Docherty, Thomas. "Notes." *Confessions: The Philosophy of Transparency*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2012. 180–198. The WISH List. *Bloomsbury Collections*. Web. 26 Apr. 2023. <<http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781849666770.0008>>.

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Notes

Introduction: The Philosophy of Transparency

- 1 Peter Brooks, *Troubling Confessions* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000), p. 6.
- 2 Giorgio Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz* (trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen; New York, NY: Zone Books, 2002), p. 24. There is an interesting trend here, one that might deserve further consideration. First, legal culpability shrinks to the admission of moral or characterological shortcomings; but this in turn is erased from consideration. As in our recent crises of capitalism, caused by bankers, we have, at best, a 'displaced' acknowledgement of the shortcomings: as Fred Goodwin said, when asked to apologize for the failures of the Royal Bank of Scotland, 'There is an apology' – the phraseology is important, and is certainly not 'I apologize'. Then, beyond this, 'the time for apology is over', as Bob Diamond put it in his meeting with the UK House of Commons Select Committee, just weeks before collecting a personal bonus reputed to be of the order of £8 million, and while many UK citizens faced the prospect of job cuts and reduced public services as a result of the bankers' behaviour.
- 3 See Wolfgang Sofsky, *Privacy: A Manifesto* (trans. Steven Rendall; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).
- 4 On the idea of a transparent society, see Gianni Vattimo, *The Transparent Society* (trans. David Webb; Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), where Vattimo traces the idea back to a certain Hegelian notion of the fulfilment of *Geist*, the moment when Spirit comes to Absolute Self-knowing, as it were, and thus where the subject coincides entirely with its presentation.
- 5 See Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2007). The collocation of disaster capital and redemption here is, of course, not to be ascribed to Klein: I mean simply to indicate coincidental overlap.
- 6 I have explored this in detail in Thomas Docherty, *Criticism and Modernity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), especially chapter 2, 'Love as the European Humour' (pp. 39–68), and chapter 5, 'The Politics of Singularity' (pp. 116–60).

Chapter 1 Now

- 1 Paul Auster, *Sunset Park* (London: Faber, 2010), p. 308.
- 2 Alain Robbe-Grillet, *Dans le labyrinthe* (Paris: Minuit, 1958).
- 3 See Edward Said, *Beginnings: Intention and Method* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1975).
- 4 I explore this much more fully in a sustained consideration of J. Hillis Miller's work, and especially his recent considerations of 'zero', in Chapter 6 of this book.
- 5 We should note in passing that, even in this demand for a secular criticism, a theological language nonetheless asserts itself, almost as if it were a primary vocabulary for Benjamin. It is well known, of course, that this is fairly common in Benjamin; but here, I will be exploring why this seems inevitable. In more recent philosophy, such as that of Giorgio Agamben, this messianic moment becomes

- 'the time that remains'. Giorgio Agamben, *The Time that Remains* (trans. Patricia Dailey; Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005).
- 6 See 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', in Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations* (ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn, London: Fontana, 1973), p. 264.
 - 7 Jean-François Lyotard, *La confession d'Augustin* (Paris: Galilée, 1998), p. 70; my translation.
 - 8 It should not escape notice that Lyotard, too, in a great deal of his writing, is heavily influenced by Judeo-Christian traditions. His work on the relation of discourse to figure – work that shapes a good deal of his fundamental aesthetics – is informed by the religious question of idolatry and the ban on images of God; and that aesthetic becomes in turn a question of the problems of representation that shape his ethics and politics as well, including the delineations of postmodernism for which he is probably most famous. For more on this, see Thomas Docherty, *After Theory* (revised 2nd edn, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996), pp. 172–6.
 - 9 G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* (trans. A.V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 60 (section A, 1).
 - 10 Such a referential version of how language operates in relation to truth is, of course, not straightforward and is highly contested. For a good introduction to the philosophical issues, see W.V. Quine, *Pursuit of Truth* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); and consider especially his formulation of what he calls 'observation sentences', which he describes as 'occasion sentences: true on some occasions, false on others' (Quine, *Pursuit of Truth*, p. 3 and *passim*).
 - 11 Jonathan Swift, *Gulliver's Travels and Other Writings* (ed. Louis A. Landa, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 310. We should note, in passing, that this also effectively trashes the preceding four sections of 'A Tale of a Tub' itself. It becomes a proto-Fishian 'self-consuming artifact', a text that erases itself as it goes along, like Robbe-Grillet's *Les Gommages*.
 - 12 See Michel Serres, *Eclaircissements: Entretiens avec Bruno Latour* (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1994), p. 76.
 - 13 See Hannah Arendt, *Crises of the Republic* (New York, NY: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1972), p. 4; and see also Hannah Arendt, *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1993), pp. 227–8.
 - 14 Arendt, *Crises of the Republic*, p. 5.
 - 15 Arendt, *Crises of the Republic*, p. 5.
 - 16 Arendt, *Crises of the Republic*, p. 5.
 - 17 See Michel de Montaigne, *Essais* (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1969), vol. 1, p. 74 ('Des menteurs'): 'Un ancien père dit que nous sommes mieux en la compagnie d'un chien connu qu'en celle d'un homme duquel le langage nous est inconnu' ('An ancient father says that we are better off in the company of a dog with which we are familiar than we would be in the company of a man whose language we don't speak'). This is an indirect allusion to the writings of the 'ancien père' that is Augustine, in Augustine, *City of God* (trans. Henry Bettenson, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980), p. 861 (Book XIX, ch. 7): 'a man would be more cheerful with his dog for company than with a foreigner'. For a fuller understanding of the extremely complex case of Rousseau, see Paul de Man's essay, 'Excuses', in Paul de Man, *Allegories of Reading* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979) – an essay that perhaps says a good deal more about de Man than it does about Rousseau.
 - 18 See François Villon, *Poésies complètes* (Paris: Livre de Poche, 1972). Villon has been rather neglected in recent times; but 'Le testament' is one of our great

