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INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT IN EUROPE

The fellowship programme was only part of the Rockefeller Foundation's activities and, considering the sums involved, not even its most important one. From the start, Beardsley Ruml's vision was to support promising centres of social science research – 'up to a dozen or fifteen world centers for social sciences' – by providing them with funds to be spread over a period of several years that would allow them to improve their infrastructure, buy books or journals, recruit additional personnel, or release researchers from routine tasks and immerse themselves in their scientific work. Again, European institutions were among the earliest beneficiaries. A much larger share of this programme, however, was dedicated to US institutions, and negotiations between the Foundation and its US beneficiaries were much less complicated and long-winded in the homeland than in Europe.¹

The European research centres that were supported as early as 1925 included, in Britain, the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), the Royal Anthropological Institute and the National Institute of Industrial Psychology, while beneficiaries on the continent were the Institut für Auswärtige Politik (Institute for Foreign Policy) in Hamburg, founded in 1923 by Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy who was also its director at the time, and the Institute for Social Sciences at the University of Stockholm. The Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wissenschaft (Association for the Emergency Funding of German Science) received funding to buy books. They all were granted sums between \$17,000 and \$75,000 (\$212,000 and \$935,000, respectively, in 2010), with the exception of the LSE, which received more than double the amount of the second largest European beneficiary. Compared to the sum allotted to the University of Chicago in the same year, however – a quarter of a million dollars over a three-year period (\$3.1 million in 2010), the support granted to the Europeans was rather moderate.

On the financial level, different options were implemented: large-scale support was partly donated as an endowment, and partly provided as a basic subsidy or an overall budget that was to be spread over a previously defined period and from which funds could be drawn. American institutions were the

only ones to benefit from so-called 'matching funds', i.e. a form of funding that required recipients to raise additional funds from other sources while the Memorial committed itself to equal the sums thus raised, with a ceiling amount previously agreed upon. Owing to this arrangement, the Local Community Research Committee of the University of Chicago, for example, was able to receive \$180,000 (\$2.2 million in 2010) in extra money between 1923 and 1931 in addition to the basic support of \$451,000 (\$5.5 million in 2010) (Bulmer 1986: 141). Support schemes that spread over several years had to be authorized by the Board of Trustees (for the Memorial) or the Executive Committee (for the RF); the allocation of 'grants-in-aid' was left to the discretion of the officers.

Like the fellowships, institutional support was focused on fostering a 'realistic approach', i.e. the type of research that would later be known as empirical social research. This type of social research was expected to improve traditional philanthropy – 'an appeal to tradition, expediency, or intuition' – by providing 'more understanding': 'The interest in science [sic] was an interest in one means to an end, and the end was explicitly recognized to be the advancement of human welfare.' Sponsoring the social sciences would help philanthropy to gain 'greater knowledge as to social conditions, a better understanding of social forces, and a higher objectivity in the development of social policy.' Due to a lack of funds, research in terms of an 'immediate personal observation of the social problems or social phenomena which were under investigation' had so far failed to emerge. Therefore research had remained 'speculative, bibliographical, or merely literary in character'.²

Ruml's second concern was to encourage cooperation among the representatives of different fields. He considered the current division of the 'social sciences' – economics, political science, sociology, anthropology and psychology – to be 'artificial' and of limited efficiency for conducting 'social research'. What was needed was a 'synthesis ... from which a new and more fruitful division of labor may be achieved'. With his memorandum, Ruml wanted to counteract the emerging differentiation of the 'social sciences' in the United States. In Europe, any differentiation of the social sciences was still a long way off.

In a closed meeting of Memorial officers in 1927, a controversy arose between Ruml and Edmund E. Day,³ the new Memorial officer who shortly thereafter would become his successor as head of the Social Sciences Division of the RF, about the issue of what later would be called interdisciplinarity. Day, feeling that Ruml's high opinion of cooperation between disciplines was somewhat exaggerated, asked Ruml why he thought institutions that were dedicated to a single discipline were inefficient. Interestingly, Ruml responded by referring to a European case to illustrate his criticism:

B.R. [Beardsley Ruml] said that a general development was ... not wholesome to preclude varied contacts of disciplines, which would be apt to happen because of the artificial academic categories ... He spoke of the Institute [für Weltwirtschaft und Seeverkehr] at [the University of] Kiel as being an example of a fine research institute in its field, which lacks effectiveness because of having few contacts.⁴

In the last sentence, Ruml gives away his actual motive for denouncing the division of the social sciences as 'artificial'. His *bête noire* was not so much that lines were being drawn between individual disciplines, but that social scientists tended to be excessively single-minded and compartmentalizing.

After Ruml had left, and the Memorial and the RF had merged, policies were reoriented along new lines. Rather than evoking cooperation as merely an ideal, the Foundation now sought to stimulate it more directly by focusing its support. Still, the rhetoric of 'cooperation' kept resurfacing in the papers and communications of RF officers. And critics of the cooperative form of conducting research soon also appeared on the scene. In a widely read magazine, Harold Laski attacked the new form of science which, he said, relied on the 'description and tabulation of fact' rather than on the personal philosophy of the individual researcher.⁵

In the transitional period between Ruml's charismatic Memorial leadership and the rational administration of support as practised by Day and his new staff, the aversion to radical change in the way research funds were allocated was particularly manifest. This seems well worth examining from the perspective of organizational sociology. From this perspective, an element that is particularistic in two respects comes to light.

On the one hand it can presumably be explained as a long-term effect of the tradition of private philanthropy, where the social ties between benefactor and beneficiary had always gone beyond the granting of material support.

On the other hand, this reticence to change reflects a respect for the approach of former collaborators. Their philosophies regarding sponsorship were not simply dismissed when they retired but continued to act as a kind of legacy. In a bureaucratic form of organization, this is something rather unexpected since the ideal of impersonal functioning has always implied that its executive staff is standardized as well, and is confined to the relatively narrow range of tasks circumscribed by their social roles, which makes it easier for them to be replaced. In the formational phase of the 'general-purpose' foundations, by contrast, neither the goals nor the criteria to be applied had been fixed to the point of making interpretational efforts by individual actors unnecessary.

But rapid change was also constrained by the foundation's clients and their expectations. A client who had been selected because he was in need of, as well as eligible for, support could rightly expect not to be arbitrarily denied this status just because the foundation personnel had changed. In the early years of philanthropic foundations, decisions were geared to the support of scholars who were deemed deserving of it, rather than to impersonal research projects. If someone was considered promising in terms of further creativity and productivity, support was almost certainly continued. Thus, requests for support were hardly ever rejected in these early years since potential applicants were much more likely to be dissuaded at a preliminary stage from applying at all. Andrew Abbott points out that even in the 1950s, when Everett C. Hughes was the editor of the *American Journal of Sociology*, this still was the customary practice in the academic world (Abbott 1999). But eventually, even

the RF turned to the new universalistic paradigm of 'peer review'. A major reason for this change, as indicated by Abbott and supported by statistics, was the quantitative growth of the discipline and the consequent impossibility of knowing all of its members personally. The shift to an anonymous evaluation of the quality of a paper – and, one may add, of a research project – was also a consequence of the fact that decision-makers no longer knew the author or applicant as a person.

The problems faced by RF officers with their German clientele after 1933 perfectly illustrate the pitfalls of the particularistic routine for sponsoring research.

EUROPEAN BENEFICIARIES – AN OVERVIEW

Between 1924 and 1941, the date when the European sponsoring programme was more or less suspended due to the United States entry into the war, funds committed to social science research centres in Europe amounted to about \$10 million (about \$150 million in 2005), according to my own estimations. To get an idea of the scale of the spending, one may point out that, after 1929, this was about the same amount the five divisions of the RF could annually dispose of for authorizing new grants. The amount dedicated to the European social sciences was thus only a negligible part of RF spending.

From the recipients' perspective, however, things looked quite different. In the early 1930s, \$10 million would, for instance, have covered one year of wages for 20,000 Austrian scholars or a one-year study stay in the United States for 5,000 European fellows.⁶

The largest sums were allotted to Britain, whose social science institutions received about 40 per cent of the money dedicated to Europe, followed by Switzerland with about 25 per cent. Support for France was remarkably high, amounting to about 17% of the sum total, whereas support for German and Austrian institutions was comparatively moderate (8 per cent and 2 per cent, respectively). All the other European countries shared another 8 per cent.

Under Ruml, the LSE had already been identified as a potential European centre, and William Beveridge, who was its director at the time, made the best of this opportunity (Beveridge 1955). The LSE was the only European university that was granted a 'research fund', otherwise the privilege of American institutions. In addition, the LSE was given considerable funds to acquire land, construct buildings and enlarge its library. Funds to the LSE were remitted under at least seventeen different project titles, and amounted to at least \$1 million (\$15 million in 2010). Among the projects that benefited from these subsidies was a rather disconcerting one entitled 'human genetics', an offshoot of one of Beveridge's more bewildering ideas and part of his effort to further the development of 'social biology'. On the other hand, the grants also served to finance a nine-volume *New Survey of London Life and Labour*. Their main effect, however, was to facilitate the research work of scholars such as Malinowski, Laski, Edvard Westermarck, Raymond Firth, Lionel Robbins and R.H. Tawney. The last grant that was remitted to the LSE in the period under

consideration served to compensate for the loss in tuition fees that was a consequence of the Second World War (Fisher 1980; Bulmer 1982; Bulmer *et al.* 1991; Dahrendorf 1995).

The attempt to induce the two leading English universities to enhance their social science activities was less satisfactory. In spite of intense RF pressure, Cambridge refused point-blank to open up to the new social sciences,⁷ and Oxford hesitated to do so until 1934 (Rockefeller Foundation 1934: 177). Oxford social sciences were further boosted when in 1937 Lord Nuffield donated £1 million (about \$3.6 million at the time, \$53 million in 2010) for the establishment of a Graduate School of Social Studies, and the RF was delighted to help. Cooperation with the two Royal Institutes – for Anthropology and for International Relations – was more of a success.⁸ The best-known collaborator of the latter institute was Arnold J. Toynbee. In 1929, the National Institute of Industrial Psychology, founded in 1921 and generously supported under Ruml, was granted funds for two more years.⁹

In the 1930s, funds were allotted to the establishment of an international network of economic institutes dedicated to the promotion of business cycle research – albeit under the label of ‘Social Security’. The University of Manchester, the London and Cambridge Economic Service of Great Britain and the newly founded National Institute of Business Cycle Research succeeded in being included in this network, along with the Institute for Statistics in Oxford and, of course, the LSE. Some of these institutions had received support by the RF programme for ‘Economic Planning and Control’ before. The Service, whose office was at the LSE and whose president was A.M. Carr-Saunders, who was appointed Director of LSE in 1937, had since its foundation in 1923 published a kind of business barometer, the sale of which had so far served to finance its activities (Rockefeller Foundation 1937: 244–6).

