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NOTES

Chapter 1

- 1 Henry Allison, *Idealism and Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 110.
- 2 R. Henson, "What Kant Might Have Said: Moral Worth and the Overdetermination of a Dutiful Action," *Philosophical Review* 88 (1979): 39–54.
- 3 Barbara Herman, "On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty," in *The Practice of Moral Judgment* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 1–22.
- 4 Herman, "On the Value of Acting," 1.
- 5 Ibid., 9.
- 6 Paul Guyer, "Moral Worth, Virtue and Merit," in *Kant on Freedom, Law and Happiness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 294.
- 7 Allen Wood, *Kantian Ethics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 149.
- 8 Ibid., 149.
- 9 Henry Allison, *Idealism and Freedom*, XVIII.
- 10 See Allison, *Idealism and Freedom*, 121.
- 11 John Searle, *Rationality in Action* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 13.
- 12 See Henry Allison, *Kant's Theory of Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 87.
- 13 Rüdiger Bittner, "Maxims," *Akten des 4. International Kant-Kongress* II, no. 2 (1974): 485–98.
- 14 This example was given by Rüdiger Bittner in the aforementioned article.
- 15 I am using affects here as a translation for *Affekten* and passions for *Leidenschaften*.
- 16 Onora O'Neill, *Constructions of Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 82.
- 17 Ibid., 83.
- 18 This thesis was named by Allison as "Incorporation Thesis" and presented in *Kant's Theory of Freedom* (1990) and discussed by him in *Idealism and Freedom* (1996).
- 19 See Allison, *Idealism and Freedom*, 121.

- 20 Iain Morrisson, *Kant and the Role of Pleasure in Moral Action* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2008), 104.
- 21 Ibid., 105.
- 22 Ibid., 121.
- 23 In the § 13 of the *Discourse of Metaphysics*, Leibniz states that “as the individual concept of each person includes once for all everything which can ever happen to him, in it can be seen, a priori the evidences or the reasons for the reality of each event, and why one happened sooner than the other. But these events, however certain, are nevertheless contingent, being based on the free choice of God and of his creatures. It is true that their choices always have their reasons, but they incline to the choices under no compulsion of necessity” (Leibniz, *DM*, § 13). In this statement, Leibniz tries to conciliate the necessity of each event with the free choice of creatures. First, Leibniz holds the position that the concept of an individual substance includes once for all everything which can ever happen to it. Then, if someone knows the concept of an individual substance, one will be able to know everything that can be said concerning this individual. In this case, to know a particular substance is the same as the nature of a circle and derives all its properties from that.

Chapter 2

- 1 Karl Ameriks, “Kant and Motivation Externalism,” in *Moralische Motivation*, eds. H. Klemme, M. Kuhn, and B.D. Schoneker (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 2006), 3.
- 2 Morrisson, *Kant and the Role of Pleasure*, 1.
- 3 I take “sympathy” as translation for *Teilnehmung*, instead of “compassion.” *Affekt* will be translated by affect, while *Leidenschaft* by passion. I will reserve emotions for a generic term that denotes moral feelings, affection, and passions.
- 4 Hume also doubts the existence of a creature, in which sympathy was completely absent, which he calls a “monster of fancy.” “It can be said that it does not have such a human creature, for whom the happiness of the others did not provoke pleasure (where it did not have place for envy or revenge), and the appearance of suffering, pain.” D. Hume, *An Essay Concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. J.B. Schneewind (Indianópolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), 52.
- 5 Morrisson, *Kant and the Role of Pleasure*, 5.
- 6 Although Frierson put Guyer among the intellectualists, I would rather describe him as an affectionist.
- 7 Patrick Frierson, *Kant’s Empirical Psychology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 117.

