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Italy in a Globalizing World

Standing in the bedroom of his sumptuous Sicilian villa, Prince Fabrizio was shaving in front of the mirror. In the reflection, he saw his nephew, Prince Tancredi, enter the room. Tancredi has come to tell his uncle that he will be leaving and heading into the mountains to fight for Giuseppe Garibaldi. The 'red shirts' of Garibaldi had landed on the Sicilian coast and were fighting to unite the island with the new Italian nation. Sicilian aristocrats, like Prince Fabrizio, were being confronted with exile or death. Initially, there was familial concern for his nephew's well-being in the campaign. Tancredi allayed these fears and explained that the northern politicians will impose a republic unless the aristocracy takes control of the situation: 'If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.' Tomasi di Lampedusa's novel entitled *Il Gattopardo* (The Leopard) illustrated the turmoil of the *Risorgimento* during the mid-nineteenth century. unification required social elites to change their way of life or face extinction. Those that changed were incorporated into the new state, a phenomenon that introduced the term *gattopardismo* into the Italian language to illustrate the way that people and traditions remain continuous despite tumultuous change.

In 2011, Italy celebrated the 150th anniversary to mark its unification. Although it is a relatively young nation, it has encountered several diverse forms of government: from monarchy, through fascist dictatorship, to republic. As social elites remain, despite the apparent changes, the state has been unsuccessful in imposing itself completely. The incomplete nature of the Italian state has created intense cleavages and a profound crisis of legitimacy that undermines central authority. Its status as a young nation and its sustained crisis of legitimacy have permitted several pre-unification traditions and identities to continue, reinforcing the weakness of the state. Central among these is the reliance upon the family. Foucault (1991b) argued that the state imposed itself in the United Kingdom and France through population management, effectively breaking the family as a unit. In Italy, the continuance of traditional practices, and the failure of the state to impose itself upon its citizens, result have resulted in the family becoming the central

unit of support. Family connections have superseded those of the state and have permitted the persistence of patrimonial networks of support (Banfield 1958; Ginsborg 1990; Cento Bull and Corner 1993; Sapelli 1995; Ginsborg 2003; Silverman 1975), which have resulted in a vacuum within public politics as family and personal connections provide the focus. This vacuum has facilitated the growth of charismatic leaders who exploit their patrimonial networks to provide a focus for political and national identity.

However, sport does not operate in a social vacuum. It is both a product of and a reflection of its social context. To present a background to *Football Italia*, this chapter will briefly outline the 150 years of Italian history. In doing so, it presents a broader historical and theoretical framework that underpins the remaining chapters. Through this outline on the nation's history, several recurring themes emerge. There is a strong regionalist identity throughout Italian history that contributes to a crisis of legitimacy of the central state. Local familial and patrimonial networks have strengthened as the central state failed to institute a legitimate alternative. In order to overcome the resultant factionalism, charismatic leaders emerged to temporarily unite the disparate groups. These charismatic leaders, however, operated within their own patrimonial networks, which further delegitimized the central state and perpetuated the crisis. The first section of this chapter will address the formation of modern Italy and its difficult transition from traditional communities to modern society. In order to understand Italian football, particular focus will be placed on Italy's post-war development to account for the transition from a protectionist national economy to a deregulated global economy. The collapse of the Fordist mass-manufacturing system facilitated the emergence of a new form of economy that flourished in the central regions of Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna. It also resulted in the continuance of existing patrimonial practices as *gattopardismo* remained. Patrimonial networks and deregulation have permitted the close networks between football, business and politics to be intensified. This has occurred spectacularly with Silvio Berlusconi, who became both the leader of a political party and prime minister, and the owner of a number of businesses, including one of Italy's top football clubs, AC Milan.

Italian modernity

In order to understand Italian football, we must situate the sport within Italian society. Italy is essentially a modern construct that refers to the geographic

peninsular south of the Alps. Until the mid-nineteenth century, the Italian peninsula was a historical oddity; it was still an assortment of regions with disparate forms of government, including the Doges in Venice, the Kings of Naples and Piedmont and the Papacy. The increased influence of the nationalist model spreading across Northern Europe, however, saw nationalistic sentiment grow across the peninsula, particularly in the north. Austrian political influence in this area resulted in strong anti-Austrian sentiments and fuelled the calls for an independent unified nation state. The charismatic leader Giuseppe Garibaldi became a focus for the political project of unification, the *Risorgimento* (Resurgence). Supported by thinkers and politicians such as Count Cavour and Giuseppe Mazzini from the northern region of Piedmont, unification effectively became a 'Piedmontization' of Italy (Arvidsson 2003). Through political machinations and conquest, the peninsula was declared a united kingdom in 1861. Anderson (2006) saw the growth of the nation as a cultural construct where participants with shared rituals and cultural traditions were considered part of an 'imagined community'. With disparate local traditions and identities, the new state has become the apposite example of an 'imagined community' (Dickie 1996). Consequently, successive governments have struggled to impose the unifying 'myths, memories and symbols' (Smith 1987) and the 'invented traditions' (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) on the nation state. Traditional practices continued after unification, creating a number of religious, political and geographical cleavages. Traditional identities conflicted with emerging national identities, with neither becoming truly dominant. As a result, the state struggled to impose itself over its subjects and faced a perpetual crisis of legitimacy.

The Catholic Church is central to the conflict between traditional practices and state control; it destabilizes the state from above and below. To unite the peninsula and the nation, the city of Rome had to be incorporated into the new kingdom. As a key symbol to a glorious past, Rome had been declared the capital of the new state even though it had not been physically incorporated into the nation. To unify the peninsula, Garibaldi had to invade Rome, leading Pope Pius IX to declare himself a 'prisoner in his own city'. As a consequence, the Pope refused to acknowledge the new state and forbade all Catholics, both at home and abroad, from participating in Italian politics, thereby effectively destabilizing the state at its inception (Wood and Farrell 2001). Meanwhile, local identity continued to remain strong. Catholic rituals that focused on the town's patron saints helped reinforce individuals' strong attachments to one's hometown or village. Localized festivals that worshipped the town's patron saint combined with annual festivals, such as Easter and Christmas, of the religious

calendar. These fuelled local sentiments and contributed to strong feelings of attachment to the local town, or *campanilismo*. Literally, this means the love of one's bell tower. The bell tower, as a dominant urban symbol, could be seen and heard from all areas of the town or locality and came to symbolize the town and one's attachment to it:

The *campanile* identifies the community of membership, in how its visibility delimits the community territory, that is the space becomes 'ours', of the well known, of the obvious, of the everyday; the *campanile* is a symbol of a '*appaesamento*' [a sense of belonging] that is not only physical, but is principally psychological (Sanga 1996, p. 36).

Campanilismo is also fuelled through local historic festivals. Throughout Tuscany, there are many folk games that reaffirm a localized, pre-unification activity, such as the *palio* at Siena, the *palio marinaro* in Livorno and the 'game of the bridge' in Pisa. The paradox of conflicting symbols emerges through the folk game of *Calcio Fiorentino* that originated in Florence. Mussolini emphasized the links between the Florentine game and the new game of football. In doing so, he reinforced the Italian origins of the game while simultaneously reaffirming a localized, pre-unification activity (Doidge 2015).

The Church's focus on the role of the family provides an alternative challenge to the state. The Church stresses that the family is the only social unit, creating a strong kinship society. As the family constitutes the first and primary point of reference for individuals, this colours their interactions with others. During his fieldwork in the 1950s, Banfield (1958) highlighted the lack of civic association within a rural community in the south of Italy. He termed such focus on one's own family as 'amoral familism', since individuals would focus on assisting their immediate family rather than aspiring to a higher, civic ideal. Helping others would not only cause the individual a material or temporal loss but also potentially make rivals stronger than the immediate family. Those who were seen as helping others were seen as frauds or hypocrites (such as the Church or Communists) or they were doing so because it is their job (like council officials). These officials were seen as corrupt, whether they were actually corrupt or not. They were assumed to perform to the same cultural 'amoral familism' and favour their own family. With a weak state, without the legitimacy to overcome these challenges, the residue of 'amoral familism' remains within bureaucratic systems and everyday life.

Regional and family identification became a feature of the Italian media. The late political development of Italy prevented the formation of a national print

capitalism that could unite the imagined community. Industrialization in Italy took place in the north and around certain ports in the early nineteenth century, that is, before unification. The lack of national industrialization inhibited the formation of a national consumer market. Manufacturers did not seek to expand their market by advertising nationally or provide additional economic stimulus to the newspaper industry (Nowell-Smith 1990). Ultimately there was a lack of independent newspapers that needed to derive their revenue from publishing and advertising. As a consequence, Italian newspapers are:

owned by companies which exist for, and earn most of their revenue from, other activities, and for whom the newspaper is merely a tool for promoting those activities. (Wagstaff 2001, p. 297)

Although some independent publishers have emerged, such as Rizzoli (who owns the *Corriere della Sera*) and De Benedetti (who owns *La Repubblica*), many Italian newspapers have been incorporated into the wider business conglomerates of leading families.

