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Notes

Chapter 1 Civil society, conflict and violence: An introduction

- 1 Citation from CIVICUS's mission statement accessible on the CIVICUS website: www.civicus.org [accessed 7 July 2011]
- 2 This part of the research process realizes an interesting point, which Katz highlighted in his discussion of the CSI methodology (Katz 2006). The comparative research undertaken within the CSI project does not treat the differences between local concepts of civil society as a problem of measurement, but takes the issue up as an essential part of the research design.
- 3 The distinction between structural and cultural aspects of civil society is laid out by Heinrich in the discussion of the CSI methodology at the end of the first phase of implementations, but is equally applicable to the structure of indicators in the most recent phase (Heinrich 2005: 220 ff).
- 4 In Tilly and Tarrow's model (2007), claim-making and the regime's response escalate into a lethal conflict when at least one side of the relationship regularly uses organized armed force either for claim-making (political actors/civil society) or for controlling claim-making (governments).
- 5 This volume and thus the introduction focus on civil society, the constellation of actors within civil society and their capacities in relation to conflict and violence. Of course there are many more factors that have an effect on the development of conflicts, for example, the exposure to violent episodes in the recent history of a country or the presence and easy availability of arms. Tilly and Tarrow label these as non-motivational factors (Tilly & Tarrow 2007: 137). But these topics lie beyond the scope of this publication.

Chapter 2 Measuring civil society globally with the CSI

- 1 A good overview of the approach and its implementation is given in Mati, Silva & Anderson (2010).
- 2 This approach does not exclude 'uncivil' civil society (e.g. violent forms of protest or phenomena such as the KuKluxKlan) from the outset and is therefore much more comprehensive and normatively neutral than many other approaches. In a second step, however, these phenomena are assessed with regard to 'normative judgments as to what the defining features of civil society are, what functions civil society should serve, what values it should embrace' (Heinrich 2004: 13).
- 3 Other well-known efforts in this direction are the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project – see Salamon, Sokolowski and Associates (2004), Salamon, Sokolowski and List (2003), Anheier and Salamon (1998); the related Global Civil Society Index; the World Bank ARVIN (association, resources, voice, information and negotiation) Framework; and the NGO Sustainability Index by USAID. The Global Civil Society Yearbook (Kumar, *et al.* 2009; Albrow, Anheier, Glasius & Price 2008; Anheier, Albrow & Kaldor 2006) also has a data appendix, which collects information from different sources and on different levels. Generic empirical material is also available from various sources (see part 3 of this chapter for some examples).

- 4 The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project is probably the best assessment of the latter by far.
- 5 The extent of participation assesses the share of people within each country who are engaged in some form of civil society activity, in a broad sense. The depth of participation measures how much engagement these active people exhibit, for example, through multiple engagements. The diversity of participation looks at the extent to which society as a whole is represented within civil society (e.g. inclusion of marginalized and minority groups).
- 6 Information on the WVS can be found at <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org>.
- 7 Reasons for this include the fact that in some countries the relevant questions were dropped from the WVS or different answer categories were used.
- 8 The syntax for this procedure is centrally provided by CIVICUS.
- 9 Country reports in English and other languages and many other papers connected to the CSI are available from CIVICUS's website <http://www.civicus.org/news-and-resources/reports-and-publications> [accessed 25 July 2011]. Country partners additionally publish and disseminate their results in various forms, and many of these are also available for download from the partners' websites, in a variety of languages.
- 10 See *Bridging the Gaps: Citizens, Organisations and Dissociation*, an overview of the key CSI findings, and *Cutting the Diamonds*, an analysis of the CSI quantitative data, both published by CIVICUS, 2011.
- 11 Bulgaria, Georgia and the Philippines did their own Population Survey, but did not include all questions. Missing items were filled up with data from other international surveys.
- 12 In this respect countries using data from existing sources (WVS, EVS) have a slight advantage, as documentation for these surveys is provided.
- 13 But see Hoelscher and Fioramonti (2011), who try to establish the factor structure of the dimensions through Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA).
- 14 The paper is available on CIVICUS's website.
- 15 It might be interesting to explore different kinds of standardization of the data and their impact on the results for the international comparisons.
- 16 However, see the methods chapters in the Global Civil Society Yearbooks (Anheier & Katz 2005, 2006, 2009; Anheier, Katz & Lam 2008).