The National Institute for Business Cycle Research was founded in 1937 and was subsidized by three English foundations – among them the Pilgram Trust and the Leverhulme Trust – as well as by the RF, which contributed \$150,000 total (\$2.2 million in 2010) over a period of five years. Its mentor was former LSE director and current private scholar Beveridge who for many years had been on excellent terms with the various Rockefeller foundations and had already benefited from RF support for the gigantic compilation on the history of prices and wages that had been completed under his direction.¹⁰

The sums reported for Switzerland are somewhat misleading since a considerable part of the funds were attributed to the Financial Section and the Economic Intelligence Service of the League of Nations in Geneva. Support was granted for the publication of laws concerning the finance and banking sector ‘of all the nations of the world having stabilized monetary systems’ and for a compilation of international agreements on the double taxation of enterprises with a transnational scope of action (Rockefeller Foundation 1929: 228–9, 253). In the 1930s, Gottfried Haberler was one of the collaborators of this division. The Institut Universitaire des Hautes Études Internationales, founded in 1927, was similarly considered worthy of support. Two years after its foundation, it received a

ten-year subsidy of \$850,000 (\$10.5 million in 2010). The third institution to be supported in Switzerland was the Jean-Jacques Rousseau Institute in Geneva, where pedagogues and psychologists were conducting research, among them Jean Piaget.¹¹

In France, the Memorial and the RF were rather at a loss to identify institutions that qualified for funding. Four research institutions – a documentation centre as well as Institutes for Ethnology, International Law and Public Law based in Paris – each had to be content with a one-time grant, which suggests that they failed to satisfy their donors. The Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère and the University of Paris received funding twice, the latter being expected to become the home of realistic social sciences. Cooperating partners in this endeavour were Lucien Lévy-Bruhl and Marcel Mauss, among others. This effort seems to have been no more successful than the attempt to convince 'Gallic' jurists of the merits of empirical political science.

The most important French ally for support given to institutions was economist Charles Rist at the University of Paris, who from the very start had acted as a fellowship advisor for the Memorial. In 1933, many years of negotiations resulted in the establishment of a non-university Institute for Economic and Social Research.¹² It was dedicated to research in fields that had so far been 'little cultivated' in France, i.e. industrial organizations, the social and economic structure of France, and the development of the agrarian sector and markets, in addition to the obligatory business cycle research. The data and documents investigated and compiled at the institute's documentation and publication centre were to be made available to the public (Rockefeller Foundation 1933: 238–9).

The first Scandinavian institution to be included in the circle of 'European centers of social science research' was the Copenhagen Institute of Economy and History. Its director was Hans Vilhelm Munch-Petersen, who also acted as a fellowship advisor. Later, the institute was also supported as an institution that did research on international relations (Rockefeller Foundation 1930: 220; and Rockefeller Foundation 1936: 248–9). The Institute for Economics at the University of Oslo, which had been founded in the 1920s and was later headed by 1927/8 Memorial fellow (and 1969 Nobel laureate for economics, together with Jan Tinbergen) Ragnar Frisch, qualified for funding because it brought together businessmen and university teachers in a concerted effort to study economic problems and because it 'combines in an interesting and unusual way inductive and deductive methods in economic research' (Rockefeller Foundation 1931: 240).

The Institute for Social Sciences at the University of Stockholm, directed by Swedish fellowship advisor Gösta Bagge, benefited from massive long-term support. It also received funds for construction works, for setting up a social science library, and for other infrastructural projects. Among the research projects that were supported was a guest professorship for American sociologist Dorothy Thomas 'to introduce a specifically American method of attack upon social problems'. Later, the Stockholm Institute, no doubt under the influence,

among others, of Dorothy Thomas and her husband W.I. Thomas, who were engaged in transcontinental cooperation with the Myrdals, also took up demography and migration research.¹³ At the time, the RF observed, and welcomed, a 'slight trend toward interchange of personnel in Scandinavia countries' which was attributed, as its most likely source, to the support given to the three sites in a 'well rounded program, and through interchange, in greatly increasing opportunities for trained investigators'.¹⁴

The group of institutions involved in business cycle research later included a number of institutes at the University of Louvain in Belgium, the Netherlands Institute for Economics, with Jan Tinbergen among its leading scholars, and the Statistical Institute for Economic Research in Sofia, Bulgaria.

In 1935, the RF started funding two institutions in Poland, the University of Lwów and the Polish Academy of Sciences in Krakow. In 1939, due to the German aggression against Poland, both programmes came to an abrupt stop.

Beginning in 1932, a negligible sum from the programme was channelled to Budapest for public administration, while the Romanian Institute for Social Sciences in Bucharest, a non-university institution directed by sociologist Demetre Gusti, who was affiliated with the local university, received at least three 'grants' starting in 1931 (Rockefeller Foundation 1931: 242).

Reviewing these three decades, it is striking to see the rather strong continuity of the ties that had been established, via the first grants, between the officers of the philanthropic enterprise in New York (and, later, its Paris Office) and their European clients.¹⁵ Long after Ruml had left, the contacts he had established remained – as well as, at least until the outbreak of the Second World War, the problems he had pointed out in his memorandum after only one year of European involvement:

Here are the first tentative steps toward the building up of the dozen or fifteen world centers for social sciences ... Only one such center can be said to have clearly emerged, the LSE. The necessity of centers in Paris and Geneva is clearly felt but the problem of method is equally obscure. In Germany, the question is one of choice among a number of strong centers, Berlin, Kiel, Hamburg, perhaps Heidelberg and Cologne. In Austria, the Vienna situation is baffling and it is unlikely that steps can be taken for some years. In Scandinavia, the U of Stockholm stands out prominently.¹⁶

In 1935, the support programme dedicated to the centres of social science research was discontinued, albeit with a five-year transition period (Rockefeller Foundation 1935: 194). At the time, the RF had already virtually stopped operating in Germany. How this came about will be discussed in the following section.

THE GERMAN CASE

As long as the Memorial's European programme lasted, German research institutions received varying amounts of money for varying periods of time. The above quotation from Ruml's memorandum shows that if, in 1925, no decision

had as yet been reached concerning the German centre or centres, the Memorial was nonetheless bent on setting one up.

One of the first institutions to receive grants for conducting concrete research projects, aside from the Institute for Foreign Politics in Hamburg referred to above, which distinguished itself primarily by its nomination of fellows, was the *Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wissenschaft* (Association for the Emergency Funding of German Science) that had been founded after the First World War with the aim of aiding the ailing universities and libraries (Marsch 1994). At a very early stage, scholars in America had set up relief committees to support the country their ancestors had come from. There was, for instance, the Society for German and Austrian Science and Art directed by German-born anthropologist Franz Boas, and the so-called 'Professorentisch' (literally 'professors' table') in Vienna that was sponsored by the Quakers to counteract the severe food shortage.¹⁷ But soon, material help was re-channelled towards the funding of scientific research. Initially, this primarily meant subsidies for buying books and meeting the costs of publications.¹⁸

The first large research grant was allotted, via the *Notgemeinschaft*, to a group of German 'anthropologists' who received the handsome sum of \$125,000 (about \$1.5 million in 2010), to be spread over a five-year period, for a 'Survey of the German Population.' From the perspective of the history of science, this research project is important in more than one respect. It was the first cooperative effort (a so-called 'Gemeinschaftsarbeit') of German scholars who went by the title of social scientists in the RF papers, and it brought together individuals who, due to their activities during the Nazi era, have acquired a questionable reputation. In this case, transatlantic cooperation between the RF and the *Notgemeinschaft* was characterized by misunderstandings rather than by the mutual intellectual and institutional enrichment it was supposed to foster, and its organizational and financial management was somewhat peculiar, to say the least.¹⁹

The idea of applying for financial aid to the RF had been suggested to the Germans by Ruml during one of his trips to Germany. In September 1929, the President of the *Notgemeinschaft*, Schmidt-Ott, submitted a detailed proposal to the RF. In New York, his German letter was translated, and a comparison of the documents shows that due to differences in language as well as in meaning, misunderstandings arose from the very start. Of course, what was termed 'Anthropologie' in one scientific culture could be translated as 'anthropology', but this by no means ensured that both terms described the same thing. In the 1929/30 annual report of the *Notgemeinschaft*, the research project was classified with the cooperative projects in medicine.²⁰ All the explanations provided by the Germans concerning the eugenicist perspective of their research project, and all the elements indicating, in a none too covert way, that this research group was a far cry from any social science approach, were without comment ignored by the RF in New York. Instead, the paper submitted to the RF board that had to authorize the grant gave much weight to the only passage of the six-page letter that referred to the influence of 'social and economic

conditions', thereby subjecting the proposal of the Notgemeinschaft to yet another interpretation. While the German application stated that 'in addition to anthropological surveys' the project would include 'a study of the population in a genealogic and historical context' and, in doing so, would take into account social and economic conditions, the RF paper levelled out the hierarchical research design and, instead, focused on details of survey techniques:

The object of the study is to find a scientific basis for judging the population both as to anthropological composition and as to social-economic relationships. Knowledge as to the recurrence of degenerative traits and the distribution of hereditary pathological attribute should result from the study proposed.

The entire area of Germany will be covered ... through the choice of sixty typical regions as points of attack. Industrial areas, remote agricultural areas, mountain areas, certain urban areas will be included. Regions of various racial or religious composition and regions differentiated by historical events will be studied.

The same documents further specify that the research project would be organized in terms of individual studies to be conducted or directed by the anthropological institutes of the nearest universities. These research directors were to cooperate via the Notgemeinschaft and the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut für Anthropologie, menschliche Erblehre und Eugenik (Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology, Human Genetics and Eugenics). The Notgemeinschaft reported that in the previous year, \$25,000 (\$310,000 in 2010) had been spent on 'preliminary work' in thirty-seven regions, and that they would try to ensure the funding of the study for all sixty regions.²¹ The research conducted so far was described as follows: 'Several related lines of investigation which are intimately related to the general plan have already been uncovered. Data of psychiatric and biological value have resulted from study of the convict prison of Staubing in Bavaria, for instance, and suggest specific criminological research.'

The RF officers, in turn, informed their superiors on what they felt to be the importance of this '*Gemeinschaftsarbeit*' (collaborative work): 'This program of research appears a most promising venture in co-ordinating the work of German universities and scientists. While the chief emphasis is upon anthropological investigation, there is a broad concept of interests involved.' This statement was echoed in Schmidt-Ott's letter of thanks in which this leading German science administrator emphasized that he expected 'support for the idea of cooperative research projects also for other social science fields'.

Reference to the social sciences is primarily found in Schmidt-Ott's covering letters and letters of thanks, but not in the comments on the actual proposal. Why the RF, given its concern with 'realistic research', considered this project as deserving of support remains unclear. Two main factors seem to have been decisive for the emergence of this misalliance. Approval was granted at a time when the Memorial and the RF were deeply involved in the merging process, and the reorganization of responsibilities and personnel that went along with it obviously resulted in a temporary confusion in the administrative order of

the Foundation. In addition, the prestige enjoyed by His Excellency Schmidt-Ott among German scholars seems to have cast a spell on his visitors from overseas, as well. When the internal organizational processes had ended and the RF had reconsolidated, none of its officers showed much interest in the project. Thus, for five years, the Notgemeinschaft received subsidies from New York which amounted to 3 per cent of its annual budget, but it was not subjected to the otherwise customary supervision by RF officers.²² Nothing happened until the German side submitted a request to have the remaining funds reallocated as subsidies for the publication of further volumes of the series they had started. When, in addition, the director of the '*Gemeinschaftsarbeit*' enquired if the 'grant' could be renewed for five more years, Paris-based Van Sickle rejected the request without even bothering to consult New York. This was in April 1933, and one would like to think that the belated change of mind was due the changed political situation. However, there is little to go on for this interpretation.

