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Stadiums

The match was being televised on the Friday evening so we had to board the coach at lunchtime to ensure we got to Piacenza in time for kick-off. Fans of all ages and genders congregated outside of the club's headquarters or popped into the cafe next door to purchase drinks and snacks for the long journey. Ten minutes after the appointed departure time, we boarded the coach and set off. Five minutes later, we stopped at the entrance to the autostrada. Another coach joined us, followed by two police cars. One of these cars pulled off onto the autostrada. The two coaches followed and the other police car took the rear. The police escort continued until we approached the city limits of Piacenza. After passing through the tollbooth, the two coaches were met by six police cars from Piacenza and ten motorcycles. This phalanx of police vehicles escorted us to the Stadio Leonardo Garilli and into the car park adjacent to the stadium. At this point we were allowed to disembark. The route to the stadium entrance was clear as it was flanked by two rows of approximately one hundred riot police. After being searched and having our tickets checked, we were allowed to take our places in the temporary away stand overlooking the pitch. After the long trip, many fans wished to purchase refreshments and approached the service trolley positioned behind the bars of the temporary stand. The sales assistants dispatched their wares from a supermarket trolley through the bars to the famished fans. Welcome to the stadium experience of an away fan of a club in Serie B.

The matchday experience represents a significant aspect of Italian football. The organization and administration of the stadiums and police are major contributing factors to the crisis in Italian football. As elsewhere in Italian football, the political and administrative bodies have not adjusted to the transformations in the global political economy. The continuance of existing patrimonial networks inhibits the opportunities for the game to reinvent itself and halt the decline. There has been little change in the policing of football matches or in stadium development and design. Consequently, Italian football has not embraced the changes that have taken place elsewhere, and

this is impeding their ability to rectify the situation. Through analysis of the fans' experience, it will be shown how the failure of the organizing bodies to correctly identify and implement coherent strategies is affecting the fans, and ultimately harming the sport. This chapter will focus on the role of the stadium in the matchday experience. It will begin with an overview of stadium development within the wider political economy of the sport before addressing its development in Italy. Interviews with fans will be incorporated to illustrate the problems that have been encountered. This will be followed with a section illustrating the response from the authorities. The following chapter will contain a similar overview and analysis into the development of policing within Italian football.

The political economy of football stadiums

The development of the football stadium reflects the political economic expansion of football. Despite the prevalence of Roman amphitheatres 2000 years ago, the current incarnation of the sports stadium is a modern phenomenon. Stadiums have evolved from public unregulated spaces into multi-functional entities. These changes reflect the global business of the sport. As football has developed into a multimillion dollar business with global appeal, the physical spaces have had to develop in line with these transformations. As Paramio et al. state (2008, p. 117), 'Modern and postmodern stadium developments need to be linked to both the socio-economic conditions of the capitalist mode of production as well as relevant sporting factors of every historical period.' It has been shown in previous chapters that political economic transformations during the 1980s contributed to a realignment of Italian television and politics. These have impacted the economic aspects of football and provided increased interest and revenues to clubs. Globally, these transformations have been replicated within stadium development. Stadiums have expanded their range of services in order to maximize income rather than focus principally on sports (Giulianotti 1999; Bale 1993a; Paramio et al. 2008). Italy, however, has not managed this transition well, and this is affecting the ability of football clubs to compete within Europe.

The football stadium reflects the privatization and commercialization of space. Before the codification of football, folk games were played in unregulated public spaces. Games took place in fields, churchyards and public squares. They were often confined by the existing natural boundaries, such as walls, ditches and buildings. Games of *Calcio Fiorentino* were played in the piazza in front of

the church of Santa Croce in Florence. A 1555 painting by Jan van der Straet depicts the edge of the pitch being delineated by the crowds of spectators. Spatial regulation of this historic game emerged by the late seventeenth century. Pietro di Lorenzo Bini's 1688 print depicts railings around the Piazza Santa Croce. This highlights the increased social regulation to maintain the square free of traffic, rather than the regulation of an annual football tournament. Nevertheless, these games were still played in public spaces, accessible to all. The development of industrial cities saw the increased subdivision and regulation of space. As modern codified football evolved, the physical space for playing the game became privatized, regulated and commodified which assisted in the creation of football stadiums. The link between the wider political economy and sport converged as grounds were built near large industrial areas with easy access to the emergent railway infrastructure to encourage an active support.

Modern stadiums were functional and focused on the core aspect of the club: football matches. The distinct architectural periods of modern football stadium have been identified: from the late nineteenth century until 1920; 1920–40; and 1940–90 (Bale 1993b; Paramio et al. 2008). New forms of postmodern stadium appear after 1990 and coincide with the globalization of sport. Functional modern football stadiums began to emerge during the early period of football. During the interwar period, modern construction materials, such as steel and concrete, were used to increase the matchday capacity and enhance the comfort for the increasing numbers of fans. After the Second World War, clubs began to incorporate architectural features to maximize comfort and enjoyment. Floodlights were introduced to allow for regular midweek games and thereby increase the revenue from the additional games. Covered terraces and additional tiers were constructed so that fans were protected from the elements and capacity was maximized. Most importantly, these maximized the revenue for individual clubs. Lately, corporate boxes were integrated into stadiums during the 1960s in a bid to increase matchday revenue. Modern stadiums also incorporated increased social control. Not only was the space delineated to clarify and commodify the space matches, but it also demarcated class lines and provided clear social divisions. Ticket prices were valued according to facilities and comfort while barriers and fencing were added to physically demarcate the divisions and prevent antisocial behaviour, such as pitch invasions and hooligan fighting.

The Hillsborough tragedy proved to be provided the nadir for modern stadiums in Britain. After the tragic deaths of ninety-six Liverpool fans, Lord Justice Taylor published a report in 1990 recommending a number of changes to the football stadiums. As Bale (1993a, p. 181) suggests:

In British football, 1990 might be flagged as the beginning of the postmodern stadium when the metal fences surrounding many grounds were taken down and scrapped.

The Hillsborough tragedy highlighted the antiquated and dangerous stadiums in Britain that were incoherently policed. Lord Justice Taylor reviewed the state of football in Britain and recommended opportunities for resolution. The report recommended that all grounds should be converted to all-seater to provide more control and safety:

Put together with progress towards all-seating, improved accommodation, better facilities, improved arrangements for crowd control, and better training of police and stewards, I believe these measures would give the best chance of eliminating or minimising football hooliganism. (Taylor 1990, p. 75)

A number of these recommendations combined to transform the British stadiums. All-seater stadiums have led to numbered seating for all ticket holders allowing cameras, police and stewards to identify and remove trouble-makers. Aside from increased restrictions on fans (as detailed later), stadiums became increasingly comfortable spaces that could be enjoyed by all the family. This contributed to increased attendances and opportunities for market exploitation.

Stadium redevelopments no longer rely on the product of football to generate revenue. In keeping with the growing commercialization of the sport, superstores and outlets in the concourses have been incorporated into the stadiums, allowing the club to sell a variety of merchandise. The stores are open throughout the week and are not limited to fans' matchday consumption. Food and drink facilities are also incorporated into the new stadiums. Rather than buying these commodities outside of the ground, fans consume these within the ground, therefore providing a source of revenue for the club. Many stadiums have incorporated restaurants and hotels into their facilities that operate throughout the week. Clubs and stadium owners also rent out the corporate spaces within the stadium for meetings, exhibitions and conferences. All of these generate income and positive emotions towards a football club as the club markets established themselves both as a corporate venue for engagements and as a space for matchday hospitality. As a consequence, the postmodern stadium is synonymous with corporate commodification.

