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RECONNAISSANCE EXPEDITIONS, RECONSTRUCTION SUPPORT AND THE RARE RETURN

Social scientists in the United States who wanted to contribute to the fight against the Nazi regime could do so in a broad variety of institutional contexts. After the attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese and the entry of the United States into the Second World War, the United States government rapidly created new institutions and substantially extended existing ones. Scientific expertise, it is true, had also been mobilized for the war effort in the First World War, but now, in contrast to the previous three decades, a large number of former citizens of enemy nations joined in the fight against the Nazis and their allies. Many of these new immigrants had been awarded US citizenship before the usual waiting period had expired, or came to benefit from special provisions that were set up to enable them to cooperate. The social scientists who actively participated in the current 'war effort' included not only psychologists, who once more deployed their testing tools. Rather the whole range of the social sciences that in the decades before had undergone so rapid a differentiation was represented. Even philosophers such as Herbert Marcuse, art historians such as Ernst Kris and cultural anthropologists such as Margaret Mead joined federal agencies such as the Office of Strategic Service, the Office of War Information or the Schools for Overseas Administration. Economists conducted studies exploring the situation of the population in Europe; communications researchers studied the effect of Joseph Goebbels' propaganda on the German population and the inhabitants of the occupied territories, and explored the possibilities of counter-propaganda; historians and political scientists were directly involved in the warfare as part of 'strategic bombing units', or participated in the planning of the postwar order in the countries to be occupied, and in the training of soldiers.

The Second World War arguably was the first war in which psychologists and other empirical social scientists were doing applied research in combat units or immediately behind the frontline, studying the morale of their own troops and interrogating prisoners to elicit information not only on military issues but also on the current morale of the Germans. Such top Nazi representatives as could be apprehended after the unconditional surrender of Germany were not actually laid on the psychoanalyst's couch, it is true, but were at least examined by professional psychologists. Given the incomparably more massive deployment of the United States government's agencies and staff of advisers, the private institutions, which, as funders of research, had in previous years been so important for the development of the social sciences, were pushed into the background. Even before the end of the war, philanthropic foundations such as the Rockefeller Foundation, which could boast long-term experience and contacts in Europe, started to discuss whether or not they should resume the support activities that had been brought to a standstill by the Nazis, and how to proceed under the changed conditions. Very soon after the surrender of Nazi Germany, experts who had been specifically recruited for this task went on reconnaissance missions to Germany and Austria where, unlike in the years before 1933–8, they primarily engaged in talks with representatives of the United States and British occupation authorities rather than with German and Austrian government officers or politicians. In addition to the reconnaissance missions charged with exploring the situation at the German and Austrian universities, émigré scholars submitted their own propositions on how to reconstruct the Teutonic universities. The first American guest professors came to Europe as early as in 1947/8, teaching in summer schools and at universities. Many of them wrote down their impressions. What these emissaries saw and deemed worth reporting may help us to understand the situation of social science research, its institutional structure and its human resources, after the Nazi purges. In the present chapter, we will analyse some of these travel reports before discussing the support the RF considered giving to sociological research in Germany and Austria, as well as the remarkable similarities that characterize the measures proposed for reorganizing the universities. As a conclusion, we will give an overview of those emigrants who decided to return to Germany and Austria.

THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION'S EXPLORATION OF GERMANY AND AUSTRIA

At the end of the Second World War, unlike at the end of the First World War when philanthropic foundations in the United States first had to familiarize themselves with the situation in Europe, the RF could have simply resumed its support of German and Austrian scholars and research institutions that had come to a halt in the 1930s. The only barriers they would now have to overcome were the more than justified animosities with respect to the atrocities that had been committed under the Nazi dictatorship, news of which had already reached them before the end of the war but were now established beyond doubt. RF officers were indeed far from unanimous in how to deal

with the Germans and the Austrians, and controversial positions were openly discussed at the RF's New York headquarters. These discussions were based on two reports on the situation in Europe, and particularly in Germany and in Austria, written by Robert J. Havighurst after the two journeys that, as an RF emissary, had taken him to these two countries in the summer months of 1947 and again in 1948.¹

Havighurst was an almost ideal choice for this mission. Born in 1900 in Wisconsin as the grandson of an immigrant from Germany, he had obtained his Ph.D. in chemistry and had then, benefiting from a grant by the National Research Council, proceeded to Harvard as a post-doctoral fellow. He had worked as an assistant professor of chemistry in Miami, but had then transferred to the University of Wisconsin, his home state, where he was appointed associate professor of physics. There, he became interested in issues of science education in secondary schools, whereupon he joined the General Education Board of the Rockefeller Foundation in 1934, first as an assistant director and, as of 1937, as a director. At the time, he was also in contact with the Princeton Radio Research Project and was among the audience of Adorno's lecture on 'A social critique of music' (see Chapter Five). In 1940, Havighurst was appointed professor for educational theory at the University of Chicago by its new president, Robert M. Hutchins, and chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee of Child Development. His interest in international comparative studies on educational issues and educational institutions, his German language proficiency and his competence as an interlocutor for scholars from a wide range of disciplines made for the particular quality of his reports on the situation in Germany and Austria. Nevertheless, his recommendations were subject to controversy among the RF officers. This was at least partially due to the fact that Havighurst was not the only expert the RF had sent on a reconnaissance mission.

Before Havighurst, Philip E. Mosely² and Norman S. Buchanan³ had gone to Europe in July 1947.⁴ Mosely, who like Havighurst had been specifically recruited as a consultant for this mission, and Buchanan, who was an associate director of the RF Social Sciences Division, visited not only Germany and Austria but also a number of other countries, among them Poland and Czechoslovakia, i.e. two countries that soon after would become part of Soviet Europe. One can be sure that the other RF officers read the diary they co-authored – unlike Havighurst, they seem to have written no final report – and that their opinion was of some weight in the discussions about future RF policies.

Buchanan, who wrote about his stay in Vienna in July 1947, started out by characterizing the most evident differences. In a country that was occupied by four powers, the Austrian government succeeded in playing off these four 'elements' against each other, and the Allied occupation forces were regularly blocking one another's action.⁵ In economic terms, Austria was facing the problem, on the one hand, of the massive integration carried through after 1938 of the Austrian economy into the economy of the Third Reich, which no longer existed after the war, and, on the other hand, that Austria's economic

reconstruction was severely hampered by the country's division into occupied zones. The result, Buchanan said, was an attitude among the population that he described as follows:

For these and other reasons too the Austrians give the impression of being balked and frustrated at every turn. In fact, there is more than a suggestion of mass frustration in a psychological sense. Certainly the drive and force and determination so noticeable in Poland is lacking in Austria. People seem to stress the difficulties in any proposed line of action and nearly to imply that the situation is hopeless. At least NSB [Buchanan] was impressed with the bland way in which people looked forward to a month of summer-long vacation under present circumstances and with the generally leisurely pace of work. This may be unfair. But with so much to be done on every hand one wonders if a little higher tempo of work is not to be expected. (The usual answer here is that people have not enough to eat or that the custom is of long standing.)⁶

Although these were the years of a near-endemic production of studies on national character, no such study was written on Austria, as far as I know.⁷ The lines quoted above as well as the rest of Buchanan's description, however, indeed qualify as a draft for a study on Austrian national character. Grumbling and lack of initiative, and sticking to traditional institutions – such as going on one's summer holiday even under conditions that seemed prohibitive – were paired with excuses when it came to explanations why something could not be done. What is remarkable is Buchanan's reference to Poland and the Polish readiness, in the same year, to show initiative and engage in action, given the well-known fact that it would take four decades of waiting for the Polish people to be allowed to make use of these skills.

These difficulties were further enhanced by a 'dearth of competent people' due to forced displacement by the Nazis, German occupation and denazification. At the universities, faculties were a sad sight, aggravated by the fact that junior and middle-aged scientists 'are just not there'. As an illustration of this general impression of the situation at Austrian universities, Buchanan described his personal impression of the people with whom he had talks during this visit (in the diary, as shown below, he not only characterized their personalities but also indicated their age, disciplinary affiliation and other institutional characteristics).

Prof. [Alfred] Verdross-Drossberg ... Vigorous personality, well spoken of by certain students ... Might be worth trip to USA.

Prof. R[oland] Grassberger, former fellow ... Besides books and journals he specifically asked for some films on the development of crime situation. Seems earnest and intelligent.

Prof. [August M.] Knoll ... dismissed by Nazis, appears beaten although only about 50.

Prof. Hans Mayer, once quite a figure perhaps but at 70 seems dignified but uninteresting.

Prof. [Ferdinand] Degenfeld-Schonburg ... elderly and quite ineffectual. Probably never was much good according to [Oskar] Morgenstern.

Dr. [Alexander] Mahr, former RF fellow who has not yet been reinstated because he applied for membership in Nazi party. Although not a professor he was presented by the Rector along with the others. Not a strong character on first acquaintance. Morgenstern gives him a bad billing.

Prof. [Ferdinand] Westphalen ... is perhaps the best of the academic economists, about 48, would like to visit US in early 1948. Interested in social problems and also in theory.

These brief characterizations clearly show the traditional approach adopted by RF officers: to search for persons who seemed worth supporting and to rely on competent peers to evaluate their scientific quality, as in the case of Morgenstern, a longstanding RF partner. (At the time, Morgenstern was in Vienna teaching at a summer school.) When urged by Buchanan to name some junior scientists who might be granted a fellowship, none of these professors was able to suggest any names (see Chapter Two).

Buchanan got a somewhat more favourable impression on visiting the Institut für Konjunkturforschung (Institute of Business Cycle Research), re-baptized Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (Institute of Economic Research), which had received RF support until 1938 (see Chapter Three). Mosely went on to visit Graz, Salzburg and Innsbruck. With respect to Graz, he noted that 'new blood' was particularly important, because this town and its university had much more strongly succumbed to Nazism than the other Austrian towns.

