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Conclusion: Ending Colonialism by Securing its Continuation

The inventors and entrepreneurs of Eurafrica – from Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Paolo d'Agostini Orsini di Camerota, Eugène Guernier, Albert Sarraut and Joseph Caillaux to Robert Schuman, Anton Zischka, Eirik Labonne, Paul-Henri Spaak and Guy Mollet – all hailed the European Economic Community as a realization of their once pioneering designs. Guernier, writing in early 1958, was thrilled: 'After decades of engagement, the nuptials of Europe and Africa has finally been celebrated.'¹ Coudenhove-Kalergi, for his part, described the Treaty of Rome as a partial fulfilment of the Pan-European programme and emphasized that Adenauer, Monnet, Spaak and other architects of the EEC were all leading members of the Pan-European organization.² After many failed attempts to turn the colonial management of Africa into a common European issue and responsibility, the promoters of Eurafrica had thus prevailed, establishing precise arrangements and institutions for the purpose of incorporating Algeria and associating the colonies of the six founding members with the Common Market.

¹ Eugène Guernier, *France-Outre Mer*, 29 January 1958.

² Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Eine Idee erobert Europa: Meine Lebenserinnerungen* (Vienna: Verlag Kurt Desch, 1958), pp. 329–44. As for D'Agostini Orsini di Camerota, he described the creation of the EEC and its association of African countries as a realization of Eurafrica and the first step toward creating 'the largest ensemble, the largest space, the largest mass in material, human and economic terms, which will become the greatest economic power in the world' (*I problemi economici dell'Africa e l'Europa*, Rome: Edizioni Cinque Lune, 1961, p. 424). As for Sarraut's continued belief in Eurafrica, and in the EEC as its realization, see his letter of support in *Cahiers Économiques et de liaison des Comités Eurafrique*, special issue 'Regards sur l'Afrique', Nos 5–6–7, 1960, p. 14.

Figure 5.1 Official EEC map showing the six Member States and the associated Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) as at 1 July 1961. Source: La Communauté européenne – Cartes. Luxembourg-Bruxelles: Service de presse et d'information des Communautés européennes, Avril 1962. Copyright: © Communautés européennes.

Figure 5.2 Map of 'Eur-Africa', as perceived from a British perspective.
 Source: James Hunt, *Europe and Africa – Can it be Partnership?*
 (London: Federal Union, without date [1958?]). Kenya National
 Archives, Nairobi.

Figure 5.3 Cover of special issue of *Cahiers économiques et de liaison des Comités Eurafrrique*, Nos 8–9, 1960. Bibliothèque nationale de France.

Figure 5.4 Cover of special issue – ‘Regards sur l’Eurafrique’ – of *Cahiers économiques et de liaison des Comités Eurafrique*, Nos 5–7, 1960. Bibliothèque nationale de France.

We have, throughout this book, drilled deeply especially into the years 1955–7. Our findings provide an empirical demonstration of what Eurafrica was about and help explain how it was established through the EEC's association of the overseas territories. As for the preceding interwar and postwar periods, we have relied on a more eclectic set of documents, ranging from archival sources and reports in news media of the period to memoirs and research material from a broad range of disciplines. Through this material, we are able to assert that the Eurafrican association realized with the EEC was but the final and successful effort to rationalize the colonial management of Africa by turning it into a shared concern and a shared possibility for the six founding member states and, potentially, for Europe as a whole.

Thus, in the view of the founders of the EEC, their community was far more than a nascent customs union encompassing six metropolitan European states. Covering a territorial sphere stretching from the Baltic to the Congo, the EEC was equally conceived in terms of geopolitical strategy, one that would ensure Western Europe's security, economic sustainability and relative political autonomy between the two superpowers. A year after the Treaty of Rome was signed, Guy Mollet confessed that this was 'probably the finest source of pride of my government. Not only did the European Community attain a solid foundation, but the first supports for an association of Europe and Africa were fixed. The Eurafrican community began to take shape.'³ In April 1958, with the offices of the European Commission set up in Brussels, the Directorate General for the overseas territories – or the DG VIII – began its work under the commissioner Robert Lemaignan (see Figure 5.5). He structured the EEC's Eurafrican activities into four areas, based on the Commission's interpretation of the Treaty of Rome: research and programme activities; cultural and social questions; trade matters; and financing of development through the

³ Guy Mollet, *Bilan et Perspectives Socialistes* (Paris: Plon, 1958), p. 34.

Figure 5.5 'Africa: A European Necessity.' Issue of *L'Européen*. *Revue des Marchés et des Affaires autour du Marché Commun* (September/October 1958), featuring a statement by commissioner Robert Lemaigen on Eurafrica and the association of the African colonies.

investment fund.⁴ Initiatives in each area ensued from Lemaighen's policy statement that 'the European community was a common good of all its participants including all the African peoples'. In 1964 the Commissioner summarized the first five years at the DG VIII, concluding that 'a broad foundation had been laid for the Eurafrican economic symbiosis', adding that this was 'an essential element of the world of tomorrow'.⁵

What this book has shown, in short, is that Africa was of paramount importance in most, if not all, efforts at European integration from the launching of the Pan-European Union in 1923 to the foundation of the EEC in 1957; that Africa was one of the biggest stakes in the Treaty of Rome negotiations; and, finally, that Eurafrica initially formed an integral part of the EEC's policy vocabulary. In this way, we have corroborated and explained what we noted in our introductory chapter – namely the surprisingly strong correlation between the historical discourses that, from the aftermath of World War I to the late 1950s, dealt with European integration and those that dealt with Africa and Europe's allegedly 'civilizing missions' in the 'dark continent'.

Much remains to be said about the Eurafrican project. First, we have indicated that the EEC's association of the African colonies staked out the future direction of the French and Belgian colonies in Africa that became independent around 1960. Through its Eurafrican arrangement, the EEC exercised a profound influence on the decolonization process and its terminus in the various arrangements of dependence, clientelism and in the perpetuation of Africa's function as a raw materials reservoir. Second, the EEC's association of the colonies and, subsequently, formally independent African states also had a wider resonance in international relations of the period, which may be traced in other international organizations, institutions and fora, such as the UN, the World Bank, the IMF and GATT. These two areas will be covered in another book, in which we also provide more archival

⁴ Robert Lemaighen, *L'Europe au Berceau: Souvenirs d'un Technocrate* (Paris: Plon, 1964), p. 119.

⁵ Lemaighen, *L'Europe au Berceau*, pp. 123, 160.

documentation to back up our claim concerning the intrinsic relation between European integration and European colonialism.⁶

Anti-independence and yet non-colonial: Eurafrica institutionalized

Already at this stage, though, it is clear that the forgotten historical relation that we recover implies several crucial conclusions concerning the history of European integration, colonialism and the decolonization process in Africa, as well as postwar European and world history more generally. Here we could start from the observation that as we enter the 1960s and the formal decolonization drive in Africa, Eurafrica would rapidly disappear from the political agenda and wider public discussion. This is probably why, even if they could conceive of its importance at the time, many scholars tacitly dismiss Eurafrica as nothing but a grand vision with little political substance or historical significance.

As early as June 1960, an article in the German daily *Die Welt* carried the anxious headline 'Läuft Afrika der EWG davon?' ('Is Africa running away from the EEC?'). The article asserted that at the time when the Treaty of Rome was drafted, 'the fact that Europe would be faced by independent States in Africa within only a few years could scarcely have been anticipated'. Such independence, the author warned, risked upsetting the EEC's entire edifice of African association. Lest a new EEC strategy towards Africa was promptly launched, the article concluded, the situation could soon prove 'dangerous for Europe and hence for the West in its entirety'.⁷ When, in 1963, eighteen independent African states decided to retain multilateral EEC association under the

⁶ For an original account of the EEC's Third World relations in the post-independence era, starting in the late 1950s, see Giuliano Garavini, *After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South, 1957–1986* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

⁷ Ferdinand Himpele, 'Läuft Afrika der EWG davon?', *Die Welt*, 2 June 1960. CVCE, www.ena.lu/africa-running-away-eeec-die-welt-june-1960-020200670.html (accessed 11 October 2013).

