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Sport and the Global Peace Movement

This chapter explores the history, characteristics, politics and implications of the global peace movement as it connects to sport and physical culture. The central argument of the chapter is that while the peace movement has connected to and informed the organization of sport at least as far back as the nineteenth century – for example, through the internationalist ethos that underpinned the revival of the modern Olympic Games – notable and significant distinctions can now be seen between the oppositional and resistive political goals that characterized the peace movement during most of the twentieth century and the current trend towards sport as a ‘tool’ useful for inclusive peace education. Commensurate with this shift, rather than engaging in political resistance against militarism, many of the current efforts connecting sport to peace tend to theorize, position and mobilize sport as a tool or metaphor by which to achieve peaceful relations through improved social and political understanding and/or effective post-war reconciliation (e.g. Dyck 2011; Gasser and Levinsen 2004; Höglund and Sundberg 2008; Sugden 2006, among others). As such, these approaches connect to a recent ‘cultural turn’ in twenty-first-century peace organizing, in which efforts have been concentrated more on building relations of peaceful understanding and less on challenging the undemocratic militarism of domestic and international relations and social life more broadly that constitute the traditional resistive principles associated with the peace movement (see Galtung 1988). Through historical examples, and contemporary comparisons, the implications of this distinction are discussed.

The chapter proceeds in three parts. In the first section, the history and features of the peace movement and various peace movement organizations (PMOs) are discussed, drawing attention to the specificities of its political ethos and the shifting goals and approaches of the global peace movement since the late nineteenth century. This is followed by an analysis of the ways in which some peace activists and PMOs have connected to and shaped sport and of how various athletes and sport organizations have come to approach and support struggles for peace. The chapter concludes with a review of critical, scholarly appraisals of sport and the peace movement and a discussion of the implications for sport and peace when the traditional ethos of the peace movement is contrasted against the current turn towards more inclusive, yet individualized, notions of peace education and a commitment to building a ‘culture of peace’.

History and features of the global peace movement

Any discussion of the global peace movement must recognize its historical, political and geographical specificities. The peace movement has been marked by trends, divisions and shifts in its organization, goals, geographies, membership and strategies. Yet, despite these pluralities and divergences, some important historical trajectories and ideological similarities can be established that allow for a general conceptual basis of the global peace movement.

It is reasonable to suggest that the roots of the peace movement extend back at least to the early nineteenth century. A general longing for peace following the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1814 facilitated the simultaneous emergence of pacifist communities, or peace societies, in both Britain and the United States. These peace societies were often underpinned by religious and/or moral commitments to non-violence and the rejection of militarism (Brock 1998). By the late 1800s, a peace movement could be seen within an emerging internationalism and a growing belief in the distinction and rights of nation states, promoted, for example, through the hosting of World's fairs designed to celebrate a global humanity (Quanz 1994). The 'pacifists' who supported this movement put forth critiques about the destructive effects of war and the general illogic of extended militarism and held as their principal concern improved international relations and understanding that would reduce conflict and promote stability and development. The Interparliamentary Union, established in 1892, and the International Peace Bureau based in Switzerland were illustrative of this era and had a direct influence on Alfred Nobel as well as the establishment of the League of Nations (Quanz 1994). This was not a socialist, idealist or utopian movement, but one that embraced a detached realism and practicality in the face of the geo-political challenges posed by the sovereign nation state (Quanz 1994). As discussed further below, this nineteenth-century peace movement contributed to Pierre de Coubertin's ambitions to create the modern Olympic Games based on nation-based character and gentlemanly understanding, and also influenced the ideological positioning of the Olympic Movement itself as an exemplar of peace promotion (Loland and Selliaas 2009; Quanz 1993; Wassong and Muller 2007).

While these features of peace promotion in the nineteenth century were influential, the peace movement proper is generally considered to be a twentieth-century phenomenon. It was after World War II that many in the scientific community began to organize in order to call for a ban of atomic weapons that had led to incredible destruction during wartime and that posed unprecedented potential for devastation on a global scale (Meyer 1999). In turn, the emergence of insurgent and resistive social movements more generally in the 1960s began to include calls for peace, notably the iconic and influential organizing within the United States against the Vietnam War. These movements called for an end to military incursions and the conscription of citizens into

military service as part of activism aimed at broad social change. Eventually, the peace movement of the 1980s focused on resisting the proliferation of an international nuclear arms race and calling attention to the threat it posed to nothing less than the future of humanity (Meyer 1999). Many of the efforts of the peace movement in the 1980s focused on critiques of the political logic and rhetoric of the Cold War, and challenged the aggressive and threatening foreign policy of countries like the United States. In this sense, there have been two main political tracks in peace movements since the end of World War II: protests against the proliferation of nuclear weapons (the aspect of the movement that achieved the greatest attention and participation), and opposition to aggressive military intervention and antagonistic foreign policy (Meyer and Whittier 1994; Rose 2000).

Importantly, while some viewed the peace movement of the 1980s as situated primarily in Western Europe (Galtung 1988, p. 380), by this time the peace movement was a global phenomenon; it was active in North America in response to US participation in the Cold War arms race, as well as in regions of South America, resisting military control of the political process. It was also during this time that the global peace movement arguably reached its peak with regard to its social profile and political import, a zenith that was evident in both Europe (Meyer 1999) and the United States (Edwards and Marullo 1995). Indeed, by the end of the twentieth century, the relative invisibility of peace movements as compared to those 20 years earlier led some to conclude that social movements calling for peace had subsided (Meyer 1999; Rochon 1990). From this perspective, one of the features of the peace movement as it reached its apex in the 1980s was its extended social and political reach, but also its reduced depth of critique as it moved from, for example, calls for complete demilitarization of Europe to a specific focus on doing away with Cruise and Pershing missiles (Rochon 1990). In addition, this late twentieth-century peace movement can be characterized by its increased willingness to work with political authority, not simply to challenge it. In this sense, the peace movement, like other social movements, was itself forced to deal with the implications of its own increased political acceptance and palatability. As Rochon (1990, p. 120) argued, 'the strategy of mass mobilization limited the ability of the peace movement to preserve its critique of the political system and to maintain its focus on cultural revolution'. As discussed further below, this trajectory has implications for the current turn towards peace education and a culture of peace as opposed to resistance to military industrialism.