- 8 Kelly Sorensen, "Kant's Taxonomy of Emotions," *Kantian Review*, no. 6 (2002): 109–28.
- 9 Sorensen, "Kant's Taxonomy," 114.
- 10 Allen Wood, *Kant's Ethical Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 196.
- 11 Nancy Sherman, "The Place of Emotions in Kantian Morality," in *Identity, Character and Morality, Essays in Moral Psychology*, eds. Owen Flanagan and Amelie Rorty (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 159.
- 12 See Karl Ameriks, *Kant and the Historical Turn: Philosophy as Critical Interpretation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 91.
- 13 Karl Ameriks, *Kant and the Fate of Autonomy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 310.
- 14 Marcia Baron, *Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).
- 15 Sally Sedwick, "Can Kant's Ethics Survive the Feminist Critique?," in *Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant*, ed. Mary Robin Schott (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 78.
- 16 Paul Guyer, *Knowledge, Reason and Taste: Kant's Response to Hume* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
- 17 *Ibid.*, 164–65.
- 18 *Ibid.*, 179.
- 19 Morrisson, *Kant and the Role of Pleasure*, 5.
- 20 Frierson, *Kant's Empirical Psychology*, 117.
- 21 Bernard Williams, *Problems of the Self* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).
- 22 Jesse Prinz, *The Emotional Construction of Morals* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
- 23 *Ibid.*, 14.
- 24 *Ibid.*, 16.

Chapter 3

- 1 Allen Wood, "Practical Anthropology," in *Akten des 4. Internationaler Kant-Kongresses* (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 2001), Tomo IV, 469.

- 2 H.J. Paton, "Kant on Friendship," in *Friendship: A Philosophical Reader*, ed. Neera Badwar (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 133–73.
- 3 *Ibid.*, 147.
- 4 See Werner Starck, "Kant's Lectures on Anthropology: Some Orienting Remarks," in *Kant's Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide*, ed. Alix Cohen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 11.
- 5 Rudolf Makkreel, "Self-Cognition and Self-Assessment," in *Kant's Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide*, 20.
- 6 This incorporation was shown by Wood, "Practical Anthropology," 464.
- 7 See *Moral Mroingovius*, II 29: 599.
- 8 *Ibid.*, 458.
- 9 I agree with Robert Louden's argument expressed in *Kant's Impure Ethics*. Louden claims that Kantian ethics is composed of a pure and *a priori* part, and of an impure part which is mentioned in the anthropological texts and in the *Doctrine of Virtue*. See R. Louden, *Kant's Impure Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
- 10 *Moral Mroingovius*, II 29: 599.
- 11 Patrick Frierson, *What Is the Human Being?* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 11.
- 12 *Ibid.*, 42.
- 13 *Ibid.*, 131.
- 14 Alix Cohen comments this development of the Kantian scholarship since the publication of the *Vorlesungen über Anthropologie* in her introduction to *Kant's Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1 a 9.
- 15 Louden, *Kant's Impure Ethics*, 7.
- 16 The sensitive feelings of pleasure and displeasure, aside from merely physical pain and pleasure, include two other kinds of feelings: sensitivity (*Empfindsamkeit*) and affects (*Affekt*).
- 17 "Many a person even wishes that he could be angry, and Socrates was in doubt whether it would not be good to be angry sometimes; but to have emotions so much under control that one can cold bloodedly deliberate whether or not one ought to be angry appears to be something paradoxical" (*Ant*, 7: 252).

Chapter 4

- 1 This chapter was previously published in *The Journal of Philosophy*, as "What Can Kant Teach Us about Emotions," 101 (2004): 140–58. Published by permission of *The Journal of Philosophy*.