Yaoundé Convention, any such fears were, of course, put to rest; by the mid-1970s most African states had opted for EEC association through Yaoundé's successor, the Lomé Convention (1975–2000, later replaced by the Cotonou Agreement, 2000–).

Such precipitate apprehensions aside, *Die Welt* was certainly right in its judgement that the Treaty of Rome was negotiated under the assumption that most African territories had a long way to go before they would attain formal statehood. As Uwe Kitzinger noted in 1962 when commenting on the Rome Treaty's colonial association provisions: 'They were based on a largely static conception of the political relations between the African countries and the metropolitan Member States. In the past three years that relationship has evolved *beyond all expectations*. Since the Treaty was signed, most of the Associates have become politically independent of any Member State.'⁸ Writing a few years later, Carol Ann Cosgrove also stressed this crucial point:

The treaty was drafted at a time when rapid decolonization was discounted by the European metropolises, with the result that no reference was made to the possible attainment of sovereign independence by the associate except in the case of Somaliland. Despite rumblings in North Africa and the imminence of independence in the Gold Coast [Ghana], it seemed likely that the colonial regimes would continue to be the recipients of any benefits yielded by association.⁹

The dismal outlook on the EEC–Africa relations expressed by *Die Welt* in 1960 thus starkly contrasted with the Eurafrican buoyancy at the time for the Treaty of Rome signing in 1957. Indeed, if *Die Welt* agonized over the prospect of 'Africa running away from the EEC' on 2 June 1960, on 26 March 1957 – the day after the Rome Treaty's signing ceremony – *The New York Times* took note of Europe's latest move in its run – or should we say *Drang* – to the South: 'Germans go to Africa: Bonn mission to study ways to develop resources.' As reported,

⁸ Uwe Kitzinger, *The Challenge of the Common Market* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), p. 98, our emphasis.

⁹ Carol Ann Cosgrove, 'The Common Market and its colonial heritage', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1969, pp. 77–8.

a German delegation was heading for 'France's African colonies to survey the joint development of industrial raw materials required by West Europe'. It was also related that this formed part of the EEC accord, 'signed today in Rome', and its objective to secure 'the joint financing of the economic development of France's African colonies'.¹⁰

Another headline in *The New York Times* in 1957 ran as follows: 'Europe may get new oil source: Common Economic Market could mean shift from Mideast to Africa: Resources big factor'. Again, we are reminded of the self-evident stability and durability with which the EEC's ownership of Africa was perceived in 1957. Here, in the wake of the agreement on the EEC, *The New York Times* recounts the upbeat mood concerning the great economic prospects proffered by the new European community's joint development of Algeria and its members' 'overseas possessions'. In as little time as five or six years, the article informs, the EEC may very well, thanks to the recently discovered oil reserves in Algeria, 'bring about a most important and perhaps permanent change in the European oil picture and a partial solution to a tough foreign exchange problem'. As also noted, the EEC's 'ultimate goal appears to be a self-sufficiency in oil and some other raw materials available from the overseas possessions, mostly in Africa'.¹¹

But while the American newspaper spoke about 'colonies' and 'overseas possessions' in relation to the EEC–Africa relations, such a designation was also a cause of concern in Europe. To be sure, Eurafrica had no place for national independence, as illustrated with utmost clarity in the case of the Algerian emergency. At the same time, Eurafrican advocates also, not least in the UN, fought an uphill struggle to distance the project from an increasingly ill-reputed and outmoded colonialism. After agreement on the EEC's overseas association scheme had been reached in late February 1957, for instance, journalists in Bonn immediately criticized their government, asking whether West Germany was not in fact now harnessed to France's and Belgium's

¹⁰ 'Germans go to Africa: Bonn mission to study ways to develop resources', *The New York Times*, 26 March 1957.

¹¹ 'Europe may get new oil source', *The New York Times*, 7 October 1957.

colonialism and the war in Algeria. Foreign Secretary Brentano flatly denied this, stating that the aid intended within the frame of the EEC's investment fund 'has nothing to do with the colonial administration'.¹² Adenauer, too, underlined that 'the association of the overseas territories has nothing in common with colonialism'.¹³ In their rhetoric, Eurafrica rather entailed the dawn of an international order guided by the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, thus serving 'the general interest and above all favouring the indigenous populations', as Brentano put it.¹⁴

Meanwhile, in Algeria and elsewhere, the Eurafrican community was hailed as a warrant for the perpetuation of the colonial system. Octave Meynier, a high-ranking military officer and publishing editor of *Eurafrique* (an influential organ in French colonial circles in North Africa), portrayed the association of Algeria and French Africa to the EEC as following in the tracks of the 'Great Discoveries' and the 'Great Conquests'. Meynier admitted that these periods now belonged to the past and that 'a page must be turned'; but, he continued, 'it must none the less be understood that colonization allowed us to encounter and bring up the under-developed peoples. The time has now come to bring them up to our level. The Era of PROMOTION of the African peoples and of their UNION with Europe has begun. In this way, EURAFRICA has been constructed in love, in an act of trust and generosity'.¹⁵ For Meynier, the Eurafrican association turned a page in the colonial story. This change was necessary – not in order to abolish European rule in Africa but to secure a future for it: 'The maintenance of French sovereignty in Algeria, supported by the creation of Eurafrica, is the only remedy able to prevent the tragic consequences of a situation that the Western world cannot allow to deteriorate any further'.¹⁶

¹² 'M. von Brentano: les résultats des entretiens de Paris sont entièrement satisfaisants pour l'Allemagne de l'Ouest', *Le Monde*, 23 February 1957, p. 6.

¹³ 'Le Chancelier Adenauer: l'association des territoires d'outre-mer n'a rien de commun avec le colonialisme', *Le Monde*, 24 February 1957, p. 3.

¹⁴ 'M. von Brentano', *Le Monde*, 23 February 1957, p. 6.

¹⁵ Anonymous [Octave Meynier], 'L'Eurafrrique est créée, L'Eurafrrique vit ...', *Eurafrrique: Revue d'action africaine et méditerranéenne*, No. 9, January 1957, p. 15.

¹⁶ Octave Meynier, 'L'Eurafrrique – Tache urgente', *Eurafrrique: Revue d'action africaine et méditerranéenne*, No. 11, July 1957, p. 2.

As institutionalized by the EEC, then, Eurafrica was perceived both as the end of colonialism and as authorizing its continuation; or, if you like, as anti-independence yet non-colonial. Since Eurafrica and initial EEC–Africa relations ruled out formal African statehood, this may explain *Die Welt* and others' trepidation towards African independence in 1960. More importantly, it could also be taken to explain the rapid decline of Eurafrica as a political concept, rallying call and overall enterprise as we enter the 1960s. In short, with its backbone of deferred independence broken, Eurafrica had ceased to be a viable project.

