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Citizens

Demic Concentration Creates Knowledge

To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ as it were) of public affections. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed towards a love to our country, and to mankind.

Edmund Burke 1790: Vol. XXIV, Part 3, para 75

What is a citizen?

An implication of cultural science is that this whole citizenship malarkey may be about more than just voting, demanding rights and asserting group identity. Citizens might also be *creating knowledge* through the mechanism of externalized, meso-level innovation. Citizenship can shape group making, which is demic, and productive of knowledge. By establishing a more stable sense of what a given deme is and how it differs from others, the process of ‘demic concentration’ can lead to a knowledge-making citizenry. In this chapter, we outline this cultural science model of citizenry and explore some of its implications.

Standard models of citizenship mostly replicate the concerns of each analytic domain that seeks to explain it. Political philosophy views citizenship through a ‘social contract’ lens, seeing an historical and logical framework of rights and obligations connecting the citizen and the state. This is the constitutional and institutional expression of rational citizenship. It approaches citizenship through a local, bottom-up model of civic association based on Burke’s ‘little platoon’ (see the quotation at the head of this chapter). Alexis de Tocqueville underscored this insight in *Democracy in America*, with his claim that it is *free* citizens, specifically, who cooperate in local associations to build civic communities.

For cultural sociologists and cultural-studies theorists, citizenship is foremost about the formation of groups within the body politic, and the construction of identity associated with those groups: progressive citizenship (or 'social justice') is when this works through political solidarity with weak or historically marginalized groups. But this same logic can work as an exclusionary mechanism, where citizenship identity works through rejecting claims to equal treatment by outsiders or new groups ('tyranny of the majority'). In both cases, citizenship is an expressive political performance associated with coalition formation variously to challenge existing power structures; form new power structures; or reinforce existing power structures.

Economists, game theorists and other students of collective action tend to view citizenship not as a bundle of rights, or as social identity, but more abstractly through the lens of a social dilemma (Dawes 1980) or 'public goods game'. By starting with the instability of large-scale cooperation, following Hobbes, this implies that collective action problems require coercion (Olson 1965). The state will have a legitimate monopoly on violence,¹ and a citizen is defined in effect as a subject who willingly submits to this arrangement in return for benefits that may include political franchise, rent transfers from other groups (e.g. copyright 'protection') or participation in some political enterprise (Oakeshott 1975). Citizenship is thus approached from the perspective of a 'calculus of consent' (Buchanan and Tullock 1962).² This approach analyses citizenship – and governmental authority arising from the consent of the governed – as an input into the production of a public good, focusing on the costs and benefits to individuals within a citizen group. A further angle is civil society, which is group formation arising from voluntary self-governance – Burke's 'little platoons'. This local citizenship, as voluntary association to get things done, connects to the concept of a commons (Ostrom 1990).

Cultural science builds on previous concepts to model citizenship as '*demic association that makes knowledge*'. Free citizens, in cooperating freely to build communities, will also make a deme; a 'we'-community. Such demes will be semiotically productive of knowledge, to the extent that they interact with 'they'-groups. We have long known that much knowledge exists in individual people (what economists call 'human capital') and in organizations, such as

¹ Note also Mancur Olson's (1982) 'stationary bandit' model of the origin of the state; and our discussion of Norbert Elias's essentially Hobbesian view of human nature, with civilization itself as the 'coercive' mechanism, in Chapter 4.

² This is exemplified in the 'Public Choice' school of economics, which is the rational choice approach to political action, or 'politics without romance' as James Buchanan puts it.

firms, who combine capital with people to do things. But the citizenry has never much been thought of as a site of knowledge, which is to say of productivity. Cultural science gives us reason to suspect that citizenship might be more than just politicized agency, but might also be creative and productive. What we have in mind here is a new audit of the particular ledgers of knowledge in a society.

Citizenship theory begins with the city-states of ancient Greece, denoting membership of a *polis* (although cities as such are much older – see Chapter 3: ‘Demes’). The concept of citizenship is the link between a person and the state, initially coterminous with the city, specifically, Athens. People had initially been organized in family groups (*phratries*) and noble families (*genes* – plural of *genos*, ‘kin’) ruled the roost. In about 500BCE citizenship was reformed to link to *demes*, which were based on districts and population, counterbalancing to some extent the influence of the aristocratic families (*genes*). The people (*demos*) of Attica were organized into 139 demes and thence into 10 tribes or *phyles*, from among which public officials were elected, juries selected, and so on (Hornblower and Spawforth 2005). Revenue-raising and religious observances were organized at the local, demic level. Thus, ancient citizenship formalized the shift from kin to non-kin as the organizational mode of civic association.