This research network, repeatedly and rather grandiosely passed off as a '*Gemeinschaftsarbeit*', was directed by Eugen Fischer who since 1927 was a professor of anthropology at the University of Berlin as well as Director of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut für Anthropologie, menschliche Erblehre und Eugenik that had opened in the same year. Fischer was one of the leading German exponents of eugenics, racial biology and racial hygiene. While in his early writings he had still argued a positive stance to racial mix, he later became an advocate of the doctrine of racial purity. He did not, however, join up with the ruthless racists of the *völkisch*-Nordic conviction. Fischer and most of his colleagues remained aloof, at least formally, from the Nazi party for a very long time, insisting on their allegedly purely scientific approach to racial issues. This did not, however, keep Fischer from assuming the post of a Rector of the University of Berlin and, subsequently, from becoming a willing executor of the *Gleichschaltung* (forced conformation) of his university (Weingart *et al.* 1988; Deichmann 1992). Fischer refrained from any explicitly anti-Semitic passages in his writings, conforming in this with a Notgemeinschaft ruling that requested its anthropologists to guarantee – in the time before the handing-over of power to the Nazis – that their publications would not be used in the public debate on the Jewish question (Weindling 1989: 467).

Fischer's favourite research methods were comparisons of blood groups and family reconstructions, both of which were supposed to enable him to determine whether illnesses and criminal behaviour were hereditary. His survey population was to have been the 'native population' of rural districts that had a high degree of endogamy or, in the terminology used at the time, racial purity. Fischer successfully fought off alternative suggestions to use occupational groups as a survey population.

Since Fischer, rather than amalgamate different disciplinary perspectives, sought to rally a number of comrades-in-arms, it seems more adequate to say that this '*Gemeinschaftsarbeit*' was cooperation based on a shared-paradigm and was, moreover, an assembly of high-level university members. However,

this paradigm group was not entirely homogeneous in its scientific orientation. Racial anthropologists whose concern was anatomy worked side by side with researchers in the field of ethnogeny, who were more strongly oriented to the natural sciences and, more particularly, to biology. Research on blood groups provided a convergence point for both orientations, bridging the gap between those who were primarily interested in morphological and anatomical issues and those who focused on the identification of hereditary factors.

A group that had initially been a rival, but had in the end also gained access to the American coffers, was centred on Ernst Rüdin, Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Munich. Rüdin and his colleagues were more interested in criminological and so-called crimino-biological issues. One of the anthropologists who rallied around Rüdin and also profited by this opportunity was Oscar Vogt, Director of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut für Hirnforschung (Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Brain Research), who fell from grace after 1933. He had examined Lenin's brain after the latter's death, he had subsequently maintained his contacts to his Soviet colleagues, and his wife was French – all of which aroused Nazi suspicions. Karl Saller, the only German anthropologist who after 1945 gave a self-critical account of the Nazi period (Saller 1961), was similarly marginalized after 1933. A content analysis of the seventeen volumes of the *Deutsche Rassenkunde* (German Ethnography) shows that almost half of it is taken up by physical anthropology (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1 Content Analysis of *Deutschen Rassenkunde* (German Ethnogeny)

Topics	Pages	%
History	225	12.1
Ethnology	150	8.1
Sociology, Demography	166	8.9
Geography	47	2.5
Pre-History	30	1.6
Economy	30	1.6
Physical Anthropology (incl. Physiognomy)	891	47.9
Methods of <i>Rassenkunde</i> (Racial Anthropology)	71	3.8
Racial Types ('Dinarisch' etc.)	12	0.6
Investigations of Blood Groups	10	0.5
Photographs	228	12.3
Total	1860	100

Source: Fischer 1929–38. Author's calculations.

Beginning in 1932, the '*Gemeinschaftsarbeit*' was reinforced by two other race researchers whose work was particularly infamous in the eyes of latter generations but who otherwise had little in common: Hans F.K. 'Rasse'-Günther ('Race-Günther') at the University of Jena, who belonged to the small group of ruthless racists among the university teachers; and Otmar Freiherr

von Verschuier, who directed the division of human heredity at Fischer's Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut für Anthropologie, menschliche Erblehre und Eugenik. The latter was for a long time primarily perceived as a scholar. Only after it was discovered that Adolf Mengele had been one of his collaborators was this image marred. It is still is a controversial issue in the literature whether or not it was by order of Verschuier that Mengele conducted his murderous research on twins in the concentration camp of Auschwitz.

In the present context, the fate of the German racial anthropologists under Nazi rule is of little relevance since our concern here is with the relations of researchers within the group and with the main sponsor, the RF. Not all of those who rallied around the 'anthropological survey' contributed to the publications that resulted from this large-scale project. Rather, there is a considerable discrepancy between the subsidies provided by the RF and the publications, as revealed by a comparison between the approximately \$100,000 (\$1.6 million in 2010) accounted for between 1931 and 1934 and the seventeen volumes of the *Deutsche Rassenkunde*.

Most of the volumes were published before the handing-over of power to the Nazis. Surprisingly, even the volumes that were published after 1933 refrained from the political kowtow to the new rulers that was customary in other publications of those years. Apparently, the authors did not feel the need to demonstrate their ideological kinship by including martial quotations from Hitler. Not so for Schmidt-Ott, their long-term spokesman in the apparatus of the German science administration; as head of the Notgemeinschaft he did feel this need, as witnessed by his deep reverence to the Führer in the Annual Reports.²³

In the preface to the first volume, Fischer defines the general principles and also refers to the way it came into being. Without the 'generous aid of the Notgemeinschaft, the work would never have been realized,' for which thanks were due in particular to the 'Honoured President, Excellency Dr. Schmidt-Ott'. Here as elsewhere in his preface, no reference, be it ever so vague, is made to the massive support provided by the RF. This contrasted with the annual reports of the Notgemeinschaft that between 1930 and 1933 explicitly evoked RF support for the association in general and, more specifically, for its racial research.

A content analysis of all the volumes clearly shows how far away German ethnogeny was from the social sciences (Table 3.1). The bulk of the published texts deals with physical anthropology, and only a negligible part of them is concerned with social science issues and reflections in the widest sense. That RF aid is passed over in silence before the outward world indeed suggests a systematic effort to distort the facts and blur the traces, which met with a like-minded response in the literature concerned with the history of the sciences.²⁴

In spite of RF interest in German social science, its local social science sponsorship programme was very slow to gather momentum. In 1928, the Heidelberg Institute, which at the time was directed by Alfred Weber, Carl Brinkmann and Emil Lederer, was granted \$60,000 (\$746,000 in 2010) over a five-year

period as a subsidy to its general research programme. Their programme was clearly demarcated by Lederer: studies were to focus on the contemporary economic structure of Europe, especially on the economic bases for establishing industries, on European trade relations with non-European countries and on capital movement in the postwar era.²⁵

In the summer of 1929, on his journey to Europe with Chicago political scientist and long-term RF advisor Charles Merriam, Ruml had already devised a plan to sponsor the establishment of a Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for International Relations in Berlin. One year later, nothing had come of it, partly because the German government had cut down its science expenditure, but mainly because of the open question of who was to be the director of the new institute: 'Unfortunately no one has emerged as the obvious leader'.²⁶ Again, one month later, the issue was discussed in private with the Secretary of the Notgemeinschaft, Fehling:

F. said that time was not yet ripe but that he thought it soon would be as an important person had consulted him confidentially about a plan he had been formulating for some time past and which he had discussed with the Minister of Education. The man is well known to the RF, but Fehling preferred not to mention his name.²⁷

A few months later, the secret about the unknown person had been revealed:

Telegraphed from frontier to Fehling who met me at station Berlin in order to discuss present prospects re Institute of International Studies in Berlin. F. stated that the project referred to at our last meeting was sponsored by Prof. Jäckh. J. wants to call his Institute, 'Institute of Peace', and will have nothing to do with the KWG [Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft] because the very name smells of militarism ... It would probably help precipitate things if F. authorized to say casually in response to German inquiries, that it is his understanding that the RF interested not merely in a center for International Studies at Geneva but also in a number of strong national centers.²⁸

The episode, the rather detailed account of which we owe to Van Sickle's otherwise so concise diary, is an apt illustration of the long-winded and complex functioning of the Teutonic science culture. Not much in this reminds one of the ideal of a scholarly republic of seekers of truth enjoying equal rights. The idealized view of forms of interaction that were obviously oriented to the no less idealized image of Athenian democracy had little in common with the actual situation. Intricate networks of administrative and political power had to be taken into account, competences were but vaguely defined, and whoever wanted to start something new was obliged to find advocates, intermediaries and power brokers who were in a position to submit his idea to those in power, the scope and composition of the latter's portfolios being unknown to anybody outside the chancelleries of his Excellency.²⁹ There were no clear procedures for applying to one of the funds that was charged with administering the finances dedicated to the sciences, nor did it

seem appropriate to propose new ideas when one had them. Rather, it was appropriate to wait for the right moment. The entrenched confrontation of republicans and mandarins, of democrats and those who grieved after the fallen monarchy, had crystallized into habitual barriers that kept scholars apart and were not at all easy to overcome. If, to boot, the topic at stake was a politically sensitive one, such as international political research, and funds of American plutocrats were involved, failure was predetermined.

Instead of founding a new institute for international studies, which in July 1930 had turned out to be definitely impossible,³⁰ the RF awarded a \$25,000 five-year period grant (\$318,000 in 2010) to the Notgemeinschaft for research on international relations.³¹ The committee, as the annual report of the RF notes in its habitually amiable and none-too-specific manner, 'consists of scholars from various fields and represents the beginning of a promising program in cooperative research upon international questions, in which German jurists, economists, political scientists, sociologists, and publicists will participate' (Rockefeller Foundation 1931: 249). Soon after the first instalment had been remitted to Berlin, a conflict with another recipient of RF aid appeared. The Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (German Academy for Political Science), directed by Ernst Jäckh, the hapless founder of an Institute for Peace, planned to extend the academy's research activities to the field of international relations. Selskar M. Gunn, Associate Director of the Social Sciences Division in Europe, who had either not read the diary of his colleague Van Sickle or was still maintaining an unbroken optimism with respect to cooperative research, tried to deal with the Berlin problems the American way: 'Personally he [Gunn] thought it would be desirable if the Hochschule could absorb the committee as it had good men on its staff and was working in close collaboration with scholars in various German universities.'³² Apparently, this cooperation never came about.

