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Opening the Social Sciences to Cosmopolitanism?

The interest in globalization within the social sciences has not only been about mapping the changes wrought by globalizing processes, but has also been concerned with the consequences of a proper recognition that such changes have occurred and therefore altered the landscape in which social science is conducted. From research seeking to 'demonstrate' the emergence and development of globalization, scholars have become more concerned with addressing the impact of globalization upon disciplinary structures and the possibilities for knowledge production in a global age. The central issue, for many social scientists, appears to rest in the following claim: that as we have moved from a system of nation states to a global system, our conceptual categories are still tied to a nation state framework and thereby are inadequate to address the new phenomena associated with the global age. The world has moved on, but our categories for understanding that world haven't. We are urged by Robinson, among many others, 'to shift our focus from the nation-state as the basic unit of analysis to the global system as the appropriate unit' (1998: 562). This is necessary, he argues, as the earlier paradigms 'are unable to account for mounting anomalies brought about by globalization' and what is required now is an 'epistemological break' (1998: 565, 572). This has been articulated most forcefully over the last decade by Ulrich Beck, with his advocacy of a cosmopolitan social science, and follows an earlier exhortation by Immanuel Wallerstein and colleagues to 'open the social sciences'.

Wallerstein does not depart significantly from Beck in his historical account of the development of the social sciences. Similar to Beck, he regards the social sciences as 'creatures', if not 'creations', of the sovereign territories otherwise known as nation states, 'taking their boundaries as crucial social [and analytic] containers' (Wallerstein *et al.* 1996: 27). As we shall see, he also concurs with the temporalization of Beck's 'first age of modernity' thesis and with the idea that there is a crisis within this age that is bringing into being a different second age. Where they do disagree, however, is that while Beck believes the state-centred paradigms to be adequate for their times (in the nineteenth century of nation states), Wallerstein, arguing for a world system that is at least 500 years old, sees the limits of these state-centred paradigms both in their own time and for ours. In contrast to Beck's call for a cosmopolitan sociology adequate to the present, then, Wallerstein puts forward the idea of 'world systems' analysis as a way of addressing the contemporary limitations of 'nineteenth-century paradigms' as well as their limitations in their own time. In the last chapter, I addressed some of the limitations of Wallerstein's historical conception of the world system and in this chapter I will show how those limitations also figure in his conception of issues of the present and of current disciplinary structures.

I

In the collective history of the social sciences written under his leadership, Wallerstein argues that the social sciences are an enterprise of the modern world. They come into existence at the same time as the circumnavigations of the globe in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries begin to establish the finitude of the world as a central feature of European thought. While traditional histories of the social sciences locate their emergence solely with the rise of the state, here Wallerstein and his colleagues point also, albeit in passing, to the importance of the emerging understanding of the global (and Europe's role in constructing

this global). This aspect, however, is theorized less systematically than the rise of the modern state in the eighteenth century and its consolidation in the nineteenth. It is this latter that is seen to provide the more immediate context for the 'disciplinarization and professionalization of knowledge, that is to say ... the creation of permanent institutional structures designed both to produce new knowledge and to reproduce the producers of knowledge' (1996: 7). The disaggregation of fields of study – disciplines – took place within the territorial limits of the state and the state in turn shaped the contours of the disciplines. This strong association between states and disciplines meant that as scholars began to theorize the changing nature of the state this would come to have serious implications for their understanding of disciplines as well.

The post-Second World War period is seen to be particularly significant in terms of the changes that were taking place 'in the world' and their subsequent implications on the production of knowledge of that world. Wallerstein and colleagues suggest that there were three key phenomena that need to be taken into account. The first was 'the change in the world political structure' brought about by the establishment of the US and USSR as the two super-powers 'and the historical reassertion of the non-European peoples of the world' (1996: 33). The second was the largest population expansion known in the history of the world, and a concomitant expansion in productive capacity. This related to the third key development which they articulated as the 'quantitative and geographic expansion of the university system everywhere in the world' (1996: 33–4). These material factors were seen to impinge on the very modes of knowledge production and also, in time, to require new ways of knowing the world. As Wallerstein *et al.* argue, the disciplines had been organized around two main axes – between the modern and the non-modern world; and, within the modern world, between the past and present – and around three substantive areas of research – the market, the state and civil society (1996: 36). Developments in the latter half of the twentieth century, as outlined above, called into question this earlier disciplinary settlement and criticism coalesced, in particular, around the 'Eurocentric' nature of the social sciences.