But as we shall come back to later, this explanation has very little to say about the fact that Africa, with a few exceptions, did *not* run away from the EEC after formal independence had been reached. On the contrary, the EEC's African association was continued through the signing of the Yaoundé Convention in 1963, although this time with nominally independent states on the African side. Equally importantly, it offers no clues as to why Eurafrica also disappeared from the radar of scholars and intellectuals, a predicament that has left the vast field of EU studies practically void of any serious investigations into a matter of paramount importance in all efforts at European integration.¹⁷ So

¹⁷ In early EU studies, it was generally recognized that parts of Africa and the Common Market were bound together in one imperial polity, and social scientists saw the association agreement as one of the central features of the EEC. For instance, in the very first issue of the *Journal of Common Market Studies*, since then the major organ of its field, Thomas Balogh dealt comprehensively with 'Africa and the Common Market' (*Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1962, pp. 79–112). Similarly, the earlier cited article by Carol Ann Cosgrove from 1969, 'The Common Market and its colonial heritage' (*Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1969), sets out from what was self-evident at the time: 'That the EEC was endowed with a colonial heritage is not in dispute' (p. 73). Erling Bjøl, in his monumental dissertation *La France devant l'Europe: La politique européenne de la IVe République* (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1966), states that the colonial question in Africa was one of three major motivations behind France's support of European integration (pp. 262–72, 295–6). In another major work, Mario Andreis reaffirmed the central importance of Eurafrica: *L'Africa e la Comunità economica europea* (Torino: Einaudi, 1967), as did Uwe Kitzinger in *The Challenge of the Common Market*, pp. 88–107. In the 1960s, too, Max Liniger-Goumaz synthesized what back then looked like an emerging field of 'Eurafrican studies' in the form of an analysis and a comprehensive bibliography of writings on Eurafrica from the Pan-European organization to the EEC. For the bibliography, see Max Liniger-Goumaz, *Eurafrigue* (Geneva: Les Éditions du temps, 1970); and, for the survey, Max Liniger-Goumaz, *Eurafrigue: Utopie ou réalité?* (Yaoundé: Editions CLE, 1972). These promising beginnings are signposts to research directions that still, fifty years later, remain largely unexplored.

how do we explain and analyse this complex of (1) Eurafrica's loss of political salience, resulting from African decolonization in the early 1960s; (2) Eurafrica's central structural elements nonetheless being carried over into the new association regime; and (3) Eurafrica's sinking into oblivion within research, in general, and EU studies, in particular? Could these processes even be jointly analysed, since they seem to operate at quite different levels? We think they could; indeed, we think this necessary in order to cut to the heart of the Eurafrican matter. In other words, by approaching these three problems as inter-related we will also be able to provide a historical conceptualization of Eurafrica as such.

Vanishing mediator: The historical logic of Eurafrica

In order to do this we need to set out from the Eurafrican complex itself and try to come to terms with the apparent paradox that we have just outlined: the fact that Eurafrica was premised on an opposition to independence while simultaneously, as we reach the postwar period, distancing itself from colonialism, which explains why Eurafrica could appeal to colonialists and anti-colonialists alike. We glimpse an answer as soon as we turn the question on its head: Was it perhaps this ability to encompass contradictory historical tendencies and satisfy opposing political interests that explains Eurafrica's successful realization?

In this book we have argued that Eurafrica was a political project that gained strength and momentum under historical circumstances that, starting with the 'Wilsonian moment' after World War I, gradually trapped Europe's imperial states in a double bind. All over their empires they had to reckon with increasingly militant political demands for national independence and sovereignty at the same time as they confronted the unavoidable prerequisite of integrating the resources of Europe and Africa into a viable strategic and economic area. Such circumstances made Eurafrica appear as a rational option, in the view of many European leaders. Or, as Enzo Grilli puts it: 'Association based

on Euro-Africanism, was then extensively used to try to preserve the influence of the metropole, while allowing the colonies to acquire various degrees of autonomy.¹⁸ However, Eurafrica was embraced not just because it served as a political and economic formation in which national independence was simply harmonized with regional economic and military integration, but rather because it was a formation that apparently made it possible to avoid the undesired aspects of both. Eurafrica envisioned the granting of a type of conditional autonomy or quasi-independence, specifically designed to serve as a bulwark against their negative corollaries in the form of protectionism, nationalist competition and anti-Western resentment; and it allowed for regional integration and consolidation of Europe's control of Africa, but without having to carry the blame for colonial exploitation and explicit white supremacy.

As we have seen, too, not only was the Eurafrican programme able to avoid these negative dimensions but also to purvey its solution as a new community, built on an equal partnership, mutual trust and interdependence, the different polities of which could now chart a course towards a brighter future. Historian Thomas Moser – in the only truly comprehensive treatment of the topic so far – sums up this aspect by stating that Eurafrica served as an ‘integrating and guiding image’ (*Integrationsleitbild*), which impacted considerably on ‘the evolution of [European] integration as well as on decolonization in the transition from the late colonial to the post-colonial era.’¹⁹ His interpretation echoes that of René Girault, who asserts that the decision of the Treaty of Rome to associate the colonial possessions ‘constituted an important milestone in France’s politics of decolonization.’²⁰ While there is some

¹⁸ Enzo R. Grilli, *The European Community and the Developing Countries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 1.

¹⁹ Thomas Moser, *Europäische Integration, Dekolonisation, Eurafrika: Eine historische Analyse über die Entstehungsbedingungen der Eurafricanischen Gemeinschaft von der Weltwirtschaftskrise bis zum Jaunde-Vertrag, 1929–1963* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2000), p. 516.

²⁰ René Girault, ‘La France entre l’Europe et l’Afrique’, in Enrico Serra (ed.), *Il Rilancio dell’Europa e i trattati di Roma/La Relance européenne et les traités de Rome: Actes du colloque de Rome, 25–28 mars 1987* (Brussels: Bruylant, 1989), p. 376.

truth in both these statements, Moser's final conclusion is less accurate: 'The Eurafrican community founded, in anticolonial spirit and for the first time in the history of their relationship, a partnership of equality between Europeans and Africans and thus gave an essential contribution to securing peace and regulating conflicts in a bi-polar world.'²¹ Girault is just as tendentious as he asserts that France, 'by imposing its European partners to take care of the OCTs, [...] pushed Europe to think about aid to underdeveloped countries.'²²

Our analysis of the EEC negotiations process lends no support to such conclusions. On the contrary, the 'spirit' of the EEC negotiations was imbued by old colonial paradigms and structures of reference. Also, what resulted was not a partnership of equality, but a licensed patronage in which the superior partner would continue overseeing and developing the inferior one. Moreover, Moser's and Girault's optimistic assessments fail to account for the dialectical character of the Eurafrican project, which secured a continuation for colonialism and at the same time went beyond it.²³

In order to make sense of this, let us return to a point made in Chapter 2. There we saw that the Eurafrican idea originally rested on the myth of the dark continent and the evolutionist paradigm stressing the white man's civilizing mission, and on the sense that Europe was in decline and could attain such scale as was necessary for its sustainability only by internationalizing the colonial exploitation of Africa. These were the *ideological* components of the Eurafrican project as it emerged in the interwar period. By the time Eurafrica was realized through the association of the African colonies to the EEC, these

²¹ Moser, *Europäische Integration, Dekolonisation, Eurafrika*, p. 517.

²² Girault, 'La France entre l'Europe et l'Afrique', p. 377.

²³ Martin Rempe, by contrast, recognizes the Eurafrican association regime as a 'compromise', enabling France to align its African and European spheres of influence, and to eventually choose Europe as 'far more attractive'. As Rempe argues, Eurafrica contributed to the gradual decolonization of French interests, yet leaves the question open as to whether this also served to decolonize Africa. See Martin Rempe, 'Decolonization by Europeanization? The early EEC and the transformation of French-African relations', *KFG Working Paper Series*, No. 27, May 2011, Freie Universität, Berlin.

components were all transmuted. Now, Eurafrica was motivated by the importance of bringing social and economic development to the world's poor and by the strategic interests of the West faced with 'communist totalitarianism' and its alleged Pan-African or Pan-Arabic filiations. Yet, beneath these transformed ideological motivations, the underlying economic and geopolitical machinery remained steady. In the late 1950s, as in the early 1920s, Europe's economy needed Africa's markets and resources, and the two continents were seen as locked in a relationship of geopolitical complementarity. In the political and ideological register, then, Eurafrica was transformed from the founding days of the Pan-European Union to its realization in the form of EEC association. In the geopolitical and geo-economic register, by contrast, it demonstrates a remarkable constancy.

The historical importance of Eurafrica, and the reason for its successful establishment, would thus seem to lie in this capacity to effect an energy exchange, a transition of political investment, between two differing ideologies and *thereby* to ensure a continuation of old relations of dominance even under the new system. Or, to put this differently, Eurafrica changed the ways in which the world system and especially the relations between Europe and Africa were described and understood, and this in order to allow trade, traffic and power to remain unchanged. Therefore Eurafrica was far more than an 'integrating image', as Moser argues; it was an actually existing historical institution and community, but of the specific, transitory character that is best described as what Fredric Jameson has called a 'vanishing mediator': a historical catalyst that ensures a smooth passage from one historical period or paradigm of thought to its different successor.