In modernity the concept of citizenship was extended to nationality, at which scale it was first theorized in the Enlightenment (Diderot et al. 1753: 488–9, entry on ‘Citoyen’; and see Paine 1792), which specifies a bundle of rights of the state towards the citizen and responsibilities of the citizen to the state. The relation between a person and a monarchy, by comparison, is that of subject, not a citizen.³ Citizenship is usually acquired by having been born in a nation (although not conferred until the age of majority), or it can subsequently be acquired through several processes including naturalization, marriage and sponsorship. Significantly, a state can refuse citizenship on a range of grounds. With a few exceptions citizenship cannot be bought, sold or transferred. It can however be multiplied – a citizen can hold dual nationality in many jurisdictions, and ‘European Citizens’ (members of the EU) enjoy civic rights in 28 countries.

A citizen is entitled to a bundle of rights associated with the state, which usually include the right to live within the boundaries of the nation and to

³ British ‘subjects’, for instance, became ‘citizens’ only after the British Nationality Act 1981 became law in 1983.

be afforded some protections and freedoms. In turn, citizenship will entail obligations that may include compulsory participation in the justice system (jury duty) or in national defence (military service), among others. Citizenship may entail rights to social insurance and services, usually including health and education. It may also extend to the franchise of participation in democracy, obligations over taxation, and obligations over personal registration and submission of private data for the purposes of statecraft, which has been a state prerogative since the compilation of the *Domesday Book* for William the Conqueror in 1086.⁴

In the academic literature, there are three established fundamental approaches to the concept of citizenship:

- (i) *The 'civil' or 'liberal' approach*, where the state exists to help citizens and to protect rights, favouring a weak state and individual freedom;
- (ii) *The active, or 'enterprise' approach*, where a state exists to universalize a 'common substantive purpose' (Oakeshott 1975) such as the 'rights of man' (French Revolution) or universal rights (American Revolution), sometimes by force (e.g. World War II and the Vietnam War), or the modern social and corporate welfare state, where the citizen has no option but to participate in the state's 'enterprise'.
- (iii) *The 'critical' or 'ideological' approach*, which analyses modern citizenship in the name of subjectivities that it fails to emancipate, especially those based on class (Marxism), gender (feminism), the raced, colonial, ethnic, migrant or multicultural subject (e.g. Mandela 1994: 35–6; Saada 2012), and many 'others' who do not conform to a dominant identity.

As it is globalized, abstracted and conducted through shared semiosis (see Chapter 6: 'Meaningfulness') and social networks, the concept of citizenship has shifted from institutional arrangements towards action around meaningfulness. A modernized version of the 'republic of letters' takes up this aspect, such that we can add a fourth approach, that of 'media citizenship' or 'cultural citizenship' (Hartley 2009a):

- (iv) *The creative, cultural or DIY approach*, where citizens create their own forms of 'association among strangers' using the affordances of digital and interactive media, social networks, and their experiences and practices as

⁴ See: www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/domesday/.

audiences and consumers, within a market environment and what would previously have been understood as private life (e.g. Hartley 2012: ch. 6; Miller 2006; Papacharissi 2010; Baym 2010; Jenkins et al. 2013).

This creative-associative conceptualization of *media or cultural citizenship* is at the core of a cultural science approach. A citizen group is self-assembling and may be self-polarizing (Sunstein 2002). Rather than seeking to be politically acknowledged, as in the case of groups pursuing the goals of ‘identity politics’, or seeking to gain or rebalance power relations, this is a view of citizenship that seeks to be *productive* through the mechanism of voluntary association through social learning (Richey 2013), and the creation of demic knowledge.

Rational citizen theory

A different line of approach to citizenship arises out of economics and game theory, centred on what we might call ‘rational citizenship’. ‘Rational citizenship studies’ therefore refers to analyses running from microeconomics, game theory, public choice theory, new institutional economics and the rational agent approach to political studies, that explain the choices and actions of citizens by the institutional incentives they face. This concept, or something like it, animates most critiques of the choice-theoretic approach to citizenship analysis (Taylor-Gooby 2008: ch. 5).

In rational citizen theory, a citizen is a member of a group, or ‘club’ (Buchanan 1965). A nation-state is a very large club (it produces many benefits that are excludable, so it is not a public good), which needs to solve ‘collective action’ problems. The basic problem in rational citizen theory is the *social dilemma* (Dawes 1980) – how to engender large-scale cooperation when each individual agent’s rational move is not to cooperate, that is, not to contribute to the public good as a citizen (‘to defect’, in the language of the theory), but yet to seek the benefits of citizenship (to ‘free-ride’). From this perspective the problem of citizenship is how to create ‘good citizens’, or people who will consistently play ‘cooperatively’ against other citizens.

