Saunders, Clare. "Conclusion." *Environmental Networks and Social Movement Theory*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. 201–206. *Bloomsbury Collections*. Web. 26 Apr. 2023. <<http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781472544490.0007>>.

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Conclusion

This book has explored environmental movement networks in London through the lens of social movement theory. It has sought to make an empirical *and* a theoretical contribution to the literature on environmentalism specifically, and social movements, more generally. The chapters have located the results of the survey of London's environmental organizations in the broader social movement literature. Empirically, the book has shown that there are links across London-based environmental networks' ideological strands and spatial dimensions, especially during critical campaigns. Generally, local environmental organizations are pleased with the support they receive from national environmental organizations, although they ask for support much less intensely and frequently than anticipated. National environmental organizations are unable to support all campaign initiatives, so they make decisions about where their resources can best be placed. Inevitably, instrumental factors, including there being a high chance of there being some kind of campaign success, play a key role in shaping those decisions. Environmental organizations within the same niche have a tendency to compete, and competition can be heightened by sectarian solidarity. A lack of resources appears to constrain rather than encourage network links, and a wealth of resources does not necessarily mean broad-ranging linkages (Chapter 4). I also found that national and community groups do, as expected, publicly shun the actions of radicals. Instead, there are private links that are not publicly apparent, even if these links only manifest themselves as tacit support (Chapter 5). Radical environmental organizations' strong collective identity encourages a systemic critique of capitalism that results in a radical ideology that sits uncomfortably with reformism and conservationism. The solidarity that results from their collective identity further decreases their accessibility for collaborative campaigning as their 'we' can be defined partly at the expense of other environmental organizations (Chapter 7).

The findings of the study are, of course, likely to be shaped by the choice of location, and I cannot claim to be able to generalize about environmentalism in other countries, or even within the United Kingdom. However, before drawing this book to a close, I will examine the usefulness of the analytical framework developed in Chapter 8 in understanding environmentalism in other parts of the world, especially in southern European countries and the United States. But it needs to be stated that it would also be a mistake to assume that interactions between environmental organizations in London are typical of relations between organizations within Britain at large. London

is unique, as a centre of government, commerce and finance, and as an international metropolis. As such, the number of campaign targets concentrated in a relatively small geographic area is second to none. While this provides a unique opportunity to study the interactions between different types of environmental organizations, it also raises questions about generalizability. No other city houses the offices of so many purported environmental villains, as well as the headquarters of banks, Parliament and the home of the prime minister. This provides London-based environmental organizations with more opportunities for collaborative ventures by comparison with those in more peripheral locations. It is also the case that high-profile environmental protests in London are much more likely to be widely advertised and broadly attended than their counterpart protests held elsewhere in the country. Therefore, they are all the more likely to attract collaboration. Furthermore, London has the highest density of national (mostly reformist) environmental organizations of any area in Britain, with the result that a similar study elsewhere would be less likely to pick up so much detail on interaction between types of environmentalism (local to national, and conservationist to radical).

While London has many characteristics that might lead us suggest that patterns of environmentalist interaction are exaggerated in comparison to the United Kingdom at large, there are also some characteristics that can be said to constrain network links. London is the largest city in the country, and it can take up to 3 hours to travel across it using public transport links. One radical activist told me that it regularly took her over 2 hours to travel from her home in north London to the meeting place of the Environmental Direct Action Group – almost as long as my journey there from Canterbury, Kent. Furthermore, radical social centres are mostly many miles apart. This means that the radical part of the movement is likely to be much more fragmented than it is in smaller cities. My impression is that, as a result of geographical distance, London's radicals are quite specialized, and tend to associate with a particular preferred social centre or pet issue, unlike in smaller towns and cities where fewer activists muscle in on a wider range of projects via a smaller number of more centralized social centres (see, e.g. Doherty et al. 2007 on direct action networks in Manchester, Oxford and Wales). The infrastructure of London may stifle collaboration not just between radicals, but throughout the whole movement as geographical distance can create social barriers. In their study of environmental groups in Alabama, Lhotka et al. (2008) found that physical proximity remains an important factor in effective communication, despite e-communication. Thus, it would be interesting to carry out similar studies in other parts of the country to allow for a proper investigation of the effects of locality on the research. Indeed, instead of selecting two localities within London (southeast and northwest), a future study could focus on two similarly sized localities *outside* of London (see e.g. Diani

and Bison 2004, but note that they looked beyond environmentalism to a variety of kinds of civic action). Perhaps local chapters of national environmental organizations outside of London feel more distanced from their national headquarters than the research participants in my study. Similarly, it would be interesting to apply this type of research to other movements to see whether configurations of relationships between national, regional and local, and reformist and radical social movement organizations can be generalized across movements.