Jameson develops his concept of the 'vanishing mediator' in an analysis of Max Weber's theory of the Protestant ethic. As a doctrine mediating between medieval religious structures and the secularized world of modernity, Protestantism initially presented itself as a superior and more authentic form of religious doctrine as opposed to Catholicism. Yet, through its rationalization of religious experience into an individual concern (of solitary reading and prayer demanding

excruciating self-discipline), in relation to which the ceremonies and hierarchies of the Church started to appear like false ornamentation, the Protestant ethic prepared the way for a secularized society in which religion as such would become superfluous for individual self-fulfilment. In Jameson's reading of Weber's analysis, this then implies that the Protestant ethic had a specific historical 'purpose' to fulfil, after which it could be dismantled and forgotten.²⁴

This seems to correspond to Eurafrica's function in the history of European integration and colonialism. In a first phase, Europe's colonial states, France in particular, understand that colonial sovereignty can be sustained in Africa only by collaborating with other European states – that is, by forming Eurafrica. This Eurafrican formation then fosters European integration and a partial Europeanization of colonialism. Once the responsibility for investments in Africa and the advantages of African trade is coordinated at an international level, the Eurafrican system can shed its colonial designation and draw on other sources for its legitimation, such as the United Nations and the emerging development discourse. When this is achieved, Eurafrica has fulfilled its function and can be dropped as a designation of the newly instituted community which is now indistinguishable from the world order as such, a postcolonial order in which relations between Africa and Europe are settled through international negotiations (the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions), but in which the economic relations inherited from the colonial era are nonetheless kept intact. All this is achieved through the vanishing mediation of the Eurafrican formation, the function of which, as it appears in hindsight, is to preserve existent relations of dominance by way of a change of inscription. Having fulfilled this function, Eurafrica 'vanishes', thus creating the impression of a historical break or discontinuity – between colonial and postcolonial, pre- and post-European integration, white supremacy and 'partnership', 'colonial exploitation' and 'development', 'civilizing

²⁴ Fredric Jameson, 'The vanishing mediator; or, Max Weber as storyteller', in Jameson, *The Ideologies of Theory, Essays 1971–1986; Volume 2: The Syntax of History* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), pp. 3–34.

mission' and 'third-world aid', the rupture being nicely symbolized by the *annus mirabilis* of 1957, which saw both the Treaty of Rome's establishment of the Eurafrican community and the first colonial territory in Africa (Ghana) emerging from colonial subjugation to independent statehood. As a vanishing mediator, then, Eurafrica produced the preconditions for its own disappearance. Yet, the transition from a colonial world order dominated by Europe into the world regime of global capitalism would not have been possible without its mediation.

This interpretation of the Eurafrican project has several advantages. For one thing, it helps to explain the resilience of the Eurafrican project, which over a period of several decades served as a geopolitical representation that could harbour so many diverging economic, strategic and geopolitical interests and tendencies that it could finally count on approval from virtually all political groupings of the West, and also from a substantial part of the African elite, with the exception only of staunch anti-imperialists, communists and Pan-Africanists.

Second, and from the perspective of a global theory of twentieth-century European and African history, the neglected causality and vanishing mediator of Eurafrica is able to make sense both of *the political and discursive discontinuity* and *the infrastructural or economic continuity* between the late colonial period and an emerging neo-colonial globalization. We put stress on the global vantage point here, for it is only from such a perspective that we have been able to observe the intrinsic relations between processes that are usually understood as separate: European integration on the one hand, African decolonization on the other. Once the intrinsic link between these is identified, we become aware of the historical importance of Eurafrica as a historical catalyst that explains both the continuity of the underlying economic system and the political and ideological discontinuity that makes us ignore this very continuity. Thus, by evincing the relation between the foundation of the EU and Africa's decolonization we have in this book detected a historical causality common to both, and this shows that what history books picture as the end of an old system and the start of a new one was not a discontinuity but a gradual process

that made the old system seamlessly pass over into a new one, without changing the fundamental parameters determining the relation of Africa and Europe. What appeared to be a discontinuity therefore turns out to be a continuity, and we can thus appreciate how this continuity necessitated the generation of the ideological mirage of a rupture: Eurafrica as a new dawn following the night of colonialism.

If this is true, we also understand how Eurafrica as a vanishing mediator helped to enable two 'myths' or historical frames that have dominated historical accounts of both the EU and postcolonial Africa: the idea of the EU as a pure origin and new start; and the idea of decolonization as a rupture providing African states with parity and agency in international relations. We also realize that, in combination, the two myths contribute to a third variety of myth and historical error, exemplified by Moser and Girault above, according to which the EEC is then credited with having made decolonization and African independence possible. Once these myths are established and worked out in so many institutional and intellectual contexts, they displace, erase and suppress historical causality itself, and replace it with an idea of political constitution, which is then commemorated and celebrated in a variety of cultural manifestations and, not least, transformed into an episteme serving as the starting point for so much research and intellectual labour, or what we today call EU studies. These myths, in other words, will serve as a foundation of the very paradigm within which the history of the EU and its relationship to both colonial and postcolonial Africa is elaborated.

In this history, as should be clear by now, the historicity of the Eurafrican project drops out of the picture, indeed must be made invisible, for otherwise neither the Treaty of Rome and the EEC, nor the 'moment' of African decolonization could be represented as new beginnings, but rather would emerge as moments in a continuous story of Europe's century-long dominance over Africa.

Eurafrica's disappearance from history

As indicated, then, the third advantage of the interpretation we offer is its ability to explain why Eurafica has been consigned to oblivion in research on the history of European integration and the history of colonialism. For, as we have stated, it is today virtually unknown that most of the visions, movements and concrete institutional arrangements working towards European integration in the inter- and postwar periods placed Africa's incorporation into the European enterprise as a central objective. But here we need to supplement this metahistorical framework of Eurafica's function as a vanishing mediator by grasping some more concrete frames of historical explanation that have served to perpetuate Eurafica's exclusion from the vast field of European integration studies as well as most other areas of historical inquiry. Some of these we already touched on in our introductory chapter, and they revolve around what we may call methodological continentalism, methodological nationalism and methodological Eurocentrism.

In the first case, the histories of Europe and Africa are conceived as insular continental entities. As Carl Ritter, one of the founders of human geography, stated: 'Each continent is like itself alone [...] each one was so planned and formed as to have its own special function in the progress of human culture.'²⁵ This framework, still part and parcel of mental maps daily fabricated to make sense of history and current affairs, prompts the idea that continental landmasses literally make sense – that is, they produce meaning by signifying apparently meaningful distinctions between human societies and events for the simple reason that such things can be spatially referred to different continental units. The pattern was set in Europe, long seen as the central continent, of course. Now, Europe is no separate landmass, but it awarded itself status as a continent because it could be argued

²⁵ Carl Ritter, *Comparative Geography* [1864], trans. William L. Cag (reprint, New York: American Book Company, 1973), p. 183. Quoted in Martin W. Lewis and Karen E. Wigen, *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1997), p. 30.

that it formed a coherent cultural region. As Martin Lewis and Kären Wigen point out, the definition of Europe as a continent in cultural terms implied that other continents could be similarly defined.²⁶ At stake in continentalism is thus a specific geographical, environmental and racial determinism. As we have seen, the Eurafrican programme was in one sense imprisoned in continentalism, because it saw Europe and Africa as opposed but complementary in economic, historical and racial terms. In another sense, it went beyond continentalism as it was conditioned by a geopolitical imagination that conceived of the world in terms not of continents but of world regions or panregions. Evidence of this is the way in which the proponents of Eurafrica regarded the Mediterranean Sea; Africa and Europe were not separated by it, but united by it. As François Mitterrand contended, the Mediterranean was the bright blue lake at the heart of Eurafrica;²⁷ and Herman Sörgel wanted to turn the lake into a giant hydroelectric dam, as we saw in Chapter 2. In this context, then, the suppression of Eurafrica from history has a spatial or geographical counterpart in the transformation of the Mediterranean from a uniting surface into a separating mote, a transformation that both inspires and is inspired by a ‘myth of continents’ that disregards connections between the histories of Africa and Europe. EU studies offers an excellent illustration of this, as it continues to inscribe the history of European integration as something that took place only on the European landmass.²⁸

Moving on to the second case, of methodological nationalism, it is clear that this is another reason why Eurafrica has not entered the surveys of Europe’s colonial history. Indeed, historians of colonialism still seem constrained by the national and linguistic barriers laid in

²⁶ Lewis and Wigen, *The Myth of Continents*, pp. 36–7.

