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Policing

The early summer sun ensured a relaxing morning on the beach. At the cafes on the seafront, hundreds of fans were enjoying a pre-match drink or lunch. Opposite the landmark bar called the Barrachina Rossa, the police were anticipating the arrival of Lazio fans to Livorno. Riot police stretched across the road that led to the entrance of the *settore ospiti* where the coaches of the away fans would be directed. Meanwhile, further along the road, young local male fans amassed behind the trees and bushes that divide the seafront from the road, in similar anticipation of the Lazio coaches. The buzz of excitement filled the air as a police motorcycle drove down the boulevard, quickly followed by four Lazio coaches flanked by police patrol cars. A flurry of activity ensued as bottles and objects were thrown at the coaches as they sped through to the away end. The youths melted back into the bushes and the patrons of the cafes continued with their drinks. The occasion marked a strange contrast to the exclusive villas that line the esplanade. The Stadio Armando Picchi is located in the fashionable Ardenza district in close proximity to the sea. Every matchday the residential roads are closed by police cordons to control access to the stadium. We walked the two miles around the cordons to the home end to guarantee good vantage points for the match. Approaching the turnstiles, a chant erupted and a group of *ultras* began marching towards the entrance, singing and waving a variety of flags. Anticipating a queue at the turnstiles, we quickly showed our tickets and identification and walked through to be confronted by a wall of riot police with their shields ready and batons wielded. They rushed towards the gates at the same time as the *ultras* descended on the entrance. The police stopped and the gates were opened. All of the *ultras* were admitted into the stadium. Stewards quickly beckoned us through the second turnstile as a similar situation occurred with the *ultras*. The gates were opened and they marched towards the home end, continuing to wave their flags and sing their songs.

None of them showed identification or a ticket. Matches are not just conflicts between groups of fans; the police also have a central role to play.

This book has addressed several key groups within Italian football. Initially it illustrated how the worlds of politics, business and football operate within dense patrimonial networks that are emptying out public involvement and facilitating the emergence of charismatic individuals. Subsequent chapters will show how the *ultras* and official supporters' club members operate within these patrimonial networks yet reflect the lack of involvement in political life. Significantly, there is another group operating within the Italian football network. The Italian forces of order are key factors in the execution of state policy and represent an important aspect of the patrimonial network. The police forces simultaneously reflect the Italian transition to deregulated business practices and illustrate the problems and contradictions of this approach. This chapter will highlight the historical development of the Italian police force to illustrate how they have reflected the unplanned organic growth of the nation and the failure of the central state to impose control. As key actors within the Italian patrimonial system, the police play an important role in the presentation and control of football fans, and this can affect the chances of violence. Changes to European policing will be also presented to illustrate the continuance of certain patterns of policing and their effect on the continuing crisis in Italian football.

The Italian forces of order: Development and continuity

There are various divisions of the Italian police that combine under the term 'forces of order'. These divisions reflect the contested nature of the Italian state and lead to confusion and lack of cooperation. As we have seen, the Italian state comprises semi-autonomous regions, with enduring local histories and memories; these help to undermine the central state. Likewise, conflict between the FIGC, Lega Calcio, CONI and Covisoc has undermined the ability of the federations to regulate efficiently the finances and operations of Italian football clubs. These patterns are reflected in the development of the Italian police. Before unification, the House of Savoy instigated a two-tier approach to local security. The *Corpo Arma dei Carabinieri Reali* (Royal Carabinieri Corps) was based on the French Gendarmerie and was introduced to Savoy by King Vittorio Emanuele I in 1814. With unification, the corps was institutionalized as the

'First Force' of the new nation and represented an armed corps for the state.¹ In 1852, the *Corpo delle Guardie di Pubblica Sicurezza* (Guardians of Public Safety Corps) were also introduced to Savoy. This created a dual model of *Carabinieri* and State Police that has continued from unification to the present day. Although there are further police divisions within Italy; these do not have direct jurisdiction over the policing of social order and have less impact on football.² In addition to the other forces of order, there is a section of the State Police with special responsibility for undercover surveillance. The *Divisione Investigazioni Generali e Operazioni Speciali* (Division of General Investigations and Special Operations), known by their acronym *Digos*, are charged with investigating serious offences such as terrorism and organized crime. Under this remit, the *Digos* also have to investigate football hooligans. They operate as non-uniformed police who infiltrate fan groups and record their patterns of behaviour in order to obtain positive identifications of known activists. As a result, this sees football hooligans being placed under the same umbrella as terrorists and the Mafia. This constitutes one area where the Italian police are following similar, pan-European, patterns of surveillance (Tsoukala 2009).

