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Scandal

Fabio Cannavaro, the handsome and tattooed captain of the Italian national football team, stood upon the podium and raised himself above his *azzurri* teammates. The captain, wearing the world-famous azure blue kit of Italy, received the World Cup and held it triumphantly above his head. Fireworks and confetti erupted from the back of the podium as Cannavaro and his Italian teammates celebrated their 2006 World Cup win, the fourth time the nation had won the competition. Only Brazil has won the competition on more occasions. The *azzurri* had just beaten France in a dramatic penalty shoot-out in the final in Germany. As the Italy team huddled around the cup and took turns in kissing the gold trophy, they became drenched in confetti and emotion. Over the public address system, the 'Triumphal March' from Verdi's *Aida* reinforced the Italianness of the victory. The World Cup triumph appeared to be a vindication of the players who had endured a turbulent two months after allegations of match-fixing surfaced in the Italian media. This scandal affected the futures of many of the players at the tournament, and the World Cup provided a suitable liberation from the travails at home.

There have been regular episodes of scandal and success throughout Italian football history. The confluence of political and economic resources has helped provide the elite clubs with the ability to compete on the national and world stage. However, the relative power of elite clubs has also brought them regularly into conflict with the governing bodies. The Federation, like the state, has struggled to impose its authority on its members. Italian football has followed broader globalization processes and undertook extensive deregulation in the 1990s, with the authorities finding it much more difficult to regulate the sport and bring continued success for Italian football. Despite their early success in the 1990s, Serie A has slipped behind German Bundesliga in the UEFA coefficient table. While the world's best players of the past went to Italy to make their name, contemporary stars are frequently choosing the Premier League, La Liga

or the Bundesliga to ply their trade. This is partly the patrimonial because model has not had the sustained resources to compete globally. The model's failure was dramatically exposed through bankruptcy and corruption scandals in the twenty-first century. This chapter will begin by illustrating the patrimonial ownership model that emerged during the 1990s. It will then show how leading businessmen (and they are all men) incorporated football into their business empires. These individuals are also politically connected, which helped afford a certain degree of protection. Yet it has not prevented the financial collapse of Italian football (the details of which will follow in the subsequent section). The following section will provide details of the *calciopoli* scandal that reinforced the continued weakness of the authorities and the personalized power networks within the elite clubs. The chapter will conclude with an analysis of *calciopoli* and argue that previous lessons have not been learnt.

The financial rise and fall of Italian football

The latter decades of the twentieth century saw an unprecedented quantity of money flow into Serie A. New owners, commercial practices and deregulated television deals helped transform Italian football into the world's best league. With the advent of the Champions League, Italian football looked well placed to continue its dominance globally into the new millennium. The popularity of the Italia '90 World Cup and the continued success of clubs like Milan were reflected in the global marketplace. Moreover, football's popularity ensured the economic support for clubs to purchase the best players in the world. Milan's success was underpinned by the Dutch trio of Marco van Basten, Ruud Gullit and Frank Rijkaard, while Napoli sought to break the Turin–Milan hegemony with the help of Maradona. Later, Juventus signed players such as Roberto Baggio, Zinédine Zidane, and Edgar Davids. In 1992 alone, the Italian clubs had broken the world transfer record three times.¹ As Serie A attracted the best players in the world, it fuelled interest in the league and provided increased revenue from global television deals. It was this success and popularity that saw the television programme *Football Italia* broadcast on British television.

The economic transformation coincided with an increase in industrial patronage in Italian football. The political processes of deregulation that affected the media and business also occurred in football. Regulations governing the ownership of football teams were relaxed in the 1980s, and this allowed Silvio Berlusconi to purchase AC Milan (Porro and Russo 2000). The transformation

of European football acted as a catalyst for other businesses to intensify their links with Italian football. As Tim Parks states, 'In Italy, you haven't really arrived until you own a football club' (cited in Arie 2004). In addition to the Agnelli family, who owned Fiat and Juventus, and Berlusconi, who combined his media operation and AC Milan, many other clubs became incorporated into this wider patrimonial network. Fiorentina was bought by the film producer Mario Cecchi Gori in 1990. Three years after his death, the club was inherited by Vittorio Cecchi Gori, who was also a film producer and the owner of Telemontecarlo. The 'sport-media complex' ensured that Fiorentina signed star players like Gabriel Batistuta and Rui Costa. Meanwhile, Sergio Cragnotti, the owner of the food conglomerate Cirio (which owned Del Monte), bought Lazio in 1992. He funded the transfers of a number of international stars, such as Pavel Nedvěd and Paul Gascoigne. Lazio became the first club to float on the Milan Borsa stock exchange in 1998 before winning its second *scudetto* in 2000. Roma followed Lazio's lead and floated two years later. The oil industry tycoon, Franco Sensi, purchased AS Roma in 1993 and funded the signing of players like Gabriel Batistuta from Fiorentina, as well as Cafu, Hidetoshi Nakata and Vincent Candela. The financial contribution from flotation led Roma to win the championship in 2001. Elsewhere, the dairy company Parmalat, which was controlled by the Tanzi family, bought Parma and other football clubs in South America. They chiefly used these clubs and their players to act as ambassadors and advertising agents for Parmalat. Many players were also exported to play for Parma in Serie A. The intensification of links between business and football has also seen the Vatican become involved after its Centro Sportivo Italiano purchased an 80 per cent share of Ancona in 2007.

The Italian model of family capitalism permits the direct involvement from owners and presidents. Many Italian club presidents remain in close control of their clubs, especially over the recruitment of players and managers. For example, the president of Livorno is Aldo Spinelli, the owner of a major Italian logistics company, Gruppo Spinelli.² Towards the end of the 2008-2009 season, as the team faltered while pushing for promotion, Spinelli took an active role in the management of the squad. Apart from sacking the manager with just two matches remaining in the season, he gave motivational speeches to the players at training and watched the final matches from the bench. This trend continued into the following season when Spinelli sacked the young manager Gennaro Ruotolo a mere two months into the new season and replaced him with the effervescent Serse Cosmi. However, Cosmi resigned his post in January 2010, citing constant presidential interference. He subsequently retracted his resignation after talks

with Spinelli. Cosmi was eventually sacked three months later, which saw the return of Ruotolo. Local newspapers also dedicate regular space for Spinelli's opinions. Before every match, there is a comprehensive preview of the match, with sections dedicated to the journalists' preview and the comments of the manager. In addition, there is a section detailing the thoughts of the president, Spinelli. This is replicated in television broadcasts and the national newspapers, where the quotes of the president often take precedence to those of the manager or players.

Livorno and Spinelli are not unique within Italian football. Some owners revel in the autocratic image they portray. Maurizio Zamparini, the owner of Palermo, is a self-confessed *mangiallenatori* (manager-eater) who, between Venezia and Palermo, has sacked twenty-seven managers in fifteen years. Likewise, Aurelio De Laurentiis, the film producer and owner of Napoli, has also taken an active role in the running of the club. This includes him entering the changing rooms at half-time and interrupting the manager's team-talk to give his own motivational speeches. More recently, Massimo Cellino, the president of Cagliari, has given his new team of Leeds United a taste of his hands-on style. In June 2014, he released the goalkeeper Paddy Kenny because his birthday fell on the 17th, and Cellino had a superstition about the number seventeen.