²⁷ François Mitterrand, *Aux Frontières de l’Union Française* (Paris: René Julliard, 1953), pp. 153–5.

²⁸ For an instructive illustration of this tendency to define even imperial aspects of the history of the EU in continental terms, see Gary Marks, ‘Europe and its empires: From Rome to the European Union’ *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1–20; and our response: Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, ‘Imperial origins of European integration and the case of Eurafrica: A reply to Gary Marks’ “Europe and its empires”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 6, 2012, pp. 1028–41.

place by the old colonial powers; and, at best, they compensate for this by engaging in traditional exercises of comparative history that never approach the intergovernmental and supranational levels and logics of European integration.²⁹ From this perspective, the detailed knowledge that we have of Europe's colonial history in no way constitutes a colonial history *of Europe*, but it is rather a set of compilations, comparisons and surveys of the various colonial projects, engagements and involvements of so many different European colonial powers. The primary unit of this historiography remains the nation state (or, better, the imperial/colonial state), which provides an organizing framework for the empirical data at hand. As long as colonialism is understood through such an epistemological frame, it apparently can have little significance for the European integration project. As *cultural memory and political history* colonialism will then exist as an object of knowledge in Europe only to the extent that this or that national culture or history can serve as its archival container or frame of reference.

Yet, having said this, we should also note that there is in fact a growing field of research that is examining the impact of colonialism and decolonization on historical as well as current notions of Europe and European identity, and which thus highlights that colonialism also needs to be approached as a shared (Western) European experience, which in many ways transgresses particular national outlooks. However, this research also suffers from an almost complete lack of engagement with the question of European integration.³⁰

²⁹ A showcase of this tendency is a recent book entitled *L'Europe face à son passé colonial*, edited by Olivier Dard and Daniel Lefeuvre (Paris: Riveneuve editions, 2008), which despite its promising title actually does not say a word about Europe and its colonial past. Rather, the book contains the usual inventory of the colonial pasts of France, Portugal, Italy, Germany, etc. Illustrative also is James R. Lehning's *European Colonialism Since 1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), published in a prestigious new series of textbooks called 'New Approaches to European History', which does not even register that there was a *European* colonialism beyond that of Europe's various imperial states. Lehning mentions the EEC only once, as he asserts – incorrectly – that the EEC 'created an alternative engine of metropolitan prosperity in which it was difficult [for France] to fit the colonial empire' (p. 285).

³⁰ For an example, see Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

Considering that critical explorations of notions of 'Europe' are the hallmark of postcolonial studies, this neglect constitutes a puzzle, particularly in view of the fact that no project since European colonialism has carried itself more proudly *in the name of Europe* than the historical European integration and the current European Union. As such, postcolonial studies have failed to address the organizational and institutional settings – such as the EU – where 'European' policy is actually being articulated and where the official historiography is being propagated.

That Europe *as Europe* – that is, as a politically, economically and legally sanctioned organization in its own right, and not merely as a nebulous historical, cultural or civilizational unit – has a colonial history thus remains a well-kept secret. This point is also substantiated by the ways in which the history of the European Union is conceived and disseminated by some of its most influential practitioners. Historian Norman Davies' view of the matter is typical, claiming, as he does in his magnum opus *Europe: A History*, that '[d]ecolonization was a necessary precondition for the emergence of a new European Community of equal, democratic partners.'³¹ Likewise, William Hitchcock states that in Western Europe of the 1950s economic expansion and the dissolution of the European colonial empires were 'closely linked' phenomena: 'As Europe grew richer, its states increasingly bound together by economic and political ties, the colonies shrank in importance.'³² Along the same lines, Clemens Wurm argues that '[t]he objective of European unity gained measurable importance as France, under pressure from colonial nationalism and the superpowers, was forced to abandon its colonial illusions.' Rather than discerning of France's European strategy as a means to retain, reform and develop its colonial empire, Wurm, like so many other scholars, thus frames the French position as one reducible to an either/or logic: 'Power through the Empire *or* through Europe was the

³¹ Norman Davies, *Europe: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 1068.

³² William I. Hitchcock, *The Struggle for Europe: The Turbulent History of a Divided Continent 1945–2002* (London: Profile Books, 2003), p. 162.

French Alternative.³³ In the early 1960s, commenting on the Mollet government's objectives a few years earlier, U. W. Kitzinger, who was Secretary of the Council of Europe's Economic Committee, correctly asserted that it was precisely the other way around. France did not have to choose between Empire *or* Europe; through Eurafrican association it rather managed to retain both: 'For the new French government the [European] Economic Community was in fact a Eurafrican as much as a European scheme.'³⁴ 'Paris', as Cosgrove could confirm in 1969, 'was adamant that her colonial links should not be weakened by the creation of the Common Market.'³⁵

Although acknowledging that colonialism had a bearing on European integration in the early postwar years, Walter Lipgens – the late doyen of the history of European integration – takes care to postulate such a colonial impact exclusively in negative terms. By definition, then, postwar colonial ambitions are said to have worked to slow and obstruct the process of European integration and so can be tacitly written off as having been void of any dynamic or facilitating potential for this same process. Instead of probing the issue, Lipgens deduces it counterfactually and rhetorically by leaving the reader with a 'fruitless' yet revealing speculation as to 'how much more smoothly European unification in its first decisive stage would have proceeded if the almost total loss of empire had occurred, and had been seen to occur, at the same time as all the other losses arising from the Second World War, instead of taking a further fifteen years to complete.'³⁶ Such a framing thus effectively eliminates the possibility of the converse relation, where 'empire' also created an incentive for European integration.

Andrew Moravcsik, finally, goes the whole hog in his widely cited *The Choice for Europe*, designating not just empire but geopolitical

³³ Clemens Wurm, 'Two paths to Europe: Great Britain and France from a comparative perspective', in Clemens Wurm (ed.), *Western Europe and Germany: The Beginnings of European Integration, 1945–1960* (Oxford: Berg, 1995), p. 179, our emphasis.

³⁴ U. W. Kitzinger, 'Europe: The Six and the Seven', *International Organization*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1960, p. 31.

³⁵ Cosgrove, 'The Common Market and its colonial heritage', p. 76.

³⁶ Walter A. Lipgens, *A History of European Integration*, Vol. 1, 1945–7 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), pp. 12–13.

aims in general as basically void of any significant explanatory clout when accounting for the birth of the EEC in the 1950s. Referring specifically to the French agenda, Moravcsik claims that 'geopolitical concerns' only 'played modest roles,' by far trailing 'economic' motivations; in fact, geopolitical objectives 'probably mitigated *against* the Treaty'.³⁷ In order to discard geopolitical explanations, Moravcsik is also forced to make numerous deceptive assertions as concerns the general historical context in which the founding of the EEC occurred. As we should be led to believe, for instance, 'Colonial considerations decline quickly in the 1950s and 1960s.' By the same token, 'The EC emerged after, not before, the resolution of major geopolitical issues.' Accordingly, Moravcsik goes on, both advocates and sceptics of the Treaty of Rome negotiations were guided by 'the realization that geopolitical issues were no longer at stake'.³⁸ Empirically speaking, as we have shown, this is clearly inaccurate. But then we need to add that Moravcsik's contention builds on an arbitrary conceptual distinction between explanations drawing from the economic or commercial realm of interests and objectives on the one hand, and explanations drawing from the geopolitical realm on the other. Needless to say, since economic and geopolitical objectives are often crafted in interdependence – although neither can be collapsed into the other – this distinction, or either/or perspective, is unsustainable for purposes of empirical historical analysis.