Economics has already taken a hard look at itself, and asked whether studying economics tends to make people more likely to defect in social dilemmas, making them *bad citizens* (Frank et al. 1996). In contrast, part of the founding project of cultural studies (Hoggart 1957) was to produce the *right sort* of citizens by inculcating the enfranchised and recently literate majority in

the project of progressive citizenship. A possible bridge between these domains is suggested by Frijters and Foster (2012), who specifically refer to love and power in groups, in which one may read citizenship as a species of *rational submission*. Another line of argument is to model citizenship as a form of *group decision-making* that relies on the superior information processing power of groups, such that joining a group is a contribution to improved decision-making and outcomes (Mendelberg 2002), although this does not address the free-rider problem.

Rational citizenship can also be modelled as a conspicuous and costly form of signalling of otherwise unobservable qualities that are important for social coordination, such as long-term commitment to a community (Spence 1973). The unintended consequence of this costly-signalling form of ‘conspicuous citizenship’ is the formation of groups as demes that have superior information processing (as shown earlier) and knowledge-producing properties compared with uncoordinated individuals. This is where active citizenship and networking among elites, including philanthropy and support for the arts, welfare and enjoyment of others, nevertheless attracts suspicion, because the groups engaged in such activities appear to be self-selecting with masonic tendencies – the ‘Establishment’, benefitting from the ‘old school tie’.

The same concern about cooperation in public goods games (social dilemmas) sits at the core of the *commons* literature (Ostrom 1990), yet there is almost no connection made between this and citizenship studies. A possible explanation is that whereas citizenship concerns are inherently of the *polis*, the city-state, or the good burghers of the town (McCloskey 2010), discussion of the commons is based around natural resources, agriculture and matters of the country, concerned with forests, grazing pastures, fishing grounds and irrigation systems. Citizens live in towns; country and rural folk tend towards the commons. A new bridging literature may be developing, in respect of *knowledge commons* (Ostrom and Hess 2011) and the innovation commons.

The evolutionary puzzle of citizenship

Citizenship is a form of cooperation. But large-scale cooperation is evolutionarily unstable because it can usually be invaded by free-riders. A citizen is therefore an unexpected evolutionary object. Coordination costs rise exponentially with the size of a group. It is driven by the costs of information,

transactions, monitoring and enforcement, and, in consequence, the cost of multiplying objectives and sources of conflict. Hence organizational growth is achieved often most effectively by breaking large organizations into modular units (Simon and March 1958). Large groups such as nations are governed through smaller political units of states, province, cantons, city, borough, local council, and so on. In turn citizenship thereby occurs at multiple scales and determines how big a group can get. This is the model pioneered in Classical Greece.

Large-scale systems of coordination (such as an economy) tend not to be groups, but rather *institutional rule systems* such as markets, which do effectively scale to a global level, as discussed in Chapter 4 (earlier), noting Hayek's (1978: 9) argument that culture evolved through mechanisms of *group selection*.

Hayek's theory of cultural evolution is an instance of what Cavalli-Sforza (2000) calls 'demic diffusion.' This works as a theory of culture-as-knowledge that diffuses with population dynamics, but not as a theory of culture as group making, or what we call *demic concentration*. The argument here is that citizenship produces knowledge through the demic process of externalized knowledge within 'we'-groups, made of meaningfulness and identity. These 'we'-groups, constituted by their interaction with 'they'-groups (foreigners, aliens, barbarians, and so on) create knowledge. 'We' do so through a Lotman-style clash of difference (Chapter 6: 'Meaningfulness'), the mutual untranslatability of incommensurable systems or semiospheres (we/they in this case) that produce communication and thus meaningfulness out of cross-border interaction. What does this knowledge do? In part it recursively builds and maintains the group. But it also maintains the larger group formations that extend citizenship to higher levels, including the city.

Creative citizenship produces organizations to deliver social and civic goods, including the product of trusts and charitable foundations. NGOs are often interest groups or lobbies, which is a different concept motivating collective action, as centred about creating or expropriating a rent (Krueger 1974), or in some way getting others to act in a way to benefit the rent-seeking group. Creative citizenship, however, is entrepreneurial in the sense of creating knowledge and value that did not exist before, and thus adds to the sum of civic capital. Political service can come down on either side of this distinction, depending upon whether it is to benefit a group of cronies, or the creation of a social good through citizenship. A sense of duty can in this way be a creative form of citizenship.