After his first visit to Germany in the summer of 1947, Havighurst described the situation of the social sciences in Germany by saying that 'research and teaching in the social sciences in Germany are now at an unbelievably low level of quality and quantity'.⁸ While at American universities the social sciences were 'a well-organized and integrated set of departments of economics, political science, sociology, social anthropology, and psychology, with certain aspects of history and geography', nothing like this could be found at German universities. Frankfurt and Munich were the only two universities in the Western zones that had 'a faculty or division of social sciences'. At all the other West German universities, the social sciences were still divided between the law and the arts faculties. Sociology, which before 1933 had been represented by 'substantial centers' at Frankfurt, Cologne, Leipzig and Berlin, had 'suffered more than any other individual disciplines' from Nazi rule. Psychology, parts of which had shown such a remarkable progress before 1933, had been annexed by the Wehrmacht and, having lost the leading representatives of gestalt psychology to the United States, had almost completely disappeared from the universities. 'Modern history' was represented by a very small number of names, because most of the historians had been dismissed for being Nazis. Political science had been perverted by the Nazis, and 'social anthropology' 'worthy of the name' was currently non-existent in Germany. In the field of economics, the Nazis had been somewhat less destructive, and

at least the Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Institute for World Economics) in Kiel had more or less survived. However, while it was well provided in terms of personnel, economic research itself was 'at a relatively low level compared with American standards'. Applied and pure statistics were taught only in Munich while the Russian zone could boast no less than four chairs dedicated to this discipline.

Havighurst's not-so-surprising diagnosis was followed by some reflections on the potential role of the social sciences in the reconstruction of Germany. In all modern societies and, thus, in Germany as well, the social sciences had to fulfil a double task: '(1) to provide data and analyses of economic, political, and social processes, (2) to produce informed, active, and moral citizens.' It was obvious that in Germany, the social sciences were currently conducting no adequate 'fact-finding and factual analysis'. This opinion was shared by German social scientists, as well. In the domain that would later be institutionalized under the heading of '*Sozialkunde*' (social studies) or '*Staatsbürgerkunde*' (civics), the shortcomings were even more appalling. As an illustration, Havighurst related an episode he had witnessed at a place he called 'University of A' during a discussion with students (and teachers-to-be) of English and American Studies. During a debate in which he had participated, a female student who had just returned from a one-month study stay in England had told her fellow students that, to her – still obvious – amazement, there were factories in England where all the workers had to be union members. 'This struck her as being quite undemocratic and she said: "I thought that sort of thing occurred only under Hitler."' I asked her whether she knew what was meant by the "closed shop" and it turned out that neither she nor any of the others were acquainted with this concept.'

Since university students, due to the German system of higher education, needed to specialize at a very early stage, they were lacking in a more general education that would include the social sciences. What these students knew was what they had been, in the best of cases, taught in their history classes in secondary school, but now:

they were all going to teach German boys and girls about English and American institutions through the medium of the language and literature of these countries. It seems to me that they were quite unprepared for this responsibility, not that they should take anything they find in Britain or America as ipso facto democratic but rather that they should have sufficient general knowledge about economic, social, and political life in the modern world.

Havighurst's friendly attitude towards Germany and the Germans that characterized his propositions did not meet with undivided approval among the RF officers. In their discussions and written documents, they were primarily concerned with the moral side of any support that might be given to Germany. Robert S. Morison, who had worked for the RF in both the Medical Sciences

and the Natural Sciences Divisions, used the metaphors of his discipline, medicine, to drive home his point of view:

My first impulse last year was to regard the question of RF aid to Germany as in no way different from that of aid to any European country. Such a course would have been in line with AG's [Allen Gregg, Director of the RF Medical Sciences Division] proposition that a physician does not censure or punish his patients. A physician is, however, under obligation not only to his patient but to society at large. No matter how much sympathy he has for the individual nor how fully he understands his wishes to injure or kill those about him, he must discourage these wishes and, if they prove intractable, isolate the individual from society. It is this second consideration that has slowly convinced me that the giving of aid to Germany must be regarded as a special problem. We ordinarily proceed on several assumptions but the one which is most important for our present purpose reads as follows: New knowledge of whatever kind, so long as it is 'true', will, through the ordinary processes of society, be put to use for the welfare of mankind. The history of the last half century raises doubts as to whether this proposition can be accepted in regard to Germany without qualifications so serious as to make it inoperative at least for the next few years.⁹

While in the years before the Second World War the RF had indeed shied away from doing anything that could have been considered as directly opposed to US foreign policy, the policies adopted by the respective governments had nevertheless only played a minor role in the Foundation's decision-making. This changed in the years after 1945, when the RF like other foundations sought to align their approach with that of US policies even at its planning stage, which did not prevent RF officers from committing to paper some rather harsh comments on their compatriots in the occupation authorities.¹⁰ RF participation in the United States policies of 'inculcation of "democratic principles"', however, would now imply – or so Morison felt – that the RF had to use quite different methods. While in democratic societies increased scientific productivity would 'in all probability' serve to consolidate the democratic layout of the society in question, it would only fortify the 'citadels of reaction and special privilege' in a 'stratified dictatorial society'. Its effects, which were obvious when they led to a gain in power for the dictator, could also be brought about in a more subtle way:

by increasing the prestige of the Wissenschaftler [scientist] so that they became in effect a priestly class separated from the people and ministering to the needs of an impersonal and, if I may say so, amoral state. The fact that some of these scientists and scholars presented to world at large with discoveries of considerable advantage to the race as a whole admittedly arouses our gratitude and commands our sympathy. This should not blind us to the fact that in Germany the primary motivation of the scientist was the personal one of increasing his own status in a pathological and dangerous system. Even today the majority of pleas for support which come to us from Germany are for aid for MY laboratory and MY library.

Therefore, Morison said, while he supported two of Havighurst's propositions that served the democratic education of German youth, he was opposed

to any aid for German researchers, if only because 'the gap between geheimrat [privy councillor] and ordinary citizen is still much too wide'.¹¹ Once a 'sound self-supporting democratic Germany' had been achieved, support for German research could be resumed.

The directors of the Natural Sciences and the Social Sciences Divisions, Warren Weaver¹² and Joseph Willits,¹³ expressed their views in two memoranda that followed shortly one after another, with Willits proceeding first. In his résumé of previous discussions within the RF, he attacked Weaver in an uncommonly sharp way, hoping that the latter would feel prompted to clarify his position. Just as Morison had done before him he called to mind the guiding principle of promoting 'human welfare throughout the world'. He accused Weaver of having on several occasions expressed opinions that amounted to seeing the German nation as a monolithic entity and, thus, indiscriminately holding all Germans responsible for the Nazis. Weaver, he wrote, seemed to abide by an Old Testament view in proposing that, for the Germans, continued suffering was only right and just. The consequence for RF policies would be to limit itself to small-scale aid, at most. Willits then proposed a counter-position to this – admittedly 'exaggerated' – representation, substantiating it by arguments on three levels. In terms of morals, he rejected any reasoning in monolithic blocks and advocated centring on individuals, since only individuals could be subjected to judgements of guilt or innocence. Germans under twenty should not be treated on the same terms as older Germans who had incurred guilt. It was the task of 'scholarship (and religion)' to always differentiate and be oriented to the future. The RF, rather than modelling its policies on the Old Testament and the War Department, should be oriented to the New Testament and to the spirit of the American Quakers. In terms of self-interest, it should be kept in mind that it was in America's own interest to have Europe prosper and that, as General Marshall had said, a productive Germany was an essential prerequisite for 'a prosperous Europe and a world in peace'. Somewhat incongruously at this point, Willits referred to the findings of modern criminology; while punishment had its place, the priority was on reform. Finally, Willits pointed out that all policies also had repercussions for their authors. One of the subtle effects of wars was that they had dire consequences not only for those who were defeated but also for those who had won and, thus, one had to ask what these consequences were in the case of the United States: reliance on power politics, 'top-dog mindedness', too narrow a proximity of the sciences to politics and the military.¹⁴

Within a week, Weaver responded by a memorandum of his own. He started out by denying that he subscribed to the three opinions attributed to him by Willits and excused himself for not having made himself sufficiently clear in the discussions. After all, he neither thought that Germany was a monolithic block nor advocated relying on the morals of the Old Testament: 'I think that, by New Testament standards, the Nazis sinned foully, and that all German bear some share of the responsibility. I think that for this they will inevitably suffer, have suffered, and should suffer. I think that all the world must to some extent share this suffering.'¹⁵

The differences, for Weaver, concerned the first steps to be taken. Given famine, houses without heating, school children without pencils and libraries without books, it was irresponsible to funnel aid to 'projects in the upper reaches of advanced scholarship', and all the more so since 'advanced knowledge' could be used for good as well as for evil purposes. Therefore, he felt that the RF should support activities that would benefit young Germans and familiarize them with democracy. After one year, the Foundation's policies could be reoriented, if need be.

Comparing the RF officers' evaluations of the situation in Germany after the end of the First World War (see Chapter One) with their perspective on the same country and, partly, the same professors in the first years after the end of Nazi rule, it becomes evident that German science and the German university were no longer considered as high-ranking, let alone exemplary. Since all German scholars were discredited due to their self-surrender to Nazi rule, it no longer seemed appropriate to stick to the neat separation that conceived of science and politics as two distinct spheres. During the early 1920s US aid programmes were oriented to providing famished scholars with a livelihood, and since their scientific reputations were beyond doubt, to allow them to resume or continue their work. But after the Second World War they shied away from any such step. As a result of the excessive politicization of the sciences during the Nazi period, RF officers were unwilling to abide by the traditional separation into two worlds: the world of pure science and the – accidentally contaminated – world of politics. The idea of freedom from value judgements – and its corollary, namely that individuals, provided they were willing to stick to a clear distinction between the two worlds, could compromise themselves in one of them without compromising their reputation in the other one – no longer worked as a defence strategy.