This notwithstanding, Moravcsik makes no secret about his awareness of the great import of France's demands of associating (or 'including', as Moravcsik terms it) the colonial territories with the EEC. At first sight this would seem to cast doubt on his relegation of geopolitical explanations. Not so, however, because in Moravcsik's view colonial association under the Treaty of Rome had next to nothing to do with geopolitics but belonged in the column for economic explanations: 'The two conditions imposed by the Socialist congress of 1956

³⁷ Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 121, italics in original.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 34, 135–6.

on the [EEC] negotiations were in large part economic: social harmonization and the inclusion of overseas territories.’³⁹

To be sure, on one occasion Moravcsik acknowledges that France’s determination ‘to maintain the economic viability of present and former French colonies’ was ‘predicted by both the political economy and geopolitical explanations’. And this is of course how it should be, indeed must be, since any economic activity in *colonies* is predicated on some type of geopolitical arrangement able to sustain such activity. To subtract geopolitical aspects from France’s plans to have the EEC secure her colonies’ ‘economic viability’ is, then, clearly a maths that does not add up. Yet Moravcsik feels perfectly confident in his pursuit of doing precisely this. What makes this even more peculiar is that from there he goes on to group ‘decolonization’ among France’s ‘geopolitical concerns’ without any hint of what he must be perfectly aware of – namely, that France’s EEC scheme (or Eurafrican scheme) to boost the colonial ‘economic viability’ by way of Algerian incorporation and colonial association had everything to do with keeping decolonization at bay. This method of erecting a conceptual firewall between economic and geopolitical explanations for the founding of the EEC thus proves a safe way of getting the matter wrong. For as we have seen, the birth of the EEC rather needs to be understood as resulting from a mutually conducive dynamic of economic, geopolitical as well as cultural factors, a dynamic that, needless to say, is very well captured in the Eurafrican scheme.

In consequence of such and other similar accounts, both European integration as a historical process and the EEC/EU as an organizational and institutional entity have been placed outside and beyond the history of colonialism.

Additionally, the disappearance of Eurafrica and the disavowal of the connection between European integration and colonialism also have to do with the fact that the Eurafrican project does not fit the dominant historiographical paradigm that understands the postwar relationship between Europe and Africa as an aspect of the general

³⁹ Ibid., p. 121.

Cold War situation and with the presumed historical rupture of 'decolonization' as a pivotal moment. Most accounts of EU history are informed by a strict adherence to a Cold War analytical framework as developed within, inter alia, International Relations scholarship. In this framework, Africa and the North–South dimension are neglected as factors impacting and shaping the historical trajectory of European integration, and the import of colonialism is at best treated in a cursory fashion. As should have become obvious from our account so far, Eurafrica cannot be reduced to a simple auxiliary to the Cold War and the efforts to contain the spread of Communism in Africa. To a significant extent, of course, it did form part of that too. But, and to apply Matthew Connelly's astute idea of 'taking off the Cold War lens,' Eurafrica must also be construed as a strategy of containment in its own right, targeting various anti-colonial and anti-Western movements that were growing in the Southern hemisphere and which were not, by far, reducible to Moscow puppets – i.e. Pan-Africanism, Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism.⁴⁰ As late as 1958 *The New York Times* was still describing Africa as 'the greatest "uncommitted" region of the globe today,' continuing to live 'a dim sort of half-life' at a distance from the main battlegrounds of the Cold War.⁴¹ Indeed, the political actors, intellectuals and institutions shaping the content and direction of European integration also saw it as deeply entrenched in a North–South struggle, and thus as a response to an allegedly deepening conflict between Christian and Muslim civilizations, between universal values and jihad, and between the white European race to the one side and the 'hordes' of brown, black and yellow races to the other.⁴²

This is not to deny that the path towards European integration and the paths towards independence taken by anti-colonial movements in

⁴⁰ See Matthew Connelly's pioneering 'Taking off the Cold War lens: Visions of North–South conflict during the Algerian War for Independence', *American Historical Review*, Vol. 105, No. 3, 2002, pp. 739–69; and also his *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

⁴¹ 'Struggle for Africa' (editorial), *The New York Times*, 19 January 1958.

⁴² Connelly, 'Taking off the Cold War lens'; *A Diplomatic Revolution*.

Africa and Asia were heavily conditioned by the Cold War. The very designation of the newly independent states as a 'third world' – supplementing the capitalist 'first world' and the socialist 'second world' – seems to have been perpetuated by the Cold War global order. As we have seen, however, in the 1950s this influence was overdetermined by a concerted European effort to secure supremacy over Africa and thus establish a 'third' geopolitical sphere, Eurafrica, that would remain out of reach of Soviet penetration and relatively independent of direct American influence. The underlying aim was to grant Europe a measure of geopolitical leverage and secure its economic sustainability, and at the same time defend Europe's interests against challenges posed by anti-colonial insurrections and wars of liberation – Vietnam, Algeria, Cameroon, to mention a few – and by the nonaligned movement of former colonies, those that convened at the Bandung meeting, or transformed the United Nations General Assembly into a platform for debating global injustices or endeavoured a united Pan-African front against Europe's colonial powers (see Figure 5.6). As *The New York Times* conveyed in June 1957:

One of the outstanding French apostles of 'Eurafrica,' Pierre-Henri Teitgen, said in a speech at the Congress of Europe in Rome Monday that for Africa the alternatives were to choose 'the American bloc, the Soviet world, the Bandung coalition, the Asian-African group or free Europe.' He added that this choice would involve much more than merely an economic link, such as is provided in the common market treaty.⁴³

Teitgen here listed the foreign policy challenges in relation to which the six European states that founded the EEC in 1957 sought to develop and modernize their imperial policy. The European integration process provided an opportunity for doing that, just as the geopolitical changes affecting the imperial order in the postwar context provided an opportunity for European integration. Taken together, these processes

⁴³ 'Ambiguity in France,' *The New York Times*, 15 June 1957.

Figure 5.6 The Bandung movement, as feared by the French-Algerian organization 'Friends of the Sahara and Eurafrica.' The city of Bandoeng is connected to each capital of the states of the non-aligned movement. Source: *Eurafrigue: Revue générale d'action africaine et méditerranéenne*, No. 14, April 1958. Bibliothèque nationale de France.

generated an internationalization of colonialism, what Ghana's first president Kwame Nkrumah denounced as 'collective colonialism' or what Europeans may have perceived as a 'reformed colonialism' or what French philosopher Alexandre Kojève, who was also an official at the Foreign Ministry, in 1957 oxymoronically called a 'giving colonialism'.⁴⁴ In justifying the association of the overseas territories as a way of improving the social and economic development of the colonies, in some ways the EEC did not differ from an older imperialism that had justified itself in much the same way. Yet, by bringing such a policy to an international level, the EEC's association of overseas countries and territories allowed Europe to posit its presence and interests in Africa as a new relationship of 'interdependence', which, just like 'Eurafrica', was a buzzword in the 1950s.