Wallerstein *et al.* (1996: 51–2) suggest that it is not surprising that the nineteenth century social sciences were Eurocentric, given the history of European conquest, nor that the cultural universality ascribed to Western ideas came to be seriously questioned in the 1970s concomitant with the growing economic power of East Asia and the perceived threat that this posed to the West. The increasing economic and political presence of other parts of the world, they suggest, also had an impact on reshaping the dominant social-scientific paradigms. The consensus around modernization theory, for example, perhaps the exemplar theory of the first age of modernity, began to break down in the 1960s and 1970s as a consequence of two particular challenges. The first came from feminist and anti-colonial scholars who critiqued the self-asserted universality of the dominant paradigms and demanded the ‘opening up’, or decolonizing, of the social sciences. This challenge, Wallerstein *et al.* (1996: 54) argue, was both epistemological as well as political in that it was as much about the personnel within departments as it was about the presuppositions built into theoretical reasoning. The second challenge was that posed by the emergence of ‘cultural studies’ and the space it opened up for the expression of otherwise minority voices and positions within academic contexts.

For Wallerstein and his colleagues, it was ‘real world’ crises that brought the limits of the nineteenth-century paradigms into sharp relief. In addition, the shift in action from the state level ‘to action at global and local levels’ further undermined the claim of ‘the self-evident nature of states as conceptual containers’ (1996: 83) and challenged the easy association between states and disciplines. These two developments pointed to the inadequacies, both historical and conceptual, of the nineteenth-century paradigms and opened up space for the articulation of different histories and analyses. After clarifying the history of the social sciences, Wallerstein *et al.* sought ‘to elucidate a series of basic intellectual questions about which there has been much recent debate’ and to suggest a better way forward (1996: 94). The restructuring of the social sciences, as they envisaged it, took into account contemporary changes in the world and sought to address

the politics of knowledge production manifest in the critiques of the dominant paradigms as well as the question of differential resource allocation, globally and across disciplines. The call 'to open the social sciences', then, was also a call for 'the transformation of the power relationships which created the particular form of institutionalization of the social sciences' (1996: 56, emphasis added).

While there is much to admire and laud in this project, the strong critique of the social sciences at the outset dissipates by the end of the analysis. This is, in part, a consequence of the failure to clarify and distinguish between 'decolonizing' the social sciences and 'opening' them. While the critique is based on the inadequacy of the association between state and discipline, there is little discussion of what the implications of this are for how we might rethink, and reconfigure, disciplinary constructions historically as well as into the future. The restructuring of the social sciences that the Report ends by advocating is one that calls for us to do social science differently in the future. To the extent that there is little discussion about how a reconceptualized history would be necessary to provide us with the tools for thinking differently in the future, the implication remains that this can be a voluntaristic move or then one that reproduces the inadequacies of the earlier paradigms (indeed, Burawoy (2005a), for one, sees the call as a form of renewed positivism). This is largely because the critique of the historical formation of the social sciences is left simply as that – critique of past practices to be resolved through new objects of inquiry without sufficient consideration of how those past practices continue to inform contemporary disciplinary approaches to supposedly new objects. A thorough-going address of this, as Mignolo (2014) has forcefully argued, would require any opening of the social sciences to be concomitant upon their decolonization. Wallerstein *et al.* do temper the focus on the nation state through their recognition of Europe's dominion over much of the rest of the world, but, I would suggest, this is not properly theorized or discussed within the Report. As Lander has similarly argued, '[i]t is not the same to assume that the historical patrimony of the social sciences is parochial, as to conclude that it is

colonial: the implications are drastically different' (1997: 72). What a decolonized social science might look like, then, will be further addressed in the conclusion to this book.