Stadiums have become tourist spaces where 'post-tourists' consume a range of experiences (Urry 1990; Urry 2002). Some clubs have added a museum to symbolize their status within world football. Barcelona and Manchester United

are notable in this case and have also added stadium tours to their portfolio of facilities and services. Restaurants have also been incorporated so that unique experiences can be sold to fans for occasions like landmark birthdays and include tours, tickets and meals. Postmodern stadiums also use their facilities for other unique experiences that are not restricted to that of the football club. Often international matches or local tournaments are hosted. As the stadium is a facility that can host large numbers of visitors, this permits the stadium to host alternative large-scale events. For example, Wembley stadium has hosted Rugby Union, Rugby League and American football matches in addition to hosting England's national tournaments and international football matches. It also allows for various spectacular events to take place, such as car racing at the 'Race of Champions'. The 2015 Rugby World Cup, hosted by England, scheduled many matches to be played in football stadiums so that they could attract larger attendances. Similarly, Fiorentina's Stadio Artemo Franchi and the Stadio Olimpico in Rome have hosted Italian rugby matches as the sport has grown in popularity. Music events have also become popular features of new stadiums. International music stars invariably incorporate large stadium events into their touring schedule. As a result, stadiums have become self-contained service economies where consumers and fans purchase an increasing range of commodities and experiences. In the case of the Amsterdam ArenA, they have even generated their own currency for use within the stadium outlets.

Innovative design and architectural elegance in postmodern stadiums mark a distinct difference from the modern stadium with their functional approach. In addition to the incorporation of architectural features, such as shops, museums and corporate boxes, postmodern features are becoming architectural events. These redevelopments and renovations initially challenged fans' emotional attachments. Modern stadiums generated positive emotions or *topophilia*, among fans who ascribed a symbolic value to the stadium (Bale 1990). The personal attachment and the atmosphere generated by the collective solidarity of the crowd fuelled the construction of emotional ties to their physical environment. New symbols are being created as stadiums become markers of high architecture. As stadiums become designed by eminent architects, such as Wembley, designed by Sir Norman Foster, and the Michel Macary-designed Stade de France, stadiums are attracting renewed interests from fans (Horne 2011). These transformations now symbolize a club's standing among its peers; these stadiums become physical manifestations of the club's status. As King (2003, p. 130) argues 'The international standing of clubs like Real Madrid and Barcelona are physically demonstrated by the Bernabeu and Nou Camp stadiums.'

Working-class fans who resented the commercialization of Manchester United still took pride in the fact that Manchester United was one of the best run clubs, and that Old Trafford was the best stadium in England, especially in comparison to their rivals, Manchester City. New architectural status, allied with the shops, museums and tour facilities, is contributing to stadiums becoming symbolic spaces for fans and tourists alike.

Stadium redevelopment in Britain was facilitated by government support driven by the emotional tragedy of Hillsborough. As Piore and Sabel (1984) demonstrated, local government assistance facilitated the growth and expansion of small, family-owned businesses in the Emilian Model. Similar support from the British government assisted stadium redevelopment. Despite the free-market ethic of the Thatcherite government who implemented the Taylor Report, the stadium renovations could not be achieved through the free market alone. Most grounds in Britain were owned by the club and would not be able to afford the costs of renovation. As a result money from central government was provided through the Football Trust, the Football Grounds Improvement Trust and the use of money from the Football Pools. Taylor also recommended that cooperation could come from local councils or from private finance initiatives, such as supermarkets. Similar cooperation exists when countries, such as the Netherlands and Germany, host international tournaments and generate similarly powerful emotional foci for change. English football also benefitted from the initial injection of revenue generated by the formation of the Premier League. Clubs like Manchester United realized that they could incorporate the stadium into the overall package of football provided to fans.

Italian stadiums: Mussolini, Italia '90 and beyond

Ironically, Italy provided an additional impetus for stadium redevelopment in England. The popularity and success of Italia '90 acted as a catalyst for the nascent Premier League as interest in football increased. It also demonstrated the inadequate and antiquated stadiums that were in use within Britain. As King notes (1998, pp. 103–4), Italia '90 not only 'demonstrated the inadequacy of English football grounds but also the potential market for football if it was properly organised'. Consequently, the newly renovated Italian stadiums were used as a benchmark against which English stadiums were measured. It is ironic that English stadiums were considered inferior to their Italian counterparts at

that time, but now those same Italian stadiums are being criticized for their anachronism. However, it was the renovation for Italia '90 that meant that many Italian stadiums missed the reforms that arose out of the troubles of the previous decade. Giulianotti (1999, p. 77) held that Italian stadiums had 'all the architectural qualities of high modernism, in facilities, scale and shiny newness, but succumbed to the Fordist vices of soullessness and instrumentality'. For example, many of the stadiums constructed for Italia '90 failed to incorporate executive boxes into their structures.

Early success inhibited the opportunities for Italian football to capitalize on the economic transformation that was taking place in football. This has been compounded by the ownership structure of Italian stadiums. Most football stadiums in Italy are municipally owned and are located in multipurpose complexes that house a variety of sports, many of which date to the fascist period. The area around the Stadio Armando Picchi in Livorno houses a horse-racing track, basketball courts, football pitches and athletics tracks. Similarly, the Stadio Olimpico in Rome is housed in the Foro Italico complex built by Mussolini to host the Olympics. This complex also includes an international swimming pool and a tennis stadium that hosts the Rome Masters international tennis tournament.

As they are communally owned, stadiums are designed for the benefit of the wider community rather than the football club itself. The Stadio San Nicola in Bari is an apposite example of a stadium that is encumbered by its communal status. It was constructed for Italia '90 and the spectators' viewpoint is poor, despite its architectural aesthetics.¹ Many communal stadiums, like the Stadio San Nicola, have running tracks encircling the pitch which places the fans some distance from the pitch. Furthermore, as these stadiums are communal, the clubs take little interest in enhancements or security issues. This can create conflict between clubs and presidents. In April 2012, the owner of Cagliari, Massimo Cellino, decided to play the Sardinian club's home match in Trieste, 300 miles away on the Slovenian border. Cellino was in dispute over the upkeep of the Sant'Elia stadium that had two sides closed for safety reasons. Although Cellino funded his own redevelopment, he circumvented safety laws by allegedly bribing council officials (Masu 2013). Personal contacts and corruption undermined any health and safety requirements.

Club owners do not welcome investing in facilities that they do not own, especially when many of the clubs are in dire financial shape. The vice president of Juventus, Roberto Bettega, highlighted the difficulty Italian clubs are placed in because they do not own the ground:

If we want to invest, to put money in to the stadium, to make it better, to make it nicer, make it a meeting point for the supporters, you have to do it in a place you know is yours or is yours for the next thirty or forty years. Why invest money in a stadium now when you don't know whether you will be playing in it next year? (King 2003, p. 130)

Since this statement, Juventus has been the only club to tackle this issue. The financial pressure of *calciopoli* combined with the reduction in television revenue since 2010 has resulted in them being the only club to purchase land from the council and build their own stadium. The Juventus Stadium was opened in September 2011 and represents the first transition to a new postmodern stadium in Italy (Doidge 2011).

