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The Eurafrican Relaunch: The Treaty of Rome Negotiations, 1955–1957

After the French Parliament had buried the European Defence Community (EDC) in August 1954, it took less than a year before a new initiative was taken to ‘relaunch’ European integration. This process would culminate in the signing of the Treaties of Rome on 25 March 1957, which founded the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The setting for *La relance Européenne* was Messina, Sicily, where the foreign ministers of the six members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) met for three days in June 1955 to discuss a set of options for the Community’s future development. Foremost on the agenda for the Messina Conference were plans to establish a common market – for which the Beyen Plan, as mentioned previously in relation to the European Political Community (EPC), was to serve as a starting point – and cooperation in atomic energy. The proposals were presented by the Belgian foreign minister Paul-Henri Spaak, who also accepted the invitation to commence and lead the ensuing intergovernmental committee.¹ This work resulted in the so-called Spaak Report, which was delivered to the six governments of the ECSC in April 1956 and subsequently discussed at the Venice Conference for the foreign ministers of the six governments on 29–30 May.²

¹ Spaak, nicknamed ‘Mr Europe’, had previously been president of the UN’s first General Assembly (1946), prime minister (1947–9), chairman of the OEEC Council (1948–50), president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (1949–51), president of the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community (1952–4) and subsequently he would take the helm of NATO (1957–1961).

² *Rapport des chefs de délégation aux Ministres des affaires étrangères (The Brussels Report on the General Common Market)*; Brussels, 21 April 1956). The principal drafters of the

Given the importance that European integration (as in the OEEC, CE, ECSC, EDC and EPC) up to this point had assigned to the colonial question and to Africa, in particular, it might strike some as quite remarkable that neither the Messina Conference nor the Spaak Report took any notice of issues pertaining to colonial territories. This becomes even more remarkable, perhaps, when considered in view of the fact that the EEC's prospective association of colonial territories would become the toughest question to resolve in the actual treaty negotiations. However, the absence of colonial matters in the Spaak Report was not indicative of their anticipated insignificance for the ensuing negotiations. Neither should France's subsequent request for colonial association be seen as a 'last-minute demand', as some scholars have tended to frame it.³ On the contrary, the omission was a conscious decision on the part of the report's authors who knew full well that France could not enter serious negotiations without some type of proviso for its colonial empire. As Pierre Uri, the chief drafter of the report, recalled at a later point, it was on the explicit demand of Félix Gaillard, head of the French delegation to the intergovernmental commission created in Messina to chaperone the Spaak Report, that the colonial issue was to be left out, on the understanding that it was up to the French to decide when to take the initiative.⁴

Spaak Report were the head of the report group, Pierre Uri (France), and Hans von der Groeben (West Germany). An unofficial and abridged English translation was issued as *The Brussels Report on the General Common Market* (Luxembourg: Information Service High Authority of The European Community for Coal and Steel, June 1956).

³ E.g. Alan S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 218.

⁴ See Pierre Uri's discussion at the 1987 conference marking the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome, in Enrico Serra (ed.), *Il Rilancio dell'Europa e i trattati di Roma/La Relance européenne et les traités de Rome: Actes du colloque de Rome, 25-28 mars 1987* (Brussels: Bruylant, 1989), p. 190. See also CVCE (Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe) 'Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories' (2011), p. 3. www.cvce.eu/obj/Association_of_the_Overseas_Countries_and_Territories-en-02904be2-7409-421d-8ee2-f393eb409fef.html (accessed 19 April 2012). Furthermore, the French government under Guy Mollet had not been a participant at Messina, having assumed office only in January 1956, and so clearly needed time to assess the Spaak Report and iron out internal divergences of opinion as concerned the Empire's, or the French Union's, status within a future common market.

The origin and initiative of the idea to include French and Belgian Africa in the Common Market can be traced to Pierre Moussa, director of Economic Affairs at the Ministry of Overseas France, and an expert on the economy of the French Union.⁵ In early May 1956, as part of the preparation for the foreign ministers' meeting in Venice at the end of the month, Moussa submitted a note to his minister, Gaston Defferre, signalling the importance of the colonial issue for the upcoming negotiations.⁶ Concurrently, the interministerial committee of the French government met to discuss the French response to the Spaak proposal. Here, as previously during the EDC and EPC deliberations, officials within the Finance and Foreign Ministries put forth qualms as to the advantages of incorporating the colonies into a common market since 'a Eurafrican economic union' may risk robbing France of its economic and 'political preeminence in her overseas countries.' For one, it was argued, a common market could well spark divisions between the colonial territories, so that some of them may choose not to participate in the 'Eurafrican common market'.⁷

However, these objections soon receded into the background as Moussa's initiative garnered support at the highest level. On 17 May, Defferre submitted a note to Guy Mollet, demanding that the French government should not enter the Common Market without the colonies being on board.⁸ On the same day he approached Maurice Faure, the head of the French delegation, and Foreign Minister

⁵ Around the same time, as Laura Kottos explains, Moussa was charged by Gaston Defferre to develop a plan for the inclusion of the French colonies into the Common Market; see Laura Kottos, 'A "European Commonwealth": Britain, the European League for Economic Co-operation, and European debates on empire, 1947–1957', *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2012, pp. 497–515. Pierre Moussa, *Les chances économiques de la communauté franco-africaine* (Paris: Armand Collin, 1957).

⁶ ANOM (Archives Nationales Outre-Mer), AFFPOL 2317, 'Les TOM et le projet de Marché commun européen', 3 May 1956, signed by Pierre Moussa. Cited in Yves Montarsolo, *L'Eurafrrique – contrepoint de l'idée d'Europe: Le cas français de la fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale aux négociations des Traités de Rome* (Aix-en-Provence: Publications de l'Université de Provence, 2010), p. 200. See also Moussa's memoirs, *Les roues de la fortune. Souvenirs d'un financier* (Paris: Fayard, 1989), pp. 60–70.

⁷ HAEU (Historical Archives of the European Union), SGICEE 3112, 'Note sommaire et provisoire concernant la compatibilité entre un marché commun de la zone franc et un marché commun européen'.

⁸ Gaston Defferre, 'Lettre à Guy Mollet', 17 May 1956; in Gérard Bossuat (ed.), *D'Alger à Rome (1943–1957): Choix de documents* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Ciacco, 1989), pp. 167–77.

Christian Pineau with the same message.⁹ In his letter to Mollet, Defferre stated that he wished, first, 'that the overseas territories be integrated into the *Eurafrican* common market and, second, that the OCTs [overseas countries and territories] enter into this common market while benefitting from special clauses justified by their state of underdevelopment'.¹⁰ Two options were considered, only to be discarded: first, that metropolitan France entered the Common Market without the OCTs. Since this would lead to a fast rupture of economic ties, and then to political secession, it was deemed unacceptable for France, 'which cannot sacrifice its African vocation for its European vocation.' As a second option metropolitan France could enter into a European common market, on the one side, and keep the French-African unity (the French Union) intact, on the other. This was ruled out as untenable, because the French economy would be subjected to competition from the five partners, while at the same time needing to continue investing in the OCTs. This would entail a situation where France would end up running a chronic trade and budget deficit.

This provided, the only real alternative, according to Defferre, was to enter the Common Market *with* the OCTs. However, even this entailed potential disadvantages that had to be anticipated and managed with special provisions, one of which needed to ensure strict curbs on migration between the continents. As Defferre argued:

Given the overpopulation and underemployment in certain European countries such as Italy, it is likely that this free circulation risks leading to rather important population movements toward the OCTs. For reasons less economic than human, it is necessary to guard oneself against an excessive flow which could lead to psychologically unfavourable reactions, which could nourish the evolution of nativist social structures and lead to clashes between Africans and Europeans, clashes of which we have but too many examples in North Africa. Thus, it is not possible to assume the principle of the free circulation of people between Europe and Africa without precautions. For that

⁹ Montarsolo, *L'Eurafrrique*, p. 204.

¹⁰ Defferre, 'Lettre à Guy Mollet', 17 May 1956, p. 168; our emphasis.

matter, I think it is likely that, for analogous reasons, our European partners will themselves raise this question, animated by the desire to guard themselves against an excessive influx, on their own territories, of Algerian populations.¹¹

So long as this and other concerns were defused in the negotiations, Defferre suggested, France should enter the negotiations by frankly stating that the integration of the OCTs would be a necessary condition.

As a final point, Defferre considered the crucial question of how to present this as an *offer* to the European partners. The impression that France used the OCTs to stall progress towards a common market needed to be avoided. As Defferre stated, France's negotiation delegation should 'instead make it appear that the offer made in this way by France is extremely constructive and that the accomplishment of a common enterprise in Africa is without doubt the most grandiose task that today may be proposed by a reassembled Europe'.¹²

Defferre was, at the same time, the key figure in the grand French attempt to reform the French Union, through the so-called 'Loi Cadre', which introduced a certain degree of autonomy and entailed a partial decentralization of power to locally elected assemblies in the overseas territories.¹³ Defferre's crucial role in formulating the French position in the negotiations is verified by a memorandum from the French government dated 22 May and discussed the same day at the interministerial meeting. Between the first and second drafting, a footnote had been inserted that declared: '[T]he decision to include the overseas countries into the Common European Market is a political decision of primary importance [*au premier chef*], and the result of a Note from the Minister of France-Overseas'. Evidently, then, France's position was now decided: to enter negotiations on the Common Market with the Empire, or as the memorandum puts it: 'Granted all necessary

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 173–4.

¹² Defferre, 'Lettre à Guy Mollet', p. 177.

¹³ For more on Defferre's reform of the French Union, see Rudolf von Albertini, *Decolonization: The Administration and Future of the Colonies, 1919–1960* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1971), pp. 425–42; Gérard Unger, *Gaston Defferre* (Paris: Fayard, 2011), pp. 139–71.

consultations and negotiations, the government of France holds that the overseas countries and territories should, in the same way as the metropolitan territories, be associated to the creation of a common European Market.'

The memorandum further states the two key principal conditions. First, the other member states would help to finance investments in France's African colonies. Second, as France supported development and production in its colonies by paying higher prices for products, an external protective tariff would be created by the Common Market, assuring that these products could continue to be imported into the market, despite prices being higher than world market prices. In addition, the French government argued that emerging industries should be subject to protection; and that labour migration between European countries and overseas countries should be 'subjected to particular dispositions that permits avoidance of repercussions ensuing from any too serious displacements of populations.'¹⁴ These would then be the main lines along which negotiations would follow over the coming year.

'Great things': The Venice Conference

Great things are in the making, reported the news bulletin *Europe*, specializing in the coverage of the European Coal and Steel Community and European integration, on 26 May 1956. Under the headline 'On the Eve of Venice' the bulletin acknowledged that the forthcoming conference in Venice would consider the project for economic integration 'from an angle of greatest political importance: one that concerns the very boundaries of the new entity, which some would like to see extended to the overseas territories, and more precisely, to the African territories'. It added: 'This idea of an integrated Eurafrica

¹⁴ HAEU, MAEF 31, 'Projet de Memorandum du Gouvernement Français sur l'établissement d'un Marché Commun (Deuxième rédaction)', 22 May 1956.

in fact corresponds to a bold vision, though some see it only as a way of eluding the political difficulties of the moment.¹⁵

On the morning of the first day of the Venice Conference, French foreign minister Christian Pineau set out by commenting on the Spaak Report. He then added the new item concerning the colonies, stating that from his government's point of view 'it is impossible not to foresee the inclusion into the common market of the overseas territories which the participating countries are responsible for'.¹⁶ Pineau proposed that a section of a future conference be devoted to the question. The five partners did not raise any objections or questions; on the contrary, as reported in *Le Monde*, 'The idea, for example, of linking Africa with Europe through the inclusion in the common market of the overseas countries and territories seemed to win over several of Mr Pineau's colleagues, most notably M. Spaak'.¹⁷ As Spaak summed up the discussion he returned to the French observation, and proposed that it be referred to a small group of experts.¹⁸

The conference, as *The New York Times* reported, ran unexpectedly smoothly and concluded at noon on 30 May,¹⁹ upon which the delegates confirmed a press release in which they stated that, 'apart from the propositions contained in the [Spaak] report, the attention of the foreign ministers was particularly drawn to the question of the inclusion of the overseas territories and countries into the common market'.²⁰ Explaining the outcome of the Venice Conference the next day, *Le Figaro* told its readers that 'the Eurafrikan idea, long considered

¹⁵ HAEU, CM 3/NEGO 92, *Europe: Bulletin quotidien*, Agence internationale de la presse, No. 919.

¹⁶ HAEU, CM 3/NEGO 93, 'Procès-Verbal de la Conférence des Ministres des Affaires Etrangères des Etats membres de la C.E.C.A.', 29 and 30 May 1956, p. 5.

¹⁷ 'Optimisme à Venise', *Le Monde*, 1 June 1956. Translation by CVCE, www.cvce.eu/obj/optimism_in_venice_from_le_monde_1june_1956-en-2bd68cad-967a-437a-a2a7-9e3c8cc9b14f

¹⁸ HAEU, CM 3/NEGO 93, 'Procès-Verbal de la Conférence des Ministres des Affaires Etrangères des Etats membres de la C.E.C.A.', 29 and 30 May 1956, p. 17.

¹⁹ '6 Nations accept atom pool report', *The New York Times*, 30 May 1956.

²⁰ HAEU, CM 3/NEGO 93, 'Procès-Verbal de la Conférence des Ministres des Affaires Etrangères des Etats membres de la C.E.C.A.', 29 and 30 May 1956, appendix IV.

to be a myth, will inscribe itself on African soil'.²¹ This mirrored the attitude expressed by a subcommittee to the Comité Verret, or the interministerial committee of the French government, which had been tasked to investigate the French position on the Common Market's inclusion of the OCTs. In its first report, it predicted that, quite in line with the optimistic plans of Eirik Labonne, Louis Armand and others that we discussed in the previous chapter, such an inclusion would enable Africa's development and the establishment of a third power, providing Europe with a 'Frontier', like the USA had its Far West and the USSR its Siberia.²²

This upbeat mood carried over into a commissioned report by the Central Bank of Belgian Congo and Rwanda-Urundi, released in September 1956. With explicit reference to the ongoing negotiations on the Common Market, the Central Bank piled up a wealth of statistical data to support the conclusion that both continents would benefit from the proposed integration. What Europe wanted to buy was produced by Africa; what Europe wanted to sell was needed in Africa. Or, as the document dryly puts it, 'Europe and Africa may find in this expansion a mutual advantage.'²³

Associate the overseas: The French–Belgian argument

If Eurafrica's inclusion on the agenda was a tranquil affair at first, it would hit rough waters at the meeting of the heads of delegation in Brussels on 6 September. At this point, France's decree on the inclusion of the OCTs, proposed as an 'offer' to their partners, received a hostile response.²⁴ In order to amend the situation the French and Belgian

²¹ 'L'Europe sans L'Afrique', *Le Figaro*, 31 May 1956.

²² 'Conclusions du groupe de travail chargé d'étudier les problèmes posés par une éventuelle participation des pays d'outre-mer de l'ensemble français à un éventuel marché commun européen', quoted in Montarsolo, *L'Eurafrrique*, pp. 206–7.

²³ 'Marché Commun Européen et Territoires d'Outre-Mer', *Bulletin de la Banque Centrale du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi*, Vol. 5, No. 9, 1956, p. 323.

²⁴ See Montarsolo, *L'Eurafrrique*, p. 204; and Paul-Henri Spaak, *The Continuing Battle*:

delegations met a few weeks later, Spaak and the Belgians offering the French their assistance, and they produced a joint report that aimed to offset the cold greeting. Finalized on 11 October, the French–Belgian report laid down the proper forms of the envisioned association of the colonial territories, specifying that ‘the different economic structures’ existing between the Six and the overseas territories did not permit any ‘pure and simple inclusion’ of these territories into the Common Market. That said, ‘it remain[ed] necessary and desirable’ for the OCTs to participate in the expansion entailed by the Common Market; the report thus went on to propose modes of ‘association.’²⁵ ‘Inclusion’ was thus replaced by ‘association’, one of the alleged advantages of this change being that the question of political representation by Africans in the European community would then never be raised, as was the case in the EPC negotiations and which also played a part in the demise of the EPC.²⁶

In this context, the report also asserted that ‘it seems permitted, at a later stage, to envision the possibilities to establish a unique common market that unites the European countries and the Overseas ones.’²⁷ Having ascertained these principles, the report continued by outlining the modalities of association, which would be of two kinds: commercial exchange; and investment. Six principles of association were established: (1) OCTs would benefit in their relation with the European countries from the regime that these establish among themselves in the treaty; (2) in reciprocity to this regime, the OCTs would apply to every European member country the same regime they accorded to their ‘own metropolitan centre’ or mother country; (3) a period of transition would be decided, and the access and measures of economic integration as outlined in the two points above should be introduced in stages; (4) an investment fund would be set up, either as a special organism or as a branch of the European investment fund. The annual

Memoirs of a European 1936–1966 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, English translation, 1971 [1969]), pp. 244–6.

²⁵ HAEU, CM 3/NEGO 252, ‘Rapport Franco-Belge sur la participation des pays et territoires d’outre-mer en marché commun européen (établi le 11 Octobre 1956)’, p. 1.

²⁶ Montarsolo, *L’Eurafrique*, p. 211.

²⁷ HAEU, CM 3/NEGO 252, ‘Rapport Franco-Belge’, p. 2.

needs would be set for US\$1 billion. The fund would cover 'public investments demanded by the economic development of the overseas territories'; (5) studies would be made to investigate the possibility of setting up a common market between African countries of similar economic structures; and (6) studies would be made, at the end of the association process, on whether and by what means 'a single common market' encompassing the European countries and the OCTs should be established.²⁸

Towards the end of October, Luc Durand-Réville, senator of Gabon and president of the section of Equatorial Africa in the French Central Committee for the Overseas, presented yet another report on the possible integration of the OCTs into the Common Market. Although an independent report, it is still interesting as it expressed the view of the French colonial administrators in Africa. It is filled with details and presented the same basic geopolitical arguments as so many previous studies, thus underscoring the familiar Eurafrican dictum of a colonial common market that offered Europe an opportunity to regain its geopolitical position vis-à-vis the USSR and the USA. There are slurs against the UN and the US, the latter being seen as pursuing 'a senseless anti-colonialism'. According to Durand-Réville, the 'French colonial professional circles' were in overall agreement on the opportunities offered by an integration of the colonies into the European Common Market, but there should be a period of transition and adaptation, and closer consideration should be given to the problem of having the other European states share in the investments.²⁹

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 6–8.

²⁹ Luc Durand-Réville, in *La nouvelle revue française d'outre-mer*, No. 12, December 1956. (cvce: www.cvce.eu/obj/position_du_congres_interparlementaire_franco_belge_sur_l_association_des_ptom_au_marche_commun_liege_27_octobre_1956-fr-90fa073d-7cfc-4212-bc46-a7f16761e3a1.html).

Europe as revenge: The Suez Crisis

It is crucial to keep in mind that the Common Market negotiations in the summer and autumn of 1956 coincided with the escalation of the serious international crisis following President Gamal Abdel Nasser's decision, in July, to nationalize the Suez Canal. As such, the Suez Crisis would become a factor in the treaty negotiations. If the negotiations over the EDC had been deeply embroiled in the wider international cold war and colonial battles taking place in Indochina and Korea, the EEC negotiations thus had its counterpart in North Africa, and not just in Egypt but also – as we shall come back to – in Algeria, whose unexploited Saharan riches served as Eurafrica's promise and edifice.

For France and Britain, and also West Germany, the Suez debacle was utterly humiliating, and its Pan-Arabic implications came to serve as a grave warning of what would be in the offing should the Eurafrican Common Market fail to materialize (see Figure 4.1). As Spaak wrote to the British foreign secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, on 21 August 1956, calling 'for a policy of absolute firmness from the Western Powers': 'If Nasser's coup is allowed to go unpunished, the prestige of this new dictator will grow vastly, and so will his ambitions and audacity. The entire situation in North, and even in Central Africa, may be affected to our detriment.'³⁰ Spaak's position was perfectly in line with the inducements in Paris, for whom Suez in large part was synonymous with Algeria. At the meeting on Suez between France, Britain and the USA in the summer of 1956 (30 July–1 August) Foreign Minister Pineau thus stated that: 'If Egypt's action remained without a response, it would be useless to pursue the struggle in Algeria.' During the meeting he also informed US secretary of state John Foster Dulles that judging from 'the most reliable intelligence sources we have only a few weeks in which to save North Africa. Of course, the loss of North Africa would

³⁰ Spaak, *The Continuing Battle*, p. 126.