Regardless of these peculiarities, it can be said that London's environmental network represents a dynamic mix of collaborative, competitive and occasionally conflictual relations. It remains open to question whether the extent of collaboration is sufficient to justify labelling London's environmentalism a 'movement'. It remains open because *some* definitions insist on a conflictual element among those who form part of a movement (Chapter 2). Some of the organizations researched in this book refrain from conflictual action, and yet, are still engaged in environmental campaigning. To avoid confusing use of the term 'movement', I prefer to include non-conflictual organizations and to refer to the object of study using the alternative concept of 'environmental networks'. This book has illustrated that 'environmental networks' is a term that can safely be used to incorporate nature lovers, political ecologists and green anarchists. It also allows us to include campaigns that are sometimes dismissed as 'not in my back yard' (NIMBY). The diversity of environmental networks is what makes them so potent: they attract the support of different sectors of the population, and constitute a force difficult for decision-makers to ignore. The success of the broad-ranging 2011 campaigns against the coalition government's plans to sell off public forests is a case in point.

Theoretically, the book has sought to develop an analytical framework for understanding interaction in environmental networks. In so doing, it has evaluated several strands of social movement theories, taking useful elements from each. The framework was built both inductively and deductively. Starting from theoretical and empirical insights of others, it sought to discover which variables might shape relations between environmental organizations. It then used results of a survey and qualitative research to inductively piece together the analytical framework. The result is an attempt to understand interaction in environmental organizations in the context of environmental organizations' broader relationships to the polity, their campaign targets, individuals and their historical relations with other environmental organizations. But to what extent can this framework help us explain environmental networks in a different context? Can my approach illuminate our understanding of environmentalism in different countries? Reflection on existing secondary sources can usefully illustrate the general appeal of my analytical framework even if the empirical insights are not especially rich.

In the United States, environmental networks are strongly segmented. It is common to think of US environmentalism as consisting of conservationists (such as the Wilderness Society and the Sierra Club), 'new' environmental campaigning organizations (like Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace), radical networks (Sea Shepherd and Earth First!) and grass-roots/environmental health networks (Citizen's Clearing House) (Connelly et al. 2012, Chapter 3). Interactions among these different segments of what is called the 'environmental movement' are few. Similarly, in southern Europe, there exists a 'rich local network of environmental groups that are not supported by strong formal environmental organizations' (Kousis et al. 2008: 1636). How can we explain the apparent lack of interaction across spatial scales and ideological streams?

Central to any explanation of the lack of interaction between different types of environmental group in the United States is the role of an influential group of environmental organizations known as the G-10 and the political context in which it emerged. G-10 was established as a coalition of politically oriented and reputable US environmental organizations in the early 1980s, in response to then President Reagan's attack on environmental policy. It consisted only of organizations with access to Congress or corporate decision-making structures. As such, it excluded apolitical organizations (like World Wildlife Fund [WWF] and the Nature Conservancy) and radical groups distrustful of central government (Greenpeace and Environmental Action) and/or engaged in direct action (Earth First!). G-10's formal policy document, *Environmental Agenda for the Future*, was derided by many environmentalists as a weak compromise overlooking corporate power and social justice. Never a huge success, the group lost cohesion when it rebranded as the Green Group in the late 1990s and invited more radical members, including Friends of the Earth US and Greenpeace US. Although the Green Group no longer formally exists, the 'Group of Ten' is still used as a disparaging label for what are taken to be bureaucratized, institutionalized, white and middle-class American environmental organizations. Such labelling sets the established groups miles apart from environmental justice campaigners and radicals.

Thus, established environmental organizations in the United States are considered to be 'old, fat and unimaginative' (Sierra Club renegade, cited in Bosso 2005: 148). But why is this? Bosso argues that it is because they had little choice given prevailing political circumstances. Political opportunity structure scholars have long suggested that movements in the United States are kept moderate as a function of the 'strong position of the Congress, the lack of tightly integrated political parties, [and] the relative openness of a deeply fragmented administration' (Kitschelt 1986: 66). Moderate environmental groups in the United States also had to survive a particularly unfavourable political climate and felt obliged to follow

through on gains they had won in Congress in to the court rooms. The seemingly more favourable political climate under Clinton and Gore looked promising, yet arguably resulted in the environmental organizations making yet more compromises. Although environmentalist and one-time Vice President Gore ensured that national environmental organizations could gain access to the president, environmental organizations' elevated status and reputation had meant that compromise was the order of the day if they were to maintain access. As Bosso (2005: 91) states, 'The imperatives of organizational maintenance and the need to establish a permanent advocacy presence in national politics typically outweighed ideological purity.'