- examples of a very specific kind of confessional text, a text written after Villon is found guilty of murder and theft, and in which he writes his revenge on his accusers. In some ways, it is a primary text of the kind of 'witnessing' that I explore in Chapter 7 of this book.
- 19 See Geoffrey Bennington and Jacques Derrida, *Jacques Derrida* (Paris: Seuil, 1991). John Gower, *Confessio Amantis*, is widely available in e-versions: see <http://omacl.org> [accessed 1 February 2012].
 - 20 Lyotard, *La confession d'Augustin*, p. 47.
 - 21 Augustine, *Confessions* (trans. R.S. Pine-Coffin, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961), p. 266.
 - 22 Benjamin, *Illuminations*, p. 265.
 - 23 In passing, we might phrase this in such a way as to say that the teller of the beads – the one who prays – holds history between finger and thumb; and, once we put it like this, we cannot help but recall Seamus Heaney's most celebrated poem, 'Digging', where we find the relation between digging the historical realm and writing: 'Between my finger and my thumb / The squat pen rests: snug as a gun.'
 - 24 Benjamin, *Illuminations*, p. 263.
 - 25 Benjamin, *Illuminations*, p. 263.
 - 26 Lyotard, *La confession d'Augustin*, p. 44. We should also consider this in relation to Samuel Beckett's 1930 study of Proust, where he sees clearly that habit, and its relation to habitation, is at the centre of *A la recherche du temps perdu*. See Samuel Beckett, *Proust* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1930). Finally, alongside these, see a key element of Russian Formalism, as expressed in the writing of Viktor Shklovsky, 'Art as Technique', in Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis (eds and trans), *Russian Formalist Criticism* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), pp. 11–12: 'If we start to examine the general laws of perception, we see that as perception becomes habitual, it becomes automatic ... Habitualization devours works, clothes, furniture, one's wife, and the fear of war'.
 - 27 Hans Blumenberg, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age* (trans. Robert M. Wallace, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983), p. 596.
 - 28 Jean-Luc Nancy, *Being Singular Plural* (trans. Robert Richardson and Anne O'Byrne, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 165.
 - 29 Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Experience of Freedom* (trans. Bridget McDonald, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 115.
 - 30 'What is a contemporary?', in Giorgio Agamben, *What is an Apparatus?* (trans. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 40.
 - 31 Benjamin, *Illuminations*, p. 263.
 - 32 Agamben, *What is an Apparatus?*, pp. 47–50.
 - 33 See Stanley Fish, *Surprised by Sin* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967). This study became the basis, in fact, for virtually all of Fish's subsequent work. His version of reader-response criticism is essentially one in which the substance of reading is a condition in which the reader is subject to constant surprises; and, in turn, this becomes a paradoxical *expectation* of surprise, the word for which is essentially 'the new pragmatism'.
 - 34 Lyotard, *La confession d'Augustin*, pp. 72–3.
 - 35 Lyotard, *La confession d'Augustin*, p. 73.
 - 36 See Augustine, *City of God*, pp. 519–20; and see my comments on this in Docherty, *Criticism and Modernity*, pp. 200–204.

- 37 The key texts are Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: La fondation de l'universalisme* (Paris: PUF, 1997); Agamben, *The Time that Remains*; and Slavoj Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).
- 38 See Gianni Vattimo, *La fine della modernità* (Milan: Garzanti, 1985).
- 39 Badiou, *Saint Paul*, pp. 12–13; my translation.
- 40 Alain Badiou, *Petit manuel d'inesthétique* (Paris: Seuil, 1998), p. 29; my translation. See also John Henry Cardinal Newman, *The Idea of a University* (ed. Martin J. Svaglic, San Francisco, CA: Rinehart Press, 1960), p. xlv. Here, in the Preface to his lectures, Newman dismisses the idea that a university education should be about the engendering of what he calls 'viewiness', or having and expressing views that are based on opinion rather than on knowledge. For a fuller engagement with these ideas in the contemporary moment, see Thomas Docherty, *For the University* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011).
- 41 Badiou, *Saint Paul*, p. 11 (translation of all quotations from this volume are mine). For a less philosophical, but equally hard-hitting version of this, see the trenchant critique of identity-politics in Tony Judt, *The Memory Chalet* (London: Heinemann, 2010), p. 202: 'you are what your grandparents suffered'. I discuss this briefly later.
- 42 Badiou, *Saint Paul*, p. 13.
- 43 Badiou, *Saint Paul*, p. 11.
- 44 Badiou, *Saint Paul*, p. 15. It would also follow from this mode of thought, of course, that democracy – if it is to be characterized solely as that political mode in which I 'tell' my voice/vote – is also anathema to truth.
- 45 Badiou, *Saint Paul*, p. 15.
- 46 Badiou, *Saint Paul*, pp. 22–3.
- 47 See Jacques Rancière, *Moments politiques* (Paris: La Fabrique, 2009), p. 92.
- 48 Rancière, *Moments politiques*, p. 92.
- 49 I have argued this in more detail in Thomas Docherty, *Aesthetic Democracy* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007).
- 50 All passages cited here are from Judt, *The Memory Chalet*, p. 202.

Chapter 2 Official Identity and Clandestine Experience

- 1 Vincent Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy* (trans. L. Scott-Fox and J.M. Harding, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 37.
- 2 Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy*, p. 37.
- 3 See 'A Sketch of the Past', in Virginia Woolf, *Moments of Being* (ed. Jeanne Schulkind, London: Triad Panther, 1978), p. 81. It is important to note, in passing, that for Virginia Woolf, the 'moment' in question is not simply a temporal moment. Rather, the term is taken essentially from the discourses of physics, where it relates to momentum, weight, attitude, mood, inclination; or, in short, the moment is a play of forces that constitute a weight of the present, its pressing upon us as a sensation of being, set against the many moments of 'non-being' as Woolf calls them, describing those less marked or less intense moments as 'nondescript cotton wool'.
- 4 We see a similar thinking in Paul de Man, when he tries to understand the movements of allegory and of irony in his famous 'The Rhetoric of Temporality' essay, in Paul de Man, *Blindness and Insight* (London: Methuen, 1983). See also my commentary on that essay in Docherty, *After Theory*, pp. 119–26.
- 5 Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy*, p. 38.

- 6 See the passage 'An ecstatic lecture', in the 'Diapsalmata' section of Søren Kierkegaard, *Either/Or* (trans. Alastair Hannay, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992), pp. 54–5; and see also Jean-François Lyotard, *Le différend* (Paris: Minuit, 1983), pp. 65–6, 153–60.
- 7 Frank Kermode, in his memoir, Frank Kermode, *Not Entitled* (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1999), writes of the abbreviation NE, meaning 'not entitled', used by sailors when they forfeit their salary due to some misdemeanour. Being 'not entitled' was described as getting a 'fucking nor'easter'; and this relates entitlement to financial standing and to evaluation. There is a study to be done on the very idea of such titles and entitlements.
- 8 In this, it extends the work in my essay, Thomas Docherty, 'For a new empiricism', *Parallax* 5: 2 (1999), pp. 51–64, and in 'Aesthetics and the demise of experience' in Docherty, *Aesthetic Democracy*. For other essays on this 'New Aestheticism', see John Joughin and Simon Malpas (eds), *The New Aestheticism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003).
- 9 For a good guide to the operations of rhetoric in question here, see Peter Mack, *Elizabethan Rhetoric* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); and, for more detailed exploration on this specifically in Montaigne, see Peter Mack, *Rhetoric and Reading in Montaigne and Shakespeare* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2009).
- 10 We are perhaps more acquainted with this in recent times courtesy of the philosophy of Lyotard, whose 'postmodern mood' is one that is characterized by the necessity to 'judge without criteria'. For a straightforward statement of this, see Jean-François Lyotard, *Just Gaming* (trans. Wlad Godzich, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), p. 14: 'we judge without criteria. We are in the position of Aristotle's prudent individual, who makes judgments about the just and the unjust without the least criterion'. Montaigne, like Lyotard, would have been familiar with this from Aristotle.
- 11 Michel de Montaigne, *Essays* (trans. J.M. Cohen, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1958), p. 351. For the original, see Montaigne, *Essais*, vol. 3, p. 281.
- 12 For an exposition and occasional exploration of what is at stake in this, see H. Aram Veaser (ed.), *The Confessions of the Critics* (London: Routledge, 1996). For the autobiographical pact, see Philippe Lejeune, *Le pacte autobiographique* (Paris: Seuil, 1975).
- 13 I explore this slightly more fully in Thomas Docherty, *The English Question; or, Academic Freedoms* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2008), where I consider what has happened to the discipline of English studies in a politics governed by audit culture, bureaucracy and the administrative priorities of a society that has seen the rise and triumph of the managerialist class. Its consequences for education more generally are explored in Docherty, *For the University*.
- 14 Leslie A. Fiedler, 'Archetype and signature: A study of the relationship between biography and poetry', *Sewanee Review*, 60 (1952), pp. 253–73.
- 15 The periodization here, especially of the so-called 'death of the author', is important. There is a link to be made between this abstract art, the kenotic dissolution of the author, and a cold-war mentality that shaped the 1960s; and I explore this in some more detail in Chapter 6, where the reduction of the author to a 'bare self' is examined.
- 16 The not so silent allusion here, of course, is to Jacques Derrida's 'Signature, Event, Context', an essay that in many ways updates and extends very profoundly the insights of Fiedler (though the two are in fact unrelated).