Berlusconi's interest in AC Milan was also not restricted to the business aspects of the club. Berlusconi still maintained some direct involvement with Milan even after his Vice President Adriano Galliani assumed the presidency when Berlusconi entered politics. In the summer of 2009, Berlusconi is alleged to have made former World Player of the Year, Ronaldinho, stand on a table and declare that he would act more professionally. The following summer, Berlusconi unveiled the new manager of AC Milan, Massimiliano Allegri, at a press conference and fielded every question from journalists, as well as insisting that the new manager play two strikers. Berlusconi was even emphatic that had he been Milan's coach in the 2009-10 season, it would have won the *scudetto* rather than finish third. So it is no surprise that as soon as Berlusconi was ousted from his position as prime minister, he resumed the presidency of Milan.

The direct involvement of presidents ensures that interactions are personalized. As has been demonstrated elsewhere in Italian society, the networks of industrial patronage extend into politics. Many of these new post-industrialists operated in extensive political-industrial patrimonial networks. Silvio Berlusconi is the embodiment of this, as the former Italian prime minister is also Italy's richest man and owner of AC Milan. His counterpart at Inter was Massimo Moratti, the son of Angelo, who constructed the Grande Inter side of

the 1960s. In addition to being a director in his late father's oil company, he is also a director of Telecom Italia and Pirelli. His sister-in-law is Letizia Moratti, who was the Mayor of Milan between 2006 and 2011, was a former education minister in Berlusconi's government and a former employee of RAI and Sky.³ Elsewhere, Gianni Agnelli, the owner of Fiat and Juventus, was made a senator for life in Italy's parliament on account of his business success.

There is a long history of political involvement in Italian football. Bologna was successful during the 1920s and 1930s at the same time that Mussolini's friend, Leandro Arpinati, was mayor of Bologna, and president of CONI and the FIGC. The president of Napoli during the 1950s and 1960s was Achille Lauro, the billionaire shipbuilder, mayor of Naples and Member of Parliament for his own Monarchist National Party. Football club ownership provides a range of opportunities for political patronage. At Palermo in the 1970s and 1980s, the Vice President Salvatore Matta was the younger brother of the prominent local DC leader (Scalia 2009). The patrimonial connections worked in three ways:

First, Matta delivered free tickets to matches to many bureaucrats of the regional, provincial and city administration, who often gave them to other friends or relatives. Second, people from lower classes were appointed stewards, which made it possible for them to let friends and acquaintances into the stadium for free. Third, *ultras* were also given free tickets, and some of their members were hired by the club as members of the security service staff. When electoral campaigns began, the *ultras'* headquarters worked as electoral committees, hosting conventions, feasts and talks from Christian Democracy candidates. The stand, finally, worked as a propaganda place where the electoral leaflets of candidates were delivered to supporters (Scalia 2009, p. 49).

Other club owners have been members of parliament, such as the DC supporting Franco Sensi of Roma and Luciano Gaucci of Perugia and Catania. Antonio Mataresse, who was president of Bari from 1977 to 1984 (before transferring it to his brother), was also a member of parliament for the DC as well as being a president of the FIGC and Serie A, and a vice president of UEFA and FIFA. These personalized, neo-patrimonial networks have allowed strategic actors to operate across boundaries to influence individual goals. For example, with Mataresse's support, Bari successfully won government funding for the Stadio San Nicola to be built for Italia '90.

The neo-patrimonial network that exists between politics, business and football extends beyond the football clubs. The weakness of the central authorities has permitted the incorporation of the Federation into the

patrimonial system of the elite clubs. The intertwined nature of Italian football sees powerful individuals in several positions in the FIGC. For example:

On the one hand, we have Adriano Galliani, president of the Lega Calcio, champion of the unity of Italian professional football, and guarantor of equal treatment for small clubs with respect to the larger clubs. Moreover, he is also meant to protect the small clubs against the threat of secession of the larger, richer clubs. On the other hand, we have Adriano Galliani, a leading figure in the G-14 who participates in secessionist plans at the national and international levels. (Porro and Russo 2004, p. 226)

Galliani's position as head of Lega Calcio was fundamentally compromised by his position as vice president of Milan. The club was part of the G-14 group of elite European clubs that lobbied for increased individual control over national and European affairs.⁴ Furthermore, Milan is also owned by Silvio Berlusconi who was in a unique position as prime minister to influence the laws regulating the finances of football. The interrelation between football, politics and business is not restricted to club presidents and owners. The former president of the FIGC, Franco Carraro, was a former Mayor of Rome, deputy for the PSI and Tourism Minister in the 1980s. He was also president of MCC, a merchant bank owned by Capitalia. This bank was the major investor in a number of Serie A clubs, in particular, Roma, Parma and Lazio. The financial underwriting of Capitalia permitted a number of clubs to operate despite accruing considerable debt. The president of the FIGC is also overseer of Covisoc, the financial regulator for the league. In this position the president has a duty to maintain the financial probity and integrity of the league. However, this was compromised through Carraro's involvement with an organization that underwrites certain clubs' debts. Consequently, patrimonial networks are entrenched in a small number of dense family and personal connections.

Although the neo-patrimonial networks permitted rapid success in the early years of the Champions League and expanding global television markets, they quickly proved unable to further capitalize on the globalized market. Incorporation into the business networks of leading families did not provide greater financial professionalism for Italian football. Stock market flotation for Roma did not bring financial transparency as the club was nearly bankrupt two years after winning the *scudetto* in 2001. Meanwhile, the links between Cirio and Lazio were so entwined that when Cirio encountered financial difficulties in 2002, the club was directly affected. Lazio continued to face widespread financial problems until they were bought by Claudio Lotito in 2004. In the same period,

Fiorentina entered bankruptcy in 2001 after the film producer Vittorio Cecchi Gori encountered financial difficulties. This saw the Florentine club relegated to the amateur leagues. A similar fate befell Napoli, who had €70 million of debts, in 2004.

The collapse of Italian industrial patrimony occurred spectacularly with Parma, the football club owned by Parmalat. When Parmalat went bankrupt in 2004, the football club was inextricably linked, which affected results on the pitch. The Parmalat bankruptcy highlighted the intricate nature of the patrimonial relationship between politics, business and football in Italy. The intensification of relationships within the network affords the owners of the businesses, and their businesses and clubs, a degree of support and legitimization. The owner of Parmalat, Calisto Tanzi, built extensive networks with many powerful politicians:

In the almost 40 pages detailed by prosecuting magistrates [investigating the bankruptcy] there emerges a design created by 20 years of friendships, acquaintances and links, resembling a large and intricate spider-web that Calisto Tanzi spun with the political and institutional elite of the First and the Second Republic ... You could call it a work of lobbying. Tanzi did not corrupt politicians. He only wanted to establish strong links of friendship and collaboration, thus creating a layer of protection for his activities. He financed political initiatives, electoral campaigns, sponsored this or that event, provided advertisements, entered into business with those people nearest to this or that politician. Not much for the likes of him. From 4 to 6 billion old lira a year. In exchange he wanted attention paid to the fortunes of his businesses. From a certain moment onwards, however, Tanzi felt that he was being obliged to finance the initiatives of politicians, their electoral campaigns, newspapers or demonstrations. In some ways, to use a metaphor, from a spider that spun an intricate web to capture insects he became a prisoner of the same web he had constructed. (*La Repubblica* cited in Della Porta and Vannucci 2007)

Calisto Tanzi represents just one example of the extensive personalized neo-patrimonial networks that interlaced the worlds of football, politics and business.