In November 1932, Excellency Schmidt-Ott assembled a select group of social scientists at the Berlin Hotel Continental to have lunch with Kittredge. Those present were Hermann Schumacher, a member of the German fellowship committee, Herbert von Beckerath, from Bonn, Arnold Bergsträsser, from Heidelberg, and Arnold Wolfers, from the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik: 'In general the program has taken the form of a series of studies of the world trade and of the effects of governmental intervention in the economic field, on movements of capital and goods. The committee on international relations has thus far avoid [sic] any attack upon outstanding controversial questions of Germany's foreign policy.'³³ In Heidelberg, the situation seems to have been less complicated. Arnold Bergsträsser, an Assistant at the Institut für Sozial- und Staatswissenschaften (Institute of Social and Political Science), had applied to the RF for the first time in February 1928. On his first visit to Heidelberg, Van Sickle was rather pleased. In August 1932, Bergsträsser sent him the first volume that had been completed thanks to RF support: *Local Economic Policy*. Half a year later, Alfred Weber, the institute's senior scientist, reported in person – albeit in German – to Van Sickle on the work that had been done so far.

Reliance on the German language by almost all German applicants as well as by the Notgemeinschaft Secretary Fehling is one of the peculiarities of the German clientele of American philanthropy. Unlike most Austrians who in their second letter to RF representatives, at the latest, started to write in English – and, in doing so, saved the Paris Office the trouble of having the documents translated before forwarding them to New York – the Germans, although most of them were quite proficient in foreign languages, held on to their mother tongue. Was it the fading pride of the once leading nation of science, was it simple thoughtlessness, or was it the fear that no other language would allow them to phrase their request in adequate terms?³⁴

Towards the end of February of 1933, Van Sickle was again in Heidelberg, negotiating on a further three-year subsidy. Although the request had his backing as well as that of the other European officers, nothing came of it. When Nazi dictatorship had been established, a number of New York trustees vetoed any further funding of German institutions. In the end, their scruples, first no doubt drawn primarily from public opinion, determined RF policies in general: individual grants, yes; institutional support, no.

In the seven years between the launching of the European programme and the end of the Weimar Republic, neither the Memorial nor the RF had managed to find German cooperation partners for the planned German centre. Had they contacted the wrong people? Was the number of scholars interested in, or considered capable of, the realistic type of research too small, or was seven years too short a period for such an undertaking, given that after the spring of 1933, RF ‘field officers’, while steadfast in their intentions, came up against the veto of the New York headquarters?

An answer to this question may be found in the impression a benevolent American visitor could not help but receive of German social sciences shortly before Hitler was appointed Chancellor of the Reich. In the summer of 1932, Tracy Kittredge had written a detailed report on the situation of the social sciences in Germany. One-third of it is dedicated to a description of the German system of higher education and the internal workings of its universities, and to a comparison with its French and, of course, American counterparts. This is what he wrote about the career paths of junior scientists, for instance:

The German system of appointment has of course its weak points as well as its strong ones. Thus, admission to the first rung of the academic ladder – the *Privatdozent*ship – is not based, as in France, upon perfectly free and fair competition open to all who satisfy certain minimum requirements, but upon invitation to compete by a professor. This practice makes possible the promotion of an excellent man, but it also opens the door to favoritism. In the present temper of Germany there is a real danger that this possibility of favoritism will react on the quality of the ‘*Nachwuchs*’ [younger generation] in the country. France has protected herself against this danger but at the expense of closing the door upon the really brilliant man who does not satisfy certain very formal requirements having little connection with capacity for research.³⁵

Kittredge found German *Nationalökonomie* (political economics) ‘well developed’, and specialization farther advanced than in France, but noted that

German economists had until recently met with little approval abroad because of the prevalence of the Historical School. He saw the German development in sharp contrast to the Austrian school which, under Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk and Friedrich von Wieser's leadership, had achieved great brilliance and top-rank renown. Their 'weakness was just the opposite to that of the German Historical School – its impatience of the tiresome grubbing for facts, and its enormous reliance on theoretical analysis.' Among the economic institutes, those in Kiel und Heidelberg stood out; the former, he wrote, was 'a mecca for research workers interested in international economic problems'. The somewhat smaller Heidelberg Institute was covering almost the whole field of the social sciences: economics, political science, sociology, history, geography and law. Until Joseph A. Schumpeter's recent departure, the third most important centre of economic research had been Bonn. This was due in part to the scholarly excellence of the three directors of the Institute (Schumpeter, Arthur Spiethoff and Herbert von Beckerath), but mainly to their capacity for harmonious cooperation and their competence in drawing up a well-designed research programme.

Kittredge continues with a comment on a peculiarity of German research organizations which cannot be fully understood unless it is seen against the background of the United States structure of departments and research centres described in Chapter One: 'The situation here [i.e. Bonn], as at Heidelberg, affords a good illustration of the difficulty of operating research programs in Germany. Research Institutes are built up around one or two scholars with a flair for organisation and a capacity to raise money. When the leader dies or is called to another university, the Institute vegetates or disappears.' Kittredge goes on to give a short summary of German business cycle research as well as of research on public finances, transportation economics and rural economics.

In contrast to economics, *sociology* seemed much less developed, and its achievements much harder to assess, for someone who had been socialized in the American world of science: 'To understand many a German sociological article one must know well the entire history of German philosophy.' According to Fehling, Kittredge writes, there were 'about thirteen first-rate sociologists' in Germany. Leopold von Wiese of the Cologne Institute, who at the time was widely considered to be the most influential sociologist in the Weimar Republic, is only briefly characterized. 'No one of the Paris Office has as yet visited the Institute.' The first visit to Cologne took place towards the end of February of 1933, under highly adverse conditions, and nothing became of it.³⁶ Johann Plenge's Forschungsinstitut für Organisationslehre (Institute for Organization Research) in Münster disposed of 'appreciable research funds': 'Report is however, that the director has such a difficult character that cooperation with him is impossible.' The last institution referred to is the Institut für Betriebssoziologie und Betriebslehre (Institute for Organizational Sociology and Business Economics) of the Technical University in Berlin, under its Director Götz Briefs.

On all these scholars, Kittredge seems to have had only second-hand information, an assumption further confirmed by the fact that both Van Sickle's and Kittredge's diaries fail to allude to their names or to any visits to their institutes. Even for those scholars he deals with in more detail, Kittredge notes that his knowledge of them is rather unequal. By way of introduction, he writes: 'Professors Mannheim at Frankfurt, Andreas Walther at Hamburg, Freyer at Leipzig, all have seminars in which research is going on with very inadequate support. Heberle, a former fellow of the R.F. is developing at Kiel an interesting program on the border line between sociology and political science.' The Seminar für Soziologie (Seminar of Sociology) of the University of Frankfurt, under its director Karl Mannheim, was reported to have been very active, conducting research on the mechanisms of leadership choice in political parties, trade unions and the Catholic Church, on women in politics, on the sociology of the immigrant and on the effect of education on social status. His conclusion was that 'Professor Mannheim is one of Germany's leading sociologists, and the work here [Frankfurt] is said to be interesting and significant.'

The seminars directed by Andreas Walther and Hans Freyer, he went on to say, were of about the same size. Walther was interested in urban sociology, had been to the United States and was the co-editor of Emory S. Bogardus's *Journal of Applied Sociology*. 'It is only lack of funds that prevents him [i.e. Walther] from developing careful inductive studies.'³⁷ Freyer was said to be Germany's 'best know[n] young sociologist'. Thanks to RF funds, American literature was 'fairly well represented' in the library of his seminar. Contacts between the RF and Freyer must have existed even before Kittredge wrote his report, since on 31 July 1931, Van Sickle's diary in Paris reads: 'Dr. Hartshorne. SSRC fellow called to discuss his project. Advised him to call on Fehling and Hans Freyer of Leipzig with whom we had discussed his project.'³⁸ Van Sickle had met Freyer in May 1931 in Leipzig, had had tea with him at his home and had also visited his institute. The memorandum notes, among other things:

Freyer himself is one of the leading sociologists and has come into the field from philosophy. In his own work he is primarily concerned with philosophic and dialectic problems and the history of sociological thought. As Director of the Institute, however, he is directing students into research of a more realistic nature. He is undertaking comparative studies in city planning, regional planning and colonization. In the latter field he is particularly interested in the methods by which colonists are selected and the type of colonist that best succeeds.

Freyer is about 40 years old, lively, alert and very friendly. He was told of the proposed work of several of the SSRC fellows next year, and he expressed the greatest willingness to receive them and to aid them in any way in their work.³⁹

The colonists Freyer proposed to study were probably part of the so-called *Binnenkolonisation* ('domestic colonization') which, given the Nazi slogan of '*Volk ohne Raum*' ('Nation without Space'), might have given rise to suspicions as early as 1931. Subsequent Nazi resettling campaigns benefited, as Götz Aly

and others have shown, from the preparatory work of the German '*Ostforschung*' ('Research of the East') (Aly and Heim 1991) – something Van Sickle could not know at the time.

Van Sickle's notes illustrate the consistent course of action taken by RF officers who travelled through Europe. Before funds were granted, candidates had to undergo a personal inspection by an RF officer. The impression thus received had at least as much weight for decision-making as the content of their projects.

Finally, almost every contact was used to open gates for protégés from both sides of the Atlantic, to encourage the exchange of ideas and to provide support. In latter-day terms, this was 'networking'.

Van Sickle and Kittredge, while not shying away from rightwing contacts, were hesitant in their dealings with the left-wingers. Kittredge's report includes a characterization of the Frankfurt Institut für Sozialforschung (Institute of Social Research). He highlighted its position between sociology and economics, praised its excellent library and considered it an 'effective center for research in labor problems' where a study on 'labor attitudes which is based on an elaborate questionnaire' was currently being conducted. For Kittredge, this study – obviously the study on blue-collar and white-collar workers in the pre-Nazi era which was published many years later (Fromm 1980) – was the first one in Germany to apply this survey technique.⁴⁰ Although comments on the political orientation of projects are rare in RF documents, there is a concluding remark about the Institut für Sozialforschung: 'It is regarded in Frankfurt as a breeding ground for communists and as being financed from Moscow.'

Although Van Sickle considered Frankfurt to be a 'very important university center', he advised against 'large aid': 'The atmosphere is international and Jewish. Many Jews on the faculty. From the point of view of research Frankfurt is of first importance. Any large aid here just now would be badly received by German public opinion. A series of small grants-in-aid might on closer examination prove advisable.'⁴¹ As such, these sentences express blatant anti-Semitism. Given the context in which they were written, the reluctance thus expressed to support research done by Jews illustrates a basic dilemma of philanthropic activities abroad. How much allowance should be made for public sentiment in the recipient country, how much compliance should be given to their prevailing standards and prejudices? With respect to the advancement of science, this dilemma has undergone a slight shift in its emphasis: how could one make the 'peaks higher' without getting involved in public controversies? This was something every member of the Rockefeller empire was mortally afraid of since that disastrous attempt to promote the industrial interests of the founder by a form of ancillary research that turned out to be nothing but propaganda. In the years after 1933, this was a recurrent pattern, and we will see how the RF and its European officers coped with this delicate, as they saw it, problem.

A third social science discipline considered in detail in Kittredge's report is *political science*. Europe, he wrote, was lacking a real equivalent to American

political science, but German international law, public law and administrative law might be seen as those fields that most closely corresponded to 'political science'. The most important institute of international law was the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for International Law) in Berlin, under its director Viktor Bruns, which according to Kittredge had been established as part of German efforts towards a revision of the Treaty of Versailles. Institutes at the universities of Kiel, Frankfurt and Göttingen are mentioned in passing, while Hans Kelsen's Cologne Institute is presented in great detail. Kittredge reports that Kelsen had been promised sufficient funds when he was appointed, but had failed to receive them due to the present crisis. Kelsen and his assistant Erich Hula, a former RF fellow, had to make do with a poorly equipped library and, as a result, were handicapped in the proper conduct of their research.