- See Jacques Derrida, *Margins: of Philosophy* (trans. Alan Bass, Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982).
- 17 Jean-François Lyotard, *Signé Malraux* (Paris: Grasset, 1996).
 - 18 Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (trans. Thomas McCarthy, London: Heinemann, 1976), p. 98.
 - 19 Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference* (trans. Alan Bass, London: Routledge, 1978), pp. 4–5.
 - 20 Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism* (trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, New York, NY: Zone Books, 1988), p. 37.
 - 21 Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza* (trans. Robert Hurley, San Francisco, CA: City Lights Books, 1988), p. 18.
 - 22 Michael Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze* (London: UCL Press, 1993), p. 61.
 - 23 Gilles Deleuze, *Pourparlers* (Paris: Minuit, 1990), p. 218; my translation. The reference is to Bernard Groethuysen (who studied under Wilhelm Dilthey), a philosopher better-known in France than in the anglophone world.
 - 24 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* (Paris: Minuit, 1991), p. 8.
 - 25 Montaigne, *Essais*, vol. 1, p. 35; my translation.
 - 26 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Confessions* (trans. J.M. Cohen, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1953), p. 17.
 - 27 'No Messiah', in Robert Lowell, *The Dolphin* (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), p. 74.
 - 28 'Critic', in Lowell, *The Dolphin*, p. 43.
 - 29 Augustine, *Confessions*, p. 22.
 - 30 Herman Melville, *Moby Dick* (London: Bantam Books, 1981), p. 11. I am indebted to Geoffrey Hartman for the speculation here about the status of nomination. In private conversation, July 1983, he suggested that 'all acts of narrative are, in the end, finally acts of nomination'. I am extending this here beyond the scope of narrative and am relating it to the status of confession. I explored what I call 'scenes of recognition' in Thomas Docherty, *John Donne, Undone* (London: Methuen, 1986).
 - 31 Augustine, *Confessions*, p. 26.
 - 32 Augustine, *Confessions*, p. 26.
 - 33 Augustine, *Confessions*, p. 347.
 - 34 Augustine, *Confessions*, p. 346.
 - 35 Augustine, *Confessions*, pp. 346, 347.
 - 36 Peter Fenves, 'Foreword: From Empiricism to the Experience of Freedom', in Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Experience of Freedom* (trans. Bridget McDonald, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. xiii.
 - 37 Catherine Belsey, *Desire* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p. 10. She explicitly opposes experience to 'texts'.
 - 38 Giorgio Agamben, *Infancy and History* (trans. Liz Heron, London: Verso, 1993), p. 14.
 - 39 Reprinted in Arendt, *Crises of the Republic*, p. 179.
 - 40 Arendt, *Crises of the Republic*, p. 109.
 - 41 Arendt, *Crises of the Republic*, p. 110.
 - 42 Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, p. 91.
 - 43 Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, p. 95.
 - 44 Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, p. 95.
 - 45 Samuel Beckett, Molloy, Malone Dies, *The Unnamable* (London: John Calder, 1959), p. 386.

- 46 I am indebted to Jim Byatt for a number of conversations through which this link of Beckettian skin to taboo, and to this specific taboo, came to be developed. Behind these formulations, I think we can hear the ghost of that archetypal first modern man, Hamlet, pondering his own potential for action or agency, pondering his identity and whether to bring it to an end or to a definite conclusion in his famed soliloquy: 'to be or not to be'. One reason why this is a *question* for Hamlet, and one that might yield a resolution, is that he thinks in terms of being itself, and not in terms of how he might *become* other than he is. In Shakespeare, typically, it is the *female* character who is cast in terms of becoming: 'I do beguile the thing I am by seeming otherwise', says Desdemona. Shakespeare's day, of course, called this 'mutability', ascribed it to femininity and devalued it. However, it is perhaps better regarded as the emergence, into modernity, of the pressure of an entire philosophy of difference, an ontology of becoming. If we attend to Agamben and Badiou, however, we now have a rival contender for the title of 'first modern': Saint Paul.
- 47 Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz*, p. 13.
- 48 Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz*, p. 12.
- 49 Arendt, *Crises of the Republic*, pp. 132–3.

Chapter 3 This Thing of Darkness I Acknowledge Mine

- 1 Blaise Pascal, *Pensées* (ed. Louis Lafuma, Paris: Seuil, 1962), fragment no. 64; Blaise Pascal, *Pensées* (ed. Léon Brunschvicg, Paris: Flammarion, 1976), fragment no. 295.
- 2 Pascal, *Pensées* (ed. Lafuma), fragment no. 113; Pascal, *Pensées* (ed. Brunschvicg), fragment no. 348.
- 3 William Shakespeare, *The Tempest*, Act V, Scene 1.
- 4 Georges Perec, *Les choses* (Paris: Julliard, 1965), p. 78; my translation.
- 5 Perec, *Les choses*, p. 65.
- 6 John Macmurray, *Conditions of Freedom* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993), p. 2.
- 7 Macmurray, *Conditions of Freedom*, p. 3; italics added.
- 8 See Sylviane Agacinski, *Le passeur du temps* (Paris: Seuil, 2000), where we find the argument that time corrupts, certainly; but it also generates and produces. The ambivalences of time here – and especially the ambiguity of 'the present' – are akin to the ambivalence that I will find in 'zero', in Chapter 6.
- 9 This modern Subject requires such a fiction precisely because of one effect of David Hume's sceptical philosophy which, in its refusal to found thinking of truth upon a stable self, opens a specific antifoundationalism whose effect is to produce various strategies of containment advanced in the name of fiction rather than truth. Fictions of the self – in those biographical fictions of the eighteenth-century novel, say – thus answer to the anxiety that there might not actually be a self in the first place. The fiction constructs, and proposes as normative, that which it pretends merely to describe. Temporally, the novel predicts – or foretells – a history; and in such foretelling makes the future into a past, while its present remains curiously void and empty. On this, see my 'foretelling' chapter in Docherty, *Aesthetic Democracy*; and see also 'Now', Chapter 1 in this book.
- 10 Erich Auerbach, *Mimesis* (trans. Willard R. Trask, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968).