Wider resistance to stadium redevelopment is also apparent within the media. After Inter defeated Chelsea in a Champions League match in March 2010, *Il Giornale's* Tony Damascelli (2010) wrote:

Some people will be happy for the UEFA ranking points, I prefer to be happy for the fact of having seen one of our teams win in London. However, what matters isn't owning your own stadium and having a multimillion turnover, what matters is not blowing a big match in the key moment.

For this journalist, winning games was more important than any of the off-field aspects of football. Despite this resistance, clubs in Italy are slowly beginning to see the wider business benefits from stadium investment. Alongside Juventus' new stadium, Roma, Fiorentina, Palermo and Atalanta have all commissioned plans for new postmodern stadiums incorporating new commercial features.

The transition to consumerism that has grown in wider society has not been utilized by Italian football clubs. The lack of investment in the stadium not only impinges on spectator comfort but also affects the ability of the clubs to maximize revenue. Although the San Siro has a shop for Milan and Inter, other clubs do not have stores at their 'homes'. Some clubs, like Roma, have stores within the city centre, but not at the stadium. Smaller clubs, like Livorno, sell official merchandise in designated outlets like the local shopping mall. During the 2008-9 season, the club signed a deal with a local sports shop to sell official Livorno products. However, they are constrained by regulated business practices that prevent them from selling non-clothing items, such as pens and key rings, as this would infringe on the market of stationers and newsagents in the city. This limits the range available, minimizes opportunities to increase revenue and reiterates that deregulated market practices are not uniform across the globe.

Stadium facilities in Serie B are indicative of the poor quality of the Italian infrastructure. Many are still playing in stadiums that were built by Mussolini. Of the clubs that have been promoted in recent years, stadium facilities have not substantially improved. Of the clubs competing in Serie B during 2008–9, the three clubs that were promoted had the better stadiums. As previously stated, the stadium of Bari was constructed for Italia '90 yet failed to incorporate new facilities.² Parma was one of the 'Seven Sisters', the seven biggest clubs in Italy during the 1990s. Despite this, the Stadio Ennio Tardini highlights the incomplete development of Italian football stadiums. Constructed in 1923, it has undergone a series of modernizations.³ The main stand has now incorporated fourteen executive boxes, a shop and disabled facilities, but the terraces at the ends of the ground still have uncovered 'temporary' stands that are in need of extensive redevelopment. While Livorno's Stadio Armando Picchi does not have any temporary stands, the only modernization that has been undertaken occurred in 2005 when the club returned to Serie A and this coincided with the visit of the president of the republic, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, who was born in Livorno. This led to the renovation of the main stand, including the dining room, VIP area and seating – not to the rest of the stadium that houses the majority of the fans.

The stadium infrastructure of other recently promoted clubs is similarly poor. The stadiums of Atalanta, Siena, Bologna, Palermo, and Empoli were all built in the 1920s and have had little renovation since. Torino's Stadio Olimpico was built under fascism to host the 1934 World Cup. It underwent a €30 million reconstruction for the 2006 Winter Olympics. Although this has improved some of the fan experience, it does not directly impact the operation of the club. The second phase of Italian stadium building occurred in the 1960s. The stadiums of Sampdoria, Genoa, Brescia, Lecce and Novara all fall into this category. And as has occurred with the fascist-built stadiums, they have not seen significant renovation since. Verona's Stadio Marcantonio Bentagodi is indicative of the second wave of Italian stadiums that were built after the war. The Bentagodi was built in 1963 and was considered a state-of-the-art stadium fifty years ago. Despite both Hellas Verona and Chievo Verona playing there, significant modernization has not occurred since Italia '90. It is indicative of the poverty of Italian stadiums that of these stadiums, the ones of Verona, Bologna, Sampdoria and Genoa were refurbished for Italia '90, a quarter of a century ago.

In contrast to these larger clubs, many stadiums in Italy are comprised of poor-quality communal stadiums. As mentioned in the opening paragraph of this chapter, Piacenza's Stadio Leonardo Garilli is a typical Serie B stadium. The away support was housed in 'temporary' stands made of scaffolding. These were

distant from the action on the pitch and the visibility was poor. There was no seating, only the metal steps of the temporary stand. The need for economic improvements was exemplified at half-time. Like many stadiums, the facilities are housed under the stands. These stands are subdivided into sections partitioned by steel fences with each section being able to be opened up dependent upon the away support. The refreshments were housed in a shopping trolley on the other side of the steel partition. The two vendors sold their items through the bars of the fence. Similar redevelopment was required for the toilets, which were unisex and in need of complete renovation. Piacenza was not unique. A similar structure existed in Grosseto at the Stadio Olimpico Carlo Zecchini. The temporary metal stands comprising of metal steps were ill-prepared for 3,000 Livorno fans attending for a Tuscan derby in February 2009. The catering facilities were more civilized than at Piacenza, where an attendant served snacks from a small kiosk. However, fans were unable to locate the toilets, and this made a large number of male fans utilize the back of the stands. The two unisex toilets were, in fact, housed in a section close to the home support, but which were ill-equipped to cope the huge number of away support. Ultimately this does not create an inclusive atmosphere for *all* fans; young and old, female and male. These facilities are not restricted to the stadiums of provincial clubs in Serie B. Similar problems of poor visibility and shade, and inadequate toilet and catering facilities, also exist at the stadiums of larger Serie A clubs; notably at Fiorentina's Stadio Artemi Franchi, Napoli's San Paolo and the Stadio Olimpico in Rome, home of Lazio and Roma.

The communal nature of Italian stadiums is clearly reductive. At the current time, no one is considering the experience of fans (with the exception of Juventus). By permitting the clubs to own their own ground, they will be inclined to consider the experiences of their fans. If the clubs can invest in the facilities then they can begin to capitalize on these investments and begin to compete with other leagues. They can also attract a wider range of fans, rather than the predominantly masculine fans that frequent the stadium nowadays. However, this has to come with clear regulation and safeguards. In certain situations in Britain, such as Plymouth Argyle, football grounds have been used as collateral to place significant debt onto football clubs, thereby threatening their survival. Similarly, the Goldstone Ground of Brighton and Hove Albion was sold to a development company, forcing the team to play in Gillingham, over seventy miles away. This situation has occurred with Cagliari. The club's owner, Massimo Cellino forced the team to play in Trieste after he did not get his way over a stadium redevelopment (that he was subsequently indicted for).

Juventus could lead the way for stadium redevelopment. In 2003, the club purchased the Stadio Delle Alpi from the council. Despite the fact that this stadium had been renovated for Italia '90, Juventus understood that it was not suitable for the club to compete in the twenty-first century. Even though 'old lady' of Juventus is the most successful club in Italy, their average attendance was under 20,000, one-third of the capacity of the Delle Alpi. The Juventus Stadium was built at a cost of €100 million and officially opened in September 2011 with an exhibition match against Notts County, the oldest professional football club in the world, and the club that Juventus took its club colours from. Not only was much of building resources of the Juventus Stadium reclaimed from the Delle Alpi but also the construction sought to make it one of the most environment-friendly stadiums in the world. Significantly, the architectural design built the stands closer to the pitch to provide better visibility for fans and improve the atmosphere. It has also copied other European clubs by incorporating a club museum, commercial space and hospitality suites (Doidge 2011).