The financial collapse of Italian football and companies like Parmalat and Cirio highlighted the full range of creative accounting that was taking place within the football clubs. The difficulty with football accounting is that it is very difficult to account for the skills and depreciation of a footballer. As a result, statements of accounts become 'visible illusions' (Morrow 1999). They only present an image of the financial situation of a club. This saw a range of illusionary measures being

employed in Italy. The most serious example of this style of accounting was called *plus-valenze*. This is where the profit made on the sale of players could be spread over an accounting term, 'Sales are immediately entered into the accounts, while purchases are spread over the entire period of the contract [original italics]' (Foot 2006, p. 491). Traditionally, the smaller clubs would benefit from this system through the sales of players to larger clubs, however the larger clubs realized that they could also benefit. By 2002, over 70 per cent of profits were comprised of *plus-valenze*. Complicated transactions took place where players transferred between clubs at inflated prices to balance the accounts. This permitted clubs to inflate their immediate accounts and provided a short-term solution to financial problems. A good example of such a practice was the swapped transfer of Fabio Cannavaro and Fabian Carini between Inter and Juventus in 2004. Cannavaro was the Italian captain (who subsequently lifted the World Cup in 2006) while Carini was a Uruguayan reserve goalkeeper at Juventus. They were exchanged for the same value. Effectively, Inter gave away their best player, suggesting that there were a number of reciprocal favours exchanged between clubs. Several players were exchanged in similar ways between both Milan clubs during the 1990s.

Although *plus-valenze* accounting was technically legal, other clubs adopted more controversial approaches. Roma was nearly bankrupt, despite winning only their third ever *scudetto* in 2001. By the start of the 2003 season, they had to declare to Covisoc, the financial regulator, that they could financially fulfil their obligations for the season. They produced signed *fideiussione*, financial guarantees, to assure the financial eligibility for the season. However, these *fideiussione* later turned out to be forged. Roma claimed that they were innocent and had been the victims of fraud themselves. Consequently, they were allowed to continue operating. Subsequently, in 2005, Torino were guilty of using similar methods. The result demonstrated that, as Porro and Russo (2004, p. 223) state, that:

Covisoc has had its powers hollowed out over time to such an extent that it now operates on the opaque frontier between respect for accounting rules and a technical-financial free-for-all.

Covisoc was a façade, and Italian football was beginning to collapse. Wider economic problems of Parmalat and Cirio affected Parma and Lazio. Meanwhile, clubs such as Roma, Napoli and Fiorentina were in severe financial turmoil. The lack of political support for Fiorentina and Napoli saw them subsequently relegated for financial irregularities.

The collapse of the Italian neo-patrimonial system was highlighted in another documentation scandal. Illegal passports were used to circumvent controls over

players. Prior to the Bosman ruling in 1995 that deregulated the transfer market for footballers, many national leagues imposed restrictions on the number of foreign players that were permitted to play in their league. The Italian Football Federation has experimented with a number of quota systems since its disastrous foray in 1908, which saw a number of clubs withdraw in protest. The situation was further complicated by the use of *oriundi*, foreign-born players of Italian descent. Quotas permitting *oriundi* as additional foreigners saw the opportunity for players and clubs to invent Italian ancestry in order to evade the restrictions. This led to a number of scandals involving false passports. Many emerged in the 1940s and 1950s, yet the most widespread passport scandal occurred in the 1990s. A large number of non-Europeans, specifically from South America, produced passports with invented Italian ancestry. Major players, such as the Lazio and Argentina midfielder, Juan Sebastian Veron, Inter winger Recoba and Milan goalkeeper Dida were implicated in the scandal. The FIGC once again demonstrated their inability to deal with the problem. As the problem was so widespread and the repercussions potentially explosive, they decided to remove the regulations of foreign players, at a stroke legalizing those who had infringed the rules. The FIGC reinforced its own crisis of legitimacy by legitimizing the actions of the clubs.

The crisis within the Italian football was severe and required political intervention. The interlaced neo-patrimonial networks operating in Italian society resulted in the strategic actors within football operating in politics. Berlusconi, in particular had a vested interest in finding a resolution to the financial crisis. Despite the deregulation rhetoric of the 1980s, Berlusconi's government attempted to reassert state control and reinforced the interrelated networks affecting football and politics. In January 2003, the Berlusconi government passed a special debtspreading decree. Dubbed *Salva Calcio* (Save Football) by the media, it allowed clubs to spread their debts over ten years. Clubs such as Milan and Inter saved over €200 million. Juventus meanwhile accused the government and the clubs of 'administrative doping'. Luca di Montezemolo, the manager of FIAT, the owners of Juventus, declared that this emergency decree was 'the exact opposite of that which should be done in a serious country' (Foot 2006, p. 493). Despite the political support in Italy, the decree was declared illegal under European law as it contravened competition laws and budgetary regulations. This led to the government amending the decree to conform to European law, while still retaining the original intentions. These decrees permitted clubs to minimize the amount of tax they paid to the state and effectively this turned Italian football into a state-subsidized industry

(Porro and Russo 2004). Thus, the state made it easier for clubs to obtain licenses from Covisoc. The neo-patrimony of Italian politics and football ensured that the individual interests of strategic actors in football were supported without addressing the fundamental issues which caused the crisis.

The financial crisis further demonstrated the weakness of the federation's regulation and the growing strength of the elite clubs. Political-institutional decline of the FIGC and Lega Calcio was undermined by clubs who took their grievances to local courts, rather than to the federation. Despite undermining the financial regulator Covisoc with the debtspreading decree, Silvio Berlusconi's government tried to restore the jurisdiction of the sporting bodies with a law dubbed 'TAR stopper'. The law aimed to bypass the local courts, the *Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale* (TAR), who always supported the local clubs whenever they took their cases to court. The federations that felt that justice was not being exercised by the local TAR, could go direct to the Lazio TAR. The inability of the federation to arbitrate its members was a central cause of the crises and reinforced its own crisis of legitimacy:

When an institution is no longer capable of resolving its internal disputes based on its own rules and mechanism, forcing actors to look at other spheres of justice, then the crisis has reached a condition that is close to terminal. (Porro and Russo 2004, p. 228)

The deregulation of the football federation had a direct impact on its ability to regulate the elite clubs. Those that had powerful political patronage were able to circumvent the regulations. This was supported by the government who granted the clubs the right to evade the federation's arbitration courts. In addition, the government attempted to provide state subsidies through *salva-calcio*. The Italian patrimonial system was bankrupt.