It is important to remember, though, that the declining visibility and even political importance of the peace movement after the Cold War did not result in the absence of active PMOs, nor did it signal a simple reversal of the movement's growth phase (Edwards and Marullo 1995). Indeed, in response to unilateral and even illegal military action by the United States and its allies post-9/11, the global peace movement has enjoyed something of a re-emergence. Some of

the features of this re-emerging peace movement are familiar, whereas others are less so. Clearly, the advent of online communication increasingly features in the contemporary peace movement to the extent that current political struggles in and around military conflict can be understood as the struggle against government, military and even complicit media sources to control information (Pickerell and Webster 2006). The contemporary peace movement has also 'evolved' in that it can be seen to have learnt from previous criticisms that peace activism was unpatriotic; it has adopted new discursive strategies to build popular support, such as arguing that ending war is the best way to 'support the troops' (Coy et al. 2008). Importantly, the connectivity and breadth of groups involved in the contemporary peace movement suggests that they do fit within notions of alter-globalization as a 'movement of movements' (Pickerell and Webster 2006). In particular, there has been significant youth engagement in the contemporary peace movement – particularly in protesting against military actions in Iraq – though the public images of this movement, and to some degree its effectiveness in mobilizing support, is regularly and routinely subject to media criticisms (see Cushion 2007).

In the broadest terms then the peace movement has been, and to some degree remains, characterized primarily by its opposition to institutionalized, corporatized and state-supported militarism. As modern states increasingly embraced and normalized militarism in support of domestic security and international relations, and regularly assumed full control of this military power, social movements organized in order to question the sanctity of state-led military power and call for peaceful resolutions to conflict and security threats. Peace historian and theorist Johan Galtung (1988, p. 378) has provided a cogent and useful definition of what can be considered the central mission of this peace movement:

The essential task of the Peace Movement in a historical perspective is to challenge monopoly control over coercion in general, and military power in particular, by the government in the modern state . . . Thus the basic argument of the Peace Movement is that the state abuses military power. (The Peace Movement) is an expression of fundamental distrust of the responsible state officials, whether military or civilian.

In addition, several other characteristics of the peace movement can be identified. First, its general commitment to resistive politics has regularly overlapped with other social movements, such as human rights, organized labour, women's rights and environmentalism. Thus, while the focus of the peace movement has been opposition to military power, it has always been indispensable, for both ideological and practical reasons, for the peace movement to connect itself to those concerned with power in other formations (Galtung 1988). Indeed, the peace movement that emerged in the latter half of the twentieth century had strong connections to anti- or counter-cultural

movements of the 1960s; it was not simply a movement of anti-militarism, but an extension of anti-establishment attitudes and organizing to include calls for peace (Salomon 1986).

For example, as Rose (2000) has documented, organized labour in the United States supported anti-war measures and organizing as far back as the 1880s, given that labour understood the working classes to disproportionately bear the brunt of military policy. Similarly, the peace movement has overlapped on a transnational scale with women's rights and feminist movements since the mid-nineteenth century (Rupp and Taylor 1999) and, in the 1980s, was underpinned by, and intimately connected to, feminist organizing and the women's rights movement that critiqued traditional and aggressive masculinity while calling for legitimate participation of women in social and political life (Meyer and Whittier 1994). Finally, the peace movement has enjoyed strong relationships with organized environmentalism, particularly since the 1970s and 1980s when emerging organizations like Greenpeace brought together concerns with ecology, nuclear proliferation and global poverty as fundamental to long-term and sustainable peace (Mol 2000).

At the same time, these relationships of solidarity between peace activists and other social movements have been marked by ambivalence, and in some cases even conflict. The phenomenon of enforced military conscription came into existence in Europe in the same era as the Declaration of Human Rights (Galtung 1988). The freedoms promised in this new rights-based social contract were simultaneously understood by some to require military defence and enforcement, a logic that clearly put peace and human rights in an ambivalent relationship (Galtung 1988). Similarly, the peace movement and organized labour have had a tenuous relationship that has served to identify and solidify the often stark class distinctions between the two (Rose 2000). After World War II, the workers' movement in the United States tended to support US military expansion as necessary for creating and maintaining jobs, and viewed the peace movement as a problematically socialist enterprise (Rose 2000). Conversely, during anti-Vietnam protests of the 1960s, many peace activists came to view organized labour as connected to the 'establishment' and therefore as part of the social structures against which they were protesting (Rose 2000). There was even tension in the case of peace activism and women's movements, as feminists in the 1980s called for their place as leaders and actors in peace organizing, not just social and domestic support for the men who had led calls for peace in the early half of the twentieth century (Meyer and Whittier 1994).

Clearly then, the peace movement has connected to other social movements. Still, it is precisely its focus upon questioning the sanctity of military power specifically that has set peace activism apart from other forms of social activism. By questioning the historically sacrosanct notion that the sovereign and/or state should control military activities unilaterally – and that military service was a laudable and even necessary feature of citizenship in order to

protect freedoms and ways of life within modern states – the peace movement succeeded in drawing attention to military power alongside cultural, economic and political power as a central element of social formation and stratification and one that should be subject to democratic processes (Galtung 1988). In historical context, unilateral military power has been one of the last sources of authority and dominance to be targeted by social movement processes and criticized for being undemocratic and oppressive, and it is the peace movement that subjected this form of power to scrutiny.