Figure 4.1 The Suez Crisis, caricature from federalist magazine *Le XXe Siècle*. Caption reads: 'Europe could make that balloon explode.' Source: *Le XX Siècle*, 1956. Historical Archives of the European Union.

then be followed by that of Black Africa, and the entire territory would rapidly escape European control and influence.³¹

More generally, the Suez Crisis proffered a prime occasion for pro-European forces to rally in support of the integration cause. Jean Monnet, for instance, and his Action Committee for the United States of Europe – a group set up by Monnet on leaving his position as president of the ECSC's High Authority – would interpret the Suez Crisis as a powerful argument for the furtherance of European integration:

³¹ Maurice Vaisse, 'France and the Suez Crisis', quoted in Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (eds), *Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 137.

The events of the summer [i.e. Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal] have revealed that only a United Europe can make its voice heard, and be respected, in the world of today. [...] In this respect, the Suez crisis is a grave warning. Even if, as we hope, it is solved by peaceful means, this fundamental lack of balance, with its threat to peace, will remain: namely, the weakness and growing dependence of Western Europe as regards its supplies of power.³²

At its meeting in Stresa in September 1956, the Liberal International rallied around a 'United Europe', seeing it as the only potent antidote to figures such as Nasser. 'The efforts of Arab-Asian nationalists to oust Europeans,' *The New York Times* reported, 'are seen by many liberals as the newest and most challenging reason for accelerating West European unity.' If Europe was united, the president of the Liberal International, Roger Motz,³³ asked rhetorically, 'Would Colonel Nasser have dared nationalize the Suez Canal, would the Algerian rebels have thought of gaining something by taking up arms?'³⁴ 'The Europeans' (or those in support of the integration cause), *The Economist* wrote around the same time,

even fairly new ones like *Le Monde*, have gained points by claiming that Suez shows that European unity is more urgent than ever and that Britain should take steps towards it. [...] The French government has already endorsed the recent recommendation of M. Jean Monnet's action committee for a united states of Europe that the Six should establish European atomic power production targets in the light of Suez.³⁵

As the Suez Crisis was appearing to reach a violent breaking point towards the end of October, so there was a simultaneous breakdown of the treaty negotiations in Paris (on 21 October). This is where the

³² Quoted in Richard Mayne, *The Recovery of Europe: From Devastation to Unity* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), pp. 239–40.

³³ Roger Motz was also president of the Belgian League for European Cooperation and former leader of the Liberal Party in Belgium.

³⁴ 'World liberals see a united Europe as the best answer to Nasser's moves,' *The New York Times*, 14 September 1956.

³⁵ 'Black mood in Paris,' *The Economist*, 29 September 1956.

French–Belgian report was presented and discussed and where the West German delegation refused to bow to French demands to have equal pay harmonization written into the treaty. The chief orchestrator of the West German refusal was Minister of Economy Ludwig Erhard, who generally disapproved of the Common Market, referring to it as ‘economic nonsense’ and ‘European incest’.³⁶ But as he returned to Bonn in triumph, Adenauer took him to task and subsequently, at a meeting on 31 October, Erhard was left with no choice but to concede to Adenauer’s vehement conviction that West Germany should compromise with France and return to the negotiation table. For Adenauer, this was directly related to Suez, which by this time, due to Soviet warnings, conjured up the threat of a nuclear World War III. A diehard champion of the Franco–British campaign against Egypt, equating – as so many European statesmen did – Nasser with Hitler, the Chancellor contended that Western Europeans, and especially the French and the Germans, had to stick together at this critical hour. Adenauer also justified his moral support for France’s intervention in Egypt with reference to France’s unconditional right to keep Algeria and to protect its soldiers against rebels who, according to Paris, were supported by Nasser. ‘Algeria’, Adenauer asserted in November 1956, ‘is not a French colony, but a province of France since 1830 with 1,5 million white French men and women.’³⁷

Adenauer’s motivation for European integration was thus primarily political and geopolitical;³⁸ and it was a geopolitics to no little extent inspired by Coudenhove-Kalergi’s interwar Pan-European movement.³⁹

³⁶ Miriam Camps, *Britain and the European Community 1955–1963* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 72.

³⁷ Quoted in Hans-Peter Schwartz, *Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction*, Vol. 2: *The Statesman, 1952–1967* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1997), pp. 240–2; 190.

³⁸ Paul M. Pitman, ‘“A General named Eisenhower”: Atlantic crisis and the origins of the European Economic Community’, in Marc Trachtenberg (ed.), *Between Empire and Alliance: America and Europe During the Cold War* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), pp. 41, 51.

³⁹ Schwartz, *Konrad Adenauer*, pp. 237–8. Adenauer and Coudenhove-Kalergi were closely attached to one another and corresponded from 1928 onward. In 1958 Adenauer introduced Coudenhove-Kalergi to de Gaulle to hold discussions on European integration;

Not only did Adenauer believe in the ‘superiority of Western civilization’, but also he was equally convinced of the inherent racial inferiority of blacks, and it was therefore inconceivable, as he phrased it, ‘that Africa, as a black continent, could be independent alongside the other continents.’⁴⁰ Such convictions were not, of course, unique to Adenauer. Spaak too, for instance, had little confidence in Africans’ ability to govern themselves: ‘What I have always found the greatest stumbling block in my relations with Africans has been my inability to get them to show any concern for the future. To govern is to foresee. While this tenet of political wisdom is universally accepted in the West, the Africans I have met seem to attach no importance to it.’⁴¹

Adenauer also firmly believed that ‘[t]he domination of the Mediterranean basin by the Soviet Russians would simply be the end for Europe.’⁴² To prevent this from happening, he deemed it necessary for the West to embark on a massive economic development of the southern Mediterranean and the adjacent Middle East, so as to fully incorporate these regions into Western Europe’s sphere of interests.⁴³ Thus, as events were seen as posing a challenge to Europe’s influence in world affairs, it had become all the more important for Europe to stake out its common geopolitical interests in a more independent fashion. ‘Then, just as Coudenhove-Kalergi had said in his time’, Hans-Peter Schwartz notes, ‘Adenauer spoke of the “appearance of non-white peoples on the political stage of world events”’. This, and its potentially detrimental effects on the future constitution of the UN, Adenauer found to be deeply disturbing.⁴⁴ Adenauer’s advocacy for a strong European power, built on a solid French–German partnership and more independent from the USA, thus also solidified in tandem with France’s decision to make the realization of the EEC hinge on Eurafrika.

see Paul Legoll, *Charles de Gaulle et Konrad Adenauer. La cordiale entente* (Paris: Harmattan, 2004), pp. 47, 60–1, 87–90, 103–4.

⁴⁰ Quoted in Schwartz, *Konrad Adenauer*, p. 191.

⁴¹ Spaak, *The Continuing Battle*, p. 399.

⁴² Schwartz, *Konrad Adenauer*, p. 190.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 190–1, 373.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 238, 254–5.

When Eisenhower on 6 November managed to generate enough (sterling) pressure on London to interrupt the French–British – and Israeli – onslaught in Egypt, which had begun the day before, this of course infuriated Adenauer. Incidentally, this coincided with a previously scheduled high-level meeting between France and Germany in Paris on 6 November, which had as its original purpose the sorting out of some of the obstacles that had stalled the treaty negotiations in October. Given the extreme situation in the hour of Adenauer's planned departure on the evening of 5 November – that is, a world apparently teetering on the brink of nuclear war due to the deeds of two colonial powers – the visit drew harsh criticism from many corners, the West German Social Democrats condemning it as a declaration of support for France's military attack on Egypt. But since Adenauer was in full agreement with France's actions, seeing it as an 'Akt europäischer Staatsräson',⁴⁵ such criticism could have no impact on his determination to go, which he did; indeed, as he was getting ready for bed, his train, on which Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano also was present, received the message about the Soviet threat of missile attacks on London and Paris should they fail to retreat promptly from Egypt.⁴⁶

As Adenauer's train arrived at Paris' Gare de l'Est on the morning of the 6th, a large crowd was there to welcome him. He was given a ceremonial salute and national anthems were played.⁴⁷ The symbolic message to the world was unmistakable: for the sake of European unity and Europe's geopolitical interests, West Germany rallied to the support of France's campaign in Egypt. Later that day, as Mollet had hung up the phone with the British prime minister, Anthony Eden, having failed to persuade him to defy US pressure and prolong the Suez operation just a bit longer, Adenauer decided to comfort Mollet:

France and England will never be powers comparable to the United

⁴⁵ Quoted in Henning Köhler, *Adenauer: Eine politische Biographie* (Frankfurt am Main: Propyläen Verlag, 1994), p. 948.

⁴⁶ Schwartz, *Konrad Adenauer*, pp. 241, 243.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 242.

States and the Soviet Union. Nor Germany either. There remains to them only one way of playing a decisive role in the world; that is to unite to make Europe. England is not ripe for it but the affair of Suez will help to prepare her spirits for it. We have no time to waste: Europe will be your revenge.⁴⁸

On his return from Paris, Adenauer issued new directives to the German delegation in Brussels, instructing the negotiators to repeal Germany's disapproval of the French requests that had stymied the negotiations in Paris a few weeks earlier.⁴⁹ Suez, for Adenauer, thus proved his point of a united 'third force' Europe as the only antidote to what he saw as the US and Soviet policy of carving up the world between them.⁵⁰ A subsequent Foreign Office memo argued along the same lines, claiming that, as a result of Suez, Europeans had 'discovered that there are many political problems that affect European nations in different ways than [...] the United States or the other NATO nations.'⁵¹ According to Brentano, Suez had subjected Europe's world reputation to 'shame and humiliation'.⁵²

However, such sentiments were not altogether new. As we shall return to later, since well before the Suez drama, Adenauer had expressed a growing unease over US priorities, seeing Washington's European loyalties compromised by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' neglect of Europe's defence and their increasing attention to the Third World. Eisenhower's visit to Achmad Sukarno's Indonesia – one of the Bandung movement's most prominent leaders – in May 1956, for instance, had 'sent shivers through Bonn'. Not only had Eisenhower's visit been friendly, but also the president had publicly

⁴⁸ Christian Pineau recounts the episode in his memoirs: *1956/Suez* (Paris: Éditions Robert Laffont, 1976), p. 191; see also Gérard Bossuat, *L'Europe des français 1943–1959: La IV^e république aux sources de l'Europe communautaire* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1996), p. 335. Translation from Keith Kyle, *Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002, 2nd rev. edn), p. 467.

⁴⁹ Ronald J. Granieri, *The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949–1966* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), p. 92.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, Ch. 2; Schwartz, *Konrad Adenauer*, p. 243

⁵¹ Quoted in Granieri, *The Ambivalent Alliance*, p. 92.

⁵² Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 92.

condoned the non-alignment, or neutrality, of some of the newly independent countries – something that was anathema to Adenauer.⁵³

The catastrophic ending of Suez, for which, according to Adenauer, the USA first and foremost was to blame, thus vindicated Adenauer even further and it convinced him of the need for the Federal Republic of Germany to play a more active role in staking out Western European policy, a course of action that, needless to say, could only materialize by way of close partnership with France. This reciprocated with the sentiment in Paris, which held that France's objectives, given Britain's strong reliance on the US, would be better served through a closer partnership with Germany.⁵⁴ With regard to the French position in particular, Perry Anderson argues, it was the 'shock of the Suez crisis' that really 'swung the balance' in favour of the Common Market and the Treaty of Rome.⁵⁵ In specifically commenting on the impact of Suez on the treaty negotiations, moreover, Robert Marjolin – vice-president of the French delegation in the treaty negotiations – went so far as to claim that the negotiations could be divided into 'two broad phases': one before Suez, marked by hesitation and tardiness; the other after Suez, characterized by greater purposefulness and vigour. Mollet, Marjolin writes, 'felt that the only way to erase, or at least lessen, the humiliation that France had just suffered from the Suez affair was to conclude a European treaty quickly'.⁵⁶ 'The Suez fiasco', Miriam Camps writes, 'had generated a new wave of "Europeanism" and had visibly strengthened the feeling in France that only through European unity could France regain a position of power and independence in the world'.⁵⁷

⁵³ Steven J. Brady, *Eisenhower and Adenauer: Alliance Maintenance Under Pressure, 1953–1960* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010), Ch.5.

⁵⁴ Ibid., Ch. 5; Pitman, "A General Named Eisenhower", p. 50.

⁵⁵ Perry Anderson, 'Under the sign of the interim', in Peter Gowan and Perry Anderson (eds), *The Question of Europe* (London: Verso, 1997), p. 57; see also John W. Young, *Cold War Europe 1945–1991: A Political History*, 2nd edn (London: Arnold, 1996), pp. 51, 132.

⁵⁶ Robert Marjolin, *Architect of European Unity: Memoirs 1911–1986* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989), p. 297.

⁵⁷ Camps, *Britain and the European Community*, p. 77.

Figure 4.2 Cartographic representation of the geopolitical situation as envisioned by federalist magazine *Jeune Europe*. The caption reads: 'In face of the Eurafrikan triangle, whose main lines are, on the one hand, Amsterdam, Strasbourg, Milan, Rome, Tripoli, Tananarive, and on the other hand, Amsterdam, Paris, Madrid, Rabat, Dakar, there rises the heavy parallelogram Moscow, Peking, Bandung, Cairo.' Source: *Jeune Europe*, No. 3, 1958. Historical Archives of the European Union.

For all the symbolic significance of Suez, however, one should be careful not to overemphasize its importance in the series of causes determining the process of postwar European integration in general, and of the Treaty of Rome negotiations in particular. Rather, Suez boosted integration efforts precisely because it was integral to the larger movement that was perceived as a challenge to Europe's global clout. From a European perspective Suez can be plotted in the sequence of other powerful challenges to European global and colonial power during the 1950s: to Indochina, Bandung and Algeria, then, Suez could now be added (see Figure 4.2). As the already-quoted sentence from *The New York Times* states, Suez was 'the newest and most challenging reason for accelerating West European unity'.

Moreover, as Paul Pitman argues in his illuminating account, Suez, by further aggravating *long-standing* German and French misgivings towards the USA and Britain, 'pushed public and parliamentary opinion in both Paris and Bonn toward European integration as an alternative to Atlantic cooperation'. In this sense, Suez should not be seen as a cause for Franco-German unity, but rather as marking the culmination of an extended development comprising several issues that all contributed to bring it about. As we will discuss more fully in the following sections, many of these revolved around Franco-German disagreements with the USA over NATO strategy and the integral questions of nuclear weapons and the role of EURATOM.

Before leaving Suez for now, though, it is important to point out that, while some of the voices cited earlier may give the impression to the contrary, Suez, although probably providing some lubrication, did not engender the magic bullet to finally unravel the mired negotiations on colonial association. And although both Paul Pitman and Irwin Wall do note in passing that the deal made between Mollet and Adenauer during their meeting in Paris at the height of the Suez Crisis included a German assent to France's demand for colonial association⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Pitman, "A General named Eisenhower", p. 52; Irwin M. Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 65.

– a piece of information we have not come across anywhere else – this, if indeed it was the case, seems to have counted for little once negotiations on the issue were resumed.

For the equilibrium of the world: Stalled negotiations

Ten days after Eisenhower's intermediation had silenced the guns in Egypt, on 16 November, the French delegation formally added the matter of colonial association to the main negotiation agenda. Here, the French–Belgian report (see pages 155–56) was presented to the heads of delegation, accompanied by a declaration of the French delegation that Robert Marjolin was tasked with explaining. The declaration began by clarifying three reasons why France could not enter the Common Market without the overseas territories. First, this concern arose from the technical inconveniences that would result if France were to combine its participation in two customs unions. Second, it reflected France's desire to extend the advantages of the Common Market to the overseas territories, 'the destiny of which is bound to that of [France]'. Third, France intended to maintain the economic and commercial unity of the '*communauté française*'. However, since the overseas territories had such a variation of constitutional and political ties to France, a 'pure and simple' inclusion was out of the question; hence the formula of 'association' was proposed. This association might then lead to the 'establishment of a real common market unifying Europe and the Overseas'. The declaration then repeated the six principles of association spelled out in the French–Belgian report, but also highlighted the advantages of association offered to the other European members. The declaration listed these advantages, stressing, *inter alia*, that the large market and natural riches made available to the other members of the community would be bound to expand further because of the public investments that France had already made.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ HAEU, CM 3/NEGO 252, 'Déclaration de la délégation française relative à l'inclusion des territoires d'outre-mer dans le marché commun', 22 November 1956, pp. 2–4.

This notwithstanding, the French initiative was confronted by a series of questions from the German and Dutch delegations, questions that were elaborated further a few days later (22 November), where all delegations, although recognizing the political importance of the posed problem, were still not convinced that association should be negotiated and settled at this stage. In sum, they proposed to postpone any settlement on the association and to move ahead with a common market of the Six – a move that sent the negotiations into a new crisis.

At this point, in this seven-hour-long meeting, Marjolin made a forceful intervention. 'The French thesis', he insisted,

has already been indicated during the previous debate: the French government will refuse to enter the Common Market if the OCTs are not associated. On the other hand, it is not conceivable from the French point of view that the OCTs are opened to European imports without there being in place a European participation in the fundamental investments in these territories. Finally, [...] these fundamental investments can only be realized with public funds.⁶⁰

Marjolin was seconded by the head of the Belgian delegation, Baron Snoy, who added the general argument that: 'Our industrial economies of Western Europe have the greatest interest possible in the association of the Overseas.' France's Pierre Uri, for his part, also weighed in, criticizing the other countries for presenting 'byzantine' and narrow-minded objections. Uri – who would become the drafter of the treaties and thus seen as one of *the* chief architects of both the EEC and EURATOM – was keen to remind the meeting of the principles at stake. The Common Market ought to be '*une grande oeuvre politique*': 'we must attach the OCTs to the European ensemble; this is a capital point for the equilibrium of the world.' Uri also mentioned 'the role of the OCTs as furnishers of raw materials: oil, minerals, etc.', which were 'vital products for Western Europe'.⁶¹

⁶⁰ HAEU, SGICCEE 3109, 'Résumé des délibérations. Réunion du Comité des Chefs de délégation du 22 novembre 1956', 23 November 1956.

⁶¹ Ibid.