Chapter 3 Exploring civil society in conflict and post-conflict countries: A continuum to peace

- 1 This chapter only briefly considers this darker side of civil society and its level of influence in conflict and post-conflict societies. Labigne and Nassauer provide a more detailed examination of violence in civil society in Chapter 7.
- 2 The intensity of the conflict is labelled as either minor – when a minimum of twenty-five battle related deaths but no more than 1,000 occur in one calendar year; or as war, when 1,000 or more battle-related deaths occur in that calendar year (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2010).
- 3 Of course, a pre-conflict stage also exists, as conflict does not arise out of nothing. There are early warnings that are flagged, and civil society exists in this stage as well. However, this chapter is only focussed on the conflict and post-conflict stages.
- 4 The Center for Systemic Peace (2010) lists episodes of major political violence between 1946 and 2010.

- 5 Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2010) lists wars and conflicts between 1975 and 2008.
- 6 Genocide Watch (2010) has ranked countries according to Stanton's (2010) stage of genocide that they are in or have been in between 1945 and 2010.
- 7 According to Stanton (2010), there are eight stages of genocide: 1) Classification for groups of people into us vs. them; 2) Symbolizations attached to the groups (e.g. yellow stars for Jewish people during Nazi rule); 3) Dehumanization of the group; 4) Organization of plans and forces for genocidal acts; 5) Polarization of the groups (usually through propaganda and laws); 6) Preparation by separating the targeted group out, drawing up death lists, forced deportation to camps, etc.); 7) Extermination through mass killing; and finally 8) Denial and covering up the acts (mass graves, blaming the victims, blocking investigations).
- 8 Significance was set at a 95% confidence interval for all tests ($p = 0.05$) unless otherwise noted, meaning results where $p \leq .05$ have only a 5% or less likelihood of occurring due to chance.
- 9 The result of the Kruskal-Wallis test is: $H(3) = 3.13, p = .37$.
- 10 All figures supplied by the author.
- 11 The results of the Kendall's tau_b tests are as follows:
Civic Engagement and Rule of Law and Personal Freedoms: $r(23) = .12, p = .40$;
Associational and Organizational Rights and Civic Engagement: $r(23) = .18, p = .22$;
Experience of Legal Framework and Civic Engagement: $r(23) = .11, p = .46$.
Significance was set at the .01 level as is common for the two-tailed test.
- 12 Please note that all of the graphs through out this chapter that illustrate indicators are based on the ranks of the mean scores used for the Kruskal-Wallis tests. Therefore the numbers presented within the graphs are not the mean CSI scores for the indicators but the mean ranks.
- 13 The results of the Kruskal-Wallis tests are:
Social Membership: $H(3) = 3.92, p = .27$;
Social Volunteering: $H(3) = 3.54, p = .32$;
Political Membership: $H(3) = 3.77, p = .29$;
Political Volunteering: $H(3) = 2.10, p = .55$;
Individual Activism: $H(3) = 3.79, p = .29$;
Diversity in Social Organizations: $H(3) = .96, p = .81$;
Diversity in Political Organizations: $H(3) = 7.22, p = .07$.
- 14 Kruskal-Wallis tests were used for the dimension analyses. No significant differences were found. Level of Organization: $H(3) = 2.29, p = .51$.
- 15 The results of the Kruskal-Wallis tests for these indicators are:
Members of Support Networks: $H(3) = 5.19, p = .16$;
Peer-to-peer Communications – Meetings: $H(3) = 5.39, p = .15$;
Peer-to-peer Communications – Exchange of Information: $H(3) = 3.22, p = .36$;
International Linkages: $H(3) = 2.12, p = .55$.
- 16 The results of the Kruskal-Wallis tests for these indicators are:
Sustainability of Human Resources: $H(3) = 2.75, p = .43$;
Financial Sustainability: $H(3) = .53, p = .91$;
Technological Resources: $H(3) = .25, p = .97$.
- 17 The differences between the group mean scores were not statistically significant:
Kruskal-Wallis test: Practice of Values: $H(3) = 2.75, p = .43$.
- 18 Kruskal-Wallis test: Practice of Values: $H(3) = 9.12, p = .03$.

