Schildermans, Hans. "Notes." *Experiments in Decolonizing the University: Towards an Ecology of Study*. London,: Bloomsbury Academic, 2021. 143–169. *Bloomsbury Collections*. Web. 26 Apr. 2023. <<http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781350149854.0004>>.

Downloaded from Bloomsbury Collections, www.bloomsburycollections.com, 26 April 2023, 07:42 UTC.

Copyright © Hans Schildermans 2021. Released under a CC BY-NC-ND licence (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/>). You may share this work for non-commercial purposes only, provided you give attribution to the copyright holder and the publisher, and provide a link to the Creative Commons licence.

Notes

Chapter 1

- 1 Alessandro Petti, Sandi Hilal, and Eyal Weizman, *Architecture after Revolution* (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2013), 123–4.
- 2 Ibid., 10.
- 3 Ibid., 8.
- 4 Ibid., 13.
- 5 This expression from Donna Haraway will return in later parts of the book as an essential aspect of practices of study. See Donna Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble. Making Kin in the Chthulucene* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 4.
- 6 Petti, Hilal, and Weizman, *Architecture after Revolution*, 21.
- 7 For an anthropological study of the lives of Palestinian refugees, see Julie Peteet, *Landscape of Home and Despair. Palestinian Refugee Camps* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005). For an ethnography of the Dheisheh Refugee Camp and the narrative of return, see Nina Gren, *Occupied Lives. Maintaining Integrity in a Palestinian Refugee Camp in the West Bank* (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2015).
- 8 See Ilana Feldman, “Reaction, Experimentation, and Refusal: Palestinian Refugees Confront the Future,” *History and Anthropology* 27, no. 4 (2016): 411–29.
- 9 In a joint publication, they write that in Arabic, the noun Al-Jame’ah does translate not only as university, but also as a place for assembly. See *Campus in Camps. A University in Exile*, 13. http://www.campusincamps.ps/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/The_CIC_BOOK.pdf
- 10 Petti, Hilal, and Weizman, *Architecture after Revolution*, 19. Campus in Camps continues the work of the Decolonizing Architecture Art Residency (DAAR), which was founded in 2007 by Alessandro Petti, Sandi Hilal, and Eyal Weizman. DAAR aims to be a place for “conceptual speculations and pragmatic spatial interventions, discourse and collective learning” (cf. <http://www.decolonizing.ps>). In that sense, Campus in Camps was a way to provide a more sustainable character to the small-scale projects and initiatives taking place at Oush Grab, and to provide a bearing on political discussions about the future of Palestine and dealing with colonial heritage. Around the same time, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), where Hilal is director of the Camp Improvement Program, wanted to start a project on the representation of camps and refugees together

with the Refugee Camp Communities of the Southern West Bank. These events created the occasion to think about an educational project that could engage more inhabitants of the Dheisheh Refugee Camp, next to Beit Sahour, in activities similar to those by DAAR. Based on his experience as a lecturer teaching students from refugee camps at Al Quds Bard University (AQBU) and as an architect at DAAR, Petti had become convinced that the camp was the right place for the campus to engage students in the events that are taking place there. In a reflection on the start-up of Campus in Camps, he writes that his experience of working with students from refugee camps in AQBU has taught him that the university is a place where different kinds of narrations, ideas, and discourses can come into being, but that it is important to contextualize and connect them in and with the lives of other people affected by the issue under study. Besides, moving from the protected space of the campus to the camp forces the university to open itself to other forms of knowledge and learning. See *Campus in Camps*.

- 11 Bianca Elzenbaumer, "Speculating with Care: Learning from an Experimental Educational Program in the West Bank," *Architectural Theory Review* 22, no. 1 (2018): 115.
- 12 Fred Moten strikingly articulates this when he writes: "Like Deleuze, I believe in the world and want to be in it. I want to be in it all the way to the end of it because I believe in another world in the world and I want to be in *that*." Stefano Harney and Fred Moten, *The Undercommons. Fugitive Planning and Black Study* (Wivenhoe: Minor Compositions, 2013), 118.
- 13 Campus in Camps is undoubtedly not the only experimental program that claims the name of the university for their practice, thereby reinvigorating the meaning of the university itself. See, for instance, the free universities-movement: Fern Thompsett, "Pedagogies of Resistance: Free Universities and the Radical Re-imagination of Study," *Learning and Teaching: International Journal of Higher Education in the Social Sciences* 10, no. 1 (2017): 24–41, or see the cooperative universities: Susan Wright, Davydd Greenwood, and Rebecca Boden, "Report on a Field Visit to Mondragon University: A Cooperative Experience/Experiment," *Learning and Teaching: International Journal of Higher Education in the Social Sciences* 4, no. 3 (2011): 38–56.
- 14 See Stefan Collini, *What Are Universities for?* (London: Penguin, 2012); Gerald Raunig, *Factories of Knowledge, Industries of Creativity*, trans. Aileen Derieg (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2013). What makes the predicament of the university even more problematic is that, at the same time, other organizations and institutions seem to have taken over the traditional tasks of the university. This trend is most outspoken in research and teaching. In order to obtain a degree, it is no longer necessary to attend lectures or courses at a university, as there are plenty of private agencies and training centers that organize the educational programs

to dispense the required knowledge, skills, and competences. Besides, it has become possible to acquire an enormous amount of specialized knowledge online via platforms such as Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs). On the side of research, it is clear that universities are not always the most efficient institutions to produce knowledge, and increasingly private companies and businesses have their own Research & Development section to conduct the research that was done before in the laboratories of universities.

- 15 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, "The University at a Crossroads," *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge* 10, no. 1 (2012): 11; On epistemicide, see Boaventura de Sousa Santos, *Epistemologies of the South. Justice against Epistemicide* (London: Routledge, 2016).
- 16 See John Willinsky, *Learning to Divide the World. Education at Empire's End* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).
- 17 Achille Mbembe, "Decolonizing the University: New Directions," *Arts & Humanities in Higher Education* 15, no. 1 (2016): 30–1.
- 18 Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, *Cannibal Metaphysics. For a Post-Structural Anthropology*, trans. Peter Skafish (Minneapolis: Univocal Publishing, 2014), 40.
- 19 Wilhelm von Humboldt, "On the Spirit and Organizational Framework of Intellectual Institutions of Berlin," in *The Idea of the University. A Reader*, ed. Michael Peters and Ronald Barnett (1809/1810; repr. New York: Peter Lang, 2018), 47.
- 20 Important to emphasize is that in this context, ecology is not primarily understood as a narrative to make the university more "green." However, it is arguable that the problems of climate change and a sustainable future touch upon the heart of the university as an entanglement of science and politics, of questions of acquiring new knowledge, questions of living together, and questions of futurity. Instead, placing ecology, in the original Greek sense of "study of the house, the living-place, the habitat," upfront affords being able to sketch a perspective in which the more pertinent question becomes how the university, as a habitat left in ruins, still harbors potential for configuring new habitable ecologies.
- 21 Bill Readings, *The University in Ruins* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 23.
- 22 Ibid., 41.
- 23 The modern research university of the times of Kant and Humboldt related directly to the nation-state. It needed to educate professionals in the fields of medicine, law, and theology, who, due to their philosophical formation, could question the foundations of their field (Kant), as well as create a "gebildetes Publikum" ("an educated public") that could embody and preserve German national culture (Humboldt). See *ibid.*, 68–9.