Creative citizenship

The copious social-science scholarship that monopolizes citizenship studies is marked by a notable *lack* of attention to the role of creativity in acts of civic association. Scholarship proceeds quickly to institutional analysis. *Creativity* has been a dominant trope in humanities-based approaches to communal life, but the concept of *citizenship* is much more weakly theorized in this domain. However, it underlies the criticism of John Ruskin, Matthew Arnold and Walter Pater,⁵ all of whom worked to a ‘civic’ sense of creativity. A flavour of it may be gained from Ruskin’s distinction between ‘political’ economy (pertaining to citizens) and ‘mercantile economy’ (pertaining to ‘power over labour’), in *Unto This Last* (1862), where citizenship is understood to be closer to the representation of beauty than of rights:

Political economy (the economy of a State, or of citizens) consists simply in the production, preservation, and distribution, at fittest time and place, of useful or pleasurable things. The farmer who cuts his hay at the right time; the shipwright who drives his bolts well home in sound wood; the builder who lays good bricks in well-tempered mortar; the housewife who takes care of her furniture in the parlour, and guards against all waste in her kitchen; and the singer who rightly disciplines, and never overstrains her voice, are all political economists in the true and final sense: adding continually to the riches and well-being of the nation to which they belong. But mercantile economy, the economy of ‘merces’ or of ‘pay,’ signifies the accumulation, in the hands of individuals, of legal or moral claim upon, or power over, the labour of others; every such claim implying precisely as much poverty or debt on one side, as it implies riches or right on the other. (Essay II: ‘The Veins of Wealth’)

This preoccupation with the ‘fittest’ artisanship and ‘disciplined’ creative expression, that is, beauty in everyday making, as the foundation of the ‘riches and well-being of the nation,’ has lasted well beyond Ruskin’s own era, just as Matthew Arnold’s prescriptions about culture as the pursuit of perfection have long outlived the debates that inspired them. Both writers were influential in literary culture, their ideas being taken up and modified among critics down

⁵ Pater’s influential *The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry* (1873), lauded the Classical Greek aspiration to make *beauty itself a civic virtue*, imputing that quality to the Renaissance, thereby inspiring the ‘aesthetic movement’ or ‘art for art’s sake’. See: www.authorama.com/renaissance-1.html.

to contemporary cultural studies, for whom Ruskin's notion of a 'political economy' based on the *creative industriousness of the citizenry* turned into a demand for 'critical literacy'. F. R. Leavis famously distinguished between 'culture' and 'civilization', as Ruskin had between 'political' and 'mercantile' economy, concluding that in the face of burgeoning 'civilization' (i.e. industrial mass culture), 'the citizen . . . must be trained . . . to resist' (Leavis and Thompson 1933: 3–4). The instrument of that training was a literary education, which was duly enforced in schools, just as these expanded to a universal, compulsory experience for all citizens. Training in discrimination, critical literacy and 'resistance' to the blandishments of commercial mass culture implies – and acquired – a strong sense of moral purpose, such that a literary education was soon construed as a training in *criticism* rather than *creation*, the idea being to turn out good citizens not good poets, artists or singers, much less farmers, shipwrights or builders.

Communication and cultural studies also borrowed perspectives from the behavioural sciences that dominated American university education in and after the 1950s. Here, the relationship between the state and the citizen was seen in terms of the one between mass communication and the mass audience, or commercial culture and the consumer. Studies tended to focus on 'media effects', where media messages (produced by corporations) caused behavioural changes in individuals. Investigators looked for positive effects (citizen-consumers may be persuaded to vote or buy 'our' way; this being the whole point of marketing and PR studies), or – more commonly – they sought out negative effects ('subjects' may be influenced to behave antisocially; or persuaded to resist or riot; or they may tune out altogether, suffering *ennui* or alienation).

A reaction against overly critical and behaviourist approaches was inevitable. It surfaced in and after the 1960s, during which period a new generation experienced its own forms of political, cultural and personal emancipation *through* the commercial culture that the critical Victorians and their 'mass society' successors sought to resist. 'Practical criticism' declined in favour of 'creative writing' and other types of artistic training, starting with tertiary education, including preparing students *for* rather than arming them *against* the media in practice-based and production courses.

From the late nineteenth century onwards – with the increasing ubiquity of the popular press, publishing, cinema and broadcasting – citizenship and consumption, commercial marketing and political propaganda, information and ideology, were increasingly hard to tell apart, especially as states and political

parties as well as news media and entertainment networks were all using the same persuasive techniques to reach the same population. As Scammell (2000: 351–2) put it: ‘the act of consumption is becoming increasingly suffused with citizenship characteristics and considerations. . . . It is no longer possible to cut the deck neatly between citizenship and civic duty, on one side, and consumption and self interest, on the other’. It seemed that democracy and markets needed each other.