II

Independent of the Report of the Gulbenkian Commission, Wallerstein had outlined his own alternative to the nineteenth-century paradigms under the frame of 'world systems analysis', as discussed in the previous chapter. This mode of enquiry offers both a different historical account of the emergence of the state system as well as a different conceptual framework within which to understand the processes under consideration. While Wallerstein suggests that world systems analysis is not a new paradigm for historical sociology, but rather 'a call for a debate about the paradigm' (2001: 256), there is, nonetheless, a strong methodological and analytical component at its core. Broadly, world systems analysis is defined by a particular relation of space and time; that is, 'the space of a "world" and the time of a "long duration"' (Wallerstein 2001: 267). There is a further specificity, however, which is the definition of the contemporary capitalist world economy as a central aspect of world systems analysis. The intention of world systems analysis is to move beyond the nineteenth-century paradigms in three ways. First, to interrogate theoretically the tripartite division of social-scientific concerns along the lines of the economy, politics and the socio-cultural and to reconstruct these within a uni-disciplinary framework. Second, to address the methodological implications of epistemology being firmly located 'in the swampy middle ground of a historical system' (2001: 271). And, third, to begin to embed these forms of knowledge and ways of knowing within new organizational and institutional forms (Wallerstein 2001: 271–2). The following section discusses the extent to which this has been successful.

Standard historical-sociological accounts of the emergence of the state system suggest processes of internal differentiation and

organization within Europe as the most significant factors. Wallerstein, in contrast, locates the emergence of states within the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Europe that he argues involved 'the creation of a world-economy' (2001: 73). The world-empires that had existed from around 10,000 BC to AD 1500, he suggests, were characterized by 'built-in space and time limits, since the expansion outwards always seemed to reach a point where the central authority's power was overtaken by disintegrative forces' (2001: 231). By 1500, however, 'something strange occurred' which led to world-empires being displaced by a world economy in turn creating, for the first time, a singular world system (2001: 232). His argument is that the world economy, first established in Europe, flourished and came 'to serve as the framework for the full development of a capitalist mode of production' (2001: 232). It absorbed the surrounding world-empires by expanding spatially – 'by virtue of the logic of processes internal to it' (2001: 232) – and, in time, covered the entirety of the globe.

Wallerstein's world system, then, can be seen to be centred upon a European core that, in its expansion outwards, incorporated the rest of the world (also known as peripheral zones) and, in doing so, constituted the first capitalist *world* economy. The processes involved, he suggests, pre-dated both national economies and nation states and so a system of knowledge production predicated on the state as 'conceptual container' can only be inadequate in this context. The world system, in this reading, has a particular history and is then also abstracted from that history to stand as the conceptual framework within which all subsequent socioeconomic and political processes are to be located and through which they are to be understood. Such an understanding necessarily gives priority, conceptually and substantively, to the processes involved in the constitution of the world system; with all other events seen to be secondary. Colonialism, in Wallerstein's account, is something to be located *within* the world system, not a historical process *constitutive* of the world system. This reinforces the priority of Europe (and processes endogenous to it) as the origin of the world and relegates other processes, which could

plausibly be considered as global, to descriptive phenomena irrelevant to the development of conceptual schema.

While world systems analysis may regard nineteenth-century paradigms as limited, as a consequence of their failure to acknowledge the world system as providing the context for the emergence of states, it nonetheless, in turn, presents a particular historical narrative as the basis for the emergence of the world system that, on examination, is similarly parochial. The historical basis for the development of the conceptual framework of world systems analysis rests on an understanding of European history; or history centred upon Europe. The global is constituted through the diffusion outward of particular processes which are seen to have their origin in Europe. The world system, then, is a European system that becomes global through its expansion and incorporation of other parts of the world. The other parts of the world are not necessary either for the instantiation of the world system (which is actually a European system) or to the understanding of that system. As Wallerstein argues, world systems 'function primarily in terms of the consequences of processes internal to them' (2001: 230) and thus are, and are to be conceived of as, autonomous and immune to the influence of others and of processes outside their initial self-defined boundaries. From arguing against the limitations of nineteenth-century paradigms and seeming to offer a distinct explanatory framework, we see that world systems analysis is itself an analysis rooted in consideration of the European state system and devoid of any consideration of the world in its historical narrative or then subsequent conceptualization. These are problems which are also inherent in the alternative analysis of a 'cosmopolitan social science' put forward by Ulrich Beck and to which this chapter now turns.