- 24 See Peter Drucker, *The Age of Discontinuity* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969). The central role of the university in the new economy as producer and seller of knowledge has spawned a vast amount of articles and books that seek to construct the conceptual and methodological tools to map the ongoing economization of the university in detail. Clark Kerr's book on *The Uses of the University*, published in 1963, has been programmatic in that it sets a research agenda about, for instance, the relation between university and industry, the disintegration of the academic body into a loosely assembled network of research units that have closer relations to external parties than to the university itself, and the rise of the administrative staff and the correlated peripheralization of academic staff. See Clark Kerr, *The Uses of the University* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963). Later on, critical sociologists of education have coined the term of academic capitalism to grasp this development. For a review, see Tiago Sihagi and Patricia Saltorato, "Academic Capitalism: Distinguishing without Disjoining through Classification Schemes," *Higher Education* 80, no. 1 (2020): 95–117.
- 25 See Roberto Unger, *The Knowledge Economy* (London: Verso, 2019).
- 26 These developments have also taken place against the background of budget cuts in the higher education sector, which have made it necessary for universities to engage more intensely with other partners to acquire additional funding. Lucrative partnerships with industry, conducting commissioned research for companies, commodifying the results of intellectual labor via patents and licenses, developing spin-off companies, and making a profit from the rental of university real estate for residence, conference facilities, and industrial parks are just a few examples of tactics that universities have deployed in order to survive.
- 27 Sheila Slaughter and Gary Rhoades, *Academic Capitalism. Markets, State, and Higher Education* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 22–3; Henry Etzkowitz and Loet Leydesdorff, "The Dynamics of Innovation: From National Systems and 'Mode 2' to a Triple Helix of University-Industry-Government Relations," *Research Policy* 29, no. 2 (2000): 109–23.
- 28 Slaughter and Rhoades, *Academic Capitalism*, 23–4.
- 29 Ibid., 24; Iikka Kaupinnen, "Towards Transnational Academic Capitalism," *Higher Education* 64, no. 4 (2012): 543–56.
- 30 Slaughter and Rhoades, *Academic Capitalism*, 25–6; Cris Shore and Susan Wright, "Privatizing the Public University: Key Trends, Countertrends and Alternatives," in *Death of the Public University? Uncertain Futures for Higher Education in the Knowledge Economy*, ed. Susan Wright and Cris Shore (New York: Berghahn Books, 2017), 7–8.
- 31 Bob Jessop, "On Academic Capitalism," *Critical Policy Studies* 12, no. 1 (2018): 104–9.
- 32 Shore and Wright, "Privatizing the Public University," 4; Susan Wright, "Universities in a Knowledge Economy or Ecology? Policy, Contestation and Abjection," *Critical Policy Studies* 10, no. 1 (2016): 62–3.

- 33 This behavioral strategy is, in the first instance, directed toward students as potential customers of higher education. However, it is essential to note that universities increasingly aim to create additional markets and attract new types of customers. This strategy is not limited to departments that have always been close to market interests, such as biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, or information technology. Classics departments—notoriously far removed from lucrative businesses—have, for instance, invested in the exploitation of profitable trips to Greece and Italy in order to generate additional external revenue. Furthermore, departments of psychology and educational sciences have made a business from the development and selling of tests and measurements copyrighted by the faculty. Slaughter and Rhoades, *Academic Capitalism*, 26.
- 34 Ibid., 29.
- 35 See Sheila Slaughter and Larry Leslie, *Academic Capitalism. Politics, Policies, and the Entrepreneurial University* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).
- 36 Isabelle Stengers, “Autonomy and the Intrusion of Gaia,” *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 116, no. 2 (2017): 392–6; Isabelle Stengers, “Reclaiming Animism,” *e-flux journal*, no. 36 (2012): 4–6.
- 37 Readings, *The University in Ruins*; See Timothy Bahti, “Histories of the University: Kant and Humboldt,” *MLN* 102, no. 3 (1987): 437–60; See Michael Peters and Ronald Barnett, “Introduction: The Very Idea of the University,” in *The Idea of the University. A Reader*, ed. Michael Peters and Ronald Barnett (New York: Peter Lang, 2018), xiv–xxiii.
- 38 Immanuel Kant, “The Conflict of the Faculties,” trans. Mary Gregor, in *The Idea of the University. A Reader*, ed. Michael Peters and Ronald Barnett (1789; repr. New York: Peter Lang, 2018), 3–18. To complete Kant’s institutional chart, it should be added that the lower faculty of philosophy is subdivided in two departments. Whereas the department of historical knowledge is concerned with history, geography, philology, the humanities, and the natural sciences, the department of pure rational knowledge focuses on pure mathematics and pure philosophy, the metaphysics of nature and morals.
- 39 Kant, “The Conflict of the Faculties,” 18.
- 40 With *Mochlos; or The Conflict of the Faculties*, Derrida has written an influential commentary on Kant’s text. In his reading, Derrida problematizes the sharp separation of Reason and power, which seems to be at the basis of Kant’s idea of the university. He argues that “the whole forms an *invaginated pocket* on the inside of every part or sub-set.” Just like the university as an institution founded by the state is an invaginated pocket of the state itself, the lower faculty is an invaginated pocket of the university as a whole, and the department of pure rational knowledge is an invaginated pocket of the faculty of philosophy. Derrida argues that there is a continuous regression of Reason within this institutional framework. Moreover, the problem with the place of Reason is radicalized when considering the foundation

- of the university. With the foundation, Derrida means the very political act of establishing or founding a university. He raises the question of how Reason can find a place within an institution of which the foundation is always an act on behalf of the state, and hence power. Jacques Derrida, "Mochlos; or The Conflict of the Faculties," trans. Richard Rand and Amy Wygant, in *Logomachia. The Conflict of the Faculties*, ed. Richard Rand (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 26. See also Dawne McCance, *Medusa's Ear. University Foundings from Kant to Chora L* (New York: SUNY Press, 2004).
- 41 Humboldt, "On the Spirit and Organizational Framework"; See Thorsten Nybom, "The Humboldt Legacy: Reflections on the Past, Present, and Future of the European University," *Higher Education Policy* 16, no. 2 (2003): 141–59. The importance of the Humboldtian ideal in the history of the university should, however, not be exaggerated. Despite what is often believed, the text itself did not give rise to the new university of Berlin founded by Humboldt in 1810, and in fact, it was only discovered in his archives at the beginning of the twentieth century. Throughout the twentieth century, his ideas have been received in various ways, and nowadays, it seems as if they yield to a more neoliberal interpretation quite easily as well. On the history of Humboldt's university reform, see Heinz-Elmar Tenorth, *Wilhelm von Humboldt. Bildungspolitik und Universitätsreform* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2018). On the continuous re-invention of the Humboldtian university, see Sylvia Paletschek, "Die Erfindung der Humboldtschen Universität: Die Konstruktion der Deutschen Universitätsidee in der Erste Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts," *Historische Anthropologie* 10, no. 2 (2002): 183–205. On the contemporary neoliberal revival of Humboldt, see Susan Wright, "'Humboldt' Humbug! Contemporary Mobilizations of 'Humboldt' as a Discourse to Support the Corporatization and Marketization of Universities and Disparage Alternatives," in *The Humboldtian Tradition. Origins and Legacies*, ed. Peter Josephson, Thomas Karlsruhn, and Johan Östling (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 141–63.
 - 42 *Wissenschaft* can unproblematically be translated as science in a very broad sense (including philosophy, literature, etc.). The translation of *Bildung*, however, is less straightforward. It cannot be translated by education, for instance, as this noun is too general and includes instrumental forms of education such as training as well. *Bildung*, on the opposite, is an utterly non-instrumental form of education, an end-in-itself.
 - 43 Humboldt, *On the Spirit and Organizational Framework*, 47.
 - 44 Humboldt was strongly inspired by the texts on the university written by Schelling and Schleiermacher. They argued against an all too stark contrast between Reason and the state as it is presented by Kant. The concept of culture allows for thinking of a process of cultivation, through *Wissenschaft* and *Bildung*, that could form a bridge between the population of the nation-state as it is, and the cultured nation-state with educated officials. See Friedrich Schelling, "On University Studies," trans.

- Edward Morgan, in *The Idea of the University. A Reader*, ed. Michael Peters and Ronald Barnett (1802; repr. New York: Peter Lang, 2018), 33–44. See Friedrich Schleiermacher, “Occasional Thoughts on Universities in the German Sense, with an Appendix Regarding a University Soon to Be Established,” trans. Terrance Tice and Edwina Lawler, in *The Idea of the University. A Reader*, ed. Michael Peters and Ronald Barnett (1808; repr. New York: Peter Lang, 2018), 19–32.
- 45 Cardinal Newman’s discourse on the university forms the Anglo-Saxon counterpart to Humboldt’s Idea of the University for German Culture. Whereas for Humboldt *Wissenschaft* and *Bildung* are central to the formation of a national culture, the Anglo-Saxon tradition primarily takes recourse to national literature for similar purposes, hence giving rise to the liberal arts tradition that is still prevalent at universities and colleges in the Anglo-Saxon world. John Henry Newman, “The Idea of the University,” in *The Idea of the University. A Reader*, ed. Michael Peters and Ronald Barnett (1852; repr. New York: Peter Lang, 2018), 180–96.
- 46 Isabelle Stengers, *Another Science Is Possible. A Manifesto for Slow Science*, trans. Stephen Muecke (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018), 113–14; See Dominique Pestre, *Sciences, Argent et Politique. Un Essai d’Interprétation* (Paris: Editions Quae, 2003).
- 47 Stengers, *Another Science Is Possible*; See Isabelle Stengers, *La Vierge et le Neutrino. Scientifiques dans la Tourmente* (Paris: La Découverte, 2006).
- 48 Some of these new ideas were collected in Ronald Barnett and Michael Peters, ed., *The Idea of the University. Contemporary Perspectives* (New York: Peter Lang).
- 49 For the sake of completeness, the seven ecosystems are knowledge, social institutions, the economy, learning, human subjectivity, culture, and the natural environment. Ronald Barnett, *The Ecological University. A Feasible Utopia* (London: Routledge, 2018), 56.
- 50 Ibid., 113.
- 51 Ibid., 51.
- 52 Invoking the concept of institution here may cause trouble with regards to its precise meaning in this context. Institution is indeed a rather vague and broad notion that includes both formal institutions of, for instance, the political, religious, and educational kind (think, respectively, of the US Congress, the Catholic Church, and the public school) and informal institutions that pass on customs and values—think, for instance, of gift-giving or praying. It needs to be stressed that in this context, the concept of institution is used to denote formal bodies with implicit and explicit rules that are based on specific values and customs to which the institution aims to grant endurance. See Douglass North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
- 53 Nevertheless, this case could be made as the modern texts on the university generally aim to breathe new air into an institution that had been in decline due to organizational failure for decades. See Bahti, “Histories of the University,” 438–9.