Unfortunately, most clubs in Italy do not have the financial and political might of Juventus. Potential investment for new stadiums could come from local government. As the Italian state is significantly decentralized, local authorities could support clubs. This, however, leads to the impact on the local taxpayers. In an American context, Schimmel (2006) has argued that public investment in stadiums for sports' franchises and mega events operate as a form of irrational gambling and do not always provide value-for-money for the public. Elsewhere, Schimmel (2001) has highlighted how urban elites use sport to promote their own interests in the name of regeneration. In the contemporary Italian context, neither the football clubs nor the municipal authorities are compelled to invest in the stadiums. Italian cities have not yet become what Harvey (1989) terms 'entrepreneurial cities'. Elsewhere, Boycoff (2013) has argued that global mega events like the Olympics reflect 'celebration capitalism' where public money bears all the risk, while private corporations enjoy the profits. As shown in previous chapters, the development of deregulated neo-liberalism has taken a distinctive approach in Italy. Local and national elites are not utilizing public money to promote wider regeneration projects by utilizing football stadiums, as they are in the United States. Curiously, power and patronage have not incorporated architecture into the patrimonial network of football. Unlike the patrons of the past who commissioned churches or public buildings, contemporary patrons are not seeking redemption through football stadiums.

The Taylor Report in England reiterated the need for public financial support for stadium redevelopment. More importantly, without statutory regulation

enforcing clubs to provide adequate facilities, club presidents seek to remain successful on the pitch. Club presidents will focus their attention on the playing staff until required by the state or federation to upgrade stadiums. There is an immediacy to contemporary football patronage. Presidents are not investing in the long-term viability of the clubs, nor seeking immortality through physical architecture. Short-term success on the pitch is the prime focus as presidents seek approval from fans. Failure to invest in the playing staff, and its effect on the performance of the football team, would see a president face extreme pressure from vocal fan groups, such as the *ultras*. Consequently, investment in a stadium is not seen as imperative.

Until stadiums are systematically redeveloped, the matchday experience for fans is poor. Even basic protection from the elements does not exist for many fans. Northern Italy especially, encounters the full spectrum of weather, from freezing temperatures and snow in the winter to dry, hot summers. This can make for an extremely unpleasant experience, as the following comment illustrates:

For the stadiums, in my opinion, they should make the stadiums a little more covered, like in England. In Italy they make it disgusting for us. If it rains, we get soaked, if it is windy, we get blown by the wind. This is the minimum. (Paolo, official Livorno supporters' club director, personal interview, June 2009)

The location of Livorno's Stadio Armando Picchi near the sea means that it feels the full effect of extreme weather, as Paolo states. This makes for an extremely unpleasant matchday experience for fans. The opposite also occurs in the extreme heat in the interior of the country. The lack of roofs at the Artemo Franchi in Florence, for example, exposes fans to extreme sunshine. Stadiums have not adapted to their environments and only four Italian stadiums are fully covered. With poor toilet facilities and inadequate catering facilities, the matchday experience for fans is not always pleasant.

It is illustrative of the Italian stadiums, that only four of them are fully covered. In addition to the new Juventus Stadium in Turin, the San Siro in Milan and the Stadio Olimpico in Rome, the Stadio Comunale Luigi Ferraris in Genoa is fully contained. Along with the Juventus Stadium, it is one of the few Italian stadiums which could be classed as postmodern in Italy. It is the home of Sampdoria and the oldest club in Italy, Genoa. After redevelopment for Italia '90, it incorporates an architectural style with user-friendly facilities. Although many redevelopments of postmodern stadiums in North America and Northern Europe have seen stadiums constructed outside the city, the Marassi, as it is known locally, is located in the heart of the city. In a clear indication of

a post-Fordist approach, the city council decided to sell the stadium. However, the council did not sell it to either of the clubs. Instead it sold the Marassi to a third-party business consortium who will seek to capitalize on their investment. Although the introduction of new business practices are seeing the council release their interest in the facilities, none of the clubs are likely to be able to increase their own revenues, as the additional events that could be located at the stadium, such as conferences and music events will profit the individual business owners, rather than the clubs themselves. Similar problems occur with communal stadiums, especially at Roma and Lazio, Hellas and Chievo Verona, and Inter and Milan. The problem for shared ownership is that no club benefits financially.

Revenue from television has contributed to the lack of stadium development in Italy. In contrast to the economic stimulus provided to the English Premier League from Sky, which was utilized for stadium redevelopment, television money is underpinning the Italian clubs' finances. This is impinging on their ability to capitalize on their matchday revenues. One respondent highlights how the clubs are completely over-reliant on television revenues:

The clubs are totally dependent on television. They do not have commercial aspects. They do not own the stadium and there are no merchandising outlets. They do not invest in the stadium and depend exclusively on television. The system is for television royalties only. Therefore the system is very weak ... [We need] less money from television and young people to return to the stadium. [We need] stadiums in an English style ... to be a fan is more comfortable, more customer focused, and above all, the type of police are more civil. It is a civil country. (Levriero, official Livorno supporters' club member, personal interview, June 2009)

The patrimonial nature of Italian business and politics permitted the complete deregulation of television rules. Football clubs became over-reliant on television money. This precluded the development of other revenue streams and help shield clubs from other structural problems in the game. As already stated, the club presidents do not feel the need to invest in their stadiums when they do not own them. They also do not have to invest in them when they are competing in the national league as television money allows them to compete with their peers. Television also necessitates the requirements for fans at the stadium. The choreographies in the stadium generate an additional atmosphere for the fans watching football on television at home. In keeping with this notion, Silvio Berlusconi has suggested that in the future, football spectators will be allowed

free access in order to generate the collective atmosphere required to enhance the television audience at home. Despite the improvement in the social capital, the Italian patrimonial system is not generating the collective will required to transform the stadium experience for fans and that could enhance the television event for viewers at home.

In light of the prestige accorded to football, the governmental approach to stadium safety is unplanned and haphazard. There seems to be no overriding principal driving change within the Italian context. Part of the drive for change in England came through the Taylor Report. This formed the legislative framework to facilitate improvements. More importantly, the government was willing to enforce the rules. Money for safety improvements came from the Football Pools and government incentives. Allied to this, commercial pressures in England led clubs to invest in their own stadiums as they sought to maximize revenue from all avenues. As King notes:

the Taylor report, despite its own intentions, did little more than provide judicial legitimacy to the free-market arguments which proposed the easiest line of reform for football in the light of the organic development of the sport, on the one hand, and the transformations of British society, on the other. (King 1998, p. 106)

The post-Fordist approach from government, allied with the desire to impose the rule of law saw the legal and economic support to these transformations.