III

Beck's (2000, 2006) arguments for a cosmopolitan social science are based upon his critique of them as methodologically

nationalist.¹ He argues that disciplines such as sociology and political science have been historically bound to nation states in their emergence and development such that they are no longer adequate to the task of dealing with the problems and processes that emerge at the level of the 'global'. He highlights the increasing number of social processes that extend beyond national boundaries and suggests that, as a consequence, 'world society' should now be the starting point of sociological and other research (see also Walby 2009). His argument is based on a perceived transition from a process of singular 'modernization' to one giving rise to coexisting 'multiple modernities'. This shift is understood by Beck as a shift from the first age of modernity – that is, one shaped by nation states – to a second, global cosmopolitan, age. While Beck generally follows the multiple modernities paradigm, discussed in an earlier chapter, his call for a *second age* of modernity, and what follows from this, is distinct and, I will go on to argue, contradictory.

In this second age, Beck argues, not only is modernity now multiple, but the concepts which had been in use in developing sociological understandings in the first age are insufficient. They are, he suggests, 'zombie' categories, that is, categories that continue to live in academic discourse even when the world that had initially given rise to them is no longer in existence. Instead, what is needed is a new set of categories and concepts that would emerge from reflection upon this cosmopolitan second age. While I have also argued that sociological concepts are inappropriately bounded – specifically, that they are 'methodologically Eurocentric', rather than methodologically nationalist – this is not something that is *only now* becoming problematic as a supposedly 'first modernity' has given way to a contemporary now-globalized world. Such an approach, I suggest, is as limited as the state-centred approaches under criticism as it is based on the idea that the concepts of the first age of modernity were appropriate to that age and that the only problem is with their application to the present and the future (for discussion, see Chernilo 2007; Fine 2007). At a minimum, however,

¹ The following two sections are a modified version of the argument in Bhambra (2011c).

the 'first age of modernity' was as much characterized by empires as by nation states and so the concepts of that age would, by that token, be as inadequate in their own time as they are claimed to be today.

Another significant problem with Beck's call for more appropriate sociological concepts is that his version of cosmopolitanism is at odds with the global age he describes. To the extent that multiple modernities, as the contemporary condition of the global world, are predicated on cultural inflections of modernity, then the world has to be understood as a multicultural world. The place of others within his new cosmopolitan global age, however, is not straightforward given his otherwise stringent critique of multiculturalism.

According to Beck, multiculturalism asserts a world of variety and plurality while at the same time presenting humanity as a collectivity divided on cultural grounds. Individuals within this conception, he continues, are seen as the product of their own languages, traditions, customs and landscapes and have an attachment to their homeland which 'is regarded as a closed, self-sufficient and sacrosanct unity' (2002: 36–7). This entails a defence of that homeland 'naturally' against imperialism, but also, he suggests, against 'miscegenation, internationalization, and cosmopolitanism' (2002: 37).² This leads to the conclusion, without any substantiation, that 'multiculturalism is at loggerheads with individualization' and that, within multiculturalism, 'the individual does not exist', being simply an 'epiphenomenon of his culture' (2002: 37). In contrast, cosmopolitanism, Beck suggests, 'argues the reverse and *presupposes* individualization' (2002: 37). However, he does not elaborate on how a cosmopolitanism of individuals is accommodated within a vision of the world as otherwise structured by different cultures. Given that cosmopolitanism must also be a cultural

² This attribution is ironic not least because the term 'cosmopolitan' was used in European discourse to indicate the 'deracinated' foreigner – frequently, 'the Jew' – whose allegiance to national state formations and political communities could not be guaranteed. Indeed, these concerns are much more characteristic of the 'imperial homelands' of Europe than they are of supposed 'homelands' resisting European imperialism. Beck is concerned with the nationalism of 'others', but does not see its relation to empire as both internal to it and its legacy.

issue, if one accepts the premises of multiple modernities as Beck claims to, then it is one that is, for Beck, primarily the expression of European culture. In this way, I suggest, his cosmopolitan version of multiple modernities is more thorough-going in its Eurocentrism than the simple version embodied in the standard paradigm.