Political affiliations were formed before unification in the same way as regional and religious identities. The Socialist Party and the trade unions represented workers before universal suffrage was extended to all males after the First World War (Sapelli 1995), highlighting a serious disjuncture between the social citizenship of most Italians and their political relationship. The political membership was further divided by religious membership that precluded political involvement. Political and religious discord divided the urban and rural bourgeoisie and prevented the formation of a middle-class party, such as the British-style Conservatives (Sapelli 1995). Such divisions inhibited the formation of mass political parties and created a fragmented political system. This contributed to a feature of Italian politics after unification, called *trasformismo* (transformism), where politicians would change political allegiances so as not to lose power or influence. Effectively, this created a consistent ruling political elite who exercised power for their own ends. *Trasformismo* continued the practice of *gattopardismo* where elites, despite changes, remained the same.

The prevalence and success of *trasformismo* helped the Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci develop his theory of hegemony. He observed how the dominant power incorporated opponents into its sphere of influence through a process of cooperation and coercion. The practice of negotiation and persuasion ensured that ruling bodies governed with the consent of the public. The result was 'the permeation throughout civil society ...', as Gramsci stated, 'of an entire system of values, beliefs, attitudes and morals that is in one way or another supportive

of the established order and the class interests that dominate it' (Gramsci 1971, p. 39). Hegemonic groups have access to the legal system and establish or repeal laws to provide a wider legal-political framework. The police and armed forces are also utilized to uphold these laws and physically quash challenges to the hegemonic order. It is in the cultural sphere that consent is manufactured with allied groups, but it does so with the potential threat of coercion. Consent is, as Gramsci argued, 'protected by the armour of coercion' (Gramsci 2000, p. 235). Hegemony is not the simple act of forcing beliefs onto a group, but a process of persuasion. Access to material resources, whether privately or state-owned, can help with this process of persuasion.

The fragmented political system necessitated a charismatic leader who could use their negotiation skills and extend their patronage to unite the factions. Through patronage and negotiation, successful leaders could utilize *trasformismo* to alienate the extremes of the political spectrum and create a relatively stable centrist government. Giovanni Giolitti utilized this system with some success and acted as Italian prime minister five times between 1903 and 1921. However, the First World War led to the collapse of the liberal post-unification political system. Military failure in the war culminated in the humiliating Battle of Caporetto in 1917. The post-war territorial settlement resulted in Italy losing territory and gaining nothing of Germany's overseas colonies (which were divided between Britain and France). Fascism drew upon the embarrassing military defeat in the First World War in order to justify its nationalist project (Wilcox 2008). The weakness of the coalition government resulted in the emergence of a new charismatic leader to unite the nation. This particular context permitted Benito Mussolini and his Fascist Party to assume control in 1922. Mussolini proceeded to impose a centralized bureaucratic state and reinforced national identity through carefully invented traditions. Mussolini invoked the image of Rome and the Renaissance to reassert Italian national identity. Football subsequently became central in Mussolini's strategy. Italy hosted and won the second World Cup in 1934, before successfully defending their title four years later in France.

The 'Miracle': Italy's post-war political economic development

The fall of fascism in 1943 and the post-war reconstruction of Italy retained many pre-fascist features. Cooperation between the Catholics and the Communists

during the Resistance resulted in an agreement to support parliamentary democracy and the birth of the first Italian republic. Despite this cooperation, the Vatican entered politics and actively supported the *Democrazia Cristiana*, the Christian Democrat Party (DC), to prevent the Communists taking power. To assist, Pope Pius XII excommunicated all members of the *Partito Comunista Italiano*, the Italian Communist Party (PCI). The Church's support for the DC reinforced key aspects of Italian society. The DC fought to have the rights of the family guaranteed in the Constitution. As Bernini states, this resulted

in the Constitution, the rights of the family as an institution superseded the rights of its individual members, and the protection of the family as a whole took priority over the guarantee of the 'legal and moral equality' of the spouses. (Bernini 2010, pp. 74–5)

Consequently, the DC reaffirmed the role and influence of the Catholic Church in Italian society. It also reinforced the centrality of the Italian family that precluded identification with wider associations or the state. Vatican support also operated to alienate the PCI and maintain a Catholic hegemony.

The emergence of two mass parties did not prevent political fragmentation. Proportional representation permitted many localized, independent parties to emerge, whereas factionalism remained within the DC and PCI. In order to maintain parliamentary democracy and prevent the PCI from obtaining power, the DC utilized its patrimonial influence to maintain its hegemony. The negotiation practised through clientelistic relationships and *trasformismo* continued. In order to control the factions and independent parties, the mass parties retained localized patrimonial networks and used these to distribute resources quickly and readily to supporters. Italy continued, as in other southern European countries, to be 'governed more by the division of the spoils by the parties than by legal and bureaucratic rationality' (Sapelli 1995, p. 115). Through effective control of government and distribution of the resources the DC prevented the Communists from forming a government. As a result, Italy became a one-party state, or *partitocrazia* (partyocracy) (Della Porta 1995; Ginsborg 1996). The *partitocrazia* and factionalism reinforced the need for charismatic leaders to control the patrimony. Alcide De Gasperi was the founder of the DC and led the party since 1945 for eight successive years. De Gasperi was instrumental in negotiating the terms of the Marshall Plan that provided American aid for European reconstruction. American support through the Marshall Plan provided the political capital for De Gasperi to reinforce public opinion against the communists, as the PCI became the largest Communist Party

outside Eastern Europe. American aid provided economic capital to lubricate the system of patrimony and financial reward for DC supporters, which further alienated the PCI.

The patrimonial system under the *partitocrazia* was assisted by state control of the economy. As a result, Keynesianism in Italy was distorted to facilitate clientelism (Della Porta 1995; Farrell 1995). Consequentially, Italy has retained a large nationalized industrial sector into the twenty-first century. Mussolini set up the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (ISI) to retain certain industries under national control. The ISI's involvement in Italian industry was so great that, by 1962, it became the second largest industrial group in Europe – only the Royal Dutch Shell group was larger (Sassoon 1986). ISI was augmented in 1953 with the Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI), the state oil and gas company, that (literally) provided the energy to support Italy's post-war recovery. Another agency of the state was instigated to overcome the 'southern question'. The Cassa per il Mezzogiorno was set up in 1950 to provide state support for development in the south of Italy. The fragmented political system, and hegemonic power in the north, had contributed to a piecemeal industrialization that had left the south significantly underdeveloped. The Cassa, ISI, ENI and similar government bodies became vehicles for clientelism as public money was used to facilitate existing patrimonial networks. Patronage was embedded in the system to such an extent that a process called the Cencelli Manual was implemented in 1968 to allocate ministerial positions (Foot 2003). Massimiliano Cencelli, a DC undersecretary, devised a mathematic formula to calculate the number of factions and ministers and allocate ministerial positions according to the number of supporters within a faction. A further example of patronage can be demonstrated within the state-controlled television station, RAI. By the 1960s, state control, and therefore control by the DC, was contested by the other political parties. A form of political deregulation occurred with the *lottizzazione* (Ginsborg 1996; Hanretty 2010). The two television stations were divided between the DC and the *Partito Socialista Italiano* (PSI), Italian Socialists. A third channel, *RAI Tre* (RAI Three), was added in 1979 to provide a station for the PCI. Despite putatively relinquishing control, it still reinforced the hegemonic position of political elites.

The dominance of a single political party in the *partitocrazia* politicized much of society. As the DC maintained hegemonic control, public appointments from teachers to council workers became acts of political patronage. This led to the formation of a state bourgeoisie; a compliant network of public officials who relied on the patronage of the DC for their jobs and were incorporated into the hegemonic group. As opposed to the independent, rational and

efficient Weberian bureaucracy, the Italian system stagnated; it necessitated the need to utilize personal and family contacts in order to circumvent bureaucratic processes. This was exacerbated by jobs being filled by a system of *raccomandazione* (recommendations) (Zinn 2001). This ensured that the patron could provide favours to their clients by recommending them for a job. Other clients dispensed their obligations by hiring the recommended individual. This became an important aspect of the patron–client relationship network.