Furthermore, it is evident from the post-1945 discussions that the social structure of German science was seen in a more critical light than after 1918. In those days, a transatlantic visitor was surprised to see that such a thing as a 'high table' had to be institutionalized to get German professors to engage in a dialogue with one another at all. But neither he nor his American colleagues would, at the time, have ventured to describe the German mandarins' obsession with status as something particularly pathological. Since it is rather unlikely that German professors after 1945 actually differed from their colleagues (or from themselves) in the Weimar Republic in this respect, this change in perspective is no doubt due to the experiences the observers had had in the meantime. The massive expansion of post-secondary education in the United States and the growing number of people engaged in scientific work, as well as American scholars' growing tendency to avoid social closure, had resulted in a more democratic and more egalitarian habitus that made the traditional habitus of the German mandarins seem even stranger than in 1920.

After 1945, this motive now linked up with another one to which US politics had subscribed after some hesitation. In the discussions about the politics to adopt toward a defeated Germany, the Morgenthau Plan, which advocated

the de-industrialization of Germany and the downsizing of its economy to the pre-modern level of a Central European agrarian state, was given priority only for a very short time (while its weight in anti-American propaganda in Germany was greater by far).¹⁶ The alternative of 'reorientation', soon re-baptized 're-education', was no doubt also strengthened through the reception of social science studies analysing the ascent of Nazism, which was no longer seen as a dictatorship over the Germans but as a dictatorship relying on the participation and approval of the German masses. A case in point is the early study by Emil Lederer, which his friend and follower, Hans Speier, edited from his posthumous papers under the title of *The State of the Masses*. With respect to the formulation of US policies towards Germany, Speier's influence was probably more important than that of the studies of former collaborators of the Frankfurt Institut für Sozialforschung.¹⁷ As soon as the perspective on Nazi Germany was no longer constrained by the double concept of an 'evil Führer versus the seduced (or even oppressed) masses', the question necessarily arose of what to do with the surviving population and how to undo the Gordian knot of their moral involvement with Nazism.

Those subsequent authors who insisted that, after 1945, the Americans dedicated themselves to missionary work in Germany, deliberately refrained from even suggesting that there might have been a viable alternative to 're-education'. And those latter-day Alexanders who thought they possessed the sword that would allow them to smash capitalism and, in doing so, to eliminate fascism as well, have been sufficiently disavowed by world history. Viewed in this light, it is not surprising that in the years after 1945 American foundations and government agencies in occupied postwar Germany acted in close cooperation. They were united by more than their citizenship, and the frequent exchange of personnel between these two worlds is proof enough of the existence of a shared frame of reference (cf. Berghahn 2001; Gemelli and MacLeod 2003).

As a matter of fact, RF efforts in Germany and Austria were initially confined to those activities that were considered compatible with 're-education' policies.¹⁸ In the end, however, the Program of European Rehabilitation largely corresponded to what Havighurst had suggested. To begin with, American social scientists, and among them primarily European emigrants, were sent as guest professors to Germany and, less frequently, Austria: Karl Brandt went to Heidelberg for a whole year, Arnold Brecht, Curt Bondy, Waldemar Gurian, Eduard Heimann and others went to various German universities for shorter periods.¹⁹

In the summer of 1948, Havighurst spent several weeks in Central Europe and, this time, also explored the needs of the scholars he contacted. From Zurich, he went first to Austria, where he met former RF fellows, in keeping with RF traditions, but he also attended the meetings of the leftist youth organizations Rote Falken and Freie Österreichische Jugend, which impressed him more strongly than his talks with the state officials. A scholar

whom neither he nor other RF officers had met before was young Vienna psychologist Walter Toman who, having benefited from a Quaker Fellowship to study at Haverford College, Pennsylvania, in the previous year, had returned to Vienna with a reference library worth \$150 (\$1,300 in 2010), which he felt to be an 'adequate library to begin with'. Havighurst's diary entry on his meeting with Toman notes that he was impressed to see 'how much a fellowship can do to influence the teaching in a University'.²⁰ In contrast, conditions for those who had not been offered any such opportunity were appalling (Fleck 2005).

The malaise of Austrian universities in the Second Republic and the waste of human capital due to the protectionism of conservative associations have been deplored more than once. It was associated both with a craving for status, which the American delegate's diary highlights along with the widespread indifference towards scientific research. When, at the request of the local Director of Education of the US Forces in Austria (USFA), Havighurst went to see the professors of economics, only two of the three of them were present (Hans Mayer was on vacation), but 'they seemed to have nothing special to say'. The diary comments on the meeting with Ferdinand Degenfeld-Schonburg and Alexander Mahr as follows:

Count Degenfeld is a man of about 55, and Mahr must be about 45. M. had an RF fellowship about 1930 for work at Columbia and Wisconsin.

D asked RJH whether he was interested in research matters or teaching matters. When RJH said 'research', D started to talk about the great amount of teaching they have to do, and steered away from talk of research. He said that Mayr [Mayer] has 100 students in his seminar and he (Degenfeld-Schonburg) also has 100. Many of these are now writing doctoral dissertations, and they take a good deal of time of professors. A very few will go ahead to do further scientific work, and they are good people ...

American books have been received with thanks by the Institute [für Wirtschaftswissenschaften], but they need journals, especially the *American Economic Review*. When RJH said that this journal is coming currently to the University Library (*in the same building*), they displayed little interest, and said they never used the University Library. They asked whether there was a chance of their getting American journals for the Institute, and RJH said he thought it was a matter for them as University teachers to work out a way of using the journals which go to the University Library.²¹

That same evening, in a 'beautiful villa in the northern part of the city, which belonged to a leading Nazi' and was now used by the United States liaison officer charged with educational issues, Havighurst also met the head of the Department of Higher Education of the Vienna Ministry of Education, who had been ill and, thus, unable to attend Havighurst's official visit to the Ministry. Baron Otto Skrbensky made ten minutes time, after dinner, for the American guest to tell him that:

there were many small needs in Austria with which he thought the RF should not be bothered. As the economic basis becomes stronger, these will be met automatically. But there are certain substantial projects that he would like to commend to RF attention. First would be a great Library, perhaps to be called the 'Rockefeller Library', to house the present National Bibliothek and the Universitaets Bibliothek.

Disregarding the fact, bewildering though it is, that even after 1945 Austrians obviously thought it a matter of importance, notwithstanding legal prohibitions, to impress American interlocutors with their titles of nobility, it is at any rate noteworthy that the top official in charge of Austrian higher education tried to win the American emissary over for a major project that would be of little use to research (and which, with or without the name of the American philanthropist family, has not been realized to the present day). He did this rather than present Havighurst with concrete issues that could be solved and the existence of which he could not possibly ignore, since all the other Austrian interlocutors actually bombarded Havighurst with just this. One will fail to understand this attitude unless one considers that in the 1940s and 1950s, conservative Austrian politicians and officials felt that Europe was being endangered by the West as well as by the East. For this, Skrbensky's successor Heinrich Drimmel, who had been his closest associate and would later become Minister of Education himself, coined the inimitable expression of 'negative good will'. The low interest, to put it mildly, in good relations with the RF emissary shown by the Austrian Minister of Education was also noted by the Assistant Director of the Humanities Division, Edward F. D'Arms.²² During his stay in Vienna in November 1947, he also had a talk with Skrbensky (Minister Felix Hurdes was tied up with other matters) which, however, was 'quite unsatisfactory', because Skrbensky was on the phone most of the time – 'The general impression was one of good will, but uncertainty and confusion.'²³

Actually, it would have been much easier for the Austrians than for the Germans to obtain support by the RF because, at the time, official US policies tended to treat 'liberated' Austria significantly better than Germany, with which the United States was, *de jure*, still at war. This fact did indeed have a negative impact in the early years on the willingness of the RF to grant financial support to German scholars or institutions. In his final report, Havighurst noted that the economic situation in Austria was better than in Germany. Bombing damage on buildings was less severe and would be repaired in a few months, the Austrian economy was functioning quite satisfactorily since support by the Marshall plan had set in, inflation had been brought to a standstill, prices and wages were under control, and the food supply was sufficient. On the political level, the situation was stable and the morale of the population was higher than in Germany, since the Austrians had come to terms with their status of having been 'liberated', 'Austria is more free, in the psychological sense, since most Austrians regard themselves as "liberated" and as not

responsible for the coming of the Nazis into power. Accordingly they deal with foreigners with more freedom and frankness than do the Germans.'²⁴

Only the situation at the universities, and especially in Vienna, was a matter of concern, since there old men 'who are looking to the past' were in charge. There were few middle-aged scholars, and 'few of them outstanding', while those younger ones who were 'of first rate quality did not yet have a chance to exert leadership'. In this context, Havighurst once more referred to psychologist Toman who had obviously impressed him very much:

Although only an Assistant in the University, he has started seminars or workgroups in three areas – clinical psychology, social psychology, and statistics. In these work groups he has university students and members of the city vocational guidance staff ... He expects to learn along with his seminar members. Toman is also getting a didactic psychoanalysis, and several of his seminar members are doing likewise. It is quite possible that Toman will be able to found a modern department of psychology within a few years, in Vienna, if given a little assistance.

A few years later, Toman accepted a position in the United States, after which he returned to Germany in the late 1950s. For a short time in the early 1960s he acted as director of the Institut für Höhere Studien (Institute for Advanced Studies) in Vienna, but soon left his home town again (cf. Fleck 2000).

As for the senior professors, Havighurst wrote, no initiative was to be expected from them; the only thing they showed any interest in was obtaining some funds to allow them to publish the works they had previously written. What was needed most for Austria was to establish ties with the rest of the world, which included stays abroad for Austrian students as well as improving their access to scientific publications. Finally, future RF activities should focus on the support of the younger scholars. Havighurst reported an American general as saying that, 'we and the Austrians often feel that we are "at the end of the line" and that nobody pays any attention to us as compared with Germany and Greece'.