- 54 For a few examples of the adoption of an ecological perspective, see Anna Tsing, *The Mushroom at the End of the World. On the Possibility of Life in Capitalist Ruins* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015); Tim Ingold, *Being Alive. Essays on Movement, Knowledge, and Description* (London: Routledge, 2011); Gregory Bateson, *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972); Felix Guattari, *The Three Ecologies*, trans. Ian Pindar and Paul Sutton (London: The Athlone Press, 2000). For a historical overview of ecological thought, see Frank Egerton, *Roots of Ecology. Antiquity to Haeckel* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012).
- 55 Wright, "Universities in a Knowledge Economy or Ecology?," 63–6. See Susan Wright, "Can the University Be a Liveable Institution in the Anthropocene?" in *The University as a Critical Institution?* ed. Rosemary Deem and Heather Eggins (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2017), 17–37.
- 56 Barnett, *The Ecological University*, 179–80. See Ronald Barnett, "The Coming of the Ecological University," *Oxford Review of Education* 37, no. 4 (2011): 439–55.
- 57 For an analysis of the development of practice theory, see Sherry Ortner, "Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties," *Comparative Study of Society and History* 16 (1984): 126–66. For an analysis of the basic tenets of practice theory, see Theodore Schatzki, Karin Knorr Cetina, and Eike von Savigny, ed., *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory* (London: Routledge, 2001). For practice-theoretical accounts in education, see Peter Grootenboer, Christine Edwards-Groves, and Sarojni Choy, ed., *Practice Theory Perspectives on Pedagogy and Education. Praxis, Diversity and Contestation* (Rotterdam: Springer, 2017).
- 58 Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons, "From Active Citizenship to World Citizenship: A Proposal for a World University," *European Educational Research Journal* 8, no. 2 (2009): 243–4; Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons, "The Politics of the University: Movements of (De-)Identification and the Invention of Public Pedagogic Forms," in *Education and the Political*, ed. Tomasz Szukdlarek (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2013), 113–14.
- 59 David Roussel, "Dwelling in the Anthropocene: Reimagining University Learning Environments in Response to Social and Ecological Change," *Australian Journal of Environmental Education* 32, no. 2 (2016): 149.
- 60 See Gert Biesta, "Interrupting the Politics of Learning," *Power and Education* 5, no. 1 (2013): 4–15; See Claudia Ruitenberg, ed., *Reconceptualizing Study in Educational Discourse and Practice* (London: Routledge, 2017). There are, however, diverging conceptions of resistance at play here. For resistance as an informal, imaginative counterforce against institutions, see Harney and Moten, *The Undercommons*. For resistance as impotentiality, the capacity not to turn one's potentiality into actuality, but leave it (im)potent, see Tyson Lewis, *On Study. Giorgio Agamben and Educational Potentiality* (London: Routledge, 2013). For resistance as a collective

struggle, a “commonness against,” see Derek Ford, *Communist Study. Education for the Commons* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016). For resistance as an anti-oppressive and fundamentally anti-educational endeavor, see Eli Meyerhoff, *Beyond Education. Radical Studying for Another World* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2019).

- 61 Also, in recent years mainly right-wing politicians have proved themselves as extremely proficient debunkers in claiming, for instance, that climate models are science made in China, aimed at a destabilization of Western economies, or that young climate activists are brainwashed by communist political movements, and that hence, they should not be listened to. On the importance of post-critical thinking for educational philosophy and theory, see Naomi Hodgson, Joris Vlieghe, and Piotr Zamojski, *Manifesto for a Post-Critical Pedagogy* (Columbia: Punctum Books, 2017); Kai Wortmann, “Post-Critical Pedagogy as Poetic Practice: Combining Affirmative and Critical Vocabularies,” *Ethics and Education* 14, no. 4 (2019): 467–81.
- 62 See Bruno Latour, “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern,” *Critical Inquiry* 30, no. 2 (2004): 225–48.
- 63 Isabelle Stengers, *In Catastrophic Times. Resisting the Coming Barbarism*, trans. Andrew Goffey (London: Open Humanities Press, 2015), 132.
- 64 For the difference between Western as a geographical location and Western as a hegemonic style of thinking that has suppressed other styles of thinking that have emerged in the geographic West as well, see Boaventura de Sousa Santos, “A Non-Occidental West? Learned Ignorance and Ecology of Knowledge,” *Theory, Culture & Society* 26, no. 7–8 (2009): 105–6.
- 65 Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 12.
- 66 Cat’s cradle is a game played all over the world, albeit in different versions. Despite the many different sequences and figures that can be made, some common characteristics can be discerned. The game is played with one piece of string, of which both ends are tied together in order to form a loop. This loop is held between two hands, and so the game begins. Now, another player takes over the piece of string, which allows for another pattern to emerge. After that, the first player (or a third for that matter) receives the pattern again, thus creating a new figure. The game continues in this way until the players arrive at a string figure that does not allow it to be passed back again. As such, cat’s cradle is a game without winners or losers, or more precisely, to win means to be able to go on time and again, to take what is passed on and respond. To play cat’s cradle, then, means to engage in a collective process of continuous unfolding in which new patterns arise continually. Often, the string figures depict scenes that are part of stories told while playing the game. A few examples are Little Boy Carrying Wood, a string figure found around the river Klamath in Oregon, Canoe with Two Sails, a string figure from the Gilbert

- Islands, Fish in a Dish, a quite common string figure that was rediscovered in various places, or the Navajo string figure Two Coyotes Running Opposite Ways. Haraway argues that as storytelling devices, string figures are not only a child's game but also a pedagogical practice, as they initiate children into the stories and narratives of the older generation while at the same time giving them literally out of hand to the new generation. The game of cat's cradle, however, is not only a child's game or a pedagogical practice, but also a way to understand what it means to do theory in educational philosophy and theory. Ibid., 13–14.
- 67 Ibid., 12.
- 68 Isabelle Stengers, "Relaying a War Machine?" in *The Guattari Effect*, ed. Eric Alliez and Andrew Goffey (London: Continuum, 2011), 134.
- 69 Ibid., 134; Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 10.
- 70 Kathrin Thiele, "To Believe in This World, as It Is: Immanence and the Quest for Political Activism," *Deleuze Studies*, 4, no. Supplement (2010): 33. In recent years, some authors have suggested the name of speculative pragmatism for this way of doing theory. See Didier Debaise and Isabelle Stengers, "The Insistence of Possibles: Towards a Speculative Pragmatism," trans. Angela Brewer, *PARSE*, no. 7 (2017): 12–19; Erin Manning, *The Minor Gesture* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016); Martin Savransky, "The Wager of an Unfinished Present: Notes on Speculative Pragmatism," in *Speculative Research. The Lure of Possible Futures*, ed. Alex Wilkie, Martin Savransky and Marsha Rosengarten (London: Routledge, 2017), 25–38.