The clientelistic relationships in Italian society encouraged ‘people to become negotiators. Because everything is fluid, everything may also be considered negotiable’ (LaPalombara 1987, p. 59). In American society, Riesman (1961) argued that during the 1950s, individuals started to become ‘other-directed’ and focused on their interactions with other people. Italy also developed ‘other-directed’ individuals who utilized their social networks and, through negotiations, developed ways to improve their position. Gundle and Parker (1996, p. 23) argue that ‘the speed and efficacy of a bureaucratic act depended to a great extent upon the pressures that a citizen could exert upon the administrator’. Consequently, the personal connections of an individual became a vehicle for patrimony and resulted in a variety of practices being used, ranging from a network of contacts to systemized corruption.

State support and Fordist manufacturing facilitated the ‘economic miracle’ that originated around Milan and the north. During the 1950s, large-scale mass production provided the catalyst for this ‘miracle’. The concentration around Milan and Turin intensified the contrast between north and south. This was exacerbated by extensive internal migration as young workers from the impoverished south migrated to work in the northern factories. Alongside the demographic transformation within Italy, consumption dramatically changed. Increased prosperity led to a growing demand for (Italian made) consumer items such as televisions, white goods, scooters and cars. Large-scale manufacturing was central to this boom in consumption. This was dominated by the car industry and ancillary companies, such as road building, rubber, oil and steel manufacturing. Fiat controlled 90 per cent of the national market and its dominance turned many small and medium-sized enterprises into dependent companies (Sassoon 1986). These industries remained, and remain today, resolutely family owned. Fiat was established by Giovanni Agnelli in 1899, and the Agnelli family have become synonymous with the company ever since. In 2010, Giovanni Agnelli’s great-great-grandson, John Elkann, became chair of the company. Similarly, the current president of Pirelli is Marco Tronchetti Provera, who is married to the granddaughter of the founder of the company.

What is significant for a book on Italian football is that family business groups incorporated football clubs into their business empires. The Agnelli family have owned Juventus in Turin since 1923; their current chair is Andrea Agnelli. In Milan, Pirelli and Olivetti were involved with Inter and AC Milan, respectively, in the 1930s. Pirelli continue to be involved with Inter and have sponsored them since 1995. As football became the most popular pastime of the more affluent Italian society, these large companies could improve staff morale by financially supporting successful local teams; industrial patronage became the norm. The Italian economy's reliance on large family businesses afforded their owners political power and saw Italian industry become an extension of the political patrimonial system.

Economic crisis and deregulation

The industrial success that fuelled the growth in consumption started to collapse in the late 1960s. Economic recession, state inefficiency and dramatic cultural changes caused by the Miracle culminated in the 'hot autumn' of 1969. The increase in trade union power led to widespread strikes across the country. Italy's economic problems were exacerbated during the decade as their inflation and balance of deficits grew. Low wages saw Italy increasingly at the bottom of the division of labour, as high technology remained with the United States, Germany and Japan. Further changes in international trade left Italy open to increased foreign competition, and its low technology base meant that it could not compete. These transformations were heightened with the devaluation of the dollar and the oil crisis in the early 1970s. Large mass-manufacturing companies had to adapt themselves to compete. Fiat, which epitomized the large Fordist mass-manufacturing of the 'Miracle', was forced to restructure with redundancies and outsourcing. Under these economic pressures, Italian society began to politicize around earlier historical traditions.

Political turmoil culminated in terrorism during the 1970s, termed the *anni di piombo* (years of lead) (Wagstaff 2001; Foot 2003; Bartali 2006; Cooke 2006; Ignazi 2006; Ginsborg 1990; Wood and Farrell 2001). The period saw the emergence of a number of invented traditions that harked back to the Resistance. With memories of the war and fascism fading, the 1970s saw the re-emergence of the extreme right in Italy. Groups such as the '*Ordine Nero*' and '*Squadre di Azione Mussolini*' created a historical link back to Mussolini's black-shirted fascist *squadristi*. Bombings at the Piazza Fontana in Milan in 1969 and at the

Bologna Railway Station in 1974, were the neo-fascists' attempts to create a 'strategy of tension'. In the same way that the *squadristi* caused chaos in the 1920s, the neo-fascists hoped that creating disorder in the 1970s would allow a strong, Mussolini-like figure to emerge from the chaos to unite the nation and restore order. More insidious was that this 'strategy of tension' was initially blamed on left-wing anarchists by the government and police. Investigative journalists uncovered details, however, which highlighted that neo-fascists were to blame and that they were in contact with Guido Giannettini, the head of the Italian secret service. Much of this was facilitated through the secretive masonic lodge, P2 (Ginsborg 1990). State complicity in terrorism left a scar in the national memory that has not been successfully reconciled (Cento Bull 2010).

Parallel to the growth of right-wing political movements in Italy was a similar communist identity. The 1970s saw an increase in popularity of partisan songs from the Second World War. Political groups used names that were deliberately evocative of the Resistance movement such as *Stella Rossa* (Red Star), *Volante Rossa* (Flying Star), and most importantly, the *Brigate Rosse* (Red Brigades). In 1978, the *Brigate Rosse* became infamous for their kidnapping and assassination of Aldo Moro, the DC president. Moro was a key proponent of the 'historic compromise' between the DC and PCI that maintained the PCI's commitment to civic participation through parliamentary democracy rather than through revolution. The *Brigate Rosse* felt that revolution was the only way to overthrow the corrupt elites. Moro symbolized the 'historic compromise' and was kidnapped and assassinated. The legacy of the Piazza Fontana bombing, however, ensured that conspiracy remains. Various, the P2 masonic lodge, the secret services and the Mafia have all been accused of organizing or supporting Moro's assassination.

The intense politicization within Italian daily life impacted football. The politics of the *piazze* were transferred to the stadium. This led to a politicization of fan groups and the emergence of the *ultras*. Although this will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, it is important to stress the wider sociopolitical processes influencing football fans. *Ultras* groups took the flags and chants of the protests into the stadium. The names of groups reflected this political influence. One of AC Milan's *ultras* groups called themselves the *Brigate Rossonere* (Red-black Brigades) to reflect the colours of the team and the colour of their politics. In this way they combined local identity with national politics.

Local political agitation resulted in the Italian regions winning significant autonomy in the 1970s. Fifteen regional governments were established to provide increased regional representation. After an intense political struggle,

these regions were provided with increased autonomy in 1976. This provided a fine benchmark for Robert Putnam's initial study of political and economic success in Italy. Putnam et al. (1993) argued that regions in Northern and Central Italy had experienced significant economic success after winning more autonomy, while those regions in the south were less successful. Putnam argued that those regions with traditions of civic engagement were more successful, both politically and economically. Participating in civic associations led to greater interaction with a wider network of individuals, what Putnam (1993; 2000) terms 'social capital'. These networks of 'social capital' led to greater involvement in local and national politics, which bred economic success. What Putnam overlooked is that social networks are a significant feature of Italian sociopolitical life anyway. As argued previously, they lubricate the bureaucracy, industry and politics. Rather than 'making democracy work', they feed patrimonialism and corruption. Indeed, two of the biggest corruption scandals in Italy, *tangentopoli* and *calciopoli*, originated in Milan and Turin, which are located in the more 'civic' north. Deregulation removed any pretence at national stability and objectivity. Personal networks of 'social capital' merely facilitated corruption and the fragmentation of the state.

Increased autonomy and politicization resulted in a wave of invented traditions as regions sought to impose their identity. Monuments were built to commemorate local figures and events, while street names were renamed in honour of local luminaries. Many traced a historical lineage back to the Resistance. For example, a monument was erected in Bologna after two demonstrators were killed when a Carabinieri car mounted a pavement. Their epitaph was inscribed as: 'Fallen Partisans of the new Resistance' and 'now and always Resistance' (Cooke 2006, p. 172). The contestation between national and regional identification continued in 2010, with the cities of Florence and Rome contesting for the national ownership of icons such as Michelangelo's statue of David and the Colosseum.

These social and economic problems saw the development of a distinctly Italian brand of post-Fordist manufacturing. Regional autonomy and family businesses combined to create the appropriate environment for successfully adapting to the emerging global marketplace. A new geographical distinction emerged in Italy between the industrial Northern region and the impoverished South. The central regions of Tuscany, Umbria, Emilia-Romagna and Le Marche became known as the 'Third Italy' (Bagnasco 1977). In particular, the Emilia-Romagna region gave its name to a new type of manufacturing system called the 'Emilian Model' (Brusco 1982; Piore and Sabel 1984). Increasingly, flexible consumer markets combined with excessive unionization in larger firms like Fiat saw many

of these companies subcontract their production. This necessitated a new form of dynamic small business that could respond quickly. Family orientation also provided the economic capital as support and security during the early years of the company. In addition, tax exemptions for small businesses with fewer than fifteen employees facilitated their survival. The newly autonomous regional authorities assisted with support for new industrial zones that permitted the creation of extensive cooperative networks that reinforced the social capital of the families. More significantly, globalization permitted these organizations to capitalize upon historical trade networks direct to foreign markets. As a consequence, Italian family businesses, such as Benetton, Armani and Gucci, became iconic global names.