In recognition of the necessity for new stadiums in Italy, the president of Livorno, Aldo Spinelli, has suggested one proposal. Few clubs have the resources or access to private capital that Juventus had. He proposes that the state should provide tax relief to the clubs to allow the reconstruction of new stadiums:

The Italian State received 100% of the taxes that we pay, I believe it is right that for 2 or 3 years they reduce the levy in a way that the club, together with the councils and the government, can make new stadiums. (Liguori 2010)

Clearly, Spinelli is openly absolving club presidents from the responsibility for stadium improvement. He also does not take into account the *salva calcio* debtspreading laws that were implemented in 2003 which effectively acted as state aid to the clubs (as discussed in the previous chapter). Yet, Spinelli is also highlighting the need for state involvement and sees the development of stadiums as a cooperation between the central state, the council and the club. Stadium renovations in England could not have been achieved through the free

market alone. Similarly, Spinelli is proposing an opportunity to inject public funds into the stadiums and launch the transformations within Italy. However, without clear management of the funding, it is unclear how stadium renovations would be managed in compliance with safety regulations. Assurances would have to be made that the funds are used only for stadium development and not to be appropriated for players or for other functions of the clubs. Furthermore, there needs to be a clear and unequivocal legal document with the appropriate sanctions to drive through this change. The Football Trust and Football Licensing Authority implemented new regulations governing safety in England (Hamil et al. 2010). These were supported by the government enforcing the Taylor Report. The problem in Italy, as Francesio (2008, p. 88) states, is 'money and will'. Many of the rules are in place, but no one enforces them. New regulatory frameworks are required and need to be supported politically.

There is an acknowledgement from the football authorities that Italy's stadiums need to be renovated or rebuilt. The FIGC submitted bids to host the 2012 and 2016 European Championships for this reason. Both of these bids failed, however, due to the ongoing economic, corruption and hooliganism problems in Italy. Like Italia '90, these tournaments were predicted to act as a catalyst for stadium rejuvenation. However, the patrimonial nature of Italian politics has accumulated the power within a small number of elite clubs. Therefore stadium regeneration would only benefit certain clubs who hosted the tournament, and these would be the elite clubs. This is illustrated by the two exceptions to the communally owned stadium in Italy. As its names suggests, the Stadio Olimpico in Rome is owned by the Italian Olympic Committee, CONI. Two of the biggest clubs in Italy (Roma and Lazio) have a better stadium because the Italian public pays for their facilities. As a publicly funded body, CONI's support for the Stadio Olimpico ensures that the taxpayer is subsidizing some of the biggest clubs in Italy. The equivalent does not occur for clubs like Siena, Brescia or Livorno whose grounds are paid for by the communes only. The patrimonial connections within Italian politics, business and sport permit the state subsidence of elite clubs to the detriment of smaller provincial clubs like Livorno.

The lack of stadium development is also contributing to the economic crisis in Italian football. Stadiums are not generating the additional revenue required to allow Italian clubs to compete financially in Europe. Reliance on patrimonial networks circumvents the need to make profound changes to the infrastructure and allow Italian football to move forward. This point was clearly made by Marco Mazzocchi, a former football analyst on *Il Processo*:

The stadiums are old, the tickets cost a lot and so the fans arrive and they are already angry. The fans feel that the soccer world doesn't respect them and we are hearing these days the same phrases from officials that we have heard in the past. If they don't do something now, Italian soccer will die. (Kiefer 2007a)

Unsafe stadiums and poor facilities are contributing to fan apathy and declining attendances. This has been exacerbated by the government that has attempted to impose increased regulations, called the Pisanu Law, on those attending matches, rather than focus on stadium redevelopment and safety. The following section will describe the impact of the Pisanu Law that was implemented after the death of Filippo Raciti in Catania and its impact on Italian football.

The Pisanu Law: An Italian Taylor Report or criminalization of fans?

The deregulation of the nation state and the football authorities has magnified the financial crises within Italian football. It permitted the increased control and manipulation of the situation by the elite clubs. Despite the carnivalesque image of Italian football fans, there have been increased controls over individual fans as extensive regulations have been introduced to control disorder at football matches. Mirroring other aspects of neo-liberal society, as the state decreases regulation of corporations, it has increased regulation on the individual. Foucault (1991b) has argued that 'the art of government' has slowly changed since the eighteenth century. Rather than sovereigns exercising power over specific subjects within a territory, 'government has at its purpose not the act of government itself, but the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase in its wealth, longevity, health etc.' (Foucault 1991b, p. 100). Foucault's theory of governmentality observes how the state, through legal, bureaucratic, and economic means, exerts power over the individual and forces them to change their behaviour. The centralization of power helped create 'docile bodies' (Foucault 1991a) as individuals would be aware that they could be being watched at times, and thus moderate their behaviour accordingly. Despite this centralization of power, however, it also dispersed power across the network as it created 'a multiplicity of points of resistance' (Foucault 1990, pp. 95–6). This aspect will be dealt with in the following chapter on the police.

Aligned to the approach of the police, the government have passed a number of measures to try and combat the problem of violence at football matches.

An early attempt at controlling fan behaviour occurred in 1989 when police authorities were given the authority to serve a Daspo⁴ (*Diffida ad Assistere alle Manifestazioni Sportive* or prohibition to attend sport events) on fans causing trouble. Those holding a Daspo have to sign a register at the time of the game at the local police station, thus ensuring that they are not in attendance at the stadium. Legislation related to Daspos have been amended regularly since. There are two fundamental criticisms of Daspos: the type of legislation and the power of the police. Testa (2013) highlights that Daspos have been introduced by *Decreto Legge* (Decree Laws). These are emergency decrees permitted under the Italian Constitution for acts of urgency. Consequently, they are not fully debated in parliament. It was a Decree Law that Bettino Craxi used to deregulate television and permit Berlusconi to cement his media empire. Testa (2013) highlights how these Decree Laws have become the norm during Berlusconi's tenure as prime minister. The consequence is that laws require constant moderation. As the lawyer Lorenzo Contucci highlights, these laws need to be debated and thought through:

In Italy when there is *confusione* you know, when there is an accident in the stadium, after two or three days you have a new law. It is an emotional law and sometimes it is not fair and it is not correct. In Italy the Daspo it is done directly by the police and there is no control over it. While in England there is a proposal I think, by the police, and then there is the judge that gives the banning order. (Lorenzo Contucci, AS Roma and lawyer, personal interview, January 2014)

Contucci's comments also highlight the other issue with Daspos; the police implement them. Unlike England, where the judiciary uphold or dismiss football banning orders, Italian magistrates do not have the same power. Problems have arisen when these measures appear to be misused or badly enforced. Daspos have been issued for having keys, flagpoles and mobile telephones as these could constitute weapons (Marchi 2005). Five Pisa fans received Daspos for taking toilet rolls to a match. The reason given for issuing Daspos to them was that they were holding 'inflammable' materials (Lo Bianco and Messina 2008). The notoriously slow judicial process in Italy also has the effect of penalizing fans. As it takes so long to appeal against police's decision, fans having to comply with a Daspo are restricted from attending matches (Testa 2013). As Contucci suggests, the police should recommend the imposition of a Daspo to the court before they are enforced.

The death of Filippo Raciti, a policeman, during fan violence securely focused the attention of fans, the media and the government. The Pisanu Law was an

attempt to rectify the violence in Italian football through increased regulation. Unsurprisingly, it was also a Decree Law, and was not adequately debated in parliament. The law was named after Giuseppe Pisanu, the Interior Minister from 2002 to 2006 who drafted the original legislation. Pisanu was also implicated in the *calciopoli* scandal, as the minister who wanted assistance for his local team, Sassari Torres del Viminale, as well as consulting with Luciano Moggi when Pope John Paul II died. The Pisanu Law illustrates the lack of enforcement within Italian football. The law was enacted in 2005 but was only enforced in 2007 after the death of Filippo Raciti in Catania. In addition, due to the heightened interest after the riots in Catania, a full-scale review of all stadiums was undertaken. This highlighted that only four stadiums were safe to hold matches (Roma, Palermo, Siena and Turin). Few questions were raised about this lack of safety and no provisions were made to fund the necessary improvements. There were rumours that the Finanziaria (Italian Budget) in 2009 would provide special credit for clubs to renovate their stadiums. However, this was not implemented after the worldwide recession and increased austerity measures placed on Italy. Once again, global factors impacted on Italy's ability to change.