A further characteristic that applies across the peace movement is the understanding that its various incarnations emerged not simply due to social discontent, but also in response to shifts in the political and social environment that simultaneously demanded and allowed for its organization (Jenkins and Perrow 2003). In other words, the internal characteristics, visions and goals of the peace movement supporting and advocating for pacifism solidified within the political and policy context that made military action a fact of modern life and militarism a significant social and political issue (Meyer 1999). Rather than understood as a strict ideological adherence to pacifism, therefore, the peace movement is more accurately conceptualized as an historic and organized response to the specificities of the political climate. This was perhaps most notable in the mid-twentieth century amidst concerns over the newly identified ‘military/industrial complex’, the term used to describe (and to warn against) the self-supporting relationship between corporate and military interests, particularly in the United States (see Mills 1959). As US President Dwight Eisenhower famously stated in his farewell address of 1961, the ‘... conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry’ was negatively shaping the country at economic, political and even spiritual levels (Fallows 2002, p. 46). As Fallows (2002) argues, Eisenhower’s concern was not simply that the military/industrial complex increased the likelihood of war and military violence, but that it had cemented the US economy into a system whereby the proliferation of arms was profitable and even necessary for economic growth, a trend that continues through to the present day. In this sense, the peace movement was a response not just to war or the threat thereof, but also to the militarization of everyday life.

With these examples of coherence in mind, one of the notable divergences within the peace movement has been the various ways in which its members have attempted to ‘frame’ the issue of peace so as to most effectively influence policy, particularly those of states and their militaries. As Marullo et al (1996) describe, when calling for change, the peace movement has attributed war and violent conflict to several sources: the anarchic structure of international relations, the aggressive behaviour of a small number of nations, and/or the social legitimacy and acceptance of violent problem-solving. In turn, the peace movement has framed their struggle along these lines at different times, depending on the context and the strategy under employ. For example, the

first of these frames – a focus on international relations – was preferred at the beginning of the twentieth century in the era of world wars, whereas by the time that the peace movement had taken to protesting the Vietnam War, the unilateral aggression of the United States was deemed the principle cause of conflict (Marullo et al. 1996). In turn, the third frame that posits violence as the result of a lack of understanding and peaceful problem-solving can be thought of as the most intelligible in the twenty-first century.

In sum, the peace movement has never operated in any social or political isolation, but has always drawn from, and been connected to, other forms of political organizing and resistance. In addition, the peace movement has tended to understand and define peace itself as not only the absence of physical violence against people but also the absence of structures of inequality, broadly defined, and a concomitant promotion of social justice. In this way, the definition of peace embraced within the peace movement has been one based on non-violence but also one that ‘... embodies the view that economic and political injustice is a form of ‘structural violence’ and cannot be called a state of peace’ (Marullo et al. 1996, p. 13, drawing on Galtung 1969). In keeping with the theoretical framework under employ in this book, the general characteristics of the global peace movement can be identified as follows. The collective identity of the peace movement is one of pacifism and belief in and commitment to non-violent means of problem-solving particularly in the face of international conflict and threats to domestic security. The opposition of the peace movement has been directed at the sanctity and normativity of violence, and threats thereof, as a legitimate means of global politics, as well as an opposition to militarism as policy, particularly as institutionalized through national governments, international allies (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO) and supranational organizations. For example, the global peace movement of the 1980s formed around, and was regularly identified by, its opposition to NATO’s infamous 1979 double-track decision that deployed 572 nuclear weapons across Western Europe (Salomon 1986). Even though the goals of the peace movement have varied between calls for transarmamentism (i.e. doing away with the most dangerous weapons, such as nuclear warheads) to disarmamentism, meaning a complete removal of the military (Galtung 1988), the movement has been unified by its calls to reject and resist policies of militarism and violence. In other words, as Salomon (1986) remarked, the peace movement of the 1980s was fundamentally concerned with seeking to alter security policies and challenge the accepted notion of military deterrence. Finally, the totality of the peace movement has been towards a de-militarized, and increasingly democratic geo-politics, one based on negotiation and understanding rather than the utility of the threat of war and the Cold War logic of ‘mutually assured destruction’.

Like most social movements, it is difficult to assess in any absolute terms the actual influence of the peace movement on government policy and

decision-making, or the success of the movement in challenging militarism and threats of war. Meyer (1999) argues that the peace movement did play a role in ending the Cold War by shifting, and ultimately constraining, the political palatability of aggressive military policy, much like social movements had succeeded in making the Vietnam War socially and politically unpopular. The sheer numbers of people participating in the peace movement and demonstrations of the 1980s made it increasingly difficult for leaders of the time, like US President Ronald Reagan and New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange, as well as organizations like NATO, to justify aggressive military policies or to offer these as part of their election platforms. Still, the extent to which the peace movement has made any direct incursion into the end of particular wars or even reductions in military policy is difficult to quantify and remains a topic of ongoing debate and analysis.

It is here though that an important shift needs to be recognized, particularly for its implications for connecting the current peace movement and PMOs to sport and physical activity. As the preceding paragraph shows, an organized and oppositional peace movement still clearly operates and has even remobilized and reinvented itself post-9/11. Yet, some of the most recently organized initiatives calling for peace, particularly those connected to sport, can be viewed as produced and constrained by an institutional, and even populist, move away from political reactions and opposition to violence and militarism and towards 'cultural responses' to the problems of war and violence (see Adams 2000; Mayor 2004; De Rivera 2004; Smith Page 2001). This shift was evident in the conceptualization of, and broad support for, the United Nations' designation of 2000 as the *International Year for the Culture of Peace* and was also seen in UNESCO's development of the *Culture of Peace News Network*, an initiative designed to offer an international repository for people to record and share local peace initiatives (Smith Page 2001). In the broadest terms, these actions were deemed necessary and appropriate steps to begin a paradigm shift from a 'culture of war' to a 'culture of peace' given that global peace efforts at the end of the twentieth century were faced with the realization that they had largely failed to convince national governments to acknowledge or even recognize the extent to which global geo-politics continued to be underpinned by a fundamental culture of war and militarism (Adams 2000).