IV

Beck develops his cosmopolitan perspective, in an article with Edgar Grande, arguing that ‘it is vital to perceive others [both] as different and as the same’, but without lapsing into postmodern particularism (2007: 71). In other words, the active cosmopolitan tolerance of ‘others’ has to be balanced by ‘a certain amount of commonly shared universal norms’ (Beck and Grande 2007: 71). It is this, they suggest, that enables cosmopolitanism ‘to regulate its dealings with otherness so as not to *endanger the integrity of a community*’ (2007: 71, emphasis added). Where cosmopolitanism had initially been defined, against multiculturalism, as being presupposed by the individual, it is now being defended as an expression of a particular community *threatened* by others. As Beck and Grande go on to argue, ‘the *legitimate* interests of others’ ought to be taken into consideration in the ‘calculation of one’s own interests’ (2007: 71, emphasis added), but there is little discussion on what basis ‘legitimacy’ is to be established or how those others are constituted separately from oneself in a way different than within the premises of multiculturalism. What is clear is that the prescription for a cosmopolitan Europe, for example, ‘united in diversity’ (ironically, given the critique of methodological nationalism, a diversity of its different national traditions), takes little account of the already existing diversity within Europe as constituted by its minorities within states.

Beck’s failure to address the place of others internal to Europe – except obliquely, as mentioned, via a reference to ‘cosmopolitan society and its enemies’ (2002) – is exacerbated by the way in which he discusses the issue of others explicitly seen as external to Europe

and the West. Not only does he not recognize cosmopolitanism as also having a provenance beyond the European intellectual tradition, he is loath to discuss cosmopolitan practices in other places. Engagement with others, in this new cosmopolitan age, seems to follow a pattern also prevalent in the previous age: condescension. This is nowhere better illustrated than in Beck's statement that: 'the West should listen to non-Western countries *when they have something to say* about the following experiences' (2000: 89, emphasis added). He then lists four main themes: (1) the possibilities for coexistence in multi-religious, multi-ethnic and multicultural societies; (2) the question of tolerance in a confined space where cultural differences are prone to lead to violence; (3) 'highly developed' legal and judicial pluralism in non-Western countries (his use of scare quotes); and (4) experience of dealing with multiple sovereignties (such as are a consequence of empire, although this word is not used). The implication is that, when non-Western countries are not speaking about these issues, it is not necessary for the West to listen. This appears to be less a form of cosmopolitan engagement, new and distinct from the nation state hierarchies of the first age, and more like 'business as usual'.

Beyond the simple arrogance of listing areas where 'we' should listen to 'them', there is also much to comment on in the substance of the list itself. Not least, the aspect that the West and the non-West are presented as two internally homogeneous blocs confronting each other as 'actors' in a world that is not recognized to have been structured by historically constituted hierarchical relations. Beck's (2002) argument, that he is not interested in the memory of the global past, but simply in how a vision of a cosmopolitan future could have an impact on the politics of the present, is disingenuous at best. He appears to think that it is possible to discuss 'the present implications of a globally shaped future' (2002: 27) without addressing the legacies of the past on the shaping of the present. He simply brushes away the historically inherited inequalities arising from the legacies of European imperialism and slavery and moves on to imagine a world separate from the resolution of these inequalities. Any theory that seeks to address

the question of 'how we live in the world', however, cannot treat as irrelevant the historical construction of that world (for discussion, see Trouillot 1995; Kelley 1999).