The Pisanu Law orders that if authorities deem there to be a potential problem with a fixture they can authorize the match to be played 'behind closed doors' or with certain restrictions. Every month the central authority, the *Osservatorio Nazionale sulle Manifestazioni Sportive*,⁵ review the forthcoming list of fixtures. Those that they deem to cause a substantial risk to fans and the public are placed under additional restrictions. These measures intensified six months after the death of Raciti after thousands of ticketless Napoli fans descended on Rome for the opening game of the season in August 2007. Police permitted the fans to board the train at Napoli, even though they knew that many did not have tickets. En route, some fans released firecrackers and smoke bombs, as well as vandalizing the trains and injuring four members of the train's staff.⁶ Problems continued on their way to the stadium, as transport buses were vandalized, as well as incidents taking place during the match. Napoli fans were banned from attending all away matches for the remainder of the season as the authorities began to clamp down.

The restrictions placed on fans provide a clear avenue of protest for fans. As Foucault (1990) argued, the centralization of power also provided more 'points of resistance'. For example, the *Ossevatorio* deemed that both games between Pisa and Livorno during the 2008-9 season were to be subjected to restrictions. The police blockaded every road and rail entry between the two cities to prevent movement of fans. This had the desired effect on disorder, but led to fan

protests and banners being attached to prominent buildings in Livorno stating that ‘without fans and colour, this is a derby of repression’. As the Daspos have demonstrated, inconsistent prognosis reinforces an anti-authority narrative of fans. In May 2010, the match between Livorno and Lazio was permitted to go ahead with fans.⁷ This was in spite of the fact that there is a history of conflict between Lazio and Livorno due to their political identities. Livorno has a strong left-wing identity, whereas Lazio fans are noted for their right-wing politics. In contrast to this declaration was a decree from 17 March 2010 related to Livorno’s local rivals, Pisa.⁸ The Serie D (amateur league) game between Pisa and Chioggia Sottomarina had a ban imposed on away fans from Chioggia, a small fishing port south of Venice with 50,000 inhabitants. For some reason this match was deemed by the *Osservatorio* to be a greater risk than the match between Livorno and Lazio. Away fans from Chioggia were banned from travelling even though there is no history of disorder between the fans and only a small number of fans would have attended. Despite some of the more forceful attempts to prevent away fans from travelling, lack of enforcement means that fans still circumvent the restrictions. A decree by the *Osservatorio* was passed for the Livorno game against Napoli in January 2010.⁹ Restrictions were placed on ticket sales to Napoli fans and away fans were banned. Despite these restrictions, approximately one thousand Napoli fans attended the game. They obtained tickets from friends and family members in Livorno and congregated towards one section of the ground. Despite these restrictions, fans still circumvented them.

The most striking feature of this monthly review is the composition of the *Osservatorio* panel. It contains representatives from each of the police authorities (police, road police, train police, Carabinieri, specials, Guardia di Finanza), the football federation, CONI (the Italian Olympic Association), the League as well as interested businesses, such as Autogrills and the train company, Trenitalia. However, it does not contain any representatives from the provincial councils or any fan groups, such as FISSC. Not only does this illustrate the lack of political involvement of the fan groups but also it reinforces the patrimonial nature of Italian decision-making. A select network of interested parties dominates decision-making. Powerful groups can actively exclude others to maintain their hegemonic position. Furthermore, the reasons for the decisions taken are not explained and alternative assistance is not always put in place to deal with any potential breaches. For example, the game between Juventus against Inter in April 2009 was considered ‘a risk’ and that the committee ‘is invited to value the opportunity of suggesting measures to make the contest with the participation of both the fans, but with restrictions on the sale of tickets.’¹⁰ The suggested measures

were not published and if any were implemented, they were unsuccessful. Mario Balotelli was still subjected to racist abuse by Juventus fans, while the Inter team bus was pelted with eggs and bottles. The result was that Juventus had to play their next home game without fans. This effectively criminalizes *all* fans regardless of their involvement. Similarly, in 2009, Livorno fans were banned from attending Frosinone because Frosinone fans had performed the fascist salute. This effectively penalized Livorno fans for the actions of Frosinone supporters. Unsurprisingly, this has not addressed some of the main issues and has further contributed to the narrative against central authority.

The Pisanu Law passed a further draconian measure that banned all articles that make the choreographies at matches. All items that are deemed to be offensive or could constitute a weapon could be banned from stadiums if the chief of police deemed it necessary. These items could include megaphones, banners and flags (except flags in the team colours). At a stroke, the government banned the one element that differentiated Italian football from other leagues. What will be seen in the subsequent chapters is that this has become a dominant narrative among a significant number of fans. As Francesio (2008, p. 197) observes, the rationale for this was that 'we [the Italians] must do the English model, and since in England they do not have banners, megaphones and drums, we ban banners, megaphones and drums and we have done the English model'. This syllogism does not solve the problem, especially as Filippo Raciti was not killed by any of the items, nor was he killed in the stadium. The weakness of the central authorities contributes to fan resentment. This is reinforced by regionalism; Italian regions and cities are granted autonomy over the designation of items. Certain banners and items can be allowed with the prior agreement of the club, police and relevant authorities. This can create a wide range of difference in the designation and implementation of these items as the following demonstrates:

In Italy, for example we make an example of Livorno, it is prohibited to enter with microphones. It is prohibited to enter with drums. The things that make noise. In this case musical instruments are prohibited. It is prohibited because the *Osservatorio* have said. Last Saturday we were in Salerno. There at Salerno there were trumpets, loudhailers and also drums. (Max, official Livorno supporters' club director, personal interview, June 2009)

Livorno's *questore* have designated that flares and certain flags constitute a breach of the law. The southern Italian city of Salerno has a different outlook as they deem that trumpets, loudhailers and drums are within the law and can be taken

to games. Elsewhere, in March 2013, a head steward at Verona ordered Livorno fans to remove a banner detailing the supporters' club, Club Luca Rondina. The head steward said that the banner was not on the authorized list, so should be removed, even though the banner was making no offensive or political statement and was taken to many different stadiums. The diverse approach to the designation of dangerous items causes resentment and delegitimizes the law.

Similar confusion occurs over the designation of political symbols. For Livorno fans, political symbols constitute a significant aspect of their identity. Under the Pisanu Law, these come under the jurisdiction of the *questore*, the local chief of police:

The *questore* of Livorno says that 'this and that' cannot enter. According to him Che Guevara is a political symbol. Perhaps, I don't know. At Florence, it is not the same ... At Florence the *questore* decides that Che Guevara is not a political symbol and can enter. Because the laws in Italy make it this way. (Stefano, Livorno *ultras* member, personal interview, June 2009)

The autonomy of the regions creates opportunities to dispute the legitimacy of the central state. Only fascist political symbols are illegal in Italy, therefore it is not forbidden to display images of Che Guevara. However, within the jurisdiction of the Pisanu Law, the *questore* is permitted to prohibit these images if they feel that these constitute a breach of the regulations. Consequently these markers of Livornese identity are banned at certain away games and contributes to the overall incredulity of the fans.