Those who had not experienced totalitarianism, world wars or the Cold War – that is, ‘Gen X’ and its successors – were ‘media natives’. They could see no need to resist commercial media, but were drawn instead to seek employment and artistic fulfilment in a media-rich environment. Ordinary consumers experienced continuous improvements in technological affordances, and practical competence was extended socially and self-improved (e.g. by YouTube tutorials), such that previously professional or craft skills (e.g. in writing, graphics, audio-visual production and editing) were ‘democratized’ across whole populations (Bruns 2008; Cheshire 2013; Flowers 2008; Rose 2012). Pretty soon, astute observers like Stephen Coleman (2003, 2005) noted that general audiences, who ‘studied’ forms of association via entertainment formats, could teach ‘political junkies’, who insisted on political or critical purity, a thing or two about civic values. Similarly, ‘pro-ams’ (Leadbeater and Miller 2004) and ‘makers’ (Anderson 2012) were the heralded as ‘new innovators’, leading a ‘new industrial revolution’.

Technological and economic trends were transforming the media landscape as a whole, with the emergence of digital technologies (Bollier 2008), the internet (Benkler 2006; Zittrain 2008), interactive and mobile media (Goggin 2008; Goggin and Clark 2009), and social network markets (Potts et al. 2008). At the same time, media and communication studies matured, absorbing ‘critical’ citizenship from literary studies, ‘political’ citizenship from social sciences, and ‘creative production’ from vocational training. Gradually new approaches to the concept of citizenship were clarified and established.

Although the ‘critical’ and ‘media effects’ traditions have proven resilient in educational settings, dissatisfaction with their presumption of a ‘command-and-control’ model of centralized mass communication manipulating individualized (behavioural) consumers has increased with the emergence of interactive, participatory, digital media, and the concomitant spread of the notion of the user (who is, among other things, an *information*-user: Gans 2012), the maker (Anderson 2012) or creative consumer (Jenkins et al. 2013).

It is from this humanistic tradition that the recent concept of the *creative citizen* has developed, not from citizenship studies directly, nor from political communication or the social sciences, which in general remain sceptical about user-agency (O'Connor 2010). Thence, attention readily shifts across to 'new media', where the *use* of mediated representations, including user-created content and socially networked association, leads to consideration of '*DIY citizenship*', and to what may be termed a 'play theory of citizenship' (Stephenson 1967; Gray et al. 2009; Hartley 2012: ch. 6),⁶ where user-citizens make their own forms of association and civic meaningfulness *out of* the resources of entertainment media, private life and consumption, often while disengaging from formal civic participation (e.g. not registering to vote), and from consumption of erstwhile 'organs of enlightenment' (the press) that had constructed and instructed the 'informed' citizen. Thus, observers noted simultaneous *disengagement* with the industrial-era technologies of democracy, and *rapid uptake* of 'new' digital, mobile and social media, such that accusations of 'civic apathy' coincide with exponential growth of user-interactivity (see Harris et al. 2010).

Emergent concepts of creative citizenship for the globalized, digital era result from the clash of erstwhile conceptual opposites, especially those of 'the citizen' versus 'the consumer', producing new meaningfulness by novel combinations of consumption and making, private life and civic participation, 'the politics of the personal' and the use of digital social networks to agitate for change. Concepts of the public sphere have been reworked accordingly (Warner 2005; Baym 2010; Papacharissi 2010; Harris et al. 2010), and studies of collective action focus not on elections but on voluntarist or affect-based activism 'on the street' or in the 'dance-off' (Hartley 2012: ch. 6), on single-issue campaigns (e.g. Sea Shepherd, Greenpeace), on organized lobbying using social networks (Get-Up!), as well as direct – but informal – political intervention (Occupy, 99%, Arab and other 'Springs'), and various forms of crowdsourcing and crowdfunding for worthwhile civic initiatives. These are all part of a larger concept of *creative citizenship*, building out from demic knowledge. Creative citizenship as a field of research has by now also intersected with 'creative economy' research and policymaking.

⁶ A 'play theory of citizenship' pays homage to William Stephenson's (1967) *Play Theory of Mass Communication*, where he seeks to counterbalance the focus on control and information with a focus on enjoyment and play.

Health care versus racketeering?