Outside the negotiation rooms, meanwhile, the OEEC's economic counsellor and former chief of the IMF's European Division, Raymond Bertrand, lent his support to the French position. As Bertrand put it in the November issue of the prominent journal *International Organization*:

Many farsighted people in France, in the overseas territories themselves, and in other European countries, have come to the view that a bold new policy is needed to prevent other French African territories from following Tunisia and Morocco into secession, and Algeria into rebellion. It is also essential that Tunisia and Morocco should be discouraged from drifting into Nasser-like habits of blackmail. Other parts of Africa would follow such a trend if it developed, and many countries besides France are deeply concerned to avoid these dangers. If the need for a new policy were accepted, association of the overseas territories with the common market could be a major part of such a policy, because of the economic advantages which it could secure fairly quickly for the overseas territories – and the even greater promise which it would hold for the future.⁶²

Given the serious and fast-moving developments taking place in Africa at that moment, Bertrand went on to say that Europe could not afford to get bogged down in details, bickering about such things as 'import concessions on bicycles in the Cameroons against Italian purchases of cocoa'. By this, he was not denying that overseas association could involve certain minor economic sacrifices on the part of the European countries in the short term. Rather, it served to get the message across that any such potential losses resulting from association 'would be a small price to pay if it succeeded in convincing Africans that partnership with Europe and with the west is the best way to freedom and prosperity'. Therefore, Bertrand concluded, 'the Brussels Conference' must 'now recognize the whole breadth of the problem

⁶² Raymond Bertrand, 'The European Common Market Proposal', *International Organization*, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1956, p. 570.

and show the same imagination as it has displayed in tackling the purely European questions.⁶³

With such 'imagination' failing to be forthcoming in Brussels and with the negotiations approaching a deadlock, Mollet can be seen as becoming increasingly public with France's agenda and vision for Europe. On 25 November, for instance, he addressed a reunion of members of the Socialist Party in Moulins, pressing the exact same point that Adenauer had conveyed to him on the eve of the Suez Crisis:

The American and Soviet reactions to the aftermath of Suez have made evident the necessity, for the middle nations [*nations moyennes*], to group together in order to attain the authority they need. Not even Great Britain with its Commonwealth has the scale any more that is needed to discuss with the two big ones. Should we allow them to divide the world between themselves, or enter into war, a war in which we would be the first victims? Whatever your opinion has been in the past, today you can only be in favour of Europe, or otherwise accept to become a satellite.⁶⁴

As negotiations resumed in Brussels at the end of November, further quarrels ensued. Why, the Dutch delegation asked, should the other Five be forced to shoulder colonial responsibilities that they did not desire, and pay for investments the benefits of which they could not enjoy? To facilitate the negotiations an intergovernmental Ad-Hoc Overseas Territories Group was set up, comprising two members of each delegation and scheduling its first meeting within a few days, thus underscoring the urgency of the matter. In addition, each of the Italian, Dutch, German and Luxembourg delegations was called on to prepare a note containing their views on the issue of association.⁶⁵

Shortly thereafter, Jean-Michel de Lattre, unofficial spokesperson for the Labonne Committee and Louis Armand's Bureau for the Industrialization of Africa (BIA), was invited by *Le Monde* (2 December)

⁶³ Ibid., pp. 570–1.

⁶⁴ HAEU, EN 2734, *Les Cahiers du Propagandiste Socialiste*, supplement to *Documentation Socialiste*, No. 25, 17 November 1956.

⁶⁵ HAEU, CM 3/NEGO 252, 'Extrait P. V. réunion chefs de délégation 29 novembre 1956'.

to repeat the main lines of his argument for a rapid industrialization of Africa through a co-European effort. Apparently, the EEC negotiations had given his message renewed urgency: 'It is in Africa that Europe will be made.'⁶⁶

German convictions: Brentano to Adenauer

While it is certainly correct to say that the negotiations over colonial association had basically ground to a halt by early December 1956, it is crucial not to lose sight – as the literature often does – of what the procrastination and irritation stemmed from, namely, at least for the most part, financial detail and pure petulance. Let us illustrate this point by juxtaposing two broad tendencies in the West German position.

On the one hand, the German delegation persisted in sifting the details. So, sticking to our chronology, on 6 December in Brussels the German delegation presented a list of new questions to the Ad-Hoc Overseas Territories Group. It was a set of extremely detailed – and insidious – questions on investments and infrastructure, ending tellingly on the following snide query: 'Once created, who will be the owner of the infrastructure [created by common European funds]?'⁶⁷

On the other hand, though, and just two days later, Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano wrote to inform Adenauer about the specific problems posed by the negotiations on the association of the colonial territories. He explained that the 'core piece' ('Kernstück') of the French–Belgian proposal for colonial association was the 'investment fund for economic infrastructure [in the colonial territories] that should be furnished with one billion dollars annually. Precisely this

⁶⁶ Jean-Michel de Lattre, 'Les grands ensembles eurafricains', *Le Monde*, 2 December 1956.

⁶⁷ HAEU, CM 3/NEGO 255, 'Note de la délégation allemande sur l'association des PTOM au Marché Commun', 6 December 1956. A long list of additional questions was submitted on December 10 (HAEU, CM 3/NEGO 255, 'Questions de la délégation allemande [complémentaires aux questions sur les investissements]', 10 December 1956).

proposal has encountered loud criticism on our part.' But, Brentano stated, this critique was really 'beside the point'. So what would be the point? In fact, that West Germany wanted to see France's and Belgium's African colonies enter the Common Market. Here we need to quote at length from Brentano's letter:

In principle, the demand for inclusion [*Einbeziehung*] of the overseas territories should be welcomed. Since many years and in numerous European organizations, as in the Council of Europe and the OEEC, plans have been worked out which have had as their aim the joint exploitation [*Erschließung*] of the overseas territories by the European states. Until now the realization of this has failed [...]. Within the frame of the Schuman Plan it also did not succeed to push through the inclusion of the overseas territories in the European Coal and Steel Community. However, in all these negotiations no doubts were ever expressed, from the perspective of the majority of the European states, and especially from the perspective of the Federal Republic, that the joint [*gemeinschaftliche*] inclusion of the overseas territories is desirable. Precisely from the German side it has been repeatedly complained that the Schuman Plan did not provide for the inclusion of the overseas territories. The significance of this persistent demand of the European states and especially also of the Federal Republic has in no way been diminished by the most recent events in world politics. There can remain no doubt that a conflict is emerging over the overseas territories, especially the African territories, between on the one hand the communist states and on the other hand the Western community of states. The outcome of this conflict will have a great, if not decisive importance as concerns the future constellation of power in the worldwide context. It follows from all this, that the demand for an inclusion of the overseas territories must not just be accepted, but welcomed.⁶⁸

This letter shows that although West Germany fought France in the negotiations on the financial details of the investment fund,

⁶⁸ Letter by Heinrich von Brentano to Konrad Adenauer, 8 December 1956. Politischen Archivs des Auswärtigen Amts, PA AA. B 10 Abteilung II, Politische Abteilung, Bd. 915, Brüsseler Integrationskonferenz.

it enthusiastically embraced France's demand, and the inclusion of the colonies, as a geopolitical and geo-economic imperative of the highest order. The position was underlined around the same time by Franz Blücher, Adenauer's vice-chancellor: 'The attitude of the Federal Republic toward Africa is clear – German trade and German industry look upon it as target no. 1.'⁶⁹

This point is also backed up by a remarkable document dating from two years earlier, in which France's ambassador and high commissioner in Germany, André François-Poncet, reported to Prime Minister Mendès France about West German initiatives to re-establish or expand in Africa. The pretext is an article in the French newspaper *L'Information* (7 August 1954) in which journalist Daniel Mayer accused the Germans – and specifically the banking interests behind the old president of the Reichsbank, Hjalmar Schacht – of using the European integration process (particularly the EDC on which a decision was forthcoming) to recuperate colonial influence. The ambassador assured Mendès France that such warnings about Germans sneaking into Africa via the back door of European integration were both confused and misguided. It was not that the Germans lacked such ambition but that, in fact, they had always been knocking at the front door. 'The attempts toward German expansion in French Africa have never been done in secret. The Germans have from the beginning demanded admittance to participate in the development of our African territories.'⁷⁰ François-Poncet subsequently listed the grounds on which West Germany had based its demands: the Schuman Declaration's clause about Africa as a common European task; the OEEC's stated aims to assist Africa; the Point Four programme launched by Truman in 1949 to aid 'underdeveloped' areas; the Labonne Committee's proposals for joint European investments in African industrial zones; and the proposal by France's State Secretary of the Air Force to

⁶⁹ Quoted in Jakov Etinger, *Bonn greift nach Afrika* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1961), p. 7.

⁷⁰ HAEU, MAEF 82, Letter from André François-Poncet to Pierre Mendès France, 'D'un article de M. Daniel Mayer sur les projets d'expansion allemande', Haut Commissariat de la République Française en Allemagne, 10 August 1954, pp. 2–3.

transfer Europe's aeronautic industry to North Africa. Proceeding to an analysis of the West German contexts in which the issue of European collaboration in Africa had been raised, François-Poncet stressed the importance of Anton Zischka's publications, Johannes Semler's implicit authorship of the Council of Europe's Strasbourg Plan, Schacht's lobbying in conservative circles for the revival of German colonialism, the Institute of Economic Research in Munich, and a number of additional associations, initiatives and communities of interest. While admitting that the Eurafrican fervour had diminished somewhat since 1950, the ambassador reached an unequivocal conclusion: 'There is thus in Germany, undoubtedly, a broad movement of interest in the exploitation and development of Africa.'⁷¹

It is precisely this 'broad movement of interest' that Brentano refers to in his letter and that always held the upper hand in the negotiations in late 1956 and early 1957, a fact ignored in scholarship. Indeed, most commentators dealing with the treaty negotiations have failed to distinguish that disagreement over the investment fund did not mean disagreement on the principles of association as such.⁷² As already indicated, the Treaty of Rome negotiations on Eurafrican colonial association were replete with precisely this consensus dictum. Indeed, in Paris on 10 December the Italian delegation presented its list of outstanding questions to the Ad-Hoc Overseas Territories Group. But in doing so the Italians emphasized that their questions concerned only certain technical aspects and in no way prejudged the 'definitive attitude of the Italian delegation on the matter'.⁷³ As we mentioned in the previous chapter, for political and demographic reasons Italy strongly supported the Eurafrican project, which would rehabilitate

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 15.

⁷² In the entire body of scholarship, Guia Migani is the only one who explicitly and, against the received idea, correctly points out that 'the criticisms [of West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Luxembourg against the French-Belgian association proposal] all concerned the modalities of association; nobody explicitly contested the principle that the African territories would participate in the Common Market'. Guia Migani, *La France et l'Afrique sub-saharienne, 1957-1963: Histoire d'une décolonisation entre idéaux eurafricains et politique de puissance* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2008), p. 54.

⁷³ HAEU, CM 3/NEGO 254, 'Questions posées par la délégation italienne.'

the already-existing Italian settler presence in North Africa and reopen access to resources and trade routes lost in World War II. As stated in *The Economist* around the same time: 'In principle it has been agreed that they should come in; this African market of 37 million people and the other smaller territories, will after all, be a welcome commercial acquisition to German [...] exporters.'⁷⁴ France's 'five partners concur', *The Economist* continued a few weeks later, 'that investment and development in Africa is in their interests too. But there has not been time to work out the sort of detailed conditions for investment under the fund which will satisfy them.'⁷⁵

The only negotiating party that came close to a principled misgiving was the Netherlands. The Dutch government feared high costs, held divergent views on trade policy and, at times, expressed a political wariness of becoming involved in France's and Belgium's colonial projects and problems.⁷⁶ This came to the fore in Brussels on 13 December as the Ad-Hoc Overseas Territories Group presented its first draft of responses to the French–Belgian report. Crucially, focus is placed on Dutch objections, according to which a separation needed to be made between the establishment of a trade zone on the one hand, and the assumption of responsibilities for development of the OCTs, which translated into the investment fund, on the other. The Dutch delegation had no objection to the first, but proposed that the second aspect should be resolved at a later stage. The Dutch feared they would otherwise be drawn into *political* issues – that is, 'all the problems relative to the development of the overseas territories, among which one cannot dissociate the economic problems from the political ones.'⁷⁷

⁷⁴ 'Challenge in Europe', *The Economist*, 15 December 1956.

⁷⁵ 'The Common Market takes shape', *The Economist*, 19 January 1957.

⁷⁶ Pierre-Henri Laurent, 'The diplomacy of the Rome Treaty, 1956–57', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 7, No. 3–4, 1972, p. 214; Frances M. B. Lynch, *France and the International Economy: From Vichy to the Treaty of Rome* (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 204; Anjo G. Harryvan and Jan van der Harst, 'A bumpy road to Lomé: The Netherlands, association, and the Yaounde Treaties, 1956–1969', in Marie-Thérèse Bitsch and Gérard Bossuat (eds), *L'Europe unie et l'Afrique: De l'idée d'Eurafrrique à la convention de Lomé I* (Brussels: Bruylant, 2005).

⁷⁷ HAEU, CM 3/NEGO 253, 'Groupe Ad hoc territoires d'outre-mer, Document de travail relatif à l'association des territoires d'outre-mer au marché commun', 13 December 1956.

However, the Dutch never came close to an all-out rejection of colonial association and on other occasions gave expression to a principled consent. It should also be remembered that on the key issue of Algeria, the Netherlands was one of the staunchest supporters of French policy, opposing Algerian independence, for instance, on grounds that it would jeopardize NATO, its foreign minister, Joseph Luns, describing the Algerian leadership as 'murderous cutthroats with whom it was impossible to deal'.⁷⁸

Shortly after the following Brussels meeting, held on 18 December, the Ad-Hoc Group circulated a draft of a preamble to its final report to the heads of delegation. Being the result of the joint work by an equal number of representatives from each country, the document confirmed the overarching consensus on all general geopolitical, political and economic issues involved. The Ad-Hoc Group's chairman, Belgian diplomat Albert Hupperts, presented it as a first balance sheet of the advantages of the association of the overseas territories:

Economically speaking, the European member states of the common market have an essential need for the cooperation and support that the overseas territories – particularly the African ones – are able to offer in order to establish long-term balance of the European economy. The sources of raw material, variegated and abundant, which the overseas territories dispose of are likely to ensure for the entirety of the European economy of the common market the indispensable foundation for an expanding economy and present the additional advantage of being situated in countries whose orientation may be influenced by the European countries themselves. In addition to the mineral riches of all kinds and the agricultural and exotic products of the overseas countries, it is fair to mention as a concrete incentive, the results of very recent prospections in the petroliferous area carried out in connection with the systematic inventorying of the immense African reserves of metals, phosphates, hydraulic energy, etc.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War*, p. 131.

⁷⁹ HAEU, CM 3/NEGO 252, 'Groupe Ad hoc territoires d'outre-mer, Projet de préambule (établi par le Président)', 18 December 1956.

Further down the preamble, comparison with the Marshall Plan for Europe was made with the assertion that the association of the overseas territories should be undertaken in the same spirit. The preamble concludes:

The proposed enterprise entails consequences of major importance for the future of Europe. [...] In aiding Africa and supporting itself on her, the community of the six is able to furnish Europe with its equilibrium and a new youth. It is in this perspective that all other elements of information assembled in the present report should be understood.⁸⁰

Integrating Sahara, winning Algeria: French arguments

Despite this general consensus, however, the report and efforts of the Ad-Hoc Group did not amount to a green light to agreement. Instead, more bickering ensued and there were still scores of details to be ironed out. Before continuing our account of the negotiations though, we need to take a moment to examine the coinciding developments in France concerning the Sahara region in general, and Algeria in particular, which together formed an integral part of France's push for colonial association with the Common Market.

On 27 December, a week after the Ad-Hoc Group had presented its final report, the French National Assembly debated a government proposition to institute the 'Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes' (OCRS), which was formally established in January 1957.⁸¹ The proposition was presented in parliament by Félix Houphouët-Boigny – a member of Mollet's government as the first-ever West

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ For an in-depth account of the OCRS, see Berny Sèbe, 'In the shadow of the Algerian War: The United States and the Common Organisation of Saharan Regions (OCRS), 1957–62', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2010, pp. 303–22.

African delegated minister, and later the first president of Côte d'Ivoire – who had been in charge of developing this plan since the formation of the Mollet government. Partly resulting from the studies and efforts undertaken by Eirik Labonne's ZOIA Committee and Louis Armand's tireless lobbying for African industrialization, the OCSR amounted to a grand organization with three objectives: development (*mise en valeur*) of the Sahara region; economic expansion; and promotion of social development of the African territories. Primarily, it would be an economic organization, but with significant military strategic, social and political consequences. At its head, there would be a director (named by the government) with far-reaching executive powers and in charge of an executive body modelled on the above-mentioned Bureau d'Industrialisation Africaine (BIA) headed by Armand. Interestingly, too, this authority would coordinate 'migration'. In his concluding remarks to the Assembly, Houphouët-Boigny delivered a passionate plea:

Ladies and Gentlemen, dangers appear that threaten our national patrimony, and from different directions. Recently, we have bitterly experienced to what extent our independence itself was threatened. We have, at the centre of the French Republic a land until now impossible to exploit, but which the ingenuity of our scientists and the labour of our workers may valorize so well that we would be able to turn it not just into a point of support, but perhaps into the very foundation of our economic independence. This does not only concern the self-sufficiency in energy that the exploitation of Sahara's hydrocarbons would guarantee, but also the rich deposits of minerals and metals that are necessary for the Metropole, and for the supply of which it is tributary to foreigners. [...] According to all technicians, Sahara, if it would remain as it is, fragmented, divided between several territories, would tomorrow continue to be dominated by draught, famine and death. It is therefore of the highest importance that each of the territories bordering to it makes proof of their solidarity by leaving parts of their economic rights in the hands of the Common Organization of the Saharan Regions.

He concluded by answering the rhetorical question: 'What will we encounter?'

We will perceive in front of us a beautiful avenue, broad and straight, lined with flowers, in which all of us together may henceforth engage ourselves. It will lead us to the new city, to the city of our dreams, to the city of our wishes, the great fraternal French-African community. If you adopt the text proposed to you, if you thus permit our researchers, our technicians, our workers to organize the rational exploitation of this immense Sahara, you will have given to France and the French Union, on the threshold to this new year, a new hope and a unique chance. But you will have done more, you will have affirmed your will to contribute to a new world, you will thus have forged a link with the overseas territories, but what a link! The most precious link of the great chain of human fraternity toward which the entire world aspires.⁸²

The next day, Mollet endorsed and presented the proposition in the Senate. No longer 'a barrier', Sahara should evolve into 'a bond', offering 'a lasting solution within the bounds of French Africa'. 'In fact', Mollet continued, 'the Saharan economy harmoniously integrates itself into the French-African economic whole'. For Algeria's industrialization in particular, Sahara offered great prospects. Like Houphouët-Boigny, Mollet spoke of the exploitation of Sahara as an epoch-defining event. 'What should evolve around French Sahara is a mystique belonging to grand projects of continental proportions.'⁸³

Mollet also paid homage to the 'pioneers, who have been determined, since ten years back, to furnish the demonstration of the immense riches contained in the desert's subsoil, and to prove also that the exploitation of them is technically possible and economically profitable'. He was referring above all to Labonne, Armand and de Lattre. Mollet emphasized the need for investments, but did not

⁸² Journal Officiel de la République Française, Débats parlementaires, Assemblée nationale, séance du jeudi 27 Décembre 1956, pp. 2895-98.

⁸³ HAEU, EN 2735, 'Déclaration prononcée par M. Guy Mollet, Président du Conseil, au cours du débat sur le Projet de loi instituant une Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes'.

mention – he was speaking in the French Parliament – the possibility of foreign sources. Neither did he give notice of the secret meeting that took place in Cologne the year before between French and German industrialists and where both Armand and Labonne had been present. As reported by the British *Tribune Magazine* on 25 March 1955, the meeting, held two weeks earlier, had broached a ‘revolutionary scheme’ – namely, the establishment of an armaments complex in the Sahara. At the meeting, Armand and Labonne expressed confidence that new technology was now available for the exploitation of ‘the hidden industrial wealth of the desert’, particularly in the southern parts of Algeria. However, as with the Eurafrican project in general, the French delegation also let it be known that since France was unable to shoulder the financing part alone, the dormant Saharan wealth needed German capital for its realization. In an attempt to persuade its German partner about the lucrative investment opportunity on offer, Armand is quoted as having told the Germans that ‘[t]he H-bomb has made the Ruhr out of date as an armaments centre. The Sahara is much more immune to attack by Russian bombers.’⁸⁴ At the time of this meeting, Armand was also in the process of being appointed by the French government – for a period of three years – as head of a ‘central committee of Eurafrican vocation’, which would ‘define a policy of foreign investments in French Africa’, ‘direct and oversee negotiations with interested foreign governments and establishments’, and facilitate political decisions in France pertaining to such investments. The main rationale behind this decision, as it can be traced in preparatory notes, was the need to encourage prospecting and fund infrastructural projects in the Sahara region so as to ‘associate the Germans, the Italians and, eventually, other European and foreign countries to important achievements in Africa.’⁸⁵

As we saw in the previous chapter, the notion of a Saharan ‘desert Ruhr’ was not new; it dated back at least a decade to precisely the work conducted by Labonne, Armand and other ‘visionaries’, to use *The New*

⁸⁴ ‘Desert Ruhr’, *Tribune Magazine*, 25 March 1955.

⁸⁵ HAEU, MAEF 63, ‘Note des investissements étrangers en Afrique Française’, 3 March 1955.