It was against a backdrop of compromises that Earth First! emerged in the United States – a full decade before it appeared in the United Kingdom. In 1979, the US Forest Service Roadless Area Review Evaluation was launched, designating 65 million of 80 million acres of wilderness for logging, mineral development and recreation. Half the remaining protected area was 'rock and ice' (Dowie 1995: 210). The Wilderness Society claimed success for the 15 million acres that were saved and staffer Dave Foreman consequently left in disgust to establish Earth First!. Seeking to avoid oligarchy and organizational maintenance issues, Earth First! activists set themselves up as a 'nomadic action group' immune to the self-preservation that was shaping the mainstream organizations (Dowie: 1996: 210). As Scarce (1990: 62) states: 'EF! was to be like a Plains Indian tribe, existing in autonomous groups which shared the same beliefs'. Unfortunately for them, Earth First! has never gained much public sympathy in the United States, and their leaders have been actively repressed.

Local groups campaigning for environmental justice emerged because the large national groups were apparently becoming increasingly distanced from the grassroots, and found guilty of institutional racism. A 1992 study by the US Environmental Careers Organization, for example, found that one-third of the mainstream US environmental organizations had no people of colour on their staff. Consequently, a number of civil rights organizations wrote to them charging them with 'racist hiring practices' (Dowie 1996: 47). At the same time, *environmental* racism – that is the disproportionate siting of sources of pollution in neighbourhoods dominated by ethnic minorities – was continuing apace (Bullard 1990).

Despite existing in drastically different political structures and having contrasting historical trajectories, the story in southern Europe is not so different. There, environmental organizations have been subject to a mix of liberal and neo-corporatist political structures, in which movements have, historically, been actively repressed (Kousis et al. 2008: 1640). This means that mainstream southern European environmental organizations are generally much younger and less well-resourced than their north European counterparts. Nonetheless, the mainstream environmental organizations there have come to develop close relationships with the state in

some countries, such as Italy, as they have taken on contractual relations following the retrenchment of public services. Consequently, they have become distanced from grass-roots and community-based campaigns. As with Western European environmental organizations (van der Heijden 1999), their professionalization has tamed their action repertoires, leading to compromises rather than all out success.

How can we understand the lack of interaction between distinct types of environmentalism in the United States and in southern Europe? In both geographical areas, the combination of a lack of historically successful interactions across factions, the drastically contrasting assessments of the value of compromising with the state, and the different emphasis given to individual level biographical characteristics of class and race have driven a wedge between the radicals and the reformists. Thus, as my synthetic analytical framework would predict, organizations' historical lack of relationships, the factions' differing relationships (from cooperative to hostile) to their campaign targets and the interactions between individuals and organizations matter deeply. Large environmental organizations apparent preoccupation with organizational maintenance appears to strengthen the gulf still further.

Thus, the key point of my analytical framework – that the shaping of environmental networks is a dynamic process, which builds on historical interaction between environmental organizations as well as past and current interactions with individuals, the polity and/or other campaign targets – appears to help us understand patterns of interaction between environmental organizations in other places, too. Of course a much more detailed empirical study of environmental networks across the world – and even across countries – is required before the synthetic approach I apply can be deemed a general theory. Moreover, it would be useful to conduct similar empirical studies of other social movements to see whether the analytic framework is equally useful across different social movement industries. I imagine that a number of other variables might come into play during such a cross-national and cross-movement study. It would be especially interesting to begin to understand how the degree of heterogeneity of particular movements influences the applicability of my analytical framework. Environmental networks are relatively large and heterogeneous compared to the anti-psychiatry movement (Crossley 2007), but relatively small and homogeneous when set against what has been called the global justice movement (GJM), of which ecology movements are considered to be just a small part (della Porta 2007). At the very least, I hope to have avoided the worst excesses of theory bashing, while developing an analytical framework that allows very different theories to talk to one another. I look forward to seeing the synthetic approach applied in future studies concerned with the configuration of social movement networks within and across different social movements.