Both are Austrian Jews, able, and more theoretically minded than their German colleagues. Their approach offers an interesting contrast to the prevailing German approach which starts from the assumption that international law has to be discovered and described by careful historical and inductive study of international agreements. To them law is an historical growth and not a product of pure reason. Kelsen maintains, on the other hand, that there is a uniformity of principles which makes international law of a higher order than any of the particular manifestations of law that may appear in the statute books of nations, or in the treaty compromises between nations.

German RF representative Fehling voted against support for Kelsen, arguing that in addition to Kiel and Hamburg, the two Berlin-based institutes, Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht and Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht (Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes for International Law and International Private Law),⁴² were quite sufficient to cover the field.⁴³ Despite this, Hula was awarded a 'grant'.

The Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (German Academy for Political Science), which Kittredge hoped to see evolve into the 'most important center for research in Germany' as a result of the support granted in 1932, was favourably reviewed, as was Mendelssohn-Bartholdy's Hamburg Institut für Auswärtige Politik (Institute for Foreign Policy), which from the very start had benefited from RF support.

With respect to future RF policies in Germany, Kittredge concluded by discussing three variants of aid and its potential beneficiaries. Large long-term aid variants in Germany were bound to come up against the problem he had himself repeatedly addressed in the report: a single person leaving an institute could bring the whole work to a standstill. Therefore, aid should only be granted to those institutes that 'have gained sufficient momentum and built up such an equipment as to offer reasonable guarantees of permanence' – a category where Institut für Weltwirtschaft in Kiel (Kiel Institute for the World Economics) had a top position.

Minor aid – Kittredge gives the figure of \$3,000 (\$42,000 in 2010) of annual support – might be granted to six to ten one-man centres or institutes to enable them to conduct ‘post Ph.D. level’ research, improve the training of future professors, and promote ‘inductive as against speculative inquiries’.

The third variant would be to continue subsidizing committees charged with ‘specific pieces of research’, as had been done in the past for the anthropological survey and, more recently, for international relations. This kind of aid did not saddle the RF with any post-hoc obligations.

Before analysing RF activities in Nazi Germany, let us briefly consider the question of whether the RF’s perspective on the situation of the social sciences in Germany in the summer of 1932 was accurate. Although it is somewhat surprising that Werner Sombart is not mentioned in the RF documents, the picture is by and large consistent. Why Ferdinand Tönnies and Leopold von Wiese were ignored or underestimated is hard to understand given their actual position and their at least partial affinity to the inductive programme of the RF. Ignoring Theodor Geiger is a real oversight which seems to be due to the fact that the field of vision of the RF officers – and their German confidants – did not extend to the smaller universities. Due to the lack of political scientists who actually identified themselves as such, and due to the RF focus on international relations as the core element of political sciences, no final evaluation is possible. What is quite certain, in contrast, is that German psychology was completely ignored as part of the field of the social sciences to be considered.⁴⁴ More or less the same is true for philosophy and history. While a sizeable proportion of German fellows were recruited from both disciplines, their disciplinary environment was not taken into account. In the case of philosophy, this meant that contacts were established with Freyer but not with Martin Buber, Ernst Cassirer, Helmut Plessner, Hans Reichenbach or Paul Tillich.

A comparison with the situation in Austria – or the Netherlands, where the distinguished historian Johan Huizinga was the fellowship advisor – clearly shows that after 1929, the national Memorial representatives were decisive for the RF field officers’ perception of, or blindness to, the local characteristics of these disciplines. Professor of Modern History Pribram sponsored psychologists such as Charlotte Bühler or ethnologists such as S.F. Nadel, Robert Heine-Geldern and Christoph Fürer-Haimendorf, while the German Committee and its Secretary Fehling were unsuccessful in their selection of fellows as well as unwilling to look for candidates beyond the circles of those students who rallied around the influential mandarins.

Half a year after Kittredge’s report was written in 1932, any plans for enhancing RF commitment in Germany had become obsolete. As a result of Nazi accession to power, RF protégés were dismissed or driven into exile while RF officers found themselves saddled with the delicate task of deciding which of those scholars that did not leave Germany could still be sufficiently trusted to conduct research that was politically unbiased.

THE NAZI PROBLEM

Even before January 1933, RF officers were attentive observers of political developments and public sentiment in the countries where the RF was operating. Discrimination against Jews, and also against women, was noted in diaries and other documents, as were the obstacles faced by those fellows who returned.

The first returning researcher whose concern over German developments was mentioned in Van Sickle's diary was a French fellow. Georges Gurvitch returned 'very depressed' from his stay in Germany and Italy:

Feels that Hitlerism is sweeping Germany and that union of Germany, Russia and Italy and a European War not unlikely – or else civil war in Germany. Fears for our whole western civilization. He regards the difference between the Social Democrats and the middle parties as practically unbridgeable. The S.Ds want economic and industrial democracy and will scrap the Republic if necessary to get it. The middle parties, on the other hand, want economic and industrial authority and will scrap the Republic if necessary. Meanwhile Hitlerism thrives. Northern Italy is full of Germans and they are almost all Hitlerites. 85 per cent of the student body at Heidelberg are fascists. Everywhere one talks of an early revision of the Peace Treaties – war is praised.⁴⁵

Until January 1933, RF officers confined their observations to paper in order to keep one another, as well as RF officers in New York, abreast of developments in Europe. After that, decisions were increasingly influenced by their evaluation of the situation in Germany and the developments to be expected. Most of their interlocutors who had stayed in Germany did not seem overly concerned. At the end of February 1933, Van Sickle, somewhat enervated, notes:

[N]or have I found two people who agree as to the immediate future. Significant is it, however, that Professor Jäckh, a Left Liberal, and Professor Spiethoff (Bonn), a Right Conservative, are agreed that developments will be orderly. Spiethoff looks for a Right consolidation that will destroy communism, restore religion, and force Germany to live within its means. Jäckh looks for a Hitler Government with Papen and Hindenburg the real masters, capable of restraining the excess of National Socialism.⁴⁶

A few weeks later, Van Sickle informed the Director of the Social Sciences Division in New York that the Paris Office was assailed by refugees enquiring about potential aid, and asked what he is supposed to do. In the same letter he also reported a proposal of the Secretary of the German Fellowship Committee arguing that it would be 'highly useful' to make 'some local grants which would not directly involve the Foundation' to support a number of 'outstanding German Jewish scholars' who had been dismissed.

He feels that such grants should only be made to men who are prepared to stick it out in Germany. He does not approve of the exodus so early in the struggle, and he is glad to note that many of the very best men are staying to see the matter through ... Fehling

states that the government has let it known that while it cannot officially retract and replace the evicted scholars upon the public pay roll, it would be far from adverse to seeing them taken care of through private or foreign resources.⁴⁷

Of course this is plain nonsense – but was it so in the spring of 1933? There is no indication whatsoever that Fehling, after January 1933, took to ingratiating himself with the Nazis. Like many others who were not subject to direct persecution, however, his reaction was a mixed one, partly laying the blame, as people will do in times of confusion, on the victims themselves and on their illusionary hopes. Fehling's trust in the good will of the government and the Nazi elite (rather than in the strength of their political opponents, or goodness knows what) is something one is least inclined to hold against him given that he was raised in the frame of mind that is characteristic of the authoritarian state. That this sentiment could be contagious, however, becomes apparent in the last sentence of Van Sickle's letter to Day: 'The individual cases are extraordinarily depressing. We should not forget, however, that during the past fifteen years the Jewish liberal element has definitely favored in Germany, and that they have, as a result, attained to a situation which inevitably produced a reaction.'

Given the enormous efforts made not only by the RF as an organization but also by all of its officers to come to the aid of those who had been driven out of their country by the Nazis, it would be unfair to set too great a store by this remark. As an illustration of the, at least temporary, disorientation and the readiness to fall back on easy explanations that is typical for this kind of situation – and what could be easier than blaming the victims? It is nevertheless depressing.

The impression that the European RF officers were more or less at a loss as to what to do is further emphasized by the unusual frequency of letters being sent to New York. In the spring of 1933, Van Sickle was obviously near-desperate in his endeavour to find a way to continue support in Germany. In his letter of 8 May 1933, once more to Day, the questions raised clearly outnumber the suggestions made. Van Sickle was much more clearly aware than his German informants that there was no future in 'objective scientific social science research' in Germany. The government, he argued, was extremely nationalist and anti-liberal. Some means of publication might survive because the government was not interested in them, but what would become of the students, and would researchers dare to publish anything that was contrary to the 'prevailing religion' in the first place? Although the prestige enjoyed by the sciences in Germany was immense, they had surrendered completely and without protesting. If freedom of speech and academic freedom was suspended, the RF would have to discontinue its support, but a way should be found to make clear to all thinking Germans how severe a blow their country's science had received.

To withdraw now would not produce the desired effect. To the public at large and to many university professors such action would be tantamount to our saying that

the Jewish scholar and the Weimar Republicans alone had our confidence; that we doubt the ability of a 'pure' German to do objective work. Withdrawal, on the other hand, after a further cooperation would not be liable to such an interpretation.

As a conclusion, Van Sickle raises the question of whether RF policies towards Germany should be the same for all RF Divisions or whether each Division should decide for itself.⁴⁸

The case of Germany's most important beneficiary of RF subsidies, the Institut für Weltwirtschaft at the University of Kiel, may serve as an illustration of how the RF was attempting to maintain its support. It also shows how hopes for niches where RF protégés in Germany might be able to survive were thwarted by the Nazis from both inside and outside the universities.

On 28 April 1933, Van Sickle reported to New York that the Director of the institute, Bernhard Harms, had got into trouble with local Nazis, but that the Prussian government and the government of the Reich were still supporting him. A few days later, Harms told Van Sickle over the telephone that he had been summoned to Berlin to explain his defence of his Jewish collaborators. Two days later, Harms again called Van Sickle to tell him that the Prussian authorities as well as those of the Reich had been 'entirely sympathetic'. A note of the same date says that Gerhard Colm had been relieved of his duties, but had not been dismissed, that Hans Neisser wanted to leave Germany and that Jakob Marschak had asked if it would be possible to transfer his RF-supported workplace to Geneva. Given Harms's reassuring information, Van Sickle suggested that the RF should make an 'emergency grant' to the Kiel Institute to help it overcome its budgetary problems, with explicit mention that they risked withdrawal, thus strengthening Harms's position.

In May, visitors from abroad affirmed that the political situation in Kiel was difficult, but that working conditions were good. At the end of the month, Harms was reported to have been confirmed in his position while a new man – 'Jessen, Nazi' – had been put in charge of finances and agriculture. Neisser was in England where he conducted research with funds from Kiel, and Colm, while relieved from his duties, was still paid by the institute. By mid-June, the RF Paris Office was informed that Harms had left Kiel, information which was corroborated a few days later by Harms himself who told Van Sickle that he had been dismissed, as of October 1933, from his position as a Director but would keep his professorship in Kiel, and that his successor, Jens Jessen, had the economic, organizational and human competencies needed for the job. In his report to New York, Van Sickle tried to make things seem not quite as bad. Harms, he wrote, had resigned of his own free will and had designed Jessen as his successor because the latter was the only Nazi-party member among the professors. Van Sickle took up negotiations with Jessen over ways to continue RF support. In this, Jessen tried to rope in Van Sickle by promising to hire a former RF fellow. After consultations with Day, Jessen was informed that previously approved annual installments would be continued, but that no 'emergency grant' would be given. Day approved a special fellowship for Harms.