- 11 Augustine, *Confessions*, p. 209. This question, of a writing in which the writer reflects on the present act of writing, became part of the staple diet of a certain kind of hyper-reflexivity often associated with postmodernism. We find it in the mid-twentieth-century French *nouveau roman*; but we also find it, before that, in the *Kunstlerroman*; and it takes a certain philosophical seriousness in Foucault and, perhaps most tellingly, in Blanchot's *L'instant de ma mort* and Derrida's response, *Demeure*. It is explored further in Chapter 7.
- 12 'Writing to the minute', of course, is Samuel Richardson's phrase describing the supposed transcription of the letters in *Clarissa*. For a good exploration of the issues involved in such 'contemporaneous' writing, see Lennard J. Davis, *Factual Fictions* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1983); but perhaps the best single commentary on the idea is in Henry Fielding's *Shamela* and its parodying of the idea.
- 13 Auerbach, *Mimesis*, pp. 70–71. Forster indicates that 'and then ... and then ...' (as in 'The king died, and then the Queen died.') is precisely the opposite of plot, which requires consequence ('The King died, and then the Queen died of grief') (E.M. Forster, *Aspects of the Novel* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1927)). Frank Kermode, in Frank Kermode, *The Sense of an Ending* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), explains this in terms of a question of roused expectations, the 'tick' of a clock that is followed by or that implies a following 'tock'. The question of expectation, and its relation to the 'event' and to surprise will all figure later in this chapter.
- 14 Augustine writes that 'Ambrose often repeated the text: *The written law inflicts death, whereas the spiritual law brings life*', Augustine, *Confessions*, p. 116. This, from 2 Corinthians, is, of course, one of the key passages for interpretation in Paul; and it has become a crux of some current debates around the significance of Paul, especially in the work of Badiou, *Saint Paul*, and in that of Agamben, *The Time that Remains*. It is interesting to note, in passing, that Paul was also a figure of fundamental importance to Macmurray in 1949, when Macmurray sees Paul as a figure who determines identity-as-difference: Paul is and is not Paul, so to speak.
- 15 Augustine, *Confessions*, p. 112.
- 16 Augustine, *Confessions*, p. 114.
- 17 Augustine, *Confessions*, p. 115.
- 18 Augustine, *Confessions*, p. 116.
- 19 See Lyotard, *La confession d'Augustin*, for this idea that the text does not describe a conversion but instead enacts it at every point.
- 20 Augustine, *Confessions*, p. 123.
- 21 Auerbach, *Mimesis*, p. 74.
- 22 René Descartes, *Discours de la méthode* (ed. E. Gilson, Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1970), pp. 44–5; these and all other translations are mine.
- 23 Descartes, *Discours de la méthode*, pp. 47–8.
- 24 Descartes, *Discours de la méthode*, pp. 64, 66.
- 25 Descartes, *Discours de la méthode*, pp. 80.
- 26 Blaise Pascal, *Oeuvres complètes* (Paris: Seuil, 1963), p. 286.
- 27 Pascal, *Oeuvres complètes*, p. 286.
- 28 Pascal, *Oeuvres complètes*, p. 290.
- 29 Pascal, *Oeuvres complètes*, p. 291.
- 30 Perec, *Les choses*, p. 38.
- 31 Perec, *Les choses*, p. 144.
- 32 See Alasdair MacIntyre, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* (London: Duckworth, 1990), pp. 170–95.

- 33 Descartes, *Discours de la méthode*, pp. 51–2.
- 34 Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (trans. Hazel E. Barnes, New York, NY: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 566.
- 35 Auerbach, *Mimesis*, p. 74.
- 36 Jean-François Lyotard, *The Inhuman: Reflections on Time* (trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 60.
- 37 Lyotard, *The Inhuman*, p. 65. See also Jürgen Habermas, *The Past as Future* (ed. and trans. Max Pensky, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), p. 66: ‘the temptation to use models from the past for the interpretation of the future seems impossible to resist’. He is speaking of the problems of Germany after reunification; but the comment has a more general applicability, in which the mood is characterized by the phrase ‘Let’s get it over with, just like we did once before!’
- 38 Perec, *Les choses*, p. 72.
- 39 Perec, *Les choses*, p. 73.
- 40 Emmanuel Levinas, *Le temps et l’autre* (Paris: Quadrige/PUF, 1991); my translation (the original: ‘*le temps n’est pas le fait d’un sujet isolé et seul, mais ... il est la relation même du sujet avec autrui*’).
- 41 Virginia Woolf, ‘Character in Fiction’, originally delivered as a paper to the Heretics’ Society in 1924, and subsequently revised and reprinted in various versions. I cite here from the version in Virginia Woolf, *Selected Essays* (ed. David Bradshaw, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 38.
- 42 Jürgen Habermas, in private conversation, University College Dublin, 14 April 1994, asserted that it was precisely this principle of autonomy as a constituent element of the movement of Enlightenment that Lyotard – at that time seen as an opponent of Habermas – ‘has not understood’. Part of the argument of this chapter derives from a consideration of this claim, which Habermas also claimed as the basic philosophical – and not political – difference between Lyotard and himself. For a fuller exploration of the implications of this, see the essays collected in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
- 43 T.S. Eliot, *The Sacred Wood* (London: Methuen, 1966), pp. xv–xvi.
- 44 Eliot, *The Sacred Wood*, p. 79.
- 45 Benjamin, *Illuminations*, p. 264.
- 46 Benjamin, *Illuminations*, p. 264.
- 47 For the best discussion of this, see Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1989).
- 48 The kind of singularity in question here is that described by Clément Rosset in his many texts, but most pertinently and succinctly in Clément Rosset, *L’objet singulier* (Paris: Minuit, 1979).
- 49 Benjamin, *Illuminations*, p. 263.
- 50 Benjamin, *Illuminations*, p. 265.
- 51 Benjamin, *Illuminations*, p. 264.
- 52 See Rosset, *L’objet singulier*.
- 53 For a fuller description of what I call ‘anatheory’, see my studies, Docherty, *After Theory*, and Thomas Docherty, *Alterities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
- 54 See Jean Baudrillard, *Fatal Strategies* (trans. Philip Beitchman and W.G.J. Niesluchowski, London: Pluto Press, 1990).
- 55 With respect to Hopkins, the single most significant ostensible parataxis is the ‘AND’ that appears in ‘The Windhover’; an ‘AND’ that actually fails to operate paratactically. The silent allusions in the rest of this paragraph are to ‘Not Ideas

- about the Thing, but the Thing itself', in Wallace Stevens, *Collected Poems* (London: Faber and Faber, 1984), p. 534; William Carlos Williams, *Paterson* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1983), p. 6; 'The Thing', in Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought* (trans. Albert Hofstadter, New York, NY: Harper Colophon, 1975), Chapter 5.
- 56 'Seeing Things' and 'The Settle Bed' in Seamus Heaney, *Seeing Things* (London: Faber and Faber, 1992), pp. 16, 28. For a fuller discussion of this 'new empiricism', as I have termed it, see my chapter on 'The Modern Thing' in Docherty, *Alterities*.
- 57 I have argued this in some theoretical detail in Docherty, *Alterities*, where I work through a series of examples, but especially focusing on Wim Wenders's *Paris, Texas*, as a paradigmatic example.
- 58 For more on the importance of the witness in relation to the confessional impulse, see Chapter 7.
- 59 Ian McEwan, *The Child in Time* (London: Picador, 1988), p. 105.
- 60 For the meaning of this 'solace of good form', see Jean François Lyotard, 'Answering the question: what is postmodernism?', in Thomas Docherty (ed.), *Postmodernism* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993).