York Times' term.⁸⁶ As a headline for a full-page Associated Press article in the *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* from 1952 had it: 'French hope to find new Ruhr under Sahara'.⁸⁷ But high-level negotiations between France and West Germany over North Africa were not new either. In 1954, for instance, as *The New York Times* reported, 'The West German Chancellor and his fifty-man delegation arrived in Paris enthusiastic about the prospects of a French-German rapprochement that would interlock the industrial capacities of the two countries in Europe and North Africa.' Ruhr industrialists, the report continued, were particularly enthusiastic. France's invitation to them as future partners in North Africa's great industrial leap not only matched perfectly with their immediate interest in gaining access to North Africa's natural wealth but also conformed with the Ruhr's more general outlook, 'according to which Europe's prosperity could be assured if the highly industrialized states would concentrate on the exploitation of the underdeveloped areas.'⁸⁸

The Economist also took a great deal of interest in the Sahara scheme. 'Four years of intensive geological research have shown,' it wrote as the proposal to create the OCRS was being prepared for the French Assembly, 'that the Sahara may rival Canada as a source of raw materials.' Iron ore 'on the scale of Lorraine and of almost Swedish quality' has been found, as have copper, tungsten, zinc, lead, manganese, natural gas and coal. Most important of all, *The Economist* highlighted, '[t]here is the smell of oil in the Sahara.' But as is commonly known, in order to exploit these immense riches France needed the aid of foreign investment. Hence, the report noted, 'there has been talk of Eurafrica, with Germany as an active partner.'⁸⁹ As W. N. R. Maxwell of the British Consulate in Dakar commented on Eurafrica in January 1957: '[I]t sounds a bit like the continuation of French colonialism supported by German funds.'⁹⁰

⁸⁶ 'French to exploit Sahara resources', *The New York Times*, 24 October 1953.

⁸⁷ 'French hope to find new Ruhr under Sahara', *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, 3 June 1952.

⁸⁸ 'Adenauer's hopes suffer a setback', *The New York Times*, 20 October 1954.

⁸⁹ 'Investing in the desert', *The Economist*, 25 August 1956.

⁹⁰ Quoted in Gordon Martel, 'Decolonisation after Suez: Retreat or rationalisation?', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. 46, No. 3, 2000, pp. 408-9.

In the course of the 1950s, then, Sahara emerged, in Houphouët-Boigny's words, as 'the centre of the French Republic', 'the foundation of its economic independence', or, to use *The New York Times*' depiction, as 'rapidly becoming a new frontier' that if 'true to its promise [...] may have a powerful effect on the industrial and economic renaissance of France'.⁹¹

The OCRS was voted into law at the height of the negotiations concerning another economic integration project, the EEC. There, one of the main questions turned out to be that of the investment fund for social and economic infrastructure development in France's and Belgium's African colonies. At the same time, by way of preparing itself to pool and manage European investments, France reorganized its economic authority in most of French Africa and instituted a whole new governmental organization to coordinate it. In a subsequent speech by Mollet, the OCRS, Eurafrica, the EEC and settlement of Algeria were presented as the pride and cornerstones of French foreign policy. The rhetoric surrounding the Sahara organization was as grand and utopian as the one surrounding the European Common Market. The OCRS, as Martin Evans puts it, was one of Mollet's 'big ideas: the symbol of his "Eurafrican" future'.⁹² Obviously, the Sahara plan contributed with economic reality and momentum to the Eurafrican association plans.

But there were more signs of consolidation of the French power elite in support of the EEC-Eurafrica nexus during this time. In January 1957, Robert Schuman weighed in on the treaty negotiations with a forceful plea for Eurafrican integration that partly echoed the report of the Ad-Hoc Overseas Territories Group. 'Eurafrica', he asserted, 'does not just signify the creation of a system of assistance; but the constitution of an economic whole, of a true association, in the interior of which a reciprocity of advantages and a communal politics of development will be put to work'.⁹³ In words alluding to the Suez

⁹¹ 'French to exploit Sahara resources', *The New York Times*, 24 October 1953.

⁹² Martin Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 303.

⁹³ Robert Schuman, 'Unité européenne et Eurafrigue: Politique révolutionnaire – Aperçu d'ensemble', *Union française et Parlement*, January 1957, pp. 1–3.

Crisis, Schuman added Eurafrica's by now much rehearsed geopolitical rationale, arguing that since the Soviet quest for world hegemony had now set its eyes on Africa, 'we should respond through the institution of a true community between the peoples of Europe and of Africa, the notion of which is at the basis of the Eurafrican idea'.⁹⁴

For Mollet's Socialist-led government, such staunch support from the opposition was of course welcomed. As noted in the previous chapter, it reflected what Tony Smith referred to as the 'colonial consensus' that characterized the Fourth Republic, basically encompassing all the political parties with the exception of the Communists. Absolutely central here, of course, was the conviction that Algeria had to remain French.⁹⁵ And since French Algeria was fundamental to the wider Eurafrican cause, much of the Paris international propaganda drive to seek support for its new Algerian policy operated *precisely* by linking it to the ongoing negotiation on the Common Market's Eurafrican integration scheme. As Evans elucidates, during the Mollet government's tenure 'two interconnected themes were given a new urgency': on the one hand, European integration; on the other hand, reforms in Algeria that would also decentralize authority in French Africa and embed Algeria in a new geopolitical context. These two themes, according to Evans, were 'seen as absolute priorities in the international field' and they 'were summed up in the concept of "Eurafrica"'.⁹⁶

According to the strategy of Mollet's socialist government, then, Eurafrica was seen as a formation allowing for reforms towards increased autonomy and political rights for Algeria and French Africa, while simultaneously integrating them on more equal terms with Western Europe. Algeria would here demonstrate both the necessity of France's European commitment and the possibility for 'dependent peoples' to pass over the stage of *national* and *political* independence by entering into a larger community. Only such a larger Eurafrican

⁹⁴ Robert Schuman, *France-Forum*, February 1957, p. 21.

⁹⁵ Tony Smith, 'The French colonial consensus and people's war, 1946-58', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1974, pp. 217-47.

⁹⁶ Evans, *Algeria*, p. 194.

community could reconcile with the new and commanding stage of *interdependence* that the world had entered. The efforts and resources of each of the community's participating parties would complement each other towards the *social* and *economic* sustainability of the whole.⁹⁷

A good example of France's strategy was Mollet's statement on France's position concerning the Algerian situation, issued to the UN General Assembly on 9 January 1957. Mollet ended his note on Algeria with reference to Eurafrica:

France is negotiating at this time with her European partners for the organization of a vast common market, to which the Overseas Territories will be associated. All of Europe will be called upon to help in the development of Africa, and tomorrow Eurafrica may become one of the principal factors in world politics. Isolated nations can no longer keep pace with the world. What would Algeria amount to by itself? On the other hand, what future might it not have, as one of the foundations of the Eurafican community now taking shape? [...] Independence would result in inevitable economic and social regression as well as political regression toward dictatorship or the quasi-feudal regime of certain Arab States – would this be progress? [...] interdependence among nations is becoming the rule.⁹⁸

In the statement Mollet also made sure he clarified the fact that 'France [would] never abandon Algeria'.⁹⁹

Major support for this outlook also came from Raymond Aron, one of France's foremost intellectuals at the time. Warning against 'propagandist slogans' – 'as though liberty were always incarnate in the nationalists and slavery in the Europeans' – Aron argued that Algerians had everything to gain by remaining with France: 'Without the European minority the Algerian masses would know a still worse

⁹⁷ Guy Mollet, *Bilan et perspectives socialistes* (Paris: Plon, 1958), pp. 45–6; see also, Talbot C. Imlay, 'International socialism and decolonization during the 1950s: Competing rights and the postcolonial order', *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 118, No. 4, 2013, pp. 1119–20.

⁹⁸ HAEU, EN 2736, 'Text of the French Government's Statement on Algeria', 9 January 1957.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

fate, because the fragile structure of modern economy would collapse.' But there was no hiding the reciprocity of it all, because, as Aron also made sure to point out, 'Algeria is the indispensable southern base of the defense of Western Europe; it is the access to the oil in the Sahara.'¹⁰⁰ Moreover, as the reference to 'Western Europe' indicates, in order for this reciprocity to materialize it could not stop short with a French–Algerian equation; rather it had to transcend the national logic on both sides of the Mediterranean and so had to involve a Eurafrican constellation:

Neither alone nor with Africa, which is for the time being a liability rather than an asset, can France attain first magnitude on a world scale. Committed to Europe, and Europe's agent in Africa, she might well claim a higher mission. [...] [I]f she continues to arrogate to herself alone a role which can be assigned only to Europe, if she tries to keep for herself the advantages of both an independent diplomacy and European solidarity, she is once again running the risk of losing on both counts [...].¹⁰¹

Thus, Aron projected, 'if peace is restored in Algeria, the task of economic development with Eurafrica as a final result, which France cannot accomplish alone, could be considered a common European responsibility.'¹⁰²

As Evans underscores, and as we shall illustrate further later, 'in the run-up to the signing of the Treaty of Rome [...], no theme was more insistent than "Eurafrica" in justifying government action in Algeria.'¹⁰³ In contrast, however, Mollet's statement earlier refers only in passing to the new Common Organization of the Sahara Regions, although it is alluded to: 'The large-scale support given by Metropolitan France makes it possible at the same time to continue a major program of

¹⁰⁰ Raymond Aron, *France Steadfast and Changing: The Fourth to the Fifth Republic* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 157, 89, 134. Originally published as *Immuable et changeante. De la IVe à la Ve République* (Paris: Calman-Lévy, 1959).

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 168.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 167.

¹⁰³ Evans, *Algeria*, p. 195.

public investments, aimed particularly at irrigating the land and industrializing the country.' Whatever this 'program' was, it was either identical to the OCRS or would be linked up with it.

The day after Mollet's statement, though, Sahara was made very explicit in Maurice Faure's, head of the French delegation, discussion with Walter Hallstein, West Germany's State Secretary for Foreign Affairs. During their meeting in Bonn, which was an attempt to break the deadlock on the association question, Faure told Hallstein that 'the future will carry brilliant possibilities' and 'the discoveries in Sahara are the evidence of this'. Hence, 'there is no need to underline the collective interest of the European powers in maintaining their positions in Africa, which, if they disappeared, would risk exposing them to very great dangers'.¹⁰⁴

A few days later, the Mollet government tried to further boost domestic support for its negotiation platform. Although important figures from the opposition, such as Schuman, had already endorsed the government's association stance in the treaty negotiations, Mollet aimed for an even broader national consensus by calling for an extended debate on the matter in Parliament. In the debate, which lasted from 15 to 22 January, Mollet spoke about 'the creation of the great European space, the creation of the Eurafrican ensemble', adding that '[t]he natural consequence of our politics of expansion is the European Common Market. It is by inserting itself into an economic space of the size of the United States and the USSR that France can ensure, with the least difficulties, the development of its trade, which is a condition and corollary for the development of its production'.¹⁰⁵

Another prominent French politician from the opposition to speak in favour of the government's association bid was Pierre-Henri Teitgen. Like Schuman, Teitgen – as we mentioned in the preceding chapter – was a Christian Democrat of the *Mouvement républicain populaire* (MRP) and a leading figure within the European Movement who also,

¹⁰⁴ Quoted in Montarsolo, *L'Eurafrrique*, p. 231. Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, ARM 16/9/11, 'Entretien Faure-Hallstein du 10 janvier 1957 de 10 à 13 heures à Bonn'.

¹⁰⁵ HAEU, EN 2735, 'Discours prononcé par M. Guy Mollet', 22 January 1957, p. 3.

in the early 1950s, became Minister for Overseas France. Addressing Parliament on 15 January, Teitgen alerted the European partners to the fact that the National Assembly might not ratify the Common Market treaty should the OCTs be excluded. 'Eurafrica appears as indispensable to Europe as it is to Africa, the historical task of a generation, the only chance for a better destiny for our territories, the only chance for France to continue its mission, and the only chance for peace in the world.'¹⁰⁶

As for the debate in general, the Suez affair constituted a crucial theme, proffering wide agreement on the position that 'only by joining together could the countries of Europe hope to arrest, and then to reverse, the decline in their influence on world events.'¹⁰⁷ Indeed, one pro-European voice went as far as to extend his ironic gratitude to Nasser and Bulganin for making Western Europeans alive to the importance of standing together.¹⁰⁸ Commenting on the Assembly debate, *The Economist* reported that 'since the Suez adventure, integration schemes, far from being suspected as "American plots," have a third force halo.'¹⁰⁹ This, of course, reverberated in the more specific debate on association. As Mollet argued:

The Association of the overseas territories to Europe, the constitution of a Eurafrican entity are political decisions of such an importance that they justify a negotiation at the highest level. Is there any better chance for Europe than this entente with Africa! The authority of Europe in world affairs already surpasses that of the sum of countries of which it is composed – and just think then of the association of Europe and Africa! On the political level as on the economic level as on the strategic level, the union of the two continents will be a significant factor in the global relations of forces, and a factor weighing in favour of peace and understanding between peoples. Does France have a reason to worry about the association of the overseas territories to the

¹⁰⁶ Journal Officiel de la République Française, Débats parlementaires, Assemblée nationale, séance du mardi 15 janvier 1957, p. 14.

¹⁰⁷ Camps, *Britain and the European Community*, pp. 79–80.

¹⁰⁸ Pitman, "A General named Eisenhower", p. 33.

¹⁰⁹ 'M. Mollet pleads for Europe', *The Economist*, 26 January 1957.

European economic ensemble? No. It is by opening to our overseas populations the abundant perspectives of a union with Europe, it is by permitting them to enter into this vast entity through our intermediary that we will best perpetuate our influence. We do not create the French–African community that is under construction today through egotistical aims. It is founded on the mutual trust between the French and African peoples. Is there any better pledge to this trust than to give Africa a chance to benefit from the chances of Europe.¹¹⁰

Mollet then referred back to the recent great debate in the Assembly – namely, the one concerning the creation of the ‘Common Organization of the Sahara Regions’ – stating that the EEC and the Association were of the same importance and kind:

Some weeks ago, by voting into effect the law that organizes the Sahara regions, you ensured the realization of a grandiose project that will remain an honour to this legislature. The vote on the Common Market will also be a historical event. The development [*mise en valeur*] of Sahara, the European Common Market, the one just as the other, offers our youth, and that of our overseas territories, immense perspectives, new fields of activity, and a response to their wish to construct. It is of this youth that you will think in a little while, at the moment you make your decision.¹¹¹

In the speech, Mollet also admitted that the determination to form the Common Market was sealed with Adenauer in November ‘last year’.¹¹²

Intervening into the assembly debate, former French member of government, parliamentarian, poet, co-initiator of the Négritude conception and future president of Senegal, Léopold Sedar Senghor, criticized the government for having conceded too much to its five partners. Ironically, he remarked that he understood that the other Five were not that willing to share with France ‘the White Man’s Burden’. Senghor also asserted that African representatives had been kept outside of the process – ‘one has given us very little enlightenment’

¹¹⁰ HAEU, EN 2735, ‘Discours prononcé par M. Guy Mollet’, 22 January 1957, pp. 11–12.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 6.

– which is why his intervention, he stated, should be seen as an interrogation. Senghor continued to interrogate especially the dangers of the association to emergent industries in Africa along with the dangers of immigration into Africa of ‘petit blancs’ (a white underclass).¹¹³ In the debates about the European Political Community (EPC), Senghor, we should recall, had argued for a Eurafrican conception that would allow Africans fair representation in the emerging political framework, and he was weary that the new EEC association would not entail the parity between Africans and Europeans which, for him, was the entire purpose of the Eurafrican idea.

On the whole the Mollet government received the parliamentary support it had asked for, the Assembly endorsing its negotiation platform by 322 votes to 207, and in a motion adopted by the Assembly during the debate, the government was requested, and thus encouraged, to stand firm on its demand on overseas association in the treaty negotiations.¹¹⁴

Meanwhile, as the parliamentary debate in Paris was winding down, Félix Houphouët-Boigny took the stand at the heads of delegation meeting in Brussels (19–22 January) and delivered a strong plea for the Eurafrican cause. Forming part of Mollet’s innermost circle, Houphouët-Boigny emphasized the political necessities of associating the overseas territories with the Common Market,¹¹⁵ and there could be no mistaking that Mollet had called on him for the precise purpose of pretending that Eurafrica had a strong *African* backing. On the final day of the French parliamentary debate (22 January), Mollet referred to Houphouët-Boigny’s splendid appearance in Brussels the day before. The weight assigned to Houphouët-Boigny’s intervention in the treaty negotiations was also underscored in *Le Monde* (January 23) and by the French ambassador in Belgium,

¹¹³ Journal Officiel de la République Française, Débats parlementaires, Assemblée nationale, séance du 18 janvier 1957, p. 167. For more on Senghor’s conception of Eurafrica, see John Chipman, *French Power in Africa* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 79–81.

¹¹⁴ Camps, *Britain and the European Community*, p. 79.

¹¹⁵ HAEU, CM 3/NEGO 252, ‘Procès verbal, réunion des chefs de délégation’ 19–20 January 1957.

Raymond Bousquet, as a few days later (25 January) he reported to Foreign Minister Christian Pineau about the progress made in the negotiations.¹¹⁶ According to Bousquet, Houphouët-Boigny seemed to have 'made an excellent impression' at the Brussels meeting of the heads of delegations:

He [Houphouët-Boigny] put emphasis on the danger to the French-Belgian ensemble represented by the attraction of the powers of Bandung (Afro-Asians). In his view, the politics of Great Britain in Africa, which assures independence to its old black colonies, but without taking measures concerning the level of life and social and economic improvement of its populations, *is extremely dangerous to the French-Belgian ensemble*. It will result from this that, if the Six do not associate the overseas territories to their exchanges and investments, the Afro-Asian bloc, 'spearhead of communism', will implant itself on these territories. Already, the Afro-Asians and the communists begin to exercise their harmful activities in Britain's old African colonies. However, neither of them is able to make anything but ideological propaganda, and without bringing anything tangible to the native populations. Europe has its opportunity, if she is wise enough to seize it, to victoriously combat this double influence, in assuring, through her actions on the financial, economic and social level, to black Africa an increasing standard of living. From an egotistical point of view, Europe has the greatest interest in this, since, without black Africa, her 150 million inhabitants will be cramped within their borders. If the Europe of the Six, through a truly efficient financial and investment policy, succeeds in making the black populations feel that the Eurafrican Association is capable of producing practical results, the French-Belgian territories of this part of the continent will not just reject the attempt of the Bandung group and the communists, but the French-Belgian territories will also constitute a symbol of prosperity to its neighbouring colonies. It is then likely that Britain's old African colonies will demand their own association to the Eurafrican Common Market on the same

¹¹⁶ For more on Houphouët-Boigny's intervention see Lynch, *France and the International Economy*, pp. 204–5.

conditions that Great Britain will do, at the right moment in the future European Market.¹¹⁷

At the Brussels meeting the delegations also discussed the very first draft of the treaty articles on association as later adopted. Two articles were confirmed, one of them stipulating that association should be in accord with the United Nations Charter (Articles 73 and 76) concerning territories that were not autonomous and under tutelage.¹¹⁸ This followed from a previous German proposal, aiming to assuage Dutch scepticism by putting association in accord with and support of the United Nations Charter on aid to insufficiently developed zones.¹¹⁹ Although anticipating events, it should be mentioned here that it is precisely to these, what we may term, African (e.g. Houphouët-Boigny, as seen earlier) and UN alibis that France was clinging when the EEC's association regime came under criticism in the UN subsequent to the Treaty of Rome's ratification. In response to criticism, launched in 1958 by a group of mainly non-aligned countries (e.g. India, Ghana, Indonesia, Yugoslavia), pointing to possible adverse effects of EEC-association for the 'Non-Self-Governing-Territories' concerned, and for a protracted failure to supply information to the UN on the types of measures planned to be enacted as part of the association scheme, France thus invoked two conditions, or alibis. First, it claimed that 'the principles underlying the establishment of the "European Common Market" were quite in accord with the United Nations Charter'. Second, it (falsely) asserted that '[i]t was only at the express request of representatives from Overseas Territories that France had urged the other EEC members to accept the association of the Territories with the Community. The future would show that the EEC would mean progress not only for Europe but also for the Territories concerned'.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ HAEU, SGCICEE 3109, Raymond Bousquet to Christian Pineau, 'Territoires d'Outre-Mer', 25 January 1957, Ambassade de France en Belgique, letter no. 184.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ HAEU, CM 3/NEGO 253, 'Note concernant l'association des pays et territoires d'outre-mer au marché commun', 20 January. 1957.