This failure was particularly significant given the military violence in the Balkans at the time, and further solidified by the attacks of 9/11 and subsequent invasion of Iraq. As a result, a *Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace* was adopted by the United Nations based on eight subject areas: Education, Sustainable development, Human rights, Gender equality, Democratic participation, Understanding and tolerance, Participatory communication, and International peace and security. While social progress in each of these areas as they connect to peace align with the traditional goals of the peace movement, they should also be recognized as signifying a shift in the

orientation of peace-focused social action, away from opposition to powerful institutions of militarism and towards cultural solutions and bases of peace. Smith Page (2001, p. 348) describes this trend in the peace movement:

In many ways, the culture of peace movement reflects the trend within peace research and theory towards a greater emphasis on an intrapersonal interpretation of peace. One can trace in the work of influential writers within the field of peace research a greater tendency to seeking cultural solutions for the problem of war.

Thus, while this call to adopt a culture of peace model as the basis of a new global peace movement aligns with the trends of interconnected social 'movements of movements', the current importance and agency of civil society organizations, and approaches to alter-globalization based on new subjectivities (Pleyers 2010), it also represents a significant shift in the political orientation of global peace movements towards building understanding rather than challenging power and policy. Calls to establish a culture of peace as the basis of anti-war organizing have thus created new challenges and contemporary ambivalences for the peace movement as a resistive practice. For example, Smith Page (2001) draws attention to how a culture of peace model is largely sermonistic in that it focuses attention on self-evident and non-threatening rhetoric at the expense of direct action and challenge. Similarly, and perhaps most importantly, mobilizing a culture of peace model as the basis for new global movements, can be seen to run the risk of offering a poor substitute for criticisms of global capitalism that are arguably more important to the peace movement in the new millennium than ever before. Given that industrial militarism and war in the twenty-first century can be traced directly to renewed forms of national exceptionalism and the violent enforcement of neo-liberal policies on a global scale (Roberts et al. 2003), the culture of peace model has been found wanting:

It can be argued that the culture of peace is very much an individualistic and bourgeoisified approach to peace, looking at how individuals should change their thinking and act more peaceably, and tending to downplay the importance of structural change (Smith Page 2001, p. 350).

This insight has significant implications for the current connections between sport and peace efforts, discussed below.

Nevertheless, while the culture of peace model can be criticized as one-dimensional, liberal or unrealistic, it has come to stand as the basis for much current peace activity and research. For example, De Rivera (2004, p. 546) suggests that the UN's culture of peace model may be 'somewhat simplistic', but he also suggests that the concept's limitation is not its conceptualization or politics but that it lacks a primary measure, namely 'the extent to which there is education for the peaceful resolution of conflict and training for nonviolence'.

He uses this lack as a basis to call for assessments of how and where such peace education is taking place. As the next section demonstrates, much – though certainly not all – of the current mobilization and organization of sport in the service of peace, and the articulations between peace activism and physical culture, tend to embrace this logic of peace education. Particularly given the burgeoning interest in ‘sport for peace’ among civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (see Darnell 2012; Wilson 2012), it is reasonable to argue that the culture of peace model is now hegemonic in structuring the relationship between sport and the peace movement. In the next section, a brief history of sport and the peace movement, from the nineteenth century through to the present day, is offered in order to illustrate this shift.

Connecting sport to the peace movement

Writing in the *International Review for the Sociology of Sport* in 1985, Sven Guldénpfennig posited that the emergence of a new peace movement presented a challenge and a controversy to the social scientific study of sport. He suggested that given recognition of the fundamental social and political changes being called for within the peace movement, support for peace was required from all sectors and institutions of society, including sport. He argued that sportspeople were clearly in support of the peace movement and that the peace movement of the time was influencing understandings of the organization and role of sport in society. The important issue, as he identified it, was whether or not those in a position to have an influence on the organization of sport itself should position sport as separate from the peace movement where it might have some indirect or ‘spillover’ effect, or whether sport should carve out an explicit political mandate in support of the peace movement itself. For Guldénpfennig, the former of these choices was clearly the majority practice in the sporting institutions of the day, though he argued that ultimately, sport should be concerned with both of these approaches.

In this section, the argument is made that the latter of these two understandings of sport in the service of peace and peace activism – in which sport organizations and stakeholders formulate and adopt an explicit political mandate for peace in the tradition of the peace movement – remains in a minority position, though it has changed and even undergone a form of hybridization since Guldénpfennig’s writings more than 25 years ago. While there are undoubtedly contemporary anti-war peace movements and actors that connect to sport in important ways, the majority tendency is still towards the political independence of sport and concomitant belief in ‘spillover’, and in turn, a commitment to the promotion and mobilization of sport for peace education in a way that aligns with recent shifts towards a culture of peace.

Before discussing the current situation, it is important to acknowledge that sport has had a connection to the peace movement since the late 1800s. One of the earliest and most explicit connections of the peace movement to sport can be seen in Pierre de Coubertin's revival of the Olympic Games. Coubertin was directly influenced by his personal and professional engagements with those who were active in the peace movement of the time, notably progressive politician and educator Jules Simon (Wassong and Muller 2007). For Coubertin, the logic of connecting sport to peace was rooted in the positive pedagogical effects of physical education. From his perspective as a political conservative and aristocrat (Loland and Selliaas 2009), Coubertin believed that effective and meaningful education should include sport and the physical, and if administered properly, this kind of educational experience would lead to the production of citizens (albeit limited to white, middle-class men) who committed to peace and led peaceful lives, ideas that were reflected in the emerging peace movement (Quanz 1993; 1994). This relationship between Coubertin and peace activists of the time was co-constituting; not only did Coubertin draw on the peace movement to inform the revival of the Olympics, but his friends and colleagues from the peace movement called for recognition of the burgeoning Olympic movement as an example of the peaceful internationalism for which they were advocating (Quanz 1994).