Chapter 4 Dilatory Time

- 1 See Montaigne, *Essays*, pp. 42–3. The essay is from Book 1, Chapter 21. Montaigne goes on to discuss the case noted by Augustine, of a man who could control his farts; and of how that was 'trumped' by Vives, who told of a man 'who could synchronize his blasts to the metre of verses that were read to him'; but he notes that 'this does not imply the complete obedience of this organ. For usually it is most unruly and mutinous.'
- 2 Montaigne, *Essays*, p. 42.
- 3 See Fredric Jameson, *The Political Unconscious* (London: Methuen, 1981), p. 102. See my commentary on this in Docherty, *Aesthetic Democracy*, Chapter 9.
- 4 It is this conception that governs a work such as Milton's *Comus*, say, in which the character of the Lady 'protects' herself against rape by saying that, while her violator can touch her body, he cannot touch her mind. This becomes an assertion of a form of intellectual freedom, however fraught. The attitude in question also shapes some political fiction, such as Helen Dunmore's recent novel, *The Betrayal*, about conditions in Stalinist Russia where the demand for a private sphere becomes 'translated' into imprisonment: you cannot get more private than that; and thus this issue itself becomes worthy of exploration, which I carry out in Chapter 7. See Docherty, *Aesthetic Democracy*.
- 5 The conception of the body as machine has a long history; but for present purposes, it is the history of this concept from Julien de La Mettrie, *Machine Man and Other Writings* (ed. and trans. Ann Thomson, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), through to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus* (trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane, London: Athlone Press, 1984), that is most important and pertinent, for it is in this 'modern' version of the concept that the relation of the body to time becomes central.
- 6 The most formidable thinking on this is that of Paul Virilio, in a series of early texts including: Paul Virilio, *Vitesse et politique* (Paris: Galilée, 1977); Paul Virilio, *L'horizon négatif* (Paris: Galilée, 1984); Paul Virilio, *L'espace critique* (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1984); and Paul Virilio, *L'art du moteur* (Paris: Galilée, 1993).

- The philosophy in these texts derives some of its significance from Virilio's work on war and on contemporary cultures conditioned by electronic and so-called 'instantaneous' media. See, for examples of this, Paul Virilio, *Guerre et cinéma* (Paris: Editions de l'Etoile, 1984); Paul Virilio, *Défense populaire et luttes écologiques* (Paris: Galilée, 1978); Paul Virilio, *Esthétique de la disparition* (Paris: Galilée, 1989); Paul Virilio, *L'écran du désert* (Paris: Galilée, 1991); and Paul Virilio, *L'inertie polaire* (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1990).
- 7 For a general approach to this question, see, for example, Jacques Attali, *Histoires du temps* (Paris: Fayard, 1982), p. 155; and Pierre Boutang, *Le temps* (Paris: Hatier, 1993). See also David Harvey, *The Enigma of Capital* (New York, NY: Profile Books, 2010), and David Harvey, *Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2009).
 - 8 See 'Modern Fiction', in Virginia Woolf, *The Common Reader* (London: Hogarth Press, 1925).
 - 9 The coincidence of this film with the year of Nixon's resignation after the bugging scandals of Watergate is, as Coppola himself has said, just that: coincidence. He wrote the script in the 1960s, before Nixon was even elected. However, the surveillance equipment described in the film is exactly like that used in the Watergate surveillance scandals. Most importantly for present purposes is the fact that the whole issue of surveillance and the question of the relation of private life to the public and political sphere is, at this time, a matter of pressing cultural concern. Watergate may not 'explain' *The Conversation*; but they both help delineate the major and pressing concerns of the cultural moment.
 - 10 David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (ed. Ernest C. Mossner, London: Penguin Classics, 1984), pp. 299–300.
 - 11 Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, p. 300. For the relation of this to Deleuze in particular, see Thomas Docherty, 'Accidental Conditions', in Gerard Delanty and Stephen Turner (eds), *Handbook of Contemporary Social and Political Theory* (London: Routledge, 2011).
 - 12 For more on this (though not in ways that accord with my own argument here), see Boutang, *Le temps*.
 - 13 Franco Moretti, *The Way of the World* (trans. Albert Sbraggia, London: Verso, 1987).
 - 14 For a different view – philosophical rather than fictional – of how such legitimization is attained, see Blumenberg, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*.
 - 15 Note here the distinction between objects and things: after Heidegger, we can think of the object as a 'thing' *reduced* to its status as an element in the subject's determining consciousness; a thing becomes an object when it is considered to be there 'for' appropriation by a conscious subject. For examples of the phenomenology of which I write here, see Georges Poulet, *Etudes sur le temps humain*, (3 vols, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1949; Paris: Plon Méaux, 1964); Jean Pouillon, *Temps et roman* (Vienna: Gallimard, 1946); A.A. Mendilow, *Time and the Novel* (New York, NY: Humanities Press, 1952); Paul Ricoeur, *Temps et récit*, vol. 2 (Paris: Seuil, 1984). A later variant and further sophistication of this kind of work is to be found in the so-called 'reader-response' school of criticism, influenced by Roman Ingarden and often associated with Wolfgang Iser or Hans-Robert Jauss, where the subject-position in question simply shifts to be identified more fully with that of the reader.
 - 16 Michael H. Levenson makes a similar point as a kind of precision of the way in which 'point of view' is important in modernism, in Michael H. Levenson,

- A Genealogy of Modernism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), especially in Chapter 1.
- 17 Auerbach, *Mimesis*, p. 74.
 - 18 Michel Serres, *Eclaircissements: Entretiens avec Bruno Latour* (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1994), p. 72.
 - 19 Serres, *Eclaircissements*, pp. 76–8.
 - 20 Serres, *Eclaircissements*, p. 76.
 - 21 Serres, *Eclaircissements*, p. 78.
 - 22 This is akin to the position rehearsed in postmodern architectural theory by Paolo Portoghesi, who comments on ‘the presence of the past’ as one determining instance or characteristic of the postmodern in terms of the built environment. See Paolo Portoghesi, *Postmodern* (trans. E. Shapiro, New York, NY: Rizzoli, 1983). A variant on this is reiterated in Charles Jencks’s many arguments about the importance of the neoclassical strain in postmodern art.
 - 23 Julia Kristeva, *Le temps sensible* (Paris: NRF, 1994), p. 208.
 - 24 Swift, *Gulliver’s Travels*, p. 310.
 - 25 Patrick Parrinder argues, in Patrick Parrinder, *The Failure of Theory* (Brighton: Harvester, 1987), that criticism depends fundamentally on disagreement. See my commentary on this position, a variant on Edward Said’s claims for criticism as a mode of dissent, in Docherty, *After Theory*, pp. 249–51.
 - 26 See Thomas Docherty, *Reading (Absent) Character* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
 - 27 See Kermode, *The Sense of an Ending*, pp. 44–5, for the outline of this plot structure; and also my commentary in Docherty, *Reading (Absent) Character*, pp. 134–55.
 - 28 Mendilow, *Time and the Novel*.
 - 29 André Gide, *Journal des Faux-monnayeurs* (Paris: NRF Gallimard, 1927), p. 23.
 - 30 Michel Butor, *L’emploi du temps* (Paris: Minuit, 1957), pp. 147–8.
 - 31 Lyotard, *The Inhuman*, pp. 65–6.
 - 32 McEwan, *The Child in Time*, pp. 93–5.
 - 33 McEwan, *The Child in Time*, p. 177.
 - 34 McEwan, *The Child in Time*, p. 105.