In the meantime, Alva and Gunnar Myrdal had put in a three weeks' stay in Kiel and on their return to Sweden sent a 'strictly personal and confidential' detailed report to Van Sickle in Paris.⁴⁹ This six-page letter typed in narrow lines is important not only as a document by two eye-witnesses, but also, and no less so, because both Myrdals showed great sympathy for the Kiel Institute and their German colleagues but, unlike Van Sickle, were under no pressure to act.

Kiel, Königsberg and Breslau, they wrote, had been converted into 'political universities' by the Reichsministerium. The Kiel Institute would doubtlessly be of major importance, and to this end, a change of staff had occurred, not as a result of 'revolutionary action' but through regular dismissals. Most of these changes, however, would not take effect before the summer semester of 1934, and dismissal from Kiel did not necessarily mean that those concerned could not get a position elsewhere. One of the professors who had been dismissed from Kiel was criminologist Hans von Hentig, who had closely cooperated with the institute's sociologists. One of the professors who had been newly appointed, besides two or three rather less competent 'sympathizers', was Hermann Bente from the University of Königsberg. The Zentralstelle für Hochschulforschung (Centre for Higher Education Research), where Svend Riemer was working, would surely be closed down. The future of business cycle research was uncertain without its director Colm, but as to the fate of junior staff in general, nothing had as yet been decided.

After this overview, the Myrdals reported on 'face to face talks' with institute staff and characterized the personality of their interlocutors: 'As a rule people have been extremely open-hearted, both as to their opinions on the general situation, on their personal hopes and fears, and on their estimation of each other.'

Harms had been the only one with whom they had, for obvious reasons, avoided discussing these 'vital problems'. All the others had confirmed that he was courageously fighting for the freedom of the institute, 'even when facing the guns'. He had sacrificed his own position to help others survive which, however, had by now turned out to be of no avail. There was no way of knowing what he really thought about the situation. 'Anyway he is out of influence.'

They had had a 'frontal discussion' with the new man, Jessen. As a person, he had impressed them as 'honest but naive, a jugendbewegt puritan type'.⁵⁰ He was well capable of considering things from a moral standpoint, but this by no means made him less dangerous, because he was 'quite a man of principles', 'doctrinaire as to the Nazi ideas of race and nationale Gesinnung [views] as first requirements'.⁵¹

Gunnar Myrdal had taken a look at some of his publications and had discussed some technical issues with him. His conclusion is that 'compared with international standards' Jessen was 'not a very prominent scholar'. Jessen was an important man within the Nazi movement, an unofficial adviser of the Kultusministerium (Culture Ministry) and rather close to the Führer. Some considered him to be the 'Robespierre' of this revolution. He saw himself as one of the few men 'inside the policy of the new state'. His fanaticism kept him

from acting with caution and a long-term perspective; in the name of the 'holy ideal' he would be ready to execute any policies whatsoever. Since he was definitely more strongly committed to other ideals than academic freedom, and since he was capable of rationalizing any given motive, vengeance and a sense of inferiority being first among them, he would pass off even complete oppression as idealism. Since he had not previously held any position of power and was sticking to a moderate rhetoric, he might still grow with his new task.

The institute's Andreas Predöhl's scientific achievements were quite good, albeit in a very narrow field. He was a diplomat, the Myrdals said – somewhat later in the letter, the meaning of the term is specified: 'He is going to conform.' That he remained with the institute was seen as one of the positive points, but he was not a 'very strong guarantee'.

The two other professors at the institute were nice, but naive and had no backbone. Among the assistants, the Myrdals explicitly mention Heberle, Walter Egle, Walther Hoffmann and Riemer. Surprisingly, Heberle had so far not been harrassed. He was one of the few German sociologists who knew what data were. He would in all likelihood have to leave Kiel, but they thought he would still be able to find another position in Germany. Egle was, for the coming years, provided for thanks to a RF fellowship; he had accomplished some good work, and although he seemed to be rather desperate, he would be able to conform to the new Germany. Hoffmann was an intelligent junior economist who could be expected to be able to direct a programme of business cycle research. However, as a former socialist, he would come up against major difficulties.

Svend Riemer was 'somewhat of a discovery'. He was one of the most brilliant junior sociologists and, in addition, well-versed in economics and statistics. The Myrdals praised Riemer's competencies in much detail and warmly recommended him for a RF fellowship which, however, he was not awarded until five years later (see Chapter Two). Riemer emigrated in 1934 with the help of the Myrdals who, having felt from the start that this step was inevitable given his Jewish wife and his socialist past, employed him, as a first measure, at their Stockholm Institute. Riemer's manuscript on working-class university students that Alva Myrdal had read during her stay in Kiel in the summer of 1933 could no longer be published in Germany, but seems not to have been published as such by Riemer in exile, either.

All in all, Kiel presented itself to the Myrdals as staffed by a rump faculty, facing major succession problems because of the lack of acceptable Nazi economists, and housing a group of young people who risked forfeiting not only their jobs but their entire academic future. Academic freedom was jeopardized by political considerations on four levels: choice of research issues, choice of the facts and data to be published, choice of senior researchers and choice of scientific staff. 'This point about the Nachwuchs [younger generation],' the two Swedes add, 'we consider to be the most devastating element in the situation as its effects reach far into the future.' They did not feel called upon, they said, to proffer advice to Van Sickle and the RF, but a major reason for

maintaining RF commitment in Germany, as they saw it, would be the opportunity to bring to bear an influence on the scientific development in that country.

In the summer months of 1933, Jessen repeated his request for an 'emergency grant', and Van Sickle again informed him of RF refusal. Less than two weeks after this letter had been expedited from Paris, Harms got in touch after a three-month silence and urged Van Sickle to grant some kind of support to Jessen, saying that he had had a long talk with him and could 'entrust his life work to J. with full confidence'.

In the end, the RF trustees refused all payments to German institutions with direct links to the Nazi government. Financial aid to individuals, in contrast, was still possible.

When Van Sickle visited Berlin in February 1934, an agreement was reached with Fehling that Jessen should be prevented from making yet another attempt to obtain an 'emergency grant'. (This little episode illustrates the RF's preference for preventing potential applicants from applying rather than impress the public by large numbers of rejected applications, as many institutions for the advancement of science did in later years. Thus, they not only kept clear of the obviously undesirable and awkward situation of having to turn somebody down, but also acted economically with respect to their officers' workload.)

In 1934, Van Sickle transferred to the New York RF Headquarters where he worked until he left the Social Sciences Division in 1938. His tasks in Europe were taken on by Kittredge. In July 1934, the latter visited the Kiel Institute, where he also met Harms who had returned from his stay abroad – made possible by an RF fellowship – and who was still fighting for his institute. Jessen, he reported, had been suspended from his directorship, and there was a possibility that Predöhl would be appointed his successor. Predöhl would not accept this position unless he was given free rein in running the institute and its research programme, as well as granted a budget by the government which would be sufficient not only for maintaining the institute but also for conducting at least a limited research programme. A few days later, Predöhl, who already held the position of a pro-rector in Kiel, was indeed appointed Director of the institute.

Negotiations between Kiel and the Paris Office continued as before. Fehling campaigned for support. The new Director, RF ex-fellow Predöhl, reported on the friendly atmosphere of the talks conducted in Berlin about the institute. He proposed to recruit another RF ex-fellow, Gerhard Mackenroth, and shortly thereafter had to admit that Leo Drescher, also an ex-fellow and recruited on similar motives by his predecessor, could no longer be employed. Drescher himself reported difficulties concerning his *Habilitation*.

One cannot help thinking that some tacit consensus had been reached between the American patrons and their German clients on a way to let the Kiel Institute have at least part of the money the New York trustees had no longer been willing to grant. By limiting support to the extensible 'old boys' network' of Rockefeller fellows, they hoped to be able to maintain the quality of research and to establish a kind of reinsurance even though this implied creating a world of revolving doors.

All RF officers seem to have disregarded the tenor of the resolutions issued by the trustees of their foundation in numerous ways. In collaboration with the Director of the Kiel Institute, Predöhl, whose appointment to this position was surely not due to the fact that he had held a three-year fellowship by the American foundation beginning in 1925, they funnelled many minor sums to those ex-fellows who rallied around the Kiel Institute and accepted all new nominations. While between 1925 and 1932 there had only been three nominations of fellows by the Kiel Institute, the number doubled after 1933, which at any rate further contributed to easing the stress on the institute's budget since no salary needed to be paid while someone was abroad. These sums would have to be added to the direct financing if the real volume of RF support was to be established.

Second, the European RF officers ignored the Myrdals' suggestions about those junior collaborators of the institute, as well as those who had to leave after 1933, whom they thought particularly deserving of support. Riemer finally got a fellowship when he was in Stockholm, but this seems to be due to the activities of his Scandinavian patrons rather than to any specific support by RF officers. All the other names mentioned in the Myrdals' report disappeared from the scientific scene.

Third, Van Sickle, Kittredge and Day – the latter by not stopping his colleagues – also dismissed the Myrdals' misgivings about scientific content and research policies. After Jessen's retreat from the directorship of the Kiel Institute, Predöhl enjoyed the Paris RF officers' unconditional confidence. Only after the end of the Second World War is there a note on Predöhl's political stance. Talking to a RF officer, exiled RF ex-fellow Friedrich Lutz pointed out that Predöhl, probably not from his innermost conviction but due to sheer opportunism, had been a Nazi until the end.⁵² This can be assumed to also apply to all the others who pursued a career in Kiel during the Nazi period, since this university was one of the strongholds of Nazi science policies (Janssen 2000).

Fourth, in the end, all these efforts were of little effect: a majority of Kiel economists emigrated, if not in 1933 like Colm and Neisser, then still in the 1930s as one by one, Rudolf Freund, Egle, Riemer, Drescher and Heberle left Germany. Among those who stayed, the founder and long-time director Harms, as well as Karl Stephans, who had worked in Kiel as a guest researcher for a certain time, died before the outbreak of the war.

The line of action followed by RF officers in Europe did not go unchallenged by their New York hierarchy. When in September 1937, Kittredge addressed a long letter marked 'personal,' and arguing for a continuation of RF activities in Germany, to Syndor H. Walker, who had served the Rockefeller foundations since 1924 after two years of working for a Quaker European aid programme, the differences of opinion became obvious:

The Paris officers were unanimously of the view that the Foundation's program should ignore, so far as possible, political considerations. Where interesting and important

work could be supported, the Paris officers were unanimous in urging that grants should be made for such work in Germany as well as in any other countries of Europe. The present situation probably renders inadvisable large grants, and necessitates particularly careful examination of individual proposals. The officers felt however, that it would be mistake to refuse assistance to work in Germany merely because the government happens to be of a type which does not win the personal approval of the Trustees and officers of the RF. It was agreed that the limitations on work in the SS field are greater than in other fields.⁵³

In the margin, beside the sentence underlined by Walker, there is a handwritten comment: 'rather mild characterization'.