However, in the years that followed, in spite of these more favourable material and psychological conditions, Austria failed to attract the support from abroad (i.e. the occupying powers) that might have allowed it to overcome the sentiment described by the American general. The interest shown by the Western powers was consistently low, with negative effects especially in the fields of science and education. Left to their own devices, the Austrian universities were primarily dominated by those forces that were mainly interested in restoring their supposed past glory. As a consequence, there was a return of the Nazis and an almost complete severance from the scientific development in Western countries, accompanied by a new wave of migration by young intellectuals.

In the late summer of 1948 Havighurst left Austria to visit West Germany. There, his diary tells us, he met returning migrants at various places who were

trying to reconstruct the universities and university education, partly in cooperation with American guest professors, and energetically supported by the social science experts in the occupation authorities. In Frankfurt, Havighurst met colleagues from Chicago who participated in the exchange programme set up for the professors of these two universities; in Heidelberg, he had talks with agrarian economist Karl Brandt; and in Freiburg he met Friedrich Lutz, who had returned from Princeton as a guest professor and later acted as an unofficial RF advisor for German matters.²⁵ American social scientists, some of whom, such as Nels Anderson, Howard Becker and Edward Y. Hartshorne Jr, worked in the military government while others, such as Everett C. Hughes and Conrad Arensberg, were guest professors, confirmed Havighurst in his impression that there were at least some institutions worth supporting.

EVERETT HUGHES'S ATTEMPT TO EXPORT CHICAGO SOCIOLOGY TO GERMANY

The most interesting case of individual reconstruction support in postwar Germany is that of Everett C. Hughes, the first American sociologist to come to Germany as a guest professor in the summer semester of 1948. He had already been to Germany in 1932, studying the Catholic workers' movement in the Ruhr area as a post-doctoral fellow of the Social Science Research Council. Now, at age fifty, he was back once more in Germany. Along with him, six other colleagues, among them psychologist Louis L. Thurstone, participated in the exchange programme set up by the University of Chicago for the University of Frankfurt, its costs being borne, in the first years, by the RF.

Hughes was a man for whom everything he did was at the same time an opportunity for field research, an attitude which, as a student at the Chicago department, he had adopted from his teacher and role model Robert Park, who was said to do research even on a taxi ride (Lindner 1990). Hughes, however, was anything but the stereotypical American. He admired Georg Simmel's sociological style. He had been in personal contact with German sociologists during his first stay in Germany and read their works. His style of research and his texts resembled essays rather than the conventional sociological research reports. Thus, he strongly contrasted with the type of American empirical social research the emergence of which had been actively promoted by emigrants such as Lazarsfeld and to which also the group of the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* was committed. Hughes later wanted to rework the notes written during his stay in Germany and to publish them as a book, but abandoned the project when he had it firmly pointed out to him, by an editor of the University of Chicago Press, that there was no public for this kind of report. The diary notes and the thematic memoranda written for the book illustrate what the situation in postwar Germany was like in the eyes of a detached observer.²⁶ In addition, they provide a number of surprising insights into the history of sociology, in general, and into the controversial question of whether, how and to what degree autochthonous German sociology – i.e. conceived of in the tradition of the so-called '*Geisteswissenschaften*' – was being

'Americanized', in particular. We must here limit ourselves to those parts of Hughes's notes that are relevant for the present context:

Twenty-four hours after leaving Chicago, I was being driven from the Frankfurt airport to a hotel with a German student as a companion. He immediately asked ... what Americans think of Germans. Soon we passed some nice suburban villas which had been damaged by bombs, and I made some banal remarks about it, as I imagine anyone who hasn't seen bomb-damage is likely to do. The young man said that Mainz was bombed much worse than Frankfurt. I supposed it was because there was more industry in Mainz. 'Oh, no', he replied, 'that wasn't the reason. It was because Frankfurt was a Jewish city and the international Jews would not allow it to be bombed.'²⁷

No initiation into the field could have been more perfectly planned. A few days later Hughes, quite unruffled, started his teaching programme in German: a lecture that had been announced as 'Problems and methods of American sociology' and a seminar intended to allow for a 'Closer review of some American investigations, with field work'. On 12 April 1948, Hughes noted in his diary:

The first lecture is over. It was about like my first lectures to French students in Quebec: a little stiff at first, but at the end of fifteen or twenty minute I got the courage to walk away from my Mss. And start practicing my mistakes harder and with gestures. I jumped at once into the forbidden subject by saying that the leading theme of American sociology grew out of the leading theme of American life – the relations of a variety of ethnic and racial groups to each other. I am convinced it is the right way.²⁸

In alluding to Quebec, Hughes referred to the fact that in 1942/3, he had been a guest professor at the Université Laval and had apparently lectured in French. With very few exceptions, Hughes had no difficulty in speaking German with the Germans, seeking every occasion to engage them in talks with him, and it seems that some of his interlocutors even failed to notice that this lean, tall man was a foreigner. Only when certain specialist terms came up was he momentarily at a loss to find the German equivalent ('Boy, did I have a time getting "frame of reference" over in German').²⁹ In the seminar, too, Hughes overturned his plans in the very first session when he noticed that the majority of his audience was not majoring in sociology but in economics and business management.

I decided to turn the seminar toward problems of occupations and work organization. That seems to please the students, and after all, sociology is sociology whether you do it on one institution or another. The students here must ... have a 'praxis' – a job in industry or business. So I will put them to work on reports about the organizations they have worked in. I have already mentioned race questions, Jews, military occupation as sociological phenomena, just as they come up in discussion. The formula of frankness, avoiding no subjects whatsoever, is popular with the students.³⁰

This attitude of 'frankness' was due, rather than to an effort on the part of Hughes to comply with the young Germans' struggle for orientation and moral absolution, to his methodological persuasion, the 'sweeping comparison'. This frankness made it easier for him to access his students who, however, were rather reluctant to follow his unorthodox teaching method. The invitation to analyse their own experiences as soldiers, working students and displaced persons in sociological terms was acted upon in oral discussions rather than in seminar papers. The help offered by Hughes, i.e. to use the studies he had brought along as a basis for comparison, was only reluctantly accepted, and it again required Hughes to direct his students' attention to the similarities between black job entrants in the United States industry and the problems accompanying the integration of displaced persons in the West German industrial working process, or to the structural similarity between the classification of the negroes in the United States and that of Jewish people in Nazi racial legislation. In the debates launched by Hughes, however, the students ventured to talk about their experiences in the Nazi youth organization ('Hitler-Jugend'), in the armed forces, with their parents' educational styles, on the black market and with '*Schiebern*' (black-marketeers). Being the sons and daughters of businessmen and white-collar workers, the idea of being forced to violate rules and regulations very much frightened them, while at the same time, they no less strongly insisted that it was easier for the lower classes to do so. When Hughes asked the students to compare their difficulties with the centuries-old tribulations of the Jewish population and their status as pariahs, however, they fell silent. 'I said that perhaps the Germans were now in a position to understand and sympathize with the Jews, who have long been in a position like the one they are describing, where one has to be very inventive to survive. They got the point, and talked of it very briefly – but were not too comfortable.'³¹

As a teacher, Hughes was most effective in more informal contacts. He had set up his workplace in a corner of one of the corridors at the university so that students could come to him at all times, but this invitation had to be repeated several times before they dared to trust the guest professor's spatial arrangement.³² Rather than simply address him, they asked an assistant whether they were permitted to do so. In addition to informal seminars in the corridor, Hughes organized extra-curricular meetings in some students' lodgings, where he contributed the coffee, and he accepted invitations by his German colleagues to attend their seminars. When in one of these seminars the professor had to leave early and let his assistant take over, Hughes was appalled by the assistant's strange behaviour.

Dr. C., the assistant, was obviously taking his opportunity to be free, and punish, in the absence of his master. And the whole class was being more free than they would have dared. The main point, to me, was the revelation of so much suppressed heat, an almost hysterical desire to discuss. I finally broke in with two observations: 1) that it was very interesting to be accidentally present in a seminar when the professor wasn't there, and 2) that the question whether a student should introduce his own

ideas in the course of a report on a book could be a matter of such heated discussion, struck me also as rather odd. This made hell break loose. The assistant, Dr. C., then oddly changed his ground and lambasted the group for not speaking their mind when the professor was there – which was a contradiction of his earlier criticism of the report of the day.³³

Hughes more than once reflected on the problematic position of the assistants, their almost complete subordination to the professor's regime and their submissiveness in adapting to this situation. When Leopold von Wiese, whom he had come to know personally in his years as a visiting student in the 1930s, described how difficult it was for him to find a successor, Hughes, who had come with Talcott Parsons to see von Wiese, asked him why the assistant whom he had so highly praised should not be considered for this position. The doyen of German sociology shrugged and replied: of course he could fill this position, but due to his military service, the 32-year-old had not yet obtained his doctorate and that, therefore, it was quite out of the question for him to be appointed. Dismissing well-worn routines in order to promote a good man without a *Habilitation*, let alone a doctorate, was simply unthinkable, he argued, and it would take the assistant at least three or four more years to clear these two hurdles.