Beck (2000: 89) continues to ignore the presence of others on the global stage with his assumption that the European 'social settlement' presents the apex of negotiating the contradictions of the modern world order. There is little discussion of other constructions of social solidarity that have existed such as the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) which, as Shilliam argues, 'stretched across 800 chapters in 40 countries on four continents' (2006: 379). Further, where there is some acknowledgement of 'development' in other places it is relativized through the use of scare quotes. The implication is that legal and judicial pluralism is only necessary in otherwise complex and developed Western societies because of the migration of populations to them from places that have such pluralism due to the presence of ethnic and religious differences (for discussion, see Amin 2004). This is then compounded by Beck's subsequent list of areas in which the West is 'beginning to adopt non-Western standards of reality and normality *which do not bode well*' (2000: 89, emphasis added). Presumably, the point is that they do not bode well *for the West* since, in his own terms, they are the everyday conditions of existence for the non-West – on which there is no comment. In particular, Beck identifies the de-regulation of the labour market in the West as leading to the 'abandonment of the co-operatively organized employee society that froze the class conflict between work and capital' (2000: 89). This is an expression of methodological nationalism, given that he does not comment on the conditions of the international division of labour, and the hierarchies between the global north and south, which were themselves a condition of this 'frozen' settlement.³ Nor does he discuss the role of the West in promoting global policies that are then seen as the importation of non-Western conditions into the West.

³ For a discussion of the development of the UK welfare state in the context of the 'postcolonial' demise of a system of Commonwealth preferences and re-orientation to the EU, see Holmwood (2000).

In another, again un-reflexive, example, Beck uses the image of a sandpit to address the current world situation. He argues that the first age of modernity involved capital, labour and state 'making sand cakes in the sandpit' (where the sandpit is the national community), and attempting 'to knock the other's sand cake off the spade in accordance with the rules of institutionalized conflict' (2000: 89). The situation in the second age of modernity is akin to business having been given a mechanical digger which is being used to empty out the whole sandpit (2000: 89). The metaphor is peculiarly inept given the association of infancy with the sandpit and the use of adult-child metaphors to understand colonial relations and responsibilities from a Western perspective. What is clear is that Beck's construction is itself an example of the methodological nationalism he opposes. He appears ignorant of the processes of colonialism, imperialism and slavery, which 'emptied out' from the sandpit of the colonized, not only mineral resources but also human bodies, and did so not according to 'the rules of institutionalized conflict' of a first age of modernity, but through naked appropriation.

The one rare attempt to address the issue of cosmopolitanism 'from below' sees Beck substitute the term 'transnationality' for cosmopolitanism; he writes this 'characterizes not only the globalization elites, but the poor exploited immigrants as well. They are treated as "excluded others" in the United States, but Haitians, Filipino or Indian immigrants are at the same time active in sustaining "their" households overseas *and* engaging in political struggles against corrupt regimes [back home]' (2002: 33; emphasis in original). While Beck does not say 'back home' this is the clear implication at the end of that sentence (in that I don't think he means corrupt regimes in the 'West'); his emphasis on 'and' is also telling – the implication being that it should be of some surprise that these immigrants can be active in sustaining households overseas (as opposed to 'back home') as well as engaging in politics elsewhere. His refusal to ascribe the notion of 'cosmopolitanism' to the 'poor exploited immigrants' makes them 'excluded others' from his framework and locates them in nationalistic particularity

without providing any information on why this must be case. Further, there is little explanation about what makes global elites specifically *cosmopolitan*, while these immigrants are only *transnational*. Beck's patronizing attitude towards these 'poor immigrants' continues a few lines along when he says that: 'it is not only the global players who are learning the de-territorialized game of power and putting it to the test, but also some *ethnic minorities*' (2002: 33). 'Global players' are not, in Beck's understanding, 'ethnic minorities' and 'ethnic minorities' are not 'global players'; the Eurocentrism implicit in the identification of 'global players' is apparent.