The dual nature of the Italian police reflects the failure of the state to gain control over individual interests. There are two conceptions in academic literature of the police: the state's police imposed from above; or the citizens' police from below (Della Porta 1998). In Italy, since the inception of the police, the forces of order have been seen as a function of governmental interests imposed from above. This has been amplified through the police having the absolute right to stop any Italian citizen for identification. As Barbagli and Sartori (2004, p. 167) state:

The forces of order in fact have the power and duty of identification, which no citizen can avoid. They can stop any person and request an identifying document, and, in some cases, when some irregularity is noted or if there is something suspicious, they may escort the person to the commissariat or to the carabinieri station.

Despite the attempt by the state to impose control over its citizens through identification, the dual nature of the Italian police reflects its weakness. After unification, the two forces were granted distinct remits. The *Carabinieri* were granted control of the countryside while the State Police monitored the cities. This was semi-clarified in a law of 1919 which stated that the State Police would be responsible for:

police functions that [are] preventative, repressive, and related to maintaining public order in the larger population centres, leaving the supervision to maintaining public order of the remaining territory of the State to the Royal Carabinieri. (Barbagli and Sartori 2004, p. 163)

The irregular development of industrialization and urbanization, exacerbated by chaotic patterns of migration, contributed to the inconsistent growth and development of the two corps. Both ultimately depended heavily upon local factors and political involvement to grow and sustain their units. By the 1960s however, parity in numbers was achieved between the two corps.

The dual model prevented the creation of an independent, strong and centralized force. As a consequence the divided forces could be incorporated into the patrimonial system. Maintaining two parallel forces with similar responsibilities over public order has been inefficient and has led to confusion and lack of cooperation. It has contributed to Italy having the largest police force in Europe (Tavares and Thomas 2008). The two forces have frequently refused to cooperate. This occurred during the 'years of lead' in the 1970s, and ultimately failed to prevent the assassination of the Christian Democrat leader, Aldo Moro (Collin 1999). Attempts have been made to rectify this situation and develop cooperation between the two forces, principally with Law 121 of 1 April 1981. This law required that Provincial Committees for Security and Public Order be set up which contain the chiefs of the three main forces of order, as well as the mayor of the provincial capital and the president of the province. Orders made in these meetings, however, 'are at times "reinterpreted", if not actually ignored, by the carabinieri' (Barbagli and Sartori 2004, p. 177). The lack of enforcement of the forces of order ultimately leads to the lack of enforcement of order further along the network of crimes. Law 121 also proposed a joint operations centre; the first of which was opened in Milan in 2000, nineteen years after the law was passed. As of 2004, 74 of the 119 provinces did not have these joint operations rooms implemented, and none were functioning correctly.

The political nature of the Italian forces of order has seen them develop a significant position within the patrimonial networks of Italian politics. The forces of order help shape public opinion as they seek to protect their institutions and generate public goodwill:

Police have a notable discretionary power, not only to the complex level, but also that of the single politician. The forces of the police can be considered as policy makers, in the sense that they 'make' the politics. (Della Porta and Reiter 2003, cited in Ferreri 2008, p. 100)

The forces of order are conscious of public opinion and their public image. Consequently, they choose appropriate action that will give them the most public support and in turn this constructs an image of a force that operates appropriately. The 1960s saw a sharp increase in certain distinct forms of crime, specifically, public protest and crimes against property. This provided the police with an apposite opportunity to manage their public image. For example, the police would not use force against a group of pensioners protesting about the cost of living. Therefore, the selective use of violence presents an image to the media and general public that this particular group required violent action. As Juvenal prosaically stated 2,000 years ago, '*Quis custodiet ipsos custodies* [who guards the guards]?'