The precision Hughes had learned to bring to his observation is also evident in his descriptions of the 'eternal assistants'. What struck him most was their habitual adaptation to their positions as subordinates. At a party he met a German colleague whom he had already come to know in 1932 in a sociological seminar. At the time, the young man had been a promising candidate for an academic career, which after the take-over of power by the Nazis had turned out to be impossible for him because he was Jewish. He had survived the Nazi years in Swiss exile, struggling along at the margins of the academic universe:

He is now back in Germany, and – although bald and forty – still an Assistant. He has not the right to lecture, – i.e. has not been appointed dozent [university lecturer]. Because of his maturity, he is often delegated to give lectures by the professor for whom he works. He was one of a party of four at lunch a few days ago; I was the host. Although I was the host, and had invited him as a colleague, he continued to play the role of Assistant. He grabbed my lighter a couple of time while I was holding it for him to light a cigarette; having grabbed it, he held it for me and then the others present to light up. When I passed sugar for his coffee, – purposely offering it to him first as an additional gesture of not wanting him to play the Assistant role of deference – he could not bring himself to take it first, but half stood up at table to pass it first to the others present. He is nearly as old as the professor whose Assistant he is, and is as good a scholar.³⁴

The description brings to mind a drawing by Paul Klee, *Two Men Meet, Each Believing the Other to Be of Higher Rank*, which shows two men of equal rank who offer one another precedence in entering an imaginary room by out-bowing each other, doubling over to knee height. For the book he planned,

Hughes later reworked the plight of junior scholars, on which he more than once commented in his diary, into a portrait of the eternal assistant:

I found that most seminars still have an Assistant, usually a very bookish person who ought to have become an instructor years ago. He carries the professor's papers, bows, hands the professor things, speaks in a very formal, over-academic way. His hands usually are moist. Some things haven't changed. My assistant, Fräulein Becker, was indispensable; she is eager to do empirical work on the consumption habits of various classes of people.³⁵

While there obviously was no way for Hughes to persuade his students to go out and do empirical research, it seemed no less obvious to him that no one endowed with the habitual frame of mind of the eternal assistant would be able to do so, in the first place. And this in spite of the fact that the situation in postwar Germany seemed to be almost prototypically calling for empirical social research:

After all, American sociology grew up around the study of crisis, personal and social, – the immigrant, race relations, social movements, etc. Thomas and Park both were interested in what happened when the 'cake of custom' was broken. So why shouldn't our concepts – if there are any good – be useful in understanding present-moment Germany. Those who object so much to the use of the word 'caste' to American race relations, should take a look at a military occupation, and see how many insights American race relations theory gives one into what is going on here. It would be perfectly silly to try to account for the relations between Americans and German here just on the basis of one group trying to get an economic or political advantage over the other.³⁶

Similarly, Hughes told his students that they were in the favourable situation to make a significant practical as well as scientific contribution by exploring the realities of life in Germany, because 'the cake of custom is so broken that human behaviour can be seen in flux'.³⁷ But while the assistants dedicated themselves to the study of old books, and the older the better, the students complained that they did not even know how to construct a questionnaire, eliciting a deep sigh – '(God save us)' – from Hughes in his 'field note'.

In the four months Hughes spent in Germany – he returned there two more times during the tenure of the exchange programme, in 1953 and in 1958 – he also visited other university towns and met acquaintances from the past who, having lost their homes in Berlin or elsewhere due to the bombings, had sought refuge in the Frankfurt environs. He admired von Wiese, albeit more as a great old teacher than as a sociologist, given that his teaching programme was no less strongly marked by the appalling separation of theory and empirical work. Ludwig Neundörfer and his private Soziographisches Institut (Sociographical Institute) in Frankfurt impressed him with his attempt to do urban research on a statistical basis (at the institute, Hughes saw boards visualizing intra-urban migration between the home and the workplace, and

analysing the religious intermix brought about by the presence of displaced persons among the population in Hessen). In Marburg, he met Max Graf zu Solms, who is mentioned very cordially in the diary. In Frankfurt and Göttingen he was much more at home with the students of ethnology than with their teachers, with whom it was impossible to discuss social anthropology. To the teachers he had to spell out the difference between the Nazi concept of '*Lebensraum*' ('vital space') and related anthropological models, and had to firmly keep them from addressing him as a representative of a superior race. Visits to Münster and Dortmund allowed him to familiarize himself with the work of the Sozialforschungsstelle (Centre for Social Research), which he felt to be the most promising German centre for social science research. He was especially interested in their studies on displaced persons and on the problems of industrial work, which prompted him to promise them to act as a consultant at a future visit.

One semester of teaching is unlikely to have much of a sustainable effect, and no doubt Hughes knew this as well as anybody. Back in the United States, therefore, his interest was more in his own role in occupied Germany. At the same time, he made an attempt to grasp the German population's attitude towards their recent past in sociological terms. Concerning his German experience, his intention was to rework it into a paper that would be 'a record of what an American saw, thought and felt, not merely about Germany, but about being an American in an occupied country'.³⁸ The former issue was addressed in a lecture at McGill University in Montreal in 1948, which however was not published until 1962 (Hughes 1994).³⁹

The twelve years of Nazi dictatorship had prevented the Germans from keeping abreast with the development of the social sciences that had occurred elsewhere, and more particularly in the United States. The eviction of Jewish professors and the subsequent draining of the teaching staff (further aggravated by the fact that the number of young academics who were dead or missing due to the war was disproportionately high), combined with the inertia of the traditional academic status system, had resulted in a climate that was averse to innovation. In spite of the experimental nature of the anomic post-war society with its near-complete uprooting of the social structure, no empirically minded sociological imagination had sprung up. By their own efforts, the social sciences in the successor states of the Third Reich were unable to reconstitute themselves.

The reports on Germany and Austria written by RF officers and by guest professors such as Everett Hughes highlight the differences between the two successor states of the Third Reich. The Americans treated the Germans with a mixture of a strict orientation towards re-education and a restraint in view of former Nazi institutes, on the one hand, and a certain indulgence, as it were, for 'persecuted' individuals, on the other hand. The occupation forces in Austria, in contrast, remained largely inactive and left the Austrians to their own devices. The RF tended to comply with the Austrians' wishes and idiosyncrasies, overlooking their inadequate ways of conducting research projects

as well as the fact that funds were draining away or were privatized. The obvious inability of German and Austrian social scientists to conduct research projects successfully and within a given time suggests that, during the Nazi period, this cultural technique of scientific work had not been developed. Only where former emigrants endowed with the relevant experience returned, at least for a certain time, to their former home countries, did projects function in a way that met American standards. This asynchronous development of a modern culture of project research all the more clearly highlights how much the Germans and the Austrians lagged behind.

When talking about the Americanization of postwar sociology, one should keep in mind that it was primarily brought to bear on the institutional level by targeting pent-up demand, since this was the main focus of US social science exports, rather than in the domain of empirical social research, which was seen as epitomized by questionnaire technology. The activities of sociologists such as Hughes, Anderson and Arensberg in Germany clearly show that what was at stake was not methodological preference but the more basic skills of social research. While there were young people in both countries who seemed worth supporting, the RF failed to spot talents in Austria as they had done in the interwar period. As a result, there were significantly fewer fellows from Austria than from Germany. The main difference between both countries, however, seems to be that in the case of Austria, next to no emigrants had returned from exile, thus allowing for the moral degeneracy deplored by Friedrich August von Hayek, and confirmed by other observers of the scene, to become rampant.⁴⁰ This will be examined and analysed in the following section.

WHO RETURNED?

Few of the sociologists who had been driven into exile seriously considered returning to their former home country. Why should they return to an environment where they would be confronted with the very people who had behaved in so deplorable a way a few years earlier? Strong motives were needed for them to decide to return, motives which, again, may be seen as push or pull factors. Among the reasons that could pull emigrants back to Germany or Austria, the most immediate one, arguably, was the existence of strong ties to their original home countries. Whoever is suffering from homesickness will spare no effort to quiet the pain. However, sociological tools are inadequate for detecting the subterranean sources on which homesickness feeds, and as for a psychological interpretation, we not only lack the necessary data but also, as far as I am concerned, the competence. A somewhat milder form of attachment that, in most cases, is also better documented can be found in terms of a more general cultural bond with the country of origin. This may range from the overwhelming experience of being unable to express oneself as well in the acquired second language as in one's mother tongue (Robert Lowie who emigrated to the United States when he was a child reported this in Lowie 1959) to preferences for cultural forms and styles for which there is no

correspondence in the new surroundings, whether it is poems, rhetorical styles or the distinctive German way of doing science. It is easier by far to record a political commitment that makes it imperative for someone to go and join the reconstruction effort.

Among the factors that pushed people back to the former home country, there are not only all the variations of disappointment with life in a foreign country, but also assignments to official roles by the occupation forces. In the latter case, their return – at least in the beginning – could be experienced as not quite real since, in travelling in one's old home country, one was fulfilling a mission for the new one (cf. Fleck and Berger 2000).

About a hundred members of the group of social scientists referred to in Chapter Four returned to their old home country at one time or another. Among them, there were a few whom the Nazis had caught when they were on the run: Alfred Missonig was captured by the Gestapo in Yugoslavia where he had escaped after a short stay in Switzerland; Gustav Eduard Kafka, who had lived in Germany until 1938 and then escaped to elude arrest, was caught by the Gestapo in 1940 in the Netherlands. While Missonig was taken to his hometown, Vienna, where he remained in prison until the end of the war, Kafka was taken to the prison of Karlau in Graz where, after the end of the war, he settled down and later became a professor of law and political science. For Walter Beck, on the other hand, who went back to Germany in 1937, the return to the Nazi Reich was largely voluntary. After the end of the war, ninety-six sociologists returned to Germany or Austria (among them three sociologists who did not go abroad until the end of the war and returned later).⁴¹ About one quarter of them did not return to Germany or Austria before the 1960s; at that time, these homecomers were already of an age that made it unlikely for them to start afresh. They were confronted with a country where economic conditions as well as scientific institutions were already in a post-reconstruction stage, and they can hardly be expected to have had a decisive influence on the outcome.⁴² The following analysis, therefore, focuses on those homecomers who returned between 1946 and the early 1960s to one of the successor states of the Third Reich.