The peace movement and emergent peace organizations of the late 1800s (such as the Red Cross and Esperanto Movement) that influenced Coubertin most directly were committed to the Enlightenment values of rationality and reason, as well as to human rights and to the sanctity of the modern nation state (Loland and Selliaas 2009). Similarly, Coubertin advocated for sport, in the form of modern Olympism, to be part of the securing of national independence and sovereignty, albeit indirectly (Quanz 1994). This meant that for Coubertin, the modern Olympic Games could contribute to peace, but Olympism as he saw it was not in and of itself, a peace movement (Quanz 1994). Rather, the influence of the peace movement on the Olympic movement can be seen in its decisions to adopt structural models of international peace organizations, to promote 'enlightened patriotism' and to support peace education for young people through sport (Loland and Selliaas 2009, p. 59).

This history suggests that while informed by the peace movement of the late nineteenth century – and while currently self-promoted as a force of and for global peace (see Hoberman 2011) – the Olympic Movement was distinct from more radical pacifist organizing around sport in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, particularly the peaceful ideals attached to and promoted by workers' sports movements. For example, more radical social movements of the time coalesced around the Spartakiade, a socialist Workers' sports event held in Paris in 1934 that attracted 12,000 participants around the world and was dubbed the 'Anti-War and Anti-Fascist Sports Meet' (McQuarrie 2010, p. 398). Further, as we have seen in Chapter 2, the

Workers' Olympics, organized by the Socialist Workers' Sports International beginning in the 1920s, were international sporting events based on socialist and pacifist values, including the 1925 version in Germany held under the banner 'No More War' (Kidd 1996, p. 154). Indeed, these events were not only held in opposition to war, but also to the ways in which sports events like Coubertin's Olympics exacerbated nationalist fervour; in contrast, the Workers' Olympics called for sport in support of international worker solidarity. In sum, while the organized pacifism and the peace movement of the time no doubt informed Coubertin's directions, he did not embrace their agenda in its totality. Rather:

Coubertin felt responsible for a certain pacifistic mood in ways that were more modest and more emotionally effective than rational political pacifism (Quanz 1993, 17).

Beyond Coubertin and the Olympics, the world of sport did connect to the peace movement in its resistive formations throughout the twentieth century, and often did so through the action of famous athletes. Perhaps no example of this is more renowned than that of iconic boxer Muhammad Ali who, in 1966, refused to accept his drafting into military service by the United States government to serve in the Vietnam War. His statement 'Man, I ain't got no quarrel with no Vietcong' became 'one of the most famous phrases of the decade' in the United States. (Zirin 2005, p. 64). Notably, Zirin (2005) reminds that at the time of Ali's declaration, the anti-Vietnam movement in the United States was still in a state of relative infancy. In fact, it would be another year before revolutionaries like Dr Martin Luther King, Jr. would join in the movement denouncing the war. In this way, Ali stands as an important and unique example of sport and athletes *leading* anti-war efforts and the peace movement; as Zirin (2005, p.67) concludes: 'Ali's defiance was far more than a footnote to the (anti-war) movement' (see the discussion of Ali and struggles for human rights in Chapter 4).

Since Ali's initial anti-war stance in 1966, other high-profile athletes have spoken out on social issues, including military incursions in ways that connect to peace and anti-war movements. For example, National Basketball Association player Steve Nash wore a t-shirt to the league's all-star game in 2003 which read 'No War – Shoot for Peace' and his fellow NBA-er Etan Thomas gained significant notoriety for his public speaking – often using slam poetry – between 2005 and 2007 that was highly critical of the US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Similarly, Major League Baseball Player Carlos Delgado delivered his own anti-war protests in 2004 by refusing to stand for the playing of the US National Anthem and God Bless America during baseball games. While these are somewhat individualized example of sport-related anti-war activism, they do illustrate the ways in which peace activism has found its way into the world of sport and suggest a legacy of anti-war athletes started by Ali.

Calls for peace also connected to twentieth-century sport in the organization of sports events and calls for peace through these events. For example, in the era of Olympic boycotts between Cold War rivals, during which the United States refused to attend the Moscow Games in 1980 and the Soviet Union reciprocated by refusing to participate in Los Angeles, 1984, media mogul and CNN founder Ted Turner created The Goodwill Games as a way to ‘. . . ease tensions during the Cold War through friendly athletic competition between nations’ (goodwillgames.com). First held in 1986 in Moscow, the Goodwill Games were staged five more times before ceasing operations, with the final version of the event staged in Brisbane in 2001 (Horne and Whannel 2012). Turner promoted the event as an Olympic-style sporting contest designed to build positive relations amidst international tensions and threats of war, and some analysts have attributed the non-proliferation treaty between the United States and Soviet Union, at least in part, to the diplomatic ‘thaw’ that the Games created (Bastian 1987). At the same time, the Goodwill Games were also clearly a tool of public relations and media promotion (L’Etang et al. 2007), features that call into question its organic or substantive connections to the global peace movement.

Still, the culture and organization of sport continues to offer a social and political site or node around which the anti-war and peace movement has organized, demonstrated and brought attention to their claims and issues in the new millennium. Given the global scale of these peace activities, and the extent to which they can be thought to overlap with other social movements, they can indeed be considered examples of contemporary ‘alter-globalization’. For example, during the international torch relay ahead of the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, protesters in India used the relay as an opportunity to call for a peaceful resolution to the ongoing Chinese occupation of Tibet and the exile of the Dalai Lama. As Majumdar and Mehta (2010) demonstrate, local manifestations of the movement in Delhi leveraged the image of peace symbolized by the Olympic flame – an image propagated by the IOC itself – as a platform to call for recognition of the Dalai Lama as a peace leader, to agitate for Tibetan independence, and to promote the global peace movement more generally. Their actions demonstrated the positioning of the Olympic flame – and Olympism more broadly – as a floating signifier of peace. That is, while the IOC has been roundly criticized for perpetuating hollow and apolitical commitments to peace that are based on ‘amoral universalism’ (see Hoberman 2011), demonstrators in Delhi showed the peace-focused discursive legacy of Olympism to be one open to their use and co-optation. In fact, the protests led the Chinese government to extend discussions with the Dalai Lama’s envoys, a result, in Majumdar and Mehta’s words (2010, p. 105): ‘made possible wholly by the global symbolism of the Olympic flame, (and which) once again helped underscore the potential of this global peace movement, often unknowingly passed off as a simple sports competition’.