Where there are citizens, so there must be cities, both of them creative. Since 2009, according to UN figures,⁷ living in cities is the majority human experience, as it has been since 1950 in developed countries, and soon will be everywhere. Cities are the focus of creative productivity, by citizens themselves, as well as by firms, industries and institutions. Not surprisingly, the idea of the creative industries or creative economy has become increasingly prominent in cultural policy and economic planning internationally (Bakhshi et al. 2013). Like other good ideas, it has not gone uncontested. For instance, introducing a collection of papers about creative cities, Phil Cooke and Luciana Lazzeretti (2008) produced an adversarial (we/they) account, making a very pointed distinction – amounting to a ‘clash of systems’ – between the ‘cultural economy’ and the ‘creative industries.’ They set these in opposition:

- *Cultural economy*: ‘lengthily trained artists, singers, curators and musicians’ with ‘an aesthetic status comparable to that of many health-care systems’; its source is in the academy and public institutions.
- *Creative industries*: ‘entrepreneurship bordering on racketeering’ where: ‘all make money, some criminally large amounts thereof’; their sources are the street, the market and private enterprise. (Cooke and Lazzeretti 2008: 1–2)

This illustrates a strand of thinking in economic and sociological thought, as well as in the arts and cultural critique, which prefers public culture to private enterprise, especially in relation to culture and creativity. That preference, for one side only of the public/private divide, produces these two different models of creative purpose. If we were to follow Cooke and Lazzeretti’s terminology, arguments for subsidized arts and culture to ensure the well-being of the populace would be called the ‘health-care’ model; whereas favouring development for profit would be called the ‘racketeering’ model. The prejudicial nature of the distinction is obvious, but despite the invidious comparison and the ambiguities and mixtures associated with everyday experience, it describes well-known and institutionally embedded distinctions, summarized in Table 5.1:

⁷ E.g. <http://esa.un.org/unup/>

Table 5.1 Differentiating the cultural and the creative (adapted from Hartley et al. 2012: 68)

	Cultural economy	Creative industries
	‘Health care’	‘Racketeering’
<i>Mode</i>	Art	Entertainment
<i>Locus</i>	Cultural institution (GLAM)	Scene, festival, mall, novelty
<i>Value</i>	National identity	Global diversity and difference
<i>Attractant</i>	Prestige	Social network (street, media, clubs, crowds)
<i>Agency</i>	Citizenship	Digital literacy
<i>Temporality</i>	Daytime	Night-time
<i>Demographic</i>	Adult	Youth
<i>Research</i>	<i>Journal of Cultural Economy</i>	<i>Journal of Cultural Economics</i>

Defenders of public culture (‘health care’) want to protect it from market forces (‘racketeering’), but from the point of view of a creative city, it is important that both of the columns in Table 5.1 are co-present, at a jostling semiospheric boundary. Rather than choose between the oppositions, then, we should see them in structured and productive conflict; and by combining them, we can propose a different purpose for creativity – neither health care nor racketeering but *innovation*. This model is posited on a systems view of the creative process, where value lies in the ‘clash of systems’ that result in the ‘emergence’ and elaboration of new ideas, which in turn result in change and renewal in complex environments. Yuri Lotman’s approach would predict that such innovation occurs where systems collide; where there is friction, buzz and complexity in the ‘the hottest spots for the semioticising process’, along the boundaries of the semiosphere (Lotman 1990: 136; see also Leadbeater and Wong 2010).

Historically, such tensions are worked through in cities – not in warfare – where asymmetrical, incommensurable and mutually untranslatable systems meet and mix on the street. A creative city is one where ideas thrive, driving both economic and cultural growth (see Chapter 9: ‘Extinction’). But ideas only thrive where they are competitive, contested, can be implemented in practice, and where difference and variety stimulate originality and novelty, to allow for the emergence of newness (Hutter et al. 2010). Historically, this

process is most intense in urban locations, especially regional or national capitals, with a diversity of arts and crafts, as well as mechanisms for the exchange of ideas, including markets. Creativity and cities were made for each other, but the process is 'non-linear'. It relies on complex systems interacting and clashing, producing what Vedres and Stark (2010) call 'structural folds' or inter-cohesion within networks, arguing that 'entrepreneurship in the business-group context is driven by the intersection of cohesive groups where actors have familiar access to diverse resources available for recombination' (2010: 1151).

The city as a human invention is highly evolved for dealing with proximate variety, change and difference in the growth and coordination of knowledge and ideas. Clash and difference drive change and innovation, which produce increasing elaboration. The creative city is one where inter-cohesive 'clusters of clusters' emerge, to enable the self-management of increasing complexity and the growth and elaboration of knowledge.