Thirty-seven pioneers of reconstruction returned before 1950. These were fifteen Austrians and twenty-two Germans, who did not always return to the country from which they had escaped, such as the Vienna autodidact Leo Kofler, who had fled to Switzerland after the *Anschluss* and went to Leipzig in 1945. His return, as well as that of eight others (Kurt Blaukopf, Julius Deutsch, Josef Dobretsberger, Bruno Frei, Jürgen Kuczynski, Oscar Pollak, Ludwig Renn and Leo Stern) was primarily due to political considerations. Most of them were members or sympathizers of anti-fascist parties and went at their request. A second and rather clearly identifiable group of pioneers returning from exile were Catholic advocates of the authoritarian state who had gone into exile because of their commitment to this state before 1938. Among them were Dobretsberger, already referred to above, as well as Johannes Messner, Johann Mokre and Wilhelm Koppers. Except for social-democratic politician

Julius Deutsch and sociologist Johann Mokre, all the other left-wing Germans and Austrians, as well as the former advocates of the authoritarian state, had spent their years of exile not in the United States, but in Mexico, Great Britain, Switzerland, the Soviet Union, Palestine, Turkey or Egypt.

Before 1950, only ten social scientists returned from the United States, while eleven came from Great Britain, seven from Switzerland, three from Mexico and six from other countries. This suggests that the countries other than the United States had indeed only served as a country of exile for the emigrants and that integration into the local cultural and scientific life was more difficult than in the United States. The small proportion of returning migrants from the United States at these early times presumably also had to do with the fact that exit conditions for these migrants were difficult in two respects. Besides the scarcity of transport facilities in the years right after the war, the United States citizenship that most emigrants had acquired proved to be a high barrier because, at the time, dual citizenship was excluded by law, and new-Americans leaving the United States for long periods were sanctioned by being deprived of their nationality.

Among the ten early homecomers from the United States, Martin Fuchs was the only one charged with a mission by the United States government. Among the eight former Germans, there were four members of the Institute of Social Research: Horkheimer, Pollock, Adorno and Henryk Grossmann. Horkheimer, at least, thought of himself as an semi-official representative of the United States, while the same can definitely not be said of Grossmann, the institute's factotum, who moved on to the Soviet occupation zone. Anthropologist Julius Lips also returned to the Eastern zone (Lips 1950), while Sigmund Neumann and Fritz Sternberg settled down in West Germany.

In the following decade (1950–60), another thirty-four emigrants returned: twenty-seven Germans and only seven Austrians. Most of them came from the United States, only two came from Great Britain, two from the Netherlands, three from Turkey, and one each from Switzerland, Sweden, Bolivia, Palestine and Mexico.

Taking these two cohorts of homecomers as the group of those who returned at an age when they were still active in their professions, i.e. when they were true returning migrants in terms of their working life, and attempting to compare and contrast these migrants, the first thing one notices is the ratio of former Germans to former Austrians. Although the overall number of emigrants from both countries had been almost equal, more than twice as many Germans than Austrians returned to their former home country. This reversal of proportions is remarkable, at any rate. While almost one out of three German emigrants came back, at some point or other, to stay in one of the German-language countries, only one out of six Austrians returned.

Remarkably, those Germans and Austrians who returned during the first one-and-a-half years after the end of Nazi rule were nearly the same age when they came back. These pioneers of reconstruction returned at an age at which one used to reach the top level of one's career, i.e. appointment to a professorship,

in the Teutonic science system and at which successful emigrants in the United States system similarly crowned their academic advancement by gaining the position of a 'full professor'.⁴³ German returning migrants were somewhat younger than their Austrian counterparts, with a median age of forty-six years as compared to forty-nine years for Austrians. In the following decade, this relation was reversed. For those who returned in the 1950s, the median age was fifty-five for Germans and fifty-two for Austrians. On closer examination, these small differences are quite remarkable. In both countries, the median age for emigrating was almost the same (thirty-five for Austrians, thirty-six for Germans). But since the great majority of Germans emigrated four years earlier than the Austrians, their average age at the end of Nazi dictatorship was higher (at the end of the war, German emigrants were forty-seven years old, Austrian only forty-two years). Thus, for the Germans, there was hardly any difference between the median age of the returning migrants and that of the emigrant population as a whole, while for the Austrians there was a significant upward variation.

This somewhat confusing age pattern of returning migrants can be accounted for by the fact that, because of Austrian restitution regulations, the great majority of early Austrian returners could reaccess the positions they had been forced to abandon in 1938. This primarily benefited those who already had civil servant status at the university before 1938, and these in turn were primarily the more or less avowed representatives of the authoritarian state (Dobretsberger, Koppers, Messner and Mokre). In contrast, the younger Austrians among the early returning migrants were barred from access to the universities in their home country and had to find other openings for themselves. Martin Fuchs initially worked as a member of the American occupation force before he joined the diplomatic service and finally returned to the United States as the Austrian ambassador; Leo Stern and Leo Kofler returned to East Germany; and Franz Borkenau went straight to Germany from his British exile to teach as a supernumerary professor at Marburg/Lahn. The two journalists Oscar Pollak and Bruno Frei continued to work in their profession. Only Kurt Blaukopf, having worked as a journalist in Vienna for some time, succeeded in engaging in an academic career in 1962 (Blaukopf 1998).

In the 1950s, the picture for those who returned to Austria, or for those Austrians who returned, is much the same. German philosopher Günther Anders settled down as a freelance author in Vienna. Adolf Kozlik worked in adult education, also in Vienna, before a short interlude at the newly founded Institut für Höhere Studien (Institute for Advanced Studies) (Fleck 2000). Ex-Viennese Eric (formerly Erich) Voegelin accepted a professorship in Munich. Similarly, Emerich K. Francis taught sociology in Munich before he was made an honorary professor in Innsbruck in 1967, where he had been to *Gymnasium* and had started his law studies in the 1920s. The two others who returned were 'returning migrants' only in a restricted sense, since during the Nazi dictatorship they had acted as a psychologist for the armed forces and as a member of the diplomatic service in a state that was an ally of the

Third Reich, respectively, and had gone to the United States only after 1945. Peter R. Hofstätter transferred to the United States for a certain time after the *Habilitation* he had obtained in the Nazi period was invalidated, and Slatko Zagoroff left Bulgaria for California. Hofstätter later returned to a professorship in Germany, and Zagoroff, having ended up out of work in the United States, pulled off the feat of being appointed to a statistics professorship in Vienna (Fleck 2000).

The situation faced by returning migrants in both parts of Germany was clearly different from that in neighbouring Austria, and this difference is due in no small part to the fact that the three successor states of the Third Reich each had to find their own ways of coping with their Nazi past and were treated differently by the occupation forces (Lepsius 1989). In East Germany (German Democratic Republic), lecture rooms and university positions were open to non-communists only in the beginning, and then only when they qualified as at least 'anti-fascists'. In the long run, survival in the GDR was possible only for those social scientists who submitted to party dictatorship. These included Jürgen Kuczynski, Alfred Meusel, Ludwig Renn and Leo Stern. For Henryk Grossmann, the question of whether or not to submit to the party line did not arise. He returned to a professorship at the University of Leipzig in the year of the proclamation of the anti-fascist republic, but died only one year after. Leo Kofler and Hans Mayer, somewhat more given to non-conformism, left the GDR, the former soon after its foundation, the latter only after the Berlin Wall was built. Kofler was suspended in 1951 and cleared to go to the West in the following year, while Mayer returned from his Swiss exile first to Hessen and then, in 1948, to Leipzig, where he held out until 1963. Lips, Meusel, Renn and Stern served the workers' and peasants' state until their deaths; and Kuczynski was reserved the privilege of honouring the state even after its sudden collapse (Kuczynski 1994).

In the Western part of Germany, conditions were significantly different from those in the two smaller successor states, each of which had its own way of ducking the responsibility for the 'Thousand-Year Reich'. Although the literature is, for once, unanimous in its lament that remigration was a small-scale affair, a closer look reveals that this was not true, at least not with respect to access to strategically important university posts. Almost all German universities saw the return of at least a few emigrated social scientists who initiated a remarkable reorientation of German social sciences in their new domain, often with the material as well as non-material support of the British or US occupation forces. They thus did the very thing that F.A. Hayek had recommended, as early as in 1948, as a means for Austria to solve her moral plight: 'I have come to the conclusion that even the presence of a single distinguished scholar with a strong personality and a spirit of independence in each faculty might completely change the moral and intellectual climate and that consequently this is the point at which any outside assistance might be most effective.'⁴⁴

In later years, when the prevailing tendency was to denounce supposed Americanization, the United States was severely criticized for its reconstruction

work. This criticism originated in the anti-imperialist sentiment of the student movement, but was later also shared by a number of advocates for the better tradition of the German brand of social sciences, i.e. as a humanistic discipline (Tenbruck 1984).

In Chapter Four, the centres of social science research in the early 1930s were identified on the basis of their number of graduates: Berlin, Heidelberg, Leipzig, Frankfurt, Munich and Cologne were the German towns where most of the social scientists of the five samples obtained their doctor's degree, 34 to 81 per cent of whom later emigrated. Were these, also, the universities to which the migrants returned? Did they really import, when returning from emigration, an Americanized version of the social sciences? Could all the holes from after 1933 be refilled? I will try to answer these three questions by examining the places of German social science remigration.

The university with the largest number of returning migrants was Frankfurt. These were Horkheimer, Adorno and Pollock, three members of the Institute of Social Research who returned quite early; Gottfried Salomon-Delattour, who came to Frankfurt as a guest professor in 1954 and, from 1958, as a full professor; Julius Kraft, as a full professor from 1957; Fritz Neumark, returning from Turkey, as a public finances specialist; and Walter Sulzbach, as an honorary professor at Frankfurt University from 1956. Although the Institut für Sozialforschung (Institute of Social Research) presented itself as an institution that took up its pre-1933 activities again, its scientific profile had changed, which was probably due, among other things, to the experiences gained in the United States. At least in the 1950s, Horkheimer, Adorno and Pollock indeed thought of themselves as the German representatives of the new American-style empirical social research. In the initial years, Horkheimer recruited collaborators of Lazarsfeld's Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University as consultants of the Frankfurt institute, and in terms of methodology, the studies conducted by the institute itself were oriented to models that its members had come to know during their American exile. This is particularly true for the study on how people were coping with the past, published as *Gruppenexperiment* (Group experiment) (Pollock 1955), a title that rather downplays the issue. Its model was the 'focused interview', i.e. a method first developed by Robert K. Merton in the context of research on mass communication.