Crucially, then, this analysis demonstrates the extent to which the agency of citizens and actors – including those within alter-globalization movements – remains crucial to the ways in which sport connects to peace in the new millennium. While current forms of political and cultural power coalesce around sport in ways that support militarism and nationalist fervours (see Butterworth 2012; Kelly 2012; Scherer and Koch 2010; Schimmel 2012), sport also continues to offer an opportunity for peace activism in a range of national and cultural contexts. For example, national and international media have promoted cricket tests between India and Pakistan as a nationalist competition, potentially perpetuating the militaristic tension between the bordering nations, but research shows that there has also been enough common interest in cricket among the people of the two countries to resist these emotional trappings and spread a sense of goodwill and internationalism (Bandyopadhyay 2008). On the one hand, this kind of analysis demonstrates the seemingly interminable ambivalence between sport, war and peace (see Gldenpfennig 1985; Shields and Bredemeier 1996; Donnelly 2011). On the other hand, it demonstrates the extent to which sport offers a site at which the contemporary peace movement can organize in resistance to the militarism of everyday life.

Recent examples from Canadian ice hockey and British football further illustrate this phenomenon. While hockey in Canada has offered a cultural site for the political legitimization of Canadian military policy in recent years (Scherer and Koch 2010), it has simultaneously constituted a focus for the peace movement and peace activists. On 8 December 2010, a group calling itself ‘Hockey Fans for Peace’ published a statement in *New Socialist* magazine, and launched a Facebook page, calling for recognition of the public opposition to Canadian military action in Afghanistan. They also called directly on the National Hockey League (NHL) and hockey journalists and broadcasters to end ‘the practice of using hockey games and broadcasts to promote the view that full support for the war is the only acceptable position for any genuine hockey fan’. Much of their attention was focused on bombastic Canadian hockey broadcaster Don Cherry who routinely uses his television programme ‘Coaches Corner’ on the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation as a pulpit to recognize Canadian servicemen and women. Hockey Fans for Peace co-founder Kimball Cariou subsequently wrote that ‘the psychological aim of this strategy is to sow divisions among Canadians, particularly among the solid majority who want an early return home for the troops in Afghanistan’ (Cariou 2011). As such, hockey in Canada became a site for peace activists to draw attention to military power and call for reform.

Further, in 2011, when a NHL franchise returned to the city of Winnipeg – and adopted the city’s traditional nickname of ‘Jets’ – the club unveiled military-themed logos and uniforms at a Canadian Forces Base. This also became a source and site of protest for anti-war activists in Canada, who drew

connections between the choices made by the club and the policies of foreign military action taken in recent years by Canada's Conservative government. Writing on the Canadian alternative news website *rabble.ca* (26 July 2011), union activist Tyler Shipley drew attention, and called for resistance, to sport as a site of militarization of Canadian life:

the team's new owner made no secret of the fact that the logo was designed in consultation with the Department of National Defence. In fact, Mark Chipman's comments in the unveiling of the new logo had more to do with the air force than the hockey team. He noted in the press conference that he only felt comfortable with the "Jets" name when he determined that he could re-brand the team around the RCAF.

Such protests against the militarism of the Jets – and of sport more broadly – drew support from the broader activist community as well. John K. Samson of the Winnipeg-based rock band, The Weakerthans, declared his opposition to the Jets military theme in a magazine interview (*prairiedog* 2012):

I think the logo and the name are atrocious. I think it's just a terrible, terrible mistake. And I'll continue to say that. I can't understand why they caved to the pressure of a bullying minority in the city. Or even maybe a bullying majority who wanted to call it the Jets and then tie themselves to this awful war machine to have as a logo. I just think it's a terrible idea.

Similar protests have occurred in the United Kingdom, where sports like football (soccer) have lent institutional, financial and discursive support to the military's participation in the War on Terror in ways that have contributed to the 'hero-ification of British militarism' (Kelly 2012, p. 10). For example, the Football League's official charity partner in 2009–10 was *Help for Heroes* (an organization discussed below), and all English and Scottish Premier League clubs have worn shirts embroidered with specially designed Earl Haig poppies during Remembrance Day weekend matches (Kelly 2012). In response, supporters of Glasgow Celtic FC protested this increasing connection between professional football (soccer) and state-led militarism by distributing leaflets at matches that described civilian deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan amidst participation by the British military (Kelly 2012). These supporter groups have also refused to enter the stadium during Remembrance Day services and, in 2010, unveiled a banner during a match reading 'Your deeds would shame all the devils in hell: Ireland, Iraq, Afghanistan. No bloodstained poppy on our hoops' (Kelly 2012, p. 11).

In the cases of Don Cherry and the Winnipeg Jets in Canada, and Celtic FC in the United Kingdom, sport – and in particular the iconic national sports of Canadian hockey and British football – has offered cultural hubs at and through which the peace movement, connected to other social activist

causes, could protest and resist state-led militarism. These activists protested in a manner clearly reminiscent of the twentieth-century peace movement. When considered alongside the Olympic-focused peace protests in Delhi, these activities suggest that amidst alter-globalization, sport continues to offer an important cultural repository for the contemporary peace movement to draw attention to its causes, crystallize and disseminate its anti-war messages, and agitate for the democratization of military policy. These opportunities for resistance are important to recognize given that sport still connects to, and even increasingly features in, the securing of state-sanctioned militarism in the twenty-first century. In addition to the British example of football and the War on Terror, the incredible popularity of sports like American football as overseen by the National Football League continues to provide opportunities not only to celebrate, but also simultaneously to legitimize and de-politicize, the US military-led 'War on Terror' (Schimmel 2012) and the deification of fallen war heroes like Pat Tillman in ways that secure the nobility of war and violence (Butterworth 2012; King 2008).