The collapse of the regulatory bodies reinforced the neo-patrimonial system. Reciprocal favours became more significant in the absence of effective regulation. Inducements were not always financial. In 1992, the Sporting Director of Torino, Luciano Moggi, was alleged to have provided prostitutes for referees of Torino's UEFA Cup matches. Moggi claimed that they were interpreters, and that he wasn't culpable if they weren't used for interpretation (Foot 2006). In the circumstance, no one could prove who requested the three women, and no charges were found. There are also many instances of physical gifts being provided to referees. In 2000 Roma president, Franco Sensi, was accused of trying to corrupt referees when he gave two £8,000 Rolex watches to the head of the referee panel, as well as lesser priced Rolexes for the other thirty-seven referees in Serie A. Sensi claimed

conspiracy and said that it was a normal practice to give gifts and that this had never been questioned in the past. Indeed, in 2004, Sensi gave six bottles of Krug champagne in a Christmas hamper to every Serie A referee. Similarly, the president of Perugia and owner of a racehorse stable, Luciano Gaucci, provided a referee with assistance in purchasing three racehorses. The referee, coincidentally, officiated in the same division as Perugia, and the Umbrian club subsequently went on to win promotion. Occasionally, the authorities punish infringements of the rules, and this simply helps to reinforce the crisis of legitimacy. In light of these events, the Roma president Sensi escaped censure. Gaucci's Perugia, however, was prevented from being promoted, while the referee was banned for life and Gaucci for three years.

Football provides significant symbolic capital in Italy. The media interest provides the president with public exposure; something that Berlusconi has exploited to his advantage when entering politics. As Agnew (2006, p. 114) highlights:

By June 2003, the accountancy firm Practice Audit estimated AC Milan to be €142.8 million in debt, while the club returned a €51.5 million loss for the financial year 2003-4. Berlusconi, however, understood that, in terms of image, AC Milan was well worth the investment, and each year he came up with the cash to meet the club's debts. For someone with huge commercial and ultimately political ambitions in a country where football is encoded into the DNA, four [now five] European Cup/Champions League trophies and seven Serie A league titles over the next 19 seasons were worth more than money could buy.

As the interdependencies have intensified between politics, business and football the prestige and symbolic capital have grown. Clubs and presidents have pushed the boundaries of authority in order to maximize the benefits for themselves and their families. Yet owners are not the only actors within these power networks. Other strategic individuals operate within these networks and seek advantages for their clubs. The following section details the exposure of the biggest match-fixing scandal in Italian history and clearly illustrates how these networks operate.

Calciopoli: Network football

The extent of the Italian neo-patrimonial system was spectacularly demonstrated in 2006. The *calciopoli* scandal demonstrated the extensive neo-patrimonial

networks operating within Italian football and how personalized contacts and *quid pro quo* favours had become embedded in the system. Politics, football and the federation were so intertwined that the scandal could only emerge through the media and the judiciary. Despite the details being initially passed to the president of the FIGC, Franco Carraro, a full investigation was not undertaken. The details were subsequently leaked through the media. The scandal started after an initial investigation into the Neapolitan-organized crime network, the Camorra, revealed an illegal betting ring in Naples. Separate investigations also took place into further illegal betting rings in Parma and Udine. These were combined with earlier investigations into the use of drugs by Juventus and a separate investigation into the sports agency, GEA World, in Rome. As a result of these inquiries, the results of thirty-nine matches were investigated and over forty people were investigated for sporting fraud. Over 100,000 conversations were transcribed over eight months by six transcribers. The leaked transcriptions permitted the various strands of the scandal to be woven together by the media and named after the *tangentopoli* scandal. The subsequent investigation was even conducted by a *tangentopoli* magistrate, Saverio Borrelli. Finally, the parallel with the previous political scandal was reinforced with the investigation being dubbed *piedi puliti* or 'clean feet'.

Global deregulation and extensive media coverage has facilitated the emergence of charismatic individuals who could bypass regulations and use media to communicate directly to the public. This occurred in Italy with personalized politicians and football club presidents. *Calciopoli* demonstrated the emergence of a charismatic individual who operated out of the media spotlight. The main focus of the scandal was placed on Luciano Moggi, the director of football at Juventus, who was alleged to have fixed matches for the Turin club. Moggi began his career at Napoli under Italo Allodi, the manager of Juventus in the middle of Brian Glanville's 'Golden Fix' allegations of the 1970s (Glanville 1999a; Hawkey 2006). He then went to both Roman clubs before making a similar cross-city move from Torino to Juventus. It was while at Torino in 1992 that Moggi was implicated in the alleged procurement of prostitutes for referees before a UEFA Cup game. Through these various positions he built strong networks with the politicians in the capital as well among the games' administrators.

Calciopoli revealed an extensive patrimonial network of reciprocal favours. Moggi was nicknamed the 'lollipop man' (*la paletta*) because he controlled the traffic between the clubs, referees, players and their agents; he acted as a patron. He was at the nexus of a network of referees, players, politicians and agents and made over 400 telephone calls per day across the network to create *la sistema*

Moggi (The Moggi System) (Mensurati 2007). Within neo-patrimonial networks, reciprocal relationships are established where both parties seek to fulfil their obligations to each other. Anthropological accounts have long highlighted how these networks are embedded within Italian society (Banfield 1958; Boissevain 1966; Silverman 1965; Silverman 1975). The informal hierarchies established by patron–client relationships parallels the Church. Saints were seen as closer to God than the individual, and the clergy were closer to the saints. To gain access to God, one must negotiate through the intermediaries of the clergy and saints. Ultimately, the patron's success relies upon their ability to provide services to their clients and fulfil their obligations to their patrons. The greater range of favours a patron can call upon provides for greater power and influence within the network. This in turn enhances the position of the clients, who benefit from having a powerful patron. Legitimation comes from fulfilling the *quid pro quo*. As Mauss (1967) highlights, the exchange of gifts symbolizes future obligations. The gift exchange establishes solidarity and obligations of future reciprocity. Within neo-patrimonial networks, exchange does not have to be a physical gift, but can also be services. Once fulfilled the patron or client is obliged to reciprocate, although there is no immediate duty to return the favour. Moggi's patrimonial network rested on similar future obligations; effectively a 'favour bank' was established where these future obligations are held.

Moggi's system required a network of compliant referees. Distrust of central authority has resulted in match officials being viewed with suspicion. Fans felt that referees suffer from *sudditanza psicologica* (physiological subjection) and would naturally favour large clubs to ensure a successful career. The central authorities have successively tried but failed to address this. In the 1926 Viareggio Charter, a committee was created to select referees for matches. The details of these selections were kept secret in order to prevent corruption. This situation quickly became unworkable, however, as the information became valuable to fans and clubs. By the 1980s, allegations were made regarding two back-to-back championship wins for Juventus in 1981–2 that were categorized as 'thefts' (especially by the fans of Roma and Fiorentina who lost out) due to the refereeing decisions in favour of Juventus. As a result, the FIGC implemented a ballot to draw referee names at random and in the only year this was performed, a small provincial team, Hellas Verona, won their only *scudetto* in 1985. This has become an oft-quoted example used by fans to 'prove' the favouritism towards larger clubs. The FIGC reinforced its lack of authority by reverting to a selection committee in the following year. Under this system, in 1999, Paolo Bergamo and Pierluigi Pairetto had become the joint heads of the Italian referees' association

with the power to designate referees for matches. Three years later, Pairetto became the vice chairman of UEFA's referees' commission. As a consequence, they became important figures in coordinating the network of referees.