- 2 In the *Groundwork*, Kant writes the following: "Suppose that the mind of this friend of man is clouded with sorrow of his own which extinguished all sympathy with the fate of others, but he still had the power to help those in distress, though no longer stirred by the need of others because sufficiently occupied with his own and suppose that, when no longer moved by any inclination, he tears himself out of this deadly insensibility and does the action without any inclination, simply from duty, then for the first time his action has its genuine moral worth" (G, 4: 398).
- 3 J. Sabini and M. Silver, "Emotions, Responsibility and Character," in *Responsibility, Character and Emotions*, ed. Ferdinand Schoeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 165–75.
- 4 "Emotions are brute forces unconnected with higher mental functions. Pain is the obvious model. Pain is a brute force; it is beyond the will; it is, or at least typically is, independent of reason" (Sabini and Silver, "Emotions," 166).
- 5 Robert Zajonc, "Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences," *American Psychologist* 35 (1980): 151–75.
- 6 This is the position of William James, see James, "What is an Emotion," in *The Nature of Emotion*, ed. M. Arnold (London: Penguin, 1968).
- 7 More recently, Jon Elster has developed the idea of a similarity between strong emotions and addiction. See Jon Elster, *Strong Feelings, Emotion, Addiction and Human Behavior* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).
- 8 Baron, *Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology*, 197.
- 9 Wiebke Deimling also claims that "Kant's taxonomy of affective states is more complex than the distinction his predecessors in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries make." Descartes and Hume, for example use "passion as their most basic term for affective states. Spinoza and Hutcheson use 'affect' and 'affection' respectively as their most general concepts. Kant decides to use these terms for more specific affective states to get a nuanced picture." See Wiebke, "Kant's Pragmatic Concept of Emotions," in *Emotion and Value in Kant*, ed. Alix Cohen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
- 10 While I use affects and passions as translations for *Affekten* and *Leidenschaften*, respectively, I use moral feelings as referring to respect (*Achtung*) and moral feeling itself (*Moralische Gefühl*). In the paper "Kant's Taxonomy of Emotions," Kelly Sorensen relate these two feelings to a reason-caused desire. See Sorensen, "Kant's Taxonomy," 109–12.
- 11 I use inclination here in a wide sense, referring to a wide range of empirical impulses, including instincts, affects, and appetites. Inclination can also have a specific meaning in Kant's thought, as the third degree of the faculty of desire. For a more detailed explanation about inclinations, see Wood, *Kant's Ethical Thought*, and Louden, *Kant's Impure Ethics*.
- 12 In *Anthropology*, Kant refers to this kind of sympathy as sensitivity, a capacity to feel states of pleasure or displeasure with the happiness or misery of the others. Kant

writes the following: “Sensitivity is not opposed to equanimity because it is a faculty and a power which either permits the states of pleasure or displeasure, or even keeps them from being felt. Sensitivity is accompanied by a choice. Sentimentality, on the other hand, is a weakness because of its interest in the condition of the others who could play the sentimentalist at will, and even affect that person against his will” (Ant, 7: 236).

- 13 Love of human beings also belongs to what Kant calls “concepts of what is presupposed on the part of feeling by the mind’s receptivity to concepts of duty as such.” However, Kant denies that this kind of practical love is, properly speaking, an emotion, since we cannot have the duty to love someone, if love is a matter of feeling. One can only cultivate this practice of benevolence, but to call it love is “very inappropriate” (MS, 6: 401).
- 14 See MS, 6: 402.
- 15 See Choderlos de Laclos, *Les Liaisons Dangereuses* (Paris: Gallimard, 1972).
- 16 I am indebted to Julian Wuerth and his outstanding work, for the sketch of a map of the self. See Wuerth, *The Account of the Self in Kant’s Philosophy*, PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania. See also Julian Wuerth, *Kant on Mind, Action and Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
- 17 According to Collins’s notes on *Anthropology* (1772–73) we observe the soul in a triple perspective, like soul (*anima/Seele*), mind (*animus/Gemüth*), and spirit (*mens/Geist*). The passive soul is called soul/*anima (Seele)*; the reactive soul is mind/*animus (Gemüth)*; when the purely active soul is spirit (*mens/Geist*). These three instances of the soul refer not to three substances, but to “three forms of feeling alive.” See Collins’s notes on *Anthropology*, AntC, 25: 16. For a groundbreaking and insightful analysis of the notes on *Anthropology* concerning the self, see Wuerth, *Kant on Mind*.
- 18 See Rek, 15: 944.
- 19 These effects include sympathetic system effects, such as acceleration of the heart, and parasympathetic system effects, such as loosening of the bowels. See Ronald De Souza, *The Rationality of Emotions* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 47–52; Elster, *Strong Feelings*, 36.
- 20 According to Elster, some emotions, like love and anger, are characterized by a point of no return beyond which self-control is no longer possible, since we lose control before we become aware of the emotion. See Elster, *Strong Feelings*, 28–29. I would like to suggest both that this no return point is due to inertial physiological aspects, and that Kant was aware of this when he said that the man in anger should sit down to calm himself. Once anger is triggered, the moment one notices it, it is already too late to maintain self-control.
- 21 The feeling theory goes back to Descartes, Hume and James, “What is an Emotion,” in *The Nature of Emotion*, ed. M. Arnold (London: Penguin, 1968). Recently, the work of Zajonc emphasizes the noncognitive elements of the feeling theory. Zajonc, “Feeling and Thinking,” 151–75.