The Pisanu Law does not take into account local football culture. This automatically brings them into conflict with fans and contributes to resistance from fans. Although the actions of the *questore* represent a significant infringement of local identity, the fans will continue to inflect other symbols with cultural meaning. In the case of the fans of Livorno, green military-style jackets and caps become inflected with greater significance and symbolizes left-wing politics. In the case of the fans with right-wing identities, the cultural inflection becomes more problematic, as one fan observed,

Some fans in Italy, Lazio, Roma, Verona and many others, the tricolour is not shown for nationalistic pride, but is shown to signify that this is a *curva* of the right ... the origins are not political, however now it becomes associated as a political symbol. In Italy, a political symbol cannot go into the stadium. The hammer and sickle, the Celtic cross. So what happens, a right wing fan shows the tricolour, it is as if they were showing the Celtic cross. (Stefano, Livorno *ultras* member, personal interview, June 2009)

Fans with a right-wing identity have inflected the national flag as a symbol of the Right. The fans of Roma, Lazio and Verona have reframed the national flag as a marker of xenophobia and right-wing politics and this becomes difficult to legislate against. Yet this also contributes to fan resentment and apathy. During the match between Livorno and Lazio in May 2010, Lazio fans displayed several tricolour flags, including one prominent national flag, which stood over twice the height of the carrier, and was waved throughout the match. The pole required for this flag would undoubtedly fall within the remit of the Pisanu Law and could constitute a weapon. In spite of the contravention of the law, and the reputation of the Lazio fans, the flag was permitted in the stadium. The hypocrisy of this situation was not lost on the fans of Livorno. Many pointed to examples of fans being prohibited from taking large flags with poles and political flags into away grounds. For example, at Parma in December 2008, Livorno fans tried to enter with a range of flags. The longer flagpoles were deemed to be weapons and had to be returned to the coach. This led to a number of confused interactions between fans and stewards that eventually saw a senior fan instruct one fan to return the flag to the coach. The contrasting implementations at Livorno and Parma undermine fan confidence in the lawmaking authorities and amplify fan antipathy.

The operation of the *Osservatorio* reinforces the creation of more regulation on fans, despite the trend for deregulation elsewhere. In an attempt to regulate the display of banners, the *Osservatorio* created the *Albo nazionale degli striscioni* (National Register of banners). This highly bureaucratic approach attempts to legislate every type of banner that is allowed to enter the stadium. Contucci and Francesio (2013, p. 59) are highly critical of this approach:

Instead of proposing effective solutions for the improvement of the situation of Italian stadiums, the *Osservatorio* has found its *raison d'être* is the high mission of imposing bureaucracy on one of the few places left 'free' in Italian society, with ridiculous initiatives such as *Albo nazionale degli striscioni* which is nothing more than an absurd and preposterous attempt to curb the spontaneity and the irreverence of the stadium. (Contucci and Francesio 2013, p. 59)

Not only is the *Albo* highly bureaucratic; it is seen as an attempt at control of fans. Once again, all football fans are regulated, except those who display offensive *striscioni*. Such a regulation is seen as an attack on the culture of fans.

The Pisanu Law also implemented regulation over the sales of tickets. These controls insist that fans must purchase a ticket from an official source, either an official supporters' club or an official ticket vendor. To obtain the ticket,

identity must be provided. The ticket vendor enters the fan's details into a ticket database that verifies that the fan is entitled to attend the ground. Any fan with a Daspo is prohibited from attending the match. However, this does not preclude people without tickets causing trouble before or after the game, as had occurred when ticketless Napoli fans visited Rome in August 2007. In addition to taking identification to ticket vendors, fans must also take their identification to the ground. Overall, the process is laborious which makes it difficult for casual fans to attend the match. As all matches are televised, fans are incentivized to stay at home, as Matteo confirms:

It's hard work to get tickets and more expensive than watching it on television.
I can sit at home in comfort, with a beer, and not have to worry about travelling.
(Matteo, Livorno fan, personal interview, March 2009)

Matteo reinforces the impact that full deregulation of television contracts has had on attendances. Furthermore he takes a holistic approach to match attendance. He identifies the time involved. It takes time to purchase a ticket and to travel to and from the stadium. He could spend more time with his family by remaining at home and watching the match on television.

As with the Daspos, the ticket controls are not effectively controlled. Two months after the death of Raciti, presenters on the satirical television programme *Le Iene* (The Hyenas) purchased tickets in the names of Benjamin Franklin, Karl Marx and Alessandro Volta.¹¹ The same programme highlighted that the presenter was able to enter the San Siro Stadium in Milan, to watch Inter, without documentation. These factors contribute to fan apathy and yet still inhibit the casual fans from attending matches. Criminalization of all fans is compounded through lack of enforcement that undermines and delegitimizes the central authorities.

The regulations over ticket purchases necessitated additional security at the stadium. The Pisanu Law instructed all clubs to install fencing around the stadium with a series of checkpoints. Upon approaching the stadium, tickets are checked by stewards before entering the stadium confines. Thereafter, one enters the turnstiles and places the ticket into a barcode reader. Both processes together can slow down entry to the stadium, causing confusion and resentment. Such an incident occurred at Parma in December 2008 when the supporters' coach arrived late after being held up in the *settore ospiti*. With two minutes before kick-off, the queue awaiting ticket inspection by the two stewards was leading to a crush. There was increased anxiety and emotion among the fans who felt that they would miss the start of the game. Fortunately, the stewards

sensed the changing mood and made cursory glances at the identification to facilitate a rapid entrance into the ground. Thus the stringent checks required were abandoned due to insufficient processes being in place to deal with the large numbers of football fans arriving at the same time. The rules were circumvented in the interests of expediency and undermined the rule of law.

A more insightful incident occurred prior to a game with Lazio at Livorno's Armando Picchi Stadium in May 2010. A group of over hundred Livorno *ultras* marched towards the gates of the Livorno *curva*, waving flags, chanting anti-fascist and anti-Lazio songs and performing in an image of unity and strength. As they approached the gates at the end, riot police mobilized and marched forward. The gates were opened to allow the *ultras* to enter so a public order incident did not occur. They marched directly into the stadium, continuing to chant and wave their flags. No tickets were displayed, so there were no identity checks performed. If *ultras* were a public order problem, the police and stewards at the ground permitted them entry without legal checks. Moreover, these situations could lead to significant health and safety issues as a number of fans get crushed. The lessons of Hillsborough have not been learnt. The fact that there has not been a tragedy like Hillsborough in Italy can be attributed to sheer luck and the decline in attendance, rather than to a systematic focus on the safety of fans.

The tragic death of Livorno's midfielder Piermario Morosini in 2012 highlighted the piecemeal approach to stadium regulation and safety. In the thirty-first minute of a Serie B match between Livorno and Pescara at the Stadio Adriatico in Pescara, Morosini collapsed and died on the pitch. Subsequent autopsies would confirm that he had suffered a heart attack from a pre-existing and undiagnosed condition. At the time, however, players and medical staff of both teams worked quickly to try and resuscitate Morosini. However, the ambulance was delayed access into the stadium because a car of the traffic police, the *vigili urbani*, was blocking the vehicular entrance to the stadium. Police had to break into the car in order to move it out of the way and allow the ambulance access. Without a coherent approach to regulations around the stadium, fans are still permitted access without checks and members of the state's authorities block access for medical vehicles. All of this threatens the safety of fans and players and does not enhance the matchday experience.