Football violence: Forward panic and Folk Devils

The problems associated with political unrest subsided after the 1970s. As will be demonstrated in the following chapter, incidents surrounding football matches increased. This has resulted in the policing of football matches being one of the largest exercises performed by the Italian police. Building on Cohen's seminal work, Marchi (2005) suggests that through selective use of force, the police help create 'Folk Devils' as well as the media. This becomes self-fulfilling. As the football fans are constructed as 'Folk Devils', the police feel increasingly justified in using force against them. Their discrimination in other fields reinforces this construction and magnifies the events surrounding football. Ferreri develops this argument by stating that the use of the Digos, the anti-Mafia and anti-terrorist force, to infiltrate the *ultras* transformed these fans into viable targets. 'With the Digos', Ferreri (2008, pp. 100–1) argues, 'the *ultras* ceased to be simply hooligans from the stadium and were transformed into a subversive phenomenon, that needed repression with force'. The Pisanu Law legitimated this political role of the police. In the previous chapter, it was highlighted that the *Osservatorio* designated certain matches 'at risk'. The forces of order are key members of this group and become clearly situated within the patrimonial network. Consequently, through a variety of measures, specific groups, and particularly football fans, have been targeted, and this helps account for a number of incidents related to football.

Violence at football is not inevitable, despite the political influence exerted by the forces of order. In his theory of violence, Collins (2008) suggests that violence is led by a small number of key proponents who are supported by the

crowd. Violence is often ignited over flashpoints, which in turn, are caused by 'forward panic'. When parties are engaged in the emotional cauldron of physical confrontation, they have to maintain 'face' and preserve the advantage. This can erupt into violence as one party's emotions rise and they seek to capitalize on a perceived weakness of the opponent. The propensity for violence increases as the duration of the tension increases before a confrontation. This allows the emotion to build, and lengthens the period for this emotion to abate. Utilizing a Durkheimian perspective, Collins advocates that an increase in the crowd will build the emotional energy of the situation and fuel the emotional tension in the parties. A flashpoint will instigate violence as one of the parties utilizes this emotion to gain advantage. Collins (2008, p. 464) recommends that participants in these events need 'to reduce their confrontational tension'. This is especially true as the numbers of police increase: 'the more officers called to the scene, the greater the chance of a forward panic or other kinds of police violence, quite apart from what the suspect does' (Collins 2008, p. 464).

Rumours can spread in this emotional atmosphere and this can fuel the opportunity of miscommunication and violence. This occurred spectacularly during the 'Derby of the Dead Child' in 2003 (Marchi 2005). Rumours circulated that the police had killed a child. Police use of tear gas and batons led many to believe that this rumour could be true and ultimately increased the tension in the stadium. The build-up and stand-offs in these circumstances increase the opportunity for forward panic to occur and for one side to provide the flashpoint. The perception of the police is crucial to the initiation of violence (Della Porta 1998; Stott and Reicher 1998). If parties enter into a situation expecting violence then this increases the possibility of forward panic occurring and violence ensuing.

The active role of the police in manipulating political and public opinion has combined with the weakness of the central state. There is a history of aggressive policing in Italy which has facilitated the construction of narratives that reinforce the lack of legitimacy of the state. The G8 summit of 2001 became the zenith for aggressive Italian policing. The summit was held in Genoa and attracted a number of anti-globalization, anarchist and leftist demonstrators from around the world. Riots ensued, resulting in one protestor being shot dead, over 500 people injured and an estimated £30 million damage caused to property (Johnston 2001; Vidal 2001). Of the 200,000 demonstrators, many claim they were there to protest peacefully. However, chaos descended as the police took a hard-line with the demonstrators. The manner in which the protestor was killed highlighted the

confusion of the police approach. *The Guardian* reported that 'Witness accounts of the fatality were conflicting, but it appeared last night that the young man had been shot and then run over by a police armoured vehicle' (MacAskill and Elliot 2001). This account was by no means unique as *The Telegraph* reported that armoured vehicles were used to plough into the dustbins that protestors hid behind. Thomas Harding, the reporter of *The Telegraph*, was attacked by the Carabinieri, as were other officially accredited reporters. Harding (2001) states: 'Anyone, lawbreaker or not, was fair game in the eye of the carabinieri, which showed itself to be as badly led and ill-disciplined as it was thuggish.' Indeed, the police action in Genoa was used as an example by the Scottish police, of what can go wrong when the police act aggressively (Macleod 2005).