It is also against this backdrop that peace movements and anti-war protesters in sport regularly face significant backlash, criticism or dismissal of their message. For example, Celtic FC officials stated that the fans who led anti-war protests had 'embarrassed' and 'tarnished' the club and Scottish journalist James Traynor called for these fans to be silenced (Kelly 2012, p. 11). In a more extreme fashion, Sunderland football player James McClean received death threats via twitter in response to his decision during the 2012 season not to wear the club shirt that featured a poppy (Fifield 2012). McLean's refusal to wear the poppy – a statement against support for state-sponsored militarism and military action – led to him being booed on the pitch and also led Cody Lachey, a former British soldier, to tweet '... he deserves to be shot dead + body dragged past the cenotaph!! (Fifield 2012)' Similarly, in the case of the Winnipeg Jets, hockey journalists routinely dismissed and/or denigrated anti-war protests on the grounds that they were politically biased, misinformed or problematically mixing sport with politics. Winnipeg Sun columnist Kevin Engstrom accused Shipley of 'pathetic pandering' while Engstrom's colleague Tom Broderick encouraged readers to depoliticize the issue, writing: 'This is a hockey jersey. It's not parliamentary procedure and it's not constitutional wrangling ... So don't sweat it. Just enjoy the hockey'. Such responses from journalists call attention to the resistive dimensions of the peace movement, even in their contemporary forms. Whereas positioning sport for peaceful education and tolerance (discussed further below) rarely, if ever, produces a cultural or political backlash, anti-war activism such as that focused on hockey in Canada or football in the United States questions the very sanctity and normativity of everyday life as it is manifest through both sport and militarism. Such protests are always likely to produce a hostile response or counterattack.

Sport and peace education

The examples listed above of anti-war activism coalesced around sport have been accompanied by an increasingly institutionalized relationship between sport and contemporary peace efforts. As described above, the burgeoning support for 'a culture of peace model' is now evident in its connections to sport, particularly in the recent organizing of various 'sport for peace' initiatives. This shift is discussed next.

Within contemporary efforts connecting sport to peace, there has been a significant and recurring focus on issues of reconciliation and social cohesion in places of violent conflict or in post-war settings. For example, using post-Apartheid South Africa as a case study, Höglund and Sundberg (2008) recently identified four processes of peace and reconciliation through sport: symbolic acts, fair representations through sport policies, resistance to stereotypes and individual development. In each of these processes, the focus is on building inclusion – at an individual or collective level – as opposed to resistance to militarism and violence.

This approach echoes efforts that have drawn on sport as a form of peace education from a social psychological perspective. This perspective has tended to recognize the ambivalence between sport, peace and war – namely that sport can exacerbate violence and aggression as much as support peace and anti-violence – and to use this ambivalence as a platform to call for reforms to sport. By this logic, sport should be constructed in such a way as to support peaceful co-existence based on unifying values that support a positive social psychology (Shields and Bredemeier 1996; Schwebel 1996). This logic also extends to the communication of sport itself, with recent calls to recognize the media construction and dissemination of sport as popular 'discursive opportunities' for the promotion of peace and understanding (Rivenburgh 2009). It is not the importance or even the effectiveness of these approaches at issue here, but rather (a) the extent to which the logic of sport in support of reconciliation and understanding diverges from the resistive principles of the peace movement, and (b) whether this has become the preferred, or even hegemonic, political approach to connecting peace and sport.

Indeed, it is reasonable to argue that the preeminent sport and peace organizations in the new millennium fit into this category of promoting a culture of peace, rather than political opposition to war and militarism. There are several organizations and initiatives consistent with this general mandate, including *Athletes United for Peace*, *Peace Players International*, *Football for Peace*, *Soccer for Peace*, the *Soccer for Peace Foundation* and *Fight for Peace*, among others. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyse each of these organizations, they all align with the general mandate of using sport to foster peaceful relations rather than opposing military action. One of the highest profile organizations in this field is *Peace and Sport*,

a non-governmental organization formed in 2007 by Olympic Medallist Joel Bouzou. Based in Monaco, and operating under the patronage of Prince Albert II, *Peace and Sport* works to mobilize sport towards the building of sustainable peace throughout the world. To do so, 'it promotes the practice of structured sport and sporting values to educate young generations and help foster social stability, reconciliation and dialogue between communities' (Peace and Sport 2011). The organization defines sustainable peace as not just the absence of war and conflict, but also a process and result that is taught and learnt. According to *Peace and Sport*, sport offers a metaphor and set of guidelines for building sustainable peace because 'it is a tool for dialogue, brotherhood and respect that transcends political, social, racial and religious differences that are often at the heart of conflicts in this world'.

Peace and Sport is a high-profile example of the cultural turn in the peace movement and peace theorizing, away from direct and critical activism against military policy and the state, and towards a more inclusive, less politicized vision and version of peace activism. Indeed, the organization celebrates its position in Monaco as illustrative of its general political neutrality in geo-political terms. The extent to which sport has been taken up by and within these kinds of peace organizations and this approach to peace building is notable given that sport has regularly been recognized for its ability and reputation to exacerbate global and international conflict (Donnelly 2011). To some degree then, it is likely that this coupling of sport to the cultural turn in peace education and a culture of peace discourse is part of an attempt to reform sport in ways that make it more amenable to peace promotion, such as that called for in the social psychology literature and discussed by Gldenpfennig (1985) in response to the peace movement of the 1980s.

Another prominent example of the logic of peace education and efforts to reform sport is the recent activity around the Olympic Truce. Based on the ancient Greek tradition of *Ekecheiria* that called for warring city states to suspend violence so that athletes could travel to and compete in Olympic competition, the modern Olympic Truce has called for a cessation of war and violent conflict, even if only temporarily, during the Olympic fortnight (Burleson 2012). Supported by a 1993 non-binding UN resolution calling for its recognition and observation, the Olympic Truce has been credited, for example, with a delay in the implementation of Operation Desert Fox in Iraq by the US Armed Forces during the 1998 Nagano Olympics, an effect that has led some to conclude that while the Olympic Truce cannot enforce peace, it may increase the chances of peace becoming the preferred option or choice of individuals and governments (Briggs et al., cited in Burleson 2012). Notably, Burleson (2012, p. 805) connects the logic and recent momentum enjoyed by the Olympic Truce to the cultural turn in peace activism as promoted and solidified by UNESCO and the UN's 1999 Culture of Peace Resolution which served to set the current agenda for peace education.