Moggi incorporated Pairetto and Bergamo into his own network. Moggi was close friends with both referee designators and persuaded them to use their discretion to direct compliant referees to certain games. They recruited another referee to act as an intermediary. Massimo De Santis was a world-respected referee who had been selected to officiate at the 2006 World Cup in Germany; a position he subsequently lost after the scandal broke. De Santis took a certain amount of pride in the role he played. He had been accused by Livorno president, Aldo Spinelli, of being part of the 'Roman Gang' and as a consequence was 'punished' by De Santis. While refereeing a match between Livorno and Siena, De Santis sent off the Livorno player Fabio Galante after seventeen minutes. The referee was recorded speaking to Innocenzo Mazzini, the vice president of the FIGC. After Mazzini said 'poor Spinelli ... you were, as always, splendid', De Santis replied, 'Did you see? Ready and go, one off' (*La Repubblica* 2006a). De Santis was utilizing his position to exact revenge on non-compliant individuals. Those who were not incorporated into the network were not afforded its protection. Meanwhile those within the network gained advantages. Compliant referees would assist Juventus by dismissing rival players like Fabio Galante at Livorno or by showing leniency to Juventus players. This system also applied in games that did not involve Juventus. The star players of Juventus' rivals would be booked or sent off so this would impact their ability to compete. They were also carefully timed so that their suspensions would coincide with the game against Juventus.

The patrimonial network required reciprocal favours. Moggi's position at Juventus granted him access to the resources of Fiat. As Juventus was owned by the car giant, Moggi could access staff discounts on Fiat cars. He could then provide these discounts, of between 23 and 50 per cent, to acquiescent referees. In one case, he called the Agnelli house to request a four-door Maserati as a gift for an important friend (*Corriere della Sera* 2006). Pairetto subsequently called the vice president of the FIGC, Innocenzo Mazzini, to state that he had the car. Gift exchange is an important feature of performing solidarity along the network. Franco Sensi, the president of Roma, stated that it was common practice when he was discovered to have given referees gifts of Rolex watches in 2000 and Krug champagne in 2004. Moggi was operating no differently; his gifts were simply worth more.

Gifts can establish a reciprocal relationship but the threat of physical violence can also intimidate individuals in the network. As Gramsci argued, hegemony is

maintained through coercion *and* consent. In the absence of reciprocal favours, Moggi could resort to violence and intimidation to make his point. In doing so, he would ensure that that referee would be more favourable in future games. In one transcript, the referee observer Pietro Ingargiola was overheard speaking to Tullio Lanese, the president of the Italian Referees' Association:

I've never seen anything like it in my life. Moggi and Giraudo [Juventus' Chairman] go in, and Moggi starts really threatening him [the referee, Paparesta], with his finger right up to the referee's eye. He was shouting at the linesman too, 'You're an absolute disgrace, not giving that penalty, how dare you?' I pretended not to see anything and went to the toilet. (Marcotti 2006)

Moggi himself confirmed this. In another transcript he states that, 'I locked the referee [Paparesta] and linesmen in the toilet and took the keys away with me to the airport' (Marcotti 2006). This shows that not only was Moggi making a symbolic gesture to ensure compliance in the future, but also he was making tacit approval from the club. The chairman of Juventus, Antonio Giraudo, was part of this meeting and although we cannot be sure what was communicated between him and Moggi afterwards, he would have been clear about Moggi's actions.

Moggi also exerted psychological pressure on Pairetto and Bergamo in order to make his intentions clear. And this was not restricted to matches in Serie A. The following exchange demonstrates the tone and exasperation of Moggi after Juventus drew 2-2 with the Swedish minnows in a Champions League qualifying match:

Moggi: But what the fuck kind of referee did you send us?

Pairetto: Fandel is one of the best ...

Moggi: Miccoli's goal was valid.

Pairetto: No it wasn't.

Moggi: It was valid, it was valid.

Pairetto: He was in front ...

Moggi: What are you talking about in front? And anyway, all through the game he messed things up for us.

Pairetto: But he's one of the top ...

Moggi: He can go and fuck himself. And for Stockholm [the return leg] I'm counting on you. (*Corriere della Sera* 2006)

Moggi clearly expected a favour in return from Pairetto for the 'poor' performance of the German referee Herbert Fandel. He later discovered that the English referee, Graham Poll was to officiate the second leg. He subsequently

rang Pairetto to find out why the Portuguese referee Lucilio Cardoso was not officiating. Pairetto expressed surprise and stated that ‘something must have happened at the last moment, I have Cardoso, something must have happened ... he must have been sick or something like that’ (*Corriere della Sera* 2006). Graham Poll was seen as conscientious and incorruptible. Moggi clearly did not feel that Juventus would gain any favours from the English referee. Despite having a key ally in Pairetto at UEFA, Moggi’s influence was not as powerful across Europe. He had a more extensive and denser network within Italy.

The transformation of television has contributed to distrust of referees. As demonstrated in previous chapters, neo-television has contributed to an increasing television audience for football. The football talk show is a significant contributing factor of this audience share. These shows, like *Il Processo*, make extensive use of the *moviola* (slow motion replay) to analyse contentious decisions, especially disallowed goals, offside decisions and fouls. The *moviola* helps to increase the emotional and dramatic narrative of the game as it fuels debate throughout the week. The centrality of the technology has entered Italian language, with an *episodio da moviola* being a controversial incident within the game. Every Monday the most popular Italian national newspaper, *La Gazzetta dello Sport*, has a match-by-match round-up of these *episodi da moviola*.⁵ Despite the fallibility of referees, the *moviola* ‘proves’ their incompetence. The hyperreal emotion of neo-television becomes heightened as the referees’ decisions become scrutinized. This has led to the role of the *moviola* being pinpointed as a key factor in discontent and destabilization of the referee. It has been attributed as a causal factor of fan violence and the referee’s association took Aldo Biscardi, the host of *Il Processo*, to court (Foot 2006). In the year before *calciopoli*, Pairetto and Bergamo admonished the media for their excessive use of the *moviola* by highlighting the fact that television had the benefit of the images of forty television cameras, and the time to replay and dissect decisions, whereas the referee had to make the decision in ‘real time’ (Monti 2005). More recently, the respected ex-referee, and the 2010 chief referee, Pierluigi Collina, stated that ‘the problem in Italy [is that the referee] whistles every contact: the referees have fear of being judged in the evening by the *moviola* and in this way, in doubt, they whistle’ (Palmeri 2010). In this way neo-television reinforces the *sudditanza psicologica* exerted on referees to benefit influential teams. The distinction between the neo-television of Mediaset and the regulation of RAI was confirmed in 2010 when the state broadcaster announced that it would be ceasing to use the *moviola* during its football talk shows (*La Gazzetta dello Sport* 2010b).

Moggi exploited the distrust fuelled by television and the *moviola* to exert more psychological pressure over the referees. He realized that more people watched football at home on the television than physically in the stadium. Consequently, if he could manipulate what people saw at home, then their opinions could be surreptitiously shaped. He was a close friend of Aldo Biscardi, the creator and presenter of the longest-running and most popular football show in Italy, *Il Processo*. Once again, Moggi's social capital lubricated the network. Moggi helped choose the guests and even fixed the results of phone polls. He asked Biscardi to minimize analysis of debatable decisions. For example after AC Milan striker Andriy Shevchenko was controversially denied a penalty, he called Biscardi and said, 'You need to lay off the referee in this one. You either say the referee was correct in his decision or you don't show the images at all and gloss over it' (Marcotti 2006). Referees that refused to cooperate would be disgraced on air. Moggi could request a debatable decision to be shown, and debated at length to discredit the referee. For example, the following conversation took place on 18 October 2005 between Moggi and Fabio Baldas, one of Italy's most famous football presenters and an ex-referee:

Baldas: How are you? Well?