¹²⁰ 'Question concerning Non-Self-Governing Territories and the international trusteeship system', *Yearbook of the United Nations*, Part 1, Sec. 3, Ch. 1, 1958, pp. 305–6. See also

Figure 4.3 Europe – personified by Marianne (France) and Germania (Germany) – showers its gifts and blessings on the African continent.
Source: *Le XX Siècle*, 1956. Historical Archives of the European Union.

There was yet another crucial parallel between the Brussels meeting on 19–22 January 1957 and the French defence of the EEC association in the UN a year later. As intimated in the UN exchange, this concerned the vision of the ‘future’ or, better, the anticipated time frame in which

‘Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories’, *International Organization*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1958, pp. 100–2, 107.

Figure 4.4 Caricature from the German press by Hans Erich Köhler, 1957. The caption reads: 'Get going, Michael! Close your eyes and think of Europe.' Source: Hanns Erich Köhler, *Pardon wird nicht gegeben: Karikaturen unserer Zeit* (Hannover: Fackelträger-Verlag-Schmidt-Küster, 1957).

the EEC was to be in charge of the development and 'progress' of the associated colonies, or the 'Non-Self-Governing-Territories'. At the Brussels meeting on 19–22 January the German proposal under consideration included the idea that the EEC's Council of Ministers should decide, *after twenty years*, whether the states of the Common Market should continue to contribute to the social development of

the overseas territories.¹²¹ We can only speculate about whether this proposal also contained a tacit assumption that twenty years on, EEC association would still encompass overseas territories as in colonies or 'Non-Self-Governing-Territories'. But given the prevailing Eurafrican conception, as seen for instance in Mollet's statement earlier – and as we will discuss further later – that '[i]solated nations can no longer keep pace with the world', that Algeria certainly had no future 'by itself', or in Adenauer's firm rejection of the notion 'that Africa, as a black continent, could be independent alongside the other continents', it is not far-fetched to suppose that the German proposal indeed operated under the assumption that colonial relations with ('Non-Self-Governing-Territories' in) Africa would be sustained for at least another twenty years.

Shortly after the Brussels meeting, Mollet continued his public appeal for the Eurafrican cause. Addressing the Republican Circle, he spoke of Eurafrica as the solution to Europe's, France's, Africa's and the world's problems. Without Eurafrica, Europe would, in effect, be lost:

The future of Africa is at issue. The European nations that assume particular responsibilities on this continent should today create their response to the profound desire for emancipation among the peoples of the old colonies. The destiny of Africa is tied to this response, but above all that of Europe, which, cut off from Africa, would remain isolated at the extremity of an immense continent dominated by communism.¹²²

Yet, no agreement on association was reached at the conference of foreign ministers on 26–28 January. The president of the conference, Spaak, addressed the situation in a critical note of 30 January, and proposed how the outstanding problems could be resolved. He first

¹²¹ HAEU, CM 3/NEGO 252, 'Association des pays et territoires d'outre-mer au marché commun, Document de travail établi par la délégation allemande', 23 January 1957.

¹²² HAEU, EN 2735, 'Allocution prononcé par M. Guy Mollet, Président du Conseil, à l'issue du déjeuner offert en son honneur par le Cercle Républicain et Société des Etudes Economiques', 22 January 1957.

stated that 'the obstacles to overcome are economic, political and even psychological'. He therefore found it necessary to repeat the principal arguments. 'If the problem is posed clearly', he began, 'it will perhaps be possible to resolve it'. He then went on to state the economic dilemma that France was in, as it is tied to its overseas areas for exports and imports. To these are then added 'political arguments of exceptional importance. The effort made by France answers a political imperative which is paramount not only for it, but for Europe.' According to Spaak, the political considerations were of three kinds: first, development; second, the scale of Europe's sphere of support and influence; and, third, the global balance of power:

The politics of aid to underdeveloped countries is now, at least in principle, recognized and proclaimed by all states. Should it not be applied so as to essentially direct it toward the territories ready to associate their destiny with that of Europe? From the perspective of the development of production in the world, what would be the situation of Europe if it would find itself cut off from the essential sources of raw materials, and deprived of riches whose extent is now beginning to reveal itself? The political view on the liaison with the overseas countries and territories is modified when a complete rupture of the relations between them and the motherland actually implies not a true independence, but transition into a dependence of another kind. Europe in its entirety ought to preoccupy itself with these under-developed countries which, in the actual division of the world, will make the power balance tip over.¹²³

Having discussed these political issues, Spaak concluded that everyone agreed on them. What caused disagreement were the economic questions about the real costs and benefits of the association. What were the Five asked to contribute? And what would they receive in return, especially concerning the investments demanded by France? This was

¹²³ HAEU, CM 3/NEGO 252, 'Conférence des Ministres des affaires étrangères, Note du Président sur les pays et territoires d'outre-mer', 30 January 1957.

the source of disagreement.¹²⁴ Yet again, we are faced with the fact that, regarding political arguments for Eurafrica, there was agreement all along. Spaak was thus correct and uncontroversial in emphasizing this point. Also, there was no disagreement regarding France's justification for wanting to include or associate the OCTs. Finally, all agreed on the geopolitical, strategic and historical motivations behind the association and the creation of Eurafrica. What alienated the partners was that they were unexpectedly asked to pay for investments in what they saw as France's territories. Hence, some were not convinced about the extent to which, and how freely, they would be able to reap their fair share of the profits stemming from the joint investment in French Africa.

Saving the West: The Cold War context

Such uncertainty and suspicion partly explains why France, as already noted, throughout the negotiations was adamant about framing Eurafrica as a 'collective' enterprise, foremost intent on serving the general European interest as it claimed to be anchored in a realism of 'interdependence' between countries. As such, it was also a historical opportunity and a French 'offer' not only to its European partners, but also to the Africans. As a subscriber to this view, Jean Farran of *Paris Match* had a hard time understanding why France's generous association offer to Europe was still disputed in the negotiations. 'It was a remarkable and significant scene', Farran wrote on 9 February, 'as France and Belgium placed their empires on the table before their partners, who responded by being choosy.'¹²⁵ A week earlier, Mollet had reiterated the French 'offer' in a statement issued to the Swedish daily *Aftonbladet*, claiming, among other things, that 'France itself, accepts to limit her sovereignty' for the sake of a European community that invited 'the peoples of black Africa and Algeria to integrate themselves

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Jean Farran, 'La marmite de l'Europe', *Paris Match*, 9 February 1957.

into a great Eurafrikan entity, in which, and with the collective assistance of the most developed nations, they will attain democracy and a true independence'.¹²⁶

It is crucial to note too that France's concurrent military activity in Algeria and Cameroon was persistently articulated in this very same collectivist and post-nationalist idiom. The warfare in Algeria, as Edgar Furniss delineated the French position in *International Organization* at the time, was not primarily a struggle for French national interests, 'on behalf of outmoded, nineteenth century colonialism or even for herself alone, but for the West, for the free world, in combating an extension of the general [anti-colonialist] nationalist offensive which so troubles Britain and the United States in the near east'.¹²⁷ Soon after the Algerian rebellion had commenced in 1954, Gaullist hardliner Michel Debré (as described in Chapter 3) – later the first prime minister to serve under de Gaulle and the Fifth Republic – announced that the French task in Algeria was 'above all to be the guardian of the free world'.¹²⁸ Algeria, Debré contended with much approval two years later in a debate in the French Senate, constituted a 'battlefield of world conflict' and so was fundamental to the West¹²⁹ – an opinion that, as Martin Thomas and Raoul Girardet underscore, he shared with a massive majority of the French political establishment at the time.¹³⁰

This is also the central argument used by France in order to justify its massive transfer of French NATO troops from Europe to Algeria. By 1955, France had made clear to its NATO partners that, if necessary, it might very well send all its European NATO forces to Algeria, since 'the defence of North Africa is essential to the defence of Europe and

¹²⁶ HAEU, EN 2735, 'Déclaration faite par M. Guy Mollet, Président du Conseil, à M. Jack Miller, Correspondent du journal suédois *Aftenbladet* [sic!]', 2 February 1957.

¹²⁷ Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., 'France, NATO, and European security', *International Organization*, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1956, p. 554.

¹²⁸ Quoted in Stephen Tyre, 'The Gaullist, the French Army and Algeria before 1958: Common cause or marriage of convenience?', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2002, p. 103.

¹²⁹ Quoted in Martin Thomas, *The French North African Crisis: Colonial Breakdown and Anglo-French Relations, 1945–62* (Houndmills: Macmillan, 2000), p. 139.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 139. Raoul Girardet, *L'idée coloniale en France de 1871–1962* (2nd edn, Paris: Hachette, 2009), pp. 335–6.

the free world'. Similarly, the French commander-in-chief in Algeria, General Jacques Allard, stated in 1957 that his mission was 'to defend the free world', and 'the rear line of defence, the last one, runs through Algeria'.¹³¹ France thus wanted other NATO members to acknowledge that from now on its primary role within NATO would be committed to the West's defence of North Africa, the western Mediterranean and Central Africa, since, in French eyes, this was equivalent to a defence of Europe.¹³² What this amounted to was nothing less than a French attempt to have NATO function as a Eurafrican defence alliance, and it is as befitting as it is logical that this endeavour was unfolding in tandem with the negotiations over the Eurafrican Common Market and EURATOM. The correlation is further substantiated when adding in the fact that France, from 1956 onwards, petitioned to have NATO also assume an economic and social role in Africa, with a particular focus on North Africa. Referring to Mollet's and Pineau's insistence that NATO 'should be economic as well as military', *The New York Times* reported that according to this view 'it would be logical for the [NATO] Council to consider North Africa and its capital needs since its economic health, like that of the Middle East, is regarded as having strategic importance for the Western World'.¹³³

From the perspective of several non-Western governments, France's actions were soon seen as indeed implying a (Eurafrican) transformation of NATO. By September 1955 the head of India's UN delegation, Krishna Menon, among others, criticized France's NATO troop transfers in the UN, claiming this now meant that 'all the allies' of NATO were implicated in France's Algerian conflict.¹³⁴ Less than a year later, eight Arab governments harshly condemned NATO's involvement in Algeria, alleging that NATO's function had been 'deformed' by countenancing the deployment of French NATO troops in Algeria. As a consequence, the statement went on, NATO had grown

¹³¹ Quoted in Girardet, *L'idée coloniale en France*, p. 343.

¹³² 'French may shift European forces to North Africa', *The New York Times*, 7 August 1955.

¹³³ 'The question of Algeria', *The New York Times*, 1 April 1956.

¹³⁴ 'Algeria barred by U.N. as issue', *The New York Times*, 23 September 1955.

into a 'direct means to support colonialism',¹³⁵ which, in essence, was exactly the role France wanted NATO to assume.

Inside NATO, meanwhile, the French troop transfers gained firm support from West Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. But the bleeding of NATO's continental strength also caused concern among several others of the partners. The Americans (who supplied most of the weapons to France), and subsequently the British too, were alarmed and soon outright hostile to the continuous French troop diversion, which by 1957 had basically emptied Europe of French NATO forces.¹³⁶ Likewise, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Alfred Gruenther, complained repeatedly, warning that Algeria was depleting the Rhine command of French troops.¹³⁷

Despite increasing misgivings, the NATO Council and the USA nonetheless had to submit since France could claim it had the North Atlantic Treaty on its side. NATO's Algerian, or Eurafrikan, outfit, which, as we discussed in Chapter 3, had been added as a French *sine qua non* in 1949 and much to the dislike of the Americans, was now paying great dividends to the French. When France contemplated further troop transfers in the summer of 1955, the NATO commanders, although with great reluctance, thus conceded that the defence of French Algeria was vital to European security.¹³⁸ Similarly, when Mollet notified the NATO Council of yet another troop transfer in the spring of 1956, designating the Algerian insurgency as jeopardizing the security of Europe, the Council again had little choice but to stand by France, acknowledging Algeria as being within the purview of the NATO treaty as well as recognizing 'the importance of the North African region to the security of Europe'.¹³⁹ Given the publicly little-known fact, until this point, concerning Algeria's status within NATO,

¹³⁵ 'U.S. get warning from Arab lands on Algeria issue', *The New York Times*, 16 June 1956.

¹³⁶ Thomas, *The French North African Crisis*, pp. 136–8; Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War*, pp. 20–2. For Britain's negative post-Suez attitude towards France's war in Algeria and NATO designs, see Martin Thomas, 'The British Government and the end of French Algeria, 1958–62', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2002, pp. 172–98.

¹³⁷ Thomas, *The French North African Crisis*, p. 137.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

¹³⁹ Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War*, p. 21.

the press made sure it was brought to the world's attention time and again from the mid-1950s onwards.

Of course, since the French government had not justified Algeria's incorporation into NATO as a precautionary measure in anticipation of a future large-scale war in Algeria when negotiating the NATO treaty in 1949 – although there were some who suspected something approaching this to be the hidden motive¹⁴⁰ – such dividends were not hailed as resulting from some prophetic propensities on the part of the French government at the time. But what many within France's political, military and intellectual elites indeed could claim to have had corroborated was the accuracy of the wider Eurafrican rationale for insisting on Algeria's NATO incorporation in 1949. We should mention that this rationale was also behind NATO's second Eurafrican enlargement in February of 1952 when the NATO Council decided to incorporate Morocco and Tunisia into the organization through a provision of association that deemed the defence of these French protectorates part of the defence of Western Europe. Again, the decision resulted from a French demand, which in turn, as reported in *The New York Times*, emerged from a massive parliamentary majority, save for the communists, who having endorsed Greece's and Turkey's NATO membership received Foreign Minister Schuman's promise that the government would make sure it convinced NATO to make the common defence also apply to Morocco and Tunisia.¹⁴¹

As with the Eurafrican association platform in the Common Market negotiations, the Mollet government's assertion that France was fighting for Europe and the West in Algeria now resonated very well with the military and Gaullists' long-standing preoccupation with North Africa as a key strategic area from which the defence of Western Europe could be upheld in the event of a Soviet attack, much in the same way as North Africa eventually had come to function in the fight

¹⁴⁰ See Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947–1949* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), p. 218.

¹⁴¹ 'NATO African role is sought in Paris', *The New York Times*, 25 January 1952.

against Germany during World War II.¹⁴² In the 1950s, after Nasser had come to power in Egypt, Algeria of course also emerged as the prime strategic bastion against Soviet incursion and Pan-Arabic infiltration in North Africa, which aimed to strengthen Moscow's position vis-à-vis both continental Europe and Europe's African colonies. As Stephen Tyre shows – drawing among others from exchanges between the French military and Ministry of Defence in the autumn of 1956 – the strategic position assigned to Algeria thus 'fitted perfectly into the development of a Eurafrikan conception of permanent and mutually beneficial links between Europe and Africa, not to mention its role in providing air and sea bases to NATO and guarding those installed further South, notably at Dakar'.¹⁴³

Writing in *Foreign Affairs* in 1953, the decorated French General Joseph de Monsabert¹⁴⁴ did his utmost to affirm North Africa's immeasurable strategic value to Europe. Monsabert, who on retirement from his military duties became a Gaullist parliamentarian, reporting, among other things, for the same parliamentary Defence Committee that in 1952 had firmly recommended Morocco's and Tunisia's incorporation into NATO's common defence, maintained that 'North Africa and Europe form one and the same body, and the Mediterranean is its circulatory system'. In a nutshell: 'Without North Africa, Europe cannot breathe and cannot act.' According to Monsabert, then, '[t]he real frontier of Europe' follows 'the ancient Roman *limes*, bordering the Sahara. From Casablanca to Berlin, from Kiel to Gabès, everything interlocks.' In spelling out the fundamentals of what ought to be a 'modern strategy' for Europe and the West, Monsabert went on to

¹⁴² See Claude d'Abzac-Epezy and Philippe Vial, 'In search of a European consciousness: French military elites and the idea of Europe, 1947–54', in Ann Deighton (ed.), *Building Postwar Europe: National Decision-Makers and European Institutions, 1948–63* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995); Martin Thomas, 'Defending a lost cause? France and the United States vision of imperial rule in French North Africa, 1945–1956', *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2002, pp. 227, 234.

¹⁴³ Tyre, 'The Gaullist, the French Army and Algeria before 1958', p. 107.

¹⁴⁴ General de Monsabert was, among other things, part of commanding the allied fighting in both North Africa and Italy – leading, *inter alia*, the Corps Francs d'Afrique and the 3rd Algerian Infantry Division – and then went on to become the first chief commander of France's occupation forces in Germany.

assert that 'there no longer are three separate and distinct continents – Europe, Asia and Africa. *There are only Eurasia and Eurafrica*.'¹⁴⁵

In line with what we accounted for earlier regarding France's plans for Sahara's industrialization and the concerns regarding the Ruhr's vulnerability to a Soviet attack, Monsabert also highlighted the geopolitical aspects and advantages of North Africa's industrial potential. In his view, the industrialization of North Africa spelled the ultimate solution to Europe's perilously situated industrial heartland. 'In developing a heavy industry there,' he wrote, 'we would be following the example of the Russians, creating a "Urals" in the Atlas Mountains of Morocco and a "Siberia" in Central Africa.'¹⁴⁶ Within the Fourth Republic of the 1950s, Wall notes, French geopolitical concerns thus looked less and less to the Rhine and Elbe and more to the Mediterranean, Algeria and Africa at large; or as he quotes François Mitterrand's statement from 1957: 'The Mediterranean, not the Rhine, is the axis of our security and our foreign policy'.¹⁴⁷

But although France, in the spring of 1956, publicly praised the NATO Council's sanctioning of French troop transfers as a sign of NATO support and unity, the crisis within NATO was already well under way. The Council's consensus rested on very precarious ground, with the USA and some other NATO members being increasingly at odds with French NATO manoeuvring. And this was certainly no public secret. 'France,' wrote *The New York Times*' C. L. Sulzberger in his comment on the NATO Council meeting, 'has consigned the best part of its Rhineland Army to the sub-Mediterranean deserts. Every French division allotted to Gruenther in Europe has been stripped

¹⁴⁵ General de Monsabert, 'North Africa in Atlantic Strategy', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1953, pp. 423, 419, 425, italics in original.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 424–5.

¹⁴⁷ Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War*, pp. 21, 271 n30. As Alfred Grosser put it in *International Organization* in 1963: 'French national security was no longer menaced on the Rhine, nor to any substantial extent on the Elbe. The line of defence of French national security, however, extended from the Paris-Algiers-Brazzaville axis. This conception was not limited to military and rightist political elements. Both national defence and defence of the West seemed to justify military action in Algeria.' 'France and Germany in the Atlantic Community', *International Organization*, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1963, p. 558.

of infantry to fight Arab nationalists.' In Sulzberger's opinion – one shared by many – the situation in the spring of 1956 was on the brink, a fact compelling him to ask: 'What is to be done about NATO's relations with the Arabs? The alliance's oil, the alliance's economy, the alliance's air strategy all depend upon the answer.'¹⁴⁸ At the same time as Algeria, in particular, and Eurafrica, in general, were influencing the conception and construction of a common market in the making, so they proved to be impacting tremendously also upon the workings and debate on the future of NATO.

If relations within the Atlantic alliance were already strained in the spring of 1956, then the American handling of the Suez Crisis had them spiralling into a full-blown crisis, setting off a French barrage of verbal attacks against the USA, with the French government going so far as threatening to leave both NATO and the UN.¹⁴⁹ Suez, then, boosted even further the geopolitical cogency of Paris' 'Eurafrican mission'.¹⁵⁰ Equally important, as noted earlier, by further corroborating established German suspicions of American and Britain intentions, Suez also vindicated Bonn and Paris in their pursuit of European integration as an alternative to Atlantic cooperation. Thus, as we also pointed out earlier, and as the crisis over France's continuous transfer of NATO troops to Algeria confirms too, Suez was not the primary cause for Franco-German unity over European integration, but rather marked a crucial milestone on a protracted journey of disagreements between France and Germany, on the one side, and the US and, to a lesser extent, Britain, on the other. The core element in these disagreements revolved around the wider NATO strategy in Europe; and since this became integral also to the wider Eurafrican strategy and so had a fundamental bearing on the treaty negotiations, it is important here to delve a bit further into the nexus of the EEC, NATO and Eurafrica.