Chapter 5 Waste and the Ecology of Anguish

- 1 Pascal, *Pensées* (ed. Lafuma), fragment no. 200; Pascal, *Pensées* (ed. Brunschvicg), fragment no. 347; Pascal, *Oeuvres complètes*, p. 528.
- 2 Villon, *Poésies complètes*, p. 61.
- 3 Maurice Blanchot, *Faux pas* (trans. Charlotte Mandell, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 1.
- 4 Blanchot, *Faux pas*, p. 1.
- 5 Blanchot, *Faux pas*, p. 3. See also Samuel Beckett, *Proust and Three Dialogues* (London: John Calder, 1969).
- 6 Blanchot, *Faux Pas*, p. 3.
- 7 See Simon Critchley, *Very Little, Almost Nothing* (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 25; and Montaigne, *Essais*, vol. 1, p. 127 (Book 1, Chapter 20).
- 8 ‘Qu’il ne faut juger de nostre heur qu’après la mort’, in Montaigne, *Essais*, vol. 1, pp. 123–5 (Book 1, Chapter 19).
- 9 Interestingly, of course, in suggesting an ‘expanse’ of time, there is a suggestion that Proust was thinking paradoxically not in temporal but in spatial terms.

- The thinker who understood the stakes of this most fully, apart from Proust himself, was Georges Poulet. See, especially, Poulet, *Etudes sur le temps humain*, his great work in three volumes as well as his study, Georges Poulet, *Proustian Space* (trans. Elliott Coleman, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977).
- 10 For the most relevant analysis of the relation between time and productivity, see the work of André Gorz, especially André Gorz, *Farewell to the Working Class* (trans. Mike Sonenscher, London: Pluto Press, 1982); and André Gorz, *Critique of Economic Reason* (trans. G. Handyside and C. Turner, London: Verso, 1989).
 - 11 In relation to these ideas of 'full' and 'empty' time, see Kermode, *The Sense of an Ending*; and Frank Kermode, *The Genesis of Secrecy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979).
 - 12 Deleuze relates this most centrally to Immanuel Kant, in a brilliant analysis of our entry into modernity. See Gilles Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy* (trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
 - 13 The classic theoretical exploration of this is Said, *Beginnings*. However, this present study is, as we will see more clearly below, more indebted to the thinking of Hannah Arendt on the relation between beginnings and freedom or autonomy.
 - 14 Simon Schama, *The Embarrassment of Riches* (New York, NY: Knopf, 1987). The anglophone response to Proust, in these terms, is Joyce, who also famously proved to be something of an irritation to a quintessential 'English' critic, F.R. Leavis. For more on this, see Docherty, *The English Question*, pp. 3–29.
 - 15 'Preface to *Lyrical Ballads*', in William Wordsworth, *Poetical Works* (ed. Thomas Hutchinson, revised by Ernest de Selincourt, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 735.
 - 16 Samuel Johnson will do something similar in order to trounce ideas of Optimism. See his 'Review of Soame Jenyns's "A Free Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of Evil"', in Samuel Johnson, *Rasselas, Poems and Selected Prose* (ed. Bertrand H. Bronson, New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pp. 219–20; and also see my commentary on this in Thomas Docherty, *On Modern Authority* (Brighton and New York, NY: Harvester and St Martin's, 1987), pp. 233–6.
 - 17 In relation to this, see also my earlier piece, Thomas Docherty, 'Big texts', *Strategies of Reading: Dickens and After*, a special number of *The Yearbook of English Studies*, 26 (1996), pp. 249–60.
 - 18 It would be true to say that this is not an entirely new phenomenon. Newspapers have always wanted to be giving us the new, as it happens; and, of course, in this they mirror some early developments of the modern novel, as in Samuel Richardson or Daniel Defoe. Newspapers take this to a limit in populist forms when they start to carry horoscopes, which give not what has happened but what will happen. There is a sociology of this that has its roots in Walter Benjamin's analysis of the role and function of readers' letters in newspapers. The analysis could be widened to deal with an entire philosophy of modernity and postmodernity, as in Vattimo, *La fine della modernità* and Gianni Vattimo, *The Transparent Society* (trans. David Webb, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), where he argues that some contemporary technologies encourage the belief in a kind of absolute presentism, the coming-to-itself of Hegelian Spirit, *Geist*, as in real-time news TV programmes.
 - 19 Beckett, Molloy, *Malone Dies*, *The Unnamable*, p. 386.
 - 20 Giorgio Agamben, *Il linguaggio e la morte* (Torino: Einaudi, 1982).

- 21 For an interesting and relevant exploration of skin in relation to our surveillance societies, see Sofsky, *Privacy*, p. 39: 'The shell of the skin represents the outline of the body. It holds the individual in an indivisible possession.' This is constantly under threat by increasingly invasive technologies, argues Sofsky; and these now look within the body itself, as when we are X-rayed or body-searched going through airports and the like.
- 22 I am partly indebted to discussions with Jim Byatt.
- 23 See Norman O. Brown, *Life against Death* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1959).
- 24 Andrew Marvell, *Complete Poems* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972).
- 25 Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer* (trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 4.
- 26 Benjamin, *Illuminations*, pp. 219–54.
- 27 Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, p. 10.
- 28 See Maurice Blanchot, *The Work of Fire* (trans. Charlotte Mandell, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 319.
- 29 We may see the possibility here of an analysis of a present predicament. In the so-called 'war on terror', everyone is potentially militarized, in that everyone is affected in a daily life by a series of norms concerning 'security' that now shape and restrict our actual living. It is worth noting also, in passing, the rhetorical slippage at stake in Bush's declaration of this war. The 'war on terror' is a bit like earlier metaphorical wars, the 'war against polio' for example. In earlier usage of the metaphor, those involved were aware that they were speaking metaphorically; Bush's mistake might be regarded as a linguistic error: he took a metaphor for a reality, and then really declared war. In the absence of a specific target, Iraq was made to fill the vacuum.
- 30 Jacques Derrida, *The Gift of Death* (trans. David Wills, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 41. For the Levinasian background to this, see my commentary in Docherty, *Aesthetic Democracy*, pp. 31–8.

