapped; Gazprom and German partners, mainly E.ON and Wintershall with its parent firm BASF, are to cooperate more closely; Germany should participate in the construction of gas pipelines other than Nord Stream; and joint ventures for marketing Russian gas in Germany should be created.
Nuclear Energy. Implementation of the framework agreement concluded between Rosatom, the Russian Nuclear Energy State Corporation, and Siemens AG on the foundation of a joint venture to modernize nuclear power plants and to pool efforts in marketing.
Energy Efficiency. The activities of the Russian–German Energy Agency are to be broadened and projects planned with Siemens in Yekaterinburg and in Krasnodar for the construction of a wind park to be implemented.
Design and Construction of Aircraft. Airbus, EADS EFW and their Russian partners, United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) and IRKUT, should carry out the agreement for the construction of the Airbus A-350 transport aircraft on the basis of the Airbus A-320.
Automobiles. Volkswagen, Daimler, and BMW are to develop and produce components for automobiles of these firms.

- Railway Transport*. The Russian Railways, the Deutsche Bahn and Siemens should cooperate in the construction of high-speed trains and the improvement of railway connections between Europe and Russia's Asian-Pacific region. *Laser and Heavy Ions Technology*. Russia should participate as the main partner in the development of x-ray laser technology on the basis of free electrons (XFEL) in Hamburg and the creation of a European Centre for the Acceleration of Heavy Ions (FAIR) in Darmstadt. Cited in Hannes Adomeit, *German-Russian Relations: Balance Sheet since 2000*, p. 27.
- 43 Interview with author, June 2013.
 - 44 Michael Birnbaum, "In Germany, Campaigns are just Beginning for Sept. 22 Parliamentary Election." *The Washington Post*, August 18, 2013, A 16.
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Chapter 4

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Chapter 6

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Chapter 7

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