Moggi: Good.

Baldas: Listen Luciano, today we haven't got much ... there is ... [just] Rodomonti [the referee for a game between Cagliari-Milan over the weekend, later investigated but cleared by the tribunal]. Is it OK if we make him look bad?

If you agree, of course ...

Moggi: Oh naturally.

Baldas: And then? And then? There's always Siena-Fiorentina ...

Moggi: But was there a penalty?

Baldas: Er ... bloody hell, yes, there was a penalty! ... And there Rosetti [a referee, also cleared by the inquiry]. You know the guy ... But if we show him, what are we going to do?

Moggi: No, no, leave him alone ... just drop the Siena game.

Baldas: OK ... if I need a favour will you do me a favour?

Moggi: No problem.

Baldas: You'll call me back soon?

Moggi: Yup, soon.

Baldas: Fine, bye. (*La Repubblica* 2006b)

As with previous conversations, there is succinctness. Moggi did not request any particular action against the referee Rodomonti; he trusted Baldas to perform correctly. In return Baldas requested of Moggi, 'if I need a favour will you do me

a favour?'. A 'favour bank' was created where Baldas now had a credit. As with those referees that complied, television presenters that acquiesced to Moggi's demands got favours in return. Although Moggi exerted power along the network, this was not a zero-sum game. He had to provide something in return. As general manager of Juventus, Moggi had access to the players of Italy's most popular club, and some of the best-known players in the world. Many of these players were Italian international stars, which increased their desirability to the media. In return for showing the highlights that Moggi requested, Juventus' general manager would provide exclusive access to these players for interviews and features. Moggi also had access to a wider network of players through the sports agency GEA World.

Globalized sport has seen the increase in third-party intermediaries. This has expanded the opportunity for familial patrimony. Deregulation of sporting contracts, accelerated by the Bosman case, has seen the introduction of a professional group of lawyers, agents and accountants to the network. Investigations by the Italian anti-trust commission during *calciopoli* highlighted that there were 233 agents working in Italy at the time (AGCM 2007). GEA World was the largest sports agency in Italy with nearly an 18 per cent share of the market. The agency was formed in 2001 when three agencies merged: General Athletic; Football Management; and Riccardo Calleri. These three agencies demonstrate the familial nature of Italian football and business (see Figure 4.1). Calleri is the son of a former Genoa and Lazio president, Gianmarco Calleri and General Athletic was comprised of Andrea Cragnotti, who is the son of former Lazio and Cirio president Sergio Cragnotti. Cirio went bankrupt at the same time as Parmalat, who was owned by the Tanzi family. Their daughter, Francesca Tanzi was also a shareholder of General Athletic. Alongside Francesca Tanzi was Chiara Geronzi, the daughter of a leading Italian banker, Cesare Geronzi, who was also investigated as part of the Parmalat collapse. Another major investor in the agency was the bank Capitalia through a trust called Romafides. Capitalia was also a major investor in Parma and Lazio, as well as underwriting Roma (owned by the Rolex-giving Franco Sensi) and Perugia (owned by racehorse-training Luciano Gaucci). In addition, Capitalia owned a merchant bank called MCC whose president was Franco Carraro, the president of the FIGC who suppressed the original details of the *calciopoli* scandal.

The third body within GEA World exemplified the familial networks operating in Italian football. Football Management employed one of Italy's leading agents, Franco Zavaglia as well as Giuseppe De Mita, a former Lazio

Figure 4.1 (Hamil et al. 2010).

official and son of former Italian Prime Minister, Ciriaco De Mita. Another key member was Davide Lippi, the son of the Italian head coach Marcello Lippi. Lippi senior had also managed Juventus on two separate occasions, from 1994–9 and from 2001 until he took the Italy head coach position in 2004. In his position as Juventus head coach he would have worked closely with Luciano Moggi, who began working at Juventus in the same year as Marcello Lippi started his first spell as Juventus manager. Most significantly, the agency also employed Luciano Moggi's son, Alessandro. This provided Moggi with access to a wider range of players, and through these he could dispense favours to television and the newspapers. In return, if players signed for GEA World, they would have access to the networks that could provide them with the potential opportunity to play for Italy's biggest and most successful club, Juventus, or for the Italian national team. Indeed, there were serious allegations of favouritism towards both Juventus and GEA players ahead of Italy's participation in the World Cup finals in Germany (Foot 2006).

As with other aspects of Moggi's patrimonial system, threats and undue influence were used. During the investigations, Roma's general manager, Franco Baldini, claimed that youth team players were placed under undue pressure to sign for GEA (Leroux 2008). In 2005, the former Siena midfielder, Stefano Argilli, was forced to leave the club because he refused to sign for GEA. He said that 'Our new manager was GEA, our general manager was GEA, half the team was GEA. It was clear to me that if I wanted to stay, I would have to sack my agent and join GEA as well' (Marcotti 2006). It didn't end with players leaving

clubs for not signing with Moggi's son's agency. Through his connections and control of agents he could end the careers of those players that displeased him. Fabrizio Miccoli and Enzo Maresca ended up playing in Portugal and Spain, respectively, effectively ending their international chances (Jones 2007). Even major players such as Thierry Henry, Zinedine Zidane and Edgar Davids were sacrificed when they did not succumb to Moggi's wishes. This also suggests the possibility of Moggi influencing players and teams. A classic example is that of Siena. When Juventus played Siena in May 2006 (before the scandal broke), the press highlighted the close financial links between the two clubs. As the midfielder of Siena argued earlier, many players were signed to GEA. Of the fourteen players in the squad to play against Juventus, seven of them were GEA players, as was the coach Gigi De Canio and the director of football Giorgio Perinetti. After a losing streak of seven games, Juventus duly went up with 3-0 just inside seven minutes; this did nothing to dispel the rumours of Juventus' undue influence.

The interconnections between Italian football, business and politics were further exposed during *calciopoli*. Moggi had many friends within politics and would extend the same acts of patrimony to politicians (Sarzanini 2006; Jones 2007; Kiefer and Fisher 2006). The Interior Minister Giuseppe Pisanu was a close friend of Moggi. Pisanu consulted with Moggi when Pope John Paul II died to see if the league could be suspended. Moggi wanted the games to go ahead because the various suspensions of players were favourable to Juventus. Moggi's power, in this case, was less influential than the Catholic Church and games were suspended. The relationship between Pisanu and Moggi was extended when Pisanu requested assistance in support of his local side, Sassari Torres del Viminale, who were given a 'problem' referee. When the team won away for the first time in two years a few weeks later, Pisanu rang back to ask Moggi if they could be helped from relegation. The Finance Minister, Domenico Siniscalco, was also in contact with Moggi to ask for favours. Within Italy, *raccomandazione* (recommendations) for jobs are also important obligations of the patron-client relationship (Zinn 2001). Siniscalco asked Moggi if his sons could attend a Juventus training school. In return Moggi wanted help for a friend who wanted to transfer within the Guardia di Finanza (Italy's tax police). These reciprocal favours expand power and social capital throughout the network of politics, football and business.