'European hunting ground': Decolonization held in check

This leads us to the fourth and major advantage of the interpretation we offer. It provides a superior explanation of the ways in which Africa and the relations between Europe and Africa evolved in the postcolonial era. For if the misrecognition that prevents us from relating the EU to colonial history is dispelled, and if the history of Eurafrica is put back into the picture, we understand why decolonization never constituted a significant rupture with the past – except in states where leaders and movements explicitly tried to break with the colonial rulers. The EEC's 'offer' of association to the Common Market here turned out to be an efficient antidote to Pan-Africanism, and this may even be said to have been its true historical purpose: to adjust Europe's foreign policy, modes of economic extraction and means of production to a nominally independent Africa, while ensuring that

⁴⁴ Kwame Nkrumah, 'Address to the Nationalists' Conference, June 4, 1962' (Accra, 1962), p. 12. Alexandre Kojève, 'Colonialism from a European point of view', trans. Erik de Vries, *Interpretation*, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2001, pp. 91–130.

the continent's resources remained within Europe's reach. The success of this strategy is amply illustrated in Arnold Rivkin's (at the time Development Advisor to the World Bank) enthusiastic account in 1966 of the EEC's 'fruitful' Eurafrican association scheme. 'Guinea's attitude,' Rivkin writes disparagingly, has 'been one of hostility to the association of other African states with the EEC. President Touré has viewed, not without reason, the existence of so attractive an alternative as the European Common Market as a serious obstacle to the achievement of his original Pan-African designs.'⁴⁵ In Rivkin's view, then, Guinea's and Ghana's stance on EEC association 'as a new neo-colonial application of the old "divide and rule" principle' cannot amount to anything but a mistaken obstinacy, totally at odds with these countries' own best interests.

As Nkrumah had it, the Treaty of Rome could 'be compared to the treaty that emanated from the Congress of Berlin' in 1885; 'the latter treaty established the undisputed sway of colonialism in Africa, the former marks the advent of neo-colonialism in Africa.'⁴⁶ Eurafrica, as conceived by the EEC, represented a new-fangled 'system of collective colonialism which will be stronger and more dangerous than the old evils we are striving to liquidate,' Nkrumah stated.⁴⁷ More specifically, leaders such as Nkrumah and Touré saw the EEC's Eurafrican design not only as strategy to foil national independence in Africa per se; more importantly perhaps, they also saw it as a deliberate attempt to frustrate the formation of any types of independently organized African integration and regionalization schemes – among numerous proposals we could mention the joint Ghana–Guinea proposals for an African Common Market.

⁴⁵ Arnold Rivkin, 'Africa and the European Common Market: A perspective,' *Monograph Series in World Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 4, (Denver: University of Denver, 1966), p. 40.

⁴⁶ Kwame Nkrumah, 'Address to the Ghana National Assembly,' 30 May 1961; quoted in Guy Martin, *Africa in World Politics: A Pan-African Perspective* (Trenton and Asmara, Eritrea: Africa World Press, 2002), p. 9.

⁴⁷ Nkrumah, 'Address to the Nationalists' Conference,' p. 12. Interestingly, Cosgrove also refers to 'collective colonialism,' yet without any reference to Nkrumah: 'In some respects the association of African territories with the EEC can be said to have produced collective colonialism.' Cosgrove, 'The Common Market and its Colonial Heritage,' p. 78.

Asked by *Der Spiegel* about Eurafrica and Guinea's relation to the European Common Market, Sekou Touré thus explained in 1959 that Guinea wanted to turn its economic relations in other directions. He dismissed Eurafrica as 'just a European idea for Africa,' which in reality entailed 'an extension of Europe to Africa. The Europeans must get that out of their heads. That is spatial thinking, strategic thinking, be it military, political or economic.'⁴⁸ Likewise, Frantz Fanon denounced Eurafrica because 'it sanctioned the fragmentation of Africa into European areas of influence and only for the benefit of the European economies.'⁴⁹ He also regarded Eurafrica as a strategy to attain international support and European backing for France's increasingly desperate attempt to hold Algeria; "Africa, hunting ground of France" tends to be substituted for a second formula, "Africa, hunting ground of Europe", Fanon wrote.⁵⁰

By contrast, Tunisian president Habib Bourguiba believed that the EEC's effort to create an integrated economic sphere encompassing Europe and Africa contained a 'true opportunity' for both. Yet it could come about only under conditions of peace and independence for all involved. As long as France conducted a 'full-scale war' against an Algerian people engaged in a 'true struggle, a heroic struggle, an epic struggle for liberation,' Eurafrica along with the plans for developing Sahara's oil and mineral resources would come to nothing. Bourguiba thus predicted that 'Eurafrica will die in Algeria'.⁵¹

If these voices represent one end of the spectrum of African opinions on Eurafrica at the crucial moment of decolonization, the other end was eloquently represented by the imposing figure of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the first West African cabinet member under Guy

⁴⁸ 'Frankreichs Zeit in Afrika ist abgelaufen: Ein Spiegel-Gespräch mit dem Ministerpräsidenten von Guinea, Sekou Touré, *Der Spiegel*, 28 January 1959, pp. 40–7.

⁴⁹ Frantz Fanon, 'Appel aux Africains', in *Pour la révolution africaine: Écrits politiques* (Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 2006), p. 151; originally published in *El Moudjahid*, No. 29, 17 September 1958.

⁵⁰ Frantz Fanon, 'Une crise continuée', in *Pour la révolution africaine*, p. 126; originally published in *El Moudjahid*, No. 23, 5 May 1958.

⁵¹ 'Wenn ein Volk seinen Verstand verliert. Ein Spiegel-Gespräch mit dem tunesischen Staatspräsidenten Burgiba, *Der Spiegel*, 18 September 1957, pp. 45–6.

Mollet and future president of Ivory Coast. As we saw in Chapter 4, he was a fervent supporter of Mollet's Eurafrican vision and instrumental in bringing about both the integration of the Sahara regions and the colonial association agreement in the Treaty of Rome. According to Houphouët-Boigny, African independence should be conducted in close partnership with the former colonial powers. As he argued, this was due in part to the political inexperience of the Africans, in part to the general world development towards closer international cooperation and interdependence, a situation in which, as he put it, 'even the largest, the most powerful [...] nations can no longer enjoy the deceptive luxury of isolation'.⁵² Instead of African independence, then, Houphouët-Boigny, echoing Guy Mollet and others, called for Eurafrican interdependence.

It was such views that triggered Fanon to state that Houphouët-Boigny was 'objectively the most conscious obstacle to the evolution and liberation of Africa' and that the Africans would have 'much to gain by isolating him and hasten his fall'.⁵³ However, the majority of African leaders followed Houphouët-Boigny's example, if ever so hesitantly. They moved into the structures and networks laid in place by the now coordinated Europeans, often modelling themselves on the routines of the French and Belgian administrations, and allowed European landowners and companies to carry on as before. For African states stuck at the threshold of independence, Eurafrica was an arrangement that allowed the political elites of what subsequently became (nominally) independent states to posit themselves as partners in a world of 'interdependent' states and regional formations, while at the same time accommodating the economic demands and policies of their former colonial masters. This was to be conducted through arrangements – such as the 1963 Yaoundé Convention – from which both camps would benefit considerably, at the cost of the majority of Africans for whom change came slowly or not at all.

⁵² 'African conciliator'. *The New York Times*, 8 August 1961.

⁵³ Fanon, 'Cette Afrique à venir', in *Pour la révolution africaine*, p. 203.

As Ali Mazrui discussed in 1963, the EEC association therefore raised uncertainties and objections on several levels among African leaders.⁵⁴ The situation was also summed up early on by Immanuel Wallerstein in two influential volumes: *Africa: The Politics of Independence* (1961); and *Africa: The Politics of Unity* (1967). Identifying the Treaty of Rome as the major factor affecting the economic structures of Africa in the early 1960s, Wallerstein was, at this point, unable to offer any conclusive assessment as to its beneficial or detrimental impact on African economic development per se.

What Wallerstein was clear about, however, were the *political* consequences of the association of the African colonies to the EEC, which, in his view, raised forbidding obstacles to all attempts at creating African integration and unity. Most of the African states in the former French Union simply found it more practical to consolidate links with the EEC than to realize the ideas presented by the movements for African unity, subsequently organized in the Organization of African Unity (OAU). These ideas included the establishment of an African Common Market and an African payments union, a coordinated industrial development and coordinated transport facilities and, finally, an African Development Bank. Of these, only the development bank had been realized by 1967.⁵⁵ Wallerstein also quoted the 1960 assessment by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA):

The preferential arrangements of the Rome Treaty will tend to preserve and even strengthen the traditional features of African trade, namely concentration on industrialized markets to the exclusion of any significant trade flows between the various monetary zones of the continent [...] There is therefore a danger that the Rome Treaty may tempt [the Associated States] to prefer the short-run advantage of

⁵⁴ Ali A. Mazrui, 'African attitudes to the European Economic Community', *International Affairs*, Vol. 39, No. 1, 1963, pp. 24–36.