¹⁴⁸ 'The two invisible members of NATO', *The New York Times*, 7 May 1956.

¹⁴⁹ Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War*.

¹⁵⁰ Tyre, 'The Gaullist, the French Army and Algeria before 1958', pp. 106–7, 112.

The Southern flank: Military strategy

As discussed earlier, prior to the controversy over Suez and France's NATO troop transfers to Algeria, both France and West Germany were becoming increasingly apprehensive about the American and British readiness to defend the continent against a Soviet attack. Instead of abiding by what was still the official NATO policy of blocking the Soviets at the West German border – so-called 'forward defence' – Paris and Bonn feared that the US and Britain were now opting for a 'peripheral strategy', whereby a NATO counter-offensive, employing nuclear weapons, would not be launched until after the Soviets first had, in effect, been permitted to conquer the brunt of continental Europe.¹⁵¹ The suspicion was thus that nuclear weapons would compensate for the reduction of NATO's already insufficient conventional arsenal. When news leaked to *The New York Times* in July 1956 indicated that the chairman of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur Radford, was indeed planning along these lines – proposing to cut the armed forces by 800,000 men in three years – this served to confirm what Paris and Bonn had feared all along, and immediately produced a serious crisis. 'Any war', *The New York Times* summarized Admiral Radford's view, 'most likely would be a general one, short, violent, and involving nuclear weapons. Consequently Army forces overseas [...] would be reduced, as one source said, to "small token forces that would wave the flag" [...] and would have atomic weapons.'¹⁵²

The so-called Radford Plan was particularly reviled by the Germans. For Adenauer, it confirmed his long-standing fear of a world divided between, and totally dominated by, the USA and the Soviet Union.¹⁵³ And such a world, where nuclear weapons would make conventional wars redundant, would also, Adenauer railed, condemn Germany to

¹⁵¹ Pitman, 'A General named Eisenhower', p. 43.

¹⁵² 'Radford seeking 800,000-man cut', *The New York Times*, 13 July 1956.

¹⁵³ See e.g. Hubert Zimmermann, *Money and Security: Troops, Monetary Policy, and West-Germany's Relations with the United States and Britain, 1950–1971* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 90–5.

become a nuclear combat zone.¹⁵⁴ 'They are dividing world supremacy between themselves,' Adenauer asserted when deliberating on the Radford Plan with his cabinet, 'and all the other countries do not matter any longer.'¹⁵⁵ At the cabinet meeting immediately after the story of the Radford Plan had broken, Vice-Chancellor Franz Blücher opined that the only way to amend this grave situation was to build a 'unified Europe': 'Only then will Europe stand a real chance of preserving her position of power between the USA and the Soviet Union.' At the same meeting, Minister for Atomic Energy Franz Josef Strauß made the claim that: 'At present, a nation that cannot produce atomic weapons is *déclassé*.' His statement came in response to Adenauer's comment that due to the fundamentally changed circumstances regarding the relationship between conventional and nuclear armaments that were suddenly unfolding, West Germany now had the right – as part of the '*clausula rebus sic stantibus*' – to revoke the ban on nuclear weapons possession that it had agreed to as part of the accession to the Western European Union in the Paris Treaties in 1954 and NATO in 1955.¹⁵⁶

In the face of the unacceptable scenario at hand, France and West Germany settled on the building of a 'Eurafrikan bloc', to use Pitman's term, as an alternative strategy for the continent's defence. Such a bloc was to attain its own nuclear deterrent, independent from Washington, at the same time as it benefitted from the vast resources and geopolitical clout contained within France's African colonies. For France, the development of a nuclear deterrent – which was necessary to arrive at a position of strength both vis-à-vis the Atlantic powers and anyone doubting its ability to defend its position in Africa – would thus be much facilitated by means of German technical and financial

¹⁵⁴ Pitman, 'A General named Eisenhower', p. 46; see also Mark Cioc, *Pax Atomica: The Nuclear Defense Debate in West Germany During the Adenauer Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 33–4; Granieri, *The Ambivalent Alliance*, pp. 86–90.

¹⁵⁵ Köhler, *Adenauer*, p. 949.

¹⁵⁶ 'Gespräche über Rüstungsbeschränkungen in den USA und England', Kabinettsitzung, 20 July 1956, *Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung*, Vol. 9, 1956 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998), pp. 488, 487, 486.

assistance, which France had been denied by the USA and Britain.¹⁵⁷ In actuality, France had been contemplating nuclear weapons cooperation with Germany ever since 1954, and in the spring of 1955 Paris had thrown out its first feeler to Bonn. Since Germany chose not to answer at this point in time, France turned to other potential partners from within the ECSC, a pursuit that Paris would subsequently continue within the negotiations for EURATOM that ran parallel to the EEC negotiations. EURATOM would thus become a means whereby France sought a joint, and thus financially less demanding, production of weapons-grade uranium.¹⁵⁸

As already intimated, however, with Bonn's extremely hostile reception of the Radford Plan in the summer of 1956, things took a sharp turn in favour of the long-standing French wish of obtaining Germany's support for the building of an independent European nuclear deterrent.¹⁵⁹ The Franco-German rapport was put on display at a NATO Standing Group special meeting, held at the end of July. Here, as Pitman reveals, France had seen to it that General Adolf Heusinger, a leading German representative, was given room to elaborate Bonn's negative opinion on the Radford Plan. While Heusinger emphasized the serious consequences of American and British troop withdrawals on the continent, he also communicated his government's support for France's military conduct in Algeria. In addition, Pitman shows, Heusinger 'referred to the importance of holding North Africa as NATO's southern flank'.

Needless to say, the French representative to the Standing Group, General Jean Valluy, was extremely supportive of Heusinger's remarks. In connection with the meeting, and in the company of several high-ranking military personnel from both countries, the two generals took the opportunity to further explicate the strategic accord between Bonn and Paris, emphasizing, *inter alia*, the importance of marking their

¹⁵⁷ Pitman, 'A General named Eisenhower', p. 43.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 45–6. See also Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War*, pp. 76, 64.

¹⁵⁹ For further elaboration, see also Catherine McArdle Kelleher, *Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), pp. 123–55.

distance from Atlantist designs by joint action in both the conventional and nuclear fields, as well as drawing attention to North Africa's crucial role for the security of the continental powers.¹⁶⁰

As the Common Market negotiations were about to enter a critical phase with many unresolved questions on the table, Pitman's penetrating work thus shows that this took place in tandem with 'French and German strategists [...] discovering that they shared not only reasonable fears regarding Anglo-American tendencies to revert to a peripheral strategy, but also an interest in establishing a Eurafrican defense bloc with atomic capabilities.'¹⁶¹

Such convergence of French and German strategic interests would, of course, be instrumental in facilitating the Common Market negotiations, as well as making sure that these became interlinked with an agreement on EURATOM.¹⁶² As Pitman also shows, in September 1956, Maurice Faure, the head of the French negotiation delegation, met with German foreign minister Brentano to inform him that EURATOM could very well be utilized for nuclear weapons purposes and that France had no intention of blocking Germany's attainment of tactical nuclear weapons. In submitting that the realization of Germany's desire to acquire the bomb would be expedited through French cooperation, Faure also 'linked progress in European integration to Franco-German armaments collaboration.'¹⁶³ Just a few weeks later, Adenauer could confirm that he was more than willing to answer the call. As Pitman quotes from the Cabinet Protocols, Adenauer made it very clear to his government that 'he wanted to use EURATOM as the quickest way to gain the option to produce nuclear weapons'. In December, the Chancellor reiterated his firm stance, asserting to his cabinet that 'Europe will have a longer life than NATO. It is now necessary to push ahead with the unification of Europe and to produce atomic weapons

¹⁶⁰ Pitman, 'A General named Eisenhower', pp. 46–7.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 47–8.

¹⁶² Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War*, p. 64.

¹⁶³ Pitman, 'A General named Eisenhower', p. 50.

in the Federal Republic.¹⁶⁴ As Wall evinces, in January 1957, at France's missile site in Algeria, France and West Germany signed a protocol on extensive military cooperation, which was followed, a month later, by Mollet and Adenauer meeting to talk about nuclear weapons research. This process, hidden from the Americans, would soon include Italy too. Before de Gaulle terminated it in 1958, it was to culminate in a tripartite agreement, in November 1957, to produce nuclear weapons, the first step, agreed on in April 1958, being the joint financing of an isotope separation plant, with France and Germany shouldering 45 per cent of the cost, respectively, and Italy the remaining 10 per cent.¹⁶⁵ As with the Eurafrican Common Market, then, it was French chutzpah and German financing that would cut the mustard and divide the world into an equilibrated three.

Countering Bandung: The United Nations

We have strayed from the immediate negotiations over the Common Market. But in doing so, we have been able to situate them in their proper and wider context. What went on in Brussels concerning the question of colonial association formed part of a much larger geopolitical and geo-strategic scheme and struggle in which Eurafrica and its Algerian linchpin took centre stage. Our straying has also enabled us to clarify and substantiate better that Eurafrica cannot be reduced to a purely French scheme, with Germany's role reduced to a more or less passive financier and interested taker of spoils. Rather, and as the 'Eurafrican defence bloc' illustrates, there was quite a bit of German agency involved too. In addition, by touching on the developments pertaining to NATO we have been able to further underscore the multiplicity of organizational and institutional settings in which Eurafrica made up an important issue. Before reconnecting with

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 52, 51.

¹⁶⁵ Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War*, p. 78; see also Zimmermann, *Money and Security*, pp. 60–1, 95.

what became the final stage of the Common Market negotiations, it is necessary to take a brief look at yet another such setting where the Eurafrican argument was pursued, namely the UN.

We have referred to the UN on a number of occasions, pointing to its partial transformation into an anti-colonial arena and the bitterness and frustration that this caused in Western capitals. A defining moment in this development that we have not mentioned yet, however, and which carries Eurafrican implications, concerns the French walkout of the UN General Assembly over Algeria on 30 September 1955. France's ending up on the losing side over a motion to reject the Assembly bureau's advice to bar Algeria from the UN agenda triggered the walkout. As Martin Thomas describes it, the attempt to exclude Algeria from the agenda 'occasioned the strongest attacks hitherto from Afro-Asian bloc delegates against French colonial oppression and human rights abuses.'¹⁶⁶ Once the motion to dismiss the Assembly bureau's recommendation had been passed (by a margin of one vote), thus allowing for the Algeria question's inclusion on the agenda, the French delegation protested by walking out of the General Assembly, claiming that the motion was in apparent violation of the UN Charter's prohibition of interventions in member states' internal affairs. Reports that Paris contemplated withdrawing from the UN altogether immediately hit the news wires, and when asked about such prospects Foreign Minister Antoine Pinay chose not to deny the rumours, while France's UN ambassador Hervé Alphand's answer was: 'We might.'¹⁶⁷

Since the UN crisis erupted just some three months after the Messina Conference and thus in the midst of the work on the Spaak Report, it is of interest to note that the official who emerged as the staunchest supporter, indeed spokesperson, for France's stance in the UN was none less than Paul-Henri Spaak himself. During the Assembly debate preceding the vote on the motion, in turn preceded by his long discussion with Pinay, Spaak rose to the defence of France not once but twice in what *The*

¹⁶⁶ Thomas, *The French North African Crisis*, p. 140.

¹⁶⁷ 'Algerian debate voted by the U.N.; French quit hall', *The New York Times*, 1 October 1955.

New York Times chose to characterize as the Belgian foreign minister's 'dramatic reappearance' on the General Assembly floor, after seven years on the sidelines. The motion to include the Algerian conflict on the UN agenda, Spaak was quoted as saying, had 'profoundly shocked' him. Backing to the full the French claim that the UN had no business meddling in France's Algerian matters, he, according to the *Times*, 'argued that France's present policy had nothing in common with nineteenth-century colonialism and should be permitted to work unhampered toward a solution of the problems in Algeria.' In the debate, Spaak also remarked that the time period since his last intervention in the UN Assembly in 1948 'had been marked by "far reaching and serious changes" in the United Nations', prompting his warning 'that "international demagoguery" would spell the doom of the United Nations.'¹⁶⁸

Such anxiety over the course on which the UN seemed to have entered in the mid-1950s reconnects neatly with Mark Mazower's unveiling of the imperial roots of the UN, the fact that many of its architects wanted the UN to serve the interests of the colonial powers rather than, as it would turn out – and much to the horror of Spaak, Mollet, Adenauer, Bevin and the like – a platform for the struggle against it.¹⁶⁹ In describing Dag Hammarskjöld as 'not always being entirely fair with Europe and the white race in general' in the UN, Spaak epitomized the sentiment of those who deeply resented the UN's anti-colonial turn.¹⁷⁰ In a long letter to President Kennedy, just prior to resigning his post as NATO Secretary General in February of 1961, Spaak vented this sentiment in more elaborate terms. In it he depicted a dystopic future scenario: 'If we are encircled in twenty-five years' time

¹⁶⁸ Ibid. In the meantime, as he was resigning as president of the Parliamentary (or Consultative) Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1951, Spaak – in a speech in the Belgian Parliament – had also lambasted the Council of Europe, accusing the Assembly for 'being hesitant' and for showing a 'lack of urgency' concerning Europe's standing in the world: 'The Europe of which we are speaking is a Europe which we have allowed to be grossly mutilated. [...] It is a Europe against which Asia and Africa have risen in revolt.' Spaak, *The Continuing Battle*, p. 223.

¹⁶⁹ Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

¹⁷⁰ Spaak, *The Continuing Battle*, p. 136.

and reduced to the position of a small minority surrounded by vast masses of humanity indifferent towards or even hostile towards us, the fate of our civilization will rapidly be sealed at our adversary's time of choosing.' Spaak obviously felt that such a grim outlook warranted a blunt question to the American president, one where he made no effort to spare Kennedy of the European sense of American betrayal that had been building over the years:

[D]oes the United States attach more importance to the UN than NATO? In other words, is it ready, in order to win the support or the friendship of the non-aligned countries, to go so far as to sacrifice the interests or to hurt the feelings of its NATO allies? This did in fact occur in connection with the Suez affair and Algeria. More recently, the same thing happened in connection with the Congo and the Portuguese territories in Africa.¹⁷¹

A few months later, on 13 November 1961, Spaak made a speech before the UN Security Council, defending the position of Belgium in the ongoing conflict in the Congo. In his memoir reflections he recalled the feeling of entering the Security Council with 'several trump cards': 'I had been present in San Francisco when the Charter was drawn up and signed. I had been President of the [first] Assembly [in 1946] and, during its early years, had played an important part in it.' In attacking the Congo resolution on the Security Council's table, Spaak stated that,

what all this amounts to in fact is a bid to hunt down the white man. The white man is to be left defenceless, he is to be deprived of a chance to plead his cause, he is to be left helpless. We would never accept such a situation in a civilized country, and what we cannot tolerate from a civilized country we can tolerate even less from the world's most important organization.¹⁷²

In his characteristic self-congratulatory manner Spaak continues in his memoirs by recalling: '[A] good many people came up to me to say that

¹⁷¹ Ibid., pp. 347–8, 350.

¹⁷² Ibid., pp. 366–7.

they had not heard a European speak out so clearly and vigorously for a long time against the accusations – which had become a sort of ritual exercise – levelled against the former colonial Powers.¹⁷³

For many Western European statesmen in the 1950s the prospects of having the UN serve as a viable arena for the defence and propagation of Europe's global role and interests were becoming slimmer by the day. Or as Britain's colonial secretary phrased it in 1957, 'the path of compromise on colonial issues in the United Nations is a primrose path'.¹⁷⁴

Indeed, just a few days after the French walkout, *The New York Times* ran the headline: 'Colonialism foes win again in U.N. on agenda issue'. Up for grabs this time were the remains of the Dutch Empire, over which, as the *Times* put it, 'The anti-colonial powers scored another victory in the United Nations today when the General Assembly placed the question of West New Guinea on its agenda'.¹⁷⁵ One should note that the description of the world as divided not only between East and West but also along the fault line between 'colonial powers' and 'anti-colonial powers' was commonplace in *The New York Times*' reporting during this period. Just as his French counterpart, the Dutch foreign minister, Joseph Luns, responded by rejecting the notion that, as he is quoted as saying, 'the United Nations should endeavor to lend assistance to the effort of one country [Indonesia] to obtain part of the territory of another'.¹⁷⁶ Even more worrisome to the Europeans, of course, was that this time round, and in contrast to the voting on the Algerian agenda issue where the USA had voted with France (albeit reluctantly), the USA did not side with the Dutch and the other colonial powers, deciding instead to abstain. Given that continental countries, unlike Britain's 'special relationship', felt they were at cross purposes with Washington regarding the precise issue that, to a large extent, defined their world role – namely, their vindication of colonial

¹⁷³ Ibid., pp. 366–7.

¹⁷⁴ Quoted in Martel, 'Decolonisation after Suez', p. 402.

¹⁷⁵ 'Colonialism foes win again in U.N. on agenda issue', *The New York Times*, 4 October 1955.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

rule in Africa – this made the UN all the more ineffectual, or, worse, outright counterproductive, showcasing, as it did, a divided West and purportedly facilitating a report between the USA and the non-aligned anti-colonialists.

White Europe, to paraphrase Spaak, was facing isolation on the world scene; it was hounded by a degenerating world organization that failed to live up to civilized standards and it had been betrayed by its most important ally in Suez and Algeria. Not only that, if nothing was done before long it would soon run the risk of being delimited on its southern flank by hordes of people teeming with misguided animosities towards Europe.

From our account so far, we already know that such views were commonplace among European integration's chief proponents and architects. Yet, when focusing on their indignant projection onto the UN, in general, and to the corrosive influence that this organization was said to have on Europe's chief ally, in particular, this lends important clues and additional context to the Eurafrican pursuit in the latter part of the 1950s. It signals the sense of urgency to close the Eurafrican deal, which walked in tandem with the sense of international isolation on the issue of colonial sovereignty. With the UN, USA and thus also NATO and the UK seen as a forlorn hope, there was just one type of international organization and cooperation left for the continental powers to sustain Europe's global greatness, and that was the EEC, or 'Little Europe' as it was commonly referred to at the time. 'Although the present crisis presents dangers for both the United Nations and NATO', Spaak argued in *Foreign Affairs* in January 1957, 'it may well be beneficial for the cause of European unity. Ever since the nationalization of the Suez Canal there has been a strong current of opinion in that direction. Colonel Nasser's bold move showed what a definite lack of esteem for the great European nations exists in certain quarters. And the failure of the United States to support the Anglo-French cause has underlined the same theme.'¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁷ Paul-Henri Spaak, 'The West in disarray', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 35, No. 2, p. 189.