Chapter 2

- 1 The universities were, of course, not the first institutions of higher learning. On the European continent, cathedral schools and monastery schools for the education and training of clerks already existed. In the Arab world, higher education had been a significant part of social life much before the coming into being of the university. Some scholars go as far as to say that the first instance of higher education was Plato's Academy. For our argument, we will limit ourselves to those forms of higher education that actually called themselves a university (*universitas magistrorum et scholarium*).
- 2 See Charles Haskins, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927).
- 3 On the history of the text and the development of the printing press, see Marshall McLuhan, *The Gutenberg Galaxy. The Making of Typographic Man* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962). Dramatizing the importance of the modalities of text for the university *ex negativo*, Stengers even claims that the invention of the printing press, and hence the possibility to produce large amounts of text, killed the

- university. Isabelle Stengers and Erik Bordeleau, "The Care of the Possible," trans. Kelly Lad, *Scapegoat: Architecture/Landscape/Political Economy* no. 1 (2011): 12.
- 4 Understanding the university under the sign of the event means to situate this account within an ontology that can be traced back via Stengers and Deleuze to the philosophy of Whitehead. An event, according to Whitehead, does not constitute a radical break in the continuity of time, marking a shift between past and future. Rather, the experience of temporality is the effect of a succession of events, a process, and every event is an ingression of different prehensions ("ingredients" of the event) that do not "explain" the event, but make up its singularity. Isabelle Stengers, *Thinking with Whitehead. A Free and Wild Creation of Concepts*, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 185–200.
 - 5 Jacques Verger, *Culture, Enseignement et Société en Occident aux XII^e et XIII^e Siècles* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 1999), 58.
 - 6 Ibid., 58; for the medieval study of law, see Antonio García y García, "The Faculties of Law," in *A History of the University in Europe. Volume 1: Universities in the Middle Ages*, ed. Hilde De Ridder-Symoens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 388–408. For the relations between university and church, respectively empire, see Paolo Nardi, "Relations with Authority," in *A History of the University in Europe. Volume 1: Universities in the Middle Ages*, ed. Hilde De Ridder-Symoens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 77–107.
 - 7 The concept of *universitas* was found for the first time in written sources in Cicero's translation of Plato's *Timaeus*. Cicero used the word as a translation of *τό πᾶν*, a syntagma that denoted the world in its entirety. The concept brings to the fore a sense of comprehensiveness and totality. It designates the world as an all-encompassing whole. Next to this mention in *Timaeus*, Cicero uses the concept twice in his *De Natura Deorum*. Here it is accompanied by a genitive that clarifies what is contained within the totality of *universitas*, first the totality of things, "*universitatem rerum*," secondly the totality of human beings, "*universitatem humani generis*." Whether it was of human beings or earthly things, the concept of *universitas* expressed the idea of a totality, an all-including assemblage. *Universitas* designated a singular unit, constituted by different elements that could, however, not be defined as merely an enumeration of these constituting parts. The *universitas* has an existence of itself, independent from the elements that compose it. Throughout history, it acquired different meanings, and in the twelfth century, it became particularly relevant again in the re-organization of social, political, and economic life. For an overview of the use of the concept of *universitas* from antiquity to the middle ages, see Ludwig Schnorr von Carolsfeld, "Geschichte der Juristischen Person: Universitas, Corpus, Collegium im Klassischen Römischen Recht" (Habilitation Thesis, University of Munich, 1933). For a history of the idea of the university and its renewed importance in the twelfth century, see Pierre

- Michaud-Quantin, *Universitas. Expressions du Mouvement Communautaire dans le Moyen Âge Latin* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1970).
- 8 Dirk Van Den Auweele, "De Renaissance van de XII^e Eeuw: Een Nieuwe Orde als Fundament der Westerse Samenleving," in *De Twaalfde Eeuw. Een Breuklijn in Onze Beschaving*, ed. Raoul Bauer, Jacques De Visscher, Hugo Vande Vondele, and Dirk Van Den Auweele (Amsterdam: De Nederlandse Boekhandel, 1984), 73–99.
 - 9 Jacques Verger, *Les Universités au Moyen Âge* (Paris: Quadrige, 2013), 22.
 - 10 *Ibid.*, 23–5.
 - 11 For completeness, the medical school of Salerno should also be mentioned, as it had a similar reputation in medicine as Paris had in theology and Bologna in law. Alan Cobban has called it a proto-university because it got its papal recognition as a *studium generale* much later than the universities of Bologna and Paris. De facto, it was already organized as a *universitas* at an earlier stage, but because the school matured quite slowly, it only got its official recognition in 1280. Another early university is the university of Oxford, which closely resembled the university of Paris in terms of its teachings and organizational structure. See Alan Cobban, *The Medieval Universities. Their Development and Organization* (London: Methuen & Co, 1975).
 - 12 From the 1140s onwards, canon law was also being taught in Bologna.
 - 13 Cobban, *The Medieval Universities*, 48–9.
 - 14 Verger, *Culture, Enseignement et Société*, 61–2.
 - 15 *Ibid.*, 64–5; Pierre Riché and Jacques Verger, *Des Nains sur des Épaules de Géants. Maîtres et élèves au Moyen Âge* (Paris: Tallandier, 2006), 129–30.
 - 16 Walter Rüegg, "Themes," in *A History of the University in Europe. Volume 1: Universities in the Middle Ages*, ed. Hilde De Ridder-Symoens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 12. For the privileges of medieval students, see Paul Kibre, *Scholarly Privileges in the Middle Ages. The Rights, Privileges, and Immunities of Scholars and Universities at Bologna, Padua, Paris, and Oxford* (Cambridge: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1962).
 - 17 Cobban, *The Medieval Universities*, 57–9. On the structure and management of the early universities, see Aleksander Gieysztor, "Management and Resources," in *A History of the University in Europe. Volume 1: Universities in the Middle Ages*, ed. Hilde De Ridder-Symoens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 108–43.
 - 18 *Ibid.*, 62–5.
 - 19 Riché and Verger, *Des Nains sur des Épaules de Géants*, 186.
 - 20 *Ibid.*, 147–8. On medieval student life, see Rainer Schwinges, "Student Education, Student Life," in *A History of the University in Europe. Volume 1: Universities in the Middle Ages*, ed. Hilde De Ridder-Symoens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 195–243.

- 21 Cobban, *The Medieval Universities*, 80–1.
- 22 Ibid., 82. On the statutes of 1215, see Jean-Luc Solère, “Être Licencié en Paradis: La Prénance du Modèle Scolaire au Moyen Âge d’après un Sermon de Robert de Sorbon,” in *La Crise de la Culture Scolaire. Origines, Interprétations, Perspectives*, ed. François Jacquet-Francillon and Denis Kambouchner (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2005), 45–64.
- 23 Ibid., 83. See also Nardi, “Relations with Authority,” 89–90.
- 24 Ibid., 85. On the teachings of the university of Paris, see Riché and Verger, *Des Nains sur des Épaules des Géants*.
- 25 Jacques Le Goff, *De Intellectuel en de Middeleeuwen*, trans. Luuk Knippenberg (Amsterdam: Wereldbibliotheek, 1989), 101–5.
- 26 See Paul Benoît and Françoise Micheau, “Die Araber als Vermittler?” in *Elemente einer Geschichte der Wissenschaften*, ed. Michel Serres, trans. Horst Brühmann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994), 269–313.
- 27 Next to Aristotle’s *Logic*, *Physics*, and *Metaphysics*, also mathematical works from the Ancient Greeks, such as Euclid and Archimedes, and medical works of Hippocrates and Galen were translated. Moreover, a lot of Arab commentaries on these texts were made accessible, for instance, the works of Al-Khwarizmi, Al-Razi, and Avicenna. At last, and quite important for the development of law universities, was the rediscovery of the *Corpus Iuris Civilis* of the Byzantine emperor Justinian. See Le Goff, *De Intellectuel en de Middeleeuwen*, 46–51.
- 28 Gordon Leff, “The Faculty of Arts: The Trivium and the Three Philosophies,” in *A History of the University in Europe. Volume 1: Universities in the Middle Ages*, ed. Hilde De Ridder-Symoens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 316–19.
- 29 Ivan Illich, *In the Vineyard of the Text. A Commentary to Hugh’s Didascalion* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 54–7.
- 30 Ivan Illich, *Text and University. On the Idea and History of a Unique Institution* (Bremen: University of Bremen). http://www.davidtinapple.com/illich/1991_text_and_university.PDF, 2.
- 31 Illich, *In the Vineyard of the Text*, 2.
- 32 Lavinia Marin, Jan Masschelein, and Maarten Simons, “Page, Text, and Screen in the University: Revisiting the Illich Hypothesis,” *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 50, no. 1 (2018): 54.
- 33 The scholastic method places strong emphasis on dialectical reasoning to extend knowledge by inference and to resolve contradictions. It often takes the form of explicit disputation in a combined written and oral form. A topic drawn from the tradition was brought forward as a question, to which the students gave different responses, leading them to the formulation of a counterproposal. Because of its emphasis on rigorous dialectical methods, scholasticism was eventually applied to many other fields of study (e.g., law, medicine). It began, however, as an attempt