These security measures, just like the regulations over ticket purchases, also make it increasingly difficult for casual fans to attend matches at home. The ticket office, by law, has to be separate from the stadium; one cannot buy a ticket at the turnstile. An illustrative example of the difficulty in obtaining tickets occurred

in January 2014. I wanted to purchase a ticket for the match between Roma and Genoa before I arrived in Rome. Unfortunately the AS Roma online ticket sales did not recognize British postcodes for credit card purchases, so the payment could not be authorized. I arrived at the stadium one hour before kick-off and asked some city police the directions to the ticket office. They replied that one could not buy tickets on a matchday. At this point, one of the officers interrupted his phone conversation and said that one could, but only for the *tribune* (sides of the stadium). He pointed me in the direction of the ticket office, about a mile away from the stadium. There were no signposts, and no indication that the building was a ticket office. As stated by the police officer, the only tickets available were in the *tribune* at a cost of €60. This entire process took an hour. The distance to the ticket office, the restrictions and the cost do not encourage more fans to attend.

At Livorno, there is a similar situation. The ticket booth is part of the sports complex adjacent to the Armando Picchi Stadium, about 200 metres from the stadium. Livorno's stadium, however, is located in a residential area with access from a number of residential streets. The erection of the steel fences prevents fans from accessing different areas around the ground without a ticket. Many of these steel fences block the various streets. Therefore, to go to the designated ticket office, one has to go around the residential streets, onto the main road and back around the other residential streets, as one fan states,

There are the regulations at the stadium. At Livorno, perhaps there is the most classic example one can make. If you decide on Sunday or Saturday to go to the match and do not have a ticket you must then go practically five long kilometres: first to the only open ticket office and then you must return to the other side to the sector of the stadium for that ticket. Therefore [removing these] would be the simplest thing [to correct]. (Paolo, Livorno official supporters' club director, personal interview, June 2009)

With the imposition of barriers around the ground, someone who decides to go to the game on the day must walk further to buy a ticket before going to the stadium. As Matteo mentioned earlier, watching the match on television saves travelling time. This is in addition to the long journey required to buy a ticket. As the state struggles to impose its authority, it treats all fans as potential hooligans. This situation acts as a serious disincentive to casual fans. The result is that only the hard-core fans attends the stadium; consequently, the *ultras* see themselves as the authentic voice of the fans as they are still jumping through these bureaucratic hoops.

In an attempt to streamline ticket purchases, the *Osservatorio* has also implemented an identity card for fans, *la tessera del tifoso*. The card is supposed to make the purchase of tickets easier as the card will be the only form of identification required. In theory this should prevent away fans from purchasing home tickets, as was witnessed with Napoli fans in Livorno. Initially this card was going to be mandatory, but has since been made voluntary. There was widespread resistance from *ultras* and other fans to the introduction of the *tessera*. It provided an opportunity for *ultras* to unite in opposition against the state regardless of pre-existing rivalries (Guschwan 2013a). If the *tessera* were mandatory, it would further affect the casual fan, who may not have the *tessera*. It would also make it difficult for non-Italian citizens to purchase tickets to away matches, thus reducing potential revenue to clubs. The card also presupposes that consumers of football only watch one team, and will not watch another.

The ill-considered nature of the regulations ensures that there are continued problems. In some cases, when the *Osservatorio* deems some games to be 'at risk', they restrict ticket sales to fans in the region of the club, or ban ticket sales to fans from the region of the other club. This presumes that all fans live in geographical proximity to the football club. For example, the match between Bologna and Lecce on 6 November 2010 was deemed a risk and tickets were restricted to fans of the region Emilia-Romagna, where Bologna is located (Contucci and Francesio 2013). Clearly fans of Bologna only live in the immediate environs of the city. The following week, ticket sales for Juventus against Roma were restricted to people from the Lazio region, where Roma is located. Again, the authorities think that Roma fans only live around the city and not elsewhere. Even holders of the *tessera* are restricted. One Inter fan who lived in Rome, and held a *tessera* for Inter, was forbidden from buying a ticket for the Inter-Roma match because it was forbidden to sell tickets to residents of Lazio (Contucci and Francesio 2013). Even possessing a *tessera*, which, in theory, affirms that a fan has no prior criminal convictions or history of hooliganism, prevented this Inter fan from travelling to see their team. More bizarrely, this fan rang the Inter helpline where this restriction was not only confirmed but also suggested that as the fan lives in the Lazio region they should buy a ticket for the away end! Clearly these restrictions are not helping control potential violence.

The card does, however, provide marketing opportunities to access the loyal fan base. Once again, AC Milan has seized the initiative. They instigated the *Cuore Rossonero* card, which also operates as a Maestro card, and a loyalty card. It allows users to accumulate loyalty points. These can be redeemed against

cheaper tickets, gifts or events with players, such as training or a meal.¹² Likewise, Livorno have implemented the *Triglia Card* (Mullet card, named after the fish mascot of the club, and one of the symbols of the city). Like AC Milan's card, the *Triglia Card* accumulates points that can be redeemed against gifts, and also acts as a MasterCard. Although these initiatives demonstrate an attempt to deal with the problems in Italian football, the lack of stadium renovation is a major discrepancy. Furthermore, the 'Q&As' related to the *Triglia Card* at Livorno are instructive of the wider distrust of authority which undermines effective regulation.¹³ Alongside general questions related to its purchases and Daspos, there are two following questions:

1. Is it true that the card has a microchip that emits a radio signal indicating the physical location of the card owner?
2. Who stores the data of the *Triglia Card*?

The response states that the details are for the football club only, and that any details sent to the *questura* are only temporarily held to allow them to check for Daspos and 'crimes at the stadium'. Both of these questions reflect a distrust of the police and central authorities. Ultimately, the card has done very little to reverse this attitude. In fact, it has become counter-productive as fans are uniting against the authorities.

Summary

Mussolini built many of Italy's stadiums. The second phase occurred in the 1960s. When some of these facilities were upgraded for Italia '90 they predated the transformation of stadiums that took place across Europe. Consequently, many stadiums are in a bad state and with even worse facilities. The matchday experience is poor. The Pisanu Law exacerbates this. The piecemeal and chaotic implementation of the Pisanu Law and the lack of full-scale investigation and implementation of adequate safety regulation contribute to fan malaise. The poor stadium infrastructure affects the clubs' ability to compete financially, from restricted revenue streams, but also because of poor comfort for fans. This is exacerbated by national regulation that does not address safety and actually inhibits matchday attendance.

The catalyst for the transformation of English stadiums was the Hillsborough tragedy where ninety-six fans were crushed to death. The lessons have not been

learnt from this and the fact that a similar tragedy has not arisen in Italy is a miracle. The draconian response to football fans is actively working against the authorities. This is not helped by the suspicion of the police. Therefore the role of the forces of order is central in understanding the matchday experience and in accounting for the decline in participation in football. The following chapter will outline the development of the Italian police forces and highlight how this contributes to the poor matchday experience for fans. Ultimately, these factors also reinforce fan identity and do not minimize violence and antisocial behaviour in stadiums.