The Italian police had demonstrated a clear sign of forward panic by attacking first to gain the advantage. This forward panic culminated in the raid on the headquarters of the protestors at the Diaz school. Accounts suggested that the police had employed right-wing activists to attack the protestors (Carroll 2007; Davies 2008; Carroll 2001; Ginsborg 2004; Jones 2007). Indeed, it was reported that the police sang fascist songs as they acted. These infiltrators and the police raided the school at night, while the protestors slept. Accounts suggest that people were kicked and beaten with batons while they slept. The police methodically went through the school beating all protestors in their way, regardless of their physical position. Fire extinguishers were fired in peoples' faces, while others were spat upon or had their heads thrust down toilets. Several women were threatened with rape and all ninety-three occupants of the school suffered serious injuries, some life threatening. Such tactics caused international outrage and strained relations with the Italian government.

Football violence: Policing the *ultras*

The heavy police presence at football matches, like the G8, provides several potential flashpoints that could generate forward panic. As described in the introduction above, a potential flashpoint occurred before the match between Livorno and Lazio at the Stadium Armando Picchi in May 2010. A group of over hundred Livorno *ultras* marched towards the gates of their *curva*. As they approached the gates, armed riot police approached the gates from inside the ground in anticipation of an attempt to attack the gates. The *ultras* were marching, waving flags and chanting anti-fascist and anti-Lazio songs. They were not

armed, throwing objects or performing any form of ritualized violence. In spite of this the riot police prepared themselves for violence and marched forward. No violence ensued, as the *ultras* were allowed into the stadium without having their tickets checked. This was an apposite example of how forward panic could escalate; the police were responding not to any specific acts of violence but to the (incorrect) perceived threat of the *ultras*. In this case the Livorno *ultras* were more focused on their hatred of Lazio and fascism than confronting the police. In other contexts it would be clear that the police could ignite the emotional tinderbox.

A further example of aggressive Italian policing surfaced in the media in May 2010. The Gugliotta affair highlighted the aggressive approach taken by certain sections of the Italian police (*Corriere della Sera* 2010; *La Repubblica* 2010a). Stefano Gugliotta lived in the vicinity of Rome's Stadio Olimpico. On the night of the Italian Cup final between Roma and Inter, Gugliotta was riding his scooter with his cousin in order to go to a party. He had not attended the match but was stopped by a policeman. The incident was filmed from the window of one of the neighbouring apartments. This video appears to show that the policeman held his arm outstretched onto Gugliotta's chest to prevent him riding off.³ Gugliotta pushed the police officer's arm away and was subsequently punched in the face. Gugliotta's cousin was confronted by the same policeman and ran off, before a number of Italian police descended on Gugliotta. Gugliotta had a broken tooth and evidence of head injuries. The young Roman was arrested and alleged that 'When I was brought in jail I was asked to sign a sheet with an X already deleted, which states that I refused additional medical visits, but I opposed. Only after I was able to sign a sheet with boxes still empty.' (*La Repubblica* 2010a). The case demonstrates the forward panic of Italian police as they seek to use violence early, rather than as a last resort. They subsequently attempted to fabricate evidence to suggest that he had refused to seek medical advice. As they act as an independent, politically orientated body, some police attempt to manipulate their position.

Aggressive policing in Italy has not been restricted to Italian football fans. Fans of English clubs and the England national team have faced considerable difficulties from the Italian forces of order (Stott and Reicher 1998; Stott and Pearson 2007). The police's perception of England fans ensured that fans entering Sardinia for the 1990 World Cup were treated as hooligans as soon as they arrived; as many as a third of Italy's police force were there to meet them. Similarly, recent games involving English clubs in Rome have highlighted

the continued perceived threat against English fans. Against Liverpool and Manchester United in 2001 and 2007, respectively, similar patterns emerged. Roma fans attacked both sets of fans as they approached the stadium; the police did not intervene. Inside the stadium riot police were stationed in the away end. There were no police in the home *curve*, only stewards. The Roma fans threw missiles over the barrier into the English fans, who subsequently threw them back. In the case of the Liverpool fans, they were attacked by the police for throwing these missiles back. The incident involving the Manchester United fans occurred after United scored and Roma fans surged towards the barrier. The United fans responded, whereupon the riot police charged down and began to baton charge indiscriminately into the United fans. It is clear from the actions of the Italian police in relation to English fans that they police the situations based on perception of the fan group. A video clip from Danish television highlights the treatment of young Danish Manchester United fans.⁴ Although English fans had a reputation for trouble and disorder that has subsequently subsided (although not disappeared). The globalization of football, and English football in particular, now sees many clubs having an international fan base. Indiscriminately treating all fans as nationally homogenous is fundamentally flawed.