- 19 The results of the Mann-Whitney tests are (Significance was set at the .01 level as is common for the two-tailed test):
 In Conflict/PC<10: $U = 1.00$, $Z = -2.46$, $p = .01$;
 In Conflict/PC>11: $U = 17.00$, $Z = -1.54$, $p = .13$;
 In Conflict/ No Conflict: $U = .00$, $Z = -2.85$, $p = .004$;
 PC<10/PC>11: $U = 15.00$, $Z = -.46$, $p = .463$;
 PC<10/No Conflict: $U = 3.00$, $Z = -1.72$, $p = .09$;
 PC>11/No Conflict: $U = 16.00$, $Z = -.87$, $p = .39$.
- 20 Please note that this indicator is measured by CSI as the higher the score, the less weight the intolerant groups have in civil society, in order to fit the needs for plotting the CSI Diamond where the higher the score, the more favourable the situation. Therefore, while the figure shows the in conflict group as having the lowest score, this means the intolerant groups have the highest weight, meaning they are more prominent in these conflict societies.
- 21 The results of the Kruskal-Wallis tests for this indicator are: Perception of Role in Promoting Peace and Non-violence: $H(3) = 4.41$, $p = .22$.
- 22 The indicators were rated by CSOs and external stakeholders. See Chapter 2 for more details on the CSI methodology.
- 23 The differences between the group mean scores were not statistically significant: Kruskal-Wallis: Perception of Impact: $H(3) = .83$, $p = .84$.
- 24 The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test found no significant differences between the means: External Environment: $H(3) = 3.90$, $p = .27$.
- 25 The results of the Kruskal-Wallis tests for these indicators are: Basic Capabilities Index: $H(3) = 5.16$, $p = .16$; Corruption: $H(3) = 2.64$, $p = .45$; Associational and Organisational Rights: $H(3) = 3.63$, $p = .31$; Rule of Law and Personal Freedoms: $H(3) = 4.74$, $p = .19$; Political Rights and Freedoms: $H(3) = 5.03$, $p = .17$; State Effectiveness: $H(3) = 1.23$, $p = .75$.

Chapter 4 An exploratory analysis of civil society and transitional justice

- 1 Backer identifies six primary functions for civil society: data collection and monitoring; representation and advocacy; collaboration, facilitation and consultation; service delivery and intervention; acknowledgement and compensation; parallel or substitute authority.
- 2 We exclude non-state, independent projects that investigate and uncover the truth about past violations since they do not represent official decisions on behalf of state actors. Future research could expand the dataset and catalogue these efforts.
- 3 The distinction between an amnesty and a pardon is analytically meaningless; we use amnesty to refer to both actions.
- 4 Amnesties adopted during the authoritarian period generally provide immunity for members of the outgoing regime. We include these mechanisms only when the new, democratic regime actively recognizes the amnesty as legally valid: where the democratic government, in other words, does not adopt a new amnesty law but instead validates the authoritarian regime's amnesty law.
- 5 We exclude reparations paid by non-state agents who may choose to compensate individuals on their own. Many companies, for example, have since paid reparations to victims of slave labour practices during Nazi Germany; such acts are not included here.
- 6 Keesing's World News Archives includes Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1931–1987) and Keesing's Record of World Events (1987–present). A team of

researchers closely analyzed 24,599 pages (from page 23,733 to page 48,332) of Keesing's archive, a catalogue of world events, for information on transitional justice mechanisms. Keesing's provides the coverage, geographically and temporally, necessary to develop a cross-national dataset of transitional justice over a period of nearly four decades. Utilizing news sources from around the world, including newspapers and wire services, and government reports, Keesing's provides an unparalleled source of unbiased summaries of world events. Finally, Keesing's focuses its coverage on political, social and economic events and is a respected, reliable source for this type of data, making it an ideal source for information on transitional justice mechanisms.

- 7 Monty Marshall & Keith Jagers, *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions 1800-2004*, available at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm> [Accessed 4 July 2011].
- 8 The information gained from this question is used to calculate indicator 2.3.1 of the CSI International Indicator Database.
- 9 We exclude Nicaragua from this analysis, since data were collected using a different scale than the rest of the sample.
- 10 The information gained from this question is used to calculate the indicator 3.5.1 of the CSI International Indicator Database.
- 11 The information gained from this question is used to calculate the indicator 3.5.6 of the CSI International Indicator Database.
- 12 These figures, in particular, may suggest issues with the voluntary nature of the survey instrument. Those institutions that are more likely to answer a survey may also be more likely to reach out to other CSOs.
- 13 All figures supplied by authors.
- 14 The information gained from this question is used to calculate the indicator 4.3.1 of the CSI International Indicator Database.
- 15 For purposes of comparison, in the remainder of the sample, 30.8 percent perceive the legal environment to be quite limiting while 51.9 percent report it to be moderately enabling. In addition, 12.0 percent report the legal environment to be highly restrictive while 5.4 percent of respondents perceive the legal environment to be fully enabling, which shows a tendency in the opposite direction of countries that transitioned to democracy during this period.