But even if Salomon-Delattour and Kraft, with the leniency that is indispensable in these matters, may be seen as successors to Oppenheimer and Mannheim, respectively, and Neumark as the one who continued the work of Adolph Löwe and Karl Pribram, there still were voids that remained unfilled. In the reconstruction phase, there was no successor for Max Wertheimer, Martin Buber or Paul Tillich.

The second university town that accommodated a remarkable number of returning migrants was Berlin, with Kuczynski, Meusel and public health specialist Kurt Winter returning to the East sector, and pedagogue Fritz Borinski as the first returning migrant to settle down in the West sector (where, however, he had to make do with working in adult education before being

appointed to a professorship in 1956). The returners who came to West Berlin were mainly political scientists who set out to take up the tradition of the *Deutsche Hochschule für Politik*. Thus, there was a nucleus of scholars doing empirical research in political science, which included returning migrants. These included Arkadij Gurland (from 1950) and Ossip K. Flechtheim (from 1952), both of whom had for different lengths of time been affiliated with the Institute of Social Research during their exile; Ernst Fraenkel (from 1951); and, later, Richard Löwenthal (from 1959, first as a guest professor) and Otto Stammer who, having plunged into the private business sector during the Nazi period, had obtained his *Habilitation* in 1949 and had in 1951 been appointed to a professorship at the newly founded Free University. Given this setup, the political sciences can be truly said to owe their specific profile uniquely to the experiences encountered during emigration. Both Flechtheim and Fraenkel had served the American government for a certain time before returning to German science, Fraenkel as a constitutional expert for Korea and Flechtheim as a collaborator of the chief prosecutor in the German war crime trials.

The changed situation in, and division of, Berlin had an impact on the non-university research centres, as well, only a small number of which still existed after 1945–9. The former Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes were transferred to West Germany,⁴⁵ and Bonn, the new capital of the Federal Republic, attracted further centres. It was not until the foundation, in 1963, of the Max-Planck-Institut für Bildungsforschung (Max Planck Institute for Human Development) that things began to change for Berlin. However, since in the interwar period the profile of Berlin as a social science hub had been less distinctive than one might expect given its position as a metropolis at the time, one can hardly say that there was a substantial local deficit to make up for. Berlin's reputation in the 1920s and 1930s was not due to the social sciences. The mandarins were old (Werner Sombart), or failed to make their mark (Alfred Vierkandt), or positioned themselves in sharp contrast to the social sciences (Eduard Spranger), while newcomers such as Emil Lederer were in place for too short a time to have a strong impact. In economics and law, the situation was a little more favourable. Ernst Wagemann and Carl Schmitt, having compromised themselves during the Nazi period, left a void after their retirement that no emigrant came to fill after 1945.

The two other German social science strongholds in the interwar period, Heidelberg and Leipzig, also had their returning migrants, albeit a smaller number of them. Among those who went to Leipzig – Germanist Hans Mayer, philosopher Leo Kofler, anthropologist Julius Lips and economist Henryk Grossmann – there was no pronounced representative of the key social science disciplines, and the political conditions did their bit to prevent the social sciences from flourishing in the first place. More or less the same can be said, albeit for very different reasons, for Heidelberg where Karl Löwith, Herbert Sultan and Alexander Rüstow returned to hold the professorships of philosophy, finance and political economics, respectively. Löwith and Rüstow were no doubt influential, each in his own way, but certainly not with respect to

what might qualify as a contribution to the development of the empirical social sciences. Heidelberg sociology was entirely informed, after the death of Alfred Weber, by Wilhelm Mühlmann. In the late 1950s, he was joined by Ernst Topitsch, who indeed supported an empirical orientation for sociology but made no contribution to it himself. None of these three homecomers can be said to have exercised a specific intellectual influence through social science competencies gained during emigration. They continued their work from the point where they had been forced to abandon it in 1933.

In Munich, sociology and the other social sciences, in spite of the well-known names that marked their history (Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl, Lujo Brentano, Max Weber), had failed to develop a distinct profile in the interwar period – the two dozen Munich graduates in our samples seem to have chosen this university primarily because it was in their home town – and for a long time failed to do so in the Federal Republic of Germany, as well. Hans Nawiasky returned from his Swiss exile to his professorship of public law and political science at the University of Munich, from which he had resigned in 1933. Apart from his contributions to the Bavarian constitution of 1946, he left no scientific trace, which may also have to do with the fact that he had kept his professorship in St Gallen, Switzerland.

The two other Munich returning migrants, Francis and Voegelin, seem to have been influential in different ways. Voegelin, founding professor of political science, not only succeeded in establishing his normative idea of political science, but succeeded even in making sure that it prevailed until long after his death. Francis, who was born in the Austrian Catholic milieu and had obtained his doctorate at the German University of Prague, did not turn to the social sciences until his stay in Canada and the United States, which was due to some twist of fate rather than to the necessity of emigrating. During his emigration, he turned to empirical research, investigating inter-ethnic relations and ethnic minorities. During his entire stay in the United States, Voegelin remained resistant to any attempt to change his style of thought. Although both of these two refugees from the Nazis (both of them Austria-born, Catholic and politically right of centre) had no links whatsoever to Munich before they were appointed founding professors of the two twin social science disciplines, they seem to have had no problem in getting their bearings. Francis no doubt taught the skills and insights he had acquired during emigration, but for all that, these two can hardly be considered as the representatives of American social sciences.

Other German universities that had returning migrants among their faculty members were Cologne, Göttingen, Hamburg and Kiel. In Cologne, René König succeeded Leopold von Wiese and established a version of sociology that significantly differed from that of his predecessor. In the years that followed he came to be perceived as the embodiment of American sociology. The Cologne-based UNESCO Institut für Sozialwissenschaften (UNESCO Institute for Social Sciences) headed by Nels Anderson, a Chicago sociologist who had done research on hobos, was another influence that likely determined the

orientation of Cologne-based social sciences. König, who made a living by writing book reviews for newspapers during his exile in Zurich, is likely to have benefited from this opportunity to familiarize himself with recent developments in sociology and neighbouring disciplines. In Cologne, the reception of recent social science research methods did not take root until after 1945 and relied much more on König's newly established international networks within the International Sociological Association and UNESCO than on his Zurich studies. The second returning migrant, Alphons Silbermann, had survived the Nazi period in Australia, which made him an unlikely 'principal agent' of the 'American way of doing social research' (Silbermann 1989). Given that another returning migrant, historian Dietrich Gernhard, came to Cologne in 1951 and set up an Institute for American Studies before transferring to the Max-Planck-Institut für Geschichte (Max Planck Institute for History) in Göttingen in 1961, Cologne can be seen as a university that was open to the new times.

Hamburg in the interwar period had provided a home for three very different professors – Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Andreas Walther and Ernst Cassirer – among whom only Nazi-partisan Walther showed a marked affinity for the social sciences. After the war, Siegfried Landshut, who was appointed to a professorship of political science at the University of Hamburg in 1951, was no more able to influence the social sciences than was pedagogue Anna Siemsen, who for a short time taught literature in Hamburg before she retired. Göttingen, where Walther taught for a short time, was a social science desert before the war but afterwards, thanks to the appointment of Helmut Plessner, who returned from exile in Groningen, the Netherlands, in 1951, a new high-profile sociological site was able to be established. Two other returning migrants were appointed professors. Jurist Gerhard Leibholz, who had been a professor at Göttingen University until 1936, returned from exile in Britain at first temporarily and from 1951 for good. Having come to know the Anglo-Saxon way of studying comparative government in Oxford, he dedicated himself to this field, in addition to his function as a judge at the Federal Constitutional Court. The second returning migrant was social democrat Gerhard Kessler who had held a professorship of economics and social policy in Leipzig before he emigrated to Turkey, and then taught as an honorary professor in Göttingen.

Before the handing-over of power to the Nazis, Kiel had had a prominent place in the chorus of German social sciences due to the Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Institute for World Economics) and the workings of Ferdinand Tönnies. After the war, its reputation was soon re-established through the appointment of Erich Schneider to a professorship of economics and as head of the Institut für Weltwirtschaft. For Gerhard Mackenroth, in contrast, the sun was shining much less brightly than in his time under Tönnies.

The post-1945 reconstitution of the social science strongholds of the Weimar Republic was achieved in different ways, but to a similar degree. For the further development of the social sciences in the Federal Republic, however, new sites alongside Frankfurt, Göttingen and Berlin became increasingly important,

and at these new sites the influence of returning migrants was much weaker than at the traditional universities, or non-existent, as for example at the Sozialforschungsstelle (Centre for Social Research) at the University of Dortmund.

However, this review of the sites where returning migrants came to work in significant numbers in postwar Germany does not provide an answer to the question of what may have prompted them to return to their former home country in the first place. Only a few of them returned to the positions they had held before their eviction by the Nazis. In contrast to early Austrian remigration, their returns were not the immediate results of restitution policies. Only a small number of those who returned to the three Western occupation zones, and then to the Federal Republic, had an explicitly political agenda. When looking beyond a psychological exploration for systematic patterns of the motives for return, one is more likely to find them among those factors that made return seem the preferable alternative. Thus, an obvious push factor for remigration came from the country where emigrants had survived in the years of Nazi dictatorship. More than half of both cohorts of returning migrants from both countries of origin returned from countries that, at the time, were obviously not very immigrant-friendly or where academic life was comparatively poorly developed. This is true for Great Britain where the social sciences were at the time still rather poorly institutionalized and where there were few attractive employment openings beyond the LSE and 'Oxbridge' (cf. Hasley 2004). But this is also true for Switzerland, which was glad to get rid of the unwanted refugees from Hitler. Return from countries outside Europe, including Turkey and Palestine, was an alternative that was favoured for obvious reasons (in the case of Palestine, this was likely to be true for those who kept their distance from Zionism). In this sense, one may argue that one out of two returning migrants really came home from an exile where, from the very start, there seems to have been little opportunity for them to feel at home.