Although Moggi and Juventus were central to the *calciopoli* investigations, they were not the only avenues of investigation. There had been long-term suspicion within the Italian game over the influence of Moggi and some openly tried to

fight the system. As repeatedly demonstrated, Moggi would use the network to damage those who did not cooperate. Fiorentina went bankrupt in 2002 and was relegated to Serie C2. Diego Della Valle, their new president and owner of Tod's shoes, took over in 2004 and guided the club back into Serie A. Della Valle frequently spoke out against the imbalance within the Italian game, especially in light of Fiorentina's relegation due to bankruptcy when clubs like Lazio and Roma were permitted to remain in Serie A. He also campaigned against the individual television rights that favoured the larger teams. However, during the 2004-5 season, Fiorentina's first season back in Serie A, the Florentine club was facing relegation due to Moggi's influence; an influence so strong that Fiorentina had two players sent off in the first eight minutes of a game against Sampdoria. Della Valle repented and asked for Moggi's assistance. As a consequence, Fiorentina avoided relegation that season but were deducted points following the scandal.

Lazio had faced similar financial problems at the same time as Fiorentina but were not relegated. After Cragnotti's arrest following Cirio's bankruptcy, the club was bought by Claudio Lotito, the owner of a cleaning services industry. Lotito made similar requests of Moggi to help Lazio avoid relegation. Lazio were also supported by Franco Carraro, the president of the FIGC. Carraro called the referee designator, Pairetto, to say 'Listen, we need to give Lazio a hand ...'. In a subsequent conversation with the vice president of the FIGC, Lazio president Lotito says 'So you have spoken to Carraro ... that's good ... that means he is on my side' (Burke 2006). In the following game, Lazio beat Parma 2-0 thanks to a penalty that was controversially disallowed. A further club, Reggina Calabria, was also investigated in the scandal as it transpired that club president Lillo Foti had asked Moggi for assistance to avoid Reggina's relegation. The Tuscan club of Arezzo were also penalized during *calciopoli* for trying to fix matches in Serie B.

Calciopoli revealed that Moggi and Juventus were not the only club to be developing patrimonial networks. Silvio Berlusconi's Milan was also trying to minimize the influence of Moggi and Juventus by building a rival network. Milan's referees' liaison officer Leonardo Meani was trying to build a separate influential network of compliant referees. Referee's Liaison Officers are employed by the clubs to accompany the referees, collect them from train stations, and generally make their time comfortable. Clearly, this gives them a great deal of time with the referee. Meani was heard in phone-taps talking to the Italian Football Association's head of assistant referees, criticizing the appointment of an assistant after Milan had lost to Siena and saying, 'I don't want him. I never asked for him nor wanted him.' As a result he advised that 'On Wednesday, try

to send two intelligent ones' (Williams 2007). For a game against Chievo Verona, Meani asked for two linesmen by name, including one, Claudio Puglisi, a noted Milan fan. Meani was granted his request from Gennaro Mazzei, the head of linesmen and Milan subsequently won the match against Chievo.

Through the scandal it transpired that Leonardo Meani was performing his task with the full approval of the vice president of Milan, Adriano Galliani. As the prosecutor Stefano Palazzi stated: 'Meani was in telephone contact with linesmen, who were asked, when in doubt, to favour Milan. Galliani approved' (Dunne 2006). Until the scandal, Galliani was president of *Lega Calcio*, the Italian Football League. As a consequence, Galliani was the guardian of the probity of the leagues. He already had a conflict of interests in relation to the arrangement and negotiation of television deals. Now that he was condoning the operation of a 'Milan system', the integrity of the league was undermined. Although he denied the existence of a 'Milan system', Galliani resigned from his position at *Lega Calcio* for his part in *calciopoli* (although he has since rejoined the board of Serie A). Milan was subsequently docked points and disqualified from the Champions League. However, on appeal, they were reinstated and went on to win the trophy in the following year.

The expansive investigation into *calciopoli* highlighted the extensive networks utilized by two of the three biggest clubs in Italy. Inter was the third club of that triumvirate and was not investigated, even though they had the most to gain from the penalization of their two main rivals. After the initial *calciopoli* investigation had been concluded, an alternative power base emerged across the city of Milan. In October 2006, it transpired that Inter took an active role in the evidence gathered two years before the scandal broke. They were undertaking their own investigations into Massimo De Santis, the leading referee in the scandal, whom they suspected of favouring Juventus. They did this through the utilization of phone-taps executed by Telecom Italia. The telecommunications company was also instrumental in authorizing and placing the phone-taps that caught the various protagonists in the *calciopoli* scandal, and which were subsequently leaked to the press. Once again, business networks help piece together the story. The newspaper that leaked the story was *La Gazzetta dello Sport* which was owned by Carlo Buora, a former vice president of Inter, and a former managing director of Pirelli, who became CEO of Telecom Italia after being purchased by Pirelli. The telecom company was also part-owner of Inter and Massimo Moratti, the president of the Milanese club, was also a non-executive director of Telecom Italia (and Pirelli). The connections are reiterated by the fact that the second largest shareholder of

Inter is Marco Tronchetti Provera who also owns Pirelli, the company that sponsors the jerseys of Inter. Once again, personalized networks explain the shifting power structure in Italian football. Inter was complicit in compiling the evidence that led to the downfall of their biggest rivals. This downfall led to Inter winning the subsequent four *scudetti* and the 2010 Champions League.

Further documentary evidence emerged between 2010 and 2011. The *calciopoli 2* investigation revealed that Moggi was utilizing a wider range of telephone communication. It transpired that he had given a number of foreign SIM cards to Pairetto and Bergamo. This meant that they could not be intercepted by Italian investigators or Telecom Italia. This suggested another level of subterfuge. The transcripts from *calciopoli 2* also revealed that in addition to the complex network of Pirelli, Telecom Italia, *La Gazzetta dello Sport* and Inter directors potentially assisting the investigation, the former president of Inter, Giacinto Facchetti (who died in 2006), had also been in regular contact with Bergamo and Pairetto. This suggests a reason for Franco Carraro's intransigence when proffered the original findings. The depth and extent of the corruption would have made it difficult to tackle. Ultimately, the criminal trials found that many of the participants had been guilty of 'sporting fraud'. In addition, Juventus were fined a further €300,000 for their part. Juventus' lawyer, Franzo Grande Stevens, suggested that it was 'not an admission of guilt, but an act of generosity' (*La Gazzetta dello Sport* 2008a). To the end, the exchange of resources was still seen as a gift, and a challenge to the authority of the authorities.

As well as illustrating the extensive networks operating across Italian football, *calciopoli* also reinforced the lack of legitimacy of the FIGC and Serie A. The authorities were consistently challenged over the outcome of the investigation. The Federation's prosecutor recommended that Juventus be stripped of their 2005 and 2006 *scudetti*, relegated to lower than Serie B and docked points. Meanwhile, Fiorentina, Lazio and Milan should be relegated to Serie B and be docked points and Reggina should have a fifteen-point sanction but remain in Serie A. All of the clubs challenged this pronouncement and the authorities compromised. Juventus were stripped of the *scudetti* of 2005 and 2006, relegated to Serie B for the first time in their history, and deducted nine points for the 2006-7 season. The remaining clubs were permitted to remain in Serie A, but with deductions in points. The guilty teams from the 2005-6 season were also removed points as part of punishment. This meant that Milan would have lost out on their Champions League place. They challenged this ruling and were permitted to enter the competition the following season, and duly won the title against Liverpool in Athens. The adjustment in league positions also created

some winners. Messina remained in Serie A thanks to Juventus' relegation, and Livorno were elevated into the UEFA Cup spot. Inter were also awarded the 2006 *scudetto* (the 2005 title remains vacant, just as in 1927).