- 22 See Paul Griffiths, *What Emotions Really Are* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 1–24.
- 23 Examples of propositional attitude theory can be seen in Anthony Kenny, *Action, Emotion and Will* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), and Robert Solomon, *The Passions* (New York: Anchor, 1977). The propositional attitude school could also be labeled in a more general way, as cognitive theory. According to De Souza, cognitive theories sustain that emotions have informational content. In his view, Solomon's theory is a modified cognitive theory, where the judgments involved are of a special kind, they are evaluative ones. See De Souza, *The Rationality of Emotions*, 40.
- 24 John Searle, offers a good summary of the basic structure of intentionality. See John Searle, "The Basic Structure of Intentionality, Action, and Meaning," in *Rationality in Action* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 34. I will take his definition of intentionality here: "Intentionality as philosophers use the word, refers to that aspect of mental states by which they are directed at, or about, or states of affairs in the world beyond themselves." Although Kant did not use the vocabulary of intentional states, I think he will agree with Searle that emotions are intentional states.
- 25 About moral salience and emotions in Kant, see Barbara Hermann, *The Practice of Moral Judgment*.
- 26 Michael Moore, "The Moral Worth of Emotions," in *Responsibility, Character and Emotions*, 198.
- 27 Kant writes: "That's why the hideous movements that we call convulsions, and epilepsy, can spread to other people: imagination gives them a certain contagiousness. This gives rise to a strategy, which does not belong to the doctor as such, of practicing medicine merely through the force of imagination. . . . Hence the confidence invalids put in the doctor adds strength to his remedies for even the most enfeebled" (Rek, 15: 944).
- 28 See *Lectures on Ethics*, Mrongovius: "Can I really conceive of a pathological compulsion in man as well? Truly I cannot, for freedom consists in this, that he can be without compulsion in the pathological sense; nor should he be compelled in that way. Even if a man is so constrained, he can nevertheless act otherwise" (29: 617).
- 29 See Elster, *Strong Feelings*.
- 30 Some of the recent exceptions are Griffiths and Elster, who seem to acknowledge that emotions are not a single type of event. Yet, from this fact, they have reached different conclusions. While Griffiths maintains that the category of emotion is not useful philosophically speaking, Elster seems to accept the philosophical use of this category.

Chapter 5

- 1 This chapter was previously published in *The Kantian Review* 13 (2008): 46–66.

- 2 MS, 6: 408.
- 3 I hold that sympathy, moral feelings, and love of benevolence are not strictly speaking affects. Kant is ambiguous about sympathy. In some texts, such as the *Doctrine of Virtue*, it is not considered an affect. However, in the early *Lectures on Anthropology*, and sometimes in the *Anthropology*, it is treated as an affect. See Borges, "Sympathy in Kant's Moral Theory," in *Akten des 4. Internationaler Kant-Kongress*, Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung, eds. Volker Gerhardt, Rolf Peter Hostmann, and Ralph Schumacher (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2001), Band III, 152–58.
- 4 MS, 6: 409.
- 5 Kant gives at least three different definitions of apathy. In Mrongovius's transcriptions, apathy is the freedom from passion. In the lectures on Anthropology of 84/85, Kant explains the concepts ataraxy and apathy: "The ataraxy of the Pyrrhonists freedom from affects (*Affekten*) and the apathy of the stoics is freedom from passions (*Leidenschaften*)" (*Anthropologie*, Mrongovius, 25, 2: 1353)." Together with this commentary, there is a note that refers to Sextus Empiricus's ataraxy, mentioning that the difference between *Affekt* and *Leidenschaft* was unknown to ancient philosophy, and that this was the reason why they did not distinguish between apathy and ataraxy. See 25, 2: 1353, note 199^a. In the *Religion*, the Stoic's apathy is a battle against inclinations (Rel, 6: 58). Here, inclinations should be understood in the general meaning of incentives of sensibility. In the published *Anthropology*, apathy is considered the freedom from affects (7: 753), having the same meaning as the moral apathy of the *Doctrine of Virtue*.
- 6 Ant, 7: 253. Kant is ambiguous about sympathy. While in the *Doctrine of Virtue*, sympathy is considered a moral feeling; in the *Anthropology* it is considered an affect. In this quotation, sympathy is undoubtedly considered an affect, whose suppression will be good to a virtuous state of self-control.
- 7 The soul cannot have full control over its passions because "they are nearly all accompanied by some disturbance which takes place in the heart and consequently also through the blood and animal spirits." Since they have this intrinsically bodily component, once an emotion is incited, there is no possibility of a total rational control of it. We could control the lesser passions, but not the more violent one, until the movement of blood and spirits has been ceased (Descartes, *The Passions of the Soul*, AT, XI, 364).
- 8 Descartes, *The Passions of the Soul*, AT, XI, 363.
- 9 Ant, 7: 285.
- 10 Ant, 7: 285.
- 11 Ant, 7: 254.
- 12 Ant, 7: 252.
- 13 Kant, *On Philosophers' Medicine of the Body*, *Rektoratsrede*, Rek, 15: 943.