Transformations in the global and Italian political economy necessitated a new type of charismatic leader. The economic shift from mass-manufacturing to flexible specialization was not restricted to manufacturing. Post-Fordist services, like advertising and finance, expanded to augment the changing economy. Together, these resulted in Italy overtaking Britain in 1987 to become the fifth largest economy. Increasing affluence introduced a new middle class of consumers. New charismatic leaders directly appealed to this emergent group of consumers. As Sapelli (1995, p. 116) notes:

The roots of this [new charismatic leader] can be found in the fact that, in the 1980s, the electoral growth of all the parties was due to the leaders' ability to attract the new middle classes, only too happy to receive the resources dispensed by the party system of government that controlled the state.

For the political parties to continue to function as before, they had to extend the patrimonial system to the new middle classes. Post-Fordist consumerism, however, constituted an ideological issue for the mass parties of Catholicism and communism. State control and regulation could uphold traditional virtues without succumbing to the unconstrained vices of consumption. Italy's third party, the PSI, was less ideologically restricted and openly appealed to the emergent middle classes. Bettino Craxi was the leader of the Socialist Party and capitalized on divisions in the DC to negotiate his way to becoming Prime Minister between 1983 and 1987. Although he represented an ideological break from the two mass parties, he still operated within the political patrimonial system. Craxi was a new charismatic leader for the consumer age and attracted new middle-class voters through deregulation. Under Craxi, 'A whole army of careerists, social climbers and yuppies entered the PSI, and used it as an instrument of political and economic promotion' (Padellaro and Tamburrano 1993, p. 35). Unencumbered by ideological issues, as the DC and PCI were,

Craxi simplified politics and made it more media-friendly. He embraced the post-Fordist, deregulated changes taking place in other Western democracies and this facilitated the growth of the 'Third Italy' and the resultant economic boom.

Craxi's reforms were driven by political expediency rather than ideology. A key element of the New Right of Thatcherism in the United Kingdom was the notion of a 'free economy/strong state' (Gamble 1994). The State had to be strong enough to disentangle state involvement in the market, while at the same time retaining legitimacy to police the new economic order through effective regulation and contesting the vested interests of the previous Keynesian regime. In Britain, Thatcher undertook a series of contests with trade unions and other vested interests to end protectionism in the state-controlled market. Rolling back the state in Britain paradoxically re-legitimized the state as it relatively successfully disentangled itself from the economy and reinforced the role of central government. The factional nature of Italian politics meant that government measures always risked defeat in parliament. Consequently, vested interests and state involvement in industry were not disentangled by Craxi. Likewise, the battle with the trade unions was not undertaken in Italy as it was in the United Kingdom. Successful challenges to the unions at Fiat, for example, was undertaken by Gianni Agnelli, rather than the state. In a further distinction from Britain, the key Thatcherite policy of reducing taxes for larger businesses were not replicated by Craxi. When combined with the tax exemptions for smaller companies this facilitated the growth of the smaller business within the Emilian Model. Most significantly, there was no systematic privatization in Italy, as the ISI and ENI retained a number of nationalized industries.

Berlusconi enters the field: The emergence of the new industrialists

Craxi's significant contribution to deregulation in Italy occurred in the world of television through his friendship with Silvio Berlusconi, a fellow Milanese. Berlusconi symbolized the new affluence in Italy and represented a significant shift from the traditional industrial families like the Agnellis and Pirelli. Furthermore, Berlusconi embodied the notion of the 'other-directed' individual (Riesman 1961). He was acutely aware of his public image and developed extensive social networks (Ginsborg 2004; Andrews 2005; Jones 2007; Foot

2003; Lane 2004). Through his friendship with Craxi, Berlusconi represents a shift towards neo-patrimony – networks based on personal connections (Eisenstadt 1973; Sapelli 1995). Craxi was godfather to Berlusconi's daughter Barbara who was born out of wedlock to his mistress Veronica Lario in 1984. Craxi subsequently acted as Berlusconi's best man at his marriage to Lario six years later. Berlusconi started his career as a singer on a cruise ship before capitalizing on his personal contacts in 1961. He persuaded the manager of the bank where his father worked to loan him the money to build an apartment complex. Showing his entrepreneurial spirit, he sold these apartments through adverts in the local newspaper. Three years later, Berlusconi used a further guarantee from his father's bank, and money from a Swiss bank with unknown proprietors, to build another residential complex (Lane 2004). It was with his third venture, however, that signalled the arrival of Silvio Berlusconi.

Berlusconi's third construction project signalled the emergence of a postmodern, individual consumer-orientated business in Milan. Entitled Milano 2, it was built throughout the 1970s and represented an early Italian example of bounded space, with resident-only access and security guards. Its location in the outskirts of Milan, close to Linate airport, meant that Berlusconi had to sharpen his negotiation skills and persuade various administrative bodies, such as the council, magistrates and unions, to receive the approval for its construction. He also persuaded the airport authorities to change their flight paths so that they would not disturb residents. The complex was marketed to the new affluent, yet individual, middle-class family and had to appeal to every generation of the family. Many green spaces and sports facilities were preserved by underground parking and were combined with schools, a church, shops and bars to provide an environment for the emerging consumer-orientated residents of Milan. Most significant for Berlusconi's future was that each apartment within the Milano 2 complex was provided with pre-installed cable television. One of these channels was supplied by TeleMilano, the cable company set up by Berlusconi in 1974 to provide local news and entertainment for the Milano 2 complex. This independent postmodern approach to residential complexes marked a profound departure from the Fordist residencies of the past. For example, the Mirafiori Sud apartment blocks for workers that were located next to the Fiat plant in Turin had communal heating systems rather than individual control.

Deregulation of the state broadcaster, RAI, by his friend Craxi, presented Berlusconi with an opportunity to expand his media enterprise. In 1975, parallel with the increased autonomy of the Italian regions, attempts were

made by a parliamentary commission to make local television and radio more regional in outlook. A year later, the constitutional court decided that the state broadcaster, RAI, should no longer hold a monopoly of radio and television within the regions. This led to the development of a number of local networks and presented Berlusconi with an opportunity to expand TeleMilano. Berlusconi acquired many of these regional stations and changed the name of his media company to Mediaset. Through Mediaset, Berlusconi actively challenged the regulators and RAI, undermining their legitimacy. He circumvented regulations by pre-recording entire schedules and sending them to each regional station for concurrent transmission. This gave, in Berlusconi's own words, 'the illusion of a network' (Schlesinger 1990, p. 273). With these transmissions, he deliberately targeted the weak spots in RAI's scheduling, using American imports such as *Dallas* to increase audience share. *Dallas* was the focus of another battle with the regulators. The regulators wanted to control commercial programmes and banned Berlusconi from showing consecutive episodes of *Dallas* and *Dynasty*. To circumvent this, he showed them concurrently on different channels. Eventually these clashes culminated in 1984 when three magistrates from Rome, Pescara and Turin decreed that these regional television networks were for regional, not national broadcasting and ordered his channels to be suspended. This coincided with broadcasts of some of Mediaset's most popular programmes, *Dallas*, *Dynasty*, *the Smurfs* and *High Noon*. Unsurprisingly, Berlusconi gained much public sympathy and the matter had to be resolved by a special decree from his friend, Prime Minister Bettino Craxi.

Berlusconi's friendship with Craxi facilitated his contest with the regulators. As prime minister, Craxi could pass an emergency decree to temporarily permit the national broadcasts of Mediaset. However, Craxi's 1984 decree was soon declared unconstitutional. Craxi leveraged all of his political support to pass a new law that effectively deregulated Italian television. The Mammi Law, named after its author Oscar Mammi, was eventually passed through parliament six years later. The Mammi Law ended the unregulated free-for-all that existed since the emergency decree. Yet, rather than create a regulatory framework to ensure pluralism, the law confirmed the duopoly between RAI, the state broadcaster, and Berlusconi's Mediaset. Although the law was drafted to look like Berlusconi had made sacrifices, it still looked tailor-made for the media magnate. It maintained that no one could own more than three stations, yet also stated that the owner of the commercial television stations could not also own stakes in satellite stations or newspapers. Berlusconi sold the daily newspaper *Il Giornale* to his brother, Paolo, and his stake in a pay-TV satellite channel to a group of investors to whom

he lent the money. The friendship between Berlusconi and Craxi facilitated new forms of patrimony based on personal contacts.

Neo-patrimonialism: Development and change of Italy's patrimonial system

This new patrimony of Craxi and Berlusconi operated on a personal *quid pro quo* basis. These 'neo-patrimonial' networks (Eisenstadt 1973; Sapelli 1995) relied on personal contacts, rather than on a simple distribution of the resources; political support was granted in return for favours. Mauss (1967) has highlighted how gifts build solidarity between recipients. These gifts build reciprocal relationships that establish future obligations; the receiver of the gift is under a duty to return the favour at a later date. After the Mammi Law was passed, allegations surfaced that Fininvest, Berlusconi's umbrella company, paid 'consultative fees' to the government office that drafted the law. This was amplified when Fininvest employed one of the key authors of the Mammi Law shortly after he left the ministry. Similarly, Berlusconi had offered Craxi political support during the politically delicate takeover of the publisher Mondadori. Berlusconi already had a stake in Mondadori and had bought the ailing television station Rete-4 from them in 1984 (the same year as Craxi's emergency decree). In 1989, Mondadori merged with the L'Espresso group, which publishes the left-leaning newspaper, *La Repubblica* and the weekly magazine, *L'Espresso*. The anti-government chairman of Olivetti, Carlo De Benedetti, owned the group. Berlusconi entered the takeover to ensure that he gained control of Mondadori, while De Benedetti was left with the L'Espresso group. Although Berlusconi won access to another media outlet, by taking on the powerful anti-governmental L'Espresso group, he also provided political support to Craxi.

Italy's neo-patrimonial system was spectacularly exposed in the *tangentopoli* scandal of 1992. *Tangentopoli* (Bribesville) originated in Milan, the same city as the 'Economic Miracle' of the 1950s and the fashion and finance boom of the 1980s (Foot 2001; Foot 2003; Ginsborg 2003). Milan is also based in the region of Lombardy, which Putnam (1993) classed as 'civic' and more likely to be economically successful. Its 'civic' nature, however, did not prevent widespread political scandal. The scandal came to light on 17 February 1992 when the PSI politician Mario Chiesa was arrested for accepting a bribe. Chiesa was also the president of an old age home and frequently received *tangente* (bribes) in return for providing cleaning contracts. Chiesa was ostracized as a 'rogue' by

Craxi and the PSI, which led Chiesa to recount the widespread systemized corruption that was taking place in Italy. Pandora's box had been opened and revelations of bribes between businessmen and politicians proliferated. The magistrates intensified investigations and arrests, which magnified media interest. The investigations became known as *mani pulite* (clean hands) and profoundly affected the Italian political system.

Widespread public disenchantment with politics was compounded by the murder of prominent people by the Mafia. The Maxi Trial into various Mafia activities commenced in 1986. Led by Giovanni Falcone, it took nearly two years and led to the indictment of nearly 500 alleged members of *Cosa Nostra*. Despite this, Corrado Carnevale, a judge who was suspected of being paid by the Mafia, overturned many of these convictions (Dickie 2013). Falcone had been promoted to Rome and was able to have Carnevale removed for the final appeals that concluded in January 1992. The convictions against leading *Mafiosi* were upheld and the families took revenge. In March 1992, two months after the conclusion of the Maxi Trial, one month after Mario Chiesa's arrest set forth *tangentopoli*, and one month before the general election, Salvatore Lima was shot by the Mafia. Lima was a prominent Sicilian politician and member of the ruling party, DC, as well as being a friend of the then prime minister, Giuio Andreotti (who was also alleged to have Mafia connections). Lima was alleged to have been a 'man of honour' for one of the leading Mafia families. Following the result of the Maxi Trial, he was deemed to have outlived his usefulness and assassinated. The Mafia's reprisals continued. On 23 May 1992, Giovanni Falcone and his wife were killed, along with three bodyguards, in a bomb blast. The Mafia detonated a bomb that blew up their car as they drove to Palermo airport. Two months later, Falcone's friend and fellow anti-Mafia magistrate, Paolo Borsellino, was killed in another bombing, along with five bodyguards.

The general election in April 1992 marked the beginning of the end of Italy's First Republic. Craxi and the PSI were heavily implicated in the *tangentopoli* scandal. Craxi initially dismissed Chiesa as a 'rogue' before acknowledging that corruption was widespread. He acknowledged that corruption was inherent in the political system, when he stated that: 'We are all guilty. We all knew.' (Gundle 1996, p. 88). Craxi went into exile in Tunisia. The loss of their charismatic leader resulted in the PSI disintegrating. The DC were also heavily implicated in *tangentopoli* and polled their lowest ever share of the vote. Parallel to *mani pulite*, there was the ongoing Mafia trial. After the assassinations of Falcone and Borsellino, Tomasso Buscetta, the most prominent *pentito*, or informant,

highlighted the close connections between the Mafia and politics. Giulio Andreotti, the DC leader who had acted as prime minister on three separate occasions, was heavily implicated in his connections to the Mafia, as was the assassinated Salvatore Lima. It was alleged that the DC could garner more votes through the Mafia, which, in turn, helped them maintain the balance of power within parliament. After being tried for collusion with the Mafia, judges declared that 'He [Andreotti] fully understood that his Sicilian associates had amicable relations with Mafia bosses, and he cultivated, therefore, amicable relations with the same bosses ... he asked them favours and he met them.' (Popham 2003). However, no proof of collusion could be proved after 1980 as the law outlawing association with the Mafia only came into force in 1982. The PCI was least tainted by scandal but could not capitalize upon the weakness of the other two parties. The crisis of Eurocommunism and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 had substantially weakened the PCI. The symbolic discrediting of communism led to a period of introspection for the party. By 1991 the party had split into the centre-left *Partito Democratico della Sinistra* (PDS) and the *Rifondazione Comunista*. The weakness of the PCI also substantially weakened the DC who had established themselves as a bulwark against communism. With the continued scandal and the defeat of communism, the DC was further discredited and its factions split into various minor parties.

The cultural impact of deregulation

Before detailing the outcome of *tangentopoli* and *mani pulite*, it is necessary to make a brief excursus to illustrate the effect deregulation had on Italian society. These changes facilitated the political transformations that took place after 1994 when Silvio Berlusconi dramatically entered politics. Deregulation transformed the structure and focus of the Italian economy; it shifted from production to consumption. This permitted the emergence of a new business elite who operated consumer-orientated businesses. They continued to operate within the patrimonial system, however, as personal relationships blurred the boundaries between politics and business. Football continued to be incorporated within the wider business groups of the new business elite. Silvio Berlusconi, for example, purchased and transformed AC Milan. The impact of deregulation on the development of Italian football will be considered in the following chapter. It is also important, however, to consider football within the wider political economic transformations that took place in Italy during the 1990s. In particular, football

facilitated Berlusconi's move into politics. Therefore, aspects of Berlusconi's utilization of football will be covered within this section as it is instrumental in understanding the move. This section will also detail the impact of deregulation on television and consumption before assessing their influence on Berlusconi's dramatic emergence in Italian politics.

A central feature of Italian deregulation under Bettino Craxi was the support provided to Silvio Berlusconi. As the owner of Mediaset, Berlusconi fundamentally changed the role and approach towards television within Italy. Under the state monopoly, RAI was regulated to provide a public service, in the same way that the original BBC mission was 'to inform, educate and entertain'. In contrast, Berlusconi's strategy was simply 'to entertain'. This led to a dramatic shift towards what Eco (1990) calls 'neo-television'. There was no ideology underpinning Berlusconi's neo-television; it simply needed to generate audience figures. Indeed, it was not until 1991 that they complied with the law and broadcast a news programme, and news was only broadcast across all three of Mediaset's channels a year later (Menduni 1996). As mentioned in the previous section, Berlusconi's networks bought cheap American imports, like *Dallas* and a number of Hollywood films. These were supplemented by extravagant variety shows with popular presenters, some of whom were symbolically signed from RAI. Through these variety shows Berlusconi helped to reinforce gender divisions. Female presenters continue to be invariably decorative to the more commanding presence of the central, male presenter. In addition, Canale 5 was constructed as a feminine-friendly station to appeal to the new consumer-orientated housewives. Football also constituted a large aspect of Berlusconi's neo-television and will be covered in the following chapter.

Neo-television provided large audiences with which to advertise new consumer products and identities. In 1979, Berlusconi created an advertising company, Publitalia, in order to exploit the new commercial television that he was introducing. Through control of his television stations and Publitalia, Berlusconi dramatically reduced the costs associated with advertising. In doing so, he opened up many new commercial avenues for consumer-orientated companies. The increased exposure to consumer culture coincided with the post-Fordist changes taking place under Craxi's reforms. Through Publitalia, the Italian population became acculturated into this new post-Fordist consumer culture. Consequently, this new consumption took on a political agenda. As the boom was driven by Craxi and supported by the DC, it was fiercely contested by the PCI who followed the Frankfurt School of Marxism and saw excessive consumption as an erosion of traditional class boundaries. This would inevitably

lead to the formation of a 'mass culture'. Despite recognizing this transition, the PCI didn't respond to these changes in their traditional support, and this contributed to their weakness after *tangentopoli*. With the mass political parties highly ideologically committed to either Catholicism or Communism, Fordist consumption could be heavily regulated. With the removal of television and advertising regulations, ideological morality could be eroded and a consumer culture created. In doing so, it opened the wider population to other aspects of Berlusconi's empire and ambitions.

Deregulation of television facilitated the transformation of commercial neo-television and transformed television into a spectacle presented to entertain. The collapse of the political system after *tangentopoli* presented an apposite opportunity of a new form of media spectacle. Berlusconi was central to the polarization of information and entertainment throughout the scandal. As Robinson observed in relation to the Watergate scandal and political news broadcasting in general, network television has the power 'to make the issues of our times those issues which best accommodate the medium' (1976, p. 431). Mediaset began broadcasting the political events as they unfolded and turned the scandal into public information and entertainment. It created a soap opera. The scandal created characters and plots as the drama unfolded. This was in sharp contrast to the state broadcaster, RAI, who presented in a 'dry' informative style. The result was a polarized audience between Mediaset and RAI viewers.

The spectacle of *tangentopoli* also created a strong feeling of 'anti-partyism' (Lipow and Seyd 1996, Axford and Huggins 1998). This feeling among the electorate led to resentment towards the traditional mass parties of the Christian Democrats (DC), the Socialists (PSI) and the Communists (PCI). Anti-partyism also led to a growing antipathy towards political parties more generally. This facilitated an interest in alternative political movements. More importantly, the feeling of 'anti-partyism' was fuelled by Berlusconi's media organization. It was in this political maelstrom, fuelled by his own companies, that he 'entered the field' of politics in 1994.

Berlusconi utilized his full range of business and media operations to assist his political emergence. Berlusconi built a broad business portfolio that was incorporated into an umbrella company called Fininvest. The company included Mediaset and Publitalia, in addition to AC Milan, Mondadori publishing, cinemas, supermarkets and financial services. Fininvest was founded in 1979 and entrusted to Marcello Dell'Ultri, Berlusconi's friend and confidant. Dell'Ultri was subsequently convicted of collusion with the Mafia and imprisoned for

six years before having his conviction overturned in 2010 as the judges could find no evidence of collusion after 1992 (Ginsborg 2004; Lane 2004; Hooper 2010; Farrell 1995). A further arrest warrant was granted in April 2014, and Dell'Ultri fled to Lebanon. Despite this, Dell'Ultri was instrumental in planning and packaging Berlusconi's political presentation.

Berlusconi made full use of his Fininvest executives to construct and present a new political party called Forza Italia (FI). Publitalia chose the parliamentary candidates and charged them 500,000 lire (approximately £250) per day for their media training. All policies were market tested on voters by the market researcher Diakron, another Fininvest subsidiary. This market research permitted Berlusconi to communicate directly with the voters without the ideology of the traditional mass parties. As Habermas (1989) argues, as the electorate becomes fragmented and less cohesive as a 'public', the mass media are able to advertise the leader and his or her party to that section of society that is least engaged with the political process. Berlusconi treated the electorate as consumers and successfully utilized his media empire to target these crucial voters.

Berlusconi's media ownership facilitated direct communication. Neo-television had blurred the boundaries between news and entertainment. Berlusconi's political emergence further distorted the boundaries as 'the distinction between TV advertising, party political broadcasts, current affairs programmes and even light entertainment was de facto abolished' (Farrell 1995, p. 47). This was demonstrated when Berlusconi announced he was 'entering the field' through a television address broadcast live across all three of his networks. His direct televisual style utilized simple language and allowed him to develop his populist, anti-party appeal. During the factional days of the *partitocrazia*, political language, dubbed *politichese*, was opaque and cryptic as politicians tried to avoid revealing too much (Crocì 2001). With his media and football background, Berlusconi began speaking in a clearer, more open style, *gentese*. This style facilitated the television-orientated approach of Berlusconi and helped present him to Mediaset viewers as a sharp contrast to the traditional parties. For example, housewives, the target market of Canale 5, were more likely to vote for Berlusconi's political party than for the traditional parties (Farrell 1995). They remain the only group that has not deserted Berlusconi after a series of scandals (Anderson 2014).

His media and football image combined to carefully symbolize his populist, man-of-the-people image. His choice of 'entering the field' is a direct reference to footballers running onto the pitch. Yet, despite his anti-partyism, he still created a political party, FI. This was another direct reference to football as it

was taken from a chant sung by Italian football fans at international matches. In addition, Berlusconi also referred to his cabinet, as his 'team', and FI's political associations as Azzurri Supporters' Clubs (Porro and Russo 2000). This made another explicit reference to the Italian national team who are nicknamed the *Azzurri* after the colour of their shirts. Fininvest also used the transformation of AC Milan as a paradigm for FI. Following his success with AC Milan supporters' clubs, the Azzurri Supporters' Clubs were constituted in the same way. He used targeted advertising to attract new members and provided incentives and discounts to join. Members were offered vacations, financial services and discount language courses. The correlation between football and politics was complete when he used the Milan supporters' clubs to directly recruit *Forza Italia* members. The two-and-a-half thousand supporters' clubs of AC Milan recruited nearly 200,000 FI members.

Distinctions between politics and football became increasingly blurred through Berlusconi's media engagements. During the 1994 election, Berlusconi was campaigning against the economist Luigi Spaventa and quipped, 'This Spaventa, how many championship cups has he won?' (Porro and Russo 2000, p. 365). Berlusconi himself takes part in chat shows in his guise as an owner of a football club. This allows him to present his populist image and make political points. Much media attention is also created when Berlusconi visits the changing room of AC Milan to chat with the star players, or when visiting other squads. During the 2008 electoral campaign, Berlusconi visited the Juventus squad to encourage them to beat Fiorentina, so that AC Milan could qualify for the Champions League. This trend is not restricted to television, or the media controlled by Berlusconi. The boundaries are also blurred in the print media as the *Corriere dello Sport* ran a headline 'confidence vote while score 2-0' which referred to Berlusconi facing a confidence vote in parliament at the same time as Milan was playing Barcelona in the Champions League final, a match they subsequently won 4-0 (Porro and Russo 2000). Elsewhere, Berlusconi has further blurred the boundaries between football and politics. Despite his position as prime minister and upholder of law and order, Berlusconi frequently attacked magistrates for being communist. In a similar fashion, Berlusconi also criticized a referee after Milan lost to the newly promoted Cesena in September 2010, because 'the problem is that often Milan get left wing referees' (*La Gazzetta dello Sport* 2010a).

The fractious nature of Italian politics means that even Berlusconi cannot win enough votes to maintain power without support. Since the inception of FI,

Berlusconi maintained a delicate balance of power with the two right-wing parties which hold very different ideologies: *Allianza Nazionale* (National Alliance) and *Lega Nord* (The Northern League). Both parties make strange bedfellows, yet they both owe their proximity to power to the profound global transformations which took place at the end of the twentieth century. Both the *Lega Nord* and *Allianza Nazionale* appeal to popular, anti-party concerns and typify the postmodern, anti-party shift from traditional mass parties. They also represent another major paradox of Italian politics. Despite both campaigning for more autonomy and immigration controls, they represent two very different aspects of Italy. The anti-fascist composition of post-war Italy not only created the polarity of the DC and the PCI but also excluded the fascists. Mussolini's heirs continued under the neo-fascist party, the *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (Italian Social Movement). Led by Gianfranco Fini, they took the opportunity that *tangentopoli* presented them to embrace democratic government and reconstituted themselves in 1995 as a centre-right political party, the *Allianza Nazionale*. Following in the Mussolini tradition they remain staunchly in support of a strong centralized state and gain most of their support from the south of Italy. Their move towards the centre was complete when *Allianza Nazionale* merged with FI in March 2009 to form a new centre-right party called *Il Popolo della Libertà* (The People of Freedom). Fini cemented his position at the heart of government by acting as deputy prime minister for five years since 2001 before being elected as president of the Chamber of Deputies (the Speaker) in 2008. After feeling marginalized by his leader, Fini led a breakaway faction from *Il Popolo della Libertà* to form *Futuro e Libertà* (Future and Freedom) in 2010. This ultimately led to the reforming of FI in 2013. Thus, despite the anti-party populism of his rhetoric, Berlusconi continues to utilize the model of the political party. However, in contrast to this southern, centralizing influence, Berlusconi's other coalition member comes from the north and is resolutely secessionist.

Lega Nord represents an apposite example of a new social movement that has developed a significant political following. Its populist rhetoric typifies the anti-party, single-issue politics of contemporary Italy. *Lega Nord* grew out of the Lombard League which was started by the charismatic Umberto Bossi in 1984. It developed throughout the 1980s as increased economic success in Milan, combined with increasing regional identities, brought a stronger affiliation for the pre-Italian regions. *Lega Nord* itself represents the imagined nation of Padania in the north of Italy. Despite Putnam's (1993; 2000) assertion that civic associations contribute to national democracy, the

Lega Nord has resolutely regionalist outlook. Secessionist policies are fuelled by strong anti-state sentiments, echoed in chants of ‘*Roma ladrona*’ (thieving Rome). These sentiments were confirmed during the *tangentopoli* scandal, even though the scandal originated in Milan itself. This also didn’t stop scandal engulfing the party in 2012 when Bossi resigned as leader after allegations he was appropriating party funds for his family (Ferrarella 2012). Despite *Lega Nord*’s strong anti-state and anti-party rhetoric, they became key allies of Berlusconi and FI, although they have remained independent and did not join *Il Popolo della Libertà*. Bossi and *Lega Nord* not only combined anti-centralization and local identity rhetoric but also exhibited strong anti-southern and anti-immigration tendencies. Bossi orchestrated one of the most punitive immigration laws in Europe by effectively criminalizing immigrants, as well as being quoted as saying that officials should open fire on boats of immigrants to prevent them landing, ‘I want to hear the roar of the canon. The immigrants must be hunted down, for better or worse ... At the second or third warning – boom! Fire the canons at them! Otherwise this will never stop’ (Andrews 2005, p. 56). Fragmentation of the traditional mass parties has provided the right conditions for the emergence of Berlusconi and his allies.

Political support and mediatized populist rhetoric have combined to enable Berlusconi to act as prime minister on three separate occasions. His first coalition after *tangentopoli* lasted a year. However, he was the first prime minister to serve a full five-year term after the 2001 elections and narrowly lost the 2006 elections (by 0.1 per cent). The centre-left union party was unable to maintain control and subsequently called an election in 2008, which Berlusconi won with his new *Il Popolo della Libertà* party (PdL). Berlusconi eventually left office in 2011 when a technocratic government under Mario Monti was installed to deal with the economic crisis affecting Italy. Anderson (2014) suggested that this was not due to the political weakness of Berlusconi *within* Italy, even though he was having problems with Fini and factionalism. It was his weaknesses in Europe that led to Mario Draghi, the head of the European Bank, and Italy’s president, Giorgio Napolitano, effectively ousting Berlusconi and installing a technocratic government. After Monti was unable to hold onto power, another general election was called in 2013. Despite the leader of the PD, Enrico Letta, becoming prime minister, Berlusconi still retained the balance of power as the PD and PdL entered into coalition. In contrast to the *partitocrazia* of the Christian Democrats, the new Italian political settlement rests with charismatic leaders like Silvio Berlusconi. The following section will discuss the reasons and implications for this political transition.

Postmodern populism: The continuance of Berlusconi

Postmodern politics sees the transition from modern mass-association political parties into a new form of political approach. The crisis in global communism and the *tangentopoli* scandal saw the decline of traditional mass parties within Italy. This has coincided with the rise in anti-partyism where voters withdrew their support to the traditional mass parties and began to focus on single-issue movements of personal identification. Axford and Huggins (1998) define this situation as 'postmodern populism'. Yet it is not just the dissolution of traditional boundaries and frustration with the previous system which accounts for this. Changes in consumption habits have shifted the traditional left-right politics centred on class and moved to politics of identity. In addition, as Castells (1996) suggests, society is increasingly becoming framed by electronic media. As a consequence, politics is becoming increasingly mediatized and being fused with the culture industry. Berlusconi's broadcasting of *tangentopoli* turned the scandal into a soap opera. The time-space compression facilitated by the media has transformed the public sphere into regional and virtual spaces, as well as creating a new 'immediacy' to politics as politicians seek to build their public image quickly.

The new social movements of the 1970s have developed into the 'anti-partyism' of the twenty-first century. These new forms of association are characterized as single-issue movements, with a more inclusive approach (Touraine 1981; Melucci et al. 1989). In Italy there has been an increase in popularity for anti-Mafia movements in the south as local issues become paramount. Other movements are adjusting to global transformations, such as the Slow Food movement, which was born in Italy as a reaction against fast food and McDonalds. It campaigns for locally sourced produce, rather than mass-produced 'fast food'. The *Lega Nord* represents another form of regional new social movement. It campaigns against state interference and immigration for the imagined nation of Padania. Under the leadership of the charismatic Umberto Bossi, it has been transformed into a powerful political party that embodies postmodern populism.

Like Bossi, Berlusconi utilizes the anti-party rhetoric of postmodern populism. He has fused football, politics and media into a populist anti-party movement (Andrews 2005). Through ownership of various media platforms, as his 'entering the field' showed, Berlusconi can operate quickly and efficiently. He can access many television networks to make political addresses use his

populist football appeal to participate in many 'non-political' broadcasts. In addition, he draws political candidates from television and football. In 2008, he appointed the former model and winner of Miss Italy, Mara Carfagna, as Equal Opportunities Minister. Likewise, candidates for the 2010 European elections included another Miss Italia contestant, Italia Caruso, a former dancer from Mediaset's variety shows, Nicole Minetti and Giorgio Puricelli, a physiotherapist at AC Milan. Populist candidates are combined with continued anti-party and anti-state rhetoric; for example, Berlusconi continues to decry the influence of the independent magistracy. This has coincided with extensive investigations into the Berlusconi's financial affairs and has resulted in charges (and acquittals) of corruption, fraud, false accounting and bribery. Many cases have expired because of the case running out of time under statute of limitations laws, many of which were shortened by Berlusconi's governments (Ginsborg 2004; Lane 2004). As a consequence of his postmodern populism, Berlusconi continued to undermine the central state even though his role as prime minister symbolized the governance of the state.

Berlusconi has come to embody and symbolize 'postmodern populism'. Postmodern politics is increasingly personalized and constructed around charismatic leaders (Von Beyme 1996). Berlusconi mobilized a part of the population as a client in opposition to the state and political opponents. *Forza Italia* and Berlusconi were indivisible as there was no process within the party's constitution that allowed members to remove him. Berlusconi carefully crafted his public image to distance himself from the corruption of *tangentopoli* even though he was a good friend of Craxi and personally profited from this relationship. His party represented the neo-patrimonial nature of Italian politics. The corrupt links between political parties and industry were replaced with personal ties. As Farrell (1995, p. 41) states:

Berlusconi talks of creating a new democratic order, but his own approach is czarist. His movement is a personal clique rather than an orthodox party – it is composed of followers and dependents rather than members or equals and has more in common with a court than with a democratic functioning organisation.

Under the statute of *Il Popolo della Libertà*, the president of the party became an elected post. In spite of this democratic shift, the postmodern populism of Berlusconi was still based on the cult of personality of its leader. In the summer of 2010, Berlusconi's key ally in the PdL, and speaker of the lower house of the

Italian parliament, Gianfranco Fini, led a faction away from the party. Fini wanted more internal democracy within the party and greater sanctions over those found guilty of corruption. It is illustrative that Berlusconi demanded that Fini step down as leader of the lower house, despite it not being within the purview of the prime minister.

Despite various personal and political issues, Berlusconi remained publicly popular. Even scandals in his personal life did not impact his popularity significantly. In 2009, Berlusconi became embroiled in a series of sex scandals. In May, Berlusconi attended the eighteenth birthday party of an aspiring model, Noemi Letizia, who he claimed was the daughter of a family friend and he presented her with an expensive necklace. However, his wife, Veronica Lario, stated that he did not attend his own children's eighteenth birthday parties and filed for divorce stating that he 'spends too much time with minors' (Kington 2009). The following month, photographs were published in Spain of semi-naked guests, including the former Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek, attending a party at Berlusconi's Sicilian villa (Sarzanini 2009). In July, it emerged that a businessman from Bari had paid for female escorts to attend parties with Berlusconi in order to receive favourable business decisions. One escort, Patrizia D'Addario, released tapes intimating that she had spent the night with the prime minister (Tonelli 2009). She decided to release the details after she claimed that Berlusconi's promise of support for a hotel planning application was not fulfilled.

Berlusconi was embroiled in another sex scandal the following year. In May 2010, a seventeen-year-old Moroccan nightclub dancer called Ruby Rubacuori (Ruby the heartstealer) was arrested for theft. Berlusconi called the Milan police to pressure them to release her by saying that she was the niece of the then Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak (Guastella 2011). Berlusconi asked for Ruby to be taken to Nicole Minetti, a former dancer on Mediaset. Minetti subsequently became a dental nurse, which brought her back into contact with the prime minister in December 2009. At a political rally that Berlusconi held in the square alongside Milan cathedral, Massimo Tartaglia, an engineer with a history of mental health issues, threw a marble replica of the cathedral at Berlusconi which broke his nose and two teeth. During this reunion with Minetti he proposed that she stand as a parliamentary candidate for the PdL. Berlusconi was prosecuted and found guilty of paying for sex with Ruby, a minor, pending appeal. Despite these allegations, Berlusconi remained a powerful symbol for his supporters. In a political rally in September 2010, Berlusconi joked of his sexual prowess as he suggested that a way for young

people to escape the recession was to marry into money. His man-of-the-people charisma appeals to that section of society that is incorporated into his patrimonial network, and isolates his political opponents.

Political debate has been reduced to opposition of Berlusconi. Despite Berlusconi's power, he has become a potent symbol for opponents. For example, Antonio Di Pietro was a leading prosecutor in the *mani pulite* corruption trial into *tangentopoli*. During Berlusconi's first tenure in 1994 a number of counter-investigations were started against Di Pietro and were deemed to be politically motivated. Subsequently, he founded the anti-corruption party called Italia dei Valori (Italy of Values). This party demonstrates the personalized and mediatized nature of new political movements. Di Pietro has made extensive use of information technology to highlight corruption and continues to publish a blog and weekly vidcasts to communicate directly with his supporters. Even though Di Pietro has a broad political remit, the personalized nature of Italian politics has resulted in many attacks on Berlusconi.

Potentially the most dramatic political movement to have emerged in recent years is led by the comedian Beppe Grillo. Cutting his teeth on satirical shows in the 1980s, he was banned from television after making a joke about the Prime Minister Craxi and the PSI stealing (long before *tangentopoli*). Instead he turned his comedic and political skills to touring theatres and piazzas across the peninsula. Like Di Pietro, Grillo makes extensive use of new forms of media to reach a different demographic from Berlusconi. Echoing the new social movements of Touraine (1981) and Melucci (1989), Grillo campaigns against corruption and for environmental issues, rather than traditional left-right political ideologies. In 2007, he initiated a V-Day (Vaffanculo or 'Fuck Off' Day) to persuade people to sign a petition to prevent people with criminal convictions from standing for parliament. Grillo is also part of a collective of bloggers, citizens and celebrities who call themselves *Il Popolo Viola* (The Purple People). They have designated 5 December as 'No Berlusconi Day' after Berlusconi tried to pass an immunity from prosecution for the heads of government, which would effectively make him immune from prosecution. *Il Popolo Viola* have organized several more anti-Berlusconi rallies where participants all wear a purple item of clothing to symbolize their participation.

More significantly for the future of Italian politics, Grillo also started a political movement called the *Movimento 5 Stelle* (Five Star Movement or M5S). It was initially formed to fight the 2010 regional elections on a range of issues:

The stars stood for the key issues they intended to raise: water (under threat of privatisation), environment, transport, connectivity and development.

Candidates of the M5S who ran for election had to pledge themselves – uniquely anywhere in the world – not to appear on television, and if they were elected, to reduce their parliamentary salaries to the median wage, assigning the rest to public purposes. (Anderson 2014)

Movimento 5 Stelle dramatically increased its popularity among the electorate. In 2012, M5S won its first municipal government in Parma. A year later, they won 25 per cent of the vote in the general election and held the balance of power in the initial discussions to form a government. But, Grillo's unwillingness to enter the government effectively opened the door to Berlusconi and the PdL to go into coalition with the PD. Despite this, M5S still represents a dramatic new force in Italian politics and has become the largest party in less than three years. In 2014, it won the mayoral elections in Livorno, the spiritual home of the PCI. Simultaneously, 'Grillo's three-step motto for raising a popular revolt – laughter, information, political action – had proved stunningly effective' (Anderson 2014). The M5S represents a significant force in Italian politics, and potentially across Europe. While the populist right has grown in popularity across Europe (Wodak et al. 2013), environmental and solidarity movements have not. Grillo's M5S can be seen as a break from the old dynamics of the past – a lesson that Italian football fans can learn from.

When Berlusconi finally left office in 2011, it was not via an election. Despite the organization of anti-Berlusconi movements, and the large crowds in Rome celebrating his exit, the electorate had not voted him out of office. The growing global financial crisis was adversely affecting the Italian economy. The international markets were growing concerned at Italy's ability to cover its debts, which exceeded the national GDP. Despite electoral success, Berlusconi had not been able to achieve economic success. The upkeep of the neo-patrimonial network necessitated significant economic resources, which were shrinking in the global recession. Like Craxi before him, Berlusconi admired Margaret Thatcher in Britain, but did not engage in systematic privatization. The Eurozone's desire to impose austerity on Italy meant that Berlusconi's lack of commitment to neo-liberalism was an obstacle (Anderson 2014). For this reason, Napolitano and Draghi conspired to remove him and impose a technocratic government, led by Mario Monti, in order to appease the markets. A series of austerity measures were subsequently passed through parliament. After this Berlusconi resigned from office vowing to return and reiterating the fact that the Italian people had not removed him. Ultimately, global factors outside of Berlusconi's control proved to be his undoing. Yet despite further

criminal convictions pending and additional sexual allegations, Berlusconi's party won 20 per cent of the vote in 2013 and held the balance of power behind the scenes.

Summary

The unification of the Italian state has created an 'Italian solution' to the nation state. The lack of legitimacy derived from its political construction, led to the state evolving in a clientelistic way as individuals sought to maintain power through a patrimonial system of patronage and corruption. As a consequence, Keynesian economics became distorted and developed into systemized corruption that eventually brought down the First Republic. In order to navigate around the corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy, Italian firms developed small and flexible post-Fordist enterprises that remained under family control. These businesses were well placed to respond to global deregulation in trade and its subsequent consumer-driven economy. However, their rapid development and restrictive family control minimized the development of a separate business class. This was also constrained by the political and bureaucratic system that permitted the business families to operate within the political realm. Berlusconi represented the neo-patrimonial shift which took place in Italy after the 1970s. He fought the existing state regulation and capitalized on complete deregulation to build a personal empire in the new post-Fordist services. Yet this deregulation was done on a personal level, influenced by global processes, but only implemented through neo-patrimonial networks. Through media and football, Berlusconi embodied the shift from state control to power divested to individuals. However, he also exemplified a continuance with past practices as he utilized personal contacts to win governmental concessions, and has retained extensive personal and family control of his business empire. The family became the perfect image for Berlusconi, as Bernini (2010, p. 77) states:

The family was used by Berlusconi as a useful metaphor to describe his own political and personal trajectory, as he presented himself alternatively as a father engaged in the rescue of his country, the offspring of a hard-working family, the devout son, and the patriarch at the head of a large family.

Berlusconi's transition into politics represents the fusion of these various postmodern aspects, but with the retention of individual and family control.

The new social movements of the 1970s have developed into the 'anti-partyism' of the twenty-first century. These new forms of association are characterized as single-issue politics with a more inclusive approach (including more female involvement). They encompass a wider range of issues, such as anti-Mafia, anti-globalization, slow food and anti-war. Despite the social capital accumulated with these movements, they are not contributing to national democracy. *Lega Nord* in particular actively undermines the state. Elsewhere, the M5S led by Beppe Grillo, campaign on an anti-party agenda. Potentially M5S could act as a reforming movement in Italian politics but will have to face the continued hegemonic power of the status quo. Parallely, the fragmentation of politics has encouraged the emergence of the charismatic leader of Berlusconi who can utilize his control of the media, football and the political system to appeal to the widest audience and neutralize dissidence. The following chapter will show how these developments are reflected within Italian football, and more significantly, how Silvio Berlusconi contributed to the transformation of Italian football.