Juventus continued to challenge the punishment. They threatened to appeal through the civil courts until FIFA made it clear that they would ban any national league from competing in international tournaments if any legal cases were heard outside the sporting jurisdiction. Thus only a global governing body could impose legitimacy onto the Italian football authorities. In 2012, Juventus won their first *scudetto* since the scandal. This represented their twenty-eighth title. However, if they had not had the 2005 and 2006 titles rescinded, then the total would have been thirty *scudetti*. In 1958 Umberto Agnelli, the president of Juventus, suggested that winners of ten *scudetti* should receive a golden star to commemorate the event. With thirty titles, Juventus would have added a third star in 2012; and they publicly announced that their jersey for the 2012-13 season would sport a third star. After negotiations with the FIGC, they agreed to keep the two stars. However, they suggested that they would instead place a slogan, '30 won on the pitch'. Italy's most successful club were publicly challenging the authority of the Federation.

Calcioscommesse: A case of déjà vu again

The consistent challenge to the authority of the Federation undermines its legitimacy. This is exacerbated by the structure of the constituents of the governing bodies. Powerful individuals act as the directors of the organizations. Club presidents and directors also act as directors of the FIGC and Serie A. As Adriano Galliani embodies, there is a conflict of interest between the president of a football club, who as an employee of that institution should be seeking the best deal for them, and a director of the league who should be focused on the best interests of *all* clubs. These conflicts of interest even resurfaced in the immediate aftermath of *calciopoli*. As a result of the scandal, Adriano Galliani resigned as president of the FIGC. Guido Rossi was the person who stepped into Galliani's role and oversaw the investigation into the scandal. Rossi was a shareholder and former director of Inter. After the *calciopoli* scandal had been administered, Rossi resigned, and promptly became president of Telecom Italia, the company that initiated the wiretaps that precipitated the scandal. These conflicts of interest do not reinforce the legitimacy of the Federation and complicates its ability to regulate effectively.

Calciopoli did not precipitate a new dawn of regulatory practice. Although many participants, including Moggi, were found guilty of sporting fraud, some of the leading figures have re-entered important roles. Adriano Galliani remains as vice president of Milan and was elected as a vice president of Serie A in 2013. Franco Carraro remained a vice president of UEFA for three years after the scandal, and still remains a member of the IOC. Lack of decisive action over a scandal in a domestic competition did not preclude Carraro from participating in international federations. Fiorentina president Diego Della Valle and Claudio Lotito of Lazio were both banned from holding a sporting office for eight and four months respectively. Both have since resumed their former roles, with Lotito subsequently being elected onto the board of Serie A. No root-and-branch overhaul of the Federation took place.

Further match-fixing scandals emerged in the years after *calciopoli*. In 2008, a match between Livorno and Atalanta was investigated for match-fixing. Livorno's captain, David Balleri, was banned for four matches, while another three players of Livorno and one of Atalanta were fined. Atalanta was again involved when another larger *Calcioscommesse* or match-fixing scandal emerged three years later. The club was deducted six points, along with Atalanta's star player and former Azzurri member, Cristiano Doni, who was banned for three years for his part. The retired Beppe Signori was another former international star who was investigated and banned (Ceniti 2011). The investigative journalist Declan Hill (2008) has highlighted how match-fixers recruit former players because they have the trust and respect of administrators and current players. Personalized networks operate outside of the corridors of power and facilitate other corrupt practices in football. Twenty players and sixteen different clubs were penalized for their involvement in the 2011. The scandal was more shocking because of how it came to light. A member of the Cremonese team crashed his car and was discovered to have traces of sleeping pills in his blood. Earlier that day several of his teammates had collapsed during a Serie B match with Paganese. It transpired that Ceremonese's goalkeeper, Marco Paolini, had drugged his teammates in order to fix a match and pay off some gambling debts. Hill (2008) has also highlighted how players facing personal problems are recruited by match-fixers in order to exert some form of control. From the transcripts of the investigation, it transpired that Paolini was boasting of connections to star players in the hope of getting a higher payout. Social capital throughout the network was facilitating corrupt practices.

From the seeds of the Paolini investigation a wider match-fixing scandal took root. Evoking images of the *calciopoli* scandal before the 2006 World Cup, police

dramatically searched the room of Azzurri squad member, Domenico Criscito, shortly before the 2012 European Championships. The Zenit St Petersburg defender was being investigated in another match-fixing scandal involving other leading players, including Stefano Mauri, the captain of Lazio, Juventus' manager Antonio Conte, and the president of Siena, Massimo Mezzoroma. The scandal centred on an alleged betting ring called 'the Gypsies' who were based in Eastern Europe. The scandal was high profile because Criscito was in the Azzurri squad for the 2012 European Championships. The defender had been photographed in May 2011 dining with a known Bosnian criminal, a leading player of Genoa, Giuseppe Sculli, and two other members of Genoa's *ultras* group. Criscito argued that 'I have nothing to do with this. I was only out for dinner with some Genoa fans' (Kington 2012). Not only does this illustrate the close connections between players and leading members of *ultras* groups; it also suggests that they are connected to organized crime.

Another branch of the 2012 match-fixing scandal took place in Bari. A parallel investigation was taking place in the southern port after the captain of Bari, Andrea Masiello, dramatically admitted that he had deliberately scored an own goal. Even more extraordinarily, this goal was in a local derby and it saved their local rivals, Lecce, from relegation. Rather than the leading *ultras* being upset that the club had lost to their local rivals, the investigation revealed that they had actually intimidated players to deliberately lose games. Three leaning *ultras* were investigated after two players revealed that the fans had approached members of the team to try and persuade them to lose so that the *ultras* could win money on bets. Although later chapters will illustrate how the *ultras* are incorporated into the patrimonial network, the examples of Genoa and Bari are illustrative of the strong legitimization of leading *ultras* from clubs and players.

Summary

Italy has a long history of scandal and crisis. The state's crisis of legitimacy is similarly reflected in the football federation. This situation has become manifest in the distrust of referees who have become symbolic of the crisis. Patrimonial networks in business and politics meet in football and these networks are utilized to circumvent existing regulations. These networks of interdependency have intensified since the deregulation of the 1980s and power has concentrated around a small number of family and personal

contacts. Despite social capital being generated, it is not contributing to a wider public benefit. *Calciopoli* demonstrated the bankruptcy of this system. Serie A now has a tarnished image that is impacting its ability to compete in the global marketplace. This is reflected in reduced attendances and interest in the game. The failure of the neo-patrimonial system is restricting Italian football's ability to implement the necessary changes. The following chapters will detail the matchday experience to illustrate that despite the political-economic transformations that have taken place in Italy, other wider transformations have not been undertaken by the clubs and authorities. The bankruptcy of the neo-patrimonial system is impeding Italy's ability to adjust to the new global order. Consequently, stadiums and policing have not been radically transformed to adjust to the transformations in global football, and these will be covered in the following two chapters.