Chapter 6 Confession and Democracy

- 1 John Le Carré, *Our Kind of Traitor* (London: Viking, 2010), p. 95.
- 2 Macmurray, *Conditions of Freedom*, p. 59.
- 3 M.L. Rosenthal, *Poetry and the Common Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 125. He traces the phenomenon, in his detailed analysis, back at least as far as Wyatt. We might also think that some earlier work in English writing obviously suggests itself, such as Gower's *Confessio Amantis*.
- 4 Rosenthal, *Poetry and the Common Life*, p. 131.
- 5 For a thorough exploration of this issue, see George Bornstein, *Transformations of Romanticism in Yeats, Eliot and Stevens* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1976); and, for what remains a classic formulation of the theoretical issues, see Jacques Barzun, *Classic, Romantic and Modern* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1962).
- 6 For an interesting history of music that aligns this minimalism with a certain moment of bureaucratic repetition in a society whose administered norms induce silence, see Jacques Attali, *Noise* (trans. Brian Massumi, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985).
- 7 In passing, it is worth recording that this period also sees an ostensible appeal to the common life within the Catholic Church, emerging through the Second

- Vatican Council between 1962 and 1965. It is probably needless to add that this is significant also for Kennedy, in terms of his Catholic background.
- 8 It should thus recall Lyotard's response to Augustine anxiety about responsibility for sins committed in infancy, and that I discussed in Chapter 1 above. There, we had a sin committed but not by a subject; and here we have a confession made, but not by a subject. The confessing I is displaced on to a narrated 'he', 'she' or 'we'.
 - 9 M.L. Rosenthal, *The New Poets: American and British Poetry since World War II* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 28.
 - 10 Rosenthal, *The New Poets*, p. 61.
 - 11 Rosenthal, *The New Poets*, p. 26.
 - 12 de Man, *Allegories of Reading*, p. 280.
 - 13 Seamus Heaney, *Human Chain* (London: Faber), p. 71.
 - 14 Theodore Roethke, *Collected Poems* (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), p. 195.
 - 15 John Berryman, *Selected Poems* (London: Faber and Faber, 1972); see especially 'Dream Song 14', 'Life, friends, is boring', p. 73.
 - 16 For an important discussion of this in terms of its consequences for democracy, see Alain Touraine, *Qu'est-ce que la démocratie?* (Paris: Fayard, 1994), pp. 204–6: 'The subject brings together identity and technique, constructing herself or himself as an agent capable of modifying her or his environment and of making her or his life experiences into proofs of freedom' (my translation).
 - 17 Richard Nixon, 'First Inaugural Address', *Bartleby*, <http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres58.html> [accessed 10 February 2012].
 - 18 'Song of Myself', in Walt Whitman, *Leaves of Grass* (New York, NY: Airmont, 1965), p. 79.
 - 19 Giorgio Agamben, *Profanations* (trans. Jeff Fort, New York, NY: Zone Books, 2007), p. 74.
 - 20 Roberto Esposito, *Communitas* (Paris: PUF, 2000), 20; my translation.
 - 21 Esposito, *Communitas*, p. 20.
 - 22 Pascal, *Oeuvres complètes*, p. 550 (série II of the '*papiers non classés*'; fragment 418 (or 233 in the earlier Léon Brunschvicg numeration)).
 - 23 Docherty, *Aesthetic Democracy*.
 - 24 Henry James, *The Altar of the Dead and Other Tales* (London: Macmillan, 1922), p. 3.
 - 25 J. Hillis Miller, 'The History of 0', *Journal for Cultural Research*, 8: 2 (2004), p. 132.
 - 26 Miller, 'The History of 0', p. 135.
 - 27 Edith Wharton, *A Backward Glance* (New York, NY: D. Appleton-Century, 1934), pp. 366–7.
 - 28 See Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz*, p. 17. The question of witnessing is taken up in more detail later in this chapter.
 - 29 J. Hillis Miller, *Speech Acts in Literature* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 6. For Miller, the beginning in question is the title of J.L. Austin, *How To Do Things with Words* (ed. J.O. Urmson, Oxford: Clarendon, 1962); and in this present piece, I shall also return to a consideration of both Miller's title and mine, 'zero' and 'one', but will do so partly via Austin.
 - 30 The issue here also relates to matters of translation, where we routinely speak in the voice of an other. This will be the starting point for Chapter 7.
 - 31 Said, *Beginnings*. While Said is concerned with what we might think of as 'authority', Miller, I shall contend, is and has been concerned with 'autonomy' and with the possibility of the 'event'. For an explanation of the precise sense of

- the 'event', see Alain Badiou, *L'être et l'événement* (Paris: Seuil, 1988); but see also the work of Lyotard, especially Jean-François Lyotard, *Peregrinations* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1988), where he makes explicit the issues surrounding the event that shape and dominate almost all of his work, including the most celebrated work around the 'postmodern'. For a fuller explanation, see also my piece, Thomas Docherty, 'Just Events', in Thomas Carmichael and Alison Lee (eds), *Postmodern Times* (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2000), pp. 53–66.
- 32 For the best example of this, see the work of Said's early protégé, Davis, *Factual Fictions*. This book is a brilliant deployment of Saidian thought, applied to the beginning of the novel; and, in it, we also see Said's fundamental intimacy with a Foucauldian logic.
 - 33 Kermode, *The Sense of an Ending*, p. 67.
 - 34 Miller has frequently been at pains to stress this sheer difficulty of reading. A typical remark would be that in J. Hillis Miller *The Ethics of Reading* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1987), pp. 3–4, where he writes that 'Reading itself is extraordinarily hard work. It does not occur all that often. Clearheaded reflection on what really happens in an act of reading is even more difficult and rare. It is an event traces of which are found here and there in written form'. For a fuller examination of these and related issues, see my 'On Reading', in Docherty, *The English Question*; and see also Chapter 4, 'Dilatory Time', here.
 - 35 At the root of this lies Hegel. In the Introduction to *Aesthetics*, Hegel stresses that such an invention is tied firmly to freedom; and I shall return to the politics of this later in the present work.
 - 36 J. Hillis Miller, *Poets of Reality* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 10. See also J. Hillis Miller, *The Disappearance of God* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963).
 - 37 Pascal, *Oeuvres complètes*, p. 557; my translation.
 - 38 Lucien Goldmann, *Le dieu caché* (Paris: Gallimard, 1955).
 - 39 For a fuller theorisation of this, see Docherty, *Reading (Absent) Character*.
 - 40 Kant might have thought of this as the difference between the synthetic and the analytic a priori. For a fuller explanation, see the introduction to Docherty, *Postmodernism*.
 - 41 J. Hillis Miller, *Ariadne's Thread* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 21.
 - 42 See J. Hillis Miller, *Fiction and Repetition* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982); but see also the preface to Miller, *Ariadne's Thread*, pp. ix–xi, where Miller, in acknowledging that the theme of *Fiction and Repetition* spawns many other texts, is explicit about how things 'get out of hand' as he writes, especially as he writes his 'beginnings' or introductions; or, how, in my own terms, his writing becomes an *event*.
 - 43 Miller, *Speech Acts*, p. 13.
 - 44 Miller, *Speech Acts*, p. 19.
 - 45 Edward Said, *The World, the Text, the Critic* (London: Faber, 1984), p. 28.
 - 46 de Man, *Blindness and Insight*, pp. 187–228.
 - 47 I argue this in detail (though not in terms of the one and the zero, of course) in Docherty, *After Theory*, pp. 119–26.
 - 48 It is worth noting, in passing, that the title of the lectures that shaped Austin, *How To Do Thing with Words*, was 'Words and Deeds'; and also that there