THE AUSTRIAN CASE

In September 1930, John Van Sickle once again visited Vienna and dined with Ludwig von Mises at Restaurant Schöner. His diary provides the brief note: 'further discussion of the proposed Institute'. The discussion, as further diary entries on a talk with Alfred Pribram clearly indicate, was not about the future of von Mises's Konjunkturforschungsinstitut (Institute for Business Cycle Research), but about the founding of a new one. The project proposed by the two Vienna confidants had obviously strongly appealed to Van Sickle, since he noted a week later: 'I spent the remainder of the period in Lausanne working up a report on the proposed Viennese Independent Institute for Social Studies.'⁵⁴

In a letter to Edmund E. Day in New York, Van Sickle reported on the initiative:

In view of the low level to which the university is sinking such a project is appealing – doubly so to me because of my affection to Vienna. [Pribram] has approached me confidentially, so that the matter is not yet on record. I have replied discouragingly as you will see from the enclosed copy of my letter, without completely closing the door.⁵⁵

He tried to persuade Day to come to Vienna: 'It seems to me that you ought to know conditions there first hand.' At the end of September, he sent Pribram's proposal to Selskar M. Gunn, as well.⁵⁶ At the time, however, Van Sickle did not manage to convince his superiors. Another memorandum Van Sickle had sent to New York at the end of October was definitely rejected by Day:

your memorandum of October 27th ... Free University at Vienna. Gunn and I talked this item over at some length. It did not seem to either of us that it would be wise to provide Foundation support for such an organization in Vienna at this time ... I personally share your opinion that some of the best existing personnel, as well as some of the best traditions, are to be found in Vienna. But for the present it would seem unwise to make any move there which would not divorced from highly charged political implications.⁵⁷

Half a year later, at least one of the superiors had changed his mind. In early May 1931, Gunn reported in detail on his visit to Vienna in the preceding

month. He informed Day that he had altered his opinion and now approved Van Sickle's suggestion of supporting the Vienna project. This shift, he said, was brought about by the fact that obviously no reasonable results could be expected from any direct dealings with the University of Vienna.⁵⁸ As a result, Day sent a telegram to Paris on 20 May: 'Van Sickle Approve further study situation Vienna but with careful explanations that no grant is assured stop.'⁵⁹

Thus the Vienna researchers could now be encouraged to set up a request, which they did in less than two months. In early June 1931, Van Sickle was already back in Vienna to discuss the founding of the institute: 'The formal request for aid for the Institute of Social Sciences in Vienna will be forwarded very shortly.'⁶⁰

The Austrians kept their promise, submitting a six-page 'Memorandum on the situation of Research in Social Sciences in Austria' well within the time limit they had been given.⁶¹ The memorandum provides a detailed description of the situation in Vienna and explains the conception of the planned institute. The document is dated 'July 27, 1931', and is signed by Friedrich August von Hayek, Alfred Francis Pribram, Ludwig von Mises and Richard Reisch, all of whom except for Pribram were members of the Konjunkturforschungsinstitut.⁶²

In a first step, the authors deplored that Austria lacked private sponsoring for the social sciences, while state funding was almost exclusively dedicated to university teaching. After the end of the war, due to general impoverishment and the influence of party politics, which presented a special danger for the social sciences, the situation had further deteriorated. What little means were available were administered by organizations with a more or less obvious political orientation, and with a tendency to dedicate them, understandably enough, to such ends as served their party line rather than abide by scientific criteria. At present, there was no support upon which independent and unprejudiced social science research could rely. The support given to the Konjunkturforschungsinstitut by the RF had enabled it to launch a number of promising studies, but the field was necessarily very narrow. Researchers in other fields of economics and, more generally, in the social sciences suffered from being unable to commit themselves exclusively to their research work.

This general and no doubt justified lament is followed by some explanations about the situation at the universities and in the various social science disciplines. The following issues were said to be promising for fruitful research:

- Social history: 'We still need a comprehensive work on the share which nobility, clergy, state-officials, bourgeoisie and labour had in the cultural and social development of the old Empire.'
- Sociology: serious studies addressing the problems arising from the 'racial and national mixture of population in Central Europe'.
- Economics: Vienna is a city that had produced the greatest number of theoreticians worldwide. But 'as soon as it comes to the question of verification of the theories', the lack of funds prevented them from pursuing their work.

- Political science: the transformation of an autocratic to a democratic community as well as its effects on social and economic policies were worthy of more in-depth studies.

For sociology and political science, the situation was particularly awkward since in both disciplines the lack of university professors tended to 'turn away' those young people who might be interested in the issues listed above 'because they do not find the slightest encouragement or aid in their study'.

The new institute was to make grants to young people to allow them to engage in full-time research work. An annual salary of \$500 (\$7,000 in 2010) each would be quite sufficient, and sponsorship should extend to two years for about twenty individuals. Considering how perfectly this proposal answered the conception initiated and pursued by Beardsley Ruml, one wonders whether its Vienna authors had not been given a hand in setting it up.

The next visit to Vienna by a RF representative did not occur until February 1932. The visitor was Gunn, accompanied by Van Sickle. In a three-page letter (dictated, but not revised, hence the spelling mistakes) to RF President Max Mason, Gunn reports his Vienna impressions:

So far we have met with nothing but gloom and almost despair on the part of some people [i.e. Prof. Pribram]. No one apparently can guess what will happen, and no ray of light is apparent. Pribram seems to think that ... Austria ... is doomed to become a 'bread and cheese' country, typically Balkan, and he sees its cultural development dwindle to a very low point ... The University has been having student troubles and has been shut for some time ... The difficulties were nationalistic and anti-Jewish in character ... Austria cannot afford to support three universities. Innsbruck [sic] and Gratz [sic] could be dispensed with as far as the needs of the country are concerned, but local pride, tradition, etc., keep them going despite the difficulties. There is overproduction of trained men in all directions. Seventy per cent of the doctors and lawyers are Jewish ... I see no feasible program for the Foundation at Vienna. Aid to certain institutes or individuals may be desirable on occasion in the future.⁶³

Van Sickle and Kittredge persevered in their efforts to secure support for Vienna, and the impression one gets, though unfounded in terms of actual evidence, is that the two RF officers made common cause with their Vienna protégés against their Paris and New York superiors.

Charlotte and Karl Bühler succeeded in securing support on their own, independent of the more comprehensive plan. Charlotte Bühler could avoid waiting for the financial approval of the common institute but had not failed to evoke the possibility of cooperative work with, for example, the Vienna ethnologists.⁶⁴ This has repeatedly been described in detail and need not be reiterated here.⁶⁵ Charlotte Bühler could even win over Gunn who, although as a rule he was more hesitant, thought fit to point out in a letter to Day that 'they [the Böhlers] are a couple who it would be difficult to beat. Non-Jewish, but liberally minded on the Jewish question.'⁶⁶

In the autumn of 1932, Kittredge stayed in Vienna for some time. He conscientiously informed the RF of Pribram's concern that the Austrian science system could no longer be maintained by its own means, and unfailingly stressed the latter's request: 'he hopes that the Foundation will continue its interest in the Social Sciences in Vienna and will find it possible, sooner or later, to make a substantial contribution toward maintaining and developing the work now being done'.⁶⁷

The seizure of power by the Nazis in Germany brought little change, for the time being, to Austria. Van Sickle and Kittredge interviewed a number of Austrians about the future of economic research in Germany. Mises's comment on the situation in March 1933 is the typical expert's mix of clairvoyance and resentment: any intelligent economic research was likely to come to a standstill for at least one generation, while the Nazis would impose their own economic theories, which were based on incorrect premises. Intellectual freedom would be abolished and, more generally, a 'legal confiscation of Jewish property' by capitalizing on income tax regulations was to be expected.⁶⁸

As a consequence of the change that had occurred in the neighbouring country, chances for setting up the new institute in Vienna even seem to have improved. In the beginning of October 1933, Van Sickle sent a long letter to Day in New York⁶⁹ reporting a talk he'd had with Pribram. Pribram had again referred to the proposal transmitted by Van Sickle two years previously and had insisted on his belief that this institute was 'the most constructive thing we could do down there'. This was followed by some very detailed propositions, beginning with the names for the institute's board of directors, which would include five persons:

- Aryan Prof. Richard Rei[s]ch, former President of the Austrian National Bank, representing Economics.
- Jew- Aryan Prof. Mises or Prof. Hans Mayer, representing Economics.
- Aryan Prof. Karl Bühler, representing Psychology.
- Aryan Prof. Verdross, representing Law and Political Science.
- Jew Prof. Pribram, representing Modern Social and Political History.

According to Pribram, it is more than ever important that the Institute should be independent of the University. The majority of the professors there are frankly Nazi. The directors of the proposed Institute would all be members of the university, but they are all Liberals and independent. There would only be one or at the most two Jews in the Direction. It might be well to get in an Anthropologist-Sociologist of the Koppers-Schmidt group [the Catholic priests Wilhelm Koppers and Father Wilhelm Schmidt].

The letter is reproduced here not only literally, but in its graphic layout in order to illustrate how much store Van Sickle, and presumably also Pribram, set by racial affiliation and how far they were prepared to go in making allowances for the general atmosphere in Vienna.

Van Sickle asked Day to re-read his letter of June 1931, arguing that while he still felt that the objections raised against the Vienna plan were justified,

'subsequent developments, especially in Germany, may have rendered them somewhat less serious'. The situation in Vienna was such, he wrote, that 'we may be justified in backing frankly the minority liberal element'. He suggested that annual grants of \$10,000 (\$158,000 in 2010) should be made for 1934 and 1935 and that for this period – with the Psychologisches Institut and the Konjunkturforschungsinstitut still benefiting from their own 'grants' – support should primarily be channelled to research work that was not covered by the programmes of these two institutions. Meanwhile, a 'habit of collaboration' might develop, and decisions as to whether to transfer support from individual institutes to the one and only 'Social Science Institute' or, inversely, to 'scrap' the latter, could be suspended until then.

Only a few days later, Van Sickle travelled via Heidelberg to Vienna where he stayed for more than a week. His report to Day is optimistic: 'The case for increased support here [i.e. Vienna] seems as strong as does the case for decreased support in Heidelberg.'⁷⁰ During lunch at Sacher's with Pribram, Alfred Verdross and Ferdinand Degenfeld-Schonburg, an agreement had been reached to form a committee for administering research funds independently from the university. The letter does not specify who was to be a member of this committee, but there is reason to believe that the three guests at Sacher's saw themselves in this role. This assumption is further confirmed by the list of research fields that were to be covered that had not previously benefited from RF support: 'Constitutional and International Law, Modern Political and Social History and Economic Policy'. Why projects in these disciplines should be able to conduct 'joint research ... on Vienna – somewhat along Chicago lines' remains unclear. Chicago, the centre of sociological research in the 1930s, was associated with a style of research that focused on urban problems as the starting point for, and object of, detailed sociographic descriptions; in Vienna, only Paul Lazarsfeld's *Wirtschaftspsychologische Forschungsstelle* (Austrian Research Unit for Economic Psychology) was familiar with this kind of research.