- to harmonize the various authorities of the Christian tradition, and to reconcile Christian theology with classical philosophy, especially Aristotelianism. Essential for the development of scholastic practice of reading was Abelard's *Sic et Non*, an overview of rules to be followed while reading a text. Riché and Verger, *Des Nains sur des Épaules des Géants*, 93–102; Jacques Verger, "Patterns," in *A History of the University in Europe. Volume 1: Universities in the Middle Ages*, ed. Hilde De Ridder-Symoens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 41–5.
- 34 For the sake of completeness, the *disputatio* should be mentioned as a third scholastic practice central to the medieval university. It proceeds in a way similar to the *quaestio*, but has less the character of an exercise. It is performed at the end of a degree to prove one's knowledge of and competence in a field of study. Schwinges, "Student Education, Student Life," 232.
- 35 Ibid., 232–3.
- 36 See, for instance, proposition 89: "Quod impossibile est solvere rationes philosophi de eternitate mundi, nisi dicamus, quod voluntas primi implicat impossibilia." The proposition denies that it would be impossible to refute the arguments of Aristotle concerning the eternity of the world, without asserting that the will of God embraces incompatibles (*impossibilia*). Sara Uckelman, "Logic and the Condemnations of 1277," *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 39 (2010): 215.
- 37 Philip Conway, "The Folds of Coexistence: Towards a Diplomatic Political Ontology, between Difference and Contradiction," *Theory, Culture & Society* 37, no. 3 (2020): 37.
- 38 Ibid., 19. For more about the stakes of diplomacy, see Isabelle Stengers, *Cosmopolitics II*, trans. Robert Bononno (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 374–92.
- 39 Isabelle Stengers, *The Invention of Modern Science*, trans. Daniel Smith (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 93–4.

Chapter 3

- 1 It is only at the beginning of the nineteenth century that the sciences acquired a noteworthy position in the university. From the Middle Ages onwards, the university consisted of the lower faculty of philosophy and the higher faculties of law, medicine, and theology. With the Humboldtian university reform in 1810, the university increasingly became a site of scientific research. This process went hand in hand with a specialization of the sciences in different disciplines with their own journals and associations, and the professionalization of hitherto technical jobs such as engineering. Walter Rüegg, ed., *A History of the University in Europe. Volume 3: Universities in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

- 2 Stengers, *The Invention of Modern Science*, 10–11.
- 3 Ibid., 105–6. In that respect, Stengers' focus on the actual doings of the scientists dovetails with various other practice-theoretical approaches of science. See Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, *Laboratory Life. The Construction of Scientific Facts* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979); Andrew Pickering, *The Mangle of Practice. Time, Agency, and Science* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995).
- 4 Ibid., 89.
- 5 See Ortner, "Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties." See Schatzki, Knorr Cetina, and von Savigny, ed., *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory*.
- 6 Theodore Schatzki, *Social Practices. A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 13.
- 7 Theodore Schatzki, "A Primer on Practices: Theory and Research," in *Practice-based Education. Perspectives and Strategies*, ed. Joy Higgs, Ronald Barnett, Stephen Billett, Maggie Hutchings, and Franziska Trede (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2012), 13.
- 8 Ibid., 13–14.
- 9 Ibid., 14.
- 10 Stengers, *La Vierge et le Neutrino*, 62.
- 11 Isabelle Stengers, "Introductory Notes on an Ecology of Practices," *Cultural Studies Review* 11, no. 1 (2008): 184.
- 12 Ibid., 190.
- 13 Isabelle Stengers, *Cosmopolitics I*, trans. Robert Bononno (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 52–5.
- 14 Stengers, *La Vierge et le Neutrino*, 31–4.
- 15 Isabelle Stengers, "Deleuze and Guattari's Last Enigmatic Message," *Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities* 10, no. 2 (2005): 157–8.
- 16 Ibid., 158. Similarly, while the Earth itself cannot be brought into the lab, the requirement that the geologist will have to meet is of a different kind and can be met, for instance, by relying on the analysis of soil samples.
- 17 Stengers, *Cosmopolitics I*, 22–4.
- 18 Stengers, "Introductory Notes," 191.
- 19 Stengers, *La Vierge et le Neutrino*, 68.
- 20 Ibid., 67.
- 21 Ibid., 167.
- 22 Ibid., 187–8.
- 23 Ibid., 78: "Comment apprendre du nouveau?"
- 24 Ibid., 78–9.
- 25 Bruno Latour, for instance, has shown that the specificity of juridical practices lies not in learning something new, but instead in relating a case to other cases in order to recognize. See Bruno Latour, *The Making of Law. An Ethnography of the Conseil d'État*, trans. Marina Brilman and Alain Pottage (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009).

- 26 Invoking the concept of learning in educational discussions means to take a risk. Two reasons can be discerned why it involves a risk. First, formulating critiques of the concept of learning and how it is deployed within policy discourses has become quite a successful recipe within the field of educational theory. It has been argued, for instance, that too strong of a focus on the concept of learning limits our understanding of educational phenomena to only include the individual acquisition of knowledge, skills, and competencies, thereby forgetting about the educational role of the teacher or the importance of the subject matter. Moreover, educational theorists have argued that the focus on learning plays into the hands of neoliberal policies that seek to transform societal issues (e.g., unemployment) into individual problems (e.g., employability). In that sense, the concept of learning seems to have been instrumentalized for political or economic aims. The second reason why using the concept of learning seems to imply a risk concerns not so much its narrowing down within political or economic discourses, but rather its widening up in philosophical arguments. In an analysis of the relations between philosophy and education, Masschelein and Simons argue that in the work of what they call the learning philosophers—the examples given include Latour (“learning curves”), Habermas (“learning processes”), and Sloterdijk (“learning”)—the concept of learning is stretched to the extent that it merely denotes processes of change or transformation in a very general sense. They claim that it has lost its precise educational meaning when it starts to denote only change or transformation. In this case, the concept of learning seems to be instrumentalized for the social, political, or ethical project of a particular philosophical theory. As such, learning has become a suspicious concept in the eyes of many philosophers of education. The more it is instrumentalized for sociopolitical purposes (cf. the learning society), the more eager philosophers of education have been to do away with it. However, learning seems to be an important concept for Stengers (*apprendre, apprentissage*), although again, it runs the risk to become a notion that is too general and hence to lose its educational meaning (in that sense Stengers could perhaps be called a “learning philosopher”). Nevertheless, I believe it is relevant to retain “learning” here. Taking the risk of using the notion might provide an interesting opportunity to reclaim learning, given the damages done due to its instrumentalization in policy discourse. In opting for this risk, I do not wish to claim that Stengers’ work is educational through and through, just because she uses the concept of learning. Nor do I think that in her work, the concept of learning could be easily exchanged for notions such as change or transformation (although these connotations are present as well). Rather, I will attempt to make the notion of learning interesting again from an educational point of view by conceptualizing it in relation to study. Hence, I will not argue that learning and studying are two altogether different phenomena, nor that they denote the same phenomenon but rather that they require each other. This means that a conception of learning that could be interesting from an