- is a vital interest in this issue within the hermeneutic philosophical tradition, very different from that of Austin, as testified to by, for example, Hans-Georg Gadamer's 'Logos and Ergon in Plato's *Lysis*', reprinted in Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Dialogue and Dialectic* (trans. P. Christopher Smith, New haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 1–20.
- 49 Gottlob Frege, *The Foundations of Arithmetic* (trans. J.L. Austin, Oxford: Blackwell, 1953). Frege's work, it should be recalled, was reviewed extremely negatively by Georg Cantor, though it is also usually agreed that Cantor had paid the work scant attention prior to reviewing it. Yet more significantly for the purposes of the argument later in the present paper, Frege was somewhat of a political reactionary, a monarchist who despised the very idea of socialism and even of democracy.
 - 50 James Joyce, *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* (ed. Richard Ellmann, London: Granada, 1977), pp. 191–4.
 - 51 James Joyce, *Stephen Hero* (ed. Theodore Spencer, revised John J. Slocum and Herbert Cahoon, London: Triad Panther, Granada, 1981), p. 190.
 - 52 Joyce, *A Portrait*, p. 192.
 - 53 Pascal, *Oeuvres complètes*, p. 506. We should perhaps compare here the formulation of Jameson, *The Political Unconscious*, p. 102, that 'History is what hurts'. Jameson arrives at this formulation by means of a reading of two profoundly theological thinkers, Spinoza and Althusser; and, interestingly, history, in being 'what hurts', is defined as that which 'refuses desire and sets inexorable limits to individual as well as collective praxis, which its "ruses" turn into grisly and ironic reversals of their own intention'. It does this, leading intentions or beginnings awry, because it is an 'absent cause', like a Pascalian *Deus absconditus* or like the zero as I am formulating it in this present argument.
 - 54 de Man, *Blindness and Insight*, p. 211.
 - 55 de Man, *Allegories of Reading*.
 - 56 Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York, NY: Viking, 1963).
 - 57 Frege, *Foundations*, pp. 49–50. All intercalated comments are mine.
 - 58 Jacques Rancière, *Hatred of Democracy* (trans. Steve Corcoran, London: Verso, 2006), p. 52.
 - 59 See Martha C. Nussbaum, *Cultivating Humanity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). For a counter-argument to Nussbaum, see Docherty, *For the University*.
 - 60 Touraine, *Quest-ce que la démocratie*, pp. 27–8.
 - 61 Benjamin, *Illuminations*, p. 224.
 - 62 For a fuller background to this, see Gianni Vattimo, *The Transparent Society*, especially the discussion of Popper's 'zero-model', p. 24.
 - 63 Maurice Blanchot, *Friendship* (trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), p. 69.
 - 64 Blanchot, *Friendship*, p. 71.
 - 65 Benjamin, *Illuminations*, p. 225.
 - 66 Benjamin, *Illuminations*, p. 225.
 - 67 Catherine Belsey, 'From Cultural Studies to Cultural Criticism?', in Paul Bowman (ed.), *Interrogating Cultural Studies* (London: Pluto Press, 2003), p. 24.
 - 68 I explore all this further in two recent books: Docherty, *For the University*; Docherty, *The English Question*.
 - 69 Benjamin, *Illuminations*, p. 243.

- 70 Touraine, *Qu'est-ce que la démocratie*, pp. 209–10.
- 71 Frances Hutcheson, *Philosophical Writings* (ed. R.S. Downie, London: Everyman, 1994), p. 15. See also my commentary on this in Docherty, *Criticism and Modernity*, p. 86 ff.
- 72 Macmurray, *Conditions of Freedom*, p. 2.
- 73 Macmurray, *Conditions of Freedom*, pp. 3, 52.
- 74 Touraine, *Qu'est-ce que la démocratie*, pp. 23, 204.
- 75 Macmurray, *Conditions of Freedom*, pp. 79–80.
- 76 The other philosopher shaping this thinking is Badiou. See, especially, the chapter 'Philosophie et amour' in Alain Badiou, *Conditions* (Paris: Seuil, 1992); but see also Badiou, *Petit manuel d'inesthétique*; and Alain Badiou, *Abrégé de métapolitique* (Paris: Seuil, 1998). For Badiou, there would be an interesting parallel between Miller's 'zero' and the figure of Christ as mediated by Saint Paul: see Badiou, *Saint Paul*.
- 77 J. Hillis Miller, *On Literature* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 127.
- 78 Miller, *On Literature*, p. 131.
- 79 Pascal, *Oeuvres complètes*, p. 356.
- 80 Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz*, pp. 104–5.

Chapter 7 Witnessing and Literary Confession

- 1 J.M. Coetzee, *Summertime* (London: Vintage, 2010), p. 249.
- 2 Seamus Deane, *Reading in the Dark* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1996), p. 103.
- 3 Deane, *Reading in the Dark*, p. 108.
- 4 Deane, *Reading in the Dark*, p. 108.
- 5 J.M. Coetzee, *Youth* (London: Secker and Warburg, 2002), p. 10.
- 6 Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz*, p. 45.
- 7 Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz*, p. 45.
- 8 This relates back to arguments advanced by Holocaust-deniers, who claimed that, because it was impossible to produce anyone who had actually been in the gas-chambers, therefore we had no conclusive proof that the chambers existed. I discuss the response to this, especially as mediated by Jean-François Lyotard, in the introduction to Docherty, *Postmodernism*.
- 9 Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz*, p. 120.
- 10 Jacques Derrida and Maurice Blanchot, *Demeure and The Instant of my Death* (trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), pp. 33–4.
- 11 Theodor W. Adorno, *Notes to Literature: Vol. 1* (ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen, New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 187: 'Auschwitz also means this much: that man, dying, cannot find any other sense in his death than this flush, this shame.'
- 12 In passing, it is worth noting that Adorno finds the exposure to the foreign something that makes him blush. We should place this alongside Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz*, p. 104.
- 13 See Gilbert Carr, 'Robert Scheu's *Die Konversation in der Ehe*. An exercise in translation', *Jahrbuch der Germanistik in Ireland*, 2 (2007), pp. 47–60. The cited passages come from p. 58. I am immensely indebted to Gilbert Carr for drawing this text to my attention and for discussing it with me.
- 14 Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz*, p. 18.
- 15 Blanchot, *The Work of Fire*, p. 303.

- 16 Blanchot, *The Work of Fire*, pp. 313–14.
- 17 Jorge Luis Borges, *Labyrinths* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978), pp. 66–7.
- 18 Borges, *Labyrinths*, p. 99.
- 19 Borges, *Labyrinths*, p. 99.
- 20 Augustine, *Confessions*, pp. 208–9.
- 21 Brooks, *Troubling Confessions*, p. 1.
- 22 Brooks, *Troubling Confessions*, p. 6.
- 23 Quine, *Pursuit of Truth*, pp. 3, 5, 6.
- 24 Brooks, *Troubling Confessions*, p. 2.
- 25 ‘The logical form of action sentences’ in Donald Davidson, *Essays on Actions and Events* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); for a fuller exploration of ‘correspondence theories’ related to Tarski-style theories, see the essays in Donald Davidson, *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), especially the first five essays grouped under Chapter 1, ‘Truth and Meaning’.
- 26 Both are included in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Ecrits politiques* (Paris: Livre de Poche, 1992).
- 27 Rousseau, *Ecrits politiques*, p. 94.
- 28 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *Comment je crois* (Paris: Seuil, 1969), p. 117; my translation.

Chapter 8 My Language!

- 1 Bennington and Derrida, *Jacques Derrida*, p. 303. This is the text that contains Derrida’s own confessional work, ‘Circonfession’. See my commentary on it in Docherty, *Aesthetic Democracy*, Chapter 1.
- 2 Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, pp. 92–3.
- 3 Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, p. 93.
- 4 Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, p. 106.