- 14 See Mary Gregor's Introduction to "On Philosophers' Medicine of the Body," in *Kant's Latin Writings* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1992), 189.
- 15 The idea of the body as a hydraulic machine became common in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries through the work of Descartes, especially in Holland.
- 16 See Ralph Major, *A History of Medicine* (Springfield: Charles Thomas Publisher, 1954), vol. II, 569–70.
- 17 Ibid., 566.
- 18 Ant, 7: 255.
- 19 According to Cumston, these three men "lived at the same time, but this is their only point in common, for their characters and geniuses were as distinctly different as were their doctrines. They may be characterized by saying that Stahl was a man of doctrines, Hoffmann a man of systems and Boerhaave an eclectic. Stahl was the chief of modern vitalism, Hoffman that of solidism, preparing the way for the school of irritability and spasms, while Boerhaave was the chief of the humoral school." See C.G. Cumston, *The History of Medicine* (London/New York: Routledge), 327.
- 20 See W.-F. Bynum and K. Porter, ed., *Companion Encyclopedia of the History of Medicine* (London: Routledge, 1993), 257.
- 21 "Sensuum, motuum, mentis et adfectuum, augmen, ab incitationis, in unoquoque eorum instrumento, sanguinem inter alias actiones percitantis, augmine pendet." Joannis Brunonis, *Elementa Medicinae* (Edinbourni: Executebat Ioseph Galetius, Mediolani M, DCC, XCII), § CLIII.
- 22 "Ante perturbationem quae tantum in graviore justo morbi impetu supervenit, sensus omnes hebetiores, motus, tam voluntati, quam non, parentes, pigriores, ingenii acumen minus, sensibilitas et adfectus languidiores, existunt. Cor et arteriae languent, ut harum pulsibus cernitur, item extrema in summo corpore vascula; ut parillore, siccitate cutis, et tumorum diminuta mole, ulcerum exficcatione, et manifesta phlogisticae, quae horum symptomatum similitudinem creet, diatheseos absentia, patet." Brunonis, *Elementa Medicinae*, § CLXXVI.
- 23 According to Mary Gregor, the therapies of Scottish Physiologist John Brown "are said to have killed more people than the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars combined." He also died from his favorite medicines, opium, and whisky. See *Rektorsrede*, introduction of Gregor, *Kant's Latin Writings*, 191.
- 24 Ant, 7: 256.
- 25 Kant, *On Philosophers' Medicine of the Body*, Rek, 15: 939.
- 26 Ibid., 15: 943.
- 27 Ant, 7: 252.
- 28 Descartes, *Passions of the Soul*, AT, XI, 364.

- 29 Sherman, "The Place of Emotions."
- 30 Ibid., 155–56.
- 31 Ant, 7: 260.
- 32 "We can be afraid, e.g., or be confident, or have appetites or get angry, or feel pity, in general have pleasure or pain, both too much or too little, and in both ways not well, but [having these feelings] at the right time, about the right things, towards the right people, for the right end and in the right way, is the intermediate and best condition, and this is proper to virtue" (Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics*, 1106 b 20).
- 33 Kant, *Ant*, 7: 253.
- 34 TL, 6: 456.
- 35 "Obligation with regard to moral feeling can be only to cultivate it and to strengthen it through wonder at its inscrutable source" (TL, 6: 399).
- 36 "So the saying 'you ought to love your neighbour as yourself' does not mean that you ought immediately (first) to love him and (afterwards) by means of this love do good to him. It means rather, do good to your fellow human being, and your beneficence will produce love of them in you (as an aptitude of the inclination to beneficence in general)" (TL, 6: 402).
- 37 Ant, 7: 257.
- 38 Baron, *Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology*.
- 39 Ibid., 203.
- 40 Ibid., 200. Here Baron is using affect as a general term for a varied set of emotions. However, her position is clear: passions are worse than affects (*Affekten*).
- 41 Ant, 7: 251.
- 42 See note 2.
- 43 Rel, 6: 29.
- 44 Ant, 7: 262.
- 45 Sherman, "The Place of Emotions," 158–59.
- 46 Ibid., 158.
- 47 Ibid., 159.
- 48 Ibid.
- 49 See Ant, 7: 286–92.
- 50 See Sorabji, *Emotions and the Peace of Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 2.
- 51 See Robert Solomon, *The Passions* (Indianópolis: Hackett, 1993).