A prime indication that the opportunity structures of the countries of exile were paramount for emigrants' decisions to return is the proportion of female returning migrants. In the whole group of about one hundred returning migrants, only three were female, and for one of these it is not even sure whether she should be counted among the returning migrants, at all. Clara Maria Liepmann, had obtained her doctorate with a thesis on penal law in Hamburg in 1927⁴⁶ and, in the same year, had gone to the United States on a Rockefeller Foundation fellowship which enabled her to study criminology and do 'practical case work' in penal institutions. When her fellowship ended, she seems to have temporarily returned to Berlin, where she worked with the Prussian penal authorities. But by 1932, she was already back in the United States, first working in Muncy, Pennsylvania, at a State Industrial Home for Women and, later, as a research assistant at the Russell Sage Foundation. There she seems to have met her future husband, Willem Van De Wall, a harpist at the Metropolitan Opera in New York, who acted as a musical therapist at the Russell Sage Foundation and had published several books on the use of music

in total institutions. For one of these books, *Music in Institutions*, Liepmann was a co-author. In 1950, the couple is said to have been in Germany. Liepmann's further trajectory, however, is unknown.⁴⁷

On the two other female returning migrants, information is somewhat more precise. Anna Siemsen's return to Hamburg at the age of sixty-four has already been reported. The third female returner was Charlotte Lütken's who, having graduated from Heidelberg, had worked as an international secretary for the executive committee of the Social Democratic Party at the beginning of the Weimar Republic. After that she seems to have made a living as a freelance sociologist. At any rate, she published a sociological study on the German youth movement in 1925 and another book, *Staat und Gesellschaft in Amerika* (State and Society in America), in 1929. During the Nazi period, she and her husband, a social democratic politician and diplomat, were in exile in London, where she worked as a senior research assistant at the LSE and as a lecturer at the University of London. Right after the end of the war she published a work on *Women and a New Society*, the pictograms being contributed by Otto and Marie Neurath's Isotype Institute in Oxford. Lütken's is said to have returned to Germany after 1949, taking up her political work and later acting as a member of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie (German Sociological Association). Not much is known about her postwar activities. While still in London, she wrote a German summary of the so-called Beveridge Plan, published in Hamburg in 1946.

From the biographies of the three female returning migrants, they can rightly be said to have been part-time social scientists. Even Lütken's, whose phases of social science work were most frequent, only temporarily engaged in this occupation, and even then only among other activities. This, however, would strongly suggest that for women exclusively doing scientific work returning to the German-language countries was not an attractive option. The virtually complete absence of women among the returning migrants after 1945 was not due to any lack of adequate female candidates for positions to be filled. Although female scholars in the United States, the main country of destination for social science emigrants, were facing discrimination in finding positions, as well, they seem to have found nevertheless that American conditions were more likely to allow them access to high-level academic positions. Between 1934 and 1951, seven female emigrants were appointed associate professors or full professors. What is remarkable is that they all belonged to the younger groups of emigrants, while older female emigrants such as Charlotte Leubuscher (born in 1888) and Charlotte Bühler (born in 1883) were not granted the privilege of obtaining a position in exile that corresponded to their previous associate professor status. Käthe Bauer, who was born in 1894 and, thus, only slightly younger, and who had done odd jobs in academia to stay afloat in the time between her eviction from her position as a private lecturer at the Handelshochschule Mannheim (Mannheim Commercial College) and her emigration to the United States in 1939, succeeded in getting a first post-escape job, supported by the Emergency Committee, at a public college in the Midwest

United States. She later transferred to a regular position at a minor college in New Jersey.

The three female social science emigrants who were born just before the turn of the century, i.e. Wally Reichenberg-Hackett (1895), Hertha Kraus (1897) and Julie Meyer-Frank (1897), were rather quick to access positions that in Germany or Austria would most likely have been inaccessible to them. Reichenberg-Hackett, however, is an exception in that even before her Vienna graduation in psychology in 1935, she had spent a year as an exchange student in the United States, where she emigrated in 1936. After a first job at the Menninger Clinic in Topeka, Kansas, she worked as an instructor at Fordham University and at the two women's colleges Sarah Lawrence and Hunter, and finally came to Duke University in 1951. Hertha Kraus's career in the United States was probably facilitated by the fact that, as a Quaker, she could rely on social contacts, which made it easier for her to get a first job after her escape to New York in 1933. But by the next year, she had already entered the world of university education, first at the Carnegie Institute of Technology in Pittsburgh (today Carnegie Mellon University) and then, from 1936, as a full professor at the renowned women's college Bryn Mawr, near Philadelphia. Julie Meyer-Frank, who had taught at Bavarian adult education centres before emigrating, started her American career as an assistant at the New School for Social Research, New York, where she was appointed lecturer in 1943 and associate professor in 1948.

The female emigrants of the next cohort, i.e. those born after 1900, were not as quick to establish themselves in the United States as their male emigrant colleagues but still did so significantly faster and more permanently than their female non-emigrant counterparts. Else Frenkel-Brunswik, it is true, was denied a formal affiliation with the department of psychology in Berkeley because of the anti-nepotism regulations that were in force at the time, but in this case her position as a research associate can be more or less equated to a regular job. Edith Weisskopf, who had been one of Frenkel's Vienna collaborators, was appointed associate professor at Purdue University in Indiana in 1949. Weisskopf's private life, however, was far from following a straight line, and certainly not without problems. Having escaping, by a hair's breadth and with break-neck daring, from Nazi-Austria, this younger sister of the well-known physicist Viktor Weisskopf was twenty-eight when she came to the United States, where she soon obtained a position as an instructor at a college near New York. Two years later, she married Gustav Ichheiser, her senior by thirteen years, who had also managed to escape from Vienna. After two years, the marriage ended, and both went to some trouble to erase the episode from their lives. Ichheiser was later institutionalized for more than ten years and was released only because the Rockefeller Foundation, in response to a reader's letter he had written (which for some unknown reason he had also sent to the Foundation), offered him a grant to have him explore in more detail the questions raised in this short text. Embittered, he spent the last years of his life under the tutelage of Hans Morgenthau, trying to have his forced institutionalization recognized as

unjustified and arbitrary. At the same time, he managed to collect his various studies for an anthology that was published posthumously (Ichheiser 1970). Only a few years later, his former wife Edith Weisskopf met with the same fate: she was also institutionalized for a number of years. And she also succeeded, after her release, to regain a foothold in her professional life (Weisskopf-Joelson 1988).

In 1948, Marie Jahoda, who had spent the war years in England, followed by a spell at the American Jewish Committee, was appointed associate professor at New York University. Two of Charlotte Bühler's other students, Hedda Bolgar and Katherine Wolf, obtained university positions in the early 1950s. Economist Steffie Browne of Vienna did so in 1954, while Ilse Mintz, who was younger, first obtained a second degree in the United States and spent some time on a job at the National Bureau of Economic Research before she transferred to a university position in 1962.

Two patterns emerge from this examination of the careers of those female social science emigrants who were successful. Establishing oneself was comparatively easier and prospects were significantly more favourable for them than for those female scholars who stayed at home. Among the younger female German emigrants, only Hannah Arendt and Rose Laub Coser were able to pursue a university career. Philosopher Elizabeth Hirsch (née Feist), who like Arendt had been a student under Heidegger, had received her doctorate in Marburg in 1928 and had in the following years continued her studies with a Rockefeller grant in Paris. Being Jewish, she lost her job as an assistant in Berlin after 1933 and emigrated to the United States in 1938 where she married another German emigrant, Felix E. Hirsch. For many years, she worked at the renowned Bard College in upstate New York as an instructor of political science, and she later transferred to the public college in Trenton, New Jersey, where she was finally appointed professor. Her study on the Portuguese liberal humanist Damião de Gois, which she had pursued since the 1940s, was not published until 1967. Arendt, who seems not to have been overly interested in a permanent university position after having come to the United States, finally accepted a position at Brooklyn College in 1953. Her prestige, however, was much more due to her guest professorships in Princeton, Chicago and Harvard. Rose Laub Coser, in contrast, had the picture-perfect career, which, in any case, was a surprise to herself. After taking her (second) degree at Columbia University she had not expected to go beyond a teacher's job, as her husband Lewis A. Coser recalled in a portrait of his wife (Coser 1999). Actually, after some intermediate stages and interruptions due to the birth of her two children, she achieved a respectable position at the new State University of New York in Stony Brook.

Finally, there is another factor that may have had an influence on emigrants' readiness to return, namely the response in the world of science that they met with during their emigrant years. It is true that the data underlying our reputation measurement do not allow for any isolated assessment of a scholar's pre-emigration reputation, but the differences between those who decided to

Figure 7.1 Boxplot of Reputation, Comparison of Four Groups, by Countries

Note: $n = 666$. The bold bar indicates the median; the rectangle below stands for the 2nd quartile; the rectangle above stands for the 3rd quartile; the line goes up to the largest value which is neither an extreme nor an outlier value.

Source: Author's calculations.

return and those who did not, which are revealed by a tentative approach based on the reputation acquired over the whole period of observation, are quite impressive after all. Figure 7.1 shows that for social scientists from both countries of origin, the median reputation was significantly lower for returning migrants than for non-returning migrants. The conclusion thus seems to be that at least on a group level of comparison, there is a relation between the problems of establishing oneself encountered abroad and the readiness to return to Germany. For the returning migrants, the return option was attractive because the option of staying in their guest countries was less so.