⁵⁵ Immanuel Wallerstein, *Africa: The Politics of Independence and Unity* (new edn, Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), part 2, pp. 129–51.

tariff concessions [in EEC markets] to the long-run gains of industrial development.⁵⁶

In dry language, the ECA report here declared that Eurafrica had been a winning strategy, achieving precisely what it had set out to accomplish. This early assessment – that ‘association with EEC can easily tend to perpetuate economic dependency’⁵⁷ – has since been corroborated by many. For instance, Obadiah Mailafia, in his comprehensive analysis of the economic development since African independence, concludes that the EEC’s ‘coercive association’ offered ‘a minimum of aid and trade concessions in exchange for continuation of European influence in the former colonies. EEC aid was oriented toward financing of infrastructures and was markedly biased against industrialization. It is therefore safe to conclude that association did not mark a major departure from the historical pattern of colonial development.’⁵⁸ Or, as Schofield Coryell put it at the time, in his evaluation of how the African territories had fared during the first five years of EEC association: ‘They thus remain essentially what they were: agricultural appendages to Europe.’⁵⁹

Wallerstein describes the process of decolonization in Africa as a political compromise between the colonial metropolitan governments and the nationalist leadership of Africa. The EEC states’ decision to associate the colonial possessions in Africa was of course not a negotiated compromise in the strict sense, as it was made before independence, yet its realization hinged on unofficial consent of African elites, who discovered that Eurafrican association was an arrangement favouring them and their political goals. Wallerstein continues:

⁵⁶ ‘The impact of Western European integration on African trade and development’, UN Economic and Social Council Document E/CN.14/72, 7 December 1960. Quoted in Wallerstein, *Africa*, part 2, pp. 137–8.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Obadiah Mailafia, *Europe and Economic Reform in Africa: Structural Adjustment and Economic Diplomacy* (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 60.

⁵⁹ Schofield Coryell, ‘French Africa and the Common Market’, *Africa Today*, Vol. 9, November, 1962, p. 13.

[T]his compromise was made at the expense of lower strata of the society (that is, small farmers, landless agricultural labor, unskilled and semiskilled urban workers, the unemployed school-leavers). Not only was this compromise made at their expense. It was intended to be at their expense. The metropolitan powers were making concessions in order to separate the nationalist leadership from these strata and prevent a more coherent and conscious degree of radical political activity; most of the nationalist elite were either indifferent to the needs of these strata or explicitly frightened of the potential threat to their own positions.⁶⁰

In our context, Eurafrica was the name of this compromise, through which Africa entered its postcolonial or neo-colonial era. If Wallerstein is right, this process wracked African peoples who now found themselves subordinated to an indigenous leadership often as ruthless and as alienated from their everyday concerns as the colonial administration once had been. We are familiar with the continuation of this history about the abuse of power and amassment of wealth by African elites driving their luxury Mercedes and Citroën limousines through the throngs of their suffering or starving populations. This is not the place to continue our account of this history, but we want to acknowledge that the history of *European* integration that we have told in this book has much to do with it. The Eurafrican project conceived in Europe between 1920 and 1960 was strongly complicit in seeing Africa off to an ill-fated beginning on its journey to independence.

Eurafrica's future: The new scramble for Africa

The past ten years have seen a renewed and rapidly increasing interest in Africa on the part of the European Union. In December 2007 a new 'Strategic Partnership' between the EU and Africa was established. As stated in the Lisbon Declaration: 'We have come together in awareness

⁶⁰ Wallerstein, *Africa*, part 2, p. 257.

of the lessons and experiences of the past, but also in the certainty that our common future requires an audacious approach, one that allows us to face with confidence the demands of our globalizing world.' 'On a global scale,' the Declaration went on, 'we have today an increased understanding of our vital *interdependence* and are determined to work together in the global arena on the key political challenges of our time, such as energy and climate change, migration or gender issues.' Furthermore, the Lisbon Summit was hailed as offering 'a unique opportunity jointly to address the common contemporary challenges for our continents, in the year that we celebrate the 50th anniversary of the European integration and the 50th anniversary of the beginning of the independence of Africa'. This provided, the new Africa–EU partnership was presented as a 'partnership of equals', set to eliminate 'the traditional donor-recipient relationship' between the two continents.⁶¹

Speaking at the university in Dakar, Senegal, a few months prior to the signing of the Lisbon Declaration, French president Nicolas Sarkozy made an equally bold declaration: 'What France wants with Africa is co-development, shared development [...] What France wants with Africa is to prepare the advent of "Eurafrica", a great common destiny which awaits Europe and Africa.'⁶²

The new 'partnership' between the EU and Africa goes well beyond the expansion of the long-standing EU–African trade and aid regime, as currently codified in the Cotonou Agreement (Yaoundé and Lomé's successor). Today, Africa is approached as an indispensable 'partner' in the EU's pursuit of a number of key objectives: geopolitical and security concerns (e.g. scarce strategic raw materials, terrorism, 'illegal immigration', trafficking, disease control, and food and energy security); economic concerns (e.g. raw materials and expanding outlets

⁶¹ Lisbon Declaration – EU Africa Summit, Lisbon, 8–9 December 2007, our emphasis, www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/documents/eas2007_lisbon_declaration_en.pdf

⁶² D. Flynn, 'Sarkozy proposes "Eurafrica" partnership on tour', Reuters, 26 July 2007, www.reuters.com/article/idUSL26102356?sp=true&view=sphere

for investment in Africa's emerging markets); and demographic and labour market concerns (e.g. labour immigration from Africa).

Considering it was relatively recent that *The Economist* blazoned abroad 'Hopeless Africa', this is a dramatic reversal of events.⁶³ Today, hardly a day passes without a news report highlighting the magnificent prospects for growth and investment in Africa, prospects that, of course, are augmented by the continent's seemingly endless wealth of natural resources. By the same token, hardly a day passes without a report of a major player making a new move in Africa. 'Call us crazy', said the chairman of the Russian investment bank Renaissance Capital, 'but when we look at Africa we believe this will be the fastest growing part of the world [...] over the next 20 years'.⁶⁴ All established and emerging global powers are today involved in an increasingly fierce battle over Africa's riches. Researchers and global media even suggest that we are witnessing a 'new scramble for Africa'.⁶⁵ To be sure, EU leaders are always fast to deny any such allegation. Distancing themselves from other major stakeholders – foremost China but also the USA, India, Russia, Brazil, the Gulf States, and Japan – they instead insist that the EU's African engagement is guided by 'interdependence' and committed to a mutually beneficial 'partnership of equals' that will promote development, economic growth, democratic governance, human rights, and peace and prosperity on the African continent.

The history of Eurafrica helps us understand this so-called new scramble for Africa, how it can happen and which stakes are involved. For in order to think theoretically about globality today, it is fundamental to know how the global was conceived in the past – that is, in historical times. Eurafrica was an intellectual endeavour and a political project that from the 1920s saw Europe's future survival – its continued

⁶³ 'Hopeless Africa', Leaders, *The Economist*, 11 May 2000.

⁶⁴ 'Russian bank nears brokerages deals in push to dominate Africa', *Financial Times*, 30 March 2010.

⁶⁵ Roger Southall and Henning Melber (eds), *A New Scramble for Africa? Imperialism, Investment and Development* (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2009); 'China's New Scramble for Africa. Beijing's trade with the continent is good for both sides' (editorial), *Financial Times*, 26 August 2010.

existence *in* history as a power shaping global history – as totally bound up with Europe's successful merger with Africa. That is, Europe could rise out of the two world wars only in the shape of Eurafrica. Today, even as the Eurafrican project is largely forgotten, the content of current EU policy-making towards its African 'partner' demonstrates that it has continued influence under the surface; and the only way to comprehend the deep structures of current EU–African relations is to bring this history to life.