- 52 M. Nussbaum, *Upheaveals of Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
- 53 See James, "What is an Emotion."
- 54 See Kenny, *Action, Emotion and Will*.

Chapter 6

- 1 A former version of this chapter was published as "Kantian Virtue as a Cure for Affects and Passions," in *Kant e-Prints*, Campinas, Série 2, v. 4, n. 2, 267–83, jul.-dez., 2009.
- 2 J. Annas maintains in *The Morality of Happiness* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) that happiness was a primary notion for all the ancient moral theories: "In them—she says—the notions of the agent's final end, of happiness and of virtues are primary, as opposed to basic. . . . They are thus primary for understanding; they establish what the theory is a theory of, and define the place to be given to other ethical notions, such as right action" (p. 9). She also points out that stoicism also presents itself as a eudemonistic theory, for which virtue is sufficient for happiness. She cites Arius Didymus: "One's aims, they say, is being happy, for the sake of which everything is done, while it is not done for the sake of anything further; and this consists in living according to virtue, in living in agreement and further (it is the same thing) in living according to nature" (Arius, 77.16–78.6; Annas, *The Morality of Happiness*, 163).
- 3 M. Nussbaum explains the independence of Stoic eudemonism from external contingencies: "According to stoicism, then, only virtue is worth choosing for its own sake; and virtue all by itself suffices for a completely good human life, that is, for eudaimonia. Virtue is something unaffected by external contingency—both (apparently) as to its acquisition and as to its maintenance once acquired. Items that are not fully under the control of the agent—such as health, wealth, freedom from pain, the good functioning of the bodily faculties—have no intrinsic worth, nor is their casual relationship to eudaimonia even that of an instrumental necessary condition" M. Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 359.
- 4 J.B. Schneewind, "Kant and Stoic Ethics," in *Aristotle, Kant and the Stoics, Rethinking Happiness and Duty*, eds. S. Engstrom and J. Whiting (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 289.
- 5 Schneewind, "Kant and Stoic Ethics," 294.
- 6 "That is to say, in what each has to put his happiness comes down to the particular feeling of pleasure and displeasure in each and, even within one and the same subject, to needs that differ as this feeling changes" (Kant, *KpV*, 5: 25).

- 7 I have in mind Barbara Herman in the last chapter of her book *The Practice of Moral Judgment*.
- 8 Kant has been criticized by many for presenting a minimal morality, without concern for friendship, emotions, and caring about others. Recently, M. Baron has defended Kant, in order to show that the *Doctrine of Virtue* gives us much more than a narrow moral theory. However, she does not consider that the virtuous actions, according to Kant, are supererogatory actions. See Baron, *Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology*, 21–107.
- 9 The idea of a narrow realm of morality, composed of the right, and wrong, and a wider one, composed of broader values also appears in some neo-Kantian contemporary theories. See Scanlon, *What We Owe to Each Other* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 342ss.
- 10 In *After Virtue*, McIntyre diagnosticated Kantian morality a failure of the enlightenment project in the foundation of morality: “The project of providing a rational vindication of morality has decisively failed—he says—and from henceforward the morality of our predecessor culture lacked any public, shared rationale or justification” (McIntyre, *After Virtue*, 2nd ed., 1984, Notre Dame University, 50). The Kantian moral theory is considered part of this failure to provide a full set of virtues. If McIntyre still persists in the searching for virtue in his neo-Aristotelian theory, Kant seems to take this impossibility of a shared public values as an undeniable truth of his time. He no longer has a conception of what is a worthy life and this is expressed in the absence of a defined conception of happiness.