'Racketeering' and 'health care' need to remain in close enough proximity to interact and cross-fertilize. In great cities, this productive opposition is literally built in: high-end cultural institutions including galleries, museums and universities are clustered in one district; street markets, shopping malls and the headquarters of global media companies in others. This is the basis for Michael Porter's urban cluster theory. Clustering is the historic, initially unplanned solution to problems of complexity; cities are the cumulative result. Complexity itself springs from myriad individual and organizational actions, stimulated by competitive difference among creative artists, 'the characteristic dialectic of disagreement, dissatisfaction, even alienation' (Cooke and Lazzeretti 2008: 4) that triggers new work, which is by definition novel, original and innovative. This rationale for the arts is the same as that for the market-based creative industries, despite the differences that divide them (Beinhocker 2006). And both are needed for a creative city – all thrive on complexity, competition, clash, creativity and coordination.

Artists, consumers and the clash of systems

When applied to the person of the artist, it is easy to see how 'the clash of systems' adds value to individual talent and energy, in China for instance:

In China, the artist might be an impresario, an amateur, an iconoclast or a state-employed ‘cultural worker’. She might be a film director, performer, singer, poet, painter or video artist. The role of the artist has changed over time: from agent of change to state functionary, from iconoclast to craftsperson, and more recently to economic agent. (Keane 2013: 127)

It would be hard to maintain these activities, functions and personae if (as *Little Britain*’s Daffyd might have said) you’re the only artist in the village. Cross-fertilization among systems is bound to be slower or less rich in choices in regional, rural and remote areas. Artists are part of the productivity of the city; their most innovative activities are best understood as products of *urban semiosis*.

Of course artists have always been economic agents. Indeed, according to Swedberg (2006), the young Joseph Schumpeter used them to model his heroic concept of the entrepreneur, upon which figure evolutionary economics is founded, as shown in Table 5.2:

Table 5.2 Schumpeter’s ‘curious parallels’ between entrepreneur and artist (from Hartley et al. 2013: ‘Agency’; see: Swedberg 2006: 250)

The static majority	The entrepreneur/the artist
– Seeks equilibrium	– Breaks out of an equilibrium
– Repeats what has already been done	– Does what is new
– Passive, low energy	– Active, energetic
– Followers	– Leader
– Accepts existing ways of doing things	– Puts together new combinations
– Feels strong inner resistance to change	– Feels no inner resistance to change
– Feels hostility to new actions of others	– Battles resistance to his actions
– Makes a rational choice among existing alternates	– Makes an intuitive choice among a multitude of new alternates
– Motivated exclusively by needs and stops when these are satisfied	– Motivated by power and joy in creation
– Commands no resources and has no use for new resources	– Command no resources but borrow what they need

This formula for the creative city focuses on businesses (enterprise), makers (artists, craft-workers and artisans) and the production process (especially in creative media, where it is fully industrialized). There is one element missing: the audience and consumer. The creative industries are unlike other sections of the economy, because *supply precedes demand* – people don't know whether they will like a new creative production till it comes out (Caves 2000). For artists and creative enterprises to succeed, they need to be inter-cohesive with a 'structurally folded', well-informed and attentive audience, with whom they can maintain a dialogic relationship, using various mechanisms for generating and 'bundling' novelty for their attention (Potts 2011).

Further, since the emergence of digital and participatory media, audiences have become productive in their own right. The historic difference between producers and consumers – experts and amateurs – is under challenge. With the growth of social media and user-created content, the productivity of the system as a whole is increased. Digital technologies link and mix user-created content seamlessly with enterprise-touched content (as in YouTube), and the ease of uploading 'content' means that creative activities by non-professionals – musicians, bloggers, pranksters – can command global attention or create new niche markets. Consumers and producers are linked in mutually participatory networks. Hence, creative cities require a creative population – one that's connected by high-speed broadband as well as by open streets – as part of its complement of artists and enterprises.

One of the most prominent signs of this new sensibility is street art deriving from anonymous graffiti. This is 'user-created content' with the added spice of attracting official disapproval. It was quickly canonized – shifting from 'anomalous' to 'law-affirming' textuality – in 'cool' cities, via artists like Keith Haring (1980s New York), Banksy in Bristol (UK) and others (Banet-Weiser 2011), with examples preserved in situ as tourist attractions, for example, the 5Pointz 'Aerosol Art Center' in Long Island, the Berlin Wall, or Melbourne's lanes. It is now so mainstream that city councils encourage and license it, creating a new distinction between 'street art' (allowed) and 'graffiti tagging' (erased).⁸ Graffiti is a visible marker of bottom-up creativity in urban life. Sometimes it's an expression of anonymous nocturnal youthful presence, sometimes of darker moods brought on by contemporary events, for example: on official buildings in former East Germany