Police and the Government: The role of politicians

The intricate political networks operating in Italian society legitimizes these actions. Politicians and the media want to be seen taking a firm line and support the police in their conduct. The prime minister, Berlusconi, defended the tactics of the police at the G8 in Genoa by saying in parliament that 'We found ourselves faced with protests that grew in intensity and numbers that grew beyond all expectations. As a result it was necessary to intervene in such a way as to guarantee the maximum security for all the delegations' (Johnston 2001). Similarly, Achille Serra, the Prefect in Rome who was in charge of the police during Manchester United's incident, argued that 'The stewards were overrun by drunk fans, the police had to intervene. I was there and from what I saw they followed the established protocol. If you're going to try and establish order over a drunk, angry mob, you're not going to do it carrying a bunch of flowers' (Marcotti 2007). This reinforces the prominence of police perception in their handling of these situations. If the authorities and police perceive a group to be violent, then they are more likely to adopt an aggressive stance. This increases the likelihood of

forward panic and resulting violence. Training needs to be undertaken by the police to understand the culture of the fans before a match (Stott and Adang 2003; Stott and Pearson 2007; Foot 2007a). Although public drunkenness is rare in Italy, it is relatively common around travelling British (and north European) football fans. Making the correct perceptions allows the police to operate more effectively and prevents the opportunity for forward panic to occur.

At the highest level, the Italian police and politicians have not adopted a flexible approach to policing football fans. Fans are treated as one homogenous group, rather than dealt with as diverse individuals or groups. Most of the focus is on the away fans in the *settore ospiti*, the area designated for away fans to park before being escorted to the ground. There are extensive regulations governing the *settore ospiti*:

In Italy, I speak of our experience of Livorno, when we organise an away trip, a major part of the club organised trips is by coach. Therefore depending on the number of people going, the *Osservatorio*, or its better to say, the responsibility of the forces of order in Livorno, require a list of the number of people going. They order an escort of one or two patrols to go with us in police cars and therefore they escort us from the motorway toll booth and escort us to the stadium ... When we make an away trip the *questura* calls every club to find out what time the coach is leaving and to know what route we are taking. (Max, official Livorno supporters' club director, personal interview, June 2009)

Official supporters' clubs are called by the *questura*, the chief of police, to detail the number of people going, the route and expected departure and arrival times. This allows for coaches to convene at the motorway tollbooths and await the police escort. Usually two police cars will escort the away coaches – one at the front, one at the rear. On arrival at the outskirts of the destination city, the away coaches are collected by a police escort from that municipality and escorted to the *settore ospiti*. This will comprise of a number of police patrol cars and motorbikes. In addition to the escorting patrol cars and motorbikes, the route will be well-marshalled by other police patrol cars and motorbikes that stop and direct traffic to facilitate a clear route for the escorted coaches. When away fans arrive in Livorno, as stated in the opening paragraph to this chapter, the road along the seafront approaching the stadium is blocked of traffic. In most cases, the *settore ospiti* is directly alongside, or inside the stadium. In the case of a trip to Brescia in March 2009, the *settore ospiti* was on the outskirts of the city. The coaches parked in the designated zone and were escorted onto modified city buses to be taken to the stadium. The buses were fitted with a Perspex barrier separating the

fans from the driver and front door of the bus. Alongside the driver, behind this Perspex barrier, stood two policemen clearly armed with semi-automatic rifles. Fans of all ages and genders are treated as potential hooligans.

The political imposition of the Pisanu Laws reinforces how the authorities treat fans as one homogenous group. On arrival at the away end of the Italian stadiums, a wall of riot police, standing behind full-length riot shields, greets the visiting fans. They act as a funnel towards the turnstiles where State Police, Carabinieri and stewards meet the away fans. At this point, the stewards will check any baggage for prohibited items and ascertain the details of flags and banners. Any banned items can be confiscated for being too political, or for constituting a weapon. Prior to a match against Parma in December 2008, two Livorno fans were prevented from taking a large flag sporting the image of Che Guevara. The pole accompanying this flag was about four foot tall. They were refused because the pole was too long and they had a political symbol on it. However, a smaller flag with the words 'Livorno' on it was permitted.