In contrast, Van Sickle's attitude towards Othmar Spann was quite unambiguous. He reported that he had advised Pribram to define the social sciences in his 'letter of request' so as to preclude 'support of the pure Romanticism and the vituperative propaganda of Spann ... yet permit support of precisely defined problems by younger scholars of the Spann School'. Van Sickle noted that the whole proposal involved some 'distinct hazards' but saw 'deep personal animosities' as their only source – which is definitely wrong. It was certainly erroneous to suppose that the conflicts between the rival groups of scholars were based on personal differences alone and had nothing to do with politics. They had their deepest roots in the fact that the protagonists belonged to different ethnic and social groups, as the 'Aryans' in particular were pointing out with increasing violence, and these conflicts could no longer be resolved by a 'tactful and impartial committee'. The inclusion of Degenfeld-Schonburg, who only a few years earlier had been the object of a rather disparaging comment by Van Sickle, actually showed that apart from the few university professors with whom the RF was already in contact there

was nobody else who was not predisposed to anti-Semitism. In this respect, also, the view reported by Van Sickle that this was something like a violent conflict between schools was inaccurate. Degenfeld-Schonburg had been the very professor who had flatly informed young Fritz Machlup that he was opposed to his *Habilitation* (Craver 1986a). By including Degenfeld-Schonburg in the circle of the 'beneficiaries', Van Sickle hoped to make it harder for him to persevere in 'his present destructive opposition to all objective liberal research':

Thus, if one of his men receives committee support, it would be harder for him to characterize as 'stuff and nonsense' another piece of work accomplished under committee auspices by a man of the rival marginal utility school, and to oppose his 'habilitation' at the university. To do so would be an affront to the whole committee.

Even if, Van Sickle adds with some resignation, his worst misgivings should come true, the RF had achieved two major goals: 'We shall have aided the social sciences in Vienna over a critical period, and we shall be in a better position to know what to do in 1935 when our existing grants to the Psychological and Business Cycle Institute terminate.'

In November 1933, Van Sickle dispatched the documents that were needed for an application to be processed to New York. The request was for US\$13,000, or 65,000 Austrian Schillings (\$213,000 in 2010) to be spread over two years, i.e. until the end of 1935, to be granted to a 'Committee for Promotion of Social Science Research – Vienna'. The reasons given were, among others, that after a recent visit to Vienna by the Assistant Director for the Social Sciences, i.e. Van Sickle, the latter had reported that the situation in Austria was 'promising', that the economic situation had improved, and that in the current academic year, Austrian universities would host about 5,000 foreign students (as compared to 7,000 foreign students in Germany). Furthermore, there was 'an abundance' of scientific personnel.

Degenfeld-Schonburg, Verdross and Pribram were members of the Committee. One of Pribram's students, Friedrich Engel-Jánosi, was to be its secretary, and ethnologist Wilhelm Koppers was to be included as a further member.⁷¹ The Committee was to draw up a 'general research program in the social sciences', complementing the work done at the Psychologisches Institut and the Konjunkturforschungsinstitut. The 'field of international relations' was explicitly mentioned. The beneficiaries of the 'useful emergency support of the social sciences in Vienna'⁷² seem to have been neither intent on nor capable of engaging in the kind of social sciences that the RF meant to promote under the generic term of 'inductive research'. Van Sickle, for one, seems to have been aware of this, since on being summoned by New York to give a more detailed account of the projects to be conducted, he was uncommonly vague: 'The recent history of Vienna, i.e. from ca. 1800 to date ... Verdross states that the opening of the Ballhaus-Platz archives gives access to a mine of information regarding the diplomatic history of the pre-war period, and the formation of

international law.⁷³ The primary goal, however, was to help the 'former fellows' who were an 'elite of young scholars', which would be a 'capitalization of the very large sums we have invested in their formation'.

An examination of the list of former Austrian Rockefeller fellows helps to clarify whom Van Sickle may have had in mind. About twenty Austrian fellows had so far benefited from fellowships. Of these, a few were ineligible for reasons of quality. Others had just been granted a renewal of their fellowship (Hans Mars, Paul Rosenstein and S.F. Nadel). Still others had obtained more or less secure positions at home or abroad (Edgar Foltin, Ludwig Fritscher, Alexander Mahr, Ewald Schams, Erich Voegelin and Elisabeth Ephrussi-Waal), or worked at one of the two institutes that were supported independently of this new project (Charlotte Bühler, Oskar Morgenstern and Gottfried Haberler), leaving Erich Hula, Leo Gross and Friedrich Thalmann among the older ex-fellows and Joseph H. Fürth, Roland Grassberger, Berthold Löwenfeld and Karl Stephans among those recently returned as potential collaborators of the new institute.

All this suggests that at this point, it was no longer possible – even considering what the term was understood to mean in the early 1930s – to set up a research association that could have reasonably carried the name 'social scientific'. Due to the lack of opportunities for studies in sociology and political science that had already been pointed out in the original memorandum by Hayek and co., the range of scholars who might focus on social science research was more or less limited to the collaborators of the Konjunkturforschungsinstitut and the Psychologisches Institut. Considering the conception of science that predominated in the interwar period, one might add the idiosyncratic Vienna version of ethnology as an institution capable of producing talents. However, these three institutions already received RF support albeit, at least partly, a rather modest amount. Thus, the new Research Committee was compelled to either allocate additional funds to collaborators of these institutions or fall back on such competencies as were represented by the Committee members themselves: modern history or, more specifically, the history of diplomacy, and law, in its more or less traditional variants.

Actually, neither the Vienna aficionados among the RF officers nor the members of the new committee need to have bothered since, as we all know, the political history of Austria took a different turn. The main question had become whether there still was something like 'reasonable freedom of research' in the first place. In January 1934, the request for support disappeared from the agenda of the RF Executive Committee. Apparently, American observers were much more in awe of a Nazi seizure of power in Germany than of the suppression of social democracy that occurred soon after in Austria.⁷⁴

Remarkably, Van Sickle did not give up but doggedly fought on for his Vienna project. As a result, a number of informative documents were drafted, and some remarkable judgements were written down. At the end of January 1934, French economist Charles Rist, having been asked for an opinion, said that he knew Dollfuss⁷⁵ well enough to feel that an authoritarian regime

headed by him would be 'compatible' with 'reasonable freedom of research'. Van Sickle, elaborating on Rist's argument, suggested that a distinction should be made between 'good and bad authoritarianism'.⁷⁶

Less than two months later, Van Sickle asked Day whether it would seem inappropriate to resubmit the suspended Vienna project, and expounded his view of the situation in Austria – and it can be safely assumed that this view was shared, if not inspired, by some of his Austrian confidants. Van Sickle, not unreasonably expecting to see 'a dictatorship tempered with Schlamperei [sloppiness]', felt that under these conditions social science research could go on and, ergo, be subsidized.⁷⁷ However, the New York headquarters, not at all willing to invest in a situation as unstable as this, flatly refused to reconsider the Vienna request.⁷⁸

In April, Van Sickle was back in Vienna, this time reporting not on dinners, but on compromises. Pribram, he wrote, was the only one to be utterly pessimistic, which had to be put down to his age, bad health and race – 'naturally the Jews are the most uneasy'. Hula and Karl Bühler were radiating optimism, the former expecting a reconciliation among the classes since the Austrians were 'very real Christians', the latter reporting small results with the new Vienna rulers which, however, presently turned out to be the effect of an intervention by a number of Catholic scientists around Koppers and Schmidt who had pleaded for tolerance with respect to Bühler's work. The scholars, described by a defiant Van Sickle as 'members of the self-constituted committee for administering a Rockefeller Foundation fluid research fund', expressed their sympathy for the removal of their request from the agenda: placed in his position, they would have done the same. But all of them, as the author of this for once rather succinct report emphasized, had been unanimous in thinking 'that within wide enough limits freedom of research is assured'.⁷⁹

Within one year, support for the Psychologisches Institut and the Völkerkundeinstitut (Institute for Ethnology) was discontinued, leaving the Konjunkturforschungsinstitut as the only one that regularly received RF funds under authoritarian state rule.⁸⁰ Understandably enough, the former beneficiaries were not prepared to take this lying down, and some of the bolder ones even tried to submit new requests to the RF. Although the pattern of RF officers being favourably inclined towards their Vienna partners' requests, and invariably being turned down by New York headquarters, persisted for several years, the group of professors who wanted to be invited to dinner increased. On 10 March 1938, Kittredge reported from Vienna on the proposals that had been submitted to him during his recent stay and listed all those with whom he had had discussions. Besides the familiar names of Pribram, Degenfeld-Schonburg and Hans Mayer, and of those fellows who were still living in Vienna ('Fürth, Hula, Mahr, Voegelin etc.), there were the newcomers Otto Brunner, Alphons Dopsch, the Director of the Konsularakademie Friedrich Hlavač, Heinrich Srbik, Richard Strigl and Stefan Verosta. It appears that somehow word had got to Vienna that the RF had meanwhile established 'international relations' as a priority for its sponsoring activities. At any rate,

Dr Anna Selig came up with a proposal for a 'Vienna International Study Center' that was to do research on the relations 'between German and non-German populations of Central and Eastern Europe' and to provide 'students from the U.S.A. and Western Europe' with a venue for their studies. In his report, Kittredge went on to say that Selig had secured 'strong backing from Catholic and Liberal groups in Austria and other countries' for her project, as well as fifty rooms in a wing of the Salesian Seminary for housing it; funds for purchasing the library of Josef Redlich would come from the Carnegie Endowment.

A few days later all this had become obsolete, and the only problem left for the RF to solve in Vienna was to decide on how short a notice the small grants already approved should be discontinued. The last installment to the Konsularakademie in the spring of 1938 was already remitted in Reichsmark, and aid for the Konjunkturforschungsinstitut was discontinued as soon as it became evident that it would cease to be anything but a branch of the Berlin Institute.⁸¹

Rather than support institutions in Austria, the RF now turned to the support of Austrian scientists in exile.

Initially, the establishment of an interdisciplinary centre for social science research in Vienna had not failed because its conception had been deficient or because there was a lack of funds, but because the rival cliques had suspiciously watched over one another to prevent preferential treatment, and in so doing behaved as if the aid the RF was prepared to give had been the stakes in a zero-sum game (which was the case only for state-administered research funding). When they had finally agreed on how to divide the pie, RF assessment of the political conditions for long-term commitment in Austria was so negative that it no longer came as a surprise when the plan of establishing a second 'world centre' for social science research in Vienna was repeatedly adjourned and, finally, abandoned. The two RF officers who had come to like their Austrian protégés had initially euphemized their reports and were now confronted with an ever-growing throng of petitioners whose scholarly expertise they were no longer able to assess, contrary to what they used to do for their early Austrian – and indeed for all – contacts. They had secured some material aid for a number of former fellows in Austria, but the great majority of former fellows as well as their patron Pribram had to leave the country in 1938 to go into exile. There, some of them could benefit from the relations established during their fellowships and did not need to draw on special aid for refugees while others were provided with more or less prolonged support by the RF.