V

Beck's (2000; 2006) argument for cosmopolitan social science and Wallerstein's world systems theory are each part of a long line of social theory that takes Western perspectives as the focus of global processes, and Europe as the origin of a modernity which is subsequently globalized, whether in convergent (modernization), divergent (multiple modernities) forms, or expanded world systems. While Beck presents his version of cosmopolitanism as potentially globally inclusive, it is an inclusivity that is dependent upon 'them' being included in 'our' understandings, as is Wallerstein's 'opening' of the social sciences. In neither case, is global knowledge addressed as a de-colonized knowledge. It is not an inclusivity that recognizes others as already constitutive of, if marginalized within, the frameworks of understanding. Nor is it one that sees that there might be something to learn from engagements with others such that those frameworks of understanding might be changed. As such, it can be seen to embody an unmitigated form of cultural Eurocentrism. Further, while Beck uses the approach of multiple modernities to present the distinctiveness of the present age, he does not deal with the contradiction this poses for his commitment to his version of cosmopolitanism. Multiple modernities, as argued previously, are predicated on an understanding of

different cultures such that their vision of the global has to be constituted as a form of global multiculturalism. To the extent that Beck sets up cosmopolitanism in opposition to multiculturalism he denies the basis for the very global age he describes.

The problems identified here are not necessarily problems with the idea of cosmopolitanism itself, but rather with the particularly parochial understanding of it as presented by Beck. In contrast to his Eurocentred universalism, and that of Wallerstein, alike, Pollock *et al.* (2000), for example, argue for an understanding of cosmopolitanism made up of dialogues among a series of local perspectives on it. Their primary argument is that the very phenomenon of cosmopolitanism is threatened by the work of purification that insists on regarding it as the product of one culture, emerging from a centre and incorporating others in its diffusion outwards. If we wish an inclusive cosmopolitanism, it would have to be one outside a centred universalism and one established on the basis of 'connections', both historical and social. As such, cosmopolitanism would have to be understood as open and not pre-given in form or content: it is not, they argue, 'some known entity existing in the world, with a clear genealogy from the Stoics to Immanuel Kant, that simply awaits more detailed description at the hands of scholarship' (2000: 577). Rather, it is best established by looking at 'how people have thought and acted beyond the local' (2000: 586), in different places and across time, to generate new descriptions. These would, in turn, suggest new practices, including new social-scientific practices in ways of understanding the world.⁴ If, as they argue, we were to take cosmopolitanism as *a way of looking at the world*, this would require us to take the perspective of *the world* in our considerations; that is, we would need to be cosmopolitan in our very practices in understanding what it was and is to

⁴ See Lamont and Aksartova (2002) for one example in which this has been successfully undertaken. Acknowledging that much of the literature on cosmopolitanism is either implicitly or explicitly associated with elites, they seek 'to explore ordinary cosmopolitanisms, defined as the strategies used by ordinary people to bridge boundaries with people who are different from them' (2002: 1).

be cosmopolitan. A cosmopolitan social science, then, would be one that was open to different voices. Further, it would be one that provincialized European understandings, not one that continued to assert the necessary hegemony of Europe.

The key issue with both Wallerstein and Beck is that their identification of the limitations of earlier social-scientific paradigms does not lead to the reconstruction of those paradigms. There is little acknowledgement in Beck's work, for example, that if certain understandings are seen as problematic today, then, there must also be an issue of whether they were not also problematic in the past. Most importantly, they would lead to misunderstandings of the nature of the present in terms of how it has arisen from that past. Indeed, any idea of a disjunction between past and present, such that the present represents a new 'phase', is open to the possible objection that there are unrecognized continuities and that the appearance of discontinuity is an artefact of the misunderstanding of past processes and their projected futures. As such, the limitations of nineteenth-century concepts of the first age of modernity require a more thorough address than Beck proposes in his simple shift to a cosmopolitan second age if the requirements of a 'global' sociology are to be properly addressed. Beyond Wallerstein's world systems analysis and Beck's cosmopolitan social science, there have been other ways in which scholars in the contemporary period have attempted to think about both the global context within which the social sciences operate and the social-scientific understandings of the global. The following chapter addresses developments within the International Sociological Association that attempt to do just that.