A further example of this trend in peace promotion that connects to sport is *Help for Heroes*, a registered charity in the United Kingdom that raises money in support of injured service men and women. According to its website, *Help for Heroes*: ‘... provides direct, practical support to wounded, injured and sick Service personnel, veterans, and their families. . . through grants to individuals and other Service charities, capital build projects and support for life at our four Recovery Centres across the UK’.

Its connections to sport can be seen not only through the support it receives from sporting organizations like the Football League in the United Kingdom, but also in the money *Help for Heroes* channels to partners like the Combined Service Disabled Ski Team to provide equipment and training for former soldiers to take up skiing. Notably, and in keeping with the cultural turn in peace activism, *Help for Heroes* is explicit about its neutrality when approaching the political dimensions of war: ‘We don’t care about the rights and wrongs of war but we believe that if young men and women are prepared to volunteer to serve our country on our behalf, and are hurt while doing so, they deserve our support’. In this sense, *Help for Heroes* illustrates a strategic commitment to transcend the political resistance to war traditionally exemplified by the peace movement, and to move towards an inclusive practice of peace activism, one that can solicit and secure the support of people and communities across the political spectrum regardless of their views on military policy and its effects.

It is possible to read this cultural turn in sport and peace activism as illustrative of contemporary alter-globalization in that rather than rejecting globalization outright, organizations like *Peace and Sport*, *Help for Heroes* and advocates of the Olympic Truce seek reforms and changes to globalization and its effects (see Harvey et al. 2009; Wilson 2012) and do so by creating and drawing upon global networks of various actors interested in organizing sport towards peace and building new subjectivities in and through the sporting experience (see Pleyers 2010). To this end, *Peace and Sport* draws on the opportunities and tools afforded by globalization, to work towards peace building, conflict resolution and tolerance and understanding. It thus operates, to a degree, as a social movement. In Wilson’s (2012, pp. 94–5) recent theoretical appraisal of sport and social movements interested in peace (broadly defined), he suggests that it is still reasonable to recognize social movements and their success by their ability to mobilize resources, secure political acceptance and influence, and effectively frame issues, usually through the work of ‘social movement entrepreneurs’. By this logic, *Peace and Sport* constitutes a social movement, exemplified by Bouzou’s capacity to draw attention to the role that sport can play in peace building, and the success of the organization in mobilizing resources amidst a broader desire for sport to play a broader social role (see Coalter 2007; Darnell 2012).

The cultural turn in the relationship between sport and peace is also reflected in the strong influence of ‘global civil society’ actors and institutions

that now support the relationship between sport and peace (Giulianotti 2011a and 2011b). As Giulianotti (2011b, p. 211) describes it, the term 'global civil society' recognizes and illustrates the global dimensions of actor networks that work towards improved conditions for humanity. Such actors can be from different types of organizations and often interact with each other in complex ways. In this sense, the social complexity and political challenges of mobilizing sport in support of the peace movement appear, in the new millennium, to be somewhat mitigated by a common commitment to the cultural turn that makes such work less politically polarizing. In this sense, amidst the transnational challenges of trying to organize sport as a meaningful and effective form of peace building, an apparent consensus has been reached to do so through peace education and inclusive practices, rather than through resistance to state-led militarism characteristic of the twentieth-century peace movement. As stated throughout this chapter, this cultural model of mobilizing sport for peace-building and rehabilitation based on notions of inclusivity that largely transcend resistive politics is qualitatively different from the NSMs focused on peace in the twentieth century and likely signals a shift in the political orientation of contemporary peace activism connected to and through sport.

This shift requires, then, an updated understanding of the politics of the peace movement as they connect to sport. The cultural turn in peace seems to embrace a sense of deliberative democracy – which strives to include as many people as possible – rather than agonistic democracy which is concerned with constructing a space of and for disagreement (see Macgilchrist and Böhmig 2012). Following Coy et al's (2008) argument that contemporary peace organizing is informed by both past discourses and contemporary political events, in current connections between the peace movement and sport, and despite ongoing and seemingly interminable violent incursions in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, the discourse of peace education has proved attractive in the face of the failed legacy of opposition and resistance to military power. Further, if social organizing and protest cycles in the peace movement are connected to broader political processes and the structures and spaces of opportunities to organize (see Meyer 1993 and 1999), then the trend towards sport focused peace education is illustrative of current opportunities, both stable and dynamic. That is, current organizing and theorizing about peace results in civil society leadership and a goal of building consensus, not making enemies, socially or politically. This logic clearly informs decisions currently made by many sport organizations that are committed to peace-building, peace education and conflict resolution but not to critiques of military power that could put such organizations in an explicitly politicized oppositional position.

At the least, though, it is reasonable to conclude that it is now more popular, acceptable and palatable to promote peaceful inclusion through sport than to call for a commitment to anti-war principles in the tradition of the global peace movement. As Cunningham and Regan (2011) have argued, it is less

politically palatable for athletes to speak out about war than it is for them to lend their names to causes that do less to challenge the dominant logic of the global neo-liberal era. If this is the case, then it is important to note that the historical legacies of iconic anti-war athletes like Muhammad Ali have been co-opted into the mainstream of global culture and capital (Zirin 2005) in ways that make it difficult to recall the extent to which these sporting figures used their popularity and profile to challenge the undemocratic militarism of everyday life. This is similar to the cultural incorporation of human rights struggles into the dominant sporting culture as described by Hartmann (2003) (and discussed in Chapter 4). Against the cultural turn in peace-building, it appears that the peace movement may have been co-opted into the dominant culture and organization of sport, as well as vice versa.