Chapter 7

- 1 Ted Cohen, “Why Beauty is a Symbol of Morality,” in *Essays in Kant’s Aesthetics*, eds. Ted Cohen and Paul Guyer (Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 222.
- 2 “Ästhetische Vorbegriffe der Empfänglichkeit des Gemüts,” in which the meaning of aesthetic is relative to pleasure and displeasure. The meaning of aesthetic in *The Metaphysics of Morals* is closer to the meaning of aesthetic in the *Critique of Judgment*, even if it is not a judgment of taste. However, both the aesthetic feelings related to the reception of morality and the judgment of taste refer to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and are, thus, distinct from the meaning of aesthetic related to the faculty of knowledge. In this last case, it regards the reference of the representation toward an object received by sensibility. In Kant, there is, therefore, a double meaning of aesthetics: one related to the faculty of knowledge and the other to the faculty of pleasure and displeasure.
- 3 KU, § 59.

- 4 P. Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 333.
- 5 F. Menegoni, *Finalità e destinazione morale nella critica del Giudizio di Kant* (Trento: Pubblicazioni di verifiche 12, 1988), 94.
- 6 H. Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
- 7 Cf. KU, § 90, 5: 448.
- 8 Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, 335.
- 9 KU, 5: 355.
- 10 KU, 5: 354.
- 11 For a detailed analysis of the instances of the soul, see Chapter 4.
- 12 G.F. Munzel, *Kant's Conception of Moral Character: The Critical Link of Morality, Anthropology, and Reflective Judgment* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 129.
- 13 Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, 145.
- 14 Alix Cohen, "The Ultimate Kant Experience: Kant on Dinner Parties," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 25, no. 4 (2008): 315–36.

Chapter 8

- 1 Robin May Schott, "Kant," in *A Companion to Feminist Philosophy*, eds. Alison Jaggar and Iris Marion Young (Malden: Blackwell, 2000), 39.
- 2 Cohen, "The Ultimate Kant Experience," 321.
- 3 May Robin Schott, *Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 78.
- 4 This line of criticism refers not only to Kant but to the rationality of Enlightenment. These criticisms have two different schools of thought that have a parallel with the second and the third waves of feminist movement. According to one of these criticisms, the rationality of Enlightenment is essential to women's liberation. According to the other, this rationality is mainly masculine and women have another way of reasoning in moral matters.
- 5 Marcia Baron, "Kantian Ethics and Claims of Detachment," in *Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant*, 161.
- 6 Baron, "Kantian Ethics," 166.

- 7 See Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).
- 8 Wood, *Kant's Ethical Thought*, 396.
- 9 See Jean Rumsey, "Re-vision of Agency in Kant's Moral Theory," in *Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant*, 132.
- 10 Wood, *Kantian Ethics*.
- 11 Rumsey, "Re-vision of Agency," 130.
- 12 Frierson, *What is the Human Being?*, 94.
- 13 *Ibid.*, 96.
- 14 Mari Mikkola, "Kant on Moral Agency and Women's Nature," *Kantian Review* 16 (2011): 89–111.
- 15 Martha Nussbaum, *Sex and Social Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 57.

Chapter 9

- 1 A previous version of this text has been published in the journal as "Passions and Evil in Kant's Philosophy," *Manuscrito* [On-line], Campinas, 37, no. 2 (2014): 333–55.
- 2 Michael Rohlf, "Emotion and Evil in Kant," *The Review of Metaphysics* 66, no. 4 (2013): 755.
- 3 *Ibid.*, 759.
- 4 A. Wood, "The Intelligibility of Evil," in *Kant's Anatomy of Evil*, eds. Anderson-Gold and Pablo Muchnik (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
- 5 Anderson-Gold, *Unnecessary Evil* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001).
- 6 Nussbaum, *Political Emotions*, 166.
- 7 Kristen Sweet, *Kant on Practical Life* (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 85.
- 8 Rohlf, "Emotion and Evil in Kant," 749–73.
- 9 Guyer, *Kant on Freedom*, 408.
- 10 Muchnik, *Kant Theory of Evil* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 27.

- 11 Ibid., 2.
- 12 Sweet, *Kant on Practical Life*, 87.
- 13 Allen Wood, *Kant's Rational Theology* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), 189.

Conclusion

- 1 Williams, *Problems of the Self*, 207.
- 2 Hellebore is a flower (*Helleborus*) which was largely used for paralysis, gout, and insanity.