As it turned out, of course, France's walkout did not amount to a walkover in the ensuing UN battles over Algeria and colonialism. Instead, on 4 February 1957, it was France that brought both issues on the agenda for the UN General Assembly's Political Committee. This time though, and clearly in anticipation of a successful conclusion of the Treaty of Rome negotiations, Europe and Eurafrica had replaced France as history's prime movers. 'Europe in its entirety', French foreign minister Christian Pineau argued, 'bringing to Africa its capital and its techniques, should enable the immense African continent to become an essential factor in world politics.' Linking Eurafrica to the Algerian crisis, Pineau cautioned that an estranged Algeria would be 'pledged to fanaticism and by its very poverty, open to communism'. By contrast, 'its participation in Eurafrica would mean for Algeria comfort, riches – in other words, the true condition of independence'.¹⁷⁸ Pineau's address struck a chord with *The New York Times*, whose subsequent editorial went all out to endorse his message:

The voice of the civilizing France of long history was heard in the United Nations on Monday. Foreign Minister Pineau's presentation of France's Algerian case was a reminder that the world as a whole owes much to the French and that in these tormented days of political and nationalistic strife there are perennial values in the ideals of France, Britain and the West in general (we would like to include our own American mission) that should not be beaten down in the current rage against so-called colonialism. [...] The oversimplification of the case by the Arab-Asian bloc, supported by the Soviet group, has impressed and fooled many millions of well-meaning people around the world. [...] What was especially challenging and hopeful in M. Pineau's presentation to the General Assembly was his vision of a broader European-African community, based on common cultural, economic and strategic interests. [...] 'Europe in its entirety,' said M. Pineau, 'bringing to Africa its capital and its techniques, should enable the immense African continent to become an essential factor in world

¹⁷⁸ Quoted in 'France proposes new plan to link Africa to Europe', *The New York Times*, 5 February 1957.

politics.' So it should; so it should. 'Eurafrica,' as he called it, can only be a dream today, but it is the sort of dream that other Frenchmen, like Jean Monnet, have envisaged for Europe herself and have done much to foster. It is the sort of dream that can become reality and that, perhaps, must become reality if the world is to avoid another and greater holocaust.¹⁷⁹

A Eurafrican Common Market: Agreement reached

In resuming our account of the treaty negotiations, it is apposite to start with a status summary of the negotiations issued by Pineau's foreign ministry on the day after his speech in the UN (5 February). The summary began by noting that 'Spaak seems to desire an association of the Overseas countries to the Common Market, which is predestined to provide the unified Europe with an extension of Eurafrica.' It then described a more or less general readiness to come to an agreement on the issue of colonial association. Germany, for instance, 'sincerely wishes to arrive at a compromise', and while the Netherlands remained sceptical 'it may align itself with the Germans as long as it does not mean excessive financial charges'.¹⁸⁰

A few days later, on 15 February, Adenauer added substance to the French picture when he tried to convince the minority in his cabinet to embrace Eurafrica and thus endorse colonial association as part of the Common Market treaty. Adenauer's stance was spelled out in the cabinet protocols: 'The Chancellor [...] is of the opinion that in the long term France offers much better economic prospects than Britain. France possesses a latent wealth, just think of the Sahara with its oil and uranium deposits. Equatorial Africa also constitutes a significant reserve. In comparison, Britain's development points to a substantial decline.'¹⁸¹ For Adenauer, a Eurafrican Common Market was thus the

¹⁷⁹ 'Europe and Africa' (editorial), *The New York Times*, 6 February 1957.

¹⁸⁰ HAEU, MAEF 3, 'NOTE, Territoires d'Outre-Mer et Marché Commun', 5 February 1957.

¹⁸¹ 'Assoziierung der überseeischen Gebiete', Kabinettsitzung, 15 February 1957, *Die*

obvious and, by far, more beneficial choice for West Germany than the simple European free trade area advocated by his Minister of Economy Ludwig Erhard and which London had brought to the table in what was seen by many as a hostile attempt to sow division among the Six.

Adenauer's accentuation of Saharan oil partly resulted from France's discovery in 1956 of huge oil and gas reserves in the Algerian Sahara, soon leading Paris to envisage self-sufficiency in oil within a few decades.¹⁸² As reported in *The New York Times* a few days prior to the German cabinet debate, the managing director of the Algerian Oil Research and Exploration Company, Armand Colot, 'predicted that in fifteen years the Sahara would be providing France with all her petroleum needs', thus 'freeing France from dependence on Middle Eastern oil'.¹⁸³ Adenauer might also have been influenced by an article published the very same month in the German Journal *Die politische Meinung*, where Waldemar Lentz analysed the Eurafrican enterprise as basically boiling down to the French colonial resources in general and Algerian oil in particular. Indeed, as Lentz asserted, 'the Sahara stands at the centre of the Eurafrican problematic'¹⁸⁴ (see Figures 4.6 and 4.7).

At the same time, progress was being made in the heads of delegation negotiations on the issue of colonial association. The negotiations were based on a detailed report produced by the Ad-Hoc Overseas Territories Group, which summed up the agreements and disagreements between the partners and specified outstanding issues. It was also the first document in which the negotiating partners explicated which territories to associate and, as such, it conveys an imperial atmosphere. The future of foreign peoples and territories were being decided in the Val Duchesse palace in Brussels:

Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung, Vol. 10, 1957 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2000), p. 144.

¹⁸² Sèbe, 'In the shadow of the Algerian War', p. 306; Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 203.

¹⁸³ 'Wider oil search set for Algeria', *The New York Times*, 7 February 1957.

¹⁸⁴ Waldemar Lentz, 'Eurafrika – Fata Morgana oder Ernst?', *Die politische Meinung: Monatshefte für Fragen der Zeit*, Vol. 2, No. 9, 1957, pp. 33–8. On the wider repercussions of France's oil discovery in Algeria, see Sèbe, 'In the shadow of the Algerian War'.

Figure 4.6 Drilling through the Sahara. Advertisement for Compagnie Française des Pétroles (Total), 1960. Source: *Cahiers économiques et de liaison des Comités Eurafrique*, Nos 5–7, 1960. Bibliothèque nationale de France.

Figure 4.7 Map of Eurafica, with the Sahara region inserted at its centre, as perceived from a French–Algerian perspective. Source: *Cahiers économiques et de liaison des Comités Eurafrique*, Nos 5–7, 1960. Bibliothèque nationale de France.

- Belgium demands the association of the Belgian Congo, of Rwanda, and of Urundi.
- Italy demands the association of Somalia, and envisions to demand that Libya, like Morocco and Tunisia, should be invited to associate.
- The Netherlands demands the association of New Guinea, provided the association regime to be established is acceptable to it. Concerning Surinam and the Dutch Antilles, the Dutch government does not have the competence to make on its own a decision requiring the agreement of the local authorities. [...]
- For France, the overseas territories, Togo and Cameroon should be part of the association. Algeria and the overseas French departments (Réunion, Guadeloupe, Martinique and Guiana) are comprised within the Common Market as they are integrated parts of the national territory. As for the independent countries of the Franc Zone (Morocco and Tunisia), France proposes that the states of the community invite them through a declaration of intent to associate themselves to the Common Market.¹⁸⁵

We should note that this was the first time Algeria officially figured as an issue and France stated its intention to incorporate it into the EEC.

In order to come to an agreement, and as a sign that this might be close at hand, negotiations were now referred to a foreign ministers' meeting which took place in Paris on 18 February. Here, the matter concerning association was the only question on the agenda, in addition to the related one of fixing the common exterior tariffs affecting importations of certain products – mainly agricultural ones – that were in competition with those imported from the overseas territories of the member states. This revealed that the association of the OCTs was, at this stage, the issue on which the success or failure of the EEC hinged. In fact, all other outstanding questions initially included on the agenda – agriculture, labour mobility, atomic research,

¹⁸⁵ HAEU, CM 3/NEGO 254, 'Groupe de travail des territoires d'outre-mer, Rapport aux chefs de délégation', 17 February 1957. Concerning France, the 'overseas territories' here referred to French West and Equatorial Africa, Madagascar and French Somaliland. For a more detailed account concerning the African territories that were associated with the EEC in 1957/1958, see Tom Soper, 'The EEC and aid to Africa', *International Affairs*, Vol. 41, No. 3, 1965, pp. 463–77.

state monopolies – were excluded and referred to the Committee of the heads of delegation. As *The New York Times* reported on the eve of the meeting, '[t]he question of overseas territories is the principal remaining hurdle for the six to pass before agreeing on a treaty'. The *Times* also let it be known that West Germany was busy garnering support for an eleventh-hour proposal that would satisfy French demands and so smooth the process to a speedy agreement.

Most importantly, the *Times* had gained access to a French memorandum that had been circulated to the Five and which contained crucial information concerning the long-term perception of overseas association. In it, the *Times* conveyed, France had announced that 'their ultimate objective was to bring all the overseas territories completely into the common market'. Thus, after the five-year start-up period, during which trade and investments pertaining to the OCTs would be attuned and developed, the overseas territories, as the *Times* paraphrased the memorandum, 'should enter fully into the common market at the end of the provisional period for that market (twelve to seventeen years)'.¹⁸⁶ The 'twelve to seventeen years' refers to the timetable for the gradual establishment of the EEC's customs union, which was to be adopted in the Treaty of Rome.¹⁸⁷ If this yet again points to a tacit assumption that the African overseas territories, or colonies, would remain as overseas territories for the foreseeable future – rather than transforming into formally independent states – it also serves as a tangible illustration of the fact that what had been brought to the negotiating table was not a European common market, but rather a Eurafrican common market.

Spaak, foreign minister of Belgium and president of the Intergovernmental Conference of Foreign Ministers, opened the foreign ministers' meeting on 18 February. He observed that no agreement had yet been reached, and went on to propose a compromise in order to

¹⁸⁶ 'Bonn backs Paris on wider market', *The New York Times*, 18 February 1957.

¹⁸⁷ As specified in the treaty's Article 8: 'The common market shall be progressively established during a transitional period of twelve years.' Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 25 March 1957, Art. 8, p. 17.

break the impasse. The difficulty pertained mainly to the balancing of two issues: the size of the contributions of the Five to the investment fund that would mainly benefit French territories; and under which conditions France would be ready to reciprocate by allowing the five other member states to trade freely with, invest in and export to these overseas territories. A third but less serious issue was the exact level at which the external tariff for certain agricultural products should be fixed in order to give the associated overseas territories competitive advantage over similar products from other countries and territories; this amounted to an extension of France's customs protection of products from the franc zone.

Negotiations began with the German foreign minister, Brentano, proposing a Marshall Plan for the French OCTs, to last for five years, through which Germany would tap funds into French Africa. Pineau rejected this proposal, and this way of stating the problem, by countering that France would then offer Germany a Marshall Plan, helping Germany to export its products into French Africa.¹⁸⁸ The real discussion, though, centred on the difficulties in agreeing on a formula concerning the member states' contributions to the investment fund, and what the investments should cover. France wanted the Five to contribute more, in return for allowing them access to the new export markets for their products. Germany for its part wanted to see a stronger French commitment to abolishing all trade barriers for such exports to the overseas areas. Spaak proposed a compromise that would make the rules agreed on span a first period of five years, during which the investment fund should be built up in return for France's scrapping of all barriers to invest in and trade with the overseas territories. The size of the fund should be US\$100 million annually (one-tenth of the billion dollars that France had initially suggested). Spaak also suggested that the fund should cover investments in the overseas territories of other member states.

¹⁸⁸ HAEU, SGCICEE 3109, Bousquet to Pineau, 'Conférence des Ministres des Affaires Étrangères du 18 février 1957. Problème de l'Association des Territoires d'Outre-Mer au Marché Commun', Brussels 21 February 1957, letter no. 401.

In the ensuing discussion the foreign ministers approached a consensus on the principles of Spaak's compromise. However, Luxemburg's Joseph Bech maintained that the amount each member state would contribute to the fund should be fixed beforehand, whereas Brentano reasserted that the investment fund was not meant to replace, but should rather add to, the investments that the mother countries had already allocated to their respective overseas territories. The German foreign minister also reaffirmed his position that reciprocity must prevail in all areas – that is, the same rules must apply for metropolitan exports to overseas territories as for overseas exports to metropolitan Europe. Hence, there should be no preferential trade treatment for the respective mother countries. In addition to this, Brentano suggested that the initial association agreement should span twelve years instead of the five recommended by Spaak; this because the overseas territories needed a longer-term commitment – an outlook once more signalling that these territories, in the minds of the negotiators, would not become independent any time soon. In response, Pineau and Faure reiterated their right to decide on exports to the overseas territories because sensitive sectors of the overseas economies may need protection from competition. For France, the resolution of this problem would be contingent on the other member states' willingness to contribute to the investment fund in order to build up the necessary infrastructure of the overseas territories.

An exchange then followed between Brentano and Faure where Faure reserved France's right to defer trade benefits to the Five in French overseas territories, if these did not after five years continue to contribute to the overseas development. Brentano retorted that it would be hard to imagine that the Five others would continue to contribute if they did not continue to enjoy open markets. Thereafter, Italy's foreign minister, Gaetano Martino, submitted that Italy was currently so burdened by developing its southern part that the country would not initially be able to contribute its share in five years, but rather would need a period of eight years. Spaak then intervened to break off the discussion, stating that since they had not reached an

agreement the problems should be referred to the next day's conference of the Heads of Government.¹⁸⁹

To add a bit more context we could also mention that, in his report to Pineau, Bousquet remarked that this last part of the foreign ministers' meeting, which took place around midnight, was not without comical intermezzos, such as Martino complaining about the terrible quality of the coffee imported from the French colonies, which would now flood the Italian market as a result of the overseas association. This, he claimed, would not make Italians favourably inclined towards the EEC, as it would force upon them a product they would not appreciate.¹⁹⁰

During the following two days, 19–20 February, the Heads of Government, under the chairmanship of Guy Mollet, met in Paris' Hôtel Matignon to resolve the final and most difficult problem in the Common Market negotiations. And on the second day agreement on overseas or colonial association was finally reached. The agreement, which was to be codified in the Treaty's Part IV (Articles 131–6), included the following items:

1. The treaty would incorporate articles expressing the will to associate the OCTs in order to invest in them and further their development.
2. A period of five years was stipulated during which the application of these principles would be applied and a convention would be made to direct the application.
3. The convention would decide contributions of various member states to social and economic investments as well as the regime of exchange between the members and the overseas.
4. The contribution, totalling US\$581.25 million for the initial five years of the member states, would be divided as follows: Germany US\$200 million; France US\$200 million; Belgium US\$70 million;

¹⁸⁹ HAEU, CM 3/NEGO 97, 'Projet de Procès-Verbal de la Conférence des Ministres des Affaires Étrangères des États membres de la C.E.C.A. (Paris 18 February 1957)', 6 March 1957.

¹⁹⁰ HAEU, SGCICEE–3109, Bousquet to Pineau, 'Conférence des Ministres des Affaires Étrangères du 18 février 1957. Problème de l'Association des Territoires d'Outre-Mer au Marché Commun', 21 February 1957, letter no. 401.

Netherlands US\$70 million; Italy US\$40 million; Luxemburg US\$1.25 million. Of these sums, US\$511.25 million would be for French territories, including Algeria; US\$30 million for Belgian, US\$35 million for Dutch, and US\$5 million for Italian.¹⁹¹

At the conclusion of the meeting a Communiqué de Presse was drawn up and issued after the conference. Crucially, it stated that work was sufficiently far ahead for the results to go into the treaty, which would shortly be signed in Rome.¹⁹² Two announcements were thus made: one declaring the association of the overseas territories; the other the establishment of the Common Market and EURATOM as marking a decisive phase of European integration. As such, agreement on association came across as indispensable and as a precondition for the successful completion of the negotiations on European integration. This perception was also commonplace in the press reporting on the agreement. 'First step toward Eurafrica,' blazoned *Le Monde* the day after the conference, remarking that the agreement had a distinct French colouring, primarily because of the association of French Africa, the investment fund and the inclusion of Algeria.¹⁹³ The next day's editorial was wholly devoted to the association of the OCTs enabled by the EEC, *Le Monde* now unequivocally asserting that the 'Eurafrica' that had just been established by the Six 'is not incompatible with the maintenance of the French Union. On the contrary, it may provide a last chance for it to evolve in a better climate.'¹⁹⁴ *The New York Times* opened its extensive

¹⁹¹ HAEU, CM 3/NEGO 97, 'Projet de Procès-verbal de la Conférence des Chefs du Gouvernement et des Ministres des Affaires Etrangères des Etats membres de la C.E.C.A tenue à Paris, en l'Hôtel Matignon, les 19 et 20 février 1957', 26 February 1957. The US\$581 million over five years that were finally agreed amounted to far less than France had suggested initially. Nonetheless, 'By African standards', listening to Cosgrove, 'this sum was large, as in 1956 French aid in public investment of a social and economic nature in West and Equatorial Africa totalled \$200 million.' Carol Ann Cosgrove, 'The Common Market and its colonial heritage', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1969, p. 79.

¹⁹² HAEU, CM 3/NEGO 254, 'Communiqué de Presse', 20 February 1957.

¹⁹³ 'Première étape vers l'Eurafrigue: Accord des Six sur l'association des territoires d'outre-mer au marché commun', *Le Monde*, 21 February 1957.

¹⁹⁴ 'Bulletin de l'étranger: Un point de départ?', *Le Monde*, 22 February 1957.

report in lofty terms: 'What may prove to be the greatest step so far toward the economic and, eventually, the political union of Europe was taken in Paris today.' It went on to mention the two treaties agreed upon – one being the EURATOM and the other the Common Market, where the latter 'would introduce gradually, over a period of twelve to seventeen years, a single or common market without tariffs or other barriers covering both the European and the overseas territories of the six nations.'¹⁹⁵ Similarly, the *Times*' editorial mentioned as its first point that: 'One of the agreements entered into at Paris calls for the organization of a common market among the six participating countries and the overseas territories of four of them.' But, as was added further down, 'this is not to be achieved overnight. It will be somewhere between twelve and seventeen years before the common market without tariffs and other barriers will spread over the six signatory countries and their overseas territories.' Again, it was not a European, but rather a Eurafrican, Common Market that had been adopted in Paris; and yet again, too, it was an undertaking in which colonial overseas territories were set to remain integrated for the long term. According to the *Times*' editorial, EURATOM would also need time to develop before it could make nuclear power a major source of energy in Europe. But then again, 'Egyptian President Nasser is of course doing his best at the moment to make home-grown atomic power popular in Western Europe.'¹⁹⁶

Included, yet excluded: Algeria's place in the EEC

The Paris agreement was also significant in that it contained a special application for Algeria.¹⁹⁷ Being an integral part of metropolitan France, the agreement established that Algeria would, for most

¹⁹⁵ '6 European premiers join for a tariff-free market and atom resources pool', *The New York Times*, 21 February 1957.

¹⁹⁶ 'Toward European unity', *The New York Times*, 22 February 1957.

¹⁹⁷ In the Treaty of Rome, the status of Algeria was stipulated in Part VI (Article 227).

purposes, form an integral part of the EEC. However, in some respects Algeria was also to be treated in a similar way to overseas territories. Crucially, for instance, it was decided that the investment fund could be used in Algeria. This meant some tricky terminological innovations. The territory of the Common Market was now of two kinds: (1) a European territory of the member states of the European Economic Community; and (2) a non-European territory of the European Economic Community (i.e. Algeria, but also, as would be specified in the Treaty of Rome, the French overseas departments of Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinique and Réunion).¹⁹⁸

Immediately following the Paris agreement, Bousquet, in a report designated as 'top-secret', summarized the negotiations on the status of Algeria to Pineau. During the intergovernmental conference, France did not raise the question of Algeria. Initially, at the time of the French–Belgian report, it was France's intention to include Algeria in the OCTs. This was in order to have Algeria benefit from the investment fund to be reserved for the French overseas, which was proposed at US\$210 million per year, of a total of US\$1 billion dollars in five years. Having realized that the European partners were not willing to contribute as much, and having heeded Minister of Overseas France Gaston Defferre's argument concerning the large investment needs in the African territories, France revised its position. On 17 February, France stated its intention to include Algeria into the Common Market as such, rather than having it associated and thus grouped together with the OCTs. According to Bousquet,

this provoked a great stir among our partners, mainly in the Italian delegation, which was little disposed to see Algerian agricultural products, direct competitors with Italian agricultural products, benefit from the same advantages as those of Italy on the metropolitan markets of the Six. The Italian delegation was no less terrified by the risk implied, for the workers of the peninsula, by the application to

¹⁹⁸ HAEU, CM 3/NEGO 97, 'Projet de Procès-verbal de la Conférence des Chefs du Gouvernement et des Ministres des Affaires Etrangères ... les 19 et 20 février 1957'.

Algerian emigrants of the chapter of the Treaty on the free movement of workers in the Common Market which is of particular interest precisely to Italy. Finally, the funds of the Investment Bank, which Italy desires to see used to as large extent as possible for the benefit of the poor regions of the peninsula, would now risk, given the situation of our Algerian departments, to be equally used to the benefit of the under-developed regions of Algeria.¹⁹⁹

France's response to this was that the parties had to come to an acceptable agreement on Algeria, since otherwise the treaty would be rejected in France. France suggested that it should obtain agreement *in principle* on insertion of Algeria into the Common Market, and it would then be content to have Algeria excluded or exempted from certain chapters of the treaty, while leaving pending those chapters pertaining to the free movement of workers and the Investment Bank. It was agreed, at the meeting of the heads of delegation on 17 February, that Algeria would be included, in principle, into the EEC, but with the proviso that the application of certain parts of the treaty to Algeria would be determined at a later date.