- educational point of view would require including an aspect of study, as well as that study could benefit from a collaboration with learning in order to become a transformative world-making process. On the instrumentalization and narrowing down of learning in neoliberal discourses, see Gert Biesta, *Beyond Learning. Democratic Education for a Human Future* (London: Routledge, 2006); Biesta, "Interrupting the Politics of Learning"; Maarten Simons and Jan Masschelein, "The Governmentalization of Learning and the Assemblage of a Learning Apparatus," *Educational Theory* 58 no. 4 (2008): 391–415. On the use of learning in philosophical arguments, see Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons, "Educational theorists," in *Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory*, ed. Michael Peters (Rotterdam: Springer, 2016), 687–93. For another way of drawing the relationship between studying and learning, see Derek Ford, "A Pedagogy for Space: Teaching, Learning, and Studying in the Baltimore Rebellion," *Policy Futures in Education* 14, no. 2 (2016): 176–93; Weili Zhao, "Daoist Onto-un-learning as a Radical Form of Study: Re-Imagining Study and Learning from an Eastern Perspective," *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 38 (2019): 261–73.
- 27 On the relation between *universitas* and *studium*, see Jürgen Miethke, "Universitas und Studium: Zu den Verfassungsstrukturen Mittelalterlichen Universitäten," *Aevum* 73, no. 2 (1999): 493–511.
 - 28 Jan Masschelein, "Some Notes on the University as Studium: A Place of Collective Public Study," in *Reconceptualizing Study in Educational Discourse and Practice*, ed. Claudia Ruitenberg (London: Routledge, 2017), 42–3.
 - 29 Lewis, *On Study*, 44–5; Tyson Lewis, "The Fundamental Ontology of Study," *Educational Theory* 64, no. 2 (2014): 166.
 - 30 Masschelein and Simons, "From Active Citizenship to World Citizenship," 243–4; Masschelein and Simons, "The Politics of the University," 113–14.
 - 31 Meyerhoff, *Beyond Education*, 164.
 - 32 Ford, *Communist Study*, 45.
 - 33 *Ibid.*, 115.
 - 34 Eli Meyerhoff and Fern Thompsett, "Decolonizing Study: Free Universities in More-than-Humanist Accompliceships with Indigenous Movements," *The Journal of Environmental Education* 48, no. 4 (2017): 240.
 - 35 Lewis, "The Fundamental Ontology of Study," 168–9.
 - 36 Tyson Lewis, "Study: An Example of Potentialism," in *Reconceptualizing Study in Educational Discourse and Practice*, ed. Claudia Ruitenberg (London: Routledge, 2017), 14.
 - 37 Erin Dyke and Eli Meyerhoff, "Toward an Anti- and Alter-University: Thriving in the Mess of Studying, Organizing, and Relating with ExCo of the Twin Cities," in *Out of the Ruins. The Emergence of Radical Informal Learning Spaces*, ed. Robert Haworth and John Elmore (Oakland: PM Press, 2017), 174–93; Meyerhoff, *Beyond*

- Education*, 163–98; A similar idea is present in the notion of “commonness against” in the work of Ford: Ford, *Communist Study*, 45.
- 38 Harney and Moten, *The Undercommons*, 18–19.
 - 39 Maarten Simons and Jan Masschelein, “The Public and Its University: Beyond Learning for Civic Employability?” *European Educational Research Journal* 8, no. 2 (2009): 212–13. A similar conception of suspension effectuated by study can be found in the work of Lewis in terms of a “preferring not to,” a “no longer, not yet,” and an “as not”: Lewis, “The Fundamental Ontology of Study,” 167–8.
 - 40 Derek Ford, “Studying Like a Communist: Affect, the Party, and the Educational Limits to Capitalism,” *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 49, no. 5 (2017): 457.
 - 41 For the lecture hall, see Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons, “The University in the Ears of Its Students: On the Power, Architecture and Technology of University Lectures,” in *Die Idee der Universität—Revisited*, ed. Norbert Ricken, Hans-Christoph Koller, and Edwin Keiner (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2014), 181–6. For the library, see Lewis, *On Study*, 87–90.
 - 42 Lewis, *On Study*, 151–60.
 - 43 Ford, “A Pedagogy for Space,” 186–90.
 - 44 Erin Dyke, Eli Meyerhoff, and Keno Evol, “Radical Imagination as Pedagogy: Cultivating Collective Study from within, on the Edge, and beyond Education,” *Transformations: The Journal of Inclusive Scholarship and Pedagogy* 28, no. 2 (2018): 160–1.
 - 45 Harney and Moten, *The Undercommons*, 67–8.

Chapter 4

- 1 For the analysis of Campus in Camps, I have worked with two types of sources. First, there are the texts written by the initiators, Alessandro Petti and Sandi Hilal, and by close collaborators such as Eyal Weizman and Bianca Elzenbaumer. These texts were essential to obtain a general idea about the vision and activities of Campus in Camps. They have, however, only played a marginal role in the analysis, as they merely provide a general account of what happens. To acquire a more detailed understanding of their work, I have consulted the publications that participants contributed to during their activities. These were collected in *The Collective Dictionary* and *The Initiatives*. Whereas the first series deals with different notions participants deem relevant to understand the camp condition, the second series presents a variety of concrete actions they have undertaken in investigating the camp and effectuating social and spatial interventions. These series contain reflections, reports of discussions, photographs, and maps that have been generated

in the course of the first two years of the program. It is mainly on the accounts in these two series that I have based the analysis.

- 2 See Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
- 3 Étienne Souriau, *The Different Modes of Existence*, trans. Erik Beranek and Tim Howles (Minneapolis: Univocal Publishing, 2015), 232–5. Framing the questioning situation in terms of decolonization presupposes an interpretation of Israel/Palestine through the lens of a settler-colonial occupation, leading to other solutions than the often claimed two-state solution framed within the language of liberal-democratic nation-states. On Israel/Palestine from a settler-colonial perspective, see Rachel Bushbridge, “Israel-Palestine and the Settler Colonial ‘Turn’: From Interpretation to Decolonization,” *Theory, Culture, and Society* 35, no. 1 (2018): 91–115; David Lloyd, “Settler Colonialism and the State of Exception: The Example of Palestine/Israel,” *Settler Colonial Studies* 2, no. 1 (2012): 59–80. On the planning strategies behind the occupation, see Eyal Weizman, *Hollow Land. Israel’s Architecture of Occupation* (London: Verso, 2007). On the repercussions of the settler-colonial paradigm for conflict resolution, see Nadim Rouhana, “Decolonization as Reconciliation: Rethinking the National Conflict Paradigm in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 41, no. 4 (2018): 643–62.
- 4 Because of this ambiguity, and its frequent use in critical theories, the term decolonization has become rather slippery. Tuck and Yang, for instance, have argued that due to the easy adoption of the concept and tactic of decolonization within educational discourses and practices (e.g., the increasing number of calls to decolonize schools, curriculum, methodology), the notion has become a metaphor that makes it possible to produce agreement between often contradictory decolonial strategies and objectives. Therefore, it risks hollowing out radical anti-colonial critiques and becoming “an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation.” Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, “Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor,” *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* 1, no. 1 (2012): 7.
- 5 Pelin Tan, “Decolonizing Architectural Education: Towards an Affective Pedagogy,” in *The Social (Re)production of Architecture. Politics, Values and Actions in Contemporary Practice*, ed. Doina Petrescu and Kim Trogal (London: Routledge, 2017), 85. For an overview of decolonial pedagogies, see Sara de Jong, Rosalba Icaza, and Olivia Rutazibwa, ed., *Decolonization and Feminisms in Global Teaching and Learning* (London: Routledge, 2018).
- 6 Before analyzing the study practice of Campus in Camps, the sources for the current and the next chapter will be situated in the temporal structure of the program. According to Bianca Elzenbaumer, who participated as a project activator, the program, once it took off, has had four phases. The first eight months of the program were dedicated to a process they called unlearning. This phase involved a series of seminars in which participants questioned the concepts they used

to understand their lives with, from the standpoint of everyday experiences. A common thread in the discussions was the need for new narratives about the camp that make it possible to notice the inventive ways of self-organization and political practice that take place. In a second phase, six project activators joined the group that would help the participants in giving concrete shape to the social and spatial interventions in the camp they intended to perform. The challenge at this point was to combine the speculative-conceptual work done during the seminars with concrete actions. A major problem which they soon encountered was that most of the project proposals either were still heavily informed by the interests of international aid agencies (e.g., the proposal for roof gardens by someone who had no interest in gardening), or were almost purely imaginative and unattainable (e.g., the proposal to set up a water park). Confronted with this situation, they decided to delay the formulation of project proposals, and instead focus more on the language. This hesitation announced the coming into being of the third phase in which they created *The Collective Dictionary*. This phase, however, was not only characterized by an increased focus on language through the elaboration of a shared vocabulary, but also by a shift in pedagogical approach. The first two phases mainly consisted of discussions and seminars within the four white walls of the Al-Feniq Cultural Center. In the third phase, they decided to go outside and started to walk through the camps while discussing, observing, mapping, taking photographs, and thinking about new concepts. These attempts to situate their thinking by concrete situations encountered in the camps resulted in a series of publications on concepts, *The Collective Dictionary*. Lastly, in the fourth phase, the project activators gradually withdrew, leaving the participants space to develop their own project proposals, which this time were more grounded in the reality of the camp that they had studied in the previous phase. Reports on different project proposals can be read in *The Initiatives*, which will be discussed in the fourth section. On the temporal structure of the program, see Elzenbaumer, "Speculating with Care." On the process of unlearning, see Silvia Franceschini and Luca Guerrini, "Campus in Camps. Decolonizing Knowledge and the Question of Un-Learning," *Re-visiones*, no. 7 (2017). On *The Collective Dictionary*, see Ilana Feldman, "Reaction, Experimentation, and Refusal."