⁸ The city of Melbourne has adopted lane art as a selling point in its tourism profile. It has developed rules for deciding between art and graffiti, and a license for artists and property owners who want to keep their street art: www.melbourne.vic.gov.au/ForResidents/StreetCleaningandGraffiti/GraffitiStreetArt/Pages/Whatistreetart.aspx.

after unification, where Hartley saw the line '*First they bring us culture; then they take our flats*' sprayed (in German) on a wall in Weimar; around Beijing and Hong Kong in support of artist Ai Weiwei in 2011; or across many cities from Istanbul through the Middle East and North Africa during the Arab Spring, for instance following the incident of the 'woman in the blue bra' in Egypt, December 2011. This is urban semiosis at its most direct, and it requires a productive, dynamic 'clash' between the previously distinct categories of artist and consumer-citizen.

Given the importance of users as producers, learning and experimentation are vital elements of creativity, but they are missing from standard creative industries models. New ideas may come from outside the industrial context of expert specialization, to include learning among myriad users, and learning from networks-as-agents. This kind of networked and creative learning is informal, distributed, peer-to-peer, just-in-time and imitative. For the ordinary citizen, it is often associated with entertainment formats rather than the formal education system. But that population is now a productive resource in its own right. Thus a prerequisite for further economic growth is education – formal and informal – for the growth of creative productivity and interaction among users. However, as for creative industries, so for education: it isn't the 'provider' that matters so much as the 'user'.

Cities with concentrated student populations lead global creativity tables, and those students lead diversification. According to Malcolm Gillies (2013), 100,000 of London's half-million students are international students, and a 'majority of undergraduates studying in London declare themselves to be other than "white British"'. Students are global mixers, early adopters, have relatively high disposable income (spare cash for novelties), are mobile, experimental, flock to special events, festivals, and colonize neglected quarters with low rents, frequently reviving them in the process. Thus, they perform a *social learning* function for cities. This is not an instrumental *training* job for higher education and schools; it is a cultural function of 'natural pedagogy' (Csibra and Gergely 2011), conducted informally in the 'clash of systems' that people experience as part of urban life. In fact, people need to cluster, both physically and online, just as much as producers do.

In such a lively environment, creative innovation accelerates both formally (education and the arts) and informally (participation and the media). Innovation itself can now be seen as both 'elaborate' production by expert organizations, and 'emergent' meanings arising from distributed, self-organizing social networks. What links them all is ideas. As John Howkins (2009) puts it, 'ideas are the new currency'. This kind of currency is not always

monetized. Some ideas circulate entirely outside of the market, operating in social networks and in economies of attention. For others, many creative artists and start-up businesses illustrate the truism that ‘emergent ideas’ and making money, especially Cooke and Lazzeretti’s ‘criminally large amounts thereof’, may be separated not by sector or ideology but merely by time – today’s YouTube video from the margins may launch tomorrow’s HNWI (high net worth individual) in the tax haven (e.g. Psy).

Civic associations need not only be for political purposes, or for addressing social problems or creating public goods. These all have collective action and free-rider problems because they require an individual cost to produce a public benefit. But there are other classes of civic association that are often enjoyable to participate in, and which also produce social benefit. These are directly creative acts of citizenship such as public festivals (such as eisteddfod competitions, comedy festivals, jazz or world music festivals, the various ‘fringe’ festivals, or any manner of subject, product, or regionally themed festival (books, food, cars, local produce, and so on).

This manner of knowledge can be cumulatively, recursively and combinatorially expressive of the deme as well as producing abstract (de-demed) knowledge. Dance, music, art, literature, food that is produced for the consumption by that same group works to concentrate a deme. It builds civic community through the creation of meaningfulness. These are produced and consumed within the deme.

The productivity of festivals is not only in demic construction and maintenance, but also in creative re-constitution. Potts (2011) argues that festivals are a prime instance of an institutional form called a ‘novelty bundling markets’, which is a species of market that has developed to address the problem of lowering the costs of the production and consumption of novelty by combining expert bundling of novelty with lowered costs of experimental sampling of new goods. Novelty bundling markets are central to media markets and cities: they facilitate economic and sociocultural innovation by improving the productivity of novelty uptake.

Standard models in theory of citizenship focus on the relation between individual and state, and on collective action problems among strangers. In all cases, a citizen is treated as a problem of groups with respect to cooperation, ethics, identity, duty and power; but it is not much treated as a problem of creativity and knowledge. Cultural science examines how citizenship can indeed be creative and productive of knowledge because it follows the same logic of an externalized deme.