This agreement gained approval at the subsequent conference of the Heads of Government (19–20 February), which was charged with deciding the Algerian issue. This meant that once the treaty had been ratified, the clauses concerning customs union (free movement of goods), minimum price for agricultural products, liberation of services, rules on competition and the institutions should all apply to Algeria and the other French overseas departments.²⁰⁰ With regard to other treaty areas – including, for Italy, the most politically sensitive issue of freedom of movement for Algerian workers with French nationality – the status of Algeria and the other French departments was set to be ‘determined’, as stipulated in the treaty, ‘within two years of

¹⁹⁹ HAEU, SGCIÉE 3109, Bousquet to Pineau, ‘Conférence des Premiers Ministres et des Ministres des Affaires Étrangères – Application du Traité de Marché Commun à l’Algérie’, Brussels 21 February 1957, letter no. 402.

²⁰⁰ This would correspond to the treaty’s Article 227; Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, p. 153.

the entry into force of this Treaty, by decisions of the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission.’²⁰¹

In principle, however, and despite such prospects, the treaty drafters had no intention of turning them into reality. Italy thus had the backing of the partners in wanting to bar Algerians from the freedom of movement provisions.²⁰² But if this was the case, one may ask, why did the treaty not do the seemingly obvious and explicitly exclude Algeria from the freedom of movement for workers? According to Goedings, this was because such an explicit exclusion would have necessitated what France refused – namely, to have the treaty establish an equally explicit differentiation between French citizens in the metropole and those residing in Algeria.²⁰³ If undertaken candidly, a discriminatory differentiation of this type would have been in obvious contradiction with French colonial myth and ideology. And it would have been particularly contradictory, we may add, at a time when the French government claimed to be doing its utmost not to exclude or discriminate but rather to include and ensure the full equality of the ‘Muslim French citizens from Algeria’, which was a new legal category created in 1956 specifically for the alleged purpose of rectifying the inequalities faced by Algeria’s Muslims, who, formally speaking, were all French citizens or nationals.²⁰⁴

²⁰¹ HAEU, SGICCEE 3109, Bousquet to Pineau, ‘Conférence des Premiers Ministres et des Ministres des Affaires Etrangères – Application du Traité de Marché Commun à l’Algérie’, Brussels 21 February 1957, letter no. 402. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Part VI, Art. 227, p. 154.

²⁰² S. A. W. Goedings, *Labor Migration in an Integrating Europe: National Migration Policies and the Free Movement of Workers, 1950–1968* (The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers, 2005), pp. 134–5.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

²⁰⁴ As established by the French constitution of 1946 (the Fourth Republic), all Algerians were French citizens. Given that ‘Muslim’, or non-European, Algerians were formally excluded from several political rights, not to speak of the many forms of harsh racist discrimination and social deprivation that they were subjected to, such formal French citizenship was of course marred by numerous inequalities. Nonetheless, as Todd Shepard has shown convincingly, this did not make it formally meaningless or practically inconsequential. See further Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006). Here, as our account indicates, we may see the French nationality question’s impact on the EEC negotiations as a case in point.

In order to avoid a potentially devastating crisis over this contentious matter, the whole thing was resolved by subtracting the question of nationality from the draft chapter on free movement, a manoeuvre that also meant the working group on migration was relieved of the nationality question. Instead, the issue was referred to the Ad-Hoc Overseas Territories Group, where, as mentioned earlier, it was decided that the application of the free movement provisions to Algeria and the French overseas departments was to be decided within two years of the treaty's ratification.

Once this was accomplished, however, the nationality question was not referred back to the working group on migration. As a result, nationality in relation to free movement dropped out of the treaty.²⁰⁵ As Goedings understands it, there is really no way of knowing whether this was deliberate or not. But given the fact that all parties were on the same page as far as the intention to exclude Algerian workers from free movement was concerned, Goedings does not find it far-fetched to assume that they were also quite content with the solution arrived at. After all, to reintroduce the nationality question on the agenda would have opened Pandora's box and thus risked a potentially lethal eleventh-hour crisis.²⁰⁶ According to Meriam Chatty, however, there is enough evidence to establish that the ejection of the nationality question was, in fact, a deliberate decision. As Chatty demonstrates, it was not until the final draft that the free movement chapter's ultimate formulation 'workers of the Member States' replaced a formulation that would have specified free movement for 'national workers'; this must obviously have been a deliberate substitution, performed in order to enable member states to exclude certain 'national workers' such as Algerians with French nationality from the member states without this being in breach of the treaty. As Chatty puts it: 'The Treaty then created a space where it was possible for member states to legally distinguish between the nationals of the member states *sensu lato* and nationals

²⁰⁵ Goedings, *Labor Migration in an Integrating Europe*, pp. 133–4.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

[to be synonymous with the treaty's 'workers'] for Community laws purposes.²⁰⁷ In this sense, the differentiation that France refused to make explicit in the treaty was, through the substitution of 'workers' for 'nationals', devolved to the member states' discretion.

That this substitution was premeditated seems to be borne out too by the sequel to the Paris agreement, where divergences appeared within the group in charge of translating the decisions made by the Heads of Government in Paris into treaty text. With a treaty signature anticipated within the month of March, these last remaining hurdles were set to be cleared in Brussels between 28 February and 3 March. The divergences included German complaints over tariffs on bananas and bickering over possible trade discrimination of German bicycles (as against French ones) for export to the overseas. Apart from these technical issues, more fundamental ones were also broached, such as what would happen after the first five-year period of the overseas association. Here it was agreed that the Council of Ministers must decide, unanimously, and before the termination of the five years, whether to impose a new regime of association. There was no talk at all about letting the overseas territories themselves have a say in this matter.²⁰⁸

As seen in the negotiations reports from Bousquet to Pineau, the crucial issue of Algeria and the French overseas departments also loomed into the foreground. The two questions to be sorted out dealt with the extent to which the treaty would apply to them with regard to agriculture and free movement of workers.²⁰⁹ After some deliberation, Germany pulled back its reservation on agriculture, thus allowing for agricultural products from Algeria and the Antilles and French Guiana

²⁰⁷ Meriam Chatty, forthcoming Doctoral Dissertation (Örebro University).

²⁰⁸ HAEU, SGCICEE 3109, Bousquet to Pineau, 'Comité des chefs de délégation des 28 février–3 mars 1957 – Problème de l'Association des Territoires d'Outre-Mer au Marché Commun', 4 March 1957, letter no. 450; and Bousquet to Pineau, 'Comité des chefs de délégation des 28 février–3 mars 1957. Chapitre de Traité relative à l'Association des TOM à la Communauté économique européenne', 4 March 1957, letter no. 451.

²⁰⁹ HAEU, SGCICEE 3109, Bousquet to Pineau, 'Comité des chefs de délégation des 28 février–3 mars 1957. Application à l'Algérie et aux Départements français d'outre-mer du Traité instituant le Marché Commun. Débat au Groupe du Marché Commun', 4 March 1957, letter no. 456.

to be traded on much the same terms as other goods. Furthermore, it was agreed that no mention would be made in the treaty concerning workers of French citizenship from Algeria and the overseas departments. Technically speaking, this meant that they would be included in the treaty – that is, they would not, as the Italians had first called for, be explicitly excluded – yet, at the same time, Bousquet noted,

It has been understood that the national administrations of the member states may, in this respect, apply protective measures demanded by all our partners. This formula evidently contains inconveniences in the sense that French citizens of Algeria and of the overseas French departments who have reason to complain against such protective measures are likely to contest these before the Court of Justice of the Common Market.²¹⁰

In line with what had previously been decided regarding free movement and Algeria and the French overseas departments as something to be determined within two years of the treaty's ratification, it was agreed that the European Commission would work out common rules in these matters.²¹¹

Given the emphasis on and awareness of the matters at stake in this deliberation, it seems safe to suggest that neither the treaty's omission of the nationality question nor its substitution of 'workers of the Member States' for 'national workers' could have been the results of decisions or non-decisions taken haphazardly. Rather, they were taken with the intent of excluding non-European Algerians from free movement while at the same time ensuring that such exclusion did not contradict French colonial rhetoric on citizenship as a universal category. We should add Chatty's remark, too, that despite the decision that the free movement provisions' application to Algeria and the French overseas departments were to be determined within two years of the treaty's

²¹⁰ HAEU, SGCICEE 3109, Bousquet to Pineau, 'Comité des chefs de délégation des 28 février–3 mars 1957. Application à l'Algérie et aux Départements français d'outre-mer du Traité instituant le Marché Commun. Décisions des chefs de délégation, 6 March 1957, letter no. 457.

²¹¹ Ibid.

ratification, this was not done until 1968, after Algeria's independence and subsequent exit from the EEC. Although not entirely true in letter, *The New York Times*' assertion concerning the Paris agreement was certainly true in spirit: 'While the other French territories will enter the common market step by step, as European investments in them grow, Algeria will enter the market on much the same basis as France. But Algerian labor will not share the freedom of movement of other labor in the six nations, nor will it receive wages or social insurance at European rates.'²¹²

After the settlement of the Algerian matter, there were, as it turns out, just a few problems left to be ironed out, the only potentially major one being the mounting domestic criticism in Belgium, claiming that Spaak had sold out the Congo and Belgium's colonial and national interests to foreign interests. The main complaint was that the Belgian Congo received too little from the investment fund, whereas French Africa, in many ways in competition with the Congo for investments and development, received much more. In Bousquet's report to Pineau, the ambassador concluded that the Belgian opinion was troubling; perhaps it would even cause the Belgian Parliament to reject the treaty. Bousquet ended his report on a more comforting note, however, as he referred to a speech given by Spaak on 5 March at a dinner organized by Vlaams Economisch Verbond: 'Mr Spaak, with his eloquence, simplicity and usual common sense victoriously refuted, in the name of Europe and Eurafrica, the argument of the newspapers [...]. His words were greeted by enthusiastic applause and a true ovation on the part of the numerous Flemish industrial and business representatives present.'²¹³

A few days later, on 9 March, Bousquet was able to inform Pineau that negotiations were finally complete. As always, the association was the trickiest issue to resolve for the partners at Val Duchesse: 'It was not

²¹² '6 European premiers join for a tariff-free market and atom resources pool', *The New York Times*, 21 February 1957.

²¹³ HAEU, SGCICEE 3109, Bousquet to Pineau, 'L'opinion belge et Val Duchesse', 5 March 1957, letter no. 462.

until the end of the conference's debates, between midnight and two o'clock in the morning that, in conditions that may appear satisfactory, the problem of Association of the OCTs to the European Economic Community was finally settled.²¹⁴

A statue to Nasser: Triumphant Eurafricanism

While the last remaining details of colonial association were finally put to rest on 9 March, it was the Paris agreement of heads of state on 19–20 February that marked the decisive moment of the EEC's colonial settlement. But as we have seen earlier, the Paris agreement was also the agreement that delivered the EEC as such. Thus, without colonial agreement, there would be no European integration agreement; and, vice versa, in order to achieve colonial agreement this presupposed a European accord on integration. This brings us back to Coudenhove-Kalergi's dictum: 'To save Africa for Europe, is to save Europe by way of Africa.' And conversely: 'Africa cannot be made available, if Europe does not unite.'²¹⁵ Some three decades and a European world war later, key elements of this Eurafrican geo-economic and geopolitical design had emerged as one of the platforms upon which the European Economic Community was set to be built.

In the immediate aftermath of the Paris agreement this was reflected in the statements made by some of the most key figures at the forefront of the EEC negotiations. Arguing for 'der Vision von Eurafrika' before his cabinet on the day after the Paris accord (February 21), Adenauer admitted that no grand geopolitical blueprint for the world was without risk. But, he added, 'the free Europe must be prepared to confront this risk, in order not to be crushed, in the foreseeable future,

²¹⁴ HAEU, SGCICEE 3109, Bousquet to Pineau, 'Comité des chefs de délégation des 7 et 8 mars', 9 March 1957, letter no. 502.

²¹⁵ Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, 'Afrika', *Panuropa*, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 3–5.

between the peoples of Asia and Africa should these peoples assume a hostile attitude towards Europe.²¹⁶

‘The most important event in the history of Europe since the French Revolution.’ Those were the words of Paul-Henri Spaak, as he summarized the intergovernmental negotiations and outlined the aims behind the overseas association before business and army circles in Brussels on 25 March. Explaining the importance of the new EEC organization, Spaak dwelled on the relation of scale to community. The rapid development of the USA and the Soviet Union ‘proves that economic and social expansion is enabled by large human communities’, he stated. He went on to argue that the world-historical importance of the EEC consisted of the creation of a community of the same size and scale as these ‘empires’. Spaak thus emphasized that the scale of the EEC extended beyond the European landmass. A ‘great historical decision’ had been made in Paris on 20 February – namely, to ‘admit into the Common Market, on certain terms, the overseas territories’. By adding the African territories, the market would include more than 200 million inhabitants and Europe would have access to the raw materials necessary for its sustainability, Spaak told his audience. For this Belgian foreign minister and chieftain of European integration, the constitution of a community incorporating Europe and Africa was thus the boldest part of the Treaty of Rome: ‘Would it not be a success, if we could realize the dream of Eurafrica, which, after the reunion in Paris, seems able to become reality?’²¹⁷

The same day, Spaak was also interviewed by Albert Housieaux, socialist parliamentarian and editor of the newspaper *Le Peuple*. According to Bousquet’s report, the interview was largely devoted to the overseas association. Bousquet quotes Spaak: ‘I consider what has been done in Paris concerning the African territories to be of an absolutely exceptional importance: 1. A new market of more than fifty million inhabitants is thus opened for the European countries. 2. The Treaty

²¹⁶ ‘Außenpolitische Lage’, Kabinettsitzung, 21 February 1957, *Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung*, Vol. 10, p. 155.

²¹⁷ Spaak gave his lecture on 25 February 1957 to military and business circles in Brussels and it was subsequently published in *Mars et Mercure*, No. 3 (March), 1957.

surpasses its purely commercial and economic character, because it is the introduction of a common policy of the countries of Europe in Africa.²¹⁸

Simultaneously, on 25 February, Guy Mollet for his part began an official visit to the USA. As he put it in his first address, fresh off the plane in New York: 'In a very cordial and frank talk with your great President I would like to stress among others, the following points: Build Europe, link it closely to Africa.'²¹⁹ Later the same day, Mollet arrived in Washington where he gave another talk, once again laying emphasis on the Eurafrican settlement: 'I would like to insist upon the unity of Europe: it is now a fact. A few days ago we jumped over the last hurdles that were on its way, and now an even broader unity is being born: EURAFRICA, a close association in which we will work together to promote progress, happiness and democracy in Africa.'²²⁰ Two days later Mollet spoke about French foreign policy to an audience of journalists in Washington. He began by commenting on the most recent developments:

Eight days ago [...] we settled the last difficulties concerning the Euratom Treaty and that of the Common European Market. We took also a capital decision: to associate Europe with the territories of Black Africa which today are linked with Belgium and France. [...] In associating the Overseas Territories of our countries with this market, the road is open to the union of Europe and Africa, to what we are beginning to call Eurafrica.²²¹

'This is not a hazy dream. I am firmly convinced that EURAFRICA will be the reality of tomorrow', Mollet asserted before the US Senate on the same day. In this speech, Eurafrica was presented as the keystone of the Treaty of Rome and as the key to a better world; as such, Mollet

²¹⁸ HAEU, SG CICEE 3109, Bousquet to Pineau, 'Interview de M. SPAAK au sujet de la Conférence de Paris', 25 February 1957, letter no. 417.

²¹⁹ HAEU, EN 2735, 'Statement given by Premier Guy Mollet on his arrival in New York', 25 February 1957, p. 25.

²²⁰ HAEU, EN 2735, 'Statement given by Premier Guy Mollet on his arrival at the Washington Airport'.

²²¹ HAEU, EN 2735, 'Speech to be delivered by Mr Guy Mollet, President of the Council of Ministers, at the luncheon of the National Press Club', 27 February 1957; published as Guy Mollet, 'The Euratom Treaty: The Common European Market', *Vital Speeches of the Day*, Vol. 23, No. 11, 15 March 1957, pp. 349–52.

also emphasized, it was in perfect line with the interests of the USA and of the wider NATO.²²² Similarly, going on to address the House of Representatives later on, Mollet confirmed that 'This new Europe also aims at associating African territories with the making of a more prosperous economic entity. It is now our task, hand in hand with our European partners, to put our industrial resources at the disposal of Africa; thus EURAFRICA will come into existence.'²²³

Mollet ended his North American tour in Canada, where he addressed the Canadian Parliament on 4 March. With regard to Africa, he declared that 'we are moving ahead with quasi-revolutionary transformations in the overseas territories'. He also stated that France, through the EEC, was opening the doors to Europe for the peoples of the African territories. (No metaphor could be less correct, of course.) Mollet ended his long speech by asking about the 'exalting tasks' that the French were about to shoulder, to which he responded: *'l'Europe à construire, le Sahara à mettre en valeur, l'Eurafrrique à édifier'* ('to construct Europe, to develop Sahara, to build Eurafrika'). Here, again, is the holy trinity of Mollet's foreign policy, and the three are firmly connected in a geopolitical logic that, through the Eurafrikan EEC, is also said to entail the resolution of the conflicts in Algeria and Suez.²²⁴

In addition, we should mention that some of this is also alluded to in the ceremonial speeches given at the formal signing procedure for the Treaties of Rome, which took place on 25 March at the Palazzo dei Conservatori, on Capitoline Hill in Rome. Whereas Pineau made reference to the Cold War context and argued that the EEC was a necessary balancing power,²²⁵ Adenauer stated: 'It is with resolve and confidence we will approach our tasks. We know in this respect the

²²² HAEU, EN 2735, 'Address by Guy Mollet before the Senate of the United States', 27 February 1957.

²²³ HAEU, EN 2735, 'Address by Guy Mollet before the House of Representatives', 27 February 1957.

²²⁴ HAEU, EN 2735, 'Déclaration prononcée par M. Guy Mollet, président du conseil des ministres de France, devant le parlement canadien', 4 March 1957.

²²⁵ HAEU, CM 3/NEGO 98, 'Discours prononcé par S.E. M. Pineau, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la France, à l'occasion de la signature des Traités instituant la Communauté Economique Européenne et la Communauté Européenne de l'Energie Atomique'.

seriousness of our situation, to which only the unification of Europe permits a remedy. We know, also, that our plans are not egoistic, but that they are destined to promote the well being of the entire world.²²⁶ The most direct reference to the colonial ambitions of the EEC, however, was given by the Dutch foreign minister, Joseph Luns: 'It is our firm conviction that these treaties, in eliminating the barriers that separate our countries, [...] assure the conditions of an increasing prosperity to our old continent and permits the continuation of her grand and global civilizing mission [sa grande mission civilisatrice mondiale].'²²⁷

Finally, the celebrations in Palazzo dei Conservatori could not have been complete without a reference being made to Nasser, or so it seemed. Nasser's shocking refusal to play according to the European colonial rules had earned him many names from the likes of Adenauer, Mollet and Spaak – a Hitler, a Mussolini, a Moscow puppet, a Napoleon of the Arabs. In Palazzo dei Conservatori he was given yet another one. But this time there was actually some truth to go around as Louis Armand, now the first president of EURATOM, jested: 'We ought to erect a statue to Nasser. To the federator of Europe.'²²⁸

²²⁶ HAEU, CM 3/NEGO 98, 'Discours prononcé par S.E. M. Adenauer ..., Chancelier de la République Fédérale d'Allemagne ...'

²²⁷ HAEU, CM 3/NEGO98, 'Discours prononcé par S.E. M. Luns, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères des Pays-Bas ...'

²²⁸ Quoted in Merry Bromberger and Serge Bromberger, *Jean Monnet and the United States of Europe* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1969), p. 176. See also Jean Monnet, *Memoirs*, trans. Richard Mayne (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1978), p. 422.