- 7 The educational philosophy that informed this practice came from Munir Fasheh, a Palestinian mathematician and pedagogue, who worked together with Campus in Camps. Taking issue with the colonial knowledge that is detached from but imposed on people, he emphasizes the importance of knowledge that is grounded in personal experiences people have with the world. See Munir Fasheh, "Community Education: To Reclaim and Transform What Has Been Made Invisible," *Harvard Educational Review* 60, no. 1 (1990): 19–35.

- 8 *Campus in Camps*, 93–118. See Alessandro Petti, “Campus in Camps: Knowledge Production and Urban Interventions in Refugee Camps,” in *The Routledge Companion to Planning in the Global South*, ed. Gautam Bhan, Smita Srinivas, and Vanessa Watson (London: Routledge, 2018), 334–44.
- 9 On the notion of common, the studiers prepared two booklets that both deal with this notion from another angle. Whereas *Common₁* mainly discusses the importance of practices of care for preserving the commons as commons, *Common₂* relates the notion of the commons with the right of return in order to rethink the Palestinian struggle.
- 10 *Vision*, 47.
- 11 *Vision*, 54.
- 12 *Citizenship*, 36.
- 13 *Knowledge*, 28.
- 14 *Common₁*, 43.
- 15 *Participation*, 23.
- 16 *Knowledge*, 18.
- 17 *Ownership*, 15.
- 18 *Responsibility*, 39.
- 19 *Participation*, 28.
- 20 *Campus in Camps*, 45–63.
- 21 *The Garden*, 50–1.
- 22 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
- 23 *The Square*, 17.
- 24 *The Pool*, 40. The stakes of *The Stadium* are similar. The intervention on this site included fieldwork in order to explore how it is used. Here, however, no specific interventions or proposals for reuse or redesign were being made. See *The Stadium*.
- 25 *The Unbuilt*, 35.
- 26 *The Bridge*, 27.
- 27 *Ibid.*, 66.
- 28 *The Suburb*, 72–3.
- 29 *The Municipality*, 59.
- 30 *The Pathways*, 15–16.
- 31 *Relation*, 37.
- 32 *Common₂*, 17–18.
- 33 Sandi Hilal and Alessandro Petti, “Reimagining the Common: Rethinking the Refugee Experience,” in *The Human Snapshot*, ed. Thomas Keenan and Tirdad Zolghadr (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2013), 133–45.
- 34 Feldman, “Reaction, Experimentation, and Refusal,” 421.

Chapter 5

- 1 Think, for instance, of how the obligation posed by the solar neutrino particle requires the physicist to construct an experimental situation in a laboratory, whereas the obligation posed by the Earth to the geologist corresponds to different requirements because indeed the Earth itself cannot be brought into the laboratory and, hence, requires another way of approaching it.
- 2 Didier Debaise, "The Dramatic Power of Events: The Function of Method in Deleuze's Philosophy," *Deleuze Studies* 10, no. 1 (2016): 6–7.
- 3 Ibid., 8–9. See Gilles Deleuze, "The Method of Dramatization," in *Desert Islands and Other Texts, 1953–1974*, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Michael Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2004), 94–116.
- 4 *Knowledge*, 22–6.
- 5 There is a shift here from the more commonsensical notion of concept as it is used to describe what is contained in *the Collective Dictionary*, to the more technical term of abstraction that plays an essential role in the philosophy of Whitehead. Whereas all concepts are abstractions, not every abstraction is a concept. Concepts are hence a subset of the set of abstractions; more specifically, they denote those abstractions that can be put into words and, hence, communicated. The example of the bird further on in this paragraph would be an example of an experience of which there is abstraction (one can recognize the singing of the bird), but no concept (although one can recognize it, it cannot be put in words).
- 6 Isabelle Stengers, "Experimenting with Refrains: Subjectivity and the Challenge of Escaping Modern Dualism," *Subjectivity*, no. 22 (2008): 50.
- 7 Alfred North Whitehead, *The Concept of Nature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), 189.
- 8 In the context of the Palestinian camps, anthropologists have, on many occasions, argued that it is of great importance which notions are used to describe situations since they play an essential role in the shaping of public perceptions and humanitarian policies. See Ilana Feldman, "The Challenge of Categories: UNRWA and the Definition of a 'Palestine Refugee,'" *Journal of Refugee Studies* 25, no. 3 (2012): 387–406; Julie Peteet, "Words as Interventions: Naming in the Palestine-Israel Conflict," *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 1 (2005): 153–72.
- 9 Alfred North Whitehead, *Modes of Thought* (New York: The Free Press, 1938), 235.
- 10 Ursula K. Le Guin, *Dancing at the Edge of the World. Thoughts on Words, Women, Places* (New York: Grove Press, 1989), 44–5.
- 11 Ibid., 169.
- 12 Karen Barad, "Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 28, no. 3 (2003): 815.

- 13 *Common*, 18–27.
- 14 *Ibid.*, 28–39.
- 15 Isabelle Stengers, “Comparison as a Matter of Concern,” *Common Knowledge* 17, no. 1 (2011): 63.
- 16 Helen Verran, “Comparison as Participant,” *Common Knowledge* 17, no. 1 (2011): 63–4.
- 17 *The Municipality*, 24–5.
- 18 *The Unbuilt*, 22.
- 19 Georges Canguilhem, “The Living and Its Milieu,” *Grey Room*, no. 3 (2001): 11; Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Brian Massumi, 2nd ed. (London: Continuum, 2004): 345.
- 20 Ingold, *Being Alive*, 70.
- 21 Tim Ingold, *The Life of Lines* (London: Routledge, 2015), 92–3.
- 22 Ingold, *Being Alive*, 129.
- 23 David Turnbull, “Cartography and Science in Early Modern Europe: Mapping the Construction of Knowledge Spaces,” *Imago Mundi* 48, no. 1 (1996): 7.
- 24 See David Turnbull, *Maps Are Territories. Science Is an Atlas* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989).
- 25 Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality. An Essay in Cosmology*, ed. David Griffin and Donald Sherburne, 2nd edition (New York: The Free Press, 1978), 21.
- 26 Tim Ingold, *The Perception of the Environment. Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill* (London: Routledge, 2000), 227.
- 27 Tim Ingold, *Making. Anthropology, Archaeology, Art and Architecture* (London: Routledge, 2013), 132.
- 28 Michel Serres, *The Troubadour of Knowledge*, trans. Sheila Glaser and William Paulson (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997), 7.
- 29 Hilal and Petti, “Reimagining the Common,” 134–5.
- 30 Giorgio Agamben, *The Use of Bodies*, trans. Adam Kotsko (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016), 30.
- 31 Tobie Nathan, “Médecins, Sorciers, Thérapeutes, Malades, Patients, Sujets, Usagers,” in *Médecins et Sorciers*, ed. Tobie Nathan and Isabelle Stengers (Paris: Les Empêcheurs de penser en rond, 2012), 218–19.
- 32 Isabelle Stengers, “Usagers: Lobbies ou Création Politique?” in *Médecins et sorciers*, ed. Tobie Nathan and Isabelle Stengers (Paris: Les Empêcheurs de penser en rond, 2012), 199: “La culture des usages, et non des utilisations justifiées par un diagnostic ou visant une fin, est un problème d’intérêt collectif, qui requiert un savoir collectif, ce que l’on peut appeler une expertise collective au vieux sens où l’expertise désignait d’abord un savoir issu de l’expérience et cultivé dans ses rapports avec l’expérience.”
- 33 See Isabelle Stengers and Olivier Ralet, *Drogues. Le Défi Hollandais* (Paris: Les Empêcheurs de penser en rond, 1991).

- 34 On the generativity of the commons, see Fritjof Capra and Ugo Mattei, *The Ecology of Law. Toward a Legal System in Tune with Nature and Community* (San Francisco: Berret-Koehler Publishers, 2015).
- 35 On commons, commoners, and commoning, see David Bollier, *Think Like a Commoner. A Short Introduction to the Life of the Commons* (Vancouver: New Society Publishers, 2014); Serge Gutwirth and Isabelle Stengers, “Le Droit à l’Épreuve de la Résurgence des Commons,” *Revue Juridique de l’Environnement* 41, no. 2 (2016): 306–43.
- 36 Agamben, *The Use of Bodies*, 87.
- 37 Ford, “Studying Like a Communist,” 457.