Chapter 6 The law, security and civil society freedoms

- 1 The figures reflected in the data include only those organizations that gave a substantive answer – one of four highly restrictive, quite limiting, moderately enabling or fully enabling – to the question of perception of the legal environment regulating civil society. In order not to give either a positive or negative value to a 'don't know' response, the overall count used to calculate the negative percentage responses in the figures excludes the survey respondents who indicated that they did not know what the nature of the legal environment was.
- 2 Russia is excluded from Figures 6.2 and 6.3 because there were no data on organizational type collected. Three of the CSI countries in the dataset used for this volume – Jordan, Nicaragua and Venezuela – are not represented in any of these figures because none of the CSOs identified themselves as human rights groups. A further country, the Philippines, is also omitted because it had only one CSO identifying as a human rights organization. The group of 'NGOs, civic groups and human rights organizations' was also quite small in Belarus (7 out of 122),

Bulgaria (4 out of 154), Italy (8 out of 90), Mexico (9 out of 349) and Slovenia (5 out of 90).

3 There were no data available in this indicator for Kosovo.

Chapter 7 Violence in civil society: Insights from the CSI Databases

- 1 We would like to thank Klaus Eder, Johannes Becke, Nicolas Legewie and Diane Vaughan's Sociology colloquia at Columbia University as well as the editors for helpful comments on earlier versions of this chapter.
- 2 In this chapter the complex discussion on the general causes of violence is not elaborated in detail, but an analysis of the different existing forms of violence in civil society gives some outlook on why violence emerges in civil society and provides input for further analysis.
- 3 For important theoretically oriented work on civil society conceptualizations, see Cohen & Arato (1994) and Alexander (2006). Detailed accounts are provided in length and depth. They range from civil society as a social space outside state or corporate control where people engage in something approximating free association among equals, to arguments about civil spheres in which the feeling of obligation to a community of others is part of the fundamental cultural structure.
- 4 Metaphorical violence is not included in the figure, as the term does not concern the real execution of violence, but a vivid description of a phenomenon (see Imbusch 2002: 38).
- 5 Imbusch (2002) mentions seven attributes for these types of violence: who the actors are, what happens when violence is used, how violence is carried out, who the victim is, why violence is used, what violence is used for and what justifications are given. We limited the figure to four attributes, as only these attributes are relevant to study violence in civil society.
- 6 Here, 'legality' refers to the governance regime the CSO acts in and therefore to national law. We do not address the discussion about the meaning of legality in the post-national global landscape here. See Krisch (2010) for such a discussion.
- 7 The underlying Organizational Survey is based on interviews conducted with CSO representatives in 25 countries by the time of preparation of this book (Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Georgia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Liberia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Philippines, Russia, Slovenia, South Korea, Togo, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zambia), where national coalitions for a common survey were established. In these countries CSOs ranging from religious groups to human rights organizations and sports associations were surveyed in significant numbers, the minimum being 85 organizations for the Japanese case. For this chapter the lack of representativeness of this sample does not cause a problem, as we aim to illustrate the need for conceptual clarification of violence in civil society.
- 8 In the Italian and Russian survey all of the respondents answered the follow-up question.
- 9 The findings need more detailed investigation to fully explain the extreme response pattern. For example the Venezuelan Analytical Country Report, 2011, elaborates on two blocs of Venezuelan civil society, one in favour of the revolutionary project and one against. Strong poles are a possible explanation for a particularly high perception of violence (SINERGIA 2010). However, the question of whether strong polarization really is a peculiarity of Latin American civil society beyond Venezuela cannot be investigated in depth here.

- 10 In the Organizational Surveys for Croatia, Georgia, Jordan, Slovenia and South Korea about 50 per cent of the respondents stated that there are forces using violence in civil society, whereas the other half answered to the contrary.
- 11 Note that the number of respondents in the category of 'ethnic-based community group' is very small ($n = 62$).
- 12 The interpretation is based on the contingency table: distribution of answers to that question by respondent's organizational background.
- 13 Additionally, we find differences within the first category of reformist violence, when we compare the claims of the groups; the country reports show that left-wing social movement groups, if they use violence, mainly do so against objects associated with, or due to interactions with, state forces. According to the cases of violence mentioned in the country reports, we can furthermore assume that in contrast civil society groups which are located rather on the right side of the political spectrum or fascist groups tend to attack persons more often. This is a further example of the diversity of violence within civil society.
- 14 For recent examples of a more fundamental discussion of the relationship between means and ends in civil society see Anheier (2007: 10–13), Munck (2006: 326) or Taylor (2004: 3–10).
- 15 For the most systematic treatment about social science research on civic ideals see Alexander (2006). For a more focused and recent literature review about studies on 'uncivil society' see Glasius (2010).

Chapter 8 Conclusion

- 1 Reichardt, S. (2006), 'Civility, Violence and Civil Society', in Keane, J. (Ed.), *Civil Society: Berlin Perspectives*, Oxford, New York: Berghahn Books, pp. 148.