Security checks are also performed on the fans. This consists of the usual 'patting down' and is consistent with many sporting events and airports. This replicates Foucault's (1991a) observations of state power being exerted on individuals to create 'docile bodies'. After the security checks, the stewards check tickets against the fans' form of identity. In compliance with the Pisanu Law, they have to ensure that the name on the ticket matches the identity of the person holding the form of identification. Once this check has been performed satisfactorily, the fans approach the turnstiles where they insert the barcode on the ticket into the barcode reader of the turnstile and proceed into the stadium. Stewards and police remain in the sections underneath the stadium but do not make their presence felt within the *curva*.

The entire operation creates an overwhelming image of force and control and increases the tension and emotion of the situation. In a country where the state has faced a long-standing crisis of legitimacy, the presentation of force at away games is potent. Not only does it criminalize all fans; it can present an altogether different image. Armoured police and carabinieri confront fans, while helicopters circle overhead. It feels like a war zone. This analogy reinforces the notion of a lack of legitimacy. It suggests that the authorities are an occupying force which has not won the 'hearts and minds' of the people they are supposed to be protecting. It also strengthens the suggestion that the police and fans are enemies. The police are acting not as intermediaries but as adversaries, and this provides ample opportunity for forward panic

and potential violence. It is for this reason that a number of Italian authors utilize the analogy of war in their research. This is particularly apposite in Dal Lago's (1990) seminal *Descrizione di una Battaglia* (Description of a Battle). Despite this, however, no violence was witnessed at any of these games during the ethnographic fieldwork in 2009, and none was reported subsequently in the media. As Collins (2008) highlights, it is rare when fights start as most people avoid them. However, when the ingredients are right, and the tension and emotion on both sides increases, it can lead to the flashpoints and forward panics that precipitate violence.

By treating all fans as one homogenous group, politicians and the police do not take account of the range of fans within the *curva*. Not all fans are hooligans or looking for violence. This is compounded by the *Osservatorio*, which designates a particular game as 'at risk' and places certain restrictions on fans. This effectively criminalizes all fans that may have attended that game and restricts them from watching their team. The police response to away fans is to treat them all as potential hooligans. The construction of this homogenous 'outsider' group contributes to the creation of a unified identity within the group (Stott and Reicher 1998; Stott and Pearson 2007). Consequently, when violent incidents occur, many fans sympathize with group members and understand why violence took place. This further delegitimizes the police.

Despite the treatment of fans as one homogenous group by politicians and the police authorities, the officers on the front line operate with extreme flexibility. In specific situations, police officers circumvent the rules depending on circumstances. This is often done in coordination with the police hierarchy. One example related to an incident encountered by the author at Brescia's *settore ospiti*. The area was directly outside the Stadio Mario Rigamonti and entry was under police authority, although I was allowed entry without being questioned while waiting for my contact, who had my ticket. There was a delay in the arrival of the buses from the parking area that saw the buses immediately directed into the away end. This led to a series of negotiations inside and outside the ground to allow my admission into the ground. On admission it became apparent that no bags or other objects would be allowed on the terrace. As the fans had transferred to the specially modified city buses there was nowhere to store my rucksack. A negotiation took place with the Digos, who refused to take it and suggested to the officer in authority that it should be allowed to be taken into the ground. This was permitted, without being searched. This example, as well as the examples described above of English fans having bottles thrown at them in Rome, illustrates the way that some Italian police make an exception in certain situations. However, this can increase the opportunity for violence.

Group identities and potential incidents are magnified through the police's 'all or nothing' approach to policing football. By not proactively responding to minor incidents, the police allow the tension and emotion to build. This increases the chance of flashpoints occurring and violence ensuing. Francesio (2008) argues that the British police take a more active role than Italian police at prevention and control. Stott and Adang (2003) suggest a more flexible attitude to policing football crowds that centres on a more interactive and less intimidatory approach. They argue that a good police model is to not wear riot gear and maintain a low profile with high levels of positive interactions with fans. This can help prevent major incidents before they start, as well as preventing the construction of symbolic events that reinforce existing narratives. By treating all fans as one homogenous group, the collective identity and memory of the group becomes shaped by events that reinforce the collective narrative. When the police used tear gas and riot equipment on fans at the 'derby of the dead child' in Rome in 2003, the wider groups of fans could understand and believe that a child had been killed. Likewise, English fans who were subjected to a baton charge from riot police in Rome could have been spared this ignominy had the original missile throwers been identified and arrested.

The poverty of the stadiums inhibits control within the stadium. This encourages the extensive policing and restrictions outside the stadium. The lack of stadium development has meant that they have not taken advantage of the transformations in surveillance and stewarding that have been adopted elsewhere in Europe. This allows the *curve* to remain liminal spaces for the creation of the *ultras* identity and legitimized their activities. Consequently, stadium redevelopment should coincide with changes to the operation of the police:

[We need] stadiums in an English style ... to be a fan there is more comfortable, more customer focused, and above all, the type of police are more civil. It is a civil country [Interviewer: the police are not civil here?] No. The police do what they want. Unfortunately the police arrest all the time and also, when the police are culpable, they always have the cover of personal liberties and are not punished. [There are] many cases, for example, the case of the G8 at Genoa in 2001. (Levriero, official supporters' club member, personal interview, June 2009)

Not only are the episodes of the G8 at Genoa used to reinforce the image of police brutality; there is a strong feeling that the Italian police are unaccountable. This image of accountability contributed to the transition to postmodern policing in Britain, especially after several high-profile miscarriages of justice (Reiner 1992).

Deregulation of the state also impacted the position of the police. As occurred in other areas of the British political economy, policing was also deregulated and privatized. In particular, as Bayley and Shearing (1996, p. 586) argue:

The state's monopoly on policing has been broken by the creation of a host of private and community-based agencies that prevent crime, deter criminality, catch lawbreakers, investigate offences, and stop conflict.

The emergence of private security firms has seen the commodification of policing and the restructuring of police and policing. This has not occurred in Italy as in Britain. As ruling hegemonic groups seek to maintain control, they have not undertaken any systematic privatization. Likewise, there have been no new regulations introduced, by the Pisanu Law or other legislation, to force clubs to be more accountable. In England, the Taylor Report introduced the use of third-party security at stadiums, forcing the clubs to take responsibility for the safety of fans.

Stewards

Privatization of police and security has seen the increased responsibility of stewards at football matches in Europe. The transition from privatization of security was made explicit in the Taylor Report that facilitated the redevelopment of stadiums in Britain. Taylor (1990, p. 33) stated that:

The safety of the public inside the ground is the responsibility of those who stage the event and administer the ground in which it is held, *ie* the 'management'. This responsibility applies in both normal and emergency situations.

Not only did Taylor place the responsibility for the hosts to manage their safety and policing; he also introduced the commercial element into the equation:

In my view a more consistent and businesslike approach should be made to such charges. If clubs were to find it more economical to recruit efficient stewards than to delegate duties to the police, there could be a significant reduction in the number of police deployed at football grounds to the benefit of the community at large ... Some clubs presently have efficient stewards whom they recruit individually and train fully with the assistance of the police. Others hire security firms to bring in a well-trained team of stewards. (Taylor 1990, p. 37)

The outcome of this approach was that the police should charge the clubs for the use of their services within the football stadium. Outside of the private space of the stadium, the police had the duty to maintain public spaces as part of their

legal duty. Should the costs involved be too high, the club could have recruited their own stewards or employed a third-party security firm.

This approach has spread across Europe. Reflecting the free-market approach of the European Union, UEFA have reiterated the importance of stewards to fan safety. Şenes Erzik, the Chairman of the Stadium and Security Committee stated that:

If stewards are well-trained and well-placed, they are the best people to help the police and allow the game to go smoothly and safely, hopefully, there will be more work for the stewards in the future, and less for the police. (Jackson 2008)

In England and the Netherlands, for example, stewards have become a professional organization that acts as the clubs' arbiters between the police and the fans.

As with other aspects of stadium safety, stewards have not been fully implemented in Italy. Although proscribed by law, the stewards in Italy do not fulfil the same function with the same vigour as in England or the Netherlands. The *Osservatorio* provides guidelines for stewards and has published a manual to assist stewards with their functions.⁵ However, they are not provided with sufficient support from the state, the police or the authorities. Many stewards are voluntary and this permits their incorporation into the patrimonial network. Stewards are provided with free entrance to the matches and do not have the skills or support to manage disorder. The continuing presence of the police places the legitimacy of the steward into question. They are reluctant to place themselves in difficult situations and therefore do not seem to enforce any rules. Bottles and other objects are frequently thrown at Italian football matches with impunity. Rather than adequate stewarding, architectural features such as netting and Perspex barriers are added to preserve the safety. The opportunities for an incident like Hillsborough are manifest.

The lack of stewards' authority reinforces the legitimacy of the *ultras*. As demonstrated above in relation to the police, the lack of enforcement over minor infringements amplifies the opportunities for tension and emotion to increase. Some stewards have been complicit with transgressors and this reinforces the group identity of the fans. The incidents with Liverpool and Manchester United fans in Rome saw stewards cooperating with the fans with 'some even allowing Italian fans through the segregation line to collect missiles that they then throw over the barriers' (Stott and Pearson 2007, p. 4). In many stadiums, including Fiorentina, Roma and Livorno, there are no stewards in the stands and this reinforces the liminal space of the *curve*. An incident during the match

between Livorno and Mantova in September 2008 occurred when an assistant referee gave a 'debatable' corner decision. This resulted in the assistant referee and the player taking the corner being the focus of a barrage of bottles and other assorted objects. No fans were reprimanded or ejected and the sanctity of the *curva* remained. The club was subsequently fined €5,000 for this infringement. This acts as a calculable cost. The costs of employing dedicated, trained stewards can run into several thousands of euros.⁶ The costs of €5,000 for occasional infringements are minimal compared to the costs the club would have to pay if they were charged by the police and stewards.

There are signs that certain areas are adopting an alternative approach to policing and stewarding at matches. Two Tuscan clubs have experimented with extensive stewarding. Empoli and Fiorentina have played a number of matches with minimal police. In addition, Fiorentina is planning a new stadium, which includes removing the perimeter fencing and incorporating increased stewarding. As Giudici (2010, p. 199) states, 'The project has the objective of "demilitarising" the stadium, improving excessively the commercial appeal of the event.' The Florentine club will provide an apposite example for the future of Italian football. This point is affirmed by the chief of police of Florence, Francesco Tagliente who stated that:

At Florence it is not like this, because in this city a project was taken forward. Launched by the *Osservatorio* and strongly backed by the head of police, it has taken away the nets from the away end and to make it that the forces are order are always moved away towards the centre of the city. The fans, initially sceptical, have started a constructive dialogue with the chief of police and the authorities. Florence is a reality seen as a model in international football. I speak for Florence; there are other problems of security for others. (Cellini 2009)

By taking away the nets that cover the away stands, the police and Fiorentina football club are beginning to treat the fans in a different manner to other clubs. Furthermore, by removing police from the stadium, they are acknowledging that the police are not passive in relation to fan violence. This approach was taken in the Champions League match between Fiorentina and Liverpool in October 2009. Fan choreographies from both sets of fans helped create a carnivalesque atmosphere and Liverpool fans freely went around the city (Giudici 2010). This situation contrasts with the response of Manchester United and Liverpool fans in Rome. It will take time to see if the 'Florence model' works, but it suggests a move towards a more progressive approach when dealing with fans.

Summary

The bankruptcy of the Italian patrimonial system has impeded its ability to undertake the wider transformations necessary to compete globally. Over-reliance on the revenue from television has permitted clubs to remain in communal stadiums with poor facilities. The lack of stadium redevelopment is contributing to the reinforcement of existing corrupt practices, as witnessed during *calciopoli* and the financial scandals. Lack of redevelopment is also impacting safety. *Curve* are surrounded by Perspex fences and netting that prevent easy exit in the event of an emergency. Without important stadium safety regulations being introduced, the potential for a Hillsborough-type tragedy is a time bomb waiting to explode. The poverty of the stadiums is also necessitating increased security outside as the police struggle to maintain order. Excessive legislation and police actions are effectively criminalizing all fans and contributing to the articulation of localized identities. This is heightening the already emotional situation that takes place at a stadium and amplifies the possibility of violence. The political role of the two police forces legitimates this violence as they seek to maintain their own profile and create the *ultras* as a 'folk devil'.

Despite these factors, there is acknowledgement that Italy needs to change. The FIGC submitted bids to host the 2012 and 2016 European Championships to act as a catalyst for stadium redevelopment. At the moment, only Juventus has constructed a purpose-built football stadium. Meanwhile, Fiorentina has started the planning process to build a new stadium and has trialled matches without police. Roma, Atalanta and Palermo are also planning new stadiums. Despite these plans, the widespread failure of the neo-patrimonial system to adjust to the global political economic transformations have impacted the matchday experience of fans and contributed to a decline in attendance at football. Ultimately, the role of the *ultras* is central to this.