Chapter 6

- 1 Alfred North Whitehead, *The Aims of Education and Other Essays* (New York: The Free Press, 1929), 98.
- 2 Debaise and Stengers, “The Insistence of Possibles,” 14.
- 3 Isabelle Stengers, *Civiliser la Modernité? Whitehead et les ruminations du sens commun* (Dijon: Les presses du réel, 2017), 10.
- 4 Ibid., 9–10; see Whitehead, *Modes of Thought*.
- 5 Ibid., 10.
- 6 Ibid., 10: “S’il ne se pose pas comme arbitre, jugeant et excluant, la question de la divergence peut devenir matière à préoccupation collective, c’est-à-dire devenir une dimension de ce que, avec Whitehead, on peut appeler le sens commun.”
- 7 Martin Savransky, *The Adventure of Relevance. An Ethics of Social Inquiry* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 40.
- 8 Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 17.
- 9 Martin Savransky, Alex Wilkie, and Marsha Rosengarten, “The Lure of Possible Futures: On Speculative Research,” in *Speculative Research. The Lure of Possible Futures*, ed. Alex Wilkie, Martin Savransky, and Marsha Rosengarten (London: Routledge, 2017), 8.
- 10 Isabelle Stengers, *Réactiver le Sens Commun. Lecture de Whitehead en Temps de Débâcle* (Paris: Les Empêcheurs de penser en rond, 2020), 164: “faire sense en commun.”
- 11 Isabelle Stengers, “L’Insistance du Possible,” in *Gestes Spéculatifs*, ed. Didier Debaise and Isabelle Stengers (Dijon: Les presses du réel, 2015), 5: “un geste pariant sur la possibilité de conférer à ce qui nous réunit le pouvoir de nous faire penser ensemble.”
- 12 Stengers, *Thinking with Whitehead*, 516.
- 13 Savransky, *The Adventure of Relevance*, 211.
- 14 Michel Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” in *Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth. Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984*, ed. Paul

- Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1997), 282. See also Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality. Volume 3: The Care of the Self*, trans. Robert Hurley (London: Penguin Books, 1990); Michel Foucault, *L'Herméneutique du Sujet. Cours au Collège de France 1981–1982*, ed. Frédéric Gros (Paris: Gallimard, 2001).
- 15 From a historical point of view, Pierre Hadot has made a similar remark by claiming that the exercises of the self that Foucault discusses always imply an insertion of the self in a social or even cosmic order, and that they hence are never purely exercises of the self on the self: “In my view, the feeling of belonging to a whole is an essential element: belonging, that is, both to the whole constituted by the human community, and to that constituted by the cosmic whole.” Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1995), 208.
 - 16 Peter Sloterdijk, *Foams. Spheres III*, trans. Wieland Hoban (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2016), 469.
 - 17 Ibid., 470.
 - 18 See also Peter Sloterdijk, “Spheres Theory: Talking to Myself about the Poetics of Space,” *Harvard Design Magazine*, no. 30 (2009): 1–8.
 - 19 Isabelle Stengers, “The Cosmopolitical Proposal,” in *Making Things Public. Atmospheres of Democracy*, ed. Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005), 997. Implicitly the question of ethology is always taken up in the ecological perspective. For instance, in Von Uexküll’s study of the tick that has gained general recognition due to Heidegger’s analysis of the text in his thinking about boredom, he investigates how environmental features such as temperature and smell trigger specific behavioral traits of the tick. Stengers’ way of phrasing the issue as etho-ecological instead of merely ecological, however, makes the ethological bearing of an ecological point of view explicit. See Brett Buchanan, *Onto-Ethologies. The Animal Environments of Uexküll, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2008).
 - 20 John Dewey, *Democracy and Education. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education* (New York: The Free Press, 1916), 11.
 - 21 Ibid., 11.
 - 22 Ibid., 46.
 - 23 Ibid., 47.
 - 24 Ibid.
 - 25 Ibid.
 - 26 Ibid.
 - 27 Ibid., 11.
 - 28 Ibid., 11–12.
 - 29 Ibid., 12.
 - 30 Stengers, *Civiliser la Modernité?* 123: “La possibilité qu’une amarante devienne tolérante au Roundup correspond donc à une ‘adaptation’ dont sa population a été

- capable lorsque le milieu est devenu létal. La science *made in* Monsanto a négligé ce dont la visée de survivre rendait capable le peuple des amarantes.”
- 31 Stengers, “The Cosmopolitical Proposal,” 997.
 - 32 Stengers, *Cosmopolitics I*, 23–7; William James, *Pragmatism and Other Writings* (1907; repr. London: Penguin, 2000), 29.
 - 33 Stengers, *Réactiver le Sens Commun*, 192–3.
 - 34 Beth Dempster in Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 33.
 - 35 Ibid., 1.
 - 36 Whitehead has called this separation of fact and value, of objectivity and subjectivity the bifurcation of nature in primary and secondary qualities, where primary qualities are believed to reside in things themselves, and secondary qualities only exist due to our perception of things (e.g., sound, smell, color). It is no coincidence that he pointed in the direction of not only Newton and Hume, but also Kant, whose critical project aimed to delimit the terrain of Reason (including its laws concerning how something can be known) from the terrain of belief. Whitehead, *The Concept of Nature*, 30; Latour, “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?” 231–2; Bruno Latour, *What Is the Style of Matters of Concern* (Asse: Van Gorcum, 2008), 10–11.
 - 37 Ibid., 39.
 - 38 In this context, Latour refers to Heidegger’s musings on the etymology of the Old German *Ding*, which not only denoted the thing not only as a gathering of the fourfold (heaven and earth, mortals, and divinities)—the first gathering of the matter of concern—but also as a form of assembly, of gathering in order to discuss. Bruno Latour, “From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik: Or, How to Make Things Public?” in *Making Things Public. Atmospheres of Democracy*, ed. Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005), 12–16. See Martin Heidegger, “The Thing,” in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 163–86.
 - 39 Maria Puig de la Bellacasa, *Matters of Care. Speculative Ethics in More Than Human Worlds* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 42.
 - 40 Maria Puig de la Bellacasa, “‘Nothing Comes without Its World’: Thinking with Care,” *The Sociological Review* 60, no. 2 (2012): 198.
 - 41 Puig de la Bellacasa, *Matters of Care*, 60.
 - 42 Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 338.
 - 43 Stengers, “Experimenting With Refrains,” 57.

Chapter 7

- 1 Stengers, “The Cosmopolitical Proposal,” 1002.
- 2 See *Vision*.

- 3 Stengers and Bordeleau, "The Care of the Possible," 27.
- 4 Stengers, *Civiliser la Modernité?* 45.
- 5 Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton (1968; repr. London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 275–6. On the meaning of potentiality in educational discourses, see Tyson Lewis, "'To Be Less than You Are': Self-suspension, Potentiality, and Study," *Ethics and Education* 11, no. 3 (2016): 340–51.
- 6 John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (New York: Dover Publications, 1958), 232.
- 7 Stengers, *Civiliser la Modernité?* 65–7.
- 8 Stengers, "The Cosmopolitical Proposal," 1002.
- 9 Stengers, *Civiliser la Modernité?* 40–1.
- 10 Ibid., 41.
- 11 Ibid., 41. "la décision à prendre soit prise, sans que nul ne puisse s'approprier, sans que nul non plus ne puisse garantir qu'elle est la meilleure possible. La décision a reçu 'ses' raisons."
- 12 Ibid., 51. "La problématisation ne remonte pas vers le plus général mais confère à la situation, toujours telle ou telle situation, le pouvoir de mettre en cause ce qui, pourtant, semble aller de soi."
- 13 Ibid., 51. "La question *Dic cur hic* a pour efficace recherchée de problématiser les raisons générales en faisant importer le 'ici'—suspens ton action, laisse-toi affecter par le 'ceci,' c'est-à-dire par *ce* monde."
- 14 Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 78.
- 15 Latour, "From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik," 12–16.
- 16 Stengers, *Civiliser la Modernité?* 197: "L'art de l'attention est un art de la voix moyenne, un art tentaculaire car il s'agit de se laisser toucher, et de conférer à ce qui nous touche le pouvoir de nous faire sentir et penser, mais toujours 'ici,' jamais 'hors sol.'"
- 17 Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 31.
- 18 Alfred North Whitehead, *Modes of Thought*, 171.
- 19 Stengers, *Civiliser la Modernité?* 199–200.
- 20 Stengers